

Are Nonvoters Dissatisfied or Just Disengaged?¹

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Abstract

The question of how to best convert nonvoters into voters is one that continues to plague civic organizations and political campaigns. Many feel that distrust and anger toward government must be part of what keeps voters from participating, since trust is low and turnout is low. We test this idea using data from statewide surveys conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC). The results suggest that nonvoters are actually somewhat more trusting of government, even independent of political interest. This finding is not robust to further statistical controls, but no analysis suggests that higher trust is associated with higher turnout. This suggests rethinking strategies for drawing these non-voters more consistently into the electorate.

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The 2014 midterm elections saw historically low voter turnout nationally, with only about 36 percent of eligible voters casting ballots. It is common to blame this low participation on a lack of trust in America's government or elected political class. The logic is sensible: why bother voting if every election seems to produce a government concerned with protecting someone else's interests? More to the point, the consequences are important: if such feelings of distrust are keeping potential voters at home, then some form of governmental reform may be the solution to drawing them back in.

In this paper we explore distrust as a cause of low turnout using survey data from California. Are those Californians who are least trusting of government, least approving of elected officials, and generally less satisfied with the status quo more likely to abstain from voting? Contrary to much conventional wisdom that expects trust to play an important role, we find that California's nonvoters are, if anything, marginally *more* trusting of government than its voters. A far stronger correlate of turnout is simple *engagement*: does the respondent have any interest in politics in the first place? And while it is certainly possible that distrust drives disengagement, the effect of trust withstands controls for interest. These findings suggest altering the strategy for boosting turnout. Reforming the system to increase trust is not a promising way to increase participation.

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If anything, we need to break the link between turnout and trust and understand better why voters are disengaged despite, not because of, how they feel about government.

Declining Trust and Turnout

The decline of trust and satisfaction with government in the United States since the mid-1960s has been affirmed and explored by numerous scholars, and at one time qualified as one of the most hotly debated topics in political science (Miller 1974, Citrin 1974, Hetherington 1999). Since many signs at the time also suggested a decline in voter turnout, it was natural to wonder if the two trends were related. But early studies in the trust literature found only a limited connection. To the extent that effects could be identified, they were often in the expected direction, with higher trust associated with higher turnout (Citrin 1974, Shaffer 1981). But the effects were small enough that their importance could largely be discounted. Measures of a voter's interest in politics and sense that participation mattered—so-called “external efficacy”—were generally much more closely associated with turnout than were measures of trust in government (Abramson and Aldrich 1982, Miller 1980). More recent studies have mostly confirmed these early conclusions, and at times within a more robust multiple regression framework (Uhlaner 1989, Teixeira 1992).

There have been some dissenters from this broader conclusion. Looking at differences within the nonvoter groups in the 1990 Senate elections, Ragsdale and Rusk (1993) identified five unique profiles of nonvoters: political ignorance, indifference, selective awareness, dissatisfaction, and conditional inactivity. Of these five nonvoter profiles, Ragsdale and Rusk found that the largest group of nonvoters fell into the dissatisfaction profile. Notably, these dissatisfied nonvoters demonstrated higher levels of political awareness and were more informed on the political races than other nonvoter groups.

In the two decades since, however, there has been almost no effort to update the original conclusions of this literature. This omission is all the more surprising since the relevant indicators of democratic health—turnout and trust—remain mired at comparatively low levels. The turnout problem was especially visible in the 2014 election, when turnout hit lows not seen in a midterm since the depths of World War II. Moreover, recent research by the Pew Research Center has found that trust in the federal government is low across demographic groups, with only modest differences (Doherty et al. 2015). Few Americans believe the government is run for the benefit of all the people. Indeed, as Doherty et al. highlight, “The belief that government is run by a few big interests spans all demographic and partisan groups” (p. 35). In addition to these more concrete metrics, the surprising rise of outsider candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders offers hints that faith in American government has reached a dangerously low tipping point. While the success of these outsiders has depended on support from those who turned out to vote, it seems reasonable to think that those who decided *not* to vote might be even more disaffected with the status quo. It is therefore worth revisiting the conclusions of the earlier research to see if anything has changed.

