

CRITICAL PLANNING



VOLUME 25: **PLANNING IN CRISIS**

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Planning in Crisis
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Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, protestors continue to meet in the Okinawan village of Henoko to oppose the sea-based expansion of US Marines Camp Schwab.

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Intro to Critical Planning Journal Volume 25: Planning in Crisis

We started making Critical Planning Journal (CPJ) Volume 25 shortly after the first global pandemic in a century took hold. It will, thus, come as a surprise to few that we revisit the theme of *Crisis*. Intermingled with the global impact of COVID-19, the time between CPJ issues saw “strong-men” authoritarians empowered around the world and the racism of state violence undressed. We watched George Floyd slowly die under the knee of Officer Derek Chauvin for nine minutes and twenty-nine seconds. Social and spatial fissures exploded.

Accordingly, the CPJ Editorial Collective reconvened in 2020 after a two year hiatus. A group of over twenty doctoral and masters students in UCLA’s Urban Planning program, the Collective developed a call for papers that asked authors to respond to this moment by considering the historical relationship between planning and crisis. Our editors were unequivocal: planning is not in a steady march towards justice. Rather, planners and their allied practitioners around the world have been directly implicated in the root-causes of inequality and social cleavage, thereby helping to condition modern discord. So, crisis, itself, should be examined as an ongoing phenomenon of concern to planning scholarship. We sought out pieces that brought to light stories of injustice, history, and course-correction that could offer future pathways towards redress.

As multicultural and multilingual scholars, we set out to broaden who could submit and who could read the final printed journal. We invited authors to submit pieces in any language, knowing that within our collective we had the capacity for multilingual review. We were excited to receive a small number of submissions in languages other than English, and hope that this can grow in future volumes. Notable in Volume 25 was a large number of Portuguese submissions and articles concerning Brazil by Brazilian authors. Recognizing Critical Planning as a Los Angeles-based journal, all submissions were translated to ensure legibility to Spanish and English readers alike. Volume 25 is designed to flatten the global linguistic hierarchy dominated by English.

We closed our call for papers on January 15th 2021, having received a tremendous cohort of submissions from around the world. The themes of Volume 25’s articles are broad, and reflect the range of geographies and interests of our authors: COVID-19-era food-system insecurities around the world; white supremacist housing histories; barriers to institutionalizing the constitutional right to housing in Brazil; varying applications of “land-as-security.” As managing editors, we have unpaid debts to all the

members of the CPJ Editorial Collective, who offered their time and labor in order to bring these works to the fore.

The articles in Volume 25 are arranged both thematically and geographically. We begin with the ways in which planners and unfettered market conditions have mediated social disparities along racial and economic lines in the United States. In their piece, Tessa Vogel, Mark Adam Rud, Mitch Markey and Jaap Vos question the use of traditional planning practices in rural areas. They introduce the framework of “sporadic pixelated use for residence” to explain how the urbanization of rural landscapes intensified as a result of the global pandemic, which resulted in the vulnerability of agricultural land stocks transitioning into residential development. These authors argue that a *planning for future generations ethos* at all scales of agricultural land governance will bolster the preservation of growing land in the country. Moving from rural to urban, Melissa Rovner explains that early 20th century developers marketed Los Angeles’ View Park neighborhood as a racial haven for White homeowners, while subdividing tracts deprived of basic amenities to be marketed towards Black families and the working poor. These exercises demonstrate how planners and developers created and exacerbated racialized disparities in wealth that have rippled through generations. Staying in Southern California, Peter Chesney argues that “transportation neoliberals” regulated the ride-share ancestor, the jitney, out of existence in the early 20th century. Chesney contends that while the jitney has remained in-vogue globally, in Manila’s jeepney and Zimbabwe’s konbi for example, it was resurrected in Southern California in 2012 as the ride-share company Lyft. An outside-of-LA County mandate, strong unions, and heavy regulation, argues Chesney, can strengthen the public mandate of paratransit, and help regular people get around. The analyses in each of these three articles help us think through, and possibly out of, complex problems of urbanization in the U.S.

The second half of the journal moves us through the United States and into the comparative geographies of Latin America. Examining the shared opportunities and limits of tenure in Mexican ejidos and the suburbs of Detroit, Carrie Gammell and Samuel Maddox document the concept of land as security. In both cases, the authors find that speculation threatens the distribution of land typologies that were key to how each federal government shaped the livelihoods of their citizens. Issues of security beyond land are found in Felipe Orsenz’s article that tackles urban-food security

in Mexico City. Thinking through the vulnerability of centralized food markets revealed by COVID-19, Orsenz suggests that markets like Mexico City's Central de Abasto, and the city's food security as a whole, have to become less concentrated in order to survive under the pressures of NAFTA and neoliberalism. Food plays a central role in Stefan Norgaard's examination of a crisis of violence that continues to exist in Mexico's State of Michoacán. Stemming from elicited forms of competition inside of the global avocado trade, and defying surface level analyses that suggest Michoacán's crisis of violence has abated, our author argues here that a move towards ethnographic, community-level research methods can help to reconcile the disparities between described and lived realities. Our final piece offers a pathway towards transformative urbanization by examining the crisis and failures of implementing Brazil's Right to the City legislation. Clarissa Freitas and Luísa Vieira da Ponte provide an account of public participation in land regularization in Fortaleza, Brazil. The authors compare how invited and invented spaces of participation are used during land regularization processes in two informal settlements. In doing so, they demonstrate how the integration of conflict and addressing the "real" city within a process of participation can create transformative inclusion through tenure security and improved quality of the built environment. Taken together, these articles ask us to consider the role urban planning plays in creating and withholding secure futures.

In addition to standard form articles, we also present to you a number of creative submissions. These pieces help us consider different ways of knowing and speaking about planning-in-crisis through visual and written-forms of relatively unleashed expression. What did it *look* like to walk the streets of Southern California in the summer of 2020? What would people *show you*, if you asked them to imagine the homes they couldn't travel to while locked down? How would a poet sing to you what it felt like to become an urbanist as a kid with a back-pack, strap-hanging from one edge of the city to the next? What does mass production upon the earth look like *from the sky*? These are some of the critical questions that Volume 25's artists and urban planning scholars, Hilary Malson, Mike the Poet, Cassie Hoeprich, and Rayne Laborde ask.

Since the publication of Volume 24, we at UCLA Urban Planning have lost irreplaceable members of our community, VC Powe and Dr. Leobardo Estrada. Dr. Estrada, an expert demographer, urban planning researcher, and teacher, was a gift to all students he guided. VC Powe was the Executive Director of External Programs at Luskin, and is remembered as a tireless student advocate. In this volume, a group of Leo's students reflect on his life and legacy. Masters of

Urban Planning student, Daniel Luu, memorializes VC in his piece, *Rest in Peace and Power*.

It is a tremendous privilege and responsibility to steer Critical Planning Journal towards any given year's publication. We are now twenty-five volumes old. That is over a quarter century of advancing heterodox planning scholarship and decentering hegemonic players and vernaculars. Because the practice of planning - that is, the organized craft of making good places through policy, social mobilization and design - continually faces threats of cooptation into ineffective and sometimes nefarious channels, the need for alternative forums like CPJ is as pressing as ever.

Finally, as this Volume is completed at a time where we are seemingly exiting crisis, in the tradition of Critical Planning, we ask that you reconsider this notion. Rather than hurriedly assembling retrospectives on the accomplishments and failures of COVID-era planners, we might shift discourse towards ongoing inequality, unintended consequences, the job not done, and the work remaining. As editors, our hope is that the volume before you might serve as an example of such a discourse.

We hope you enjoy reading this Volume as much as we did putting it together.

Your Co-Managing Editors,
Daniel Iwama & Jessica Bremner

Le(o)gacy: You will get this done...

Warmth. Refuge. Mentor. Profe. The most common words used to describe Leobardo “Leo” Estrada. Most of us would say that we would never have finished our programs without him. All of us miss him terribly. Although he never described his theoretical approach to working with his students, academics would call it identity-affirming, culturally resonant, or trauma-informed. Where universities pay their “diversity and inclusion” officers big bucks and spin their wheels on how to best support their students, we realize that Leo had the formula down: warm smile, welcoming office, laughter, clear guidance, and constant reassurance. He was more than just a nice guy. With academic integrity and acumen that were above most others, he provided encyclopedic advice on all things urban planning. He helped us with our research and writing, getting us to the finish line with our dissertations and theses. “You will get this done,” he said. So, we did.

This co-authored piece provides our best attempt at writing about our profe who left us too soon. Through tears and laughter, we constructed our individual recollections and put together this introductory section on his life and contributions. We hope that it provides the reader a glimpse into this giant that came before us.



NINA M. FLORES

Doctoral Advisee 2011 - 2016

It was pouring the morning, when for reasons unknown, I decided to answer the phone. Driving in erratic Southern California storm traffic, I can still picture the blur of brake lights through the streaks made by my ineffective windshield wipers. On the other end of the line came a measured, calm voice:

"Hello, this is Leo Estrada from UCLA. I'm reading your PhD application and wanted to talk. Tell me about this jury consulting. Wait, do I hear rain? Are you driving? Pull over so you're safe..."

I already trusted this caring voice in my ear and quickly adhered to his advice. From the stillness of my parked car, windows fogging and rain hurtling against it in uneven bursts, two things happened: 1) my first of hundreds of conversations with Leo unfolded, meandering from PhD life to family to travel, and 2) I experienced the first hint of authentic care that he so carefully imparted to all of his students – a way of moving through this world that forever shaped my own approach to teaching and mentorship.

A week later I received my acceptance to the program. A month later I met Leo in person for the first time. Now that voice in my ear was intentionally instilling confidence, building a foundation for me to believe that I belonged in this program, belonged in academia. He believed in me long before I believed in myself.

"I'm not worried about you -- you're going to excel."

I think about these words often, especially as I continue creating my own career path. What does it mean to excel? What does it look like? Feel like? Who can help us imagine new ways of excelling? Will they be accepted in an academic world that prizes quantity of publications and citations over quality of teaching and mentorship?

Often, if I mention that I'm an alum of UCLA's urban planning program, people quickly follow up with the question: "Do you know Leo Estrada?" As we share smiles and laughs and stories, the truths eventually start to tumble out:

"He's the only reason I graduated."
"I wouldn't have made it through the program without him."
"Everyone else had given up on me except for him."

When I think about the decades of students who benefited, and continue benefiting, from his authentic care I see the inimitable influence of Leo's guidance.

I see how he excelled in a profession in which we're charged with holding students in our care as they engage in the process of learning and unlearning.

I see his quiet resistance to the soul-crushing acceptance of "publish or perish" - the mantra of academia.

I see that resistance echoed again and again with his endless commitment to teaching, service, mentorship, and student support as the key priorities in higher education.

I see how to apply and replicate his model of care-based mentoring -- guiding students, working with them to build their agency, and helping them balance personal, academic, and professional growth.

I see how rare it is to have encountered someone who dedicated their career to uplifting everyone from students to junior faculty to the campus as a whole.

I see the power, impact, and lasting legacy of his choices and recognize that as Leo's former advisees we have a model for prioritizing authentic care through the choices we make every day, every month, every term.

Leo used to joke about one day calling upon his "revolutionary army" of students from across his decades of teaching and mentoring. We hear your call Leo, and we will champion your legacy. Rest in peace and power.

MARCIA HALE

Doctoral Advisee 2011 - 2018

Where would we be without our teachers? Our mentors? I can imagine a dozen scenarios for my own life less-realized. However, I know for sure that the more actualized version of life that I get to live would not have unfolded without the mentorship of Professor Leo Estrada. A true teacher, Professor Estrada cared as much about the lives of his students as he did for society as a whole. The vision of justice and the commitment to community that drove his work translated into care for each individual that he worked with. This integrity or cohesion was a defining aspect of Leo's character for me.

I met Leo as a second-year student in the Urban Planning Master's Program. While away for fieldwork in Guatemala over the summer, I received notice that I was offered a fall teaching assistantship. I had no way of knowing at the time the pivotal role this position would play in my life. I returned home to LA and met Professor Leo Estrada, just a couple of weeks before classes began. That office on the fifth floor would become my refuge over the next seven years. And the class, Planning with Minority Communities, was

so profoundly rich, in principles and in pedagogy, that it continues to teach and guide me today. I would TA the class three times over the next few years. What I remember most is the first time I heard Leo deliver his closing punchline at the end of that first quarter. In a lecture hall of 80 students, he asked people to turn and look at one another, to acknowledge and appreciate each other and the community that had been built over the course of the semester.

At the time I was too green to appreciate the complexity, but that moment has stayed with me ever since. It was the first time I seriously considered pursuing a PhD and creating a life as a teacher and an academic researcher. Later, as I began teaching my own classes, I modeled my pedagogy after Leo's classroom. My intention for our time together is to build a community in which we come to know and care for one another. From this care and connection, we collectively engage questions of and frameworks for justice and equity. It wasn't until the middle of my third year as an assistant professor building university and community partnerships that I realized another layer of this course. Planning with Minority Communities was about learning the significance of being in community! What an incredible lesson, especially for planning students. It is not about the activity of engaging or building community, but rather about being a part of community. Emotionally, psychologically, spiritually we further equity and justice from within, not externally. Profoundly revolutionary for a planning school.

Leo was a revolutionary in so many ways. His care for students and for his broader communities compelled this incredibly successful and accomplished researcher to spend an enormous amount of his

professional life mentoring. While he was not rewarded by the institution for his efforts, having ended his career as an associate rather than as a well-deserved full professor, I know that he found his rewards in the light of life and purpose that he saw in his students' eyes. He tended that light as sacred, not least of all by allowing himself to be guided in his mentoring by the students themselves. He listened deeply to each of our goals and aspirations, curiosities and commitments, and challenges and heartaches. He guided us by affirming us, never imposing will or expectations of his own or of the institution. He recognized the knowing, the vision, inside each of us that had brought us into the program. He believed in and nurtured that vision, mentoring us in how to harness the institution and its certifications to aid in realizing the vision. Leo was part wizard, part Yoda, part Paulo Coelho, part bouncer, part gatekeeper, shepherding us through the institutional morass – teaching us how to navigate with our hearts and integrity intact.

These characteristics translated across disciplines, sectors, and cultures. Leo served as an expert demographer to the U.S. Census Bureau. He lent his expertise in race and ethnicity, working toward a more representative census and a more just allocation of resources. He served as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Population Division and as Staff Assistant to the Deputy Director. He was a technical advisor to the National Center on Health Statistics, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and National Institute for Drug Abuse. Leo was beloved by students that he worked with in the U.S. and around the globe. He coordinated the UCLA Study Abroad program in Geneva - Global Environment and Sustainability,



now transferred to the University of Geneva. He also served as one of the coordinators of the Urban Futures Program that includes UCLA, the University of Geneva and the University of Sydney. Through Leo's mentorship, I was able to experience both of these programs, which informed my comparative research. I was inspired by his work and guided into my own at the intersections of global migration, the climate crisis, and the use of international and regional frameworks to forward social and environmental justice. But I also witnessed how Leo became a part of each community that he participated in, and was quickly valued as an expert, mentor, and bridge builder.

Leo left this world far too soon. But his legacy lives on in the countless people he taught, mentored, supported and inspired. Like Leo himself, his legacy is nuanced and carries evolving wisdom. In this current moment, its message is: It's not what you know – it's how you know it, what you do with it, and how you live and create from it that matters.

PALOMA GIOTTONINI

Doctoral Advisee 2012 - 2018

I completed my PhD in the summer of 2018. About one year later, I was offered a lecturer position at the Department of Urban Planning. I have no words to describe the array of emotions I felt when I was assigned to Leo's office, the same office that I had visited so many times during my PhD. As I opened the door, I realized that everything was there in the exact same position, his books, his writings, his computer, a vast collection of his students' dissertations, many

of them typewritten, additional evidence of a legacy that spans many generations. As I entered the office, I automatically sat in the chair facing Leo's desk, the same chair I used on many occasions during office hours. It took me a while to use his chair, and every time I did, I felt his enormous presence in the room.

As many of his students will attest, Leo's mentorship was not only special and different to anything we had experienced before. His support was crucial in a system that rarely offers nor recognizes anything quite like it. To Leo, his students' lives were as important, and sometimes even more important, than their research. Leo never questioned why we spent our limited meeting time discussing issues outside of our academic life. He understood that some of us had to take care of our children, our elders, even our friends.

He was an unstoppable supporter of diversity in academia. This was an especially important part of his *quiet protest*. In one of our first meetings, I expressed concerns about falling behind, noticing that everyone in my cohort was single, younger, and educated in the US, while I was the only international student with a thick accent and a 9-month-old baby at home. With a slight smile Leo said that I had nothing to worry about, that it is OK to have a life. As a reassurance, he said that sometimes, when things got complicated, other professors would send students to him. He was commonly asked by other departments to guide, support, and push many students to get through their programs, even when he was not on their committees.

There was a lot of dignity in the support he provided. His support was quiet, benign, but constant. It was always there but barely felt. It was not an overt "Yeah you can do this!". He gave the quiet support one

Remembering Leobardo Estrada, 1945-2018



gets from someone who will never openly say they are there to push you, but will make sure you stand up, will hold your hand, and will walk beside you to see that you keep going.

It is clear to me that his enormous legacy, his mentorship, his work has touched and changed so many lives inside and outside the academic realm. Every time I meet someone who knew Leo, I learn something new about him, some other project, some other activity that he took on. Every time the story or the experience is about a meaningful thing that changed someone's life for the better.

In one of my last office hours sessions in his office, I was talking to one of my students. A young first-generation undergraduate student from an immigrant background who was in his last year at UCLA. He was questioning his decision to get an education as he had to sacrifice many things. He was questioning his belonging in this university. Apart from his studies, he had a full-time job and had to contribute to support his family. He humbly said: "I don't know if I'm doing the right thing, Profe, sometimes I think I should just quit and do more for my family." (Profe is short for Professor, in Spanish, and something Leo was called often). In that conversation I recognized, even more, the power of Leo's mentorship and support to underrepresented students. I took that student calling me "profe" as a badge of honor, as a welcome into the legacy of Leo. Most importantly, I understood my commitment to continue his work, a responsibility which I think is shared by many of us, his students. Leo gave us a great example of how not to fall into the traps of academia, to keep our humanity, to guide and support those like us, to always find adequate words of encouragement for those who are struggling on this lonely path. Leo opened the gates widely and shared his key with us.

SARAH SOAKAI

Doctoral Advisee 2016 - 2018

I first met Leo at the UCLA faculty lounge for PhD Welcome Day. I left with the impression that I had no idea what I was getting into. Apparently, I did not. I am not sure I would have survived my first year as a doctoral student without Leo. When I lost a child my first year, Leo helped me focus on self-care and the task at hand as a first-year doctoral student and then as a second-year (getting through core graduate course requirements and comprehensive qualifying exams). Before he passed away, Leo helped me figure out the nuts and bolts at the beginning of the exam process. I completed the exams, in part, for him, his passing, and his legacy.

Like many students, office hour meetings with Leo were what I needed to survive, thrive, and succeed

in graduate school. Part of Leo's mentoring meant reading out loud some of my writing. After reading through the final course papers from Law and the Pacific Islands and Advanced Planning History and Theory, Leo argued that the institution (the academy) should bend, cater, acclimate, and adjust to the student, not the student to the institution. This was part of Leo's mentoring philosophy. As one of the first Latino sociologists in the country, he understood the importance of navigating institutions unlikely to bend, cater, acclimate, adjust to students, especially students still in/on the margins of the academic institution like students of color and women. Leo mentored and equipped such students with the confidence and tools to navigate and negotiate the academy that is still very much set in its old traditions even though a supposed progressive, liberal facade is espoused.

Since I was advised by Leo at the end of his professional career and because he is who he is, he had already been through a slew of various, diverse students from different backgrounds with multiple experiences. As a former educator at a Title 1 public high school, mentoring and teaching such a diversity is not an easy endeavor, and anyone that says differently, has not really mentored and taught. Leo did both seamlessly among a cadre of diverse students. I am no exception. I am sure he had questions, issues, and found a faith I practice (I am LDS/Mormon) and that is essentially part of my being awkward and limiting. I sensed this through meeting with him on a weekly basis my first year, but he did what is supposed to do in mentoring and teaching me through to reach program milestones.

At a demography symposium honoring him, in addition to the scholarly rage folks expressed about Leo never reaching full professorship at UCLA (yet he was chair of the Academic Senate not once, but twice!), Maria Blanco² described how Leo democratized mapping. He perhaps democratized many things as a pioneer in Latinx Sociology and Urban Planning. During contemporary moments when the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated injustices and racial polarization continues to manifest in different ways across the United States, Leo's legacy reminds us all that while 'knowledge is power, understanding is liberation.'³ Leo understood.

1. Lehi's dream in The Book of Mormon, Another Testament of Jesus Christ.
2. Demography, Redistricting, and Power: A Symposium in Honor of Dr. Leobardo Estrada's Contributions to the Academy and Community, May 31, 2019, UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative, Luskin, Urban Planning.
3. Manulani Aluli Meyer, National Pacific American Leadership Institute (NaPALI) 2017 Summer Fellowship.

SUSAN NAKAOKA

Doctoral Advisee 2009 - 2014

The borderlands, liminality, double consciousness, in-betweenness – there are many terms that describe the space that people of color occupy in the academy and, more broadly, in the U.S. Embodying warmth, support and a trauma-informed approach, Leo normalized our existence in higher education. As a Japanese American/Chicana, a mother, a student entering a doctoral program at the age of 41, I imagine I had more than my share of insecurities. This was true even though I had done my undergraduate and master's degrees at UCLA - despite my comfort with the institution, still, a feeling of unworthiness lingered.

Because my main advisor was on sabbatical during the year I entered, Leo agreed to be “co-advisor” for me. As the years went on, Leo functioned as my primary advisor, as we had developed a relationship and flow to our work. Leo shepherded me through the program, ensuring that I met each milestone and warning me to stay out of the politics at my full-time job, which was eating me alive. His office at the end of a hall meant safety and warmth when the rest of the building was cold and disconnected. Leo provided a haven for me and so many others.,

Culturally affirming, student-centered, trauma informed, Leo embodied all of these education practices. Students' differences were cherished, not picked apart. Our style and ways of knowing were valued, not critiqued. The rigor and quality of our work was pushed, with gentle nudging and insightful editorial advice. I remember working on a publication that was based on my master's thesis, and although Leo was not familiar with the project, he offered a way to organize the article that respected my frame of intersectionality, while allowing me to hone in on the ways in which race, class, and gender oppression impacts Japanese American women political activists. His broad knowledge and insight guided us on a wide array of research and writing projects.

Even though I had years of teaching experience, I continued to learn from him as I watched him teach “Planning in Minority Communities,” a class that he had created and taught for many years. We talked through each assignment, the syllabus and the class discussions. Most doctoral students don't get the type of pedagogical support necessary to embark on their career of teaching, but Leo provided that for many of us. Even though I graduated in 2014, I continue to teach that course in the summer, introducing new crops of students to his photo, his words, and his assignments. The students, mostly students of color from the LA area, smile as they imagine this giant that came before them.

What I'll remember most about Leo is his warm smile that greeted me with inquiries about my son, my

partner, my parents, my trips to Hawai'i and invited me into conversations about his wife and son and their family vacations in Puerto Ricos. These weren't just meaningless pleasantries. These were life-affirming words that meant that my identity as a woman, mother, partner, person of color, was important, quite “normal” and, most of all, that I belonged.

TISHA HOLMES

Doctoral Advisee: 2012-2015

I met Leo in the Spring of 2012 when I was assigned to be his teaching assistant for *Urbanism: A Spatial Look*. I heard from others that he was a wonderful mentor who cared deeply for his students but never found an opportunity to make it to his office before then. When we met to talk about the class, I understood why his sign up sheet for office hours was always full.

In the classroom, he brought an ease to lecturing, engaging students and designing assignments which helped students creatively learn about the history of urban development from ancient to modern cities. During our meetings, he shared stories about his inspiring academic career, his wife and sons and how much he enjoyed Puerto Rico and golfing. When he offered me an opportunity to lecture, he provided thoughtful encouragement and helpful feedback on content and classroom management. His wide-ranging knowledge and ability to give critical insight with care were endearing. As we made it to the last weeks of the quarter, I felt I found my place in the academy because Leo taught me the value of engaged student mentorship and community activist pedagogy. Then, my father had a stroke. I abruptly left to return to Trinidad to help him recover and hoped to return in time to administer and grade final exams. He passed away two weeks later and sent my world into a tailspin. It was at this point I considered withdrawing from the program.

During that emotional summer, Leo gave much support and care, emphasizing that I needed to be with my family and gave me the space to grieve. When I reached out to talk about my options, his quiet demeanor calmed me as I shared my struggles with grieving, caring for my toddler and meeting the demands of a doctoral program. He empathetically encouraged me to keep pursuing the PhD and committed to help me through the process. At our meetings, he always inquired about my family before we started talking about my progress. I remember his warm laughter when he would try to troubleshoot my dissertation writing blocks and we would brainstorm solutions like playing the lottery. Forever the pragmatic optimist, he was able to quell my anxieties with his step-by-step guidance (and his candy stash), giving me hope that I would eventually prevail. When I

graduated and started working at his alma mater FSU, I felt that even if we were physically far apart, I still was close to him, holding office hours with my first generation students of color in the very building where he went through his doctoral studies. I promised to visit California to bring him a Florida golf ball for his retirement gift. Like my father, his untimely passing left a raw, sad void that even to this day is difficult to accept.

Leo's legacy and impact on the lives of his students and the communities he worked with cannot be understated. His intelligence, grit and passion made him a public intellectual giant. His kindness, patience and compassion made him a beloved educator, mentor and friend. Thank you for believing in us, for sharing your light unconditionally and for showing us the way. We cherish and miss you dearly. Rest in peace and power mi querido Profesor.

YOH KAWANO

Doctoral Advisee 2015 - 2020

Prior to the start of every lecture, I salute a poster that shows Leo smiling back at me. I am seeking guidance, calm, and fortitude before I confront the cacophony of the classroom. I think back to the many encounters I had with Leo in the past 20 years, when he welcomed me to the confines of his office on the 4th floor of UCLA's School of Public Affairs. On one such encounter, I vaulted into his office in distress, tormented by the spectacle that awaited me the following week – the qualifying exams. As I pulled out my notes and rambled incoherently, he stopped me, put my notes aside, cleared the table, and said in his calm and soothing voice, “this is how it is going to be.” In the next ten minutes, he explained how the exam was going to be conducted, what I needed to do to prepare both mentally and physically (bring your favorite snacks he said), and if I did those things, how I would succeed without any doubt in his mind. Somehow, in an instant, my mind was cleared and I knew exactly what I had to do to succeed. As we suddenly found extra time on our hands, we proceeded to talk about my family and the state of international soccer.

Much like John Wooden, the “Wizard of Westwood,” Leo had a profound and lasting impact on each and every student who had the fortune to be mentored by him. Leo taught us that academic success was more than a good GPA, a peer reviewed publication, being cited by others in your field, or hard nosed scholarly rigor. He knew that we are also parents juggling multiple jobs, students living in poverty, immigrants adjusting to life in Los Angeles, collectively dealing with a life full of uncertainties. He understood and related to the pressures we faced

by our own decision to pursue higher education and whether or not it would pay dividends moving forward. We were humans navigating a treacherous and uncertain path. We were all *different* in the types of burdens we shoulder, each with a unique path to success that did not necessarily align with higher education expectations. During my last office hour meeting with him, he told me how he was undergoing his fourth (or maybe it was his fifth?) round of chemotherapy. “There are two kinds of people there. Those who choose to show despair on their sleeves, and those who see it as an opportunity to recover.” Even in the most critical moments of his life, Leo refused to succumb to the negative pressures of life, instead choosing to chat with the nurses and ask about *their* well-being.

I am not alone. Leo is “El Padrino,” as he is fondly referred to by those whose lives he has touched, and in his many years of service. He has a legion of grateful former students. He has left an indelible legacy of care, respect, and mentorship, making us all better human beings because of it. In academic standards, how is this impact measured? The problem is that it is not. Karen Webber, from the Institute of Higher Education at the University of Georgia, conducted a summarized research analysis on the impacts of global higher education, focusing on the institutional measure of faculty productivity. Her investigation into academia seeks to provide analytical data on faculty productivity, painting a picture largely devoid of the very essence of academic life: students. Webber acknowledges these shortcomings as “challenges.” Qualitative measures such as advising, mentorship, total amount of time and effort spent with students, are all “hard to quantify and do not address the quality of effort at all,” and get marginalized in productivity measures (2011 Webber, p108). Instead, conceptual models of faculty productivity rely on measurable metrics such as teaching workload, extramural funds received, number of citations made and referenced, quality of judgement through the peer review process, leadership with research expertise, recruitment efforts, collaboration with peers, commitment to teaching, allocation of time in academic tasks, etc (2011 Webber). The “publish or perish” mentality continues to solidify this trend that measures research productivity through the enumeration of publications produced in a short period of time. Faced with the mounting pressures associated with this de facto rule, early faculty find it increasingly difficult to satisfy the endless demands from students, instead forced to produce measurable research outputs that contribute to their dossiers for advancement considerations.

In the minds of those of us who have received the “Leo Estrada” treatment—and here I am not only speaking of students, but of colleagues, community activists, and an entire cadre of affected individuals—it

is a shame that Leo was not formally considered for the totality of his legacy. Higher education needs to do better, allowing its platform to acknowledge and reserve its highest platitudes to those who have made the largest impact on those who matter most: students.

Webber K.L. (2011) Measuring Faculty Productivity. In: Shin J., Toutkoushian R., Teichler U. (eds) University Rankings. The Changing Academy – The Changing Academic Profession in International Comparative Perspective, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1116-7_6

REMEMBERING LEOBARDO ESTRADA, 1945-2018

(Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7 to Nov. 9, 2018.)

Leobardo (“Leo”) Felipe Estrada, who recently retired after a four-decade career at UCLA, passed away on November 3, 2018 at his home in Playa del Rey, California, surrounded by his family and close friends. He was 73.

Born in El Paso, Texas on May 6, 1945, Leo was the son of Leobardo Estrada, a prominent Baptist minister, and Isabel Estrada. When Leo was four years old, the family moved to Dallas and eight years later to Los Angeles where he graduated in 1962 from El Rancho High School in Pico Rivera. He attended Baylor University, graduating in 1966 and continued his education at Florida State University, earning a Ph.D. in Sociology and Demography in 1970.

Leo began his teaching career in 1970 at North Texas State University in Denton where he taught Sociology. In 1977, he joined the faculty at UCLA’s Department of Urban Planning and retired after four decades in June 2018. In 2015, he was the first Latino elected to the rare honor and responsibility of representing the entire UCLA faculty in their governance of the university as Chair of the Academic Senate. Over his 48 years in academia, he took sabbaticals and summer leave to do research or teach at the University of Texas El Paso, the U.S. Bureau of the Census in Washington, the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center, the University of Geneva, Switzerland and the University of Sinaloa in Mexico.

Leo was the ultimate teacher. Teaching and mentoring were his deepest passions at UCLA and the other campuses where he worked. He trained, inspired and empowered hundreds of students whose careers were launched and advanced in great part due to his support. His success with students came from a unique and effective blend of Socratic listening and questioning, appreciation of the whole person, gentle yet persuasive pushing, and savvy guidance for surmounting challenges especially those of students without role models in educational pursuits. At his retirement, many of his colleagues recognized and praised his role in making UCLA’s Urban Planning program more student-centric.

As a researcher, Leo reached far beyond the academic spheres. He was a leading applied researcher on the elderly, urban conflict, census policies and methods, and most importantly, in redistricting efforts impacting Latinos and other racial/ethnic minorities. His seminal demographic work for redistricting produced the 1990 redistricting changes for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and led to the first Latina being elected to the Board of Supervisors. He provided primary evidence for the leading advocacy organizations on voting rights such as NALEO, Advancement Project, and MALDEF. And

as an entrepreneur, he participated as a partner or research leader in several research and consulting companies.

Leo served on the boards of numerous organizations and corporations including AARP, SCAN Health Plan Group, Broadway Stores, National Association of Child Care Resources and Referral Agencies, Hispanics in Philanthropy, The California Endowment (as a founding member), Santa Marta Hospital, among many others. He also served on dozens of advisory boards.

Over the long term, Leo’s most significant legacy will be his untiring commitment and numerous contributions to community empowerment and social justice. For example, in 1991, he was appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley to the Christopher Commission that assessed police-community relations following the Rodney King beating. His tireless and insightful work on the Commission contributed to new approaches to community policing that have spread throughout the nation. Through direct and indirect efforts and time, Leo supported numerous organizations in Los Angeles and beyond, especially those dedicated to improving the lives of the underrepresented. He was a passionate force committed to helping women gain financial stability as exemplified by his two-decade service on the Board of New Economics for Women. He fully exemplified the importance and value of community service to his colleagues, the urban planning field and UCLA, the institution he loved, appreciated, and transformed.

But, above all, Leo treasured and loved his family. He was a devoted husband, father, grandfather, brother, brother-in-law, and uncle. He is survived by his beloved wife of 36 years, Ivelisse Rodriguez Estrada; their two sons Andres and partner Lucianne Ungerbuehler and Ricardo and partner Shadeh Shabestari; and their much-loved grandson and son of Andres, Ezana Estrada. He also leaves behind a son, Adam Estrada of Austin Texas; three sisters, Priscilla, Irma and Omega of Dallas Texas; and a large extended family throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

**Rest In Peace
& Power**

DAVID LUU



Remembering VC Powe, 1954-2020

Death and Life of The Great American Landscapes: How Traditional Planning's Failures Fragment Rural Western Places

Tessa Vogel, Mark Adam Rud,
Mitch Markey & Jaap Vos

ABSTRACT

Historically, the planning profession has focused on the problems of urban areas and largely ignored the issues of rural areas. Within the planning profession, rural places are most often seen as those yet to become urban. Consequently, planners not only ignore the needs of rural populations but also overlook the importance of rural landscapes for food production. Rural areas and their natural amenities are now an appealing alternative for wealthy urbanites trying to escape from high housing prices and congested cities.

This paper highlights the planning crisis in rural areas, including how the conversion and loss of agricultural lands is directly driven by poorly considered application of traditional planning tools. This paper asserts that if planners continue to use urban planning tools to address rural issues, they will have actively contributed to the demise of rural landscapes. Rural contexts beg for place-based approaches that acknowledge land and lifestyle challenges of non-urban space. Without a change of approach, planners will continue to play a central role in the conversion of productive rural lands to residential development, perpetuating a crisis of planning.

INTRODUCTION

Rural in-migration to counties adjacent to metropolitan regions has seen an upswing over the past decade, particularly to amenity areas with recreational value (Cromartie et al. 2020). The extension of high-speed internet access to rural communities and a rising dependence on online retail have facilitated remote living and working ("Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales" 2020) and accelerated the intrusion of external actors to rural places. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this trend toward settlement of undeveloped landscapes, where fresh air, scenic views, and lower exposure to public health risks beckon ("What to Look for..." 2020). New coronavirus funding currently bolsters remote lifestyles under banners of telehealth and education (Hyer 2020). Pending federal funding for infrastructure may provide still more investment in rural connectivity, which may result in even more development and growth.

With the ability to live and work virtually anywhere, settlement patterns are rapidly

Muerte y Vida de Los Grandes Paisajes Norteamericanos: Cómo Errores de Planificación Tradicional Fragmentan Lugares Rurales del Oeste Estadounidense

Tessa Vogel, Mark Adam Rud,
Mitch Markey & Jaap Vos

RESUMEN

Históricamente, la profesión de la planificación se ha centrado en los problemas de las zonas urbanas y ha ignorado en gran medida los problemas de las zonas rurales. Dentro de la profesión de planificación, los lugares rurales se consideran con mayor frecuencia como aquellos que aún no se han convertido en urbanos. En consecuencia, los planificadores no solo ignoran las necesidades de las poblaciones rurales, sino que también pasan por alto la importancia de los paisajes rurales para la producción de alimentos. Las áreas rurales y sus comodidades naturales son ahora una alternativa atractiva para los residentes urbanos adinerados que intentan escapar de los altos precios de la vivienda y las ciudades congestionadas.

Este documento destaca la crisis de planificación en las áreas rurales, describiendo cómo la conversión y pérdida de tierras agrícolas está directamente impulsada por un uso deficiente de las herramientas de planificación tradicionales. Este documento afirma que, si los planificadores continúan utilizando herramientas de planificación urbana para abordar los problemas rurales, habrán contribuido activamente a la desaparición de los paisajes rurales. Los contextos rurales requieren acercamientos que se basen en el lugar, que reconozcan los desafíos de la tierra y el estilo de vida del espacio no urbano. Sin un cambio de enfoque, los planificadores seguirán desempeñando un papel central en la conversión de tierras rurales productivas al desarrollo residencial, perpetuando una crisis de planificación.

INTRODUCCIÓN

La inmigración rural a los condados adyacentes a las regiones metropolitanas ha experimentado un repunte durante la última década, particularmente áreas de alta comodidad con valor recreativo (Cromartie et al. 2020). El acceso a Internet de alta velocidad con el que cuentan las comunidades rurales y la creciente dependencia al comercio en línea han facilitado la vida y el trabajo remoto (*Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 2020*) y ha acelerado la intrusión de actores externos en los lugares rurales. La pandemia del COVID-19 aceleró esta tendencia hacia el asentamiento en paisajes no desarrollados, donde el aire fresco, las vistas panorámicas y una menor exposición a los riesgos de salud pública

reconfiguring to suit the desires of new residents. The Western U.S. has experienced unprecedented population growth as people from other parts of the country have migrated in search of a simpler lifestyle (Benzow 2021). The permanent landscape effects of the rural conversion process have been underexplored by the planning community. Implications for the loss of productive agricultural lands amid the current pace of population growth represents a crisis for the profession as profound changes in land use and lifestyles extend into rural space.

This article explores the application of planning in rural places and shows how urban planning tools unintentionally facilitate the transformation of the rural landscape into suburban sprawl. The methods we use included conversations with rural Idaho planners, professionals in related sectors, and rural farmers where the topic of the preservation of agricultural and working lands were discussed. We then contextualize rural planning with place-based issues, focusing on how the Western U.S. demonstrates the unique nature of rural land uses while highlighting problems in contemporary Idaho. We conclude by urging for a new rural planning approach, citing non-traditional models that adequately apply to rural landscapes and their communities beyond failed urban-centric praxes.

PLANNING'S URBAN ROOTS AND LOW-DENSITY DEVELOPMENT

Historically, planning is an urban profession, with theory and practice centered around city concerns. JAPA's special issue celebrating the profession's centennial references agricultural space only three times: as a vestige of bygone sustainability ideals (Daniels 2009), as a neglected space in post-war suburban design patterns (Hoffman 2009), and as an implied non-concern for modern urban form (Talen 2009). The inference is that planning's responsibility emanates from the city and city-region, with hinterlands relegated to dumping grounds, extractive grounds, playgrounds, and byways for increasingly globalized urban processes (Brenner and Schmid 2012). In a review of the literature on rural planning, Frank and Reisch conclude that "the planning profession has largely approached rural communities, if they are approached at all, as downscaled cities, cities in waiting" (Frank, Reisch 2014).

