

# Generality of the Abstraction Mechanisms in Artificial Grammar Learning

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## Abstract

Artificial grammar learning (AGL; Reber, 1989) has been a major experimental paradigm for the study of human induction processes. In this work we investigate the extent to which the learning mechanisms involved in AGL are general, an issue important to the ecological validity of AGL research. We have used three kinds of stimuli: Letter strings (the standard in AGL work), city sequences that corresponded to routes of an airline company, and shapes that were presented so that later shapes in a sequence contained all previous ones. We compared overall accuracy and patterns of error in these domains to find that performance was not different. The implications of this finding for existing theories of AGL and proposed relations to other cognitive mechanisms are discussed.

## Introduction

Central to the existence of all living creatures is the ability to abstract the essential structure in a domain of instances in order to successfully generalize to other new instances. That living agents survive implies that nature has somehow solved the problem of induction. The abundance of successful inductive learners makes it even more unfortunate that our understanding of induction is still inadequate. For instance, Pinker notes: (1979; p.278) "Induction has been called 'scandalous' because any finite set of observations supports an intractably large number of generalizations."

As early as the late fifties, Miller (1958) presented participants with a set of letter strings generated by a finite state language (Chomsky & Miller, 1958) to find that learning was more efficient when compared with learning of random strings. This was, presumably, by virtue of the fact that "...the sequences formed according to elaborate and restrictive rules were more redundant, carried less information per syllable, than the random syllables." Reber (1967) not only replicated this finding but also extended it in the case where participants had to discriminate between strings that complied with the rules of the language and strings that violated these rules in certain ways. The training of Reber's participants involved presenting a subset of the possible strings that could be generated with the grammar. These studies initiated a long tradition of AGL experiments. The AGL paradigm promised to provide a more principled

way of understanding human abstraction processes, because the domains used (strings generated from finite state languages) could be very precisely described in information theory terms (e.g., Miller, 1958).

Several different theories have been proposed to account for AGL competence. The original claim by Reber and his colleagues (see Reber, 1989, for a review) has been that participants learn in training something of the abstract, rule structure of the finite state language used to create the stimuli. This view was corroborated by "transfer" experiments, where the symbols used in training were different from the symbols used in test. Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey (1984) have instead argued that participants acquired "correlated grammars", that is a set of "microrules" which generally approximated the true grammar, but might at the same time include unrepresentative or even wrong rules. A similar approach from a different point of view has been offered by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) who suggested that all participants learn in the training part is simply information about which bigram fragments are allowed.

Brooks and Vokey (1991) suggested that grammaticality decisions in test do not so much depend on whether an item is grammatical or not-grammatical, but rather on whether it is more or less *similar* to the training items. They have found that both similarity and grammaticality are important, and these results have been replicated in later research (Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Pothos & Bailey, 1997).

The theoretical controversy as to which account best reflects human performance is still going on; however, all theories mentioned are specified independently of the particular instantiation of the strings of a finite state language. Thus, a direct prediction of existing AGL theories is that performance should not change with different stimulus domains, as long as the grammar used is the same.

We used the Reber and Allen (1978) grammar to generate three sets of stimuli, letter strings (as in the Reber and Allen, 1978, study), city sequences that corresponded to routes of an airline company (referred to as "cities" stimuli below) and shapes that were presented so that later shapes in a sequence contained all previous ones (referred to as "shapes"). Our choice for this grammar was motivated partly because this is a grammar that has been widely used (e.g. Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) but also

because it has been designed in a way that allows an investigation into the particular pattern of errors.