California Voters, Nonvoters, and Attitudes towards Government

California offers a good test case for a number of reasons. California's turnout in 2014 fell below the national mean—only 31 percent of eligible residents and 42 percent of registered voters cast a ballot in the fall election—and by many measures has been falling for some time

(McGhee and Krimm 2016). At the same time, trust in government in California is as low as anywhere. The state has been actively tinkering with its political system in the hopes of turning these numbers around, adopting a “top two” primary and an independent redistricting commission partly in the hopes that they would restore some faith in the system and increase turnout. The link between trust and turnout is at least facially plausible in the Golden State: indeed, when voting eligible but unregistered California residents were asked why they have not registered to vote, a plurality of 30 percent cited some version of a lack of trust or confidence in government or politics (Baldassare et al. 2015). Finally, understanding turnout is arguably more important for California than for many other states. California’s populist political system stands virtually alone in the number of elected offices and the degree to which key policy questions are decided at the ballot box through the initiative process. If turnout matters, it matters in California.

That said, while a lack of trust is prevalent among the eligible unregistered population, it is also common among voters. Indeed, the initiative process itself has frequently produced results that suggest voters have a lack of trust in government and elected officials (Baldassare 2002). California’s famous Proposition 13 property tax limitation measure exemplified this lack of trust by strictly binding the hands of future governments on tax policy. Similarly, Proposition 98 in 1988 displayed a lack of voter confidence that government would protect spending for public schools, mandating instead that a designated portion of the state budget be dedicated to that expense. Both initiatives are now enshrined in the California constitution. In his assessment of California constitutionalism, Griffin argues that “citizens are more likely to favor direct democracy when they distrust politicians and how the government works (or appears to work)” (p. 552, 2009).

Thus, there are reasons to believe both that trust might be especially low among those who do not vote, and that it might be equally pervasive across the electorate. Moreover, the fact that this question has not been examined in decades raises questions about whether the original conclusions of a null effect still hold. California will be our preliminary testing ground for this critical update.

Data and Methods

To explore these questions, we use data from the 2012 through 2014 waves of the Public Policy Institute of California’s statewide survey. The primary mission of the survey is to measure opinions of California adults on the key policy questions of the day, so the survey’s target population is not the electorate but all Californians age 18 or older. It is not a survey of registered voters and does not have validated turnout: rather it is a random digit dial sample of telephone numbers, both cell phones and landlines, with around 1,700 to 2,000 respondents in each survey, weighted to a variety of census demographics to account for nonresponse. The survey uses likely voter screens to identify its voter population for elections-related questions, and the last survey is conducted in the weeks prior to Election Day.

Given the nature of the survey, our dependent variable is not a direct measure of participation in any given election, but a *propensity* to vote in a more general sense. In using this measure, we accept that many factors determine participation in any given election, including the candidates who are running and the issues that are discussed. But individuals still have a broader tendency that determines likely participation across multiple elections. We measure this broad tendency in two different ways. The first is through self-reported propensity to vote. The survey asks respondents “How often would you say you vote—always, nearly always, part of the time, seldom,

or never?” Because it is a self-report, this measure allows for individual variation in vote propensity outside the classic demographic factors. However, as with any self-report of turnout, it is also likely to be inflated toward higher participation as respondents seek to appear more civic-minded than they will actually turn out to be. Ironically, the result may be a measure with lower variance than the actual turnout in the election.