Urban peripheries are perceived as vacant grounds of future city space. Consider the Pacific Northwest states' mandated growth boundaries, which incorporate "preservation" of working lands despite mixed observations of success (Hepinstall-Cymerman, Coe, and Hutyra 2013; Kline et al. 2014; Lewis et al. 2018). We define working lands as lands that are actively managed to generate long term income from agriculture and forestry. Washington and Oregon cities are designed to expand into peri-urban

atrasen (*What to Look for...* 2020). Los nuevos fondos de financiamiento para el coronavirus actualmente refuerzan los estilos de vida remotos bajo insignia de tele-salud y educación (Hyer 2020). Los fondos de financiación federal que están pendientes para infraestructura podrían proporcionar aún más inversión en conectividad rural, lo cual podría resultar en aún más desarrollo y crecimiento.

La capacidad de vivir y trabajar prácticamente en cualquier lugar, está reconfigurando los patrones de asentamiento para rápidamente adaptarlos a los deseos de los nuevos residentes. El oeste de EE. UU. ha experimentado un crecimiento demográfico sin precedentes a medida que personas de otras partes del país han migrado en busca de un estilo de vida más simple (Benzow 2021). Los efectos paisajísticos permanentes del proceso de conversión rural han sido poco explorados por la comunidad de planificación.

A medida que los cambios profundos en el uso de la tierra y los estilos de vida se extienden al espacio rural, las implicaciones en cuanto a la pérdida de tierras agrícolas productivas en medio del ritmo actual de crecimiento de la población representan una crisis para la profesión.

Este artículo explora la aplicación de la planificación en lugares rurales y muestra cómo las herramientas de planificación urbana facilitan involuntariamente la transformación del paisaje rural a una expansión suburbana. Los métodos que utilizamos incluyeron conversaciones con planificadores rurales de Idaho, profesionales de sectores relacionados y agricultores rurales donde se abordó el tema de la preservación de las tierras agrícolas y de tierras de trabajo que discutimos. Luego, contextualizamos la planificación rural con problemas basados en el lugar, centrándonos en cómo el oeste de los EE. UU. demuestra la naturaleza única de los usos de la tierra rural al tiempo que destaca los problemas en el Idaho contemporáneo. Concluimos instando a un nuevo acercamiento de planificación rural, citando modelos no tradicionales que se aplican adecuadamente a los paisajes rurales y sus comunidades más allá de las prácticas fallidas centradas en las ciudades.

RAÍCES URBANAS DE PLANIFICACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DE BAJA DENSIDAD

Históricamente, la planificación es una profesión urbana, con la teoría y la práctica centradas en las preocupaciones de la ciudad. El número especial de JAPA que celebra el centenario de la profesión hace referencia al espacio agrícola solo tres veces: como un vestigio de ideales de sostenibilidad pasados (Daniels 2009), como un espacio descuidado en los patrones de diseño suburbano de la posguerra (Hoffman 2009), y como una no preocupación implícita por la forma urbana moderna (Talen 2009).

La inferencia es que la responsabilidad de la

agricultural space reserved for growth (Sullivan 2015). The region's effectiveness to reduce sprawl matches the nationwide, inconclusive urban growth controls (Anthony 2004; Paulsen 2013). Since its inception in 1978, Portland, Oregon's Metro has expanded its border 36 times (Latta 2016). While Portland's urban growth boundary is often touted as exemplary among land use programs for preservation, the productive agricultural fringe still lies in wait for the city. Most planners think of urban sprawl as subdivisions leapfrogging into nearby countryside, and adjacent hinterlands filling in with similar development. From the rural perspective, the suburbanization process begins much earlier. The model outlined by Esparza and Carruthers in *JPER* (2000) suggests that modification of rural areas starts with very low-density residential development deeper in rural places. The first step is not a leapfrog subdivision but a kangaroo jump of a single home site within productive acreage. We can call this a sporadic pixelated use for residence (SPUR), which occurs farther from newly urbanizing nodes.

In their article exploring suburbanization of Sierra Vista, Arizona, Esparza and Carruthers (2000) demonstrate how planners directly contribute to the cyclical development of ex-urban lands. Beginning as a low-density prospect, the authors illustrate that agglomeration of subdivided SPURs eventually invites problems associated with competing urban land uses. Professional planning arrives as an institution to arrange land use geographies with the century-old rational model and zoning ordinances until rural land increasingly resembles the central metros originally fled. The process then repeats itself, physically extending as far as the latest transportation innovations and funding will allow (Kaplan, Holloway, and Wheeler 2014). This planning posture is reactive, and it fails to recognize its own role in the suburbanization process. Sierra Vista allowed for large lot housing within an aggressively annexed municipal boundary, yet developers still perceived development within the municipal boundary this as too onerous and simply sought less regulated land beyond the city border in unincorporated Cochise County (Esparza and Carruthers 2000, 29).

What Esparza and Carruthers deduced from Arizona occurs across the country, large lot zoning and growth boundaries with rural SPUR development. Key to spatial progression is what Esparza and Carruthers describe as planners' nonchalance toward intersecting land market dynamics, where lower-cost, more loosely regulated land coveted for any number of rural values becomes pressured by capital for residential conversion (2000, 31-2). A recent report from the American Farmland Trust found that between 2001 and 2016, low-density residential development in agricultural areas was 23 times more likely to convert to urban and high-density residential patterns than

planificación emana de la ciudad y la ciudad-región, con zonas periféricas relegadas a vertederos, terrenos extractivos, patios de recreo y caminos secundarios para procesos urbanos cada vez más globalizados (Brenner y Schmid 2012). En una revisión de la literatura sobre planificación rural, Frank y Reisch concluyen que "la profesión de la planificación se ha acercado en gran medida a las comunidades rurales, si es que se acercan a ellas, como ciudades reducidas, ciudades en espera" (Frank, Reisch 2014).

Las periferias urbanas se perciben como terrenos vacíos del futuro espacio urbano. Considere los límites de crecimiento obligatorios de los estados del noroeste del Pacífico, que incorporan la "preservación" de las tierras de trabajo a pesar de las observaciones mixtas de éxito (Hepinstall-Cymerman, Coe y Hutyra 2013; Kline et al. 2014; Lewis et al. 2018). Definimos tierras de trabajo como tierras que se gestionan activamente para generar ingresos de agricultura y silvicultura a largo plazo. Las ciudades de Washington y Oregón están diseñadas para expandirse y penetrar los espacios agrícolas periurbanos reservados para el crecimiento (Sullivan 2015). La eficacia de la región para reducir la expansión descontrolada coincide con los controles de crecimiento urbano inconclusos a nivel nacional (Anthony 2004; Paulsen 2013). Desde su inicio en 1978, el Metro de Portland, Oregón, ha expandido su frontera 36 veces (Latta 2016). Si bien el límite de crecimiento urbano de Portland a menudo se promociona como ejemplar entre los programas de uso de la tierra para la preservación, la agricultura productiva todavía se encuentra a la espera de la ciudad. La mayoría de los planificadores piensan en la expansión urbana (*sprawl*) como subdivisiones que saltan al campo cercano¹, y que las zonas periféricas adyacentes tienen que rellenarse con un desarrollo similar. Desde la perspectiva rural, el proceso de suburbanización comienza mucho antes. El modelo delineado por Esparza y Carruthers en *JPER* (2000) sugiere que la modificación de las áreas rurales comienza con un desarrollo residencial de muy baja densidad, más profundo en los lugares rurales. El primer paso no es una subdivisión tipo salto de rana, sino un salto de canguro a una sola unidad de vivienda dentro de un territorio productivo. Podemos llamar a esto un uso pixelado y esporádico para residencia (SPUR)², que ocurre más lejos de los nuevos nodos urbanizados.

En su artículo que explora la suburbanización de Sierra Vista, Arizona, Esparza y Carruthers (2000) demuestran cómo los planificadores contribuyen directamente al desarrollo cíclico de las tierras ex-urbanas. Comenzando como un prospecto de baja

1. leapfrogging

2. Sporadic pixelated use for residence (SPUR)




Figure 1. Standard Urbanization Model. Author 2020, adapted from Esparza and Carruthers 2000.

Figura 1. Modelo de urbanización estándar. Autor 2020, adaptado de Esparza y Carruthers 2000.

otherwise undeveloped farmland. According to the report, the total impact translated into a nationwide removal of one acre of productive agriculture for urban development every 20 seconds (Freedgood et al. 2020).

Though regional variation is fundamental to local governance, local flexibility remains an issue for preservation policy even under robust, state mandated land use codes. Although Oregon enables local zoning of its remotest lands “exclusively” for productive uses, space designated nominally for food, fiber, and forestry may be replaced by SPURs, resorts, short-term rental housing, golf courses, and utility arrays (Grishkin 2004; Campbell 2019; “What Is EFU Land?” n.d.). Even where zoning implies purely agricultural purposes, conditional uses defeat its intention. For instance, in Owyhee County in southwest Idaho, the invasion of SPURs were only fully appreciated after mapping the county agricultural zone’s conditionally permitted residences. Whether in the regulatory approach of Oregon’s protocols or the more *laissez-faire* enabling statute in Idaho, agricultural zoning has failed to prevent the loss of productive landscapes.

Working landscapes are not “vacant” in wait of inevitable subdivision; they are occupied by essential land uses of industries necessary for human survival and regional economic livelihood. The threat of SPUR development is not the immediate shift in land use from agricultural to residential but the looming prospect of denser development patterns permanently replacing rural land uses across space and time. The further one can afford to drive and “get away from it all,” the further from urban cores the conversion of working landscapes takes place.

**CONTEXTUALIZING WORKING LANDS
ISSUES IN THE RURAL WEST**

Rational planning and Euclidean zoning, derived from urban contexts, have failed to control the physical decline of rural landscapes. This failure stems largely from the unique concerns of rural communities, which are radically different from the demands of urban land

densidad, los autores ilustran que la aglomeración de SPURs subdivididos eventualmente invita a problemas asociados con usos competitivos del suelo urbano. La planificación profesional llega como una institución para arreglar las geografías de uso de la tierra con el modelo racional centenario y las ordenanzas de zonificación, haciendo que la tierra rural se asemeje cada vez más a las áreas metropolitanas de las cuales las personas originalmente huyeron. El proceso luego se repite, extendiéndose físicamente hasta donde lo permitan las últimas innovaciones de transporte y financiamiento (Kaplan, Holloway y Wheeler 2014). Esta postura de planificación es reactiva y no reconoce su propio papel en el proceso de suburbanización. Sierra Vista permitió viviendas en lotes grandes dentro de un límite municipal agresivamente anexado, sin embargo, los desarrolladores aún percibían el desarrollo dentro del límite municipal como demasiado oneroso y simplemente buscaban terrenos menos regulados más allá de la frontera de la ciudad en el condado de Cochise no incorporado (Esparza y Carruthers 2000, 29).

Lo que Esparza y Carruthers dedujeron de Arizona ocurre en todo el país, grandes lotes de zonificación y límites de crecimiento con el desarrollo rural SPUR. La clave para la progresión espacial es lo que Esparza y Carruthers describen como la indiferencia de los planificadores hacia las dinámicas del mercado de la tierra, donde la tierra de menor costo y menos regulada es codiciada por cualquier cantidad de valores rurales, y por lo tanto, se ve presionada por el capital para la conversión residencial (2000, 31-2). Un informe reciente de American Farmland Trust encontró que entre 2001 y 2016, el desarrollo residencial de baja densidad en áreas agrícolas tenía 23 veces más probabilidades de convertirse en patrones residenciales urbanos y de alta densidad que las tierras agrícolas sin desarrollar. Según el informe, el impacto total se tradujo en una remoción a nivel nacional de un acre de agricultura productiva para el desarrollo urbano cada 20 segundos (Freedgood et al. 2020).

use (Frank and Reisch 2014; Lapping 2005; Daniels 2017). It is essential that planning practice focuses on the physical, social, and economic realities of the lands and inhabitants of rural places and the issues facing them.

The core land use dilemma in rural places is the feasibility to continue productive lifestyles on agricultural lands amid development pressures. Bundled property rights include rights to acquire, use, and dispose of property freely (Pilon 2017). When local governments put restrictions on these rights—such as prohibiting land divisions, residential development, or certain uses—landowners are pressured to work within new boundaries. If little to no residential development is allowed or minimum lot sizes are so large that land divisions are impossible, land use tensions can become antagonistic in rural agricultural areas. A secondary conflict exists between identities of self-reliance (a right to do with one's land as one wants) and recognition that the universal exercise of this right will lead to the complete removal of agricultural lifestyles.

Strict zoning and land division regulations by local governments are meant to prevent residential conversion of agricultural lands and limit urban sprawl. Private property owners, in contrast, stress an inherent right to manage their land as they see fit. Often, reconciliation of conflicting perspectives involves finding middle ground that protects agricultural landscapes without creating such narrow restrictions for property owners that they have few viable options for the future. A review of county comprehensive plans in Idaho shows that policy solutions tend toward large lot zoning, which encourages low-density residential development and, ultimately, urbanization.

Minimum lot sizes or maximum divisions from agricultural zoning restrict land splits below a certain size or number. Such regulations are not uniform across states like Idaho, which allows for denser suburban sprawl and SPURs in localities more lenient toward land divisions, often regardless of the zoning or use. The paradox of the private right of residential development in agricultural space is on full display in unincorporated Bonner County in Northern Idaho. Here, the demand for rural homesites is so great that the local planning department proposed a change to its minor land division ordinance to allow private property owners to subdivide land more easily and into more lots with minimal regulation or oversight of potential impacts, as a minor land division is not held to subdivision standards (Bonner County, 2020). Fortunately, the planning and zoning commission recommended keeping the lot limit of minor land divisions to no greater than four lots (Bonner County, 2021).

Rural landowners have limited land use options due to being land rich and cash poor. While rural

Aunque la variación regional es fundamental para la gobernanza local, la flexibilidad local sigue siendo un problema para la política de preservación, incluso en los robustos códigos estatales para el uso de suelos. Aunque Oregón permite la zonificación local de sus tierras más remotas “exclusivamente” para usos productivos, el espacio designado nominalmente para la alimentación, la fibra y la silvicultura puede ser sustituido por SPURs, complejos turísticos, viviendas de alquiler a corto plazo, campos de golf y servicios públicos (Grishkin 2004; Campbell 2019; *What Is EFU Land?* n.d.). Incluso cuando la zonificación implica fines puramente agrícolas, los usos condicionales impiden su intención. Por ejemplo, en el condado de Owyhee en el suroeste de Idaho, la invasión de SPURs solo se apreció completamente después de mapear las residencias condicionalmente permitidas en la zona agrícola del condado. Ya sea en el enfoque regulatorio de los protocolos de Oregón o en el estatuto que permite más *laissez-faire* en Idaho, la zonificación agrícola no ha logrado prevenir la pérdida de paisajes productivos.

Los paisajes de trabajo no están “vacíos” a la espera de una subdivisión inevitable; los suelos están ocupados por usos esenciales de industrias necesarias para la supervivencia humana y el sustento económico regional. La amenaza del desarrollo de SPURs no es el cambio inmediato en el uso de suelos agrícolas a residenciales, sino la perspectiva inminente de patrones de desarrollo más densos que reemplazan permanentemente los usos de suelos rurales en el espacio y el tiempo. Entre más lejos se permita conducir y “alejarse de todo”, más lejos de los núcleos urbanos se producirá la conversión de los paisajes de trabajo.

CONTEXUALIZACIÓN DE LOS PROBLEMAS DE LAS TIERRAS DE TRABAJO EN EL OESTE RURAL

La planificación racional y la zonificación euclidiana, derivadas de contextos urbanos, no han logrado controlar el deterioro físico de los paisajes rurales. Este fracaso se debe en gran parte a las preocupaciones únicas de las comunidades rurales, que son radicalmente diferentes de las demandas del uso del suelo urbano (Frank y Reisch 2014; Lapping 2005; Daniels 2017). Es esencial que la práctica de la planificación se concentre en las realidades físicas, sociales y económicas de las tierras, en los habitantes de los lugares rurales y los problemas que enfrentan.

El dilema central del uso del suelo en las zonas rurales es la viabilidad de continuar con estilos de vida productivos en las tierras agrícolas en medio de las presiones del desarrollo. Los derechos de propiedad agrupados incluyen derechos para adquirir, usar y disponer de la propiedad libremente (Pilon 2017). Cuando los gobiernos locales imponen restricciones a estos derechos, como la prohibición a la división

landowners may own extensive acreage, land is not appraised at high value for agricultural purposes. Discussions between rural planners in monthly meetings of the Idaho chapter of the American Planning Association (APA) suggests that financial incentives for using agricultural land as intended, such as tax breaks through agricultural exemptions, do little to offset costs farmers incur in their labor. On the other hand, if converted for residential use, the market (and taxable) value of rural land increases exponentially while allowing for a homeowner tax credit on property used as a primary residence. The complex consequences of land use designations are common knowledge for productive agricultural landowners who seek to maximize the physical and fiscal value of land.

For many rural landowners, a future SPUR is a nest egg. The division of land, whether for family or developers, is often a late-life financial lifeline for older farmers or an inheritance for their heirs (Daniels 2017). Many aging farmers plan to sell land to the highest bidder on the open market at retirement, especially if they do not have heirs who want the land for continued agricultural purposes. This typical scenario can be posed as a genuine question: why shouldn't a farmer be allowed to recoup his land's highest monetary value, which often comes from a developer with the capital to purchase and subdivide for residential development? Farmers are independent business operators who do not have pensions waiting after a lifetime of physical labor. Given the ability to obtain liquid cash for the sale of a residential parcel (or many), it is little wonder that family enterprises averaging \$1.3 million in debt often pursue cash (Leggate 2019). In the absence of a willing, new operator with a fair market offer, the likelihood of SPUR development only increases.

The introduction of a residential use within a rural landscape belies socioeconomic problems of rural land fragmentation. If additional SPURs are allowed in agricultural areas, increased settlement occurs; and less land remains available for communities and industries reliant on the reciprocal local commerce based in the land. Once ex-urban SPUR fragmentation begins, adjacent agricultural land and tax values rise, making long-term productive enterprises even more costly. Rising values can instigate a sequence of similar conversions, as neighboring farmers who would be interested in maintaining the character and use of land by buying it out cannot afford to do so against the speculative prospect of residential profit. Low-density development can ultimately reduce the "critical mass" of acres necessary for the resilience of individual operators and their surrounding communities, who are already pressured by fluctuating margins, economic inequality, shifting consumer trends, globally tinged commodity prices, and national subsidies (Daniels 2017). Farm exit and subsequent land use conversion

de tierras, el desarrollo residencial o ciertos usos, los propietarios de estas tierras se ven presionados a trabajar dentro de nuevos límites. Las tensiones por el uso del suelo pueden volverse antagónicas en áreas agrícolas rurales si se permite poco o ningún desarrollo residencial, o si el tamaño mínimo de los lotes es tan grande que la división de la tierra es imposible. Existe un conflicto secundario entre las identidades de autosuficiencia (el derecho a hacer con la tierra propia lo que uno quiera) y el reconocimiento de que el ejercicio universal de este derecho conducirá a la eliminación total de los estilos de vida agrícolas.

Las estrictas regulaciones de zonificación y división de tierras por los gobiernos locales están destinadas a prevenir la conversión residencial de tierras agrícolas y limitar la expansión urbana. Los propietarios privados, por el contrario, enfatizan el derecho inherente a administrar sus tierras como mejor les parezca. A menudo, la reconciliación de perspectivas en conflicto implica encontrar un término medio que proteja los paisajes agrícolas sin crear restricciones demasiado estrechas para los propietarios que den pocas opciones viables para el futuro. Una revisión de los planes integrales del condado en Idaho muestra que las soluciones políticas tienden a la zonificación de lotes grandes, lo que fomenta el desarrollo residencial de baja densidad y, en última instancia, la urbanización.

Los tamaños mínimos de lote o las divisiones máximas de la zonificación agrícola restringen las divisiones de tierra por debajo de cierto tamaño o número. Dichas regulaciones no son uniformes en estados como Idaho, lo que permite una expansión suburbana más densa y SPURs en localidades más indulgentes con las divisiones de tierras, a menudo independientemente de la zonificación o el uso. La paradoja del derecho privado de desarrollo residencial en el espacio agrícola está en plena exhibición en el condado no incorporado de Bonner en el norte de Idaho. Aquí, la demanda de terrenos para viviendas rurales es tan grande que el departamento de planificación local propuso un cambio a su ordenanza de división de tierras menores para permitir a los propietarios privados subdividir la tierra más fácilmente y en más lotes, con regulación mínima, poca supervisión de impactos potenciales, ya que una división de tierras menores no está sujeta a los estándares de subdivisión (Condado de Bonner, 2020). Afortunadamente, la comisión de planificación y zonificación recomendó mantener el límite de lote de las divisiones de tierra menores a no más de cuatro lotes (Condado de Bonner, 2021).

Los propietarios rurales tienen opciones limitadas de uso del suelo debido a que son ricos en tierras y pobres en efectivo. Si bien los propietarios rurales pueden poseer una superficie extensa, la

is particularly probable if landowners rank among the smallest family operators facing imminent collapse from corporate consolidation (Semuels 2019). Here, the crisis of modern vulture capital coincides with land use loss, inflecting global financial machinations into local planning policy well beyond any growth boundary.

When a landowner's choice to split rural land or to sell it to a developer who will subdivide it emerges, local governing bodies are ultimately responsible for land fragmentation and conversion. The processes for land use actions extend from governments and their ordinances, which lay out minimum lot sizes, division procedures, and allowed uses. Planners facilitate land use actions, and SPUR development can accumulate with little to no awareness of total land losses. A land split becomes more than just one land split when aggregated. Where local planning perpetuates landscape fragmentation, it contributes to the nationwide agricultural land losses cited by Freedgood, et al. (2020). Local planning policy in rural and ex-urban space, especially near areas of existing (sub)urban sprawl, often emphasizes the right to break up land for speculation or sale under public pressure and market demand. As planners process divisions and implement zoning to allow for SPUR parcels within productive landscapes, they are responsible for agricultural land losses.

Not all aspects of urbanization in and around rural agricultural places are negative. Proximity to urban centers can provide a larger pool of seasonal or part-time laborers, or off-farm employment options for farming family members to contribute financially. Expanding populations can provide opportunities for value-added and downstream value capture through farmers' markets, restaurants, gourmet grocery stores, and consumers directly (Heimlich et al. 2001). However, urban amenity boons require relatively close city populations for success. Moreover, they must be weighed against negative land use impacts of SPUR developments, which are long-lasting. Consequences include complaints from new, residential neighbors about preexisting farm odors, noises, and chemical uses; increased traffic on farm-dependent roadways overcrowded as commuter roads; decline of farm input suppliers, machinery dealers, and other local agricultural support businesses; increased adjacent property taxes to reflect the land value of potential nonfarm development; increased pressures from responsive water-use and land-use restrictions; and deteriorating crop yields due to urban smog, theft, and vandalism (Heimlich et al. 2001).

Insistence that development represents rural land's highest and best use also masks the disproportionate public costs of extending services to SPUR developments. SPUR developments demonstrate no ability for growth to "pay for itself" over time compared to less intensive land uses that

tierra no se valora a un alto valor para fines agrícolas. Las discusiones entre los planificadores rurales en las reuniones mensuales del capítulo de Idaho de "Asociación americana de planificación" *American Planning Association* (APA) sugieren que los incentivos financieros para usar tierras agrícolas según lo previsto, como las reducciones de impuestos a través de exenciones agrícolas, hacen poco para compensar los costos que los agricultores incurren en su trabajo. Por otro lado, si se convierte para uso residencial, el valor de mercado de la tierra rural (y los impuestos a los que está sujeto) aumenta exponencialmente, y a la vez, permite un crédito fiscal sobre la propiedad utilizada como residencia principal. Las complejas consecuencias de las designaciones de uso del suelo son de conocimiento común para los propietarios agrícolas productivos que buscan maximizar el valor físico y fiscal de la tierra.

Para muchos propietarios rurales, un futuro SPUR es una reserva de fondos. La división de la tierra, ya sea para familias o desarrolladores, es a menudo un salvavidas financiero para los agricultores mayores o una herencia para sus herederos (Daniels 2017). Muchos agricultores de edad avanzada planean vender la tierra al mejor posterior en el mercado abierto al momento de la jubilación, especialmente si no tienen herederos que quieran la tierra para fines agrícolas continuos. Este escenario típico puede plantearse como una pregunta genuina: ¿por qué no se debería permitir que un agricultor recupere el valor monetario más alto de su tierra, que a menudo proviene de un desarrollador con el capital para comprar y subdividir para el desarrollo residencial? Los agricultores son operadores comerciales independientes que no recibirán pensiones después de toda una vida de trabajo físico. Dada la capacidad de recibir efectivo líquido por la venta de una parcela residencial (o muchas), no es de extrañar que las empresas familiares con una deuda promedio de \$1.3 millones a menudo busquen efectivo (Leggate 2019). En ausencia de un nuevo operador dispuesto y con una oferta de mercado justa, la probabilidad de desarrollo de SPURs solo aumenta.

La introducción de un uso residencial en un paisaje rural oculta los problemas socioeconómicos de la fragmentación del suelo rural. Si se permiten SPURs adicionales en áreas agrícolas, se produce un mayor asentamiento; y queda menos tierra disponible para comunidades e industrias que dependen del comercio local recíproco basado en la tierra. Una vez que se inicia la fragmentación de los SPURs ex-urbanos, los terrenos agrícolas adyacentes y los valores fiscales aumentan, haciendo que las empresas productivas a largo plazo sean aún más costosas. El aumento de los valores puede provocar una secuencia de conversiones similares, ya que los agricultores vecinos que estarían interesados en mantener el

provide necessary food (Clark 2019). When properly accounted for, externalities suggest SPURs represent a land use nuisance within productive agricultural landscapes that conventional urban planning practices have not mitigated.

The pros and cons of SPUR developments fail to account for the consequences of compounding working lands' losses on rural landowners. As urbanized development encroaches further into rural places, working lands are not always completely converted. Yet, rural planners in the APA Idaho Chapter repeatedly mentioned that fragmentation along with new infrastructure and housing between properties leads to increased travel time between parcels, proliferation of conflicting land uses, and loss of total productivity, which all make farming and ranching more time intensive and costly. These burdens exacerbate the cultural and financial precariousness of rural identity (those in areas of low population density with large distances between homes and businesses and areas where agriculture is a primary industry with residents working on farms or ranches (Boudreau et al. 2011)) as well as urban-rural inequality. Planners' roles in rural identity and inequality represent a significant blemish on a profession steeped in equity concerns.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR RURAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNANCE

The federal government works within rural landscapes and the resource dependent industries that support rural communities largely through programs within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and agencies of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Despite its large presence in rural landscapes, the federal government has generally opted out of physical land use planning in rural landscapes. As a result, the burden of rural planning falls on local governments, which have largely been unable to adequately address rural planning issues. The planning profession's urban bias adapts smart growth tools, transportation tools, and small downtown revitalization to rural communities rather than protecting resource-dependent industries. Regional planning occurs largely through metropolitan planning organizations, whose focus on vehicle miles traveled and other urban concerns are mostly irrelevant to rural places. Despite the limited role of formal government in many rural areas, some land managers work almost exclusively in productive agricultural landscapes.

Federal policies for working landscapes have historically centered around two main themes: first, scientific management of resources, and second, investment in technology (rural electrification and now broadband) along with financial subsidies and grants for industries. Advancing agricultural practices, funding infrastructure projects, and increasing community access to technology still guide federal policies to this

carácter y el uso de la tierra comprándola no pueden permitirse el lujo de hacerlo frente a la perspectiva especulativa de ganancias residenciales. El desarrollo de baja densidad puede, en última instancia, reducir la "masa crítica" de acres necesaria para la resiliencia de los operadores individuales y de las comunidades circundantes, que ya están presionados por márgenes fluctuantes, por la desigualdad económica, las tendencias cambiantes de consumo, los precios de las materias globalizadas y de subsidios nacionales. El fin de la finca y la posterior conversión del uso del suelo es particularmente probable si los propietarios se encuentran entre los operadores familiares más pequeños que enfrentan un colapso inminente debido a la consolidación corporativa (Semuels 2019). Aquí, la crisis del capital buitre moderno coincide con la pérdida del uso del suelo, acentuando maquinaciones globales sobre política de planificación local, más allá de cualquier límite de crecimiento.

Cuando surge la elección de un propietario de dividir la tierra rural o venderla a un desarrollador que la subdividirá, los órganos de gobierno locales son, en última instancia, responsables de la fragmentación y conversión de la tierra. Los procesos para las acciones de uso del suelo se extienden desde los gobiernos y sus ordenanzas, que establecen los tamaños mínimos de los lotes, los procedimientos de división y los usos permitidos. Los planificadores gestionan acciones de uso del suelo, y el desarrollo de SPURs puede acumularse con poca o ninguna conciencia de las pérdidas totales de tierra. Una división de tierra se convierte en más de una división de tierra cuando es agregada. Cuando la planificación local perpetúa la fragmentación del paisaje, contribuye a las pérdidas de tierras agrícolas a nivel nacional citadas por Freedgood, et al. (2020). La política de planificación local en el espacio rural y ex urbano, especialmente cerca de áreas de expansión (sub)urbana existente, a menudo enfatiza el derecho a dividir la tierra para la especulación o venta bajo presión pública y demanda del mercado. A medida que los planificadores procesan las divisiones e implementan la zonificación para permitir parcelas SPURs dentro de paisajes productivos, son responsables de las pérdidas de tierras agrícolas.

No todos los aspectos de la urbanización en los lugares agrícolas rurales y sus alrededores son negativos. La proximidad a los centros urbanos puede proporcionar un grupo más grande de trabajadores de temporada o de medio tiempo, u opciones de empleo fuera de la finca para que los miembros de la familia agrícola contribuyan financieramente. El crecimiento de la población puede ofrecer oportunidades de valor agregado y la captura de valor en la cadena de comercialización a través de los mercados de agricultores, los restaurantes, las tiendas de comestibles gourmet y los consumidores directamente (Heimlich et al. 2001).

day (Lapping 2005). These foci are products of the New Deal era, when productive agricultural landscapes of the American West were directed toward producing food domestically and facilitating growth from urban areas; and global markets had yet to force substantial influence into rural places.

Contemporary working landscapes increasingly experience externalities from globalization and land speculation hedging bets on amenity-rich communities (Brenner 2012). Foreign ownership of land is regulated at the state level with varying degrees of restrictions. For instance, one global survey found that in Idaho, only citizens or those with the intention of becoming citizens can purchase farmland (REIBC 2019). It is unclear whether this restriction is enforced; and regardless, such restrictions do little to address foreign companies that are vertically integrated into Idaho-based companies. Therefore, external actors present new threats to rural communities that were once isolated from land-based investments. The following section highlights federal programs that, while well-intentioned, miss the mark of protecting rural communities from emerging threats.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)

Promotion of agricultural and forestry industries is clearly a priority for the USDA, yet preservation is absent from USDA considerations (USDA 2018). The USDA, perhaps the most prominent agency tasked with managing federal programs in working landscapes, issues a departmental strategic plan every five years. Among the goals of the 2018 to 2022 USDA Strategic Plan are maximizing the ability of American agricultural producers to prosper, facilitating rural prosperity and economic development, strengthening stewardship on private lands, and enabling productive and sustainable use of national forest system lands (USDA 2018).

Protecting working lands from disruptive influences in order to preserve the productive industries and communities that rely on them might fall under a few of the goals of the 2018 to 2022 USDA Strategic Plan, but the vulnerability of working lands goes unmentioned. Rural communities are increasingly subject to global market pressures, real estate speculation, and lack of pathways for aspiring farmers to enter the industry. Nevertheless, many of the strategic plan's objectives do not address systemic issues. The lone strategy identified to address systemic concerns is to, "*Encourage* entry into farming through increased access to land and capital for young, beginning, and underrepresented farmers and ranchers" (USDA 2018, emphasis added). Conspicuously, this strategy goes unmentioned in the key performance measures listed to monitor plan progress.

Sin embargo, las ventajas de las comodidades urbanas requieren poblaciones urbanas relativamente cercanas para tener éxito. Por otra parte, deben sopesar los impactos negativos del uso de la tierra de los desarrollos SPURs, que son duraderos. Las consecuencias incluyen quejas de vecinos residenciales nuevos sobre olores, ruidos y usos químicos preexistentes en las fincas; aumento del tráfico en las carreteras dependientes de las fincas superpobladas como carreteras de cercanías; aumento de los impuestos a la propiedad adyacente para reflejar el valor de la tierra del potencial desarrollo no agrícola; mayores presiones derivadas de las restricciones sensibles al uso del agua y al uso del suelo; y el deterioro del rendimiento de los cultivos debido al smog urbano, el robo y el vandalismo (Heimlich et al. 2001).

La insistencia en que el desarrollo representa el mejor y más alto uso del suelo rural también oculta los desproporcionados costos públicos por la extensión de servicios a los desarrollos SPURs. Los desarrollos de SPURs demuestran que el crecimiento no tiene la capacidad de "pagar por sí mismo" con el tiempo en comparación con los usos menos intensivos de la tierra que proporcionan los alimentos necesarios (Clark 2019). Cuando se contabilizan adecuadamente, las externalidades sugieren que los SPURs representan una molestia para el uso del suelo dentro de los paisajes agrícolas productivos que las prácticas de planificación urbana convencionales no han mitigado. Los pros y los contras de los desarrollos SPURs no tienen en cuenta las consecuencias de agravar las pérdidas de las tierras de trabajo para los propietarios rurales. A medida que el desarrollo urbanizado invade aún más los lugares rurales, las tierras de trabajo no siempre se convierten por completo. Sin embargo, los planificadores rurales en el Capítulo de APA Idaho mencionaron repetidamente que la fragmentación junto con la nueva infraestructura y viviendas entre propiedades conduce a un mayor tiempo de viaje entre parcelas, la proliferación de usos de la tierra en conflicto y la pérdida de la productividad total, lo que hace que la agricultura y la ganadería requieran más tiempo con un mayor costo. Estas cargas exacerban la precariedad cultural y financiera de la identidad rural (aquellas en áreas de baja densidad de población con grandes distancias entre hogares y negocios, y áreas donde la agricultura es una industria primaria con residentes que trabajan en fincas o ranchos (Boudreau et al. 2011) así como la desigualdad urbano-rural. Los roles de los planificadores en la identidad rural y la desigualdad representan un defecto significativo en una profesión impregnada de preocupaciones por la equidad.

The only USDA program directed toward land preservation extends from an umbrella of conservation easements. The program's long-term funding in farm bill packages is uncertain, and it prioritizes state conservation goals. If a state USDA office wants to focus most or all easement money toward wetlands enhancement and none to agricultural preservation, it possesses that prerogative.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fails to address the unique nature of development and community planning in working landscapes by conceiving of them as micro-cities of the future rather than large landscapes that support existing small communities. At the federal level, the EPA has taken a lead role in developing smart growth principles meant to promote sustainability and equity and mitigate the negative impacts of development within communities. *Essential Smart Growth Fixes for Urban and Suburban Zoning Codes* is one example of how the EPA is using smart growth principles to address issues in urban planning. Urban-centric growth control models have been adapted by the EPA through publications such as the *Essential Smart Growth Fixes for Rural Planning, Zoning, and Development Codes* (US EPA 2012). However, smart growth places the burden solely on local governments to address development issues, even though many communities are interwoven into the fabric of the federal government due to neighboring public lands.

FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT (FLPMA)

Seemingly contiguous landscapes are in fact a patchwork of federal and local properties regulated by different entities. Yet, landscapes are ecologically, economically, and socially integrated with the communities that inhabit them. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is the largest land manager in the American West, overseeing approximately 245 million acres of surface lands. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) governs the administration of BLM parcels and has significant implications for surrounding communities. FLPMA requires the BLM "to develop, maintain, and when appropriate, revise land use plans" (Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 1976). Land use plan revisions are scientific and data-driven processes addressing multiple use and sustainable yield issues on BLM lands.

A lack of public representation and large land holdings neighboring public lands that change ownership quickly are detrimental to planning efforts. Resource Management Plans (RMPs) serve as the land management blueprints for BLM districts and are further defined in FLPMA. FLPMA requires coordination with local governments to ensure consistency with local plans during RMP development

PROGRAMAS FEDERALES PARA LA GOBERNANZA DEL PAISAJE RURAL

El gobierno federal trabaja dentro de los paisajes rurales y las industrias dependientes de los recursos que apoyan a las comunidades rurales en gran parte a través de programas dentro del Departamento de Agricultura de los EE. UU. (USDA) y de agencias del Departamento del Interior de los EE. UU. A pesar de su gran presencia en los paisajes rurales, el gobierno federal generalmente ha optado por no usar planificación del uso físico del suelo en los paisajes rurales. Como resultado, la carga de la planificación rural recae en los gobiernos locales, que en gran medida no han podido abordar adecuadamente los problemas de planificación rural. El sesgo urbano de la profesión de la planificación adapta las herramientas de crecimiento inteligente, los instrumentos de transporte y la revitalización de pequeños centros urbanos a comunidades rurales, en lugar de proteger industrias que dependen de aquellos recursos. La planificación regional se produce en gran medida a través de organizaciones de planificación metropolitana, cuyo enfoque en las millas recorridas en vehículos y otras preocupaciones urbanas son en su mayoría irrelevantes para los lugares rurales. A pesar del papel limitado del gobierno formal en muchas áreas rurales, algunos administradores de tierras trabajan casi exclusivamente en paisajes agrícolas productivos.

Las políticas federales para los paisajes laborales se han centrado históricamente en dos temas principales: primero, la gestión científica de los recursos y, segundo, la inversión en tecnología (electrificación rural y ahora banda ancha) junto con subsidios financieros y subvenciones para las industrias. El avance de las prácticas agrícolas, la financiación de proyectos de infraestructura y el aumento del acceso de la comunidad a la tecnología siguen guiando las políticas federales hasta el día de hoy (Lapping 2005). Estos focos son productos de la era del "Nuevo Acuerdo" (New Deal) cuando los paisajes agrícolas productivos del oeste estadounidense se dirigieron a producir alimentos a nivel nacional y a facilitar el crecimiento de áreas urbanas; y los mercados mundiales todavía tenían que ejercer una influencia sustancial en las zonas rurales. Los paisajes trabajadores contemporáneos experimentan cada vez más externalidades de la globalización y las apuestas de cobertura de la especulación de la tierra en comunidades ricas en servicios (Brenner 2012). La propiedad extranjera de la tierra está regulada a nivel estatal con diversos grados de restricciones. Por ejemplo, una encuesta global encontró que en Idaho, solo los ciudadanos o aquellos con la intención de convertirse en ciudadanos pueden comprar tierras agrícolas (REIBC 2019). No está claro si se aplica esta restricción; e

or prior to the conveyance of lands. However, the public is generally not involved in RMP development until after a draft is produced; and belated involvement heightens already tense relationships with the public. Indeed, most Western U.S. ranchers harbor significant antipathy toward federal land management in general (Regan 2016).

