

Learning visual appearance from language is mediated by causal intuitive theories

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Abstract

What and how do people learn about visual appearance from language? We test the hypothesis that in the absence of sensory evidence, people born blind use abstract causal knowledge to infer object appearance. Congenitally blind ($n=19$) and sighted adults ($n=59$) reported how many colors two types of artifacts were likely to have: artifacts for which having many colors is intended to facilitate function ($n=30$, e.g., fairytale book, fruit candies), and artifacts for which colorfulness is irrelevant or distracting ($n=30$, e.g., instructional manual, painkillers). The number of colors estimated per object was highly correlated across groups. Blind and sighted people assigned more colors to artifacts for which colorfulness facilitates function and appealed to makers' intentions in open-ended explanations. A text-only version of GPT-4 generated similar but non-identical colorfulness estimates compared to humans. Our findings suggest that people infer the appearance of unseen objects using causal 'intuitive theories' informed by linguistic evidence.

Keywords: causal reasoning; cognitive development; concepts and categories; intelligent agents; language and thought

Introduction

Language provides rich information about the sensory world. Languages of the world have large 'sensory lexicons' (e.g., 'blue,' 'round,' 'rough'; Viberg, 1983; Levinson & Majid, 2014; San Roque et al., 2015; Winter et al., 2018). Recent work with large language models (LLMs) trained exclusively on text suggests that sensory information can be acquired from language alone. For instance, LLMs can report the colors of common objects (e.g., strawberries are red), reconstruct color similarity space (e.g., red is more similar to orange than to green) and 'draw' approximate object shapes (Abdou et al., 2021; Patel & Pavlick, 2022; Sharma et al., 2024; Marjeh et al., 2022, 2024; Mukherjee et al., 2024).

Evidence from people born blind suggests that humans can also acquire knowledge about appearance from language (Marmor, 1978; Zimler & Keenan, 1983; Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Shepard & Cooper, 1992; Connolly et al., 2007; Lenci et al., 2013; Saysani et al., 2018, 2021; Kim et al., 2019, 2021; Bedny et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020;

Hauptman, Elli, et al., 2025). Landau and Gleitman (1985) showed that a 4-year-old blind child, Kelli, knew that color is a property of physical objects perceptible only with the eyes. Blind and sighted adults have shared knowledge of color similarity space, use similar color labels for some common objects (e.g., strawberries are red), and have shared intuitions about how object color varies across instances (e.g., two strawberries are more likely to be the same colors than two cars; Marmor, 1978; Shepard & Cooper, 1992; Saysani et al., 2018, 2021; Kim, et al., 2019, 2021). Although other senses, such as audition and touch, can provide information about visual experience via analogy, visual phenomena like color have no auditory or tactile analogs, pointing to language as an important source of information.

A key outstanding question is how people learn visual information from linguistic evidence. Knowledge of visual appearance can be learned in part from explicit descriptions, such as, 'Skittles are small, round, and smooth-coated candies that come in a variety of bright colors, including red, orange, and green' (GPT-4). Knowledge of one object's appearance (e.g., Skittles) can also be generalized to a broader category (e.g., fruit-flavored candy) or other related examples (e.g., M&Ms). Many modern accounts of how sensory information is learned from language emphasize tracking co-occurrence statistics of words (e.g., 'yellow' occurs with 'banana,' 'ripe' occurs with 'banana,' therefore 'yellow' and 'ripe' are related; Lewis et al., 2019; Lupyan & Lewis, 2019; Ostarek et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2025; see also Grand et al., 2022).

However, human learning often goes beyond the surface properties of the evidence. Children and adults use causal mental models, also called 'intuitive theories,' to infer unseen properties of objects, such as what objects contain on the inside based on whether they are natural kinds or artifacts (Ortony & Medin, 1989; Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989, 1992; Bloom, 1996; Kelemen, 1999; see also Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Tenenbaum et al., 2007; Carey, 2011; Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, 2016). Even young children know that an object's appearance is related to deeper causal properties (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Rosengren et al., 1991; Springer & Keil, 1991; Gopnik et al., 2001; Matan

& Carey, 2001; Greif et al., 2006; Gelman, 1998). For instance, children prefer biological explanations for how flowers get their colors (e.g., because of sun and rain) but intentional explanations for how cans get their colors (e.g., because someone wanted them to be that color; Springer & Keil, 1991). Such knowledge allows children to make predictions about unobservable properties from sensory evidence, e.g., if it looks like a machine, it was likely made by a person.