Our second measure of turnout propensity seeks to avoid this social desirability bias by swinging entirely in the other direction and assigning each respondent a propensity based on the demographic correlates in actual elections. To generate this propensity score, we estimate the following multilevel logit model with the combined California voter registration files from the data firm Political Data, Inc. for the 2012 and 2014 general elections:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\mathbf{X}_i\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_{j[i]})$$

$$\alpha_j \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{county}}^2)$$

for the i th registrant, where y is coded 1 for a registrant who voted in the election and 0 otherwise, \mathbf{X} is a matrix of covariates with $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ a vector of corresponding coefficients, and α is a set of $j = 1, \dots, 58$ random county offsets with mean zero and variance estimated from the data. Our covariates include age, gender, ethnicity, home ownership, naturalized status, partisan registration, and whether the election was a midterm or not.² We use this model to generate a propensity score that estimates the probability that each respondent in the survey data is a voter in each election. The propensity score from this model has a mean of 0.68 and standard deviation of 0.21. It correlates well with the self-reported propensity to vote, though it likely overstates propensity for those with self-reports that are very low³ (see Appendix A for comparison). It is worth noting that, apart from the obvious methodological differences between these two measures, they also capture slightly different concepts: the self-report is phrased in terms of one’s long-term tendencies, while the predicted propensity is based on turnout in two specific elections (the fall general in 2012 and 2014). If they produce similar numbers despite all these differences we can be more confident in the results.

With these self-reported and imputed vote propensities, we test several possibilities. First, we explore whether those who are more trusting of government on several items from the traditional trust battery (Citrin 1974) also have a higher propensity to vote. We then compare those results

² This model is fairly effective at predicting out-of-sample, with an average 10-fold cross-validation Brier score of 0.19, compared to 0.21 for a null model that assumes the mean turnout propensity for all respondents. We tested a variety of more flexible k nearest neighbor models, but none outperformed this logit specification.

³ It is difficult to precisely validate respondents’ self-reports, but they seem too generous based on turnout history in the voter registration file. Only about 2% of survey respondents claimed to “never” vote, but fully 15% of registrants in 2014 had failed to vote in all of the fall general elections since 2000 for which they were registered at their current address. Similarly, about 60% of respondents claimed to “always” vote, but the registration file suggests the number is about 24%. The registration file numbers necessarily omit all elections prior to the last time a person registered (or re-registered) to vote, so they are based on only a subset of the elections that many registrants have participated in. That means they likely overstate the number of registrants who never vote and understate the number who always vote. Nonetheless, the basic point that the survey responses overstate participation is likely correct.

to a similar analysis for a question about interest in politics. Is one concept more clearly correlated with turnout than the other?

Results

The PPIC statewide survey includes a question relating to general trust in state government (How much of the time do you think you can trust the state government in Sacramento to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?) and a question relating to general trust in the federal government (How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington today to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?). As evident in Table 1, a comparison of mean imputed vote propensity and mean self-reported voting frequency across responses to the question on trust in state government shows significantly lower mean scores among those with the most trust in state government (respondents answering “just about always”). We find similar results in a comparison of mean scores across trust in the federal government. Moreover, we also find similar lower mean imputed vote propensity scores and mean self-reported voting frequency among other items in the battery of state and federal trust questions (see Appendix B). These initial findings suggest that California registered voters who are most trusting in government are less likely to turn out to vote.

Unsurprisingly, as presented in Table 2, a comparison of mean propensity and mean self-reported voting frequency across interest in politics shows significantly higher mean scores among those with the higher levels of interest. This suggests that engagement as measured by political interest may have stronger relationship to turnout than trust in government.

It is possible that those with lower trust are also more interested in politics, in which case the independent correlation between trust and turnout may be minimal or nonexistent. For our purposes here, establishing the precise causal relationship between trust and interest is less important than confirming that trust has some correlation with turnout separate from the apparently stronger relationship between interest and turnout in Table 2.⁴ To test this idea, we regressed our measures of turnout on both trust and interest. To ensure we had the most robust measure of trust possible, we carried out a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to identify and compute scores for the factors underlying the battery of federal and state trust related questions included in the PPIC statewide survey. A PCA was run on six questions that measured trust in state and federal government (see Appendix C for items included).⁵ Confirming the suspicion that motivated this portion of the analysis, this factor score and the political interest question are modestly but negatively correlated ($r=-0.12$), indicating that those who are more trusting are also less interested in politics. Thus, it is worth testing the relative correlations of each. Moreover, both trust and interest might reflect other factors more causally distant from turnout. For example, Republicans are

⁴ Those who feel less trusting may feel the need to pay closer attention to politics, those who pay closer attention may become less trusting, or other variables might determine both jointly.