Large private land holdings that neighbor public lands can change owners quickly. In some cases, new landowners seek to exploit access to public lands through development. FLPMA, as a policy tool to address land conversion near public lands containing natural resources dependent on large, contiguous tracts, is not designed or authorized to respond to rapid market changes in private space. To address this issue, BLM released *Planning 2.0*, which would have required early public engagement in the RMP process and allowed the BLM to expand the RMP boundaries to include local governments and other administrative boundaries. Theoretically, *Planning 2.0* would integrate local planning and RMPs to help address issues related to working landscapes; but its potential effectiveness is moot, since the effort was repealed in 2017.

FEDERAL-LOCAL PLANNING IN WORKING LANDS

Aside from programs promoting certain environmental land values (such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's floodplains), there are no uniform, nationwide requirements for local planning in rural space outside of regional transportation funding and limited rural technical assistance programs to prioritize economic development ("About RD" n.d.). Remaining non-federal or non-state managed rural space not subject to municipal jurisdiction falls under authority of county governments. Land use policy at the county level is directed by elected boards and appointed commissions; consequently, policy can shift with the winds of local politics and result in inconsistent or contradictory aims. Local, rural landscape planning is functionally overlooked at the federal level.

IN FOCUS: IDAHO

Recently, Idaho ranked as the fastest growing state in the nation per capita, with an in-migrating population boom frequently cited as a concern for existing residents throughout the state (Luck 2020). The boom has created a housing crunch; as a result, Idaho has led states in percentage home price increases in 2020 over the past year (Kirsch 2020). As absent-owner speculators buy up rural parcels throughout the state, their intentions for widespread SPUR development have only begun to emerge (Day 2020). Idaho's growth trend is the subject of a prior study by Narducci, et al. (2017), which projects productive agricultural land losses in Boise and the Treasure Valley region. Areas

independientemente, esas restricciones hacen poco para abordar a las empresas extranjeras que están integradas verticalmente en empresas con sede en Idaho. Por lo tanto, los actores externos presentan nuevas amenazas para las comunidades rurales que alguna vez estuvieron aisladas de las inversiones en la tierra. La siguiente sección destaca los programas federales que, aunque bien intencionados, no dan la talla en cuanto a la protección de las comunidades rurales ante las amenazas emergentes.

"DEPARTAMENTO DE AGRICULTURA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS" UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)

La promoción de las industrias agrícolas y forestales es claramente una prioridad para el USDA, sin embargo, la preservación está ausente de las consideraciones del USDA (USDA 2018). El USDA, quizás la agencia más prominente encargada de administrar programas federales en paisajes trabajadores, emite un plan estratégico departamental cada cinco años. Entre los objetivos del Plan Estratégico del USDA de 2018 a 2022 se encuentran maximizar la capacidad de los productores agrícolas estadounidenses para prosperar, gestionar la prosperidad rural y el desarrollo económico, fortalecer la administración de tierras privadas y permitir el uso productivo y sostenible de las tierras del sistema forestal nacional (USDA 2018).

Proteger las tierras trabajadoras contra influencias disruptivas para preservar las industrias productivas y las comunidades que dependen de ellas podría caer dentro de algunos de los objetivos del Plan Estratégico del USDA de 2018 a 2022, pero la vulnerabilidad de estas tierras productivas no se menciona. Las comunidades rurales están cada vez más sujetas a las presiones del mercado global, la especulación inmobiliaria y la falta de vías para que los agricultores aspirantes ingresen a la industria. Sin embargo, muchos de los objetivos del plan estratégico no abordan cuestiones sistémicas. La única estrategia identificada para abordar las preocupaciones sistémicas es: "Fomentar el ingreso a la agricultura a través de un mayor acceso a la tierra y al capital para jóvenes, principiantes y agricultores, ganaderos subrepresentados" (USDA 2018, énfasis agregado).

Evidentemente, esta estrategia no se menciona en las medidas clave de desempeño enumeradas para monitorear el progreso del plan.

El único programa del USDA dirigido a la preservación de la tierra se encuentra bajo la categoría de una servidumbre de conservación. El financiamiento a largo plazo del programa en los paquetes de facturas agrícolas es incierto y prioriza los objetivos de conservación del estado. Si una oficina estatal del USDA desea concentrar la mayor parte o todo el dinero de la servidumbre en la mejora

outside the state's capital region have not received the same level of analysis.

Idaho's enabling legislation is the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), which, mandates all incorporated municipalities and county governments to adopt comprehensive plans and processes for certain land use actions. LLUPA requirements are an unfunded mandate with no technical assistance offered by the state (*Local Land Use Planning Act 1975*). The law was amended in recent years to add agriculture as a mandatory element for analysis in comprehensive plans, a legislative gift to the seed industry in response to suburbanization impacts in the Treasure Valley. As with all other comprehensive planning elements, few guidelines were provided; and no enforcement mechanisms were adopted for *not* addressing the topic. Resulting local planning documents vary widely in form, length, and implementation. Ordinances for agricultural land protection are typically modest, minimum parcel sizes; some counties enforce limitations on buildable home sites.

Idaho contains 24,000 active farms, making up 26 percent of the state's surface area and contributing to 7 percent of the state's total economic activity (Sallet 2020). These figures are startling given that more than three-fifths of the state's land base is managed by federal agencies. Struck by the findings of Freedgood, et al. (2020), in October 2020, the APA's Idaho Chapter conference featured sessions by the report's lead author and by a contingent of academic and professional planners in the state calling to investigate agricultural land losses. The chapter has since formed an ad hoc committee exploring the issue across rural areas.

PLANNING OUTSIDE THE URBAN TOOLBOX: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The failure of traditional planning practices to adequately provide for the preservation of working landscapes in rural places necessitates exploration into unconventional planning tools. Planning techniques must be rooted in a culture of place rather than taking an arms-length, prescriptive posture. While processes that incorporate these attributes are atypical, they are not unfounded.

Planners in and around agricultural landscapes need to understand the players involved in soft decision-making processes and the adaptive approach required to manage and respond to the temporal variations in economic, ecological, and social components of rural policy systems at multiple scales of power. Beginning in 2001, the Owyhee County Board of Commissioners in Idaho and local Shoshone Paiute Tribes engaged a diverse set of stakeholders dubbed the Owyhee Initiative. This group responded to longstanding competing interests of ranchers, Tribes, the BLM, recreation groups, and environmental

de los humedales y nada en la preservación agrícola, posee esa prerrogativa.

"AGENCIA DE PROTECCIÓN AMBIENTAL" ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)

La Agencia de Protección Ambiental (EPA) no aborda la naturaleza única del desarrollo y la planificación comunitaria en los paisajes trabajadores al concebirlas como microciudades del futuro en lugar de grandes paisajes que apoyan a las pequeñas comunidades existentes. A nivel federal, la EPA ha asumido un papel de liderazgo en el desarrollo de principios de crecimiento inteligente destinados a promover la sostenibilidad y la equidad, y a mitigar los impactos negativos del desarrollo dentro de las comunidades. Soluciones esenciales de crecimiento inteligente para códigos de zonificación urbana y suburbana es un ejemplo de cómo la EPA está utilizando principios de crecimiento inteligente para abordar problemas en la planificación urbana. La EPA ha adaptado los modelos de control del crecimiento centrados en las zonas urbanas a través de publicaciones como *Essential Smart Growth Fixes for Rural Planning, Zoning, and Development Codes* (US EPA 2012). Sin embargo, el crecimiento inteligente sitúa la carga únicamente en los gobiernos locales para abordar los problemas de desarrollo, a pesar de que muchas comunidades están entretejidas en la estructura del gobierno federal debido a las tierras públicas vecinas.

"LEY FEDERAL DE GESTIÓN Y POLÍTICA DE TIERRAS" FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT (FLPMA)

Los paisajes aparentemente contiguos son de hecho un mosaico de propiedades federales y locales reguladas por diferentes entidades. Sin embargo, los paisajes están ecológica, económica y socialmente integrados con las comunidades que los habitan. La Oficina de Administración de Tierras (BLM) es la administradora de tierras más grande del oeste norteamericano, y supervisa aproximadamente 245 millones de acres de superficie de tierras. La Ley Federal de Gestión y Política de Tierras (FLPMA) rige la administración de las parcelas de BLM y tiene implicaciones importantes para las comunidades circundantes. La FLPMA requiere que el BLM "desarrolle, mantenga y, cuando sea apropiado, revise los planes de uso del suelo" (Ley Federal de Política y Manejo de Tierras de 1976). Las revisiones del plan de uso del suelo son procesos científicos y basados en datos que abordan cuestiones de uso múltiple y rendimiento sostenible en las tierras BLM.

La falta de representación pública y las grandes propiedades de tierras vecinas a las tierras públicas que cambian de propiedad rápidamente son perjudiciales para los esfuerzos de planificación. Los planes de gestión de recursos (RMPs) sirven como planos de gestión para el uso de suelos en

organizations. Years of locally initiated collaboration culminated in the signing of the federal Owyhee Public Lands Management Act of 2009, which increased local management of rangeland resources, designated half a million acres of new wilderness, released wilderness study areas for multiple uses, enhanced protection for Native American cultural resources, and improved recreation access (*Owyhee Public Lands Management Act 2009*). The reality of adjacent federal lands can guide similar cross-scale brokering toward consensus-based landscape solutions across the West.

Native American ideology and Tribal planners provide insight for effectively managing working landscapes. The Iroquois Confederacy's Great Law of Peace speaks of an embeddedness between humans and the natural order of the world. Embeddedness is perhaps best expressed as a parable, which teaches that people become a part of the land after they resided there for seven generations (Bedford 1997). The recognition that the current state of the land is a product of the previous seven generations alters land use considerations for resource-based industries in working landscapes. Umatilla County, Oregon has entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation to administer the county's planning duties while honoring the community's connection to the land due to the checkerboard pattern of Tribal and unincorporated parcels. A land protection planning commission, as opposed to a traditional planning and zoning commission, is a regulatory body that reviews development permits (Anderson 2018). In this instance, the land protection planning commission emphasized the Tribe's perspective that planning has a duty not only to protect private property rights to develop land but also to protect land and its associated resources for generations to come. The model of embeddedness offers a rebuttal to traditional urban planning's preoccupation with near-term land values and offers a framework for planning in the West's resource-dependent communities.

In addition to Native American ideology and Tribal tools, underutilized tools exist in the federal sphere. USDA's Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) operates the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, a suite of property deed restrictions for landscape values with funding in the farm bill. For Agricultural Land Easements (ALEs), NRCS offers 50 percent of the developable value of agricultural parcels; partners with local governments or non-profits (e.g., land trusts) to make up the remaining half; and records term or permanent development restrictions on those properties (Daniels 2017). Idaho's NRCS office teams with local land trusts to negotiate voluntary agreements and make up the purchase cost, enacting a state policy of

los distritos de BLM y se definen con más detalle en FLPMA. FLPMA requiere coordinación con los gobiernos locales para garantizar la coherencia con los planes locales durante el desarrollo del RMP o antes del traspaso de tierras. Sin embargo, el público generalmente no participa en el desarrollo RMP hasta que se produzca un borrador; y la participación tardía aumenta las relaciones ya tensas con el público. De hecho, la mayoría de los ganaderos del oeste de Estados Unidos albergan una antipatía significativa hacia la gestión federal del territorio en general (Regan 2016).

Las grandes propiedades de tierras privadas que se encuentran cerca de tierras públicas pueden cambiar de propietario rápidamente. En algunos casos, los nuevos propietarios buscan explotar el acceso a las tierras públicas a través del desarrollo. Como herramienta de política para abordar la conversión de tierra cerca de tierras públicas que contienen recursos naturales y que dependen de grandes tramos contiguos, La FLPMA no está diseñada ni autorizada para responder a los cambios acelerados del mercado en el espacio privado. Para abordar este problema, BLM lanzó *Planning 2.0*, que habría requerido una participación pública temprana en el proceso de RMP y le habría permitido a BLM expandir los límites de RMP para incluir gobiernos locales y otros límites administrativos. En teoría, la Planificación 2.0 integraría la planificación local y los RMP para ayudar a abordar los problemas relacionados con los paisajes trabajadores; pero su eficacia potencial es discutible, ya que el esfuerzo fue derogado en 2017.

PLANIFICACIÓN FEDERAL-LOCAL EN TIERRAS DE TRABAJO

Aparte de los programas que promueven ciertos valores ambientales de la tierra (como las llanuras aluviales de la Agencia Federal para el Manejo de Emergencias), no existen requisitos uniformes a nivel nacional para la planificación local en el espacio rural fuera de la financiación del transporte regional y de programas limitados de asistencia técnica rural para priorizar el desarrollo económico ("Acerca de RD" n.d.). El espacio rural restante no federal o no administrado por el estado, no sujeto a la jurisdicción municipal cae bajo la autoridad de los gobiernos de los condados. La política de uso de la tierra a nivel de condado está dirigida por juntas electas y comisiones designadas; en consecuencia, la política puede cambiar con los vientos de la política local y resultar en objetivos inconsistentes o contradictorios. La planificación del paisaje local y rural es funcionalmente ignorada a nivel federal.

EN FOCO: IDAHO

Recientemente, Idaho se clasificó como el estado de más rápido crecimiento en la nación per cápita, con un *boom* de la población inmigrante que se cita

permanent land protections. From inception in 2014 through 2019, more than 10,000 acres have been preserved for perpetual land productivity in Idaho, with roughly equivalent acreage under active negotiation (Brown 2020). The same ALEs have preserved nearly 200,000 working acres in Montana in the same time, simultaneously achieving environmental co-benefits. Montana's coordinator suggests that success stems from a cocktail of cultural will blended from consistent outreach, capital, strong relationships, and proven delivery of results (Sullins and Naugle 2021).

With creative collaboration, programs like NRCS's Agricultural Conservation Easement Program can find wider application. State and local governments can aid the federal funding match in cooperation with non-profits, as was accomplished by a publicly approved levy in Blaine County, Idaho ("Program Guide to the Blaine County Land Water and Wildlife Program" 2013). Commercial operators, as a directly affected constituency, can also provide assistance: Colorado's cattlemen have integrated an agricultural easement mission into their industry goals, with a fully sponsored land trust preserving more than 600,000 critical rangeland acres over 25 years ("Conservation" n.d.). Innovative partnerships distribute political and fiscal capital across stakeholders, suggesting a model that takes advantage of dispersed public and private assets toward common landscape goals.

Another tool growing in popularity is Land Link and associated programs, which connect retiring landowners with new farmers to secure a plan to transfer agricultural land (Behrens n.d.). These programs can assist prospective farmers otherwise unable to compete with the capital of developers. New farmers gain direct access to agricultural property, retiring farmers still earn a profit on land they no longer wish to work, and acres are spared SPUR development. Continuing productive use also allows the social capital in the agricultural community to remain and potentially grow. Programs like Land Link are critical if farmers' heirs do not seek a future in agriculture or do not exist, as there are currently few systems in place to connect and promote transfers (McIntosh 2020).

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

The problem of land conversion and fragmentation through SPUR development can be thought of like toothpaste squeezed from a tube: once taken out, it is impractical if not impossible to put back in. Unlike Jane Jacobs's theory of resurgent urban environments, once great landscapes across the West have been developed, returning them to productive capacity is a false prospect. The historical and current negligence of landscape resurgence represents an imminent crisis for the planning profession, which perpetuates permanent agricultural land losses with the regulatory

con frecuencia como una preocupación para los residentes existentes en todo el estado (Luck 2020). El *boom* ha creado una crisis de vivienda; como resultado, Idaho ha liderado los estados en aumentos porcentuales de precios de viviendas durante el 2020 (Kirsch 2020). A medida que especuladores, y a su vez, propietarios ausentes compran parcelas rurales en todo el estado, apenas empiezan a emerger sus intenciones de un desarrollo SPUR (Día 2020). La tendencia de crecimiento de Idaho es el tema de un estudio previo de Narducci, et al.(2017), que proyecta pérdidas de tierras agrícolas productivas en Boise y la región de Treasure Valley. Las áreas fuera de la región de la capital del estado no han recibido el mismo nivel de análisis. La legislación habilitante de Idaho es la "Ley de Planificación del Uso del Suelo Local" *Local Land Use Planning Act* (LLUPA), que obliga a todos los municipios incorporados y gobiernos de los condados a adoptar planes y procesos integrales para ciertas acciones de uso del suelo. Los requisitos de la LLUPA son un mandato no financiado sin asistencia técnica ofrecida por el estado (Ley de Planificación del Uso de la Tierra Local de 1975). La ley fue enmendada en los últimos años para agregar la agricultura como un elemento obligatorio para el análisis en los planes integrales, un regalo legislativo para la industria de semillas en respuesta a los impactos de la suburbanización en Treasure Valley. Al igual que con todos los demás elementos de planificación integral, se proporcionaron pocas directrices; y no se adoptaron mecanismos de aplicación para abordar el tema. Los documentos de planificación local resultantes varían ampliamente en forma, extensión e implementación. Las ordenanzas para la protección de la tierra agrícola son típicamente parcelas modestas de tamaños mínimos; algunos condados imponen limitaciones a los terrenos edificables.

Idaho contiene 24,000 granjas activas, que representan el 26 por ciento de la superficie del estado y contribuyen al 7 por ciento de la actividad económica total del estado (Sallet 2020). Estas cifras son alarmantes dado que más de las tres quintas partes de la base territorial del estado son administradas por agencias federales. Impresionado por los hallazgos de Freedgood, et al. (2020), en octubre de 2020, la conferencia del Capítulo de Idaho de la APA contó con sesiones del autor principal del informe y de un contingente de planificadores académicos y profesionales en el estado que llamaban a investigar las pérdidas de tierras agrícolas. Desde entonces, el capítulo ha formado un comité *ad hoc* que explora el tema en las áreas rurales.

MÁS ALLÁ DE LAS HERRAMIENTAS URBANAS: ENFOQUES ALTERNATIVOS PARA LA PLANIFICACIÓN

El fracaso de las prácticas tradicionales de planificación para preservar adecuadamente los

tools employed to prevent them. Contrary to common perception among planners, low-density and large-lot zoning do not protect agricultural lands; in fact, they initiate agricultural land losses by encouraging SPURs. Failure to focus attention beyond growth boundaries, areas of impact, and urban fringe have led to unsustainable development cycles now accelerated by increasing intrusion of global capital outside city spaces, particularly in the American West. Theoretical approaches imagining rural places as abstractions of urban form disregard the unique contexts and needs of communities reliant on tangible productive uses in agricultural landscapes.

Irrespective of local policy, agricultural land losses must be examined and addressed by local planners in collaborative processes with all relevant stakeholders and the public. Systems and programs need to be implemented to ensure rural planning offices and local elected bodies can both measure productive land losses closer to real time and analyze their potential consequences. Reluctance to regulatory approaches in Western states like Idaho may provide an opportunity for greater success with creative, place-based, and stakeholder-driven models.

The non-traditional strategies explored above for the Western U.S. seem to emanate from certain themes. They start with the context of place and people rather than a suite of long-established tools. They thrive on considerations of all relevant players, including those in other agencies, sovereign governments, private industry, and civic groups. They include the possibility of voluntary programming to achieve goals, with social or financial costs shared among stakeholders. They accept models of iteration, experimentation, and incrementalism, perhaps in alignment with adaptive management and outcome-based approaches of natural resource methods familiar to rural communities. They seek solutions fit to specific concerns, acknowledging the diversity of rural experience. Perhaps above all, they appreciate that results are most likely to be achieved when desired change is initiated by the people of that place, with trust leading to successful outcomes.

paisajes trabajadores en los lugares rurales requiere la exploración de herramientas de planificación no convencionales. Las técnicas de planificación deben estar arraigadas en una cultura del lugar, en vez de adoptar una postura distante y prescriptiva. Si bien los procesos que incorporan estos atributos son atípicos, no carecen de fundamento.

Los planificadores en los paisajes agrícolas y sus alrededores deben comprender a los actores involucrados en los procesos de la toma de decisiones sutiles, y en el enfoque adaptativo requerido para gestionar y responder a las variaciones temporales en los componentes económicos, ecológicos y sociales de los sistemas de políticas rurales en múltiples escalas de poder. A partir de 2001, la Junta de Comisionados del condado de Owyhee, en Idaho, y las tribus locales de los Shoshone Paiute, convocaron un conjunto diverso de partes interesadas, denominado Iniciativa Owyhee. Este grupo respondió a intereses de larga data y en competencia de ganaderos, tribus, BLM, grupos de recreación y organizaciones medioambientales. Años de colaboración iniciada localmente culminaron con la firma de la Ley Federal de Administración de Tierras Públicas de Owyhee de 2009, que aumentó la gestión local de los recursos de los pastizales, designó medio millón de acres silvestres nuevas, lanzó áreas de estudio de zonas silvestres para usos múltiples, protección mejorada para los recursos culturales de los indígenas americanos y mejor acceso a la recreación (*Owyhee Public Lands Management Act* 2009). La realidad de las tierras federales adyacentes puede guiar a una intermediación entre escalas similar hacia soluciones de paisaje basadas en el consenso en todo Oeste.

La ideología de los indígenas americanos y de los planificadores tribales brinda conocimiento para administrar de manera efectiva los paisajes trabajadores. La Gran Ley de Paz de la Confederación Iroquesa habla de un arraigo entre los humanos y el orden natural del mundo. El enraizamiento quizás se expresa mejor como una parábola, que enseña que las personas se vuelven parte de la tierra después de haber residido allí durante siete generaciones (Bedford 1997). El reconocimiento de que el estado actual de la tierra es un producto de las siete generaciones anteriores altera las consideraciones de uso del suelo para las industrias basadas en los recursos de los paisajes trabajadores. El condado de Umatilla, Oregón, ha firmado un memorando de entendimiento con las Tribus Confederadas de la reserva Indígena de Umatilla para administrar las tareas de planificación del condado y, al mismo tiempo, honrar la conexión de la comunidad con la tierra debido al patrón de tablero de ajedrez de las parcelas tribales y no incorporadas. Una comisión de planificación de protección de la tierra, a diferencia de una comisión de planificación y zonificación tradicional, es un organismo regulador que

revisa los permisos de desarrollo (Anderson 2018). En este caso, la comisión de planificación de protección de la tierra enfatizó la perspectiva de la Tribu, según el cual, la planificación tiene el deber no solo de proteger los derechos de propiedad privada para desarrollar la tierra, sino también de proteger la tierra y sus recursos asociados para las generaciones venideras. El modelo de integración ofrece una refutación a la preocupación de la planificación urbana tradicional por los valores de la tierra a corto plazo y ofrece un marco para la planificación en comunidades del oeste que dependen de los recursos. Además de la ideología de los indígenas americanos y las herramientas tribales, existen herramientas infrautilizadas en la esfera federal. "El Servicio de conservación de Recursos Naturales del USDA" *Natural Resource Conservation Service* (NRCS) opera el Programa de Servidumbre de Conservación Agrícola, un conjunto de restricciones de escritura de propiedad para los valores del paisaje con fondos en la ley agrícola. Para las "servidumbres de tierras agrícolas" *Agricultural Land Easements* (ALE), NRCS ofrece el 50 por ciento del valor desarrollable de las parcelas agrícolas; se asocia con gobiernos locales o organizaciones sin fines de lucro (por ejemplo, fideicomisos de tierras) para compensar la mitad restante; y registra las restricciones de desarrollo a plazo o permanentes de esas propiedades (Daniels 2017). La oficina del NRCS de Idaho se une a los fideicomisos de tierras locales para negociar acuerdos voluntarios y cubrir el costo de compra, promulgando una política estatal de protección permanente de la tierra. Desde el inicio en 2014 hasta 2019, se han conservado más de 10,000 acres para la productividad perpetua de la tierra en Idaho, con un territorio aproximadamente equivalente bajo negociación activa (Brown 2020). Los mismos ALE han preservado cerca de 200,000 acres de trabajo en Montana durante el mismo tiempo, logrando simultáneamente beneficios colaterales para el medio ambiente. El coordinador de Montana sugiere que el éxito proviene de una combinación de voluntad cultural combinada con un alcance constante, con capital, relaciones sólidas y entrega comprobada de resultados (Sullins y Naugle 2021).

Con la colaboración creativa, programas como el Programa de servidumbre de conservación agrícola de NRCS pueden encontrar una aplicación más amplia. Los gobiernos estatales y locales pueden ayudar a aportar fondos federales en cooperación con organizaciones sin fines de lucro, como se logró mediante un impuesto aprobado públicamente en el condado de Blaine, Idaho (*Program Guide to the Blaine County Land Water and Wildlife Program* 2013). Los operadores comerciales, como constituyentes directamente afectados, también pueden brindar asistencia: los ganaderos de Colorado han integrado una misión de servidumbre agrícola en

sus objetivos de la industria, con un fideicomiso de tierras totalmente patrocinado que preserva más de 600,000 acres críticos de terrenos rancheros durante 25 años ("Conservación" n.d.). Las alianzas innovadoras distribuyen el capital político y fiscal entre las partes interesadas, lo que sugiere un modelo que aprovecha los activos públicos y privados dispersos hacia objetivos de paisaje comunes. Otra herramienta que está ganando popularidad es *Land Link* y los programas asociados, que conectan a los propietarios de tierras jubilados con nuevos agricultores para asegurar un plan de transferencia de tierras agrícolas (Behrens n.d.). Estos programas pueden ayudar a posibles agricultores que de otro modo no podrían competir con el capital de los desarrolladores. Los nuevos agricultores adquieren acceso directo a la propiedad agrícola, los agricultores que se jubilan aún obtienen ganancias en la tierra que ya no desean trabajar, y estos acres se ahorran el desarrollo de SPURs. El uso productivo continuo también permite que el capital social en la comunidad agrícola permanezca y crezca potencialmente. Los programas como *Land Link* son fundamentales si los herederos de los agricultores no buscan un futuro en la agricultura o no existen, ya que actualmente hay pocos sistemas para conectar y promover las transferencias (McIntosh 2020).

DISCUSIÓN FINAL

El problema de la conversión y fragmentación de la tierra a través del desarrollo de SPURs se puede considerar como una pasta de dientes extraída de un tubo: una vez extraída, es poco práctico, por no decir, imposible, devolverla. A diferencia de la teoría de Jane Jacobs sobre el resurgimiento de los entornos urbanos, una vez que se han desarrollado grandes paisajes en el oeste, devolverles su capacidad productiva es una perspectiva falsa. La negligencia histórica y actual del resurgimiento del paisaje representa una crisis inminente para la profesión de la planificación, que perpetúa las pérdidas permanentes de tierras agrícolas con las herramientas regulatorias empleadas para prevenirlas. Contrariamente a la percepción común entre los planificadores, la zonificación de lotes grandes y de baja densidad no protege las tierras agrícolas; de hecho, inician pérdidas de tierras agrícolas al fomentar los SPURs. La falta de atención más allá de los límites del crecimiento, de las áreas de impacto y de la periferia urbana han llevado a ciclos de desarrollo insostenibles ahora acelerados por la creciente intrusión de capital global fuera de los espacios urbanos, particularmente en el oeste norteamericano. Los enfoques teóricos que imaginan los lugares rurales como abstracciones de la forma urbana desatienden los contextos únicos y las necesidades de las comunidades que dependen de usos productivos tangibles en los paisajes agrícolas.

Independientemente de la política local, los planificadores locales deben examinar y abordar las pérdidas de tierras agrícolas en procesos de colaboración con todas las partes interesadas relevantes y con el público. Es necesario implementar sistemas y programas para garantizar que las oficinas de planificación rural y los órganos electos locales puedan medir las pérdidas de tierras productivas más cerca del tiempo real y analizar sus posibles consecuencias. La renuencia a los enfoques regulatorios en los estados del oeste como Idaho puede brindar una oportunidad para un mayor éxito con modelos creativos, basados en el lugar e impulsados por las partes interesadas.

Las estrategias no tradicionales exploradas anteriormente para el oeste de EE. UU. Parecen emanar de ciertos temas. Estas comienzan con el contexto del lugar y de las personas en lugar de un conjunto de herramientas establecidas desde hace tiempo. Prosperan en las consideraciones de todos los actores relevantes, incluidos los de otras agencias, gobiernos soberanos, industria privada y grupos cívicos. Incluyen la posibilidad de programación voluntaria para lograr objetivos, con costos sociales o financieros compartidos entre las partes interesadas. Aceptan modelos de iteración, experimentación e incrementalismo, quizás en alineación con el manejo adaptativo y los enfoques basados en resultados de los métodos de recursos naturales familiares para las comunidades rurales. Además, buscan soluciones que se ajusten a preocupaciones específicas, reconociendo la diversidad de la experiencia rural. Quizás, sobre todo, estas estrategias no tradicionales aprecian que es más probable que se logren resultados cuando las personas de ese lugar inician el cambio deseado, y la confianza conduce a resultados exitosos.

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LA is Better When We Ride Together

Mike The Poet

1. [WHAT'S HAPPENING ON THE SURFACE]

In the shadow of Union Station
security cameras in operation
the Hall of Administration, poetics of location
a flyaway bus takes the turn around
a group of college kids hold art materials
the sky looks ethereal over the cathedral--
a woman holding a bicycle walks down the aisle
her red hat reads "I Love Jesus"
Please report harassment over the intercom
"If you see something, Say something"
"Be safe, be kind" "Stand behind the yellow line"
transfer to the Silver Line, the Silver Streak,
Amtrak, the Metrolink, cruise the corridor
You have dreams and goals

"Save these seats for seniors"
"Do not block or lean against the door"
Look out for the student is the skateboard
there's a helicopter over City Hall
hungry birds feast on the platform
twelve yellow poles, umbrellas on a rooftop
a modernist glass box, commuters in an elevator
a man selling cell phone chargers
a goth girl with Purple Hair
empty chairs in Pershing Square
"Objects in mirror are closer than they appear"
transfer at 7th Street Metro Center
Dodger dogs, Laker leathers
LA is better when We Ride Together

2. [WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON BELOW THE SURFACE]

The message on the Metro poster proclaims:
LA is better when We Ride Together
but policy makers don't take the measures
necessary to ensure equity across the board
the trend is rising poverty, a city of working poor
Resegregation has dislodged diversity
while absentee corporations buy real estate
driving up market rates, forget a living wage
the housing shortage is exacerbated by
greedy developers building luxury units
to line their pockets & isolate the populace –
the Ellis & Costa-Hawkins Act perpetuate the gap
there's a litany of laws reinforcing inequality:
21st Century crooked public policy

LA is better when we ride together
but too many residents are *denied* the pleasure
of enjoying the landscape and weather
because they're working 2 jobs just to survive –
the city's most overcrowded neighborhoods
have the highest rent burdens & most pollution
the city of Angels needs *real angels*
to manipulate the angles controlled by devils
dominating financial levels & civic amenities –
the heartless moguls horde the resources
through crooked policy, a false democracy
the truth is scary, they won't share authority –
eradicating inequality should be the priority

3. [EPILOGUE]

LA is better when We Ride Together
the question is: *will we ever?*

(Dis)possession: The Racialized Development of View Park and Los Angeles' Uneven Housing Market

Melissa Rovner

ABSTRACT

Considering the national awakening to the pervasiveness of racial violence, historical acts of planning must be examined for how they have concretized racial inequalities in the built environment. This paper engages with Critical Race Theory to consider how the historical development of the View Park subdivision of Los Angeles contributed to the materialization of White Supremacy. The developer's plan for the fully improved, racially and socioeconomically restricted subdivision of View Park, especially when compared to its plans for subdivisions intended for Black and working-class persons, illustrates how possession was achieved by design for the exclusive use of White persons through disinvestment in non-White communities.

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL INFLECTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD EXCLUSION

In 1963, Peggy Wright, one of the first Black women to purchase a home with her family in the acclaimed View Park neighborhood of Los Angeles, was assaulted for stepping onto a neighbor's lawn on her walk home from the bus stop (Pimentel 2018). Wright's encounter was one of many acts of racial antagonism and violence directed toward Black families who moved into suburban neighborhoods in the 1960s. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1948 ruling against the legality of racially restrictive covenants, View Park was an exclusively White subdivision. In the 1920s its developer, the Los Angeles Investment Company (LAIC), capitalized on racial homogeneity through the blanket application of racially restrictive covenants and an aesthetic investment in Whiteness. Residential "improvements," as they were called, like paved sidewalks and street trees and geometries like curved streets and wide lot frontages were designed to ensure the sustained value of View Park properties for White homeowners. Unlike gridiron planning, distinctly residential forms, especially when paired with residential zoning, were resistant to changes of use. The Los Angeles City Planning Commission supported the implementation of these kinds of "improvements" as a "business proposition," claiming they would lead to increased profits and sustainable market values when paired with residential dispersal and racial homogeneity (Fogelson 1993, 249). Neighborhoods occupied by Los Angeles's non-White and working-class populations, on the other

(Des) posesión: El desarrollo racializado de View Park y la desigualdad del mercado inmobiliario de Los Ángeles

Melissa Rovner

RESUMEN

Teniendo en cuenta el despertar nacional a la omnipresencia de la violencia racial, los actos históricos de planificación deben examinarse para ver cómo han concretado las desigualdades raciales en el entorno construido. Este documento entra en diálogo con la Teoría Crítica de la Raza (*Critical Race Theory*) para considerar cómo el desarrollo histórico de la subdivisión de View Park en Los Ángeles contribuyó a la materialización de la supremacía blanca. El plan del desarrollador para las mejoras del View Park son racial y socioeconómicamente restringidas, especialmente cuando se compara con sus planes para las subdivisiones destinadas a personas negras y de clase obrera; ilustra, además, cómo la ocupación se logró con el diseño para el uso exclusivo de personas blancas a través de la desinversión en comunidades no blancas.

INTRODUCCIÓN: INFLEXIONES HISTÓRICAS DE LA EXCLUSIÓN DE LOS VECINDARIOS

En 1963, Peggy Wright, una de las primeras mujeres afroamericanas en comprar vivienda con su familia en el aclamado vecindario de View Park en Los Ángeles, fue agredida por pisar el césped de un vecino en su camino a casa desde la parada de autobús (Pimentel 2018). El altercado de Wright fue uno de los muchos actos de antagonismo racial y de violencia dirigidos hacia las familias negras que se mudaron a los barrios suburbanos en la década de 1960. Antes del fallo de la Corte Suprema de 1948 contra la legalidad de los pactos racialmente restrictivos, View Park era una subdivisión exclusivamente blanca. En la década de 1920, su desarrollador, *Los Angeles Investment Company* (LAIC), capitalizó la homogeneidad racial mediante la aplicación general de pactos racialmente restrictivos y una aplicación generalizada de la raza haciendo inversiones en una estética blanca. Las "mejoras" residenciales, una forma de llamarlas, como aceras pavimentadas y árboles en las calles, y geometrías como calles curvas y fachadas anchas de lotes fueron diseñadas para asegurar el valor sostenido de las propiedades de View Park para los propietarios blancos. A diferencia de la planificación de parrilla (*gridiron*), las formas distintivamente residenciales eran resistentes a los cambios de uso, especialmente cuando se combinaban con zonificación residencial. La comisión de planificación de la ciudad de Los Ángeles apoyó la implementación

hand, were not commonly granted these protections. Industrial or toxic waste zoning was often applied to African American neighborhoods, causing declines in environmental health and property values (Rothstein 2017, 48). As Richard Rothstein demonstrates, economic zoning was accompanied by a racial overlay, creating resilient interconnections between race, land, and the allocation of capital.

Uneven racial experiences in Los Angeles's housing market are conspicuous when comparing View Park to the poor quality of LAIC subdivisions marketed to Black and working-class populations in the early twentieth century. Unlike View Park, LAIC's earliest subdivision in South Los Angeles, "Butler and Elder," was advertised to "mill men" and "Colored people" (LAIC 1909). LAIC subdivided the Butler and Elder tract into small, regularized lots without plumbing infrastructure or street improvements, making them amenable to changes in use (Los Angeles District Criminal Court Case 736, *U.S. v. Elder et al.* 1913). Today, View Park is zoned for low-density, single-family residential use, while the Butler and Elder tract is zoned for heavy industrial and manufacturing (Department of City Planning, *General Plan Land Use* 2020). The houses of View Park have been recognized for their "historic significance," while the houses of the Butler and Elder subdivision have been demolished and replaced with commercial and industrial buildings (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, National Park Service 2016). By considering the choices of exclusion and inclusion made by LAIC in its development of racialized subdivisions, it becomes clear that some populations were made vulnerable to market fluctuation while others were made profitable.

This study expands upon the growing body of literature on race, capital and space by engaging with Critical Race Theory. In the 1920s, the Chicago School popularized the "Concentric Zone Theory," or the belief that the central city and its non-White inhabitants were subject to continual decline (Park & Burgess 1925). Those assumed to have economic mobility (in other words, White people) were expected to migrate to the periphery. As Andrea Gibbons shows, the dynamics of home valuation between the city center, where ethnically Mexican, Asian, and Black migrants and Eastern European immigrants were historically concentrated, and the periphery, where White suburban enclaves economically prospered, are intrinsic to urban planning and form (2018). Though Los Angeles's growth was patterned as an alternative to concentric development and the supposed decline that accompanied it, capital followed the growth of decentralized suburbs, where middle-class homes and the required average income to own them excluded non-White populations, as did racial restrictions and violence (Rothstein 2017, 49). Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes this process as "organized abandonment,"

de este tipo de "mejoras" como una "propuesta comercial", alegando que estas conducirían a mayores ganancias y valores de mercado sostenibles cuando se combinaran con la dispersión residencial y la homogeneidad racial (Fogelson 1993, 249). Por otro lado, los vecindarios ocupados por la población no blanca y de clase obrera de Los Ángeles comúnmente no recibieron estas protecciones. La zonificación de desechos industriales o tóxicos se aplicó a menudo a los vecindarios afroamericanos, lo que provocó una disminución en la salud ambiental y los valores de las propiedades (Rothstein 2017, 48). Como demuestra Richard Rothstein, la zonificación económica estuvo acompañada de una superposición racial, creando interconexiones resilientes entre la raza, la tierra y la asignación de capital.

Las experiencias raciales desiguales en el mercado inmobiliario de Los Ángeles son conspicuas cuando se compara View Park con la mala calidad de las subdivisiones de LAIC comercializadas para la población negra y de clase obrera a principios del siglo XX. A diferencia de View Park, la subdivisión más antigua de LAIC en el Sur de Los Ángeles, Butler and Elder, se anunciaba para "hombres del molino" y "gente de color" (LAIC 1909). LAIC subdividió el tramo "Butler y Elder" en lotes pequeños y regularizados sin infraestructura de plomería o mejoras en las calles, lo que los hizo susceptibles a cambios en el uso (Caso 736 del Tribunal Penal del Distrito de Los Ángeles, *US v. Elder et al.*, Casos criminales RG-21 1907 -1929). En la actualidad, View Park está zonificado para usos residencial unifamiliar de baja densidad, mientras que el tramo Butler and Elder está zonificado para industria pesada y manufactura (Departamento de Planificación urbana, Plan general de uso del Terreno 2020). Las casas de View Park han sido reconocidas por su "importancia histórica", mientras que las casas de la subdivisión Butler and Elder han sido demolidas y reemplazadas por edificios comerciales e industriales (Departamento del interior de los Estados Unidos, Servicio de Parques Nacionales). Al considerar las opciones de exclusión e inclusión hechas por LAIC en su desarrollo de subdivisiones racializadas, queda claro que algunas poblaciones se volvieron vulnerables a las fluctuaciones del mercado mientras que otras se volvieron rentables.