We hypothesized that when learning about visual appearance from language, people born blind reverse-engineer this approach: they generatively infer appearance information not accessible through sight from deeper object properties. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that for man-made objects (i.e., artifacts), people born blind use the makers' intentions to infer how colorful an object is likely to be. Consider the case of a handful of fruit candies. How many colors is it likely to have: 1, 5, or 70? Some of these answers seem more probable than others: the colors of fruit candies often communicate different flavors (of which there are typically a few). Likewise, a fairy tale book is designed to be colorful to entertain and capture the attention of children, whereas an instructional manual is less colorful so as to not distract from its content. In the current study, we tested whether people born blind would use information about an artifact's intended function to infer its colorfulness.

We presented congenitally blind and sighted adults with labels of artifacts (e.g., 'a fairy tale book') and asked them to estimate how many colors (i.e., 'colorfulness') each object was likely to have. For half of the objects, like the fairy tale book, colorfulness is intended to facilitate function, and for the other half, colorfulness is either not relevant or obtrusive to function (e.g., an instructional manual).

A separate group of participants rated each of the objects on the degree to which having many colors was useful to its function. These ratings were used to validate the object conditions and to predict participants' estimates of colorfulness item-by-item.

While sighted people could estimate the number of colors an object has based on their visual experience, people born blind cannot. We hypothesized that blind people would estimate an object's colorfulness using causal intuitions about the relationship between object colorfulness and function (e.g., colorfulness facilitates function by enhancing communicability or aesthetic appeal). If so, we predicted that i) blind and sighted people's colorfulness estimates would be correlated, ii) blind people would assign more colors to artifacts for which having many colors facilitates function, and iii) blind (and sighted) people would invoke the makers' intentions when asked to provide open-ended explanations for their colorfulness estimates.

To offer further evidence that language could serve as a source of information about colorfulness, we presented the same task to an LLM trained exclusively on text (GPT-4). Unlike blind people, LLMs do not have access to other sensory information. Thus, if GPT-4 can produce human-like judgments of colorfulness, this suggests that colorfulness

information can be extracted from language. Whether GPT-4 learns something like a causal model of appearance or instead uses vast amounts of linguistic data and memory resources to mimic human-like performance remains an open question, to which we return in the Discussion.

Method

Participants

Nineteen congenitally blind adults (14 women, 5 men; age range 20-75 years, $M = 40.9 \pm 15$ SD) and fifty-nine sighted age- and education-matched controls (37 women, 20 men, 2 non-binary people; age range: 21-71 years, $M = 40.15 \pm 11$ SD) participated in the study. The sighted group consisted of two samples ($n=19$, $n=40$). The second sample was used as a reference group in correlation analyses. Sample size was comparable to prior studies with blind participants (e.g., Saysani et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2021) and was confirmed by a power analysis.

Blind participants lost their sight due to pathologies of the eyes or optic nerve anterior to the optic chiasm (i.e., not due to brain damage), and had at most minimal light perception since birth. All participants were screened for cognitive and neurological disabilities (self-report).

Blind participants completed the study in-person at the National Federation of the Blind National Convention and were compensated \$30 per hour. Sighted participants completed the study online via Prolific and were compensated \$13 per hour. Experimental procedures were reviewed and approved by the Johns Hopkins University Homewood Institutional Review Board.

Stimuli

Artifacts were organized into two conditions. Colorfulness-Intent (*Intent*) artifacts were those for which having many colors is intended to facilitate function by communicating information (e.g., candy flavor) or appealing to the aesthetic preferences of an intended audience (e.g., children) ($n=30$). No-Colorfulness-Intent (*No-Intent*) artifacts were those for which colorfulness is *not* intended to facilitate function; in other words, colorfulness is either irrelevant or obtrusive to function (e.g., instructional manual, mild painkillers) ($n=30$). Artifact descriptions were created in *Intent/No-Intent* pairs across conditions to control for shape. For example, fairy tale book and instructional manual formed a pair ('book'), and fruit candies and mild painkillers formed a pair ('capsules').

In an online study ($n=20$), a separate group of sighted participants rated how helpful having many colors is to the function of each object on a scale from 1 (not helpful) to 7 (very helpful). *Intent* objects received significantly higher 'helpful-to-function' ratings than *No-Intent* objects ($F_{(1,19)} = 24.41$, $p < .001$). These ratings were also used in correlation analyses to predict object colorfulness estimates item-by-item for both blind and sighted participants. If participants are using helpfulness-to-function to estimate number of colors, then these metrics should be correlated.