⁵ PCA was deemed suitable as the correlation matrix showed that all variables had at least one correlation coefficient greater than 0.3. Moreover, the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure was 0.765 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < .0005$), indicating that the data was likely factorizable. PCA revealed only one component with an eigenvalue greater than one and which explained 49.8% of the total variance. Only one component was retained. The interpretation of the data was consistent with the trust attitudes the battery of questions was designed to measure with the loading of trust items on component 1. Component loadings are presented in Appendix D.

Table 1. Mean Voting Propensity and Mean Voting Frequency by Trust in State and Federal Government

	State Trust				Federal Trust			
	none of the time <i>n</i> = 796	only some of the time <i>n</i> = 5395	most of the time <i>n</i> = 1883	just about always <i>n</i> = 317	none of the time <i>n</i> = 541	only some of the time <i>n</i> = 3842	most of the time <i>n</i> = 1045	just about always <i>n</i> = 197
Imputed voting propensity	.67 _a	.64 _b	.58 _c	.55 _c	.67 _a	.66 _a	.61 _b	.55 _c
Self-reported voting frequency	.90 _a	.84 _b	.83 _b	.83 _b	.87 _a	.85 _a	.82 _b	.83 _{a,b}

Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances. Self-reported voting frequency based on responses to the question “How often would you say you vote—always, nearly always, part of the time, seldom, or never?” and coded from 0 to 1, ranging from 0 – never to 1 – always.

1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.

2. Cell counts in some subtables are not integers. They were rounded to the nearest integers before performing pairwise comparisons.

Source: Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey 2012–2014; Political Data, Inc.

Table 2. Mean Voting Propensity and Mean Voting Frequency by Interest in Politics

	Interest in politics			
	none <i>n</i> = 327	only a little <i>n</i> = 1809	a fair amount <i>n</i> = 3708	a great deal <i>n</i> = 2642
Imputed voting propensity	.50 _a	.57 _b	.63 _c	.68 _d
Self-reported voting frequency	.56 _a	.74 _b	.87 _c	.94 _d

Note: Values in the same row and not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances. Self-reported voting frequency based on responses to the question “How often would you say you vote—always, nearly always, part of the time, seldom, or never?” and coded from 0 to 1, ranging from 0 – never to 1 – always.

1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row using the Bonferroni correction.

2. Cell counts in some subtables are not integers. They were rounded to the nearest integers before performing pairwise comparisons.

Source: Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey 2012–2014; Political Data, Inc.

Table 3. Multiple Linear Regression of Self-Reported Vote Propensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Constant	0.845*** (0.005)	.523*** (.022)	.357*** (.044)
Trust Factor Score	-0.013*** (0.003)	-.007*** (.003)	-.002 (.003)
Interest in politics	-	.109*** (.007)	.084*** (.007)
African American	-	-	.009 (.019)
Asian American	-	-	-.046*** (.022)
Latino	-	-	.036*** (.016)
Other/multiple race	-	-	-.038 (.029)
Democrat	-	-	.055*** (.014)
Republican	-	-	.050*** (.016)
Other Party	-	-	-.001 (.032)
Some high school	-	-	-.058*** (.026)
High school graduate	-	-	-.035*** (.017)
Some college	-	-	-.005 (.012)
Post-graduate degree	-	-	.008 (.014)
Age	-	-	.003*** (.000)
Homeowner	-	-	.040*** (.013)
Born in the US	-	-	.028 (.019)
Income	-	-	.009*** (.003)
Male	-	-	.003 (.010)
Midterm	-	-	-.004 (.014)
Off-year	-	-	-.004 (.012)
Total N	4708	4691	4107
Adjusted R^2	0.0096	.1487	.2469
Std. Error of Estimate	0.234	.217	.200

Note: Cell entries are coefficients and standard errors from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is self-reported vote propensity, with higher values for a greater self-reported likelihood of voting.