There were some a priori reasons why performance might be specific to the type of stimuli. For instance, it has been suggested that AGL is essentially equivalent to priming, rather than reflecting a more profound type of learning mechanism (Knowlton & Squire, 1996). Roughly speaking, implicit memory, or priming, of previous events is assessed by looking at effects of these events on a later task, in the absence of any explicit recall of the events. Object decision priming has been suggested to be mediated by a "perceptual representation system" (PRS) that essentially describes the structural dependencies in an object (Schacter et al., 1991), and so that, for instance, no priming for "impossible" objects can be observed (since the PRS cannot describe the global structure of an impossible object). Thus, if AGL does indeed reflect priming, performance with the shapes stimuli would be expected to be superior, since the regularities with these stimuli have a more salient spatial structure, which would be better "understood" by the PRS. Our "shapes" stimuli consisted of nested elements precisely to stress the impression of a coherent whole, and thus emphasize spatial dependencies. Conversely, in a transfer condition, if the priming view of AGL is accurate, performance would be particularly bad, relative to performance with stimuli where the sequential symbolic structure of the strings was more obvious (as is the case with letter strings, for example).

Also, with the cities stimuli one could anticipate that encoding of the regularities due to the artificial grammar we used would be strongly affected by background knowledge biases, relating to the relative plausibility of different routes. Since we did not construct the stimuli so that the routes might reflect any realistic constraint, trying to interpret the task pragmatically would be thus likely to reduce overall accuracy; such biases would also be expected to be more potent in a transfer condition since direct information about the items is compromised by the change in the city names used.

Previous investigations on the generality of the learning processes involved in AGL have mostly focused on identifying some of the conditions in which AGL-type learning was possible. For instance, Altmann, Dienes and Goode (1995) used musical tones and graphic symbols<sup>1</sup> in some of their conditions. Altmann et al. reported that participants could successfully generalize knowledge acquired from musical tones to letter sequences and vice versa, or from sequences of nonsense words presented auditorially to sequences of graphic symbols (see also Whittlesea and Wright, 1997, for a more recent similar investigation). In the work reported below we were interested in comparing directly performance with different

<sup>1</sup> But the symbols in the graphical stimuli were presented sequentially as in letter strings, thus remaining perceptually distinct.

types of stimuli, to address specifically the question of how general are the abstraction mechanisms involved.

## Method

### Design

Predictions for differences in the learning mechanisms apply both to the ordinary AGL paradigm, where there is no change in the symbols used from training to test, and the transfer paradigm, where the symbols are changed. We thus report experiments employing both paradigms. In each case, a 3 x 8 mixed design was used, with training and testing on the three sets of stimuli as the between-subjects factor and performance on eight different subsets of the test strings as a within subjects factor. Our interest was in comparing performance with different types of stimuli, rather than assessing learning of the grammar, therefore we did not use controls (see Redington & Chater, 1996, for an extensive discussion of methodological issues in AGL).

### Materials

In all conditions we created the stimuli according to the Reber & Allen (1978) grammar<sup>2</sup>, shown in Figure 1. In the condition where there was no change in vocabulary from training to test, the letters used were RXMSV and the "shapes" and "cities" stimuli were constructed by mapping letters to shapes and cities respectively. So, RXMSV corresponded to a circle, a hexagon, a concave shape, a square and a rhombus in the one case, and in the other to Athens, Berlin, London, Paris and Madrid. The shapes were chosen so that they were of roughly similar salience and, likewise, the cities were intended to be well known European capitals and representative of most of Europe. Examples of stimuli in the different conditions are shown in Figure 2.




Figure 1: The finite state grammar used in the Experiments.

<sup>2</sup> Details for the motivation for this grammar and the ways test items were constructed are given in Reber and Allen (1978).






Figure 3: Performance with different types of stimuli.

The Reber and Allen (1978) stimuli that we used were designed so that non-grammatical items were constructed by violating grammatical items in specific ways. Therefore, the items used in the test part of the experiment could be split in the following mutually exclusive subsets: Items with violations in the first position ("vio first," in Figure 4), violations in the second position ("vio second"), deep violations, violations in the next to last position ("vio next to last"), violations in the last position ("vio last") and items that were spelt backwards ("backwards"). The grammatical items used in the test part were distinguished depending on whether they had been presented in the training part or not ("seen" and "rest of G items").