Este estudio amplía la creciente literatura sobre raza, capital y espacio al involucrarse con la Teoría Crítica de la Raza. En la década de 1920, la Escuela de Chicago popularizó la "Teoría de la zona concéntrica", o la creencia de que la ciudad central y sus habitantes no blancos estaban sujetos a un continuo declive (Park & Burgess 1925). Aquellos que, se asumía, tenían una movilidad económica (en otras palabras, los blancos) se esperaba que migraran a la periferia. Como muestra Andrea Gibbons, la dinámica de valoración de viviendas entre

whereby jobs, protections, and opportunities move away from central regions of the city along with White working-class populations as they assimilate to an Anglo middle-class suburban ideal (Gilmore 2020). The real estate industry, along with developers, local chambers of commerce, and planning officials, created a self-fulfilling prophecy: They justified disinvestment in non-White communities by arguing that non-White communities were naturally subject to decline. By sequestering capital in racially restricted suburbs, they guaranteed the very decline they foretold.

Similarly, developers like LAIC moved from dealing in the cheap and unregulated lowlands near the city center to the decentralized suburbs of Los Angeles. The inchoate Baldwin Hills supported the construction of the suburban fantasy, View Park. As Dianne Harris demonstrates with her analysis of the homogenous White community of Levittown, “racial privilege and exclusion become visually naturalized in verdant spaces that appear wholesome and even precious, the seeming ineffability of boundaries linked to that of an apparently organic spatial structure” (2006, 99). Despite its “precious” appearance, View Park, like Levittown, was anything but organic or racially neutral. The Spanish-style estates and curving, landscaped vistas were politically motivated and inscribed with racial meanings that continue to be projected in the historically preserved suburban district.

RACIAL SPECULATION AND WHITENESS AS PROPERTY

Whiteness can be understood as a structural phenomenon that ensures the unearned comparative success of White people by the continual renaming and re-establishing of disadvantages for non-White people by entities of power (Harris 1993; Lipsitz 2006). Historically, White identity was associated with property; and property was associated with the exclusive rights of possession, use and dispossession. Through slavery, Black people were denied possession of selfhood, land, and property in the United States. The belief in “Whiteness as Property,” therefore, is “historically rooted in white supremacy and economic hegemony over Black and Native American peoples” (Harris 1993, 5). According to widely distributed historical texts by Adam Smith (1791) and Lewis Henry Morgan (1877), the single-family home and private property are a result of Anglo civilization and the ability to extract from the land its full potential. Black and Indigenous populations were portrayed as evolutionarily backward and therefore undeserving of or unable to improve land in accordance with Anglo standards. Though the complex and fluctuating racial patterns of Los Angeles’s history counter any clear notions of a Black/White binary, Black populations were associated with the bottom of the racial hierarchy; consequently, they were subject to some

el centro de la ciudad, –donde históricamente se concentraron los migrantes étnicamente mexicanos, asiáticos y negros, y los inmigrantes de Europa del Este–, a diferencia de la periferia, donde los enclaves suburbanos blancos prosperaron económicamente son intrínsecos a la planificación urbana y forma urbana (2018). Aunque el crecimiento de Los Ángeles emergió como una alternativa al desarrollo concéntrico y al supuesto declive que lo acompañó, el capital siguió al crecimiento de los suburbios descentralizados, donde las casas de clase media y el ingreso promedio requerido para poseerlas excluían a las poblaciones no blancas, al igual que las restricciones raciales y la violencia (Rothstein 2017, 49). Ruth Wilson Gilmore describe este proceso como un “abandono organizado”, mediante el cual los trabajos, las protecciones y las oportunidades se alejan de las regiones centrales de la ciudad junto con las poblaciones blancas de la clase obrera, a medida que se asimilan a un ideal suburbano de clase media anglosajona (Gilmore 2020). La industria de bienes raíces, junto con los desarrolladores, las cámaras de comercio locales y los funcionarios de planificación, crearon una profecía autocumplida: justificaron la desinversión en comunidades no blancas argumentando que las comunidades no blancas estaban naturalmente sujetas al declive. Al tomar capital en suburbios racialmente restringidos, garantizaron el mismo declive que predijeron.

De manera similar, los desarrolladores como LAIC pasaron de negociar en las tierras bajas baratas y no reguladas, cerca del centro de la ciudad, a los suburbios descentralizados de Los Ángeles. El incipiente Baldwin Hills apoyó la construcción de la fantasía suburbana, View Park. Como demuestra Dianne Harris con su análisis de la comunidad blanca homogénea de Levittown, “el privilegio y la exclusión racial se naturalizan visualmente en espacios verdes que parecen sanos e incluso preciosos, la aparente inefabilidad de los límites vinculados a los de una estructura espacial aparentemente orgánica” (2006, 99). A pesar de su apariencia “preciosa”, View Park, como Levittown, era cualquier cosa menos orgánica o racialmente neutral. Las propiedades de estilo español y las vistas curvas y ajardinadas fueron motivadas políticamente y están inscritas con significados raciales que continúan proyectándose en el distrito suburbano históricamente conservado.

LA ESPECULACIÓN RACIAL Y LA BLANCURA COMO PROPIEDAD

La blanquitud puede entenderse como un fenómeno estructural que asegura el éxito comparativo, inmerecido, de las personas blancas, mediante el cambio continuo de nombre y el restablecimiento de las desventajas para los no blancos por parte de entidades de poder (Harris 1993; Lipsitz 2006).

of the worst discriminatory practices in California (Almaguer 1994). Single-family home ownership was not a natural outcome of Anglo civilization, as the dominant White powers argued, but a construct forged in the interstices between settler colonization and the exploitation of Black and Indigenous peoples.

Scholars of Critical Race Theory argue that colonial forms of dominance have not disappeared but have merely undergone a series of modernizations (Calderon-Zaks 2010; Pinderhughes 2011, 236). New forms of financial and geographic dominance supported the control of property. As early as the nineteenth century, a “dual market in banking” was formed based on the belief that Black people posed greater risks to financial institutions (Baradaran 2017). Black persons were either relegated to community-based networks with limited funds or charged more for less secure loans, making it harder for them to invest in property. Racial segregation ensured that the supposed financial risks associated with Black populations were isolated from superior geographies. Though racial zoning was not practiced in Los Angeles as it was in the South, racially restrictive covenants were widespread, preventing non-White persons from purchasing or occupying properties in White neighborhoods. When racially restrictive covenants were banned, racial violence and discriminatory or predatory lending were enlisted to maintain the color line (Taylor 2019). Today, racial segregation in Los Angeles remains trenchant, even when accounting for differences in income (Ong et al. 2016). Therefore, W.E.B. Du Bois (1934) and Robert L. Allen’s (1969) early theorizations of Black life in America as a colonized nation within a nation stay relevant. The work of Critical Race Theory scholars is furthered by considering how profits were secured for beneficiaries of Whiteness through the exploitation of Black populations—a central device of domestic, internal, or neo-colonialism.

During the Jim Crow Era, Black populations fought to assert their identity as free individuals by moving to the relatively progressive city of Los Angeles. Despite booster efforts to promote the region as an Eden reserved for the Anglo home seeker, by 1910, 40 percent of the Black residents of Los Angeles owned their own home (Sides 2004, 16). Los Angeles served as a kind of “third space,” where both Black and White populations speculated on social and economic ascension through property and home ownership. According to Homi Bhabha, it is in “third spaces” that notions of racial or cultural origins or purity prove untenable (1994). This is true for View Park, which transitioned from a White-only to a predominantly Black-owned subdivision during the Civil Rights Movement. View Park can be understood as a “border zone” due to this transition and based on Bhabha’s theorization. Border zones provide

Históricamente, la identidad blanca se asoció con la propiedad; y la propiedad estaba asociada a los derechos exclusivos de posesión, uso y despojo. A través de la esclavitud, a las personas negras se les negó la posesión de la individualidad, la tierra y la propiedad en los Estados Unidos. Esa creencia en “la blancura como propiedad”, está “históricamente arraigada en la supremacía blanca y en la hegemonía económica y se asienta sobre los pueblos negros y nativos americanos” (Harris 1993, 5). Según los textos históricos ampliamente distribuidos de Adam Smith (1791) y Lewis Henry Morgan (1877), la vivienda unifamiliar y la propiedad privada son el resultado de la civilización anglosajona y de su capacidad de extraer de la tierra todo su potencial. Las poblaciones negras e indígenas fueron retratadas como evolutivamente atrasadas y, por lo tanto, de poco mérito o incapaces de mejorar la tierra de acuerdo con los estándares anglosajones. Aunque los patrones raciales complejos y fluctuantes de la historia de Los Ángeles contrarrestan cualquier noción clara de un binario negro / blanco, las poblaciones negras se asociaron con la parte inferior de la jerarquía racial; en consecuencia, estuvieron sujetos a algunas de las peores prácticas discriminatorias en California (Almaguer 1994). La propiedad de una vivienda unifamiliar no fue un resultado natural de la civilización anglosajona, como argumentaron las potencias blancas dominantes, sino una construcción forjada en los intersticios entre la colonización y la explotación de los pueblos negros e indígenas.

Los académicos de la Teoría Crítica de la Raza argumentan que las formas coloniales de dominación no han desaparecido, sino que simplemente han sufrido una serie de modernizaciones (Calderon-Zaks 2010; Pinderhughes 2011, 236). Nuevas formas de dominio financiero y geográfico apoyaron el control de la propiedad. Ya en el siglo XIX, se formó un “mercado dual en la banca” basado en la creencia de que las personas negras representaban mayores riesgos para las instituciones financieras (Baradaran 2017). Por tanto las personas negras fueron relegadas a redes comunitarias con fondos limitados o se les cobró más por préstamos menos seguros, generándoles una dificultad en el momento de invertir en propiedades. La segregación racial aseguró que los supuestos riesgos financieros asociados con las poblaciones negras se aislaron de las geografías superiores. Aunque la zonificación racial no se practicaba en Los Ángeles como sí en el sur, los pactos racialmente restrictivos estaban generalizados, lo que impedía que las personas que no eran blancas compraran u ocuparan propiedades en los vecindarios blancos. Cuando se prohibieron estos convenios racialmente restrictivos, se recurrió a la violencia racial y los préstamos discriminatorios o predatorios para mantener la línea de color (Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor 2019). Hoy

the potential for conflict and transformation, or an “ongoing negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation” (Bhabha 1994, 2-5). The rebellious act of Peggy Wright illustrates the complex racial and cultural negotiations incited by property development and ownership.

Wealthy Black families increasingly moved into neighborhoods like View Park in the 1960s, but integration was short-lived. As the Black population rose in View Park, White residents left for fear of a decline in property value and neighborhood character. By the 1980s, the Black population in View Park outnumbered the White population nine to one (Jennings 2015). According to census data, from 1980 to 2015, homes in predominantly White neighborhoods appreciated on average \$200,000 more than comparable homes in non-White neighborhoods (Howell and Korver-Glenn 2020). Today, White homeowners capitalize on differences in property value by moving into neighborhoods like View Park at increasing rates. Meanwhile, Black homeowners in View Park fear gentrification, which would push out long-time residents and change the community they fought hard to establish (Jennings 2015). Developers like LAIC contributed to the materialization of land-based and race-based profits that continue to negatively affect Black populations and neighborhoods today.

GROWTH OF THE CO-OPERATIVE BUILDING COMPANY, LAIC

From the 1900s to the 1960s, the developers of View Park, LAIC, grew from a nascent idea to a multi-million-dollar company. With limited starting capital, LAIC, under the direction of President Charles Elder, began dealing in the least expensive and least valuable urban regions of Los Angeles. They purchased land and built and financed homes in their first tract, “Butler and Elder,” in 1906, referring to it internally as the “Tin Can” for its proximity to the river, the city’s dumping grounds at the time (Hernandez 2010). In his 1913 trial testimony, Elder described the neighborhood as “in very bad, dilapidated condition.” Later, Elder explained, “The Salt Lake Railroad came in there and put in one of their railroad tracks right alongside the Butler and Elder tracts, which brought the property up and made it a manufacturing section, an industrial district” (Los Angeles District Criminal Court Case 736, *U.S. v. Elder et al.* 1913). In Baist’s Real Estate Atlas Survey from 1910, the precarious positioning of the Butler and Elder tract is readily apparent (Figure 1). The modest four acres of land was situated at the confluence of the Atchison, Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads between the river and the largest switching station in the region. The lowlands adjacent to the river, especially south of downtown Los Angeles,

en día, la segregación racial en Los Ángeles sigue siendo incisiva, incluso cuando se tienen en cuenta diferencias en ingresos económicos (Ong et al 2016). Por lo tanto, las primeras teorizaciones de W.E.B Du Bois (1934) y Robert L. Allen (1969) sobre la vida negra en Estados Unidos como una nación colonizada dentro de una nación siguen siendo relevantes. El trabajo de los estudiosos de la Teoría crítica de la raza va más allá al considerar cómo se aseguraron las ganancias para los beneficiarios de la blanquitud a través de la explotación de las poblaciones negras, un dispositivo central doméstico, interno o neo-colonial.

Durante la Era de Jim Crow, las poblaciones negras lucharon por afirmar su identidad como individuos libres mudándose a la ciudad, relativamente progresista, de Los Ángeles. A pesar de los esfuerzos para promover la región como un Edén para habitantes anglosajones, en 1910, el 40 por ciento de los residentes negros de Los Ángeles eran propietarios de su propia casa (Sides 2004, 16). Los Ángeles sirvió como una especie de “Tercer Espacio”, donde, tanto la población negra como la blanca, especulaban sobre el ascenso social y económico a través de la propiedad y la posesión de vivienda. Según Homi Bhabha, es en los “terceros espacios” donde las nociones de origen racial o cultural o de pureza resultan insostenibles (1994). Esto es cierto para View Park, que pasó de una subdivisión de solo blancos a una subdivisión de propiedad predominantemente negra durante el Movimiento por los derechos civiles. View Park puede entenderse como una “zona fronteriza” debido a esta transición y con base en la teorización de Bhabha.

Las zonas fronterizas brindan el potencial para el conflicto y la transformación, o una “negociación en curso que busca autorizar híbridos culturales que emergen en momentos de transformación histórica” (Bhabha 1994, 2-5). El acto rebelde de Peggy Wright ilustra las complejas negociaciones raciales y culturales incitadas por el desarrollo y la propiedad inmobiliaria.

Las familias negras adineradas se mudaron cada vez más a vecindarios como View Park en la década de 1960, pero la integración duró poco. A medida que la población negra aumentó en View Park, los residentes blancos se fueron por temor a una disminución en el valor de la propiedad y por el carácter del vecindario. En la década de 1980, la población negra de View Park superaba en número a la población blanca de nueve a uno (Jennings 2015). Según los datos del censo, de 1980 a 2015, los hogares en vecindarios predominantemente blancos se apreciaron en promedio \$200,000 más que los hogares comparables en vecindarios no blancos (Howell & Korver-Glenn 2020). Hoy en día, los propietarios blancos aprovechan las diferencias en el valor de la propiedad al mudarse a vecindarios como View Park, y evitarse las tasas crecientes.

were known for flooding. Coupled with dusty unpaved streets, pollution from neighboring industries, and the accident-prone railway, the region was a danger to occupant health and safety.

LAIC subdivided the four acres into thirty-three lots, thirty feet by one hundred feet each, upon which they built seventeen houses for the exclusive use of "Colored people" (LAIC 1909) (Figure 2). Without plumbing infrastructure laid in the surrounding neighborhoods, homes in the tract were not equipped with restrooms; and electrical infrastructures were implemented only after purchases were made. The homes were relatively homogenous in material and setback distance from the street, but each home varied significantly in size and form, suggesting economic diversity in the neighborhood. A broad representation of economic standing is not surprising for the region, given it was one of few areas that Black people were not prevented from occupying through racial deed restrictions and violence. Though governed racially through the explicit marketing and sale of properties to Black audiences, the range in size and configuration of homes suggests the tract was relatively unregulated materially and economically.

The vacant lots and groupings of small accessory buildings scattered throughout the tract also suggest something about the character of the development. At the time, it was common for working-class and non-White families to live in a tent on a financed lot while saving money to build a home. Many families used their land to raise chickens and grow food, which necessitated ad-hoc, self-built structures and practices (Nicolaidis 2002). The oral history of George A. Beavers, co-founder of the first Black insurance company, Golden State Mutual, and former resident of the Butler and Elder tract, provides insight into the nature of the tract. At the age of eleven, Beavers worked as a water boy for rail laborers like his father, who laid tracks for the extension of the nearby Santa Fe line. Beavers married and bought a home next to his parents' residence on east Washington Street near Santa Fe in 1911. Two years later, both generations of Beavers lost their homes in an electrical fire (Beavers interviewed by Hopkins, UCLA Oral History). Though the exact

Mientras tanto, los propietarios negros en View Park temen la gentrificación, lo que expulsaría a los residentes desde hace mucho tiempo y cambiaría la comunidad por la que lucharon arduamente y lograron establecer (Jennings 2015). Desarrolladores como LAIC contribuyeron a la materialización de ganancias basadas en la tierra y la raza que continúan afectando negativamente a las poblaciones y vecindarios negros en la actualidad.

CRECIMIENTO DE LA COOPERATIVA CONSTRUCTORA: LAIC

Desde la década de 1900 hasta la de 1960, los desarrolladores de View Park, LAIC, pasaron de ser una idea incipiente a convertirse en una empresa multimillonaria. Con un capital inicial limitado, LAIC, bajo la dirección del presidente Charles Elder, comenzó a negociar en las regiones urbanas menos costosas y menos valiosas de Los Ángeles. Compraron terrenos, construyeron y financiaron viviendas en su primer tramo, "Butler and Elder", en 1906, refiriéndose internamente a él como el "Tin Can" por su proximidad al río, el vertedero de la ciudad en ese momento (Hernández 2010). En su testimonio, en el juicio de 1913, Elder describió el vecindario como "en muy malas condiciones, en ruinas". Más tarde, Elder explicó: "El ferrocarril de Salt Lake entró allí y puso una de sus vías de ferrocarril justo al lado del tramo Butler y Elder, lo que elevó

la propiedad y la convirtió en un área manufacturera, un distrito industrial" (Distrito Criminal de Los Ángeles Court Case 736, US v. Elder et al., RG-21 Criminal Cases 1907-1929). En la encuesta *Real Estate Atlas* de Baist de 1910, la posición precaria del tramo Butler y Elder es evidente (Figura 1). Los modestos cuatro acres de tierra estaban situados en la confluencia de los ferrocarriles de Atchison, Santa Fe y Southern Pacific, entre el río y la estación de conmutación más grande de la región. Las tierras bajas adyacentes al río, especialmente al sur del centro de Los Ángeles, eran conocidas por las inundaciones; junto con las polvorientas calles sin pavimentar, la contaminación de las industrias vecinas y el ferrocarril propenso a accidentes, la región era un peligro para la salud y la seguridad de los ocupantes.



Figure 1. Map of the "Butler & Elder Tract" illustrating its entanglement with multiple lines of the Pacific Electric Railway. Source: Baist's Real Estate Atlas Surveys of Los Angeles, 1910, Library of Congress.

Figura 1. Mapa del "tramo Butler & Elder" que ilustra su enredo con múltiples líneas del Pacific Electric Railway. Fuente: Encuesta Real Estate Atlas de Baist de Los Ángeles, 1910, Biblioteca del Congreso.

cause of the fire is unknown, properties were built dangerously close to electrical and transportation infrastructures. Denied from alternative opportunities, working-class families, and especially Black families seeking homeownership, were dependent upon higher risk investments subject to catastrophe.

Using proceeds from its first speculations, LAIC began building factories, warehouses, mills, and yards in the neighboring southlands. Bulk lumber purchases were shipped into the harbor and transported directly to LAIC properties, where large numbers of windows, doors, and pre-cut building panels were held in stock. Wooden structures of two to four rooms and one to one-and-a-half stories conformed to market demands and by cutting out the “middle-man,” these standardized homes could be constructed for as little as \$200 (LAIC 1909). LAIC promoted the efficiency that a multipronged approach to home development afforded them. At the time, efficiency was paramount to a prospective developer’s ability to grow. As long as Los Angeles’s residential market continued to prosper in accordance with the 1880s boom, developers with the resources to build the most housing in the least time for the cheapest price would rise to the top before available lands ran out. The southern location of LAIC home-building warehouses and subsidiaries, including the Elder Building Material and Paint Supply companies, allowed for the quick erection of multiple standardized homes in the region. LAIC marketed to people working in the nearby factories, including Polish, Russian, Italian and Jewish immigrants (most prominently) as well as Mexican and Black migrants. The region quickly grew into a polyglot landscape of various industries and subdivided residential lots containing apartment buildings; tents; shacks; and modest, single-family homes.

LAIC’s business venture was not nearly as modest as its homes. LAIC established the Global Savings Bank to manage the company and its subsidiaries’ financial operations, offering lots and homes to purchasers on installment plans. Popular investment magazines and business elites spoke out in favor of LAIC’s business practices. *The Globe* ran numerous stories on the integrity of LAIC’s financial operations, stating that “LAIC sales are

LAIC subdividió los cuatro acres en treinta y tres lotes, de treinta pies por cien pies cada uno, sobre los cuales construyeron diecisiete casas para uso exclusivo de la “gente de color” (LAIC 1909) (Figura 2).

Sin la infraestructura de plomería puesta en los vecindarios circundantes, las casas en el tramo no estaban equipadas con baños; y las infraestructuras eléctricas se implementaron solo después de que se realizaran las compras. Las casas eran relativamente homogéneas en material y tenían casi la misma distancia que las separaba de la calle, pero cada casa variaba significativamente en tamaño y forma, lo que sugiere diversidad económica en el vecindario. La amplia representación económica no es sorprendente para la región, dado que fue una de las pocas áreas que no se impidió a los negros ocupar a través de restricciones de actos raciales y violencia. Aunque se rige racialmente a través del mercadeo explícito y la venta de propiedades a audiencias negras, la variedad en tamaño y configuración de las casas sugiere que el terreno estaba relativamente desregulado material y económicamente.

Los lotes vacíos y las agrupaciones de pequeños edificios accesorios dispersos por todo el tramo también sugieren algo sobre el carácter del desarrollo. En ese momento, era común que las familias de clase obrera y no blancas vivieran en una carpa, en un lote financiado, mientras ahorraban dinero para construir una casa. Muchas familias usaban su tierra para criar pollos y cultivar alimentos, lo que requería estructuras y prácticas *ad-hoc*, construidas por ellos mismos (Nicolaidis 2002). La historia oral de George A. Beavers, cofundador de la primera compañía de seguros negra, Golden State Mutual, y ex residente de Butler and Elder, proporciona conocimiento sobre la naturaleza de este tramo. A la edad de once años, Beavers trabajó como *water boy*¹ para trabajadores ferroviarios como su padre, quien construyó vías para la extensión de la cercana línea




Figure 2. Detail of LAIC’s houses built at the intersection of Santa Fe Avenue and Washington Street. Source: Sanborn Fire Insurance Map, Los Angeles County, 1906, Library of Congress

Figura 2. Detalle de las casas de LAIC construidas en la intersección de la Avenida Santa Fe y la Calle Washington. Fuente: Mapa de seguros contra incendios de Sanborn, condado de Los Ángeles, 1906, Biblioteca del Congreso

1. Water boy (también water girl), en español, chico del agua hace referencia a personas que en los Estados Unidos, trabajaban en el campo proporcionando agua a los trabajadores agrícolas en el siglo XIX y principios del XX.

being conducted on an economic basis; with a view of building up business by legitimate methods, altogether devoid of speculative risk or sensationalism" (1911, 10-11). In the summer of 1913, Los Angeles Mayor George Alexander joined leaders in infrastructure, real estate, and finance at a banquet in praise of Charles Elder, president of LAIC, the "largest co-operative building company in America" (Clary 1966, 247). Despite an illusion of stability, the company's many holdings were tied to speculative futures based on inflated stocks. With the onset of a national depression in fall of 1913, LAIC faced bankruptcy. Charles Elder and his partners were indicted for overspeculating and using the mail to defraud the public, placing the company and its ethics under public scrutiny (Los Angeles District Criminal Court Case 736, *U.S. v. Elder et al.* 1913). The Supreme Court facilitated the reorganization of LAIC under new leadership to prevent further collapse of the region's property market. While LAIC experienced the trial as a setback in its trajectory toward future success, the most vulnerable of its indebted homeowners suffered irreparable loss. Though \$105,000 worth of stock was purchased in 1907, the trial revealed that only \$10,000 remained in the fund in 1913. Untruthful assertions led prospective homeowners to invest in LAIC stock; but as the market crashed and stock values plummeted, stockholders were turned away without the profits promised (*Los Angeles Herald* 1915).

To secure LAIC's survival after reorganization, some investments were rendered dispensable and others were prioritized in the making of a specific vision of Los Angeles. These choices were economically as well as racially motivated. In the 1910s and 1920s, land development was relatively unregulated in the nation's cities. Individuals and collectives commonly purchased land and developed and sold lots with minimal investments in mixed-use regions at the start of their careers. With installment payments from their earliest debtors, many companies began developing fully improved, racially restricted communities in the 1920s and 1930s. The Los Angeles Real Estate Board, Los Angeles City Planning Commission, and Republican Party acknowledged and encouraged the transition in their campaigns for neighborhood restrictions and improvements from the 1910s to the 1930s (Redford 2014). During these pivotal decades of development, racially, economically, and materially homogenous developments in the suburbs were touted as secure investments. Housing conditions near the central city where dangerous industries and infrastructures were concentrated, on the other hand, were attributed to the assumed amoral characteristics of the racial groups concentrated therein (Glotzer 2020). Realtors and planners believed the presence of Black people to be the underlying cause of residential decline, using their beliefs to justify price gouging, or disinvestment,

Santa Fe. Beavers se casó y compró una casa junto a la residencia de sus padres en East Washington Street cerca de Santa Fe en 1911. Dos años más tarde, ambas generaciones de Beavers perdieron sus hogares en un incendio eléctrico (Beavers entrevistado por Hopkins, UCLA Historia oral). Aunque se desconoce la causa exacta del incendio, las propiedades se construyeron peligrosamente cerca de infraestructuras eléctricas y de transporte. A las familias de clase obrera y especialmente las familias negras que buscaban propiedad de vivienda, se les negaban oportunidades, lo cual las obligaba a inversiones de mayor riesgo sujetas a catástrofes.

Utilizando las ganancias de sus primeras especulaciones, LAIC comenzó a construir fábricas, almacenes, molinos y patios en las tierras vecinas del sur. Las compras de madera a granel se enviaron al puerto y se transportaron directamente a las propiedades de LAIC, donde se mantuvieron almacenados un gran número de ventanas, puertas y paneles de construcción precortados. Las estructuras de madera de dos a cuatro habitaciones y de uno a un piso y medio se ajustaban a las demandas del mercado y eliminando al "intermediario", estas casas estandarizadas podrían construirse por tan solo \$200 (LAIC 1909). LAIC promovió la eficiencia que les brindaba un enfoque polifacético para el desarrollo de viviendas. En ese momento, la eficiencia era fundamental para la capacidad de crecimiento de un futuro desarrollador. Mientras el mercado residencial de Los Ángeles siguiera prosperando, de acuerdo con el boom de la década de 1880, los desarrolladores con los recursos para construir la mayor cantidad de viviendas, en el menor tiempo, por el precio más barato, prosperarían antes de que se agotaran los terrenos disponibles. La ubicación sur de los almacenes de construcción de viviendas de LAIC y sus subsidiarias, -incluidas las empresas Elder Building Material y Paint Supply-, permitieron la rápida construcción de múltiples viviendas estandarizadas en la región. LAIC comercializaba a trabajadores en las fábricas cercanas incluyendo inmigrantes polacos, rusos, italianos y judíos (más prominente), así como a migrantes mexicanos y negros. La región creció rápidamente en un paisaje políglota, de varias industrias y lotes residenciales subdivididos conteniendo edificios de apartamentos; carpas; chozas y viviendas unifamiliares modestas. El proyecto comercial de LAIC no se acerca a la modestia de sus hogares. LAIC estableció al Global Savings Bank como administrador de las operaciones financieras de la empresa y sus subsidiarias, ofreciendo lotes y casas a los compradores en planes de cuotas. Las revistas populares de inversión y las élites empresariales se pronunciaron a favor de las prácticas comerciales de LAIC. The Globe difundió numerosas historias sobre la integridad de las operaciones

in neighborhoods and among populations purported to be risks to property values. Though the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) would institutionalize the valuation of risk as a direct result of racial composition in the 1930s through their lending and insuring policies, the racialization of space was already prevalent in the housing developments of earlier decades. By looking at View Park, developed by LAIC after reorganization, it becomes clear that real estate speculation was not merely a financial act but a cultural one, enmeshed with architectural forms and ethnic identities as much as economic ones.

DEVELOPMENT OF VIEW PARK

As of 1913, the year of LAIC's indictment and reorganization, the largest of their endeavors involved the purchase of 3,000 acres of the acclaimed Baldwin Hills Estate (Figure 3). The hilltop land was located close enough to downtown Los Angeles and the region's largest university (the University of Southern California) to facilitate convenient commutes for wealthy professionals, while being removed enough to facilitate healthful living in isolation from the pollutants of the lowlands to the east. Elder had been in negotiations with Lucky Baldwin's daughters, heiresses of the estate, since 1912, and had contracted a deal to complete the purchase the following year. When the economy plummeted in 1913, along with the valuation of LAIC stocks upon which speculative future purchases were to be funded, the deal faltered. After the crash and reorganization of the company, LAIC's new directors speculated as to how they could fulfill Elder's promise and secure the lucrative lands for future development. While LAIC's South Los Angeles homeowners were selling back their stocks for dimes on the dollar, LAIC's new directors were busy securing the extension of the Baldwin contract for the development of a racially restricted subdivision. By 1915, the new directors of LAIC – including JE Fishburn, President of the National Bank of California; Harry Chandler, LA Times Publisher; Henry O'Melveny, real estate lawyer; and William Allen Jr., President of the Title Insurance and Trust Company – solidified a new deal (Clary 1966, 248). Based on their power and knowledge of land holdings, it is plausible that the new directors were selected specifically to maintain LAIC's control over the Baldwin lands after reorganization.

LAIC's interest in the future development of View Park was apparent in their promotion of the Republican Party as early as 1911. Both Elder and Fishburn publicly supported George Alexander in his campaign for mayor against Socialist candidate Job Harriman (Clary 1966, 248). Alexander promised to protect the interests of private speculators and prevent municipal oversight in the development of Los Angeles's industry, infrastructure and real estate. A "Committee of 100," as it was called, was

financieras esta empresa, afirmando que "las ventas de LAIC se realizan sobre una base económica; con miras a construir negocios con métodos legítimos, completamente desprovistos de riesgo especulativo o sensacionalismo" (1911, 10-11). En el verano de 1913, el alcalde de Los Ángeles, George Alexander, se unió a los líderes en infraestructura, bienes raíces y finanzas en un banquete en el que elogiaba a Charles Elder, presidente de LAIC, la "empresa cooperativa de construcción más grande de Estados Unidos" (Clary 1966, 247). A pesar de la ilusión de estabilidad, muchos activos de la empresa estaban atados a futuros especulativos basados en acciones infladas. Con el inicio de una depresión nacional en el otoño de 1913, LAIC se enfrentó a la bancarrota. Charles Elder y sus socios fueron acusados de especulación excesiva y de utilizar el correo para defraudar al público, poniendo a la empresa y a su ética bajo escrutinio público (Caso 736 del Tribunal Penal del Distrito de Los Ángeles, U.S. v. Elder et al. 1913). La Corte Suprema facilitó la reorganización de LAIC bajo un nuevo liderazgo para evitar un mayor colapso del mercado inmobiliario de la región. Aunque LAIC sufrió un retraso en su trayectoria hacia el éxito, los propietarios endeudados eran los más vulnerables y quienes sufrieron pérdidas irreparables. Pese a que se compraron acciones por un valor de \$105.000 dólares en 1907, el juicio reveló que solo quedaban \$10.000 dólares en el fondo en 1913.

Afirmaciones falsas llevaron a los posibles propietarios a invertir en acciones de LAIC; pero cuando el mercado colapsó y los valores de las acciones se desplomaron, los accionistas fueron rechazados sin las ganancias prometidas (Los Angeles Herald 1915).

Para asegurar la supervivencia de LAIC después de la reorganización, algunas inversiones se hicieron prescindibles y otras se priorizaron en la elaboración de una visión específica de Los Ángeles. Estas alternativas estaban motivadas tanto económica como racialmente. En las décadas de 1910 y 1920, el desarrollo de la tierra estaba relativamente desregulado en las ciudades del país. Los individuos y colectivos comúnmente compraban terrenos, desarrollaban y vendían lotes con inversiones mínimas en regiones de uso mixto al comienzo de sus carreras. Con los pagos a plazos de sus primeros deudores, muchas empresas comenzaron a desarrollar comunidades mejoradas y con restricciones raciales en las décadas de 1920 y 1930. La junta de bienes raíces de Los Ángeles, la Comisión de planificación de la ciudad de Los Ángeles y el Partido Republicano reconocieron y alentaron la transición en sus campañas de restricciones y mejoras en los vecindarios desde la década de 1910 hasta la de 1930 (Redford 2014). Durante estas décadas cruciales de desarrollo, el desenvolvimiento racial, económico

formed to back Alexander's pro-business platform, of which Elder and Fishburn were representatives. The committee was led by Bradner W. Lee, executor of the Lucky Baldwin real estate holdings. In his address to the committee in 1911, Lee echoed sentiments of the Los Angeles Real Estate Board and the planning commission, arguing for certain neighborhood characteristics and deed restrictions to secure racial and economic homogeneity within planned suburban communities (Redford 2014). Large land holdings such as the Baldwin Estate were to be developed to secure profits for developers, the city, and White prospective homeowners in alignment with the committee's ambitions.

A series of ordinances had been written into law in the preceding years that set the stage for the additional guidelines suggested by Lee. In 1908, the Los Angeles City Council initiated the nation's first zoning law to ensure the separation of residential and alternative uses in select, predominantly White-occupied geographies. The ordinance created three, large, residentially zoned districts in North and West Los Angeles, where uses determined to be "nuisances," including laundries, lumber yards, and factories, were forbidden. East and South Los Angeles, on the other hand, were zoned as industrial, despite being home to Los Angeles's ethnically diverse and working-class populations (Fogelson 1993). Planned communities with curved roads and landscaped vistas were touted to protect residents from the dangers of the over-concentrated, industrial city. Social evolutionary theories and the studies and representations of the Chicago School were cited in support of municipal and urban initiatives. Planners and developers associated non-White and working-class populations with the detriments of the city by promising to prevent an influx of "adverse influences" in new, racially restricted, self-contained communities.

LAIC, under the guidance of newly elected leadership, manifested the goals of Republican realtors, planners and developers in the material and legal architectures of View Park. In 1923, the company began subdividing neighborhoods in the foothills with

y materialmente homogéneo en los suburbios fue promocionado como inversión segura. Las condiciones de vivienda cerca del centro, donde se concentraban industrias e infraestructuras peligrosas, por otro

lado, se atribuyeron a las supuestas características amorales de los grupos raciales concentrados en ella (Glotzer 2020). Los agentes inmobiliarios y los planificadores creían que la presencia de personas negras era la causa subyacente del declive residencial, y usaban sus creencias para justificar la especulación de los precios o la desinversión en los vecindarios y entre las poblaciones que supuestamente eran riesgosas para el valor de las propiedades. Aunque la Administración Federal de Vivienda (por sus siglas en inglés FHA) institucionalizaría la valoración del riesgo como resultado directo de la composición racial en la década de 1930 a través de sus políticas de préstamos y seguros, la racialización del espacio ya preveía en los

desarrollos habitacionales de décadas anteriores. Al observar View Park, desarrollado por LAIC después de la reorganización, queda claro que la especulación inmobiliaria no era meramente un acto financiero sino cultural, entremezclado con formas arquitectónicas e identidades étnicas tanto como económicas.

DESARROLLO DE VIEW PARK

A partir de 1913, el año de la acusación y reorganización de LAIC, el mayor de sus esfuerzos involucró la compra de 3,000 acres de la aclamada Baldwin Hills Estate (Figura 3). La tierra en la cima de la colina estaba ubicada lo suficientemente cerca del centro de Los Ángeles y de la universidad más grande de la región (la Universidad del Sur de California) para permitir el desplazamiento de profesionales adinerados, y a la vez lo suficientemente retirado para una vida saludable, aislada de los contaminantes de las tierras bajas del este. Elder había estado en negociaciones con las hijas de Lucky Baldwin, herederas de la propiedad, desde 1912, y había llegado a un acuerdo para completar la compra el año siguiente. Cuando la economía se desplomó en 1913, junto con la valoración




Figure 3. Map illustrating LAIC land purchases and developments as of August 1913. Source: Tract Maps and Cadastral Maps of Southern California, UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library.

Figura 3. Mapa que ilustra las compras y desarrollos de terrenos de LAIC a partir de agosto de 1913. Fuente: Tract Maps y Catastral Maps of Southern California, UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library.

curved, paved roads and sidewalks lined with street trees and custom street lamps (Figure 4). Minimum home prices were set for the large lots with frontages twice the width of those at the Butler and Elder subdivision to ensure the economic composition of the neighborhood ranged from middle-class to upper-class. An architectural review board was established to ensure that house plans followed general community guidelines, but lot purchasers were encouraged to customize their estates aesthetically. The racial composition of the neighborhood, on the other hand, was highly controlled by LAIC. Racial restrictions were written into the deed for every lot within View Park, forbidding use or occupation "by any person not wholly of the Caucasian race" (Horak 2016). LAIC demonstrated their commitment to racial exclusion in the 1919 Supreme Court case *Los Angeles Investment Company v. Gary*. When Alfred Gary, an African American man, purchased a home in a tract owned by LAIC, the company filed for revocation, arguing that Gary did not have the right to occupy the land due to a racially restrictive covenant written in the deed. Though the court ruled in favor of Black ownership in the *Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v Garrott* earlier that year on the grounds that racially restrictive covenants violated the fourteenth amendment, the court's decision did not protect Black occupation of land. LAIC found a loophole in the legal precedent, securing the right to deny their exclusive developments, and the benefits appreciated therein, from non-White occupation.