Source: Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey, 2012–2014.

generally more likely to vote but less trusting of government, while Latinos are the opposite: less likely to vote but more trusting of government. If these more fundamental factors are explaining the relationship, it would suggest that distrust in government is not causing higher participation but rather standing in for other factors that do.

Table 3 shows the results of first controlling for political interest in a regression and then also controlling for a wide range of demographics.⁶ The results of these regressions can be found in the first column of Table 3.⁷ Controlling for political interest alone does not eliminate the negative correlation between trust and turnout, but it does attenuate it somewhat. However, once demographic factors are also controlled, the relationship between trust and turnout disappears (though it maintains its negative sign).

As a confirmation, we also regressed the imputed score on a series of control variables. This analysis requires more caution, since the variables we are controlling for are themselves part of the model that produced the imputation. Thus, it is impossible to control for all of them at once, as with the self-report in Table 3. Instead, we controlled for one set of variables at a time. The effect is equivalent to purging the imputed turnout score of the influence of that variable to ensure that it alone does not explain the correlations we find. (Each of these models also controls for political interest, which was not part of the imputation.) We have reported the results with the greatest effects on the trust coefficient in Table 4, with the full results reported in the Appendix.⁸ The findings in Table 4 leave a negative relationship between trust and turnout in every specification, suggesting that no single set of demographic variables explains all of the relationship by itself. But some factors such as race, age, and home ownership suggest that a large portion of the relationship can be explained with just these factors by themselves. Older people, home owners, Republicans, and non-Hispanic whites are both more likely to vote and less trusting of government.

Discussion

Early research on trust in government found a weak and, if anything, positive relationship between higher trust in government and voter turnout. Using more recent data from California, we confirm that the relationship is modest, but find if anything it runs the other way: higher trust in government is associated with a tendency to stay home on Election Day. This relationship is not very robust: it mostly appears to be a function of other demographic and political variables. The relationship becomes very weak once these other factors are accounted for, but it never changes direction: it always suggests that higher trust is connected to lower turnout.

⁶ Specifically, we control for all the demographics that produced the imputed score—age, gender, ethnicity, home ownership, naturalized status, partisan registration, and whether the election was a mid-term or not—plus income and education. Income and education were not part of the imputation because they are not contained in the registration file.

⁷ Because the self-reported turnout variable only has five categories, we ran this model as an ordered logit. The substantive results were unchanged. These results can be found in Appendix E.

⁸ Our imputed vote propensity contains prediction error due to the imperfect fit between the demographic characteristics of the registration file and turnout. To address this problem, we ran each of 1000 simulated vectors of imputed vote propensities, then simulated 100 vectors of coefficients for each of these regressions, and finally combined these 100,000 simulations to produce the full range of error. The results were essentially unchanged.

Table 4. Multiple Linear Regression of Imputed Vote Propensity

	Also controlling for:				
	--	Race/Ethnicity	Party	Age	Home-ownership
Constant	.497*** (.019)	.619*** (.019)	.433*** (.020)	.198*** (.017)	.416*** (.017)
Trust Factor Score	-.020*** (.003)	-.011*** (.003)	-.017*** (.003)	-.010*** (.002)	-.013*** (.002)
Interest in politics	.050*** (.006)	.033*** (.006)	.042*** (.006)	.021*** (.005)	.028*** (.006)
Total N	4691	4562	4567	4557	4660
Adjusted R^2	.0634	.2135	.1077	.4612	.3451
Std. Error of Estimate	.215	.197	.210	.162	.179

Source: Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey, 2012-2014; Political Data, Inc.

Our research design amounts to a set of partial correlations, and so can never completely resolve whether trust *causes* turnout. For instance, our demographic and political controls might cause higher or lower trust, which then causes higher or lower turnout, even if those same control variables also have a direct effect on turnout through other mechanisms. That would make trust a complex function of many different factors in a person's life, but still a direct proximate cause of turnout by itself. What our analysis does strongly suggest, however, is that in present-day California the true relationship is not positive: there is no evidence that a lack of trust in government keeps voters from the polls. Either distrust mobilizes them to vote, or it is correlated with other factors that do.