Performance in the different subsets for the three types of stimuli used is shown in Figure 4. Repeated measures ANOVA with "performance in different subsets of test items" as a within subjects factor were conducted for each type of stimuli separately. In all three models the homogeneity of variance assumption could not be maintained (as assessed by the Mauchly Sphericity Test) thus we had to resort to a more conservative test. For the "letters" and the "cities" stimuli the F-ratio was not significant by the Greenhouse-Geisser test. (for "letters":  $F(3.02, 63) = 2.24, p=.105$  and for "cities":  $F(2.66, 63) = 1.14, p=.349$ ). In the case of the "shapes" stimuli very low performance on items with violations in the next to last position led to a highly significant difference ( $F(2.63, 63) = 7.69, p=.001$ ). We then looked at whether there was an interaction between type of stimuli used and performance in different subsets of the test items. A mixed factorial design was run with "type of stimuli used" as the between subjects factor and "performance for different subsets of test items" as a within subjects factor. Again, the Mauchly Sphericity Test was significant ( $W < 0.05$ ) so we had to use a test with fewer degrees of freedom. However, the interaction between "type of stimuli used" and "performance for different subsets of test items" was not significant ( $F(7.53, 189) = 1.69, p>.1$ ) by the Greenhouse-Geisser test.




Figure 4: Performance on different subsets of the test set.

The overall pattern of results for the transfer conditions was similar, albeit distinguished by a decrease in accuracy, as is typically found with transfer experiments (Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Altmann et al., 1995). Overall performance was in general only slightly above chance (Figure 5) and one-sample t-tailed tests against chance were significant in the cases of the cities and letters stimuli, but not in the case of shapes (cities stimuli:  $t(19) = 3.831, p=.001$ ; letters stimuli:  $t(19) = 2.57, p=.019$ ; shapes:  $t(19) = 0.711, p>.7$ ). Despite the fact that it might look as if learning is possible with stimuli sets such as cities and letters and not possible with the shapes, as before, the differences in performance across conditions were not significant ( $F(2,57) = 2.537, p=.09, MSE = 0.003$ ). Power analyses again revealed that at least 150 participants would have been required to provide a  $p=.01, power=0.95$  difference for a given comparison between performance on different kinds of stimuli (largest sample estimate was more than 10000).

Likewise, a mixed-factorial design ANOVA with "type of stimuli used" as the between participants factor and "performance for different subsets of test items" as a within participants factor, was not significant ( $F(14, 399) = 1.43, p=.138$ ), thus replicating the essential findings of the no-transfer condition (see Figure 6).




Figure 5: Mean performance with each type of stimuli, in the transfer condition.




Figure 6: Performance on different subsets of the stimuli for the transfer condition.

## Discussion

We compared an overall accuracy measure for the different kinds of stimuli and also we looked at whether the patterns of error were any different across stimulus domains, both in a no-transfer experimental paradigm and a transfer one. Differences were expected by taking note of the possible connection of AGL with priming (Schacter et al, 1991) and also the fact that a realistic content was likely to introduce general knowledge biases that were irrelevant with the actual regularities in the stimuli.

It was concluded that performance did not seem to depend on the type of material used, the way items were constructed or the existence of any possible biases. This result is significant for existing theories of AGL since they all assume that the learning processes involved in successful generalization from training to test depend only on the human processor being able to access the symbolic structure of the stimuli. Also, it supports the use of AGL as an experimental paradigm for the study of inductive inference; the finding that AGL does not depend on differences with the types of stimuli investigated suggests that AGL-type of learning might well be directly generalizable to more realistic learning situations as well.

Future work will further address the conditions that might be affecting AGL. For instance, the stimuli in this study were all constructed so as not to affect in any way the symbolic salience of the stimuli, in line with the observation that all existing theories of AGL depend on such information being available. Thus, an interesting question that follows is whether learning would be compromised in situations where such information is less available.

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