Racial exclusion was sold accompanied by a particular vision of homeownership and community at View Park. LAIC advertisements for View Park commonly featured healthy Anglo children alongside caricatured references to Mediterranean and Spanish conquistadors (Figure 5). Unrestricted views and restricted homesites were romanticized to align with booster language used in popular turn-of-the-century promotions of Los Angeles. Individual and municipal boosters, including the Chamber of Commerce most prominently, constructed an illusion of a "Spanish fantasy past" that celebrated the colonial conquest of the region and disguised both the diverse ethnic heritage of its founders and the forced labor and eradication of Indigenous peoples in its making (Deverell 2004; Krupp 2007). The Mission and Spanish Revival styles grew into popularity in Southern California in the 1910s and 1920s in alignment with the Spanish fantasy. According to mythologized portrayals, ethnically Mexican and Indigenous peoples were naturally savage and lazy but had been rendered docile and productive through their service to the Spanish friars while constructing the missions of early California.

View Park homes were adorned with thick wooden entry doors, cylindrical entry towers, Spanish

de las acciones de LAIC sobre las que se financiarían las compras especulativas futuras, el trato fracasó. Después del colapso y la reorganización de la empresa, los nuevos directores de LAIC especularon sobre cómo podrían cumplir la promesa de Elder y asegurar las lucrativas tierras para el desarrollo futuro. Mientras los propietarios de LAIC en el sur de Los Ángeles vendían sus acciones por una fracción de su valor, los nuevos directores de LAIC estaban ocupados asegurando la extensión del contrato de Baldwin para el desarrollo de una subdivisión racialmente restringida. Para 1915, los nuevos directores de LAIC, —incluido JE Fishburn, presidente del National Bank of California; Harry Chandler, editor de LA Times; Henry O'Melveny, abogado de bienes raíces; y William Allen Jr., presidente de Title Insurance and Trust Company—solidificaron un nuevo trato (Clary 1966). Teniendo en cuenta su poder y conocimiento de la propiedad de la tierra, es plausible que los nuevos directores fueran seleccionados específicamente para mantener el control de LAIC sobre las tierras de Baldwin después de la reorganización.

El interés de LAIC en el futuro desarrollo de View Park fue evidente en su promoción del Partido Republicano en 1911. Tanto Elder como Fishburn apoyaron públicamente a George Alexander en su campaña a la alcaldía contra el candidato socialista Job Harriman (Clary 1966, 248). Alexander prometió proteger los intereses de los especuladores privados y evitar la supervisión municipal en el desarrollo de la industria, la infraestructura y los bienes raíces de Los Ángeles. Se formó un "Comité de 100", como se le llamó, para respaldar la plataforma pro-empresarial de Alexander, de la cual Elder y Fishburn eran representantes. El comité estaba dirigido por Bradner W. Lee, albacea de las propiedades inmobiliarias de Lucky Baldwin. En su discurso ante el comité en 1911, Lee hizo eco de los sentimientos de la junta de Bienes raíces de Los Ángeles y la comisión de planificación, defendiendo ciertas características del vecindario y restricciones en el contrato para asegurar la homogeneidad racial y económica dentro de las comunidades suburbanas planificadas (Redford 2014). Se desarrollarían grandes extensiones de tierra, como Baldwin Estate, para asegurar ganancias para los desarrolladores, la ciudad y los posibles propietarios de viviendas blancos, en consonancia con las ambiciones del comité.

Una serie de ordenanzas habían sido escritas dentro de la ley en los años anteriores que sentaron las bases para las pautas adicionales sugeridas por Lee. En 1908, el Ayuntamiento de Los Ángeles inició la primera ley de zonificación de la nación para garantizar la separación de usos residenciales y alternativos en zonas geográficas seleccionadas predominantemente ocupadas por blancos. La ordenanza creó tres distritos grandes de zonas residenciales en el norte

arches, whitewashed plaster, decorative ironwork, and clay-tile roofs in service of this illusion. Names like "The Barcelona" and "The Peyolas" were given to LAIC model homes in advertisements for View Park that promised "a view that rivals the Mediterranean" (*The Los Angeles Times* 1928). In addition to showcasing sketches and plans of possible homes in their architectural showroom, LAIC commissioned professional photos to market the first homes built in the tract. Anglo Models were situated in idle positions among the highly constructed landscapes, water features, and gazebos, as if to promise a carefree life of leisure for View Park homeowners (Figure 6). The Mediterranean, Mission, and Spanish Revival homes of View Park rendered the Spanish fantasy past alive in the present, as if it had been preserved for the regions' Anglo (and purportedly "rightful") heirs.

The federal government joined in sponsorship of View Park's racial and material architectures in the 1930s. View Park was one of the first planned communities to be insured by the FHA under the National Housing Act. FHA insurance promised better terms and greater security on mortgage investments, but it was only offered to White prospective homeowners or White developers for properties with racial deed restrictions in place (Jackson 1987). The meaning of property "value" and "nuisance" were imbued with racial prejudice. If a neighborhood experienced an "infiltration" of non-White or immigrant populations, it was expected to decline in value. This expectation became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because federal investments and municipal regulations protected neighborhoods like View Park from market fluctuation, property values in exclusive White enclaves escalated. Today, the Doumakes House, built by LAIC in 1928 in one of the earliest View Park subdivisions, is listed as a national landmark due to the integrity it has maintained for over fifty years. The 3,117 square foot house features Spanish Colonial Revival forms and elements preserved within narrow margins of their initial condition. The exterior smooth stucco and clay tile roof, in addition to the interior iron light fixtures, brass hardware and hand carved wooden doors, are original. At its inception, the house was of a superior quality;

y oeste de Los Ángeles, donde se prohibieron algunos usos, los cuales fueron determinados como "molestos", incluidas las lavanderías, los depósitos de madera y las fábricas. El este y el sur de Los Ángeles, por otro lado, se dividieron en zonas pensadas como industriales, a pesar de ser el hogar de las poblaciones étnicamente diversas y de clase obrera de Los Ángeles (Fogelson1993). Se promocionaron las comunidades planificadas con calles curvas y vistas ajardinadas para proteger a los residentes de los peligros de la ciudad industrial excesivamente concentrada. Las teorías de la evolución social, los estudios y representaciones de la Escuela de Chicago fueron citados en apoyo de iniciativas municipales y urbanas. Los planificadores y desarrolladores

asociaron a las poblaciones no blancas y de clase obrera con el detrimento de la ciudad prometiendo prevenir la afluencia de "influencias adversas" en comunidades nuevas, autónomas y con restricciones raciales.

Bajo la guía de los líderes recién elegidos, LAIC, manifestó los objetivos de los agentes inmobiliarios, planificadores y desarrolladores republicanos en las arquitecturas materiales y legales de View Park.

En 1923, la compañía comenzó a subdividir vecindarios en las estribaciones con calles y aceras pavimentadas, con curvas rodeadas de árboles en las calles y farolas con diseño particular (Figura 4). Se establecieron

precios mínimos de vivienda para lotes grandes con fachadas dos veces más anchas que los de la subdivisión Butler and Elder con el fin de asegurar que la composición económica del vecindario variara de clase media a clase alta. Se estableció una junta de supervisión arquitectónica para garantizar que los planos de las casas siguieran las pautas generales de la comunidad, pero se alentó a los compradores de lotes a personalizar estéticamente sus propiedades. Por otro lado, la composición racial del barrio, estaba altamente controlada por LAIC. Las restricciones raciales fueron redactadas en la escritura para cada lote dentro de View Park, prohibiendo el uso u ocupación "por cualquier persona que no sea completamente de raza caucásica" (Horak 2016). LAIC demostró su compromiso con la exclusión racial



Figure 4. Aerial view of the View Park neighborhood in the foothills of the former Baldwin Estate, c. 1928. Source: "Dick" Whittington Photography Collection, 1924-1987, USC Digital Library.

Figura 4. Vista aérea del vecindario de View Park en las estribaciones de la antigua Baldwin Estate, c. 1928. Fuente: Colección de fotografía "Dick" Whittington, 1924-1987, Biblioteca digital de la USC.

but it owes its preservation in part to the sequestering of resources for the economic and social advancement of White people. New classes of White speculative homeowners were able to acquire high quality homes in the 1930s due to the favorable terms offered by LAIC under FHA's insurance policies. FHA loans served as a safeguard against foreclosure, while the neighborhood improvements of View Park served as an aesthetic insurer of financial appreciation, in alignment with municipal support.

Though View Park has come to be known as the "Black Beverly Hills," the opportunities experienced by Black families after the 1960s were not commensurate with or extended to the same economic gamut as those of White families. Only a selection of the region's wealthiest Black families had the means to move into the suburban enclave; and even then, View Park properties appreciated at a lower rate than properties in the predominantly White suburbs to the west (see

table in endnote). In 2015, View Park residents debated the benefits of obtaining historic recognition for their neighborhood, exhibiting fears of White gentrification to their community and its identity (Jennings 2015; Pimentel 2018). Despite ongoing debate, in 2016, the View Park District was listed on the National Register of Historic Places, making it the largest federal historic district in the country (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, National Park Service). The history of View Park, and its cycles of racialized investment and disinvestment, illustrates the continued effects of Whiteness on the uneven housing market. From 2010 to 2020, the Black population of View Park dropped from 85 percent to 78 percent, while its White population rose from 4 percent to 8 percent (U.S. Census Bureau). As the few remaining residential regions of Los Angeles that have not appreciated in accordance with surrounding neighborhoods are repopulated with White middle-class home seekers, Black and other non-White populations are priced out of homes they fought hard to acquire after decades of overt racial discrimination in the housing market

en el caso de la Corte Suprema de 1919, *Los Ángeles Investment Company v. Gary*. Cuando Alfred Gary, un hombre afroamericano, compró una casa en un terreno, propiedad de LAIC, la compañía solicitó la revocación, argumentando que Gary no tenía derecho

a ocupar la tierra debido a un pacto racialmente restrictivo que estaba redactado en la escritura. Aunque el tribunal falló a favor de la propiedad negra, en el caso de *Title Guarantee and Trust Co. V. Garrot*, a principios de ese año, con el argumento de que los convenios racialmente restrictivos violaban la decimocuarta enmienda, la decisión del tribunal no protegió la ocupación negra de la tierra. LAIC encontró una laguna jurídica en el precedente legal, asegurando el derecho a negar sus desarrollos exclusivos, y los beneficios apreciados en ellos, de la ocupación no blanca.

La exclusión racial se vendió acompañada de una visión particular de la propiedad de vivienda y la comunidad en View Park.

Los anuncios de LAIC para

View Park comúnmente mostraban niños anglosajones saludables, junto con referencias caricaturizadas de los conquistadores españoles y mediterráneos (Figura 5). Las vistas ilimitadas y los terrenos restringidos se idealizaron para alinearse con un lenguaje populoso utilizado en las promociones populares de principios de siglo en Los Ángeles. Los impulsores individuales y municipales, incluida la Cámara de comercio, de manera más prominente, construyeron una ilusión de un "pasado de fantasía español" que celebró la conquista colonial de la región y disfrazó tanto la herencia étnica diversa de sus fundadores, como el trabajo forzoso y la erradicación de los pueblos indígenas, en su elaboración (Deverell 2004; Krupp 2007). Los estilos como Misión y la arquitectura neo-colonial española se hicieron populares en el sur de California en las décadas de 1910 y 1920 en alineación con la fantasía española. De acuerdo con representaciones mitificadas, los pueblos étnicamente mexicanos e indígenas eran naturalmente salvajes y perezosos, pero se habían vuelto dóciles y productivos a través de su servicio a los frailes españoles mientras construían las misiones de la antigua California. Las casas de View Park fueron adornadas con puertas



Figure 5. Advertisement for "The Barcelona," a home designed by LAIC in View Park "with a view that rivals the Mediterranean." Source: The Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1928: E3.

Figura 5. Anuncio de "The Barcelona", una casa diseñada por LAIC en View Park "con una vista que rivaliza con el Mediterráneo". Fuente: Los Angeles Times, 30 de septiembre de 1928: E3.

CONCLUSION: DESIGNED OBSOLETION

From 1910 to 1930, LAIC managed to sequester profits for White homeowners by leveraging the societal limitations inflicted upon Black populations. Initially, LAIC capitalized on the inexpensive lands of South Los Angeles and the limited options afforded to Black prospective homeowners by offering cheap bungalows on installment plans to “Colored people.” Though LAIC appeared to offer homeownership to individuals previously excluded from the housing market, homes in the Butler and Elder tract were not developed with the improvements or the securities necessary to ensure economic prosperity. The installment plans offered by LAIC to Black families were backed by inflated company stocks, making debtors especially vulnerable to market fluctuations. Though Black migrants speculated on social and economic advancement through property and home ownership, the terms to which they were subject did not support the fulfillment of these aspirations.

On the surface, the single-family bungalow demonstrated a commitment to values, including personhood and freedom, that were previously denied to Black persons in America. Risky financing schemes, dangerous infrastructures, and industrial zoning, however, threatened to unravel the possibilities for Black ascension in an industry founded upon White Supremacy. Here, Homi Bhabha’s theory of cultural liminality is at work. Black-owned homes in South Los Angeles were situated between “no longer” and “not yet;” Black migrants were no longer slaves or property themselves, but they were not given the opportunity to acquire the benefits of property ownership afforded to White people. When municipal leaders desired industrial growth, the properties owned and occupied by Black populations in South Los Angeles were easily transformed. In the 1920s and 1930s, the gridirons of LAIC’s early tracts, proximal to transportation and oil, were easily cleared and coupled to provide space for industrial giants like Goodyear Tire to move in. According to ecological models and social evolutionary theories, the racial disposition of non-White and immigrant populations, not a lack of investment, contributed to continual decline near the city’s core. However, the bungalows of South Los

de entrada de madera gruesas, torres de entrada cilíndricas, arcos españoles, yeso encalado, herrajes decorativos y techos de tejas de arcilla al servicio de esta ilusión. Nombres como “The Barcelona” y “The Peyolas” fueron dados a las casas modelo de LAIC en anuncios de View Park que prometían “una vista que compite con el Mediterráneo” (En Los Ángeles Times, septiembre de 1928). Además de mostrar bocetos y planos de posibles viviendas en su sala de exposición arquitectónica, LAIC encargó fotografías profesionales para comercializar las primeras viviendas construidas en el tramo.

Modelos anglos en posiciones inactivas fueron puestos entre paisajes artificiales, fuentes de agua y miradores, sugiriendo una vida sin preocupaciones para los propietarios de View Park. (Figura 6). Las casas al estilo Mediterráneas, Misión y Arquitectura Neo-colonial española de View Park dieron vida al pasado de fantasía español en el presente, como si se hubiera conservado para los herederos anglosajones (y supuestamente “legítimos”) de la región.

El gobierno federal se unió al patrocinio de las arquitecturas raciales y materiales de View Park en la década de 1930. View Park fue una de las primeras comunidades planificadas en ser aseguradas por la FHA bajo la Ley Nacional de Vivienda. El seguro de la FHA prometía mejores condiciones y mayor seguridad en las inversiones hipotecarias, pero solo se ofrecía a los posibles propietarios blancos o desarrolladores blancos para propiedades con restricciones raciales vigentes en la escritura (Jackson 1987). El significado de la propiedad “valor” y “molestia” estaba imbuido de prejuicios raciales. Si un vecindario experimentaba

una “infiltración” de poblaciones inmigrantes o no blancas, se esperaba que su valor disminuyera. Esta expectativa se convirtió en una profecía autocumplida. Debido a que las inversiones federales y las regulaciones municipales protegieron a vecindarios como View Park de las fluctuaciones del mercado, los valores de las propiedades en los enclaves blancos exclusivos aumentaron. Hoy, la Casa Doumakes, construida por LAIC en 1928, en una de las primeras subdivisiones de View Park, está catalogada como un monumento nacional debido a la integridad que ha



Figure 6. Models posing outside of LAIC’s “Peyolas” model home on Aureola Boulevard in View Park, 1928. Source: “Dick” Whittington Photography Collection, 1924-1987, USC Digital Library.

Figura 6. Anuncio de “The Barcelona”, una casa diseñada por LAIC en View Park “con una vista que rivaliza con el Mediterráneo”. Fuente: Los Angeles Times, 30 de septiembre de 1928: E3.

Angeles, mass produced and slapped together on site, were not designed to last. Black populations, and their interest payments, were a stepping stone for White company profit in a pursuit to develop exclusive White enclaves in the suburbs of Los Angeles.

LAIC's speculations on both ends of the economic and racial spectrum illustrate how Los Angeles's residential disparities were a result of designed obsolescence rather than the evolutionary decline predicted by followers of the Chicago School. Curved streets with residential improvements prevented residential decline from occurring in tracts like View Park, as did the residential zoning granted to Los Angeles's northern and western geographies. Street trees, paved sidewalks and plumbing were improvements sequestered for White people in tracts where people "not of the Caucasian race" were forbidden from owning or occupying property. Narratives of White Superiority were supported by the financial securities offered to homeowners at View Park. Homeowners were less likely to default on loans with favorable terms supported by federal mortgage insurance. The aesthetics of View Park, as well as its distinctly residential character, further sold a narrative of White cultural superiority. Spanish Revival estates aligned with romanticized visions of California's colonial past, obscuring the violent histories from which they were extracted. Meanwhile, a neo-colonial pattern of development was staged. Property and possession were associated with Whiteness, and depravity and decline were associated with persons who did not fit the White racial construct.

Though View Park became a predominantly Black neighborhood with the decision of Plessy vs. Ferguson and the progress of the Civil Rights Era, it was not without racial violence, struggle, and White flight. The upward mobility experienced by a select few of the wealthiest Black families in the 1960s cannot account for the disparities experienced by homeowners in subdivisions like Butler and Elder. Today, Persons of Color, and especially Black people, are disproportionately subjected to housing insecurity, which proves especially dangerous in the face of a global pandemic. The uneven housing crisis and racialized housing insecurity present today should be seen, at least in part, as a result of what George Lipsitz has famously termed a "possessive investment in Whiteness." Investing in Whiteness maintains the existence of structured advantages, like profits from housing in a discriminatory market, for those who identify as White (Lipsitz 2006). Considering the national awakening to the persistence and pervasiveness of racial violence and inequality that we face in 2020, narratives of neighborhoods like View Park must be examined for how they have occluded, or at least complicated, the contemporary legacy of segregation and other racial atrocities.

mantenido durante más de cincuenta años. La casa de 3,117 pies cuadrados presenta formas y elementos de la arquitectura neo-colonial española conservados dentro de los estrechos márgenes de su condición inicial. El techo exterior de tejas de arcilla y estuco liso, además de las lámparas interiores de hierro, los herrajes de latón y las puertas de madera talladas a mano, son originales. En sus inicios, la casa era de una calidad superior; pero debe su preservación, en parte, al secuestro de recursos para el progreso económico y social de la gente blanca. Nuevas clases de propietarios especulativos blancos pudieron adquirir viviendas de alta calidad en la década de 1930 debido a los términos favorables ofrecidos por LAIC bajo las pólizas de seguro de la FHA. Los préstamos de la FHA sirvieron como una protección contra la ejecución hipotecaria, mientras que las mejoras del vecindario de View Park sirvieron como un asegurador estético de apreciación financiera, en consonancia con el apoyo municipal. Aunque View Park ha llegado a ser conocido como el "Black Beverly Hills", las oportunidades experimentadas por las familias negras después de la década de 1960 no fueron proporcionales ni se extendieron a la misma categoría económica que las de las familias blancas. Sólo una parte de las familias negras más ricas de la región tenía los medios para trasladarse al enclave suburbano; e incluso entonces, las propiedades de View Park se apreciaron a un índice más bajo que las propiedades en los suburbios predominantemente blancos al oeste (ver tabla en la nota al final). En 2015, los residentes de View Park debatieron los beneficios de obtener un reconocimiento histórico para su vecindario, mostrando temores de gentrificación blanca a su comunidad y su identidad (Jennings 2015; Pimentel 2018). A pesar del debate en curso, en 2016, View Park District fue incluido en el Registro Nacional de Lugares Históricos, lo que lo convierte en el distrito histórico federal más grande del país (Departamento del Interior de los Estados Unidos, Servicio de Parques Nacionales). La historia de View Park, y sus ciclos de inversión y desinversión racializada, ilustra los efectos continuos de la blanquitud en el desigual mercado inmobiliario. De 2010 a 2020, la población negra de View Park cayó del 85 por ciento al 78 por ciento, mientras que su población blanca aumentó del 4 al 8 por ciento (Oficina del Censo de EE. UU.). A medida que las pocas regiones residenciales restantes de Los Ángeles que no se han apreciado, de acuerdo con los vecindarios circundantes, se repueblan con blancos de clase media que buscan hogar, con poblaciones negras y otras poblaciones no blancas se ven excluidas económicamente de las casas que lucharon arduamente por adquirir después de décadas de manifestaciones raciales evidentes y de discriminación en el mercado de la vivienda.

Endnote: From 1960 to 1970, the Black population of View Park increased from 4.2 percent to 62.6 percent, while median property values increased by only 29.6 percent. Compared with the City of Los Angeles, whose Black population stayed relatively stable from 13.5 percent to 17.9 percent between 1960 and 1970, median property values in View Park increased by 24.7% less than the city average (54.3%). que el promedio de la ciudad (54,3 por ciento).

	Increase, Population Black	Increase, Median Property Values
View Park	58.4%	29.6%
City of LA	4.4%	54.3%

Data tabulated from the 1960 and 1970 US Census of Population and Housing by Municipal Area.

CONCLUSIÓN: OBSOLESCENCIA DISEÑADA

De 1910 a 1930, LAIC logró retener ganancias para los propietarios blancos aprovechando las limitaciones sociales infligidas a las poblaciones negras.

Inicialmente, LAIC capitalizó las tierras económicas del sur de Los Ángeles y las opciones limitadas a los posibles propietarios negros al ofrecer bungalos baratos en planes de pago a plazos para la “gente de color”. Aunque LAIC parecía ofrecer la propiedad de vivienda a personas previamente excluidas del mercado, las viviendas en el distrito Butler and Elder no se desarrollaron con las mejoras o con los valores necesarios para garantizar la prosperidad económica. Los planes de pago ofrecidos por LAIC a las familias negras estaban respaldados por acciones infladas de la empresa, lo que hacía que los deudores fueran especialmente vulnerables a las fluctuaciones del mercado. Aunque los migrantes negros especulaban sobre el avance social y económico a través de la propiedad y la posesión de la vivienda, los términos a los que estaban sujetos no respaldaban el cumplimiento de estas aspiraciones. En la superficie, el bungalow unifamiliar demostró un compromiso con los valores, incluida la personalidad y la libertad, que antes se les negaba a las personas negras en Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, los esquemas de financiación arriesgados, las infraestructuras peligrosas y la zonificación industrial amenazaban con la posibilidad de desenredar el ascenso de los negros en una industria fundada sobre la supremacía blanca. Aquí entra en juego la teoría de la liminalidad cultural de Homi Bhabha. Las casas que les pertenecían a los negros en el sur de Los Ángeles estaban situadas entre “ya no” y “todavía no”; los inmigrantes negros ya no eran esclavos o propiedad de ellos mismos, pero no se les dio la oportunidad de adquirir los beneficios de la propiedad que se les brindaba a los blancos. Cuando los líderes municipales deseaban el crecimiento industrial, las propiedades que poseían y ocupaban las poblaciones negras en el sur de Los Ángeles se transformaban fácilmente. En las décadas de 1920 y 1930, el sistema de parrilla (*gridiron*) de los primeros tramos de LAIC, próximas al transporte y al petróleo, se despejaron y acoplaron fácilmente para proporcionar espacio para que gigantes industriales como Goodyear Tire se mudaran. De acuerdo con los modelos ecológicos y las teorías de la evolución social, la disposición racial de las poblaciones inmigrantes y no blancas –no la falta de inversión–, contribuyó al declive continuo cerca del centro de la ciudad. Además, los bungalos del sur de Los Ángeles, producidos en masa y ensamblados en el lugar, no fueron diseñados para durar. Las poblaciones negras y sus pagos de intereses fueron un trampolín para las ganancias de la compañía blanca en una búsqueda por desarrollar enclaves blancos exclusivos en los suburbios de Los Ángeles.

Las especulaciones de LAIC en ambos extremos del espectro económico y racial ilustran cómo las disparidades residenciales de Los Ángeles fueron el resultado de la obsolescencia diseñada en lugar del declive evolutivo predicho por los seguidores de la Escuela de Chicago. Las calles curvas con mejoras residenciales evitaron que ocurriera un declive residencial en áreas como View Park, al igual que la zonificación residencial otorgada a las geografías norte y oeste de Los Ángeles. Los árboles de las calles, las aceras pavimentadas y la plomería fueron mejoras que los blancos se apropiaron en áreas donde personas “que no eran de raza caucásica” tenían prohibido poseer u ocupar propiedades. Las narrativas de la superioridad blanca fueron respaldadas por los valores financieros ofrecidos a los propietarios de viviendas en View Park. Los propietarios de viviendas tenían menos probabilidades de incumplir préstamos con condiciones favorables respaldadas por el seguro hipotecario federal. La estética de View Park, así como su carácter claramente residencial, vendió aún más una narrativa de la superioridad cultural blanca. Las propiedades de la arquitectura neo-colonial española se alineó con visiones románticas del pasado colonial de California, oscureciendo las historias violentas de las que fueron extraídas. Mientras tanto, se escenificó un patrón de desarrollo neocolonial. La propiedad y la posesión se asociaron con la blanquitud, y la depravación y el declive se asociaron con personas que no encajaban en la construcción racial blanca.

Aunque View Park se convirtió en un vecindario predominantemente negro con la decisión de Plessy vs. Ferguson y el progreso de la era de los Derechos Civiles, no estuvo exento de violencia racial, de lucha y de la *White flight* (huida de los blancos). La movilidad ascendente experimentada por un selecto y pequeño grupo de las familias negras más ricas en la década de 1960 no puede desvanecer las disparidades experimentadas por los propietarios de viviendas en subdivisiones como Butler y Elder. Hoy en día, las personas de color, y especialmente las personas de raza negra, están sometidas de manera desproporcionada a la inseguridad de la vivienda, lo que resulta especialmente peligroso frente a una pandemia mundial. La desigual crisis de la vivienda y la inseguridad habitacional racializada que se presentan hoy en día deben verse, al menos en parte, como resultado de lo que, acertadamente, George Lipsitz ha denominado como una “inversión posesiva en la blanquitud”. Invertir en la blanquitud mantiene la existencia de ventajas estructuradas, como las ganancias de la vivienda en un mercado discriminatorio, para quienes se identifican como blancos (Lipsitz 2006). Teniendo en cuenta el despertar nacional a la persistencia y omnipresencia de la violencia racial y la desigualdad que enfrentamos en 2020, las narrativas de vecindarios como View

Park deben examinarse para ver cómo han ocluido, o al menos complicado, como persiste el legado contemporáneo de segregación y otras atrocidades raciales.

Nota final: De 1960 a 1970, la población negra de View Park aumentó del 4.2 por ciento al 62.6 por ciento, mientras que el valor medio de las propiedades aumentó solo en un 29.6 por ciento. En comparación con la ciudad de Los Ángeles, cuya población negra se mantuvo relativamente estable del 13,5 al 17,9 por ciento entre 1960 y 1970, el valor medio de las propiedades en View Park aumentó un 24,7 por ciento menos que el promedio de la ciudad (54,3 por ciento).

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**Where There Is Smoke
There is Fire:
Scenes from Southern California,
Summer 2020.**

Hilary Malson



A *June: Memorial for Robert Fuller.*
Palmdale, CA. Juneteenth, 2020.

B *July: Protective bollard, tagged
"Fuck FEMA Camps."*
Koreatown, Los Angeles, CA. July 3, 2020.





C August: Cancel Rent Rally, organized by Chinatown Community for Equitable Development.

City Hall, Los Angeles, CA. August 10, 2020.

D September: Smoke from the Bobcat Fire in Angeles National Forest, as seen from Griffith Park.

Los Angeles, CA. September 24, 2020.

The Return of the Jitneys: Transportation Neoliberals Never Waste A Good Crisis

Peter Sebastian Chesney

ABSTRACT

This article presents a history of jitneys from the Gilded Age streets until their return to discourse among post-1970s transportation neoliberals. Transportation neoliberals were an intellectual set including professors, policymakers, consultants, and con men. They discovered the history of jitneys, which Southern Californians invented during a wartime slump in global commerce in 1914. Abolished in the U.S., jitneys remained in operation in crisis-prone cities like Manila and Harare. Selective memories of jitneys in an age of austere state budgets contributed to the trade's return as a cheap, unregulated alternative to public transit. History was the tool that led jitneys, in the guise of Lyft and Uber, back into U.S. streets after the global financial crisis.

"It is doubtful that Uber stems from neo-liberal ideology."

Michael Storper,
"The Neo-liberal City as Idea and
Reality" (2016)¹

In the 1970s, neoliberal thinkers reported on informal rideshare economies functioning all over the world and unearthed a history of an informal rideshare economy that briefly existed in Los Angeles during World War I. Economic crises, first in 1914 and then in the postcolonial period in the Philippines, created social conditions where driver-entrepreneurs with access to vehicles but without steady employment converted cars, trucks, and jeeps into so-called "jitneys" or "jeepneys." These unlicensed buses did not have set schedules or routes but rather plied busy streets, always looking for more riders and dropping passengers off at requested destinations. As shown in figure 1, drivers in Los Angeles typically took many fares at once. Passengers even perched on running boards or hung from the doors of vehicles with seats for only five. Cities like Los Angeles soon banned jitneys, but they survived in informal enclaves. A century later, during the global financial crisis, jitneys returned to California's city streets.

1. Michael Storper, "The neo-liberal city as idea and reality," *Territory, Politics, Governance* 4, no. 2 (2016), 26. Image: W.E. Dunn, "The Application of Established Legal Principles to the Jitney," *Electric Railway Journal* (Annual Convention Issue 1915), 504.

El Retorno de los Jitneys: Los Neoliberales del Transporte Nunca Desperdician Una Buena Crisis

Peter Sebastian Chesney

RESUMEN

Este artículo presenta una historia de los jitneys desde su Época Dorada en las calles hasta su regreso al discurso entre neoliberales del transporte después de la década de 1970. Los neoliberales del transporte eran un conjunto intelectual que incluía profesores, legisladores, consultores y estafadores. Descubrieron la historia de los jitneys, que los californianos del sur inventaron durante una caída del comercio mundial durante la guerra en 1914. Abolidos en los Estados Unidos, los jitneys siguieron funcionando en ciudades propensas a crisis como Manila y Harare. Los recuerdos selectivos de los jitneys en una época de presupuestos estatales austeros contribuyeron al retorno del comercio como una alternativa barata y no regulada del transporte público. La historia fue la herramienta que llevó a los jitneys, disfrazados de Lyft y Uber, a volver a las calles de Estados Unidos después de la crisis financiera mundial.

"It is doubtful that Uber stems from neo-liberal ideology."

Michael Storper,
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Reality" (2016)

En la década de 1970, los pensadores neoliberales notificaron sobre las economías informales de viajes compartidos que funcionaban en todo el mundo y desenterraron la historia de una economía informal de dichos viajes compartidos que existió brevemente en Los Ángeles durante la Primera Guerra Mundial. Las crisis económicas, primero en 1914 y luego en el período poscolonial en Filipinas, crearon condiciones sociales en las que los conductores-empresarios con acceso a vehículos, pero sin empleo estable convirtieron automóviles, camiones y jeeps en los llamados "jitneys" o "jeepneys".

Estos autobuses sin licencia no tenían horarios o rutas establecidas, sino que recorrían calles concurridas, siempre buscando recoger más pasajeros, dejándolos en los destinos solicitados. Como se muestra en la figura 1, los conductores en Los Ángeles generalmente tomaban muchas tarifas a la vez. Los pasajeros incluso se encaramaban en los estribos o se colgaban de las puertas de los vehículos con asientos por solo cinco centavos. Ciudades como Los Ángeles pronto prohibieron los jitneys, pero sobrevivieron en enclaves informales.

Michael Storper, a professor in UCLA's school of urban and regional planning, cites Uber in an influential rebuttal to what he calls "the critical neo-liberalism literature" (Storper 2016). Critical neoliberal scholarship ranges from geography by David Harvey to history by Philip Mirowski. To Storper, critics of neoliberalism in post-1960s cities were "imprecise and over-reaching" in their confusion of liberalism's confidence in markets with "laissez-faire doctrine or plutocratic authoritarianism" (ibid). Thus, neoliberalism, as construed by its critics, is unlikely to be the relevant framework for making sense of Uber or Lyft, which neoliberals might "subsequently" justify but which likely "emerge[d] as a pragmatic response to the possibilities of reducing transaction costs and increasing capital utilization that are offered by new technologies" (ibid)². Though Storper rightly urges caution against totalizing theories of neoliberalism, his rebuttal denies the possibility of a long, local, and documented relationship between neoliberal ideology and informal transit that predates the founding of Uber and Lyft. In fact, neoliberal professors at University of California educated two rideshare founders, Uber's Travis Kalanick (UCLA engineering) and Lyft's Logan Green (UCSB business economics). Setting aside Kalanick, an Ayn Rand fan,³ this paper tracks the genealogy from transportation neoliberals explicitly to Green and his Lyft startup.

The thinking that led to the creation of Lyft dates to a 1972 article in *Reason*. To prove the link, I hold myself to Storper's standards for a better critical neoliberalism literature. To those opposed to neoliberal ideology, a neoliberal is a member of a policymaking and intellectual set advocating cuts to public services, sales of public assets, transfers of public responsibilities to private entities, and a mentality valuing information processed in markets

2. Storper, "The neo-liberal city," 37-38 and 26-27.
3. Carl Franzen, "Republicans and Democrats are fighting over who loves Uber more," *The Verge*, 25 August 2014. Kalanick dropped out of UCLA in 1998. His memories of the undergraduate experience and advice for students are indicative of a neoliberal approach to education. He has bragged of having worked 40 hours a week while a student and praised the engineering department for letting students "learn without being in class...This allowed great flexibility with my extreme entrepreneurial and academic workload." Phil Hampton, "Q&A with Travis Kalanick," *UCLA Newsroom*, 9 October 2015.
4. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University Press, 2005). See commandment number 12 in Philip Mirowski, "The Thirteen Commandments of Neoliberalism," *The Utopian*, 19 June 2013.
5. Kristian Olesen, "Infrastructure Imaginaries: The Politics of Light Rail Projects in the Age of Neoliberalism," *Urban Studies* 57, no. 9 (2020): 1811-1826.

Un siglo después, durante la crisis financiera mundial, los jitneys regresaron a las calles de las ciudades de California.

Michael Storper, profesor de la escuela de planificación urbana y regional de la UCLA, cita a Uber en una refutación influyente a lo que él llama "la literatura crítica del neoliberalismo" (Storper, 2016). La academia neoliberal crítica abarca desde la geografía de David Harvey hasta la historia de Philip Mirowski. Para Storper, los críticos del neoliberalismo en las ciudades posteriores a la década de 1960 eran "imprecisos y exagerados", pues tendían a confundir la confianza del liberalismo en los mercados con la "doctrina del laissez-faire o el autoritarismo plutocrático" (ibid). Así, es poco probable que el neoliberalismo, tal y como lo interpretan sus críticos, sea el marco pertinente para dar sentido a Uber o Lyft, que los liberales podrían justificar "posteriormente", pero que probablemente "Surgió[ge] como una respuesta pragmática a las posibilidades de reducir los costos de transacción y aumentar la utilización del capital que ofrecen las nuevas tecnologías" (ibid.). Aunque Storper insta con razón la precaución contra las teorías totalizadoras del neoliberalismo, su refutación niega la posibilidad de una relación larga, local y documentada entre la ideología neoliberal y el tránsito informal que es anterior a la fundación de Uber y Lyft. De hecho, los profesores liberales de la Universidad de California educaron a dos fundadores de viajes compartidos, Travis Kalanick de Uber (ingeniería de UCLA) y Logan Green de Lyft (economía empresarial de UCSB). Dejando a un lado a Kalanick, un fanático de Ayn Rand, este artículo rastrea la genealogía desde los liberales del transporte explícitamente hasta Green y su startup¹ Lyft.

El pensamiento que llevó a la creación de Lyft se remonta a un artículo de 1972 en la revista *Reason*. Para probar el vínculo, aplico los mismos estándares de Storper para una mejor literatura crítica del neoliberalismo. Para quienes se oponen a la ideología neoliberal, un neoliberal es un miembro de un conjunto político e intelectual que aboga por los recortes de los servicios públicos, la venta de activos públicos, la transferencia de responsabilidades públicas a entidades privadas y una mentalidad que valora la información procesada en los mercados por encima del conocimiento disciplinario, las ideas heredadas o incluso la ética básica. Las políticas de transporte liberales incluyen –lo obvio–,

1. El término anglosajón *Startup* hace referencia a una empresa de nueva creación que comercializa productos o servicios a través del uso de las nuevas tecnologías con un modelo de negocio escalable que permita un crecimiento rápido y sostenido en el tiempo.

over disciplinary knowledge, inherited ideas, or even basic ethics.⁴ Neoliberal transportation policies include the obvious – for example, governments selling freeways or some of their lanes for conversion into toll road facilities – and less obvious – for instance, urban light rail networks plotted to draw investment and consumers into gentrifying neighborhoods.⁵ Similar thinking is at work in any enthusiasm for the jitney after years of mounting skepticism about government services like public transportation. Neoliberals call for competition, to the death, between public options and for-profit alternatives, putting transit-dependent people at risk of losing mobility rights.⁶ Jitney boosters have stressed how micro-entrepreneurs, in both 1914 Los Angeles and late 1940s Manila, easily gained access to the materials and skills needed to become drivers; but transportation neoliberals have rarely differentiated between small owner-operators and startups-cum-industrial-titans, which have too easy access to venture capital. Storper has requested evidence of plans leading to transportation deregulation, evidence “that such policies really are designed and intended to enhance [negative social outcomes] and are not unintended effects of a complex and pragmatic political process” (Storper 2016).⁷ By writing a history of jitneys and showing how neoliberal thinkers selectively pull simplistic lessons from complex historical narratives, I illustrate how Uber and Lyft did – and do – stem from neoliberal ideas, which justify malicious, sometimes criminal, strategies of privatization.

JITNEY AND ANARCHY:

The Anarchists Who Seized the Means of Transportation in 1910s Los Angeles

“Don’t talk to the driver.
 Don’t crowd into a seat beside men.
 Don’t sit on the door.
 Don’t converse with men passengers.
 Don’t sit on anyone’s lap.”