Figure 1: Shared knowledge of artifact colorfulness across groups. Panel A: Participants. The sighted group consisted of one sample of equal size to the blind group ($n=19$), collected first, and a larger reference sample ($n=40$). Panel B: Experimental design. Seven example artifact pairs (out of a total of 30 pairs) are shown for display purposes. Panel C: Item-wise correlations (Spearman's rho ρ) of normalized colorfulness judgments across groups. p values denote correlations between averaged group responses (e.g., average sighted vs. average blind). Confidence intervals (95%) are indicated via shading. In the plots displaying correlations with GPT-4, one outlier is excluded ('tape for scrapbooking': GPT-4: 4.75, sighted: -0.57, blind: 0.5).

Procedure

Participants provided open-ended numerical estimates of how many colors artifacts were likely to have (Figure 1A-B). The experiment had two parts. First, participants were presented with artifact labels one at a time and were asked to guess the number of colors each artifact was likely to have. All analyses of colorfulness judgments were performed using these initial judgments, which were made before the other components of the experiment were known to the participants.

In the second part of the experiment, we asked participants to guess the number of colors again, rate their confidence on a scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (very confident), label the colors of the artifacts, and explain the reasoning behind their answers. Each participant was asked about 15 artifacts per condition (15 *Intent*, 15 *No-Intent*) in one of four versions, counterbalanced across participants, such that individual participants were not asked about both artifacts within a given *Intent/No-Intent* pair.

We also interrogated a text-only version of GPT-4 (gpt-4-0613, temperature=0.5) using the same task. Each artifact description was presented one at a time along with the same

set of questions we asked human participants. No further information was provided.

Analyses

Colorfulness judgments were standardized (z-scored to mean=0 $\pm$ 1 SD) within each participant to account for individual differences. To assess agreement in colorfulness judgments within and across groups, we performed Spearman's rho (ρ) rank correlations. We first asked whether participant groups agreed about the degree of colorfulness of all artifacts. Colorfulness judgments made by each participant in the blind and sighted groups (both $n=19$) were correlated with judgments averaged across members of the sighted reference group ($n=40$) and judgments made by GPT-4. The significance of these correlations was then tested using Student's t -tests and ANOVAs that modeled the Fisher-Z transformed single-subject correlations. To assess agreement within the blind group, we calculated Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) to account for the fact that there was no blind reference group.

Next, we asked whether participant groups agreed about differences in the number of colors assigned to artifacts within *Intent/No-Intent* pairs (e.g., 'fairy tale book' minus

‘instructional manual’). We correlated average artifact pair differences for each group.

Finally, to assess agreement in the use of color labels across groups, we selected the most frequent color labels ($n=13$ color labels; accounting for 97% of all labels) used by blind and sighted participants combined. We then correlated across groups the relative differences in the use of these labels for *Intent* vs. *No-Intent* artifacts.

Results

Blind and sighted people agree about how many colors objects have

The number of colors generated per object (i.e., colorfulness judgments) were highly correlated across the two sighted samples, suggesting shared intuitions among sighted people (sighted vs. sighted reference, average of individual participants’ correlation values: $\rho = .72 \pm 0.15$ SD; one sample t-test: $t_{(18)} = 13.65, p < .001$; Figure 1C). Colorfulness judgments of blind and sighted people were also significantly correlated (average of individual participants’ correlation values: $\rho = .59 \pm 0.14$ SD; $t_{(18)} = 13.76, p < .001$), though less so than between the two sighted samples (two-sample t-test, $t_{(36)} = -3.02, p = .005$). Blind participants also showed high within-group agreement (blind: Kendall’s $W = .54, p < .001$, sighted: $W = .57, p < .001$). These results suggest that first-person sensory access is not required to estimate how many colors an object has.

Blind and sighted people infer object colorfulness from intended function

Both sighted and congenitally blind participants judged Colorfulness-Intent (*Intent*) artifacts to have more colors than No-Colorfulness-Intent (*No-Intent*) artifacts (subject-wise repeated measures ANOVA, 2 conditions (*Intent*, *No-Intent*) x 2 groups (sighted, blind): main effect of condition, $F_{(1,36)} = 441.29, p < .001$; Figure 2).




Figure 2: Average item-wise colorfulness judgments across groups. Average non-normalized judgments for all 60 artifacts are displayed for each group. Paired artifacts (e.g., ‘fairy tale book,’ ‘instructional manual’) are connected by lines.