If the relationship between trust and turnout *is* causal it implies that less cynical voters are also more complacent, avoiding voting because they feel the system is fine the way it is. This would turn a common explanation for low turnout on its head. Rather than selecting for optimism and a belief in the system, voting today in California would be selecting disillusionment and cynicism. An effective outreach strategy might then seek to convince *trusting* voters that even satisfaction requires participation—that all voices should be heard. In other words, the best way to use such a causal link between trust and turnout might be to rupture it. This could be good news for those who want to promote turnout, since it is probably easier to convince a trusting person that participation matters than to get the same concession from a cynic.

While the negative correlation between trust and turnout is intriguing, interest in politics is a stronger and more robust predictor of turnout. Moreover, correlations between interest and turnout survive controls for trust itself, meaning both high and low trust individuals are more likely to vote if they have more interest in politics. This should encourage further exploration into the causes of this lack of interest. If both trusting and cynical voters disengage from politics, it is clearly not the nature of politics alone that leads to the disengagement. Are the causes of this disengagement different for the trusting and the cynical? Does interest even *have* a causal effect on turnout, or is it also a proxy for some factor omitted from our analysis? These ought to be important questions moving forward.

These results are necessarily preliminary in a number of ways. Because we have no direct measures of turnout, we are describing turnout propensities rather than turnout itself. That said, the two are very closely related, and we use both imputed propensities and self-reported propensities to let each support the weaknesses in the other. The fact that the results are fairly consistent increases confidence that a more precise and specific measure of turnout for a given election would produce similar results.

We are also limited in what we can say about the nature of the trust-turnout link. We have no panel data that could help us leverage change over time to explore the causality of the relationship. Nor do we have a deep battery of questions about other attitudes toward government such as external efficacy, which correlated strongly with turnout in the early studies. External efficacy is likely embedded in both the trust and political interest items we examine here, and may account for some of the relationships we see.

Overall, we should not overstate the magnitude of the trust-turnout link we have identified. It is not much larger than the weak relationship found in the earliest research on trust in government, and it largely evaporates with additional statistical controls. But we have updated this finding with far more recent data, in a large, diverse state that has often been seen as a prime example of both dysfunctional government and low turnout. More to the point, such relationship as we find runs counter to the conventional wisdom that distrust leads to disengagement. That casts more doubt on this conventional wisdom than even the earlier null results could muster. If higher turnout is the goal, we should spend less time trying to make voters trust government, and more time asking if trust should be an important part of the conversation in the first place.

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Appendix A

Comparison of Imputed and Self-reported Vote Propensity

		n	Mean Imputed Vote Propensity	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Self-reported Vote Propensity	never	138	.438	.214	.024
	seldom	218	.470	.224	.020
	part of the time	611	.477	.224	.013
	nearly always	1743	.579	.226	.008
	always	5828	.683	.209	.005
Total		8538	.625	.230	.003

Appendix B

Mean Voting Propensity and Mean Voting Frequency for Additional Trust Items

	State Big Interest		Federal Big Interest		State Gov Waste			Federal Gov Waste		
	a few big interests <i>n</i> = 5730	benefit of all <i>n</i> = 2008	a few big interests <i>n</i> = 4259	benefit of all <i>n</i> = 1048	a lot <i>n</i> = 4777	some <i>n</i> = 2939	don't waste very much <i>n</i> = 580	a lot <i>n</i> = 3556	some <i>n</i> = 1751	don't waste very much <i>n</i> = 272
Imputed voting propensity	.63 _a	.58 _b	.66 _a	.61 _b	.64 _a	.59 _b	.64 _a	.66 _a	.62 _b	.61 _b
Self-reported voting frequency	.84 _a	.83 _b	.85 _a	.82 _b	.85 _a	.82 _b	.86 _a	.86 _a	.82 _b	.84 _{a,b}

Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances.

Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction. Cell counts in some subtables are not integers. They were rounded to the nearest integers before performing pairwise comparisons.