Miss Marvel Spencer,
Los Angeles Herald, 24 May 1915⁸

Miss Marvel Spencer’s etiquette for riding in jitneys appeared in the *Los Angeles Herald*, a local, worker-oriented newspaper of the era. Miss Spencer’s admonitions surely gave female readers second thoughts about the jitneys. Spencer warned women and girls to beware of sexual anarchy in vehicles with male drivers and male riders. That said, she told

6. Adrian Moore, “Private Transportation and Competition,” *Reason*, 18 May 2004.

7. Storper, “The neo-liberal city,” 18-19.

8. “Girl Draws Code of Jitney Etiquette for Bus Patrons,” *L.A. Herald*, 24 May 1915.

por ejemplo, los gobiernos que venden autopistas o algunos de sus carriles para convertirlos en instalaciones de carreteras de peaje –y menos obvio–, por ejemplo, las redes de tren ligero urbano creadas para atraer inversiones y consumidores a vecindarios en proceso de gentrificación. Este tipo de pensamiento explica el entusiasmo por el jitney tras años de creciente escepticismo sobre los servicios gubernamentales como el transporte público. Los neoliberales hacen un llamado a la competencia, a muerte, entre las opciones públicas y las alternativas con fines de lucro, lo que pone a las personas que dependen del transporte público en riesgo de perder sus derechos de movilidad. Los impulsores del jitney han enfatizado cómo los microempresarios, tanto en Los Ángeles de 1914 como en Manila a fines de la década de 1940, obtuvieron fácilmente acceso a los materiales y habilidades necesarias para convertirse en conductores; pero los neoliberales del transporte rara vez han diferenciado entre pequeños propietarios-operadores y *startups*-industriales-titanes, que tienen el acceso a capital de riesgo demasiado fácil.

Storper ha solicitado evidencia de los planes que conducen a la desregulación del transporte, evidencia “de que tales políticas realmente están diseñadas y con la intención de mejorar [los resultados sociales negativos] y que no son efectos involuntarios de un proceso político complejo y pragmático” (Storper 2016). Al escribir una historia de los jitneys y mostrar cómo los pensadores neoliberales extraen selectivamente lecciones simplistas de complejas narrativas históricas, ilustro cómo Uber y Lyft surgieron –y siguen surgiendo– de las ideas neoliberales, que justifican estrategias de privatización maliciosas, y a veces criminales.

JITNEY Y ANARQUÍA:

Los anarquistas que se apoderaron de los medios de transporte en la década de 1910 en Los Ángeles

“No hables con el conductor.
 No te apiñes en un asiento junto a los hombres.
 No te sientes en la puerta.
 No converses con los pasajeros hombres.
 No te sientes en el regazo de nadie”.

Miss Marvel Spencer,
Los Angeles Herald, 24 May 1915

La etiqueta de la señorita Marvel Spencer para viajar en jitneys apareció en *Los Angeles Herald*, un periódico local de la época orientado a los trabajadores. Las advertencias de la señorita Spencer seguramente hicieron que las lectoras pensaran dos veces antes de montarse en los jitneys. Spencer advertía a las mujeres y a las niñas que tuvieran cuidado con la anarquía sexual en los vehículos

female *Los Angeles Herald* readers not to be too proud to use jitneys. Scandalized reporting against the jitney trade was published in capitalism's pet paper: the *Los Angeles Times*. The *Los Angeles Times* always took the side of the railroads, including during debates about the propriety of jitneys. Streetcar monopolies operated on a for-profit basis with guarantees from the city against competitors. To invest in rail was to count on a regulatory apparatus that marked any transportation alternative as illegal. However, streetcar networks hardly served the city equitably. Motorman jobs were few, and fares for long trips to the suburbs were identical to those for short trips within the city. When World War I began in 1914, a world trade slump began. The recession threw many Los Angeles men, including new car owners, out of work. Conditions were perfect for car owners to retool their personal vehicles into jitneys, which offered superior service to streetcars for the same fare.⁹

That fare was five cents, an amount that inspired the name "jitney" for unlicensed cabs and buses. Before signifying a mode of transportation, jitney was a slang term for coins used in Francophile and frontier gambling cultures. Poker players threw (*ont jeté*) small bets of five cents into the pot. Gambling already operated beyond the boundaries of polite or moralistic society, so the jitney entered criminal vernacular as a common word for a coin worth five cents. A *Vocabulary of Criminal Slang* (1914) references the term twice. As a noun, it was "general currency...used variously to signify an extremity in finance. Example: 'Break away; he hasn't got a jitney.'" In the definition for an anti-Italian slur, the book added, "You couldn't find a jitney with a search warrant in this bunch of wops" (Jackson and Hellyer, 1914). Both criminal insiders and police referenced jitneys in descriptions of people

9. This is the standard story of the jitneys from the following histories of the automobile in Los Angeles. Scott L. Bottles, *Los Angeles and the Automobile: The Making of the Modern City* (University of California Press, 1987), 49-51, Clay McShane, *Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City* (Columbia University Press, 1994), 194-197, Peter D. Norton, *Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City* (MIT Press, 2008), 151, and James Nicholas Stroup, "Jitneys, Buses, and Public Transportation in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles," dissertation completed for the department of history, University of California, Riverside, 2015.
10. Louis E. Jackson and C.R. Hellyer, *A Vocabulary of Criminal Slang: With Some Examples of Common Usages* (Portland City Detective Department, 1914), 50 and 88.
11. Hayden White, "The Problem of Style in Realistic Representation: Marx and Flaubert" (1979) in Hayden White, *The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory, 1957-2007*, Robert Doran, ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 173.

con conductores y pasajeros masculinos. Eso sí, dijo a las lectoras de *Los Angeles Herald* que no fueran demasiado orgullosas de usar jitneys. En el periódico preferido del capitalismo, *Los Angeles Times*, se publicaron reportajes escandalosos contra el comercio de jitneys. *Los Angeles Times* siempre se puso del lado de los ferrocarriles, incluso durante los debates sobre la conveniencia de los jitneys. Los monopolios de tranvía funcionaban con ánimo de lucro y con garantías de la ciudad frente a los competidores. Invertir en el ferrocarril era contar con un aparato regulador que marcaba como ilegal cualquier alternativa de transporte. Sin embargo, las redes de tranvía apenas sirvieron a la ciudad de manera equitativa. Los trabajos de motorista eran pocos y las tarifas para viajes largos a los suburbios eran idénticas a las de viajes cortos dentro de la ciudad. Cuando comenzó la Primera Guerra Mundial en 1914, comenzó una caída del comercio mundial. La recesión dejó sin trabajo a muchos hombres de Los Ángeles, incluidos los propietarios de automóviles nuevos. Las condiciones eran perfectas para que los propietarios de automóviles adaptaran sus vehículos personales para convertirlos en jitneys, que ofrecían un servicio superior a los tranvías por la misma tarifa.

Esa tarifa era de cinco centavos, una cantidad que inspiró el nombre de "jitney" para los taxis y autobuses sin licencia. Antes de significar un modo de transporte, "jitney" era un término de la jerga para las monedas que se usaban en las culturas del juego francófilo y de la frontera. Los jugadores de póquer lanzaron (*ont jeté*) pequeñas apuestas de cinco centavos al bote. El juego ya operaba más allá de los límites de la sociedad educada o moralista, por lo que el jitney entró en la lengua vernácula criminal como una palabra común para una moneda que vale cinco centavos. A *Vocabulary of Criminal Slang* o "Vocabulario de la jerga criminal" (1914) hace referencia al término dos veces. Como sustantivo, era "moneda general ... usada de diversas formas para significar un extremo en las finanzas. Ejemplo: 'Aléjate; no tiene un jitney.'" En la definición de insulto anti-italiano, el libro agregó: "No se podía encontrar un jitney con una orden de registro entre este montón de wops?" (Jackson y Hellyer, 1914). Tanto los delincuentes como la policía hicieron referencia a los jitneys en las descripciones de personas tan pobres que no valía la pena robar o investigar. El cambio tropológico en el significado del Jitney de un término para una miseria de dinero a un vehículo que cobra una miseria de dinero muestra cuán socialmente marginalizados fueron los primeros conductores y pasajeros de los Jitneys. Confiando en las actividades informales o del mercado gris para sobrevivir, los

2. Wop es un insulto peyorativo para italianos o personas de ascendencia italiana.

too poor to be worth robbing or worth investigating.¹⁰ The tropological shift in meaning of jitney from a term for a pittance of money to a vehicle charging a pittance of money shows how socially marginalized the earliest drivers and riders of jitneys were.¹¹ Relying on informal or gray market activities for survival, jitney drivers knew their position was at the bottom of an urban society on the Pacific Rim and in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. The trade crisis in Los Angeles thoroughly proletarianized many car owners.

The first jitney operators to receive attention in the *Los Angeles Times* were based in the port city of Long Beach, twenty miles south of Los Angeles. Operations began in September, about a month after the first shots of the Great War reduced the volume of sea commerce. Shortly after, a local rail line closed as passengers abandoned it for the jitneys.¹² Jitney literature has predominantly assumed the perspectives of capital, consumers, or city planners in discourse about whether the jitney trade was threatening or beneficial. Lost in each framework is the worker who chose temporary self-employment. Jitney drivers risked injury on the job, wear and tear to their machines, and threats of litigation from both capitalists and consumers. On the positive side, jitney drivers had the right to exit their business at will, set their own hours, and decide which riders or neighborhoods to serve. As workers without bosses, jitney drivers entered a way of life growing popular with anarchists like the local *Magónistas* or the Wobblies (International Workers of the World).¹³ Jitney drivers played a robust role in pre-war Southern California. In fact, jitney drivers organized syndicates of their own, like the 700-strong Auto Buss Owners' and Operators' Association, a union which was headquartered in historical Skid Row at 225 East 6th Street.¹⁴

Self-employment had a great attraction for workers in Los Angeles, which is clear from literature they read and songs they wrote and sang. After years of exile in many places along the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, Ricardo Flores Magón settled in Los Angeles after the 1910 revolution south of the border. He edited an anarchist newspaper, *Regeneración*, which told readers about the "evidence" that "humanity

conductores de jitney sabían que su posición estaba en el fondo de una sociedad urbana en la Cuenca del Pacífico y en la Frontera México-Estados Unidos. La crisis comercial en Los Ángeles proletarizó completamente a muchos propietarios de automóviles.

Los primeros operadores de jitney que recibieron atención en *Los Angeles Times* tenían su sede en la ciudad portuaria de Long Beach, veinte millas al sur de Los Ángeles. Las operaciones comenzaron en septiembre, aproximadamente un mes después de que los primeros disparos de la Gran Guerra redujeran el volumen del comercio marítimo. Más adelante, una línea ferroviaria local se cerró cuando los pasajeros la abandonaron por los jitneys. La literatura del jitney ha asumido predominantemente las perspectivas de capital, consumidores o los planificadores urbanos en discurso sobre si el comercio de jitney era amenazante o beneficioso. Cada uno de estos marcos pierde de vista al trabajador que eligió el autoempleo temporal. Los conductores de jitney se arriesgaban a sufrir lesiones en el trabajo, desgaste de sus máquinas y amenazas de litigio tanto por parte de los capitalistas como de los consumidores. En el lado positivo, los conductores de jitney tenían derecho a salir de su negocio a voluntad, establecer sus propios horarios y decidir a qué pasajeros o vecindarios atender. Como trabajadores sin jefes, los conductores de jitney asumieron un estilo de vida que se hizo popular entre los anarquistas como los magonistas locales o los wobblies (trabajadores internacionales del mundo).³ Los conductores de jitney desempeñaron un papel importante en el sur de California antes de la guerra. De hecho, organizaron sus propios sindicatos, como la Asociación de Propietarios y Operadores de Autobuses de 700 miembros, un sindicato que tenía su sede en el histórico Skid Row en 225 East 6th Street.

El trabajo por cuenta propia tenía un gran atractivo para los trabajadores de Los Ángeles, lo cual es evidente en la literatura que leían y las canciones que escribían y cantaban. Tras años de exilio en muchos lugares a lo largo de la zona fronteriza entre Estados Unidos y México, Ricardo Flores Magón se instaló en Los Ángeles después de la revolución de 1910 al sur de la frontera. Editó un periódico anarquista, "Regeneración", que contaba a los lectores sobre la "evidencia" de que "la humanidad no necesita ni patrón ni gobierno" (Magón, 1914). Los ejemplos incluyen "las comunidades libres de los [pueblos indígenas] yaquis, de [la ciudad de] Durango, en el sur de México, y muchas otras regiones donde los habitantes han tomado posesión de la tierra" (ibid). Magón delinea una opción: "o ser libres,

3. Los Trabajadores Industriales del Mundo (IWW), también conocidos como los 'Wobblies', era una organización sindical radical fundada en los Estados Unidos en 1905.

12. "Auto Busses Stir Trouble," *L.A. Times*, 20 September 1914. I initially found several of the *Times* and *Tribune* articles cited in this paper in the Jitney Buses Scrapbook, Collection no. 6023, Special Collections, USC Libraries, University of Southern California.

13. Kelly Lytle Hernández, *City of Inmates: Conquest, Rebellion, and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles, 1771-1965* (University of North Carolina Press 2017), 92-130.

14. "Referendum Is Threatened IF City Passes 'Jitney' Law," *L.A. Tribune*, 27 February 1915.

15. Translations are mine: "pruebas...la humanidad no

does not need a boss or a government" (Magón, 1914). Examples include "the free communities of the Yaqui [Native people], of [the city of] Durango, in the south of Mexico, and so many other regions where the inhabitants have taken possession of the land" (ibid). Magón delineates a choice: "either to be free, entirely free and denying all Authority, or to be slaves perpetuating the command [or management] of man over man" (ibid). Magón's article was published in the spring of 1914, mere months before the first jitneys took to the streets.¹⁵ "Gasoline Gus," a mocking depiction of a cartoon chauffeur, showed up in bourgeois East Coast newspapers and made its first appearance in the *Los Angeles Times* in 1913. Two years later, a popular song ironically heroized him and described him leaving chauffeuring to drive his own "jitney bus." Self-employed, Gus was free to drive recklessly, which terrified one prim passenger. A bourgeoisie, she commanded, "'Don't go too fa-ar.' Gus retorted, 'It's not that kind of ca-ar.'"¹⁶

The threat of sexualized danger to women and girls was a key theme in the assault of the bourgeois press against the jitney trade. The most prominent police figure to protest against jitneys was Aletha Maxey Gilbert. Gilbert, LAPD's so-called "City Mother," descended from a local lineage of women in policing. Her mother ran the Lincoln Heights jail from 1888 to 1912. In 1914, Gilbert was promoted and became one of the city's first female police officers. Gilbert's City Mother's Bureau bore responsibility for intimate matters like the sexual activity of "wayward girls," who reputedly lacked attentive parents and came to police women for guidance and protection.¹⁷ In January 1915, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that Gilbert wanted

necésita de jefe o gobierno," "las comunidades libres del Yaqui, de Durango, del Sur de México y de tantas otras regiones en que los habitantes han tomado posesión de la tierra," "o ser libres, enteramente libres negando toda Autoridad, o ser esclavos perpetuando el mando del hombre sobre el hombre." Ricardo Flores Magón, "Sin Jefes," *Regeneración*, 21 March 1914.

16. "Gasoline Gus Takes on a New Pupil," *L.A. Times*, 13 April 1913. Allan Holtz, "Obscurity of the Day: Gasoline Gus," *Stripper's Guide*, 21 November 2012. "Gasoline Gus and His Jitney Bus," performed by Billy Murray and Chorus, 1915, UCSB Cylinder Audio Archive.

17. Janice Appier, *Policing Women: The Sexual Politics of Law Enforcement on the LAPD* (Temple University Press, 1998), 73-76 and 85-86. For a fascinating recent literary history linking the waywardness of girls to anarchy, see Saidiya Hartman, *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval* (W.W. Norton & Company, 2019).

18. "Outrage: Men in Busses Insult Girls," *L.A. Times*, 9 January 1915. "Imperative: Stringent Regulation of the Jitney Busses," *L.A. Times*, 4 January 1915.

completamente libres y negando toda Autoridad, o ser esclavos perpetuando el mando [o gestión] del hombre sobre el hombre" (ibid). El artículo de Magón se publicó en la primavera de 1914, pocos meses antes de que los primeros jitneys salieran a las calles. "Gasoline Gus", una representación burlesca de un chófer de dibujos animados se presentó en los periódicos burgueses de la costa este y apareció por primera vez en *Los Angeles Times* en 1913. Dos años más tarde, una canción popular lo convirtió en héroe irónicamente y lo describió dejando su oficio de chofer para conducir su propio "autobús jitney". Gus, que trabajaba por cuenta propia, era libre de conducir imprudentemente, lo que aterrorizó a un pasajero remilgado. Un burgués, ordenó, "No te vayas demasiado lejos". Gus replicó: "No es ese tipo de carro".

La amenaza del peligro sexualizado para las mujeres y las niñas fue un tema clave en el ataque de la prensa burguesa contra el comercio del jitneys. La figura policial más destacada que protestó contra los jitneys fue Aletha Maxey Gilbert. Gilbert, la llamada "madre de la ciudad" del Departamento de Policía de Los Ángeles, desciende de un linaje local de mujeres policías. Su madre dirigió la cárcel de Lincoln Heights desde 1888 hasta 1912. En 1914, Gilbert fue ascendida y se convirtió en una de las primeras mujeres policía de la ciudad. La Oficina de Madres de la Ciudad de Gilbert se encargaba de asuntos íntimos como la actividad sexual de las "niñas discolas", que supuestamente carecían de padres atentos y acudían a las mujeres policías en busca de orientación y protección. En enero de 1915, *Los Angeles Times* informó que Gilbert quería que la ciudad de Los Ángeles diera prioridad a la seguridad de las mujeres a la hora de redactar una nueva ley para regular los jitneys. Se indignó al enterarse de "que muchas pasajeras que aborronaron los cazadores de monedas de cinco centavos han sido obligadas a sentarse en el regazo de hombres que nunca antes habían visto". Aquí, ella hace eco de las palabras del comerciante de muebles W.G. Hutchison, que se opuso cinco días antes a "la amenaza moral que supone permitir que personas sin escrúpulos se amontonen entre mujeres y niñas". Tanto la policía, como los comerciantes del centro de Los Ángeles que vendían lujos a la clase media guardaban enérgicamente la virtud de las chicas ricas que navegaban por la ciudad; les preocupaba que la espantosa reputación de los hombres en jitneys repeliara a las clientas ricas del distrito comercial central de la ciudad.

Los oponentes del comercio de los jitney también se autodenominaron paternalistas en las llamadas anti-jitney para proteger a los peatones. Dos informes de muertes y mutilaciones bajo las ruedas de los jitneys enfatizaron a los conductores como hombres perpetradores de atrocidades contra las peatonas.

the City of Los Angeles to prioritize women's safety when composing a new law to regulate the jitneys. She was outraged to have learned "that many girl passengers who boarded nickel chasers have been required to sit on the laps of men they had never seen before." Here, she echoes the words of furniture retailer W.G. Hutchison, who objected five days earlier to "the moral menace through allowing this opportunity for unscrupulous persons to crowd in among women and girls."¹⁸ As much as the police, downtown Los Angeles shopkeepers who sold luxuries to the middle classes strenuously guarded the virtue of rich girls navigating the city; they worried that the frightful reputation of men in jitneys repelled rich, female customers from the city's central shopping district.

The jitney trade's opponents also anointed themselves as paternalists in anti-jitney calls to protect pedestrians. Two reports of death and maiming under the wheels of jitneys emphasized drivers as male perpetrators of atrocity against female pedestrians. Mrs. Mary E. Keller, 62, died when speeding jitney driver Jacob Spilhauig, 16, dragged her pinned body one hundred feet along a street in Boyle Heights before he got his bus to brake. Jitney driver D. Wolownic "had his eyes on a prospective passenger a half block away" when he hit Mrs. R. Booth. In both cases, the *Los Angeles Times* highlights accounts of a female victim with an Anglo name and a male driver with a name evoking white ethnic heritage. The jitney trade was the recipient of one more layer of exotism in a newspaper article entitled "The Jitney Assassins." The *Los Angeles Times* article sarcastically told Germans to wage their "war upon cripples, and old men, and women and children" of London simply by "buy[ing] the thousand jitneys that now make a slaughter pen of the streets of Los Angeles."¹⁹ The trope remains among conservative nationalists and neoliberal thinkers who still use gender to frame attacks on foreigners and workers. Feminist critic Sara R. Farris reads narratives of violence against

La Sra. Mary E. Keller, de 62 años, murió cuando el veloz conductor de jitney Jacob Spilhauig, de 16 años, arrastró su cuerpo inmovilizado cien pies a lo largo de una calle de Boyle Heights antes de conseguir que su autobús frenara. El conductor de Jitney D. Wolownic "tenía sus ojos puestos en un posible pasajero a media cuadra de distancia" cuando golpeó a la Sra. R. Booth. En ambos casos, *Los Angeles Times* destaca los relatos de una víctima femenina con un nombre anglosajón y un conductor masculino con un nombre que evoca la herencia étnica blanca. El comercio del jitney fue el recipiente de una capa más de exotismo en un artículo de periódico titulado "Los asesinos del Jitney."

El artículo de *Los Angeles Times* dijo sarcásticamente a los alemanes que librarán su "guerra contra lisiados, ancianos, mujeres y niños" de Londres simplemente "comprando los mil jitneys que ahora hacen un matadero en las calles de Los Ángeles." El tropo permanece entre los nacionalistas conservadores y los pensadores neoliberales que todavía usan el género para enmarcar ataques contra extranjeros y trabajadores. La crítica feminista Sara R. Farris interpreta las narrativas de violencia contra las mujeres –o contra cualquier sujeto feminizado–, como formas de marcar límites entre poblaciones modernas contra tradicionales, las mujeres de carrera contra las trabajadoras del cuidado, y los espacios urbanos a los que pertenecen las mujeres contra aquellos en los que corren demasiado riesgo de sufrir agresiones sexuales.

Los insultos y ataques a los conductores de jitney como hombres viciosos de origen inmigrante indicaba que el oficio tenía un verdadero potencial para perturbar los ferrocarriles, una importante industria local y también un conglomerado inmobiliario. Un ejecutivo de tranvía en *Electric Railway Journal* reaccionó llamando a los conductores de jitney "poco mejor que un parásito que socava la fuerza y la vitalidad del servicio ferroviario" y advirtió de manera ominosa a los conductores que "se retiren voluntariamente del campo" antes de que "el interés público deba en última instancia forzar su eliminación" (Dunn, 1915). Luego, *Sunset*, una revista impresa por Southern Pacific (S.P.) Railroad de la dinastía Huntington, impugnó a los conductores de jitney como "francotiradores de automóviles". Los trabajadores de Los Ángeles habían estado en desacuerdo durante mucho tiempo con el ferrocarril S.P., porque sus ingenieros habían mantenido los trenes funcionando a tiempo durante una huelga en el puerto en 1911.

Los trabajadores con conciencia de clase sabían que S.P. Railroad también operaba el Pacific Electric Railway y que Henry E. Huntington, el sobrino del fundador de S.P., era propietario privado del Los Angeles Railway. La industria mantuvo agresivamente un régimen laboral antisindical llamado open shop

19. "The Chase: Nickels Ahead; Blood Behind," *L.A. Times*, 7 December 1914. The age of Spilhauig [or Spilhauiz] is from the 1920 U.S. Census, which had him listed as a "chauffeur" who "delivers bread." *Ancestry Library Edition*. "Still More Pestiferous: After 'Jitney' Hits Woman," *L.A. Times*, 17 December 1914. "The Jitney Assassins," *L.A. Times*, 4 January 1915.

20. This dynamic is called the "sexualization of racism and racialization of sexism" by Sara R. Farris, *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism* (Duke University Press, 2017). For the parallels between rightwing uses of gender with rightwing uses of queer and/or disabled identity politics, see Jasbir K. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Duke University Press, 2007) and *The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability* (Duke University Press, 2017).

women – or against any feminized subject – as marking boundaries between modern versus traditional peoples, career women versus care workers, and urban spaces where women belong versus ones where they are too much at risk of sexual assault.²⁰

The vitriol in attacks on jitney drivers as vicious men from immigrant backgrounds indicated the trade had real potential to disrupt the railroads, an important local industry and also a real estate conglomerate. A streetcar executive in *Electric Railway Journal* reacted by calling jitney drivers “little better than a parasite sapping the strength and vitality of the railway service” and ominously warned drivers to “voluntarily withdraw from the field” before “public interest must ultimately force its removal” (Dunn, 1915).²¹ Then *Sunset*, a magazine printed by the Huntington dynasty’s Southern Pacific (S.P.) Railroad, impugned jitney drivers as “auto snipers.” Working people in Los Angeles had long been at odds with the S.P. Railroad, for its engineers had kept the trains running on time during a harbor strike in 1911. Workers with class consciousness knew that S.P. Railroad also operated the Pacific Electric Railway and that Henry E. Huntington, the nephew of S.P.’s founder, privately owned the Los Angeles Railway. The industry aggressively maintained an anti-union labor regime called the “open shop,” so the motormen who operated local rail lines had never organized.²² First rail, then the jitney drivers’ association, turned to Los Angeles City Council, where capital lobbied for heavier regulation and drivers demonstrated for a more laissez-faire approach to urban transportation.

Government abolished the jitneys by setting rules inimical to the trade’s competitive advantage. Business leaders like grocer Walter W. Ralphs said that jitneys had become a “public utility, and should be treated as such.” Bruce Wetherby, a shoe retailer, went one step further. To him, it was “unthinkable that this class shall be permitted to operate without police restrictions.”²³ The *Los Angeles Times* shared a petition calling for jitney drivers to purchase licenses in order to fund “a board for examination of applicants for license, and the necessary additional police for the enforcement of the ordinance without putting additional burden on

“tienda abierta”, por lo que los conductores que operaban las líneas ferroviarias locales nunca se habían organizado. Primero el tren, luego la asociación de conductores de jitney, se dirigió al Ayuntamiento de Los Ángeles, donde el capital presionó para lograr una regulación más estricta, y los conductores se manifestaron a favor de un enfoque más laissez-faire para el transporte urbano.

El gobierno abolió los jitneys estableciendo reglas contrarias a la ventaja competitiva del comercio. Líderes empresariales como el tendero Walter W. Ralphs dijo que los jitneys se habían convertido en una “utilidad pública y deberían ser tratados como tal”. Bruce Wetherby, un minorista de zapatos, dio un paso más. Para él, era “impensable que a esta clase se le permitiera operar sin restricciones policiales.” Los Angeles Times compartió una petición en la que pedía a los conductores de jitney que compraran licencias que financiarían “una junta para examinar a los solicitantes de licencias y la policía adicional necesaria para hacer cumplir la ordenanza sin imponer una carga adicional a los contribuyentes”. El concejal James Simpson Conwell predijo “que la situación debe ceder a la operación de una ley más alta que cualquier ordenanza, una ley que es inflexible e implacable - la ley económica... El autobús ha llegado para quedarse como medio de transporte de la ciudad, y que en un futuro no lejano se convertirá en un sistema de tránsito rápido de lujo, en el que la seguridad, los asientos, la velocidad y la comodidad están garantizadas, y por lo tanto, se paga a un precio conmensurado.” Conwell todavía votó a regañadientes para restringir a los conductores de jitney de rutas con líneas de ferrocarril. Los conductores de Jitney debían cumplir con un horario y comprar bonos de seguros para garantizar una compensación en caso de un accidente que causara lesiones o daños a la propiedad.

Los conductores de jitney lucharon contra la regulación, pero su sueño murió después de dos votaciones sucesivas para reducir el comercio de jitney en Los Ángeles. La propuesta 4 prohibió a los jitneys de operar en “distritos peligrosamente congestionados de la ciudad” y requería que los conductores mantuvieran todos los vehículos en funcionamiento todos los días desde las 6 a.m. hasta la medianoche (Wilson, 1917). The Electric Railway Journal no intentó ocultar los trucos sucios de la industria cuando los editores se jactaban que los conductores habían llevado a los votantes del “sí” a las urnas en 550 automóviles. Con 100.000 votos emitidos, el lado anti-jitney ganó por 9,981 votos. Quedaron algunos jitneys en la carretera, pero el número se redujo de 1.000 en 1916 a 32 en 1917. La próxima vez que la desregulación del comercio de jitney llegó a la boleta electoral fue en el punto más bajo de la próxima gran crisis en 1935. La Corporación

21. W.E. Dunn, “The Application of Established Legal Principles to the Jitney,” *Electric Railway Journal* (Annual Convention Issue 1915), 504.

22. “Auto Snipers and Trolley Cars,” *Sunset* 34, no. 1 (January 1915), 47. Louis B. Perry and Richard S. Perry, *A History of the Los Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-1941* (University of California Press, 1963), 53.

23. “Imperative: Stringent Regulation of the Jitney Busses,” *L.A. Times*, 4 January 1915.

24. “The Why and the Wherefore: Drastic Regulation Necessary Safeguard,” *L.A. Times*, 12 January 1915.

25. “Jitney Ordinance Passed,” *L.A. Tribune*, n.d.

taxpayers.”²⁴ Councilman James Simpson Conwell predicted “that the situation must yield to the operation of a higher law than any ordinance, a law that is inflexible and merciless - the economic law... the motor buss has come to stay as a means of city transportation, and that it will in the not distant future develop into a system of rapid transit de luxe, in which safety, seats, speed and comfort are guaranteed, and a commensurate price is paid therefor[e].”²⁵ Conwell still voted reluctantly to restrict jitney drivers from routes with rail lines. Jitney drivers were to keep to a schedule and to buy insurance bonds to guarantee compensation in the event of a crash causing injury or property damage.²⁶

Jitney drivers fought back against regulation, but their dream died after two successive votes to curtail the jitney trade in Los Angeles. Proposition 4 forbade jitneys from “dangerously congested districts of the City” and required drivers to keep every vehicle in operation daily from 6 a.m. to midnight (Wilson, 1917)²⁷ The *Electric Railway Journal* made no attempt to hide the industry’s dirty tricks when the editors boasted that motormen had chauffeured ‘yes’ voters to the polls in 550 cars. With 100,000 ballots cast, the anti-jitney side won by 9,981 votes. A few jitneys remained on the road, but the number dropped from 1,000 in 1916 to 32 in 1917.²⁸ The next time deregulating the jitney trade made the ballot was at the nadir of the next great crisis in 1935. The Los Angeles Railway Corporation, recently stripped of its New Deal-era Blue Eagle, cut service so drastically that its workers, the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway and Motor Coach Workers of America, sponsored a bill to bring back jitneys. Five hundred laid-off engineers moved to incorporate their own busing service and drive the vehicles themselves.

26. Tentative: Five Thousand Dollars for Jitneys’ Victims,” *L.A. Times*, 19 February 1915.

27. Phillip D. Wilson, “Proposition and Ordinances Submitted to vote of Electors, June 5th, 1917,” in the appendix to *Analysis of Jitney Operations in Los Angeles* (Southern California Rapid Transit District Planning Department, April 1983).

28. “Los Angeles Excludes Jitneys,” *Electric Railway Journal*, 1917. See Ross D. Eckert and George Hilton, “The Jitneys,” *Journal of Law and Economics* 15 (October 1972), 318-322.

29. J.J. Morgan, “Initiative Ordinance Proposed by Petition, Repealing Certain Ordinances of the City Prohibiting the Operation of Jitney Busses on Public Streets, Submitted to Vote of Electors May 7, 1935” and Mrs. J.O. (Marie) Colwell, “Argument Against Proposition No 1 Commonly Known As Jitney Bus’ Ordinance,” both in the appendix to *Analysis of Jitney Operations in Los Angeles* (Southern California Rapid Transit District Planning Department, April 1983), Los Angeles Metro Archives.

de Ferrocarriles de Los Ángeles, recientemente despojada de su Blue Eagle de la era del Nuevo Acuerdo (New Deal), cortó el servicio de manera tan drástica que sus trabajadores, la Asociación Amalgamada de Street and Electric Railway and Motor Coach Workers of America, patrocinó un proyecto de ley para traer de vuelta los jitneys. Quinientos ingenieros despedidos se trasladaron para incorporar su propio servicio de transporte y conducir los vehículos ellos mismos. Los votantes rechazaron la ordenanza después de escuchar a Marie Colwell, quien estaba preocupada por los choques, la congestión y el despecho de los trabajadores contra su antiguo empleador.

JITNEY Y AUTORIDAD:

Los neoliberales del transporte que se apoderaron del legado del Jitney

“Miren al Tercer Mundo, donde los sistemas de vehículos pequeños, tipo automóvil, funcionan con éxito y eficacia. Tenemos mucho que aprender de los jeepneys de Manila, los colectivos de Caracas y los mutatus de Nairobi”.

Melvin M. Webber,

The Joys of Automobility, abril de 1988

El discurso de apertura del ingeniero Melvin Webber en una conferencia de la UCLA de 1988 con el tema “El automóvil y la ciudad”, sorprendió por completo a los asistentes. Después de décadas de fuertes sentimientos de planificación urbana hacia el automóvil, que iban principalmente desde la ambivalencia hasta la acritud, Webber rompió el paso. El trabajo de campo reciente sobre las redes de transporte fuera de Europa y América del Norte presentó los usos informales de los vehículos “similares a los automóviles” de manera mucho más positiva. Más pequeños que los autobuses urbanos típicos pero más grandes que los automóviles personales unifamiliares, que eran omnipresentes en Estados Unidos, los vehículos de paratransito anticiparon la posibilidad de “extender el equivalente a la automovilidad para todos” (Wachs y Crawford, 1992). Lo que le dio a Webber la autoridad para hacer una declaración tan audaz a favor de los jitneys –y en anticipación de un futuro para nuevas empresas como Lyft y Uber– fueron los dieciséis años anteriores de ensayos sobre el tema de autores a quienes llamo “neoliberales del transporte.” Su discurso comenzó después de la década de 1960 y su llamada crisis urbana. La White flight redujo las bases fiscales y llevó a los responsables de la formulación de políticos a modelar sus programas nacionales de lucha contra la pobreza teniendo en cuenta las lecciones aprendidas de los países en proceso de descolonización. Los llamados a acabar con los monopolios del transporte

Voters defeated the ordinance after hearing from Marie Colwell, who was worried about crashes, congestion, and workers' spite against their former employer.²⁹

JITNEY AND AUTHORITY:

Transportation Neoliberals Who Seized the Jitney Legacy

"Look to the Third World, where small-vehicle, auto-like systems operate successfully and effectively. We have much to learn from the jeepneys of Manila, the *colectivos* of Caracas, and the *mutatus* of Nairobi."

Melvin M. Webber,

"*The Joys of Automobility*," April 1988³⁰

Engineer Melvin Webber's keynote speech at a 1988 UCLA conference themed "The Car and the City" utterly surprised attendees. After city planning's decades of strong feelings about the car, which ranged mostly from ambivalence to acrimony, Webber broke stride. Recent fieldwork on transportation networks outside of Europe and North America shined a far more sympathetic light on the informal uses of "auto-like" vehicles. Smaller than typical city buses but larger than single-family personal cars, which were ubiquitous in the U.S., paratransit vehicles anticipated the possibility "of extending the equivalent of automobility to everyone." (Wachs and Crawford, 1992).³¹ What gave Webber the authority to make such a bold statement in favor of the jitneys – and in anticipation of a future for startups like Lyft and Uber – was the previous sixteen years of essays on the matter by authors whom I call "transportation neoliberals." Their discourse began after the 1960s and its so-called urban crisis. White flight shrank tax bases and led policymakers to model their domestic antipoverty programs on lessons learned from countries in the

30. Webber's speech was reported in an article next to this image to illustrate his point. Connie Koenenn, "Future Gridlock: Blame All the Empty Seats, Expert Says," *L.A. Times*, 12 April 1988.

31. *The Car and the City: The Automobile, the Built Environment, and Daily Urban Life*, Martin Wachs and Margaret Crawford, eds. (University of Michigan Press, 1992), 284.

32. For two excellent books on this nexus of foreign and domestic politics, see Alyosha Goldstein, *Poverty in Common: The Politics of Community Action During the American Century* (Duke University Press, 2012) and Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Harvard University Press, 2015).

33. "A Message from the Publisher of Reason," *Reason* (January 1971).

público y a abrir las calles a la competencia de los jitneys vinieron de jóvenes estudiantes graduados y profesores titulares, consultores y estafadores.

El jitney dio su primer salto desde las Filipinas poscoloniales al discurso de la economía urbana de California en la primavera de 1972. Sandi Rosenbloom, candidata a título de doctorado en ciencias políticas de la UCLA, publicó "Taxis y Jitneys: El caso de la desregulación" en *Reason*, una revista libertaria que entonces solo estaba en su cuarto año. La publicación comenzó en Boston, pero se trasladó a la ciudad costera de Santa Bárbara en 1971. Rosenbloom ya había publicado una breve reseña bibliográfica sobre colectivos en Caracas; mientras que el Sun Belt de Houston publicó datos sobre el auge del comercio del jitney en Manila, Seúl y Teherán. Las tres megaciudades tenían redes informales de viajes compartidos, totalmente privatizadas que transportan al 25 por ciento, 15 por ciento y 100 por ciento de los usuarios de transporte público, respectivamente. Rosenbloom también hizo una rápida referencia a la historia de los jitneys en Los Ángeles y aludió críticamente a su desaparición a manos de un *trolley lobby*⁴ (Rosenbloom, 1972). Para durar más y suprimir los jitneys, una alianza de intereses de tranvía, buscadores de rentas se basó en "mandatos restrictivos y legislación prohibitiva" (ibid). A veces llamados "taxis gitanos", los jitneys en los Estados Unidos sobrevivieron aquí y allá. Como implica el apodo racializado, el comercio predominaba en los enclaves urbanos de los grupos minoritarios de clase trabajadora como el distrito Hill de Pittsburgh, Hunters Point en San Francisco y el sur de Chicago.

Pisándole los talones a Rosenbloom, el profesor de historia del transporte de UCLA, George Hilton, escribió *The Jitneys* con el estudiante de doctorado en economía de la USC Ross Eckert. Publicado en el *Journal of Law & Economics* de la Universidad de Chicago, un foro importante para debutar la teoría económica libertaria desde 1958, el artículo de Hilton y Eckert se convirtió en la historia más influyente del comercio de jitney jamás escrita. Hasta la fecha, *The Jitneys* es la fuente más citada sobre el comercio de jitney. Con treinta y tres páginas y 139 notas, el artículo de Hilton y Eckert se encuentra entre los relatos académicos más rigurosos del oficio. Los autores argumentan que la hostilidad de los ferrocarriles hacia los jitneys, y las leyes anti-jitney con los cuales los intereses ferroviarios presionaron a las ciudades para que aprobaran, llevaron al desarrollo del transporte urbano en Estados Unidos en una dirección

4. En política, el *lobbying*, la persuasión o la representación de intereses es el acto de intentar influir legalmente en las acciones, políticas o decisiones de los funcionarios del gobierno, generalmente legisladores o miembros de agencias reguladoras.

process of decolonization.³² Calls to break up public transit monopolies and open the streets to competition by jitneys came from young graduate students and tenured professors, consultants and con men.