Figure 3: Color label use across groups and conditions. The size of each color label denotes its relative frequency within participant groups and conditions.

All groups assigned more colors to artifacts for which colorfulness is intended to facilitate function (i.e., Colorfulness-Intent artifacts; all $ps < .001$). This effect was highly significant in each group and statistically identical across groups (group by condition interaction, $F_{(1,36)} = 0.03, p = .88$; main effect of group, $F_{(1,36)} = 1, p = .32$).

In both groups, colorfulness judgments were highly and equally correlated with ratings of how helpful colorfulness is to function collected in a separate online study (sighted: $\rho = .84, p < .001$, blind: $\rho = .82, p < .001$). These results support the hypothesis that people born blind use this information to predict the number of colors an object is likely to have.

Further evidence for the idea that blind people can infer colorfulness from intention comes from analyses of item-wise variation. Since items within a pair were matched on shape, differences in the number of colors assigned within *Intent/No-Intent* pairs offers a more fine-grained test of whether the degree to which colorfulness facilitates function influences estimates of colorfulness. Difference scores were highly correlated across the sighted samples ($\rho = .86, p < .001$) and were also correlated across sighted and congenitally blind people ($\rho = .51, p = .004$). Notably, the two sighted samples exhibited numerically higher agreement than sighted and blind participants, suggesting that sighted people may rely partially on visual memory when making

colorfulness judgments, whereas people born blind may rely more on inferences about intention.

Finally, we observed numerical differences in the color labels that blind and sighted people used across *Intent* and *No-Intent* artifacts, whereby brighter colors (e.g., blue, red, green) were produced more often for *Intent* artifacts and neutral colors (e.g., black, white) were produced more often for *No-Intent* artifacts (Figure 3). Differences in color label use across conditions was highly consistent across groups ($\rho = .98$, all $ps < .001$).

Together, these results suggest that people born blind infer colorfulness of artifacts by appealing to the intentions of the maker (e.g., fairy tale books are colorful because they are intended to capture the reader’s attention; Table 1).

Table 1: Example explanations from each group. For each object, participants were asked, “why did you choose that number of colors?”

	Fairy tale book	Instructional manual
Sighted	The ones we own are colorful.	They are usually not too colorful from my experience.
Blind	They are usually geared toward children, and colors grab a kid’s attention.	It would have to have one color to be easy to find among other booklets.
GPT-4	Most have colorful illustrations to make the stories more engaging.	Most I’ve seen usually have a base color, a color for accents, and black text.

Humans and GPT-4 generate similar but non-identical colorfulness judgments

To provide additional insight into the extent to which colorfulness information is available in linguistic data, we interrogated a text-only version of GPT-4 using the same task. Unlike blind people, GPT-4 lacks access to sensory information, including from touch, audition, and smell. If GPT-4 nevertheless produces similar colorfulness estimates to humans, this would suggest that language contains relevant information about object colorfulness.

Colorfulness judgments were significantly correlated across human participants and GPT-4, an LLM trained exclusively on text (blind vs. GPT-4, average of individual blind participants’ correlation values: $\rho = .5 \pm 0.16$ SD; sighted vs. GPT-4: $\rho = .5 \pm 0.12$ SD, both $ps < .001$). Correlations between human groups (blind vs. sighted reference, sighted vs. sighted reference) were higher than correlations between humans and GPT-4 (main effect of

comparison group (sighted reference, GPT-4), $F_{(1,36)} = 54.45$, $p < .001$). This finding suggests that although GPT-4 can acquire information about artifact colorfulness from language, it does not fully capture human performance.

Like blind and sighted people, GPT-4 assigned more colors to artifacts for which colorfulness is intended to facilitate function. (Figure 2; *Intent* vs *No-Intent* artifacts $t_{(58)} = 4.56$, $p < .001$). The size of this effect was not different between GPT-4, and the human groups (item-wise repeated measures ANOVA, 2 conditions (*Intent*, *No-Intent*) $\times$ 3 groups (sighted, blind, GPT-4), group by condition interaction, $F_{(2,116)} = 0.27$, $p = .76$; main effect of group, $F_{(2,116)} = 0$, $p = 1$).

Differences in the number of colors within *Intent/No-Intent* pairs were also correlated across GPT-4 and congenitally blind participants (GPT-4 vs. congenitally blind: $\rho = .6$, $p < .001$). Interestingly, colorfulness difference scores were not correlated across GPT-4 and sighted participants (GPT-4 vs. sighted: $\rho = .23$, $p = .21$). However, as reported above, blind and sighted people’s difference scores were correlated ($\rho = .51$, $p = .004$). This pattern of results suggests that blind people and GPT-4 learn object colorfulness from language in partially different ways.