Appendix C

Full results of imputed vote propensity regressions from Table 4

	Controlling for:								
	Race	Party	Education	Age	Home-ownership	Nativity	Income	Gender	Election Year
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
Constant	.619*** (.019)	.433*** (.020)	.504*** (.022)	.198*** (.017)	.416*** (.017)	.460*** (.020)	.450*** (.020)	.509*** (.019)	.577*** (.019)
Trust Factor Score	-.011*** (.003)	-.017*** (.003)	-.021*** (.003)	-.010*** (.002)	-.013*** (.002)	-.019*** (.003)	-.020*** (.003)	-.020*** (.003)	-.019*** (.002)
Interest in politics	.033*** (.006)	.042*** (.006)	.045*** (.006)	.021*** (.005)	.028*** (.006)	.047*** (.006)	.038*** (.006)	.052*** (.006)	.044*** (.005)
African American	-.065*** (.016)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asian American	-.177*** (.018)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Latino	-.206*** (.012)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other/multiple race	-.082*** (.019)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democrat	-	.096*** (.012)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Republican	-	.139*** (.013)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Party	-	.094*** (.035)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Some high school	-	-	.026 (.019)	-	-	-	-	-	-
High school graduate	-	-	-.013 (.016)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Some college	-	-	.006 (.014)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Post-graduate degree	-	-	.064*** (.015)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Age	-	-	-	.008*** (.000)	-	-	-	-	-

Homeowner	-	-	-	-	.244***	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	(.009)	-	-	-	-
Born in the US	-	-	-	-	-	.054***	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	(.014)	-	-	-
Income	-	-	-	-	-	-	.023***	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	(.003)	-	-
Male	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.039***	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(.010)	-
Midterm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.274***
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(.012)
Off-year	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.000
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(.010)
Total N	4562	4567	4648	4557	4660	4651	4337	4691	4691
Adjusted R^2	.2135	.1077	.0700	.4612	.3451	.0728	.0973	.0709	.3333
Std. Error of Estimate	.197	.210	.213	.162	.179	.214	.211	.214	.181

Appendix D: Survey Questions

Political Trust

(These questions were included in the Principal Components Analysis)

How much of the time do you think you can trust the state government in Sacramento to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?

Would you say the state government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all of the people?

Do you think the people in state government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington today to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?

Would you say the federal government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all of the people?

Do you think the people in the federal government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

How much confidence do you have in the Governor and California Legislature when it comes to their ability to solve the state's most important problems—a great deal, only some, very little, or none?

Political Interest


Generally speaking, how much interest would you say you have in politics—a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or none?

Self-Reported Vote Frequency

How often would you say you vote—always, nearly always, part of the time, seldom, or never?

Appendix E

Principal Components Analysis—Component Loadings



Component Loading	
	Component 1
State Big Interest	.4345
Federal Gov. Waste	.4111
Federal Big Interest	.4103
Federal Trust	.4075
State Gov. Waste	.3953
State Trust	.3893

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 component extracted.

Appendix F

Ordinal Logit Regression for Self-reported Vote Frequency

Number of strata = 1 Number of PSUs = 4,691	Number of obs = 4,691 Population size = 3,938.5651 Design df = 4,690 F(2, 4,689) = 133.16 Prob > F = 0.0000
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	B	Std. Error	t	P>t	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
Trust Factor Score	-0.0845329	0.0279801	-3.02	0.003	-0.139387	-0.02968
Interest in politics	0.987301	0.0630533	15.66	0	0.8636869	1.110915
[votefreq=.00]	-1.309308	0.2338151	-5.6	0	-1.767695	-0.85092
[votefreq=.25]	-0.2055754	0.1990626	-1.03	0.302	-0.5958316	0.184681
[votefreq=.50]	1.036274	0.1895272	5.47	0	0.6647113	1.407836
[votefreq=.75]	2.432137	0.1883832	12.91	0	2.062817	2.801456

Dependent Variable: Self-reported vote frequency. Based on responses to the question “How often would you say you vote—always, nearly always, part of the time, seldom, or never?” and coded from 0 to 1, ranging from 0 – never to 1 – always.