The jitney made its first jump from the postcolonial Philippines into the urban economics discourse of California in the spring of 1972. Sandi Rosenbloom, a UCLA political science Ph.D. candidate, published "Taxis and Jitneys: The Case for Deregulation" in *Reason*, a libertarian magazine then only in its fourth year. Publication began in Boston but moved to the beach city of Santa Barbara in 1971.³³ Rosenbloom had already published a short literature review about *colectivos* in Caracas; while the Sun Belt city of Houston published data about the booming jitney trade in Manila, Seoul, and Tehran. The three mega cities had informal, fully privatized ride-share networks carrying 25 percent, 15 percent, and 100 percent of transit riders respectively. Rosenbloom also made a quick reference to the history of jitneys in Los Angeles and alluded critically to their demise at the hands of a "trolley lobby" (Rosenbloom, 1972). To outlast and to suppress the jitneys, an alliance of rent-seeking streetcar interests relied on "restrictive injunctions and prohibitive legislation" (ibid). Sometimes termed "gypsy taxis," jitneys in the U.S. survived here and there. As the racialized moniker implies, the trade predominated in working-class minority group's urban enclaves like the Hill District of Pittsburgh, Hunters Point in San Francisco, and South Chicago.³⁴

Hot on Rosenbloom's heels, UCLA transportation history professor George Hilton wrote "The Jitneys" with USC economics doctoral student Ross Eckert. Published in the University of Chicago's *Journal of Law & Economics*, a major forum for debuting libertarian economic theory since 1958,³⁵ Hilton and Eckert's article became the most influential history of the jitney trade ever written. To date, "The Jitneys" is the most widely cited source on the jitney trade. At thirty-three pages and 139 notes, Hilton and Eckert's article ranks among the most rigorous academic accounts of the trade. The authors argue that the hostility of railroads

completamente "insatisfactoria". Mirando hacia atrás, Hilton y Eckert prescribieron la competencia entre los monopolios de los tranvías y una alternativa como los jitneys, especialmente si "los operadores y todos los demás usuarios de las calles cargaban todos los costos de su operación. Esto implica un sistema de tarifas a los usuarios que reflejaría los costos sociales del movimiento en varios momentos y lugares de la ciudad" (Hilton y Eckert, 1972). Sin comentar explícitamente en su momento, los autores insinuaron que los responsables de la formulación de políticas deberían considerar medidas como la apertura de calles a la competencia –o precios de congestión– para reducir las ineficiencias del transporte.

En octubre de 1972, cuando apareció impresa *The Jitneys*, Hilton llevaba diez años de miembro vitalicio de la Mont Pelerin Society, el "colectivo de pensamiento" del neoliberalismo, y estaba a la mitad de un trabajo de consultoría con el American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI contrató al profesor para realizar un estudio poco después de que el Memorando Powell de 1971 alentara a los donantes de derecha a donar a las fundaciones para contrarrestar la "Nueva Izquierda" en los campus. Hilton se centró en la "Asistencia para el transporte masivo urbano" Urban Mass Transportation Assistance (UMTA), un programa federal contra la pobreza de la Gran Sociedad de la década de 1960. Publicado en 1974, *Federal Transit Subsidies* de Hilton describe a UMTA como derrochador e ineficaz. Los datos muestran que la proporción de viajes de trabajo en automóvil en EE. UU. aumentó del 64 al 78 por ciento en los diez años anteriores. Para Hilton, las tendencias a la baja en el uso del transporte público se debieron principalmente a que los pasajeros tomaron la decisión racional de comprar un automóvil para un desplazamiento más conveniente en lugar de factores como los vuelos industriales a las ciudades periféricas y la planificación de baja densidad en paisajes suburbanos del Cinturón del Sol. Al final del estudio, Hilton citó su propio artículo *The Jitneys* mientras soñaba con otro camino. Según Hilton, el comercio legalizado de jitneys "se habría adaptado fácilmente a las condiciones de demanda en expansión o en declive. En particular, la industria se habría adaptado a las fuerzas de difusión que comenzaron a moldear nuestras ciudades a medida que disminuía la dependencia del tranvía" (Hilton, 1974). La legitimación de los jitneys en la década de 1970 tenía el potencial de abrir un mercado adecuado para los viajeros en núcleos urbanos y periferias suburbanas.

En 1974, la UMTA contrató al *Urban Institute*, otro *think-tank*⁵ para estudiar modos alternativos de

34. Sandi Rosenbloom, "Taxis and Jitneys: The Case for Deregulation," *Reason* (February 1972). The first entry in Black playwright August Wilson's *The Pittsburgh Cycle* was called *Jitney* (Samuel French, Inc, 2002 [originally 1982]) and set in the Hill District, 1977.

35. Arguably, the economic analysis of law made its major advance since Jeremy Bentham when Chicago professor of economics Ronald Coase published "The Problem of Social Coast" in this journal in 1960. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "law, economic analysis of," *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, Second Edition (2008).

36. Eckert and Hilton, "The Jitneys," 293 and 325. For the number of citations, see Google Scholar.

5. Un think tank "tanque de pensamiento" es un laboratorio de ideas, instituto de investigación, gabinete estratégico, centro de pensamiento o centro de

to jitneys, and the anti-jitney laws railroad interests lobbied cities to pass, led urban transportation development in the U.S. in an entirely “unsatisfactory” direction. Looking back, Hilton and Eckert prescribed competition between streetcar monopolies and an alternative like the jitneys, especially if “operators and all other users of the streets were bearing the full costs of their operation. This implies a system of user charges which would reflect the social costs of movement at various times and places in the city” (Hilton and Eckert, 1972)³⁶ Without commenting explicitly on their moment, the authors nonetheless implied that policymakers should consider measures like opening streets to competition – or congestion pricing – to reduce transportation inefficiencies.

In October 1972, when “The Jitneys” appeared in print, Hilton was ten years into his life membership with the Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberalism’s “thought collective,” and halfway through a consulting gig with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI hired the professor to conduct a study soon after the Powell Memorandum of 1971 encouraged rightwing donors to give to foundations to counteract the “New Left” on campuses.³⁷ Hilton zeroed in on Urban Mass Transportation Assistance (UMTA), a federal antipoverty program from the 1960s Great Society. Published in 1974, Hilton’s *Federal Transit Subsidies* describes UMTA as wasteful and ineffective. The data shows that the proportion of U.S. work trips by car had risen from 64 percent to 78 percent in the previous ten years. To Hilton, down trends in transit usage were mainly a result of riders making the rational choice to buy a car for more convenient commuting rather than factors like industrial flight to edge cities and the Sun Belt’s planning for low-density suburban landscapes. At the end of the study, Hilton cited his own article “The Jitneys” while dreaming about another path. According to Hilton, the legalized jitneys trade “would have adapted readily either to expanding or declining demand conditions. In particular, the industry would

transporte como “car pool [o automóvil compartido], bus de suscripción y jitney” (Kirby, 1974).

Mientras que paratransito solo ha sido abordado brevemente en la historia de los jitneys, el informe señaló un vínculo crucial entre los desarrollos futuros y el Dial-a-ride, “donde las nuevas llamadas pueden ser atendidas mientras otros pasajeros todavía están en el vehículo” (ibid). En 1982, el Departamento de Transporte de Ronald Reagan encargó un estudio de paratransito UMTA al autor Gabriel Roth, consultor y economista del transporte del Banco Mundial desde 1967. En el primer capítulo, “Aprendiendo del extranjero”, Roth destaca cómo los microempresarios en países en “desarrollo” ofrecen “transporte público urbano que genera ganancias y proporciona un buen servicio” (Roth y Wynne, 1982). Luego, Roth agrega una lista de once ubicaciones en todo el mundo donde los jitneys contribuyen a la infraestructura de transporte: Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Buenos Aires, Calcuta, Manila, Estambul, El Cairo, Singapur, Nairobi, Belfast y Puerto Rico (un territorio de los EE. UU.). Seis años después, el trío de ciudades que Webber enumeró en su discurso de apertura en la UCLA incluyó dos de la lista de Roth, Manila y Nairobi, y una de la obra de Rosenbloom, Caracas. El argumento de Roth de que los modelos globales de paratransito tenían potencial para “aplicarse en los Estados Unidos” informó el discurso de Webber (ibid).

De manera evidente el discurso de Webber omitió cualquier mención del reciente intento, en el invierno de 1982, de establecer un servicio de jitney llamado Express Transit District (ETD). Los fundadores fueron los Mendenilla, tres hermanos con experiencia en la conducción de taxis. Los Mendenilla solicitaron una licencia para iniciar un negocio en Los Ángeles llamado ETD –un acrónimo similar a Rapid Transit District (RTD) que era la red de autobuses públicos de la región–. A diferencia de RTD, que daba servicio a un área masiva, ETD propuso rutas solo a través de Hollywood. Cuarenta “inversionistas / conductores”, en su mayoría inmigrantes de México, Rusia e Irán, recibieron \$10,000 cada uno. ETD utilizó los fondos para comprar jitneys y para cubrir la logística (*Analysis of Jitney Operations*, 1983).

Los clientes debían pagar el mismo precio por viaje que cobraba RTD, pero los usuarios del transporte público de Los Ángeles anticiparon un aumento de tarifas en caso de que los tribunales anularan la Propuesta A. En 1980, los votantes aprobaron el aumento de medio centavo en el impuesto a las ventas para financiar el transporte. Apostándole a una decisión judicial favorable, ETD no pudo obtener ganancias después de que los jueces

reflexión de un grupo de expertos cuya función es la reflexión intelectual sobre asuntos de política social, estrategia política, economía, tecnología o cultura.

37. *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*, Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds. (Harvard University Press, 2009). “Mont Pelerin Society Directory - 2010,” *DeSmogBlog*, accessed 11 January 2021. AEI’s top donor was Richard Mellon Scaife, heir to the Mellon banking family of Pittsburgh. Jane Mayer, *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right* (Doubleday, 2016), 73-111.

38. George W. Hilton, *Federal Transit Subsidies: The Urban Mass Transit Assistance Program* (American Enterprise Institute, 1974), 97, 109-111, and 130. Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton University Press, 1996) and Joel Garreau, *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (Anchor Books, 1992).

have adapted to the forces for diffusion which began to shape our cities as dependence on the streetcar declined" (Hilton, 1974).³⁹ Legitimizing jitneys in the 1970s had the potential to open a market suited for riders in urban cores and on the suburban fringes.

In 1974, UMTA hired the Urban Institute, another think tank, to study alternative modes of transportation like "car pool, subscription bus, and jitney" (Kirby, 1974). While *Para-transit* only briefly touched on the history of jitneys, the report noted a crucial link between future developments and Dial-a-ride, "where new calls may be answered while other passengers are still in the vehicle" (ibid).³⁹ By 1982, Ronald Reagan's Department of Transportation commissioned an UMTA paratransit study by author Gabriel Roth, a consultant and transportation economist with the World Bank since 1967. In the first chapter, "Learning from Abroad," Roth stresses how micro entrepreneurs in "developing" countries offer "urban public transport that run at a profit while providing good service" (Roth and Wynne, 1982). Roth then adds a list of eleven locations around the globe where jitneys contribute to transportation infrastructure: Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Buenos Aires, Calcutta, Manila, Istanbul, Cairo, Singapore, Nairobi, Belfast, and Puerto Rico (a territory of the U.S.). Six years later, the trio of cities Webber listed in his keynote speech at UCLA included two from Roth's list, Manila and Nairobi, and one from Rosenbloom's work, Caracas. Roth's case that global paratransit models had potential for "application in the U.S." informed Webber's speech (ibid).⁴⁰

Notably absent from Webber's speech was any mention of the recent attempt, in winter of 1982, at the establishment of a jitney service called Express Transit District (ETD). The founders were the Mendenillas, three brothers with experience driving taxis. The Mendenillas applied for a license to start a business in Los Angeles named ETD, an acronym similar to RTD. Rapid Transit District (RTD) was the region's public bus network. Unlike RTD, which serviced a massive area, ETD proposed routes through Hollywood alone. Forty "investor/drivers," mostly immigrants from Mexico, Russia, and Iran, fronted \$10,000 each. ETD used

mantuvieran la votación para subsidiar RTD en abril de 1983. ETD cerró tienda ese mes. En 1986, un profesor de planificación de UC Irvine llamado Roger Teal descubrió que RTD, que él consideraba "tránsito subsidiado", había llevado a ETD y su esfuerzo de empresa informal a la quiebra. (Teal y Nemer, 1986). Luego, Teal dio un giro hacia el romance al enfatizar que ETD era "un negocio familiar" con conductores hispanohablantes y "pasajeros leales" que querían "apoyar un negocio operado y propiedad de chicanos" (ibid).

La elegía de Teal por ETD, publicada en la revista "Transportation", marcó la apoteosis del neoliberalismo del transporte como un discurso intencionalmente disimulado y francamente malicioso.

El artículo de Teal no menciona cómo él, como consultor, había testificado en nombre de ETD en las audiencias de la Comisión de Servicios Públicos donde un juez aprobó la licencia comercial. En cambio, Teal reinventó selectivamente el tercer acto de la trama. En el invierno de 1983, los reguladores comenzaron a escudriñar la empresa. RTD informó infracciones como hacinamiento, vehículos utilizando números de ruta RTD y conductores deteniéndose en zonas de autobuses RTD y "tocando la bocina ... para atraer pasajeros" (Crumpley, 1983). El Departamento de Relaciones Laborales de California respondió a tres quejas de robo de salario y concluyó que ETD les debía a sus conductores más de \$140,000. La Patrulla de Autopistas de California inspeccionó los jitneys y puso al 73 por ciento de los vehículos "fuera de servicio" por "luces, llantas y equipo mecánico en condiciones inseguras" (ibid). Un mes después, los autobuses no estaban reparados y seguían en uso. Finalmente, en abril, uno de los fundadores de la empresa se fugó a Ciudad Juárez con lo que quedaba de aproximadamente tres a diez millones de dólares que la empresa había recaudado de conductores-inversoristas. No los cuarenta mencionados en la solicitud, pero al menos 373 conductores, en su mayoría inmigrantes, afirmaron que los hermanos les habían vendido rutas. ETD los estafó.

El neoliberalismo del transporte no tenía en cuenta a los trabajadores que iban a perder sus trabajos como conductores de autobuses cuando los consultores recomendaban cortar el transporte público. Tampoco tenía en cuenta a los trabajadores que sufrían cuando la desregulación abrió espacio para que los estafadores promulgaran esquemas fraudulentos de robo de salarios. A los economistas informalistas, como Hernando de Soto, solo les importaban los empresarios, nunca aquellos a quienes pisoteaban. El autor peruano de *The Other Path* (1986) encubre (whitewashes) lo peor de la liberalización comercial, la desinversión urbana y la retirada del gobierno con sus interpretaciones ingenuamente populistas del multiculturalismo. En

39. Ronald F. Kirby, *Para-transit: A Summary Assessment of Experience and Potential* (Urban Institute, 1974), 9 and 14.

40. Gabriel Roth and George G. Wynne, *Free Enterprise Urban Transport* (Urban Mass Transportation Administration Office of Policy Development 1982), 1/1, 4/11.

41. *Analysis of Jitney Operations in Los Angeles* (Southern California Rapid Transit District Planning Department April 1983), Los Angeles Metro Library Archives.

42. This Los Angeles County ballot measure passed in November 1980, and it imposed an additional half-cent local sales tax to fund both improved bus service and breaking ground on a light rail system.

the funds to purchase jitneys and to cover logistics (*Analysis of Jitney Operations*, 1983). Customers were to pay the same price per ride as RTD charged,⁴¹ but public transit users of Los Angeles anticipated a fare hike on the horizon in the event that the courts struck down Proposition A.⁴² In 1980, voters approved the half-cent bump in sales tax to fund transit. Betting on a favorable judicial decision, ETD was unable to turn a profit after judges upheld the vote to subsidize RTD in April of 1983. ETD closed shop that month. In 1986, a UC Irvine planning professor named Roger Teal found that RTD, which he deemed “subsidized transit,” had forced ETD’s exercise in informal enterprise into bankruptcy (Teal and Nemer, 1986). Teal then veered into romance by stressing that ETD was “a family owned business” with Spanish speakers for drivers and “loyal riders” wanting “to support a Chicano-owned and operated business” (ibid).⁴³

Teal’s elegy for ETD, published in the journal *Transportation*, marked the apotheosis of transportation neoliberalism as an intentionally dissembling and outright malicious discourse. Teal’s article did not mention how he, as a consultant, had testified on ETD’s behalf at the Public Utilities Commission hearings where a judge approved the business license.⁴⁴ Instead, Teal selectively reimagined the third act of the plot. In winter of 1983, regulators began scrutinizing the company. RTD reported infractions like overcrowding, vehicles using RTD route numbers, and drivers stopping in RTD bus zones and “honking...to attract passengers” (Crumpley, 1983). The California Department of Labor Relations responded to three complaints of wage theft and concluded

43. Roger F. Teal and Terry Nemer, “Privatization of urban transit: The Los Angeles jitney experience,” *Transportation* 13 (1986), 5-22. For a glowing review of intercity jitneys as “community-based transportation” and “an important example [of] the viability of market-based, privatized transit” in Southern California, see Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Lisa Schweitzer, and Adriele Robles, “*Camionetas*: Informal travel among immigrants,” *Transportation Research* 39, no. 10 (December 2005): 895-911.

44. *Analysis of Jitney Operations in Los Angeles* (Southern California Rapid Transit District Planning Department April 1983), Los Angeles Metro Library Archives, 9. Labor contractualization and the romance of life without a long-term boss had a structural appeal to short-term business consultants, who consistently recommended that major firms hire temps. Louis Hyman, *Temp: How American Work, American Business, and the American Dream Became Temporary* (Viking, 2018).

45. Jerry Crumpley, *An Overview of Jitney Operations in Los Angeles* (Southern California Rapid Transit District Planning Department August 1983), Los Angeles Metro Library Archives, 17-19.

lugar del transporte público, el libro anunciaba el “colectivo de Lima ... los sedanes con capacidad para 5 pasajeros y camionetas ‘station wagon’ debidamente acondicionadas para transportar 8 y 9 personas” (de Soto, 1986). Las observaciones de De Soto inspiraron a su compatriota, el poeta Mario Vargas Llosa, a ver los barrios marginales de las ciudades del tercer mundo como escenario de aventuras románticas. El bohemio burgués que vivía la vida de un expatriado en París celebró “la economía informal, una sociedad paralela y en muchos sentidos más auténtica, laboriosa y creativa que la sociedad que dice ser el país legal” (ibid). Los neoliberales del transporte han instado a los urbanistas y planificadores a ir a aprender del extranjero, porque estas son las lecciones que a menudo esperan que los estudiantes y académicos encuentren.

Sin embargo, los críticos del neoliberalismo deben ser más cautelosos al interpretar a los países latinoamericanos u otros países “en desarrollo” como el escenario preeminente para un cambio en el pensamiento económico. Los geógrafos, como David Harvey, que escriben como si el neoliberalismo hubiera nacido en Chile y Argentina, son especialmente susceptibles al deslizamiento marxista hacia la xenofobia fronteriza. Storper ha ayudado a redirigir la atención antineoliberal desde la década de 1970 hacia los usos anteriores del término en *Atlantic World* de la década de 1930. Para personas como Walter Lippmann, el neoliberalismo no era un insulto, sino una etiqueta que se usaba con orgullo para diferenciarse del estatismo en el Tercer Reich o en la Unión Soviética. En términos generales, los neoliberales del transporte han incluido a aquellos que priorizaron la eficiencia del tráfico junto con aquellos que promocionaron los placeres de la movilidad. Mientras que algunos neoliberales del transporte eran ideológicos hasta el punto de la crueldad, otros eran decididamente más pragmáticos. Durante la crisis del terremoto de Northridge de 1994, el columnista de Los Angeles Times y profesor de planificación urbana de la USC Kevin Starr vio el desastre como “una ventana de oportunidad” para que Los Ángeles legitimara el jitney, un modo de tránsito que conocía por su investigación sobre la historia del Sueño de California (Starr, 1994). Varias autopistas colapsaron durante el terremoto, y Starr creía que el paratránsito podría ayudar a prevenir una inminente pesadilla de tráfico. Adelantando a los críticos, Starr quería que la ciudad “diversificara sus opciones de transporte”, no simplemente aboliera el transporte público, como querían los “muchachos Adam Smith” entre sus colegas de la USC (ibid).

CONCLUSIÓN:

Los neoliberales del transporte se han apoderado del futuro.

that ETD owed its drivers over \$140,000. California Highway Patrol inspected the jitneys and placed 73 percent of the vehicles “out of service” for “lights, tires, and mechanical equipment in unsafe condition” (ibid). A month later, the buses were not fixed and still in use.⁴⁶ Finally, in April, one of the company’s founders absconded to Ciudad Juárez with what was left of an estimated three to ten million dollars the firm had collected from driver-investors. Not the forty mentioned in the application, but at least 373 drivers, mostly immigrants, claimed the brothers had sold them routes. ETD conned them.⁴⁶

Transportation neoliberalism had regard neither for workers who stood to lose their jobs as bus drivers when consultants recommended cutting public transit nor for workers who suffered when deregulation opened space for con men to enact fraudulent wage theft schemes. Only entrepreneurs, never those whom they trampled, mattered to informalist economists like Hernando de Soto. The Peruvian author of *The Other Path* (1986) whitewashes the worst of trade liberalization, urban disinvestment, and government retreat with his naively populist renderings of multiculturalism. In place of public transportation, the book heralded Lima’s “colectivo...the sedans with a capacity for 5 riders and ‘station wagon’ vans properly upgraded to carry 8 and 9 persons” (de Soto, 1986). De Soto’s observations inspired his countryman, the poet Mario Vargas Llosa, to see the slums of third world cities as the setting for romantic adventure. The bourgeois bohemian living the expat’s life in Paris celebrated “the informal economy - a parallel and in many senses more authentic, industrious, and creative society than the society which claims to be the legal country” (ibid).⁴⁷ Transportation neoliberals have urged urbanists and planners to go learn from abroad, because these are the lessons often waiting for students and scholars to come find.

Critics of neoliberalism nevertheless must be more wary of reading Latin American or other “developing” countries as the preeminent staging ground for a turn in economic thought. Geographers

46. Jerry Belcher, “Jitney Bus Firm Probed for Possible Investment Fraud,” *L.A. Times*, 13 April 1983. Jerry Belcher, “PUC Laxity in Probing Jitney Backers Told,” *L.A. Times*, 14 April 1983.

47. “los automóviles sedán con capacidad para 5 pasajeros y camionetas station wagon, debidamente acondicionadas para llevar 8 y 9 personas” and “la economía informal - sociedad paralela y, en muchos sentidos, más auténtica, trabajadora y creativa que la que usurpa el título de país legal.” Hernando de Soto, *El otro sendero: La revolución informal* (Editorial El Barranco, 1986), 104 and xx.

48. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

“... permitir que los operadores de jitneys y autobuses privados ingresen al mercado del transporte para competir con la MTA y entre ellos. Los empresarios de transporte público que obtengan el 100% de sus ingresos de las tarifas ... rápidamente descubrirían qué tipo de servicios atraerían a los conductores de automóviles.”

James E. Moore II,
ingeniero de la USC, abril de 2007

Por lo tanto, James Moore ilustra cómo los llamados a la diversidad en el transporte, a pesar de que los negacionistas afirman lo contrario, provienen de la ideología neoliberal. La primera señal de que la burbuja inmobiliaria del sur de California estaba estallando llegó el 2 de abril de 2007, cuando un prestamista de alto riesgo llamado New Century Financial Corporation of Irvine se declaró en quiebra. La crisis había comenzado y los neoliberales del transporte estaban ampliamente preparados para reestructurar las ciudades de California en respuesta. Esa primavera, Logan Green estaba terminando su tumultuoso último año en UC Santa Barbara. Un aspirante a emprendedor y un lector cercano de la literatura sobre planificación urbana; Green había sido elegido miembro de la “Junta de Pagadores de Tarifas de Estacionamiento” del campus (Bradley, 2015). Con el libro *The High Cost of Free Parking* “El alto costo del estacionamiento gratuito” del profesor de UCLA Donald Shoup en mano, Green convenció a la junta de aumentar los precios del estacionamiento drásticamente para reducir la congestión. Por otro lado, Green fundó una startup de car-sharing (autos compartidos) con una flota de autos Prius (ibid). El campus denunció los aumentos en los costos de estacionamiento, por ello, las tarifas volvieron a bajar, y la startup de Green pronto fracasó. El recién graduado se fue a viajar por el mundo durante un verano. Green visitó Zimbabwe, un país donde una crisis de inflación desbocada, desde 2006, había sumido a los propietarios de automóviles en la pobreza, y muchos propietarios transformaron sus vehículos en jitneys llamados kombis. Green regresó a los Estados Unidos y fundó Zimride.

Zimride conectó a conductores que buscaban un pequeño ingreso en efectivo con pasajeros que buscaban un viaje barato entre campus. En 2012, la empresa pasó a llamarse Lyft y lanzó una “app” o aplicación para teléfonos inteligentes para ayudar a los conductores y pasajeros a encontrarse en cualquier lugar de la ciudad. Cuatro años después, el director asociado del Instituto de Estudios de Transporte de la UCLA, Juan Matute, llamó a la Lyft Line una actualización de las “versiones de jitneys del siglo XXI” (Poole, 2016). Los usuarios obtuvieron la opción de pagar precios más baratos por viaje si estaban dispuestos a arriesgar un viaje más largo.

like David Harvey, who write as if neoliberalism was born in Chile and Argentina, are especially susceptible to the Marxist slip into borderline xenophobia.⁴⁸ Storper has helped redirect anti-neoliberal attention from the 1970s back to earlier uses of the term in the 1930s Atlantic World. To the likes of Walter Lippmann, neoliberalism was not a slur but a label proudly used for differentiation from statism in the Third Reich or in the Soviet Union. Broadly speaking, transportation neoliberals have included those who prioritized traffic efficiency alongside those who touted the joys of mobility. While some transportation neoliberals were ideological to the point of cruelty, others were decidedly more pragmatic.⁴⁹ During the Northridge earthquake crisis of 1994, *Los Angeles Times* columnist and USC urban planning professor Kevin Starr saw the disaster as “a window of opportunity” for Los Angeles to legitimize the jitney, a transit mode he knew from his research into the history of the California Dream (Starr, 1994).⁵⁰ Several freeways collapsed during the earthquake, and Starr believed that paratransit might help prevent a looming traffic nightmare. Preempting critics, Starr wanted the city “to diversify its transportation options,” not simply abolish public transit, as the “Adam Smith boys” among his USC colleagues wanted (ibid).⁵¹

CONCLUSION:

Transportation Neoliberals Have Seized the Future

“...allow private jitney and bus operators to enter the transportation market to compete with the MTA and with each other. Transit entrepreneurs who get 100% of their revenues from fares...would quickly figure out what kinds of services would attract car drivers.”

James E. Moore II, USC engineering,
April 2007⁵²

Thus, James Moore illustrates how calls for transportation diversity, regardless of any denialist

49. Storper, “The neo-liberal city,” 11 and 19.

50. This is a regionalized variation on the American Dream, which was the promise of a shot at independence, mobility, and prosperity for everyone in the United States. The California variation, according to historian Kevin Starr, promised all of the above plus an even more liberated way of life amidst natural beauty and bounty. Kevin Starr, *Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915* (Oxford University Press, 1973), chapter 13.

51. Kevin Starr, “The Ultimate Car Culture Was Built on Public Transport,” *L.A. Times*, 31 July 1994. For the uses of crises by neoliberal thinkers and policymakers, including pragmatists, see Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Knopf Canada 2007), 166.

52. “How to Fix Traffic,” *L.A. Times*, 15 April 2007.

Solo cuando Lyft Lines comenzó a recoger a varios pasajeros que iban a diferentes destinos, la compañía revivió por completo los jitneys de Los Ángeles de 1914 o los jeepneys de Manila. Robert Poole, de Reason, elogió el trabajo intelectual detrás de la innovación de Green, que fechaba en Learning from Abroad de Roth y sus pasajes en Manila, Nairobi, Jartum y San Juan. Poole procedió con entusiasmo a predecir que tanto Lyft como Uber representarían los “primeros pasos hacia [un] futuro del tránsito privado” (ibid).

Los críticos del neoliberalismo han denunciado los avances en los viajes compartidos, pero incluso ellos a menudo montan sus ataques en términos decididamente neoliberales. Según el escritor de tecnología Tom Slee, el problema es menos la privatización de un servicio público que los sistemas de clasificación y la amenaza de la “regulación algorítmica” tanto para los conductores como para los usuarios (Slee, 2017).

Las ciudades pueden recurrir a la abolición de los viajes compartidos una vez más, pero creo que el paratransito ha demostrado ser una adición útil a las redes de transporte urbano. La pandemia detuvo el crecimiento de viajes compartidos, pero Lyft se mantiene en una posición sólida para reanudar su invasión en el metro de Los Ángeles después de que finalice el cierre de la COVID-19. Los votantes de California aprobaron la Propuesta 22⁸ sorprendentemente neoliberal después de que el viaje compartido vertiera fondos sin precedentes en la campaña del “sí”. La Propuesta 22 ha despojado a los conductores de su condición de trabajadores y su acceso a los derechos y protecciones asociados. Como contratistas independientes, los conductores de Lyft jitneys han regresado, irónicamente, al ideal sin jefes del anarquismo del transporte.

Sin embargo, los tiempos obviamente han cambiado. Los conductores de Jitney eran iguales a los pasajeros. Debido a que los usuarios de Lyft tienen el poder de emitir quejas sobre los conductores, los conductores corren el riesgo de perder su empleo cada vez que rechazan a un usuario por una oferta para conducir por encima del límite de velocidad. En respuesta a las preocupaciones sobre la regulación

claim to the contrary, stem from neoliberal ideology. The first sign the Southern California real estate bubble was bursting arrived on April 2, 2007, when a subprime lender called New Century Financial Corporation of Irvine filed for bankruptcy. The crisis had begun, and transportation neoliberals were amply prepared to restructure California cities in response.⁵³ That spring, Logan Green was finishing his tumultuous last year at UC Santa Barbara. An aspiring entrepreneur and a close reader of urban planning literature, Green had been elected to the campus "Parking Rate Payers Board" (Bradley, 2015). With UCLA professor Donald Shoup's *The High Cost of Free Parking* in hand, Green convinced the board to increase parking prices dramatically to reduce congestion. On the side, Green founded a "car-sharing" startup with a fleet of Prius cars (ibid). The campus decried parking cost increases, parking rates went back down, and Green's startup soon failed. The new graduate left to travel the world for a summer. Green visited Zimbabwe, a country where a crisis of runaway inflation since 2006 had plunged car owners into poverty, and many owners retooled their vehicles into jitneys called *kombis*. Green returned to the U.S. and founded Zimride.⁵⁴

Zimride connected drivers seeking a little cash income with riders looking for a cheap trip between campuses. By 2012, the firm was renamed Lyft and released a smartphone "app," or application, to help drivers and riders find each other anywhere in the city. Four years later, the UCLA Institute for Transportation Studies associate director Juan Matute called the upgraded Lyft Line the "21st-century versions of jitneys" (Poole, 2016) Users gained the option to pay cheaper prices per ride if they were willing to risk a longer trip. Only when Lyft Lines began to pick up multiple passengers going to different destinations did the company fully revive the jitneys of 1914 Los Angeles or jeepneys of Manila. Reason's Robert Poole acclaimed the thought work behind Green's innovation, which he dated to Roth's *Learning from Abroad* and its passages on Manila, Nairobi, Khartoum, and San Juan. Poole proceeded excitedly to predict that both Lyft and Uber amounted to the "first steps toward [a] private transit future" (ibid).⁵⁵ Critics of neoliberalism have denounced developments in ridesharing, but even

algorítmica y la privatización, recomiendo los siguientes caminos a seguir.

- Al igual que la Asociación de Operadores y Propietarios de Autobuses, una asociación de operadores de jitney que se resistieron a los intereses de la ciudad y del ferrocarril capitalista, los conductores de viajes compartidos deberían formar colectivos. Grupos como Gig Workers Rising tienen el potencial de seleccionar representantes para ayudar a establecer políticas en el vehículo y hacer cumplir de manera justa a los trabajadores. Solo el personal de control de calidad debe tener acceso a las grabaciones del tablero instaladas y operadas por el conductor, de sus interacciones con los pasajeros, además de las calificaciones del desempeño en los teléfonos inteligentes de los conductores.
- Recordando los delitos asociados con ETD, una startup que robó los salarios de los trabajadores y defraudó a los inversores, las empresas de viajes compartidos deberían colaborar con las ciudades para alejarse de un modelo de negocio fuertemente asociado con el fraude. En pruebas breves de asociaciones público-privadas con el transporte público, Lyft debería dejar de robar pasajeros de los corredores de autobuses y bloquear las zonas de carga de autobuses. En cambio, Lyft debería aceptar una misión pública como servir a los pasajeros más allá del alcance del metro de Los Ángeles. El público también debe financiar los viajes de Lyft para los pasajeros que lo necesiten, especialmente los ancianos, los niños en edad escolar y las personas con problemas de movilidad, enfermedades crónicas o ceguera.
- Conociendo el riesgo que los jitneys representaban para el ferrocarril en Los Ángeles –el servicio dinámico puerta a puerta tenía claras ventajas competitivas sobre las líneas de transporte fijo– los funcionarios del gobierno deberían regular enérgicamente el viaje compartido. Dado que Lyft no muestra señales de que se detendrá en la mera diversificación del transporte, el estado debería poner límites a la cantidad de capital que las empresas de viajes compartidos pueden recaudar y dividir esta confianza en unidades localizadas o regionalizadas. La localización de viajes compartidos permitirá políticas mejor adaptadas a lugares específicos, a diferencia de las ambiciones universales de muchas empresas de tecnología que buscan rehacer el mundo en un único dominio de diseño californiano.

53. Julie Creswell and Vikas Bajaj, "Home Lender Is Seeking Bankruptcy," *New York Times*, 3 April 2007.

54. Ryan Bradley, "Lyft's Search for a New Mode of Transport," *MIT Technology Review*, 13 October 2015. This is where I found the image at the beginning of this section.

55. Robert Poole, "Surface Transportation News #147," Reason, 7 January 2016.

56. Tom Slee, *What's Yours Is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy* (OR Books, 2017).

they often mount their attacks in decidedly neoliberal terms. According to technology writer Tom Slee, the problem is less the privatization of a public service than ratings systems and the threat to both drivers and riders of “algorithmic regulation” (Slee, 2017).⁵⁶

Cities might resort to abolishing rideshare once again, but I believe paratransit has proven a useful addition to urban transportation networks. The pandemic halted the growth of rideshare, but Lyft remains strongly positioned to resume its encroachment on Los Angeles Metro after the COVID-19 lockdown ends. California voters passed the strikingly neoliberal Proposition 22⁵⁷ after rideshare poured unprecedented funding into the “yes” campaign. Proposition 22 has stripped drivers of their worker status and their access to associated rights and protections. As independent contractors, Lyft jitney drivers have returned, ironically, to the *jefes* ideal of transportation anarchism. However, times have obviously changed. Jitney drivers were riders’ equals. Because Lyft users have the power to issue complaints about drivers, drivers risk losing employment every time they rebuff a user for a bid to drive over the speed limit. In answer to concerns about both algorithmic regulation and privatization, I recommend the following paths forward.

- Like the Auto Buss Owners’ and Operators’ Association, an association of jitney operators who resisted the city and capitalist rail interests, rideshare drivers should form collectives. Groups such as Gig Workers Rising have the potential to select representatives to help set in-vehicle policies and to enforce compliance fairly to labor. Only quality control personnel should have access to driver-installed and driver-operated dash recordings of driver-rider interactions plus riders’ smartphone ratings of driver performance.
- Remembering crimes associated with ETD, a startup that stole wages from workers and defrauded investors, rideshare companies should collaborate with cities to steer away from a business model heavily associated with fraud. In short trials of public-private partnerships with

57. This State of California ballot measure passed in November 2020, and it created a previously undesignated category of employment, “independent contractor,” for app-based transportation workers. As independent contractors, both ride share and delivery drivers were exempted from a number of rights that California had guaranteed to most gig workers through 2019’s Assembly Bill 5. Such rights included sick pay, minimum wage for every hour on the clock, and worker’s compensation.

transit, Lyft should stop poaching riders from bus corridors and blocking bus loading zones. Instead, Lyft should accept a public mission like serving riders beyond Los Angeles Metro's reach. The public should also fund Lyft rides for riders in need, especially elders, school children, and people with mobility impairments, chronic sickness, or blindness.

- Knowing the risk jitneys presented to rail in Los Angeles – the door-to-door dynamic service had clear competitive advantages over fixed transit lines – government officials should strenuously regulate rideshare. Since Lyft shows no sign it will stop at mere transportation diversification, the state should put ceilings on the amount of capital rideshare firms can raise and bust this trust into localized or regionalized units. The localization of rideshare will allow for policies better attuned to specific places, as opposed to the universal ambitions of so many tech firms to remake the world into a single California design dominion.⁵⁸

58. These recommendations came from discussions, demos, and debates with Martin Wachs, Yu Hong Hwang, Sandi Rosenbloom, Andrew Utas, Marques Vestal, Gus Wendel, Colin Scott, Zachary Pitts, and Peter Lunenfeld. "The California Design Dominion: Thirteen Propositions by Peter Lunenfeld," *WIRED*, 8 January 2020.







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Sounds of Home

Ru'a Al-Abweh, Cassie Hoeprich,
& Akana Jayewardene



In June 2020, dozens of friends around the world documented their homes. By recording sounds in their households and around their neighborhood, and by soliciting sounds from people in the places they missed dearly, the sounds of home forged portals, like a dynamic journal. These audio collages pull us back into individual and collective moments of longing for – and exploring – home at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

More on the project here:
<https://digitalsalonpodcast.org/Sounds-of-Home>

Running Around the City

Mike The Poet

My autobiography laced with poetry
accelerated at 18 running around the city
UCLA sociology understanding urban
Planning jumping geography creative
nonfiction flipping spoken word diction
Backpack rap underground hip hop
Garage band punk rock new left review
Kerouac blues Bukowski coffeehouse crews
open mic news choose your own adventure
enter the stage from the page wordplay
for days reading everyday about ancestors
an ongoing oral history always listening
keeping my ear around sacred ground
every part of town I could be found

By the late 90s I wanted to write professionally
but I wasn't quite sure how or where to do it
so I started hitting open mics anywhere I could
while in the daytime giving city tours & freelance
writing about neighborhoods & local music
Every year I was moving from 18 to 30
Westwood, Sawtelle, Culver City, Hollywood,
Pico, Koreatown, Inglewood, Monterey Park
friendships the heart expansion & art
finding peace in public space & architecture
wishing the weather a window of inner work
I did an internet search for self worth
I found it on my shirt written in my heart
running around the city kickstarted the art

Seeking Landed Security in (De)Industrialized Detroit and (Post)Colonial Mexican Ejidos

Carrie Gammell & Samuel Maddox

ABSTRACT:

The utility of land as a form of security is nothing new; however, the exact interpretation of “security” has shifted during times of crisis. Landed security can mean grounds from which to extract resources; commodities to be bought, managed, and sold; tracts from which to draw sustenance; or spaces for habitation and community building. This essay explores conflicting fluctuations in the identity projected upon land, by both state and private interests, through the rise and fall of two specific patterns of land tenure: the suburbs of Detroit, Michigan and the agrarian, communal *ejidal* settlements of Mexico.