In sum, our findings from a text-only version of GPT-4 suggest that linguistic evidence contains information about the number of colors objects have, but that humans and large language models do not learn this information the same way.

Discussion

We find that blind and sighted people living within the same cultural context show high agreement about how many colors an artifact is likely to have. Sighted adults likely base their colorfulness judgments in part on common visual experiences. Consistent with this idea, they agree more with each other than with congenitally blind people or a text-trained LLM. Sighted participants also appeal to their experiences with real objects when explaining their colorfulness judgments (e.g., ‘I said that fairy tale books have nine colors because the fairy tale book I own has that many colors’). By contrast, people born blind acquire their knowledge of object colorfulness from linguistic evidence.

How do people and machines learn how many colors an object is likely to have from language? As noted in the Introduction, some ‘visual’ information can be learned from explicit descriptions. For example, most blind people agree that school buses are yellow, which can only be learned as an explicitly stated fact (Kim et al., 2021). However, learning appearance only from explicit descriptions or even by generalizing from explicit descriptions of one object to another has limitations. Stated color facts are only useful for previously encountered objects, or objects that are similar to those objects.

Relying exclusively on such fact-based learning is feasible for LLMs, which are trained on vast amounts of linguistic data and have better memory capacities but is less reliable for humans. Blind and sighted people often disagree on arbitrary object-color mappings (e.g., in one study, 50% of blind

participants and 100% of sighted participants labeled bananas yellow and polar bears white; Kim et al., 2019; 2021). By contrast, modern LLMs readily generate the colors of objects that align with the intuitions of sighted people (e.g., Liu et al., 2025). For example, text-trained GPT-4 produces ‘brown’ for aardvarks and ‘pink’ for axolotls. However, LLMs that are more modest in size also sometimes do not acquire sighted-like object-color pairings, and, unlike blind people, also appear to be fooled by raw frequency statistics (i.e., uncommon colors are named more frequently, such as ‘green’ for banana; Liu et al., 2025).

The current evidence suggests that in addition to using learning mechanisms that rely on explicitly stated descriptive facts, humans also rely on a generative approach to infer unobservable perceptual properties of objects using intuitive theories of why objects appear the way they do. In particular, we find that blind adults provide higher colorfulness estimates for objects for which colorfulness is intended to facilitate function and also appeal to the intentions of the makers in their explanations.

The current results are consistent with prior evidence that blind and sighted people tend to agree about visual knowledge that can be inferred from deeper causal properties (Kim et al., 2019; 2021). For example, blind and sighted people have similar intuitions about how object color varies across tokens (e.g., two stop signs are more likely to be the same color than two cars), an aspect of appearance that can be explained by the causal relationship between object function and appearance (i.e., object color is less likely to vary when it is relevant to function; Kim et al., 2021). Here we suggest that an analogous mechanism is used to infer the colorfulness of individual object tokens. In addition to being less mnemonically costly, a generative approach also enables inferences about objects that are very different from those previously encountered in the evidence, including novel objects.

A key open question is *how* linguistic evidence is used to construct causal models of appearance, including models of how color is used to entertain, impress, distract, inform, and capture the attention of others. Another open question is whether LLMs acquire something like causal models of object colorfulness and, like humans, use such models to infer appearance. Because LLMs like GPT-4 have memory capacities and access to more data compared to human learners, it is also highly plausible that they mimic human inference using more ‘memory-based’ approaches (Bender & Koller, 2020; Warstadt & Bowman, 2022; Frank, 2023; Kauf et al., 2023; Lake & Murphy, 2023; McCoy et al., 2024). Although GPT-4’s colorfulness judgments were significantly correlated with those of humans in the current study, its judgments for some items (e.g., scrapbooking tape) were distinctly not human-like. Endowing LLMs with causal models of appearance as a form of inductive biases during training may enable the creation of AI models that bridge language and vision in human-like ways.

In summary, the current study demonstrates that knowledge of visual appearance, specifically artifact

colorfulness, can be learned from language alone. However, our findings also suggest that for humans, learning from language is mediated by causal mental models of the world, i.e., ‘intuitive theories.’ These intuitive theories are themselves shaped by linguistic evidence and enable generative inferences about sensory information in the absence of first-person experience.

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