SEEKING LANDED SECURITY IN (DE)INDUSTRIALIZED DETROIT AND (POST)COLONIAL MEXICAN EJIDOS

To be “landed” is to have the right to possess, occupy, and defend one’s access to and value from land. The designation of land as “a security,” or an investment which defines a relationship of citizens to land in terms of either land access or value, provides a foundation for economic and civic participation and protection from de facto exclusion. Popular discourse around property regimes and their resultant exploitations and failures tends to focus on the United States.

Domestic policies and practices would benefit from an international, comparative lens in order to document and elucidate alternative paths to landedness and security.¹ Throughout the world, and especially in the United States and Mexico, COVID-19 has ravaged communities that were already grappling with both the persistence of landed insecurity and long histories of racial discrimination. Evictions have emerged as the most common property-related risk associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in spite of the fact that access to adequate housing is essential to reduce the spread of the virus. Even before the pandemic, landed insecurity was a persistent humanitarian crisis in which the financial entanglements of opportunistic actors undervalue and thus overrun the physical embeddedness of established and often vulnerable communities.

Although the house-bespeckled tracts of land that were emblematic of suburban development in the postwar United States may seem worlds apart from the rural *ejidos* (communal agrarian lands) of post-revolutionary Mexico, these two systems of early-twentieth century land-use sorting have more in common regarding their spatial politics than the

En búsqueda de la Seguridad Territorial en el Detroit (Des)Industrializado y en los Ejidos Mexicanos (Pos)Coloniales

Carrie Gammell & Samuel Maddox

RESUMEN

La utilidad de la tierra como forma de seguridad no es nada nuevo; sin embargo, la interpretación exacta de “seguridad” ha cambiado durante tiempos de crisis. La seguridad territorial puede significar tener una tierra de donde extraer recursos; materias primas que se comprarán, gestionarán y venderán; terrenos de los que sacar sustento; o espacios para vivienda y construcción comunitaria. Este ensayo explora las fluctuaciones conflictivas en la identidad proyectada sobre la tierra, tanto por intereses estatales como privados, a través del auge y caída de dos patrones específicos de tenencia de la tierra: los suburbios de Detroit, Michigan y los asentamientos ejidales, comunales de México.

Estar “seguro territorialmente” es tener derecho a poseer, ocupar y defender el acceso y el valor de la tierra. La designación de la tierra como “una seguridad”, o una inversión que define una relación de los ciudadanos con la tierra en términos de acceso o valor de esta, proporciona una base para la participación económica y cívica, y la protección contra la exclusión de *facto*. El discurso popular sobre los regímenes de propiedad y sus consiguientes explotaciones y fracasos tiende a centrarse en los Estados Unidos. Las políticas y prácticas nacionales se beneficiarían de un lente comparativo e internacional para documentar y dilucidar caminos alternativos hacia la propiedad de la tierra y la seguridad.¹ En todo el mundo, y especialmente en los Estados Unidos y México, el COVID-19 ha devastado comunidades que ya estaban lidiando tanto con la persistencia de la inseguridad territorial, como también con largas historias de discriminación racial. Los desalojos se han convertido en el riesgo de propiedad más común asociado con la pandemia de COVID-19, a pesar de que el acceso a vivienda adecuada es esencial para reducir la propagación del virus. Incluso antes de la pandemia, la inseguridad de la tierra era una crisis humanitaria persistente en la que los enredos financieros de los actores oportunistas subestiman y, por lo tanto, sobrepasan el arraigo físico de las comunidades establecidas y, a menudo, vulnerables.

Aunque las extensiones de tierra, adornadas con casas, que fueron emblemáticas del desarrollo suburbano en los Estados Unidos de la posguerra pueden parecer mundos aparte de los ejidos

casual observer might imagine. In both countries, federal governments made great strides to protect the livelihood of their citizenry through specific uses of land amidst uneven development and in the wake of tense labor relations. In time, however, socio-spatial goals shifted with the rise of an increasingly global economic paradigm: Federal governments ceded control of land use to individuals with greater liquid capital who offered the promise of a rising tide through development that raised not only the quality of life of the general population but also bolstered the economic context in which they collectively operate. Localized interventions in deindustrialized Detroit responded to particular economic and demographic conditions in the city, while decentralized intervention across post-colonial Mexico responded to widespread land-use reform in the nation via the *ejido* system. In each case, speculation on the value locked within unused or so-called poorly managed land – as demanded through the rise of the entrepreneurial state and made possible through governmental complicity – now threatens the distribution of lands that federal governments once viewed as central to the livelihood of their citizenries.

DEVELOPMENT FROM A DISTANCE:

INDUSTRIAL MAGNATES AND THE SPANISH CROWN

In their 1846 text, *The German Ideology*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels viewed the state as a product of bourgeois social and economic interests. Two years later, Marx expounded on that idea in his polemic, *The Communist Manifesto*, when he argued that “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx 1848). In other words, the nation state serves to realize and perpetuate the cultural hegemony and financial interests of the ruling class.

In the case of the American North, the top-down control that guided and shaped urban development was clearly vested in the industrialists, critically referred to as robber barons, who manipulated the supposedly free market and corrupted the federal government to streamline their own capital accumulation and expand their influence westward. Capitalism spatially segregated the bourgeoisie (i.e., the industrialists) and the proletariat (i.e., the workers), as industrialists used their newfound wealth to flee the noise and pollution of their own factories for quiet, tree-lined residential boulevards. Furthermore, they spent significant amounts of money to ensure that the state did not regulate the activities of big business. Thus, the manufacturing sector and the sociospatial formation of the nineteenth-century American city became inextricably linked.

As “the center of industrial gravity of the United States,” the Great Lakes region was both a destination for bulk cargoes and a magnet for

rurales (tierras agrarias comunales) del México posrevolucionario, estos dos sistemas de ordenación del uso de la tierra de principios del siglo XX tienen más en común con respecto a su política espacial de lo que el observador casual podría imaginar. En ambos países, los gobiernos federales hicieron grandes avances para proteger el sustento de sus ciudadanos a través de usos específicos de la tierra en medio de un desarrollo desigual, como consecuencia de tensas relaciones laborales. Sin embargo, con el tiempo, los objetivos socioespaciales cambiaron con el surgimiento de un paradigma económico cada vez más global: Los gobiernos federales cedieron el control del uso de la tierra a personas con mayor capital líquido que prometieron un crecimiento vigoroso a través del desarrollo que no solo elevó la calidad de vida de la población en general, sino que también reforzó el contexto económico en el que operan colectivamente. Las intervenciones localizadas en el Detroit desindustrializado respondieron a condiciones económicas y demográficas particulares de la ciudad, mientras que la intervención descentralizada en el México poscolonial respondió a la reforma generalizada del uso de la tierra en la nación a través del sistema ejidal. En cada caso, la especulación sobre el valor fijo en tierras no utilizadas o mal administradas – como se exigió a través del surgimiento del estado empresarial y se hizo posible a través de la complicidad gubernamental –, ahora amenaza la distribución de tierras que los gobiernos federales alguna vez consideraron centrales para el sustento de sus ciudadanos.

DESARROLLO A DISTANCIA:

MAGNATES INDUSTRIALES Y LA CORONA ESPAÑOLA

En su texto de 1846, “La ideología alemana”, Karl Marx y Friedrich Engels veían al Estado como un producto de los intereses económicos y sociales burgueses. Dos años más tarde, Marx expuso esa idea en su polémico, “El manifiesto comunista”, cuando argumentó que “el [poder] ejecutivo del estado moderno no es más que un comité para administrar los asuntos comunes de toda la burguesía” (Marx 1848). En otras palabras, el estado nacional sirve para realizar y perpetuar la hegemonía cultural y los intereses financieros de la clase dominante.

En el caso de los Estados Unidos, el control *top-down* guió, dio forma al desarrollo urbano y estaba claramente en manos de los industriales, llamados críticamente barones ladrones, quienes manipularon el mercado supuestamente libre y corrompieron al gobierno federal para racionalizar su propia acumulación de capital y expandir su influencia hacia el oeste. El capitalismo segregó espacialmente a la burguesía (es decir, a los industriales) y al proletariado (es decir, a los trabajadores), ya que los industriales utilizaron su nueva riqueza para

immigrants. Cities such as Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee grew steadily from their eighteenth-century foundations through the Second Industrial Revolution (Markusen 1991, 231). Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario were connected to the Ohio River by the Ohio and Erie Canal, to the Mississippi River by the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and to the East Coast by the Michigan Central Railroad and the New York Central Railroad. Iron ore, coal, and limestone for the steel industry traveled southbound from the Great Lakes, while supplies, food, and coal traveled northbound from Appalachia. At the same time, the industrial workforce—Dutch, German, Polish, and Finnish immigrants eager to begin anew—easily accessed the great American manufacturing cities by boat or train from New England. In time, immigrants formed their own communities around epicenters of lucrative labor.

Classical economics flourished in the late eighteenth and early-to-mid nineteenth century, as capitalism emerged from feudalism and the Industrial Revolution led to vast societal changes. During this time, the United States transformed from a predominantly rural, agricultural nation into an urbanized, industrial nation. In his 1776 book, *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith argued that the wealth of a nation is determined not by the monarchy's gold but by the nation's income. This scale of income, however, was predicated upon the division of labor and the constant flow of capital. Classical economists like Smith advocated for the freedom of the market and free trade over protectionism, both of which validated the supremacy of the private sector and laid the groundwork for monopolization and labor exploitation.

The rise of the Great Lakes' shipping, shipbuilding, and manufacturing industries in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of a new class of wealthy industrial magnates who depended on large, immigrant labor forces. Economic disparities between industrialists and workers grew exponentially. Railroad tycoons such as Charles Lang Freer, who made his fortune from the Peninsular Car Company, enjoyed lavish, leisurely lifestyles in mansions far from Detroit's industrial center, while railroad workers endured low wages and dangerous working conditions. Unions crusaded for the eight-hour working day and successfully abolished child labor. Later, in the twentieth century, the rise of the automobile industry led to the materialization of a new class of wealthy automotive magnates. Henry Ford of Dearborn, Michigan, a rural farming town ten miles outside Detroit, revolutionized the manufacturing of the automobile by introducing the concepts of the assembly line and mass production. In addition, he revolutionized labor relations with his high wage policy, which prevented massive turnover, raised productivity, lowered overall labor costs, and propelled the Model T

hacer del ruido y la contaminación de sus propias fábricas hacia bulevares residenciales tranquilos y arbolados. Además, gastaron importantes sumas de dinero para asegurarse de que el estado no regulara las actividades de las grandes empresas. En consecuencia, el sector manufacturero y la formación socioespacial de la ciudad estadounidense del siglo XIX se vincularon inextricablemente.

Como "el centro de gravedad industrial de los Estados Unidos", la región de los Grandes Lagos era, tanto un destino de carga a granel, como un imán para los inmigrantes. Ciudades como Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago y Milwaukee crecieron constantemente desde sus cimientos del siglo XVIII hasta la Segunda Revolución Industrial (Markusen 1991, 231). Los Grandes Lagos: Michigan, Hurón, Erie y Ontario estaban conectados al río Ohio por el canal Ohio y Erie, al río Mississippi por el canal Illinois y Michigan, y a la costa este por el ferrocarril central de Michigan y el ferrocarril central de Nueva York. El mineral de hierro, el carbón y la piedra caliza para la industria del acero viajaron hacia el sur desde los Grandes Lagos, mientras que los suministros, los alimentos y el carbón viajaron hacia el norte desde los Apalaches. Al mismo tiempo, la fuerza laboral industrial —inmigrantes holandeses, alemanes, polacos y finlandeses ansiosos por comenzar de nuevo— accedía fácilmente a las grandes ciudades manufactureras estadounidenses en barco o tren desde Nueva Inglaterra. Con el tiempo, los inmigrantes formaron sus propias comunidades alrededor de epicentros de trabajo lucrativo.

La economía clásica floreció a finales del siglo XVIII y principios del siglo XIX, cuando el capitalismo emergió del feudalismo y la Revolución Industrial condujo a grandes cambios sociales. Durante este tiempo, Estados Unidos pasó de ser una nación predominantemente rural y agrícola a una nación industrializada y urbanizada. En su libro de 1776, "La riqueza de las naciones", Adam Smith argumentó que la riqueza de una nación no está determinada por el oro de la monarquía sino por los ingresos de la nación. Esta escala de ingresos, sin embargo, se basaba en la división del trabajo y el flujo constante de capital. Los economistas clásicos, como Smith, abogaron por la libertad del mercado y el libre comercio sobre el proteccionismo, lo que generó una validación de la supremacía del sector privado y sentaron las bases para la monopolización y la explotación laboral.

El auge de las industrias de transporte, construcción naval y manufactura de los Grandes Lagos en el siglo XIX condujo al surgimiento de una nueva clase de magnates industriales que dependían de una gran fuerza laboral inmigrante. Las disparidades económicas entre industriales y trabajadores crecieron exponencialmente. Magnates ferroviarios como Charles Lang Freer, que hizo su

to industry dominance.

Distinct from the United States, the top-down, hegemonic control that shaped the urban fabric of Mexico came from outside rule, specifically the Spanish Crown, rather than internally from manufacturing magnates. The convoluted system of land tenure that developed over the course of the nearly 300-year-long Spanish occupation of Mexican lands in part was politically imported from the old country's *encomienda* system, roughly equivalent to feudal vassalage, yet responded to indigenous systems of communal land use. Nevertheless, land use through the combination of labor relations and political precedent was heavily tempered by the unique and untenable spatiality of the extraction-oriented Spanish settlements (Chevalier 1963, vii–viii).

The mountainous geography that defines much of northern Mexico also defined the colonial conquest of the region; within the country's highland hills were the greatest reserves of silver that the world would ever see, the key to Spain's global economic dominance. From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, New Spain produced more than one-third of the silver circulated around the world while simultaneously, and more locally, urbanizing tracts of land previously deemed unbuildable (Chevalier 1963, 4; "The Geography of Silver Mining" 2016). However, after one hundred years of extraction, the silver mines that once supported these new townships had run dry, leaving behind a labor class with no livelihood. In response, miners began acquiring more and more land, consolidating tracts into large estates called haciendas in order to pursue cattle ranching. Ranching did not immediately require particularly fertile land, but it allowed for the eventual possibility of converting land to agricultural use. Aside from generally being invested in productive land use, *encomenderos* found agriculture particularly appealing. *Encomenderos* had grown tired of tortillas, beans, and maize and craved the food of their homeland, particularly Castilian bread. Thus, they made the slow turn to farming, a legacy of direct cooperation with the land that would, in a post-revolutionary Mexico, stand as emblematic of equity across the nation (Chevalier 1963, 48–52 & 168).

The typology of the *hacienda* – from the Spanish *hacer*, "to make" or "to produce" – is firmly rooted in production. Large tracts of land were owned and developed by *hacendados* (vassals) but were operated, maintained, and worked mostly by indigenous serfs, a racial provision of the *encomienda* labor system that predated and permuted into the Mexican hacienda property system (Chevalier 1963, viii). Unlike an *encomienda*, which granted the *encomendero* no property rights, the *hacienda* operated on a Lockean principle of land ownership (Keith 1971, 431–32). In keeping with the etymology of the name, *hacendados* laid claim to their land because of labor, even if it

fortuna con la *Peninsular Car Company*, disfrutaban de un estilo de vida lujoso y relajado en mansiones alejadas del centro industrial de Detroit, mientras que los trabajadores ferroviarios soportaban salarios bajos y condiciones de trabajo peligrosas. Los sindicatos lucharon por la jornada laboral de ocho horas y abolieron con éxito el trabajo infantil. Más tarde, en el siglo XX, el auge de la industria del automóvil llevó a la materialización de una nueva clase de magnates de la automoción. Henry Ford oriundo de Dearborn, Michigan –una ciudad agrícola rural a diez millas de Detroit–, revolucionó la fabricación del automóvil al introducir los conceptos de línea de montaje y producción en masa. Además, revolucionó las relaciones laborales con su política de salarios altos, que evitó una rotación masiva, aumentó la productividad, redujo los costos laborales generales e impulsó el Modelo T al dominio de la industria.

A diferencia de los Estados Unidos, el control hegemónico *top down* que dio forma al tejido urbano de México provino del dominio externo, específicamente de la Corona española, más que internamente de magnates de la industria. El complicado sistema de tenencia territorial que se desarrolló en el transcurso de la ocupación española de tierras mexicanas durante casi 300 años fue en parte importado políticamente del sistema de encomiendas del antiguo país, aproximadamente con una equivalencia al vasallaje feudal, pero respondió a sistemas indígenas del uso de tierras comunales. No obstante, el uso de la tierra a través de la combinación de relaciones laborales y precedentes políticos fue fuertemente moderado por la espacialidad única e insostenible de los asentamientos españoles orientados a la extracción (Chevalier 1963, vii–viii).

La geografía montañosa que define gran parte del norte de México también definió la conquista colonial de la región; dentro de las colinas de las tierras altas del país se encontraban las mayores reservas de plata que el mundo jamás vería, la clave del dominio económico global de España. Desde mediados del siglo XVI hasta mediados del siglo XVII, la Nueva España produjo más de un tercio de la plata que circulaba en todo el mundo, mientras que simultáneamente, y de manera más local, urbanizaba extensiones de tierra que antes se consideraban no edificables (Chevalier 1963, 4; "The Geography of Silver Mining" 2016). Sin embargo, después de cien años de extracción, las minas de plata que alguna vez apoyaron a estos nuevos municipios se habían secado, dejando atrás a una clase trabajadora sin medios de vida. En respuesta, los mineros comenzaron a adquirir más y más tierras, consolidando extensiones en grandes propiedades llamadas haciendas para la ganadería. La ganadería no requirió proseguir con tierras particularmente fértiles, pero permitió la posibilidad eventual de convertir la tierra para uso

was not truly their own labor that was “mixed” with the land to produce property (Locke 1690, Sect. 27). Moreover, land grabs were commonly viewed as an opportunity to amplify personal and familial status and were couched in little more than pure ego. Usurpations were regularly much farther afield than could be practical: “Everyone, it seems, hankered after nobility, a state which required the cachet of land – the more land the more nobility – a phenomenon remarked by [Alexander von] Humboldt in 1803, all this regardless of its utility” (Chevalier 1963, vii–viii). In time, expansive estates grew out of step not only with the development of the burgeoning national identity of Mexico, including its frustrations with inequity and dictatorial rule, but also with the limitations set by Locke for private property, his only stipulation being that “there is enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Locke 1690, Sect. 27). This was clearly not the case at the turn of the nineteenth century in Mexico, where *haciendas* occupied almost all the arable land in many parts of the country, and an estimated one-half of the rural population lived and likely labored within their confines (“The Reform of Article 27” 1994, 327; Lagos and Goodman 2005, 31). The excesses of the landed gentry eventually led to the fall of this pervasive *latifundium* system, when the Mexican proletariat rose up in revolt under the cry of “*tierra y libertad*” (land and liberty) and established a modern democracy, reframing land rights across the country as a direct response (Alba 2021).

In both the industrial United States and colonial Mexico, urban development was driven by extraneous forces: Henry Ford along with his fellow business magnates and the Spanish Crown along with the *encomenderos*, respectively. Due to a lack of local embeddedness, urban development yielded monocultural spaces of production with the aim of only the most efficient returns on profit. In time, however, these extensive urban environments, predicated on the presupposition of the perpetuity of what were – and inevitably always are – very tenuous iterations of capital reproduction, produced great socio-spatial vulnerabilities for both the heart of America’s manufacturing sector and for the expansive *haciendas* of New Spain. Nevertheless, out of vulnerability and collapse often comes invention, and in the case of these two seemingly disparate developed contexts, the invention is security through changes in land use – or the designation thereof – implemented at the national scale.

**LAND USE AS NATIONAL SECURITY:
 SUBURBANIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
 EJIDO**

In his 2010 book, *Seeking Spatial Justice*, noted postmodern political geographer and urban theorist Edward W. Soja asserts that “the spatiality of

agrícola.

Además de invertir, en general, en el uso productivo de la tierra, los *encomenderos* encontraron la agricultura particularmente atractiva.

Los *encomenderos* se habían cansado de las tortillas, los frijoles y el maíz, ansiaban la comida de su tierra natal, particularmente el pan castellano. Por lo tanto, dieron un giro lento a la agricultura, un legado de cooperación directa con la tierra que, en un México posrevolucionario, sería emblemático de la equidad en todo el país (Chevalier 1963, 48–52 y 168).

La tipología de la hacienda – del español “hacer”– está firmemente arraigada en la producción. Grandes extensiones de tierra pertenecían y eran desarrolladas por hacendados (vasallos), pero eran operadas, mantenidas y trabajadas principalmente por siervos indígenas, una disposición racial del sistema de trabajo de *encomienda* que precedió y permutó en el sistema de propiedad de la hacienda mexicana (Chevalier 1963, viii). A diferencia de una *encomienda*, que no concedía al *encomendero* ningún derecho de propiedad, la hacienda operaba según el principio lockeano de propiedad de la tierra (Keith 1971, 431-32). En consonancia con la etimología del nombre, los hacendados reclamaron su tierra debido al trabajo, incluso si no era realmente su propio trabajo el que se “mezclaba” con la tierra para producir la propiedad (Locke 1690, Sect. 27). Asimismo, el acaparamiento de tierras se consideraba comúnmente una oportunidad para amplificar el estatus personal como también familiar, y se expresaba en poco más que puro ego. Las usurpaciones eran regularmente mucho más lejanas de lo que podría ser práctico: “Todo el mundo, al parecer, anhelaba la nobleza, un estado que requería el prestigio de la tierra –cuanta más tierra, más nobleza– un fenómeno observado por [Alexander von] Humboldt en 1803, esto independientemente de su utilidad” (Chevalier 1963, vii–viii). Con el tiempo, las haciendas expansivas crecieron fuera de sintonía, no solo con el desarrollo de la floreciente identidad nacional de México, incluidas sus frustraciones con la inequidad y el gobierno dictatorial, sino también con las limitaciones establecidas por Locke para la propiedad privada, su única estipulación era que “hay suficiente, es igualmente bueno, dejado en común para los demás” (Locke 1690, Sect. 27). Claramente, este no era el caso a principios del siglo XIX en México, donde las haciendas ocupaban casi toda la tierra cultivable en muchas partes del país, y se estima que la mitad de la población rural vivía y probablemente trabajaba dentro de sus confines (“The Reform of Article 27” 1994, 327; Lagos y Goodman 2005, 31). Los excesos de la nobleza terrateniente finalmente llevaron a la caída de este sistema de *latifundio* dominante, cuando el proletariado mexicano se rebeló bajo el grito de “*tierra y libertad*” y estableció una democracia moderna, reformulando los derechos a



Figure 1a. postwar American suburbia

human life must be interpreted and understood as fundamentally, from the start, a complex social product, a collectively created and purposeful configuration and socialization of space that defines our contextual habitat, the human and humanized geography in which we all live out our lives” (Soja 2010, 17–18). In the United States, the “social product” of spatiality has largely been defined by the federal subsidization of suburbanization. Suburbanization spatially segregated the racialized proletariat from each other, as the federal government subsidized the dispersion of both housing and industry under the guise of national security and financial prosperity. A new social class, the American middle class, emerged to fill the in-between urban-rural space.

The urbanization of the United States occurred over a period of many years, with the nation attaining urban-majority status between 1910 and 1920. In response to concerns over the effects of radical political agitation in American cities and the alleged spread of communism in the American labor movement, the U.S. Department of Labor launched the “Own Your Own Home” campaign in 1917. By encouraging homeownership outside the industrial city, the federal government guarded against possible labor strikes and uprisings, since those beset by monthly mortgage payments and home maintenance would have neither the time nor the means to join the picket line. The pine industry clearly echoed the U.S.

Figura 1a. suburbios norteamericanos de posguerra

la tierra en todo el territorio del país como respuesta directa (Alba 2021).

Tanto en los Estados Unidos industrializados como en el México colonial, el desarrollo urbano fue impulsado por fuerzas externas: Henry Ford junto con sus compañeros magnates empresariales y la Corona española junto con los encomenderos, respectivamente. Debido a la falta de arraigo local, el desarrollo urbano generó espacios monoculturales de producción con el objetivo de obtener solo los rendimientos de ganancias más eficientes. Sin embargo, con el tiempo, estos extensos entornos urbanos, basados en la presuposición de la perpetuidad de lo que fueron, –e inevitablemente siempre son–, iteraciones muy tenues de reproducción del capital, produjeron grandes vulnerabilidades socioespaciales, tanto para el corazón del sector manufacturero de los Estados Unidos como para las haciendas expansivas de la Nueva España. Sin embargo, de la vulnerabilidad y el colapso a menudo surge la invención, y en el caso de estos dos contextos desarrollados aparentemente dispares, la invención es la seguridad a través de cambios en el uso de la tierra, –o la designación de estos mismos–, implementados a escala nacional.

**USO DE LA TIERRA COMO SEGURIDAD NACIONAL:
SUBURBANIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DEL EJIDO**
En su libro de 2010, *Seeking Spatial Justice* o “En



Figure 1b. post-revolutionary Mexican ejidos

Figura 1b. Ejidos mexicanos posrevolucionarios

Department of Labor's sentiments, as representatives insisted that the homeowner's "type of citizenship is an antidote for disintegrating influence, communistic or otherwise" (Vale 2007, 20). The father of modern American suburbia, William J. Levitt, even went so far as to say that "[n]o man who owns his own house and lot can be a communist. He has too much to do" (Lacayo 1998).

The Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression led to a rise in home foreclosures and severely set back the federal government's push for homeownership. Responding to the nation's needs for relief, reform, and recovery, President Franklin D. Roosevelt enacted The New Deal, a series of programs, public work projects, financial reforms, and regulations. The National Housing Act of 1934 served as a solution to the poverty and insecurity that gripped the nation by making housing and home mortgages more affordable. Meanwhile, the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 encouraged millions of American families to move out of urban apartments and into suburban houses by offering low interest, zero-down-payment home loans to veterans. The implicit spatial security of suburbanization, as well as the affordability of the automobile, resulted in the blanketing of the American landscape with single-family developments.

After the Second World War, the United States government stoked renewed popular fears

la búsqueda de la justicia espacial", el célebre geógrafo político posmoderno y teórico urbano Edward W. Soja afirma que "la espacialidad de la vida humana debe interpretarse y entenderse fundamentalmente, desde el principio, como un producto social complejo, una creación colectiva con un propósito y una configuración determinada, además de una socialización del espacio que define nuestro hábitat contextual, la geografía humana y humanizada en la que todos vivimos nuestra vida" (Soja 2010, 17-18). En los Estados Unidos, el "producto social" de la espacialidad ha sido definido en gran medida por el subsidio federal de la suburbanización. La suburbanización segregó espacialmente al proletariado racializado entre sí, ya que el gobierno federal subsidió la dispersión, tanto de la vivienda, como de la industria, bajo la apariencia de la seguridad nacional y la prosperidad financiera. Una nueva clase social, la clase media estadounidense, surgió para ocupar el espacio intermedio entre lo urbano y lo rural.

La urbanización de los Estados Unidos ocurrió durante un período de muchos años, y la nación alcanzó el estatus de mayoría urbana entre 1910 y 1920. En respuesta a las preocupaciones sobre los efectos de la agitación política radical en las ciudades estadounidenses y la supuesta propagación del comunismo en el movimiento obrero estadounidense, el Departamento de Trabajo de Estados Unidos lanzó la campaña *Own Your Own Home* "Sea

of communist espionage and offered an alternative, dispersed spatialization as a protective solution. The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 established an interstate highway system in order to make coast-to-coast transportation more efficient and defend the United States from communist attack. By bulldozing Black and immigrant neighborhoods under the “urban renewal” program and encouraging a mobile society in the name of national security, the federal government sought to remove urban decay and promote prosperity. The explicit spatial security of the Interstate Highway System, according to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “would change the face of America with straightaways, cloverleaf turns, bridges, and elongated parkways. Its impact on the American economy – the jobs it would produce in manufacturing and construction, the rural areas it would open up – was beyond calculation” (Eisenhower 1963). As the federal government subsidized both housing and infrastructure well beyond the city, the American middle class achieved a work life and home life separation which mimicked that of the bygone industrialists. Jobs remained plentiful, and wages continued to grow. For a time, financial prosperity enabled labor relations issues to fall by the wayside.

In Mexico, the process of achieving land security followed the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), which was predicated on populist outrage over landlessness. The impetus of ensuring that individual property rights would never again eclipse societal wellbeing was chief among the concerns of the revolutionaries. In keeping with the demands of the peasants who led the revolt, the Constituent Congress of 1917 drafted Article 27 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States. Article 27 outlines the identity of land as, first and foremost, commonly held: “Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has the right to transfer title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property” (Const. Art. 27). Effectively, Article 27 finally made private property – the scorn of the revolutionaries – secondary to social wellbeing and cooperation. Their ideological groundwork made plain, the drafters of Article 27 proceeded to a much more tactical and aggressive posture, one calling for re-distributive justice:

The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth. With this end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed estates; to develop small landed holdings in operation; to create new

dueño de su propia casa” en 1917. Al fomentar la propiedad de vivienda fuera de la ciudad industrial, el gobierno federal se protegió contra posibles huelgas y levantamientos laborales, ya que aquellos acosados por los pagos hipotecarios mensuales y el mantenimiento de la vivienda no tendrían ni el tiempo ni los medios para unirse al piquete de huelga. La industria del pino claramente se unió a los sentimientos del Departamento de Trabajo de EE. UU., ya que los representantes insistieron en que el “tipo de ciudadanía del propietario es un antídoto para la influencia desintegradora, comunista o de otro tipo” (Vale 2007, 20). El padre del suburbio moderno estadounidenses, William J. Levitt, llegó incluso a decir que “ningún hombre que tenga su propia casa y terreno puede ser comunista. Tiene mucho para hacer” (Lacayo 1998).

El desplome de Wall Street de 1929 y la Gran Depresión provocaron un aumento de las ejecuciones hipotecarias y retrasaron gravemente el impulso del gobierno federal por la propiedad de vivienda. Respondiendo a las necesidades nacionales de alivio, reforma y recuperación, el presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt promulgó “El nuevo trato” (*The New Deal*) una serie de programas, proyectos de obras públicas, reformas financieras y regulaciones.

La Ley Nacional de Vivienda de 1934 (*The National Housing Act*) sirvió como una solución a la pobreza y la inseguridad que se apoderó de la nación al hacer que la vivienda y las hipotecas de las propiedades fueran más asequibles. Mientras tanto, la Ley de Reajuste de los hombres en servicio militar de 1944 (*The Servicemen's Readjustment Act*) alentó a millones de familias estadounidenses a mudarse de apartamentos urbanos a casas suburbanas ofreciendo préstamos hipotecarios a bajo interés y sin pago inicial a los veteranos. La seguridad espacial implícita de la suburbanización, así como la asequibilidad del automóvil, dieron como resultado la cobertura del paisaje estadounidense con desarrollos unifamiliares.

Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos avivó los renovados temores populares al espionaje comunista y ofreció una especialización alternativa y dispersa como solución protectora. La Ley de Ayuda Federal de Carreteras de 1956 (*The Federal Aid Highway Act*) estableció un sistema de carreteras interestatales para hacer más eficiente el transporte de costa a costa y defender a los Estados Unidos del ataque comunista. Al arrasar barrios negros e inmigrantes bajo el programa de “renovación urbana” y alentar una sociedad móvil en nombre de la seguridad nacional, el gobierno federal buscó eliminar el deterioro urbano y promover la prosperidad. La seguridad espacial explícita del Sistema de Autopistas Interestatales, según el presidente Dwight D. Eisenhower, “cambiaría la cara de Estados Unidos con carreteras rectas, giros

agricultural centers, with necessary lands and waters; to encourage agriculture in general and to prevent the destruction of natural resources, and to protect property from damage to the detriment of society. Centers of population which at present either have no lands or water or which do not possess them in sufficient quantities for the needs of their inhabitants, shall be entitled to grants thereof, which shall be taken from adjacent properties, the rights of small landed holdings in operation being respected at all times. (Const. Art. 27)

Over the course of the next few decades, Article 27 led to the wide-scale implementation of the *ejido*, a system of communally governed agrarian land tenure based on usufruct rights – as opposed to private property – that was entirely constructed through federal redistribution of land to the commons. Initially, the rate of redistribution was slow. However, under President Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, the power of *ejidal* land reform was centralized to the office of the executive, and implementation began to take off. From 1934 to 1940, Cárdenas's government expropriated 17.9 million hectares of land from the *hacendados*, the rural elite, and redistributed it to 810,000 peasants, accomplishing more than all the previous administrations combined in the years since the Mexican Revolution. Cárdenas envisioned this massive resorting of land use “as a social system which [would not only liberate] the rural worker from the exploitation from which he [had] previously suffered, [but would also become] a system of agricultural production, with a large part of the responsibility for providing the food and supplies of the country” (Lagos and Goodman 2005, 48–49). In effect, Cárdenas's vision was to provide social security not through financial redistribution, as is the case in so many “developed” nations, but instead to provide opportunity as a source of security through the redistribution of lands for communal usage. The implementation of the *ejidal* system was so widespread that by the 1980s, over 28,000 *ejidos* existed across the nation, containing over three million households and comprising the majority of Mexico's arable land (“The Reform of Article 27” 1994, 327).

In both the United States and Mexico, federal governments advanced the concept of land tenure as a means of controlling and appeasing the populace. Suburban homeownership in the United States and *ejidal* usufructuary rights in Mexico provided an illusion of self-sufficiency and national security. As U.S. citizens built personal wealth through property rights and Mexican citizens benefited from agricultural subsistence through communal usufruct rights, their respective governments inculcated ideologically distinct perceptions of necessary landedness – or, an

en forma de trébol, puentes y avenidas alargadas. Su impacto en la economía estadounidense – los trabajos que produciría en la manufactura y la construcción, las áreas rurales que abriría – era incalculable” (Eisenhower 1963). A medida que el gobierno federal subsidiaba tanto la vivienda como la infraestructura mucho más allá de la ciudad, la clase media estadounidense logró una separación entre la vida laboral y familiar que imitaba la de los industriales de antaño. Los trabajos siguieron siendo abundantes y los salarios siguieron aumentando. Durante un tiempo, la prosperidad financiera permitió que los problemas de relaciones laborales se olvidaran en el camino.

En México, el proceso de lograr la seguridad territorial siguió a la Revolución Mexicana (1910-1920), que se basó en la indignación populista por la falta de tierra. El ímpetu de asegurar que los derechos de propiedad individuales nunca más eclipsarían el bienestar social fue una de las principales preocupaciones de los revolucionarios. De acuerdo con las demandas de los campesinos que lideraron la revuelta, el Congreso Constituyente de 1917 redactó el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. El artículo 27 describe la identidad de la tierra como, primero y, ante todo, de propiedad común: “La propiedad de las tierras y aguas dentro de los límites del territorio nacional se confiere originalmente a la Nación, que ha tenido y tiene el derecho de transferir el título de propiedad a personas privadas, constituyéndose así en propiedad privada” (Const. Art. 27). Efectivamente, el artículo 27 finalmente hizo que la propiedad privada – el desprecio de los revolucionarios – fuera secundaria al bienestar social y la cooperación. Una vez aclarada su base ideológica, los redactores del artículo 27 adoptaron una postura mucho más táctica y agresiva, que exigía una justicia redistributiva:

La Nación tendrá en todo momento el derecho de imponer a la propiedad privada las limitaciones que el interés público demande, así como el derecho a regular el aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales susceptibles de apropiación, con el fin de conservarlos y asegurar una distribución más equitativa de la riqueza pública. Con este fin, se tomarán las medidas necesarias para dividir los latifundios; desarrollar pequeñas propiedades en funcionamiento; crear nuevos centros agrícolas, con tierras y aguas necesarias; fomentar la agricultura en general, prevenir la destrucción de los recursos naturales y proteger la propiedad de daños en detrimento de la sociedad. Los núcleos de población que en la actualidad no tengan tierras ni agua o que no las posean en cantidad suficiente para las necesidades de sus habitantes, tendrán derecho a las subvenciones

urgency to define a relationship of citizens to land – in order to promote protectionist agendas of state security through people and social security through land.

**GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
 WEAKENING GOVERNMENTS AND INCREASING
 PRIVATIZATION**

As land-use planning became increasingly global, accelerated flows of capital across international borders led to the creation of transnational real estate markets. According to geographer David Harvey, global wealth and power become centralized in the hands of a few entrepreneurs through the processes of privatization, financialization, management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions. In his 2012 book, *Rebel Cities: from the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*, Harvey argues that “left unregulated, individualized capital accumulation perpetually threatens to destroy the two basic common property resources that undergird all forms of production: the laborer and the land” (Harvey 2012, 80).

In the United States, globalization released the constraint of spatial stability – that is, the nationalization of business enterprise – and facilitated dramatic increases in the transnational mobility of capital, while post-Fordism emphasized new information technologies and the rise of the service economy. A new social class, the professional-managerial class, emerged. In 1973, the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo, which caused an oil crisis, or “shock,” with many short-term and long-term effects on global politics and the global economy. The oil shock – along with increased competition from foreign markets, the end of the postwar boom, and increasing privatization – made mass production through the division of labor uncompetitive. As the United States transitioned from a Fordist manufacturing-based economy to a post-Fordist service-based economy, social inequalities between the new professional-managerial class (i.e., white-collar workers) and the established working class (i.e., blue-collar workers) became increasingly evident. Meanwhile, the federal government’s investment in “a whole new set of industries... led to an extraordinary shift in the nation’s industrial center of gravity away from the heartland” (Markusen 1991, 230).

As many once-booming manufacturing metropolises, such as Cleveland, Detroit, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh, dramatically slowed in the 1950s and 1960s, the greater region has struggled to adapt to new economic and demographic conditions. Many workers have fled the Great Lakes for the American West in search of employment in newer manufacturing industries. At the same time, many White residents

de la esta, que se tomarán de las propiedades adyacentes, respetándose en todo momento los derechos de las pequeñas explotaciones agrarias en funcionamiento (Const. Art. 27).

En el transcurso de las siguientes décadas, el artículo 27 condujo a la implementación a gran escala del ejido, un sistema de tenencia agraria de la tierra gobernado comunalmente basado en derechos de usufructo –en oposición a la propiedad privada–, que fue construida enteramente a través de la redistribución federal de la tierra a los bienes comunes. Inicialmente, la tasa de redistribución fue lenta. Sin embargo, bajo el presidente Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, el poder de la reforma agraria ejidal se centralizó en la oficina del ejecutivo y la implementación comenzó a despegar. De 1934 a 1940, el gobierno de Cárdenas expropió 17.9 millones de hectáreas de tierra a los hacendados, la élite rural, y la redistribuyó entre 810,000 campesinos, logrando más que todas las administraciones anteriores combinadas en los años transcurridos desde la Revolución mexicana. Cárdenas visualizó este recurso masivo del uso de la tierra “como un sistema social que [no solo liberaría] al trabajador rural de la explotación que [había] sufrido anteriormente, [sino que también se convertiría en] un sistema de producción agrícola, con una gran parte de la responsabilidad de proporcionar alimentos y suministros al país” (Lagos y Goodman 2005, 48–49). En efecto, la visión de Cárdenas era brindar seguridad social no a través de la redistribución financiera, como es el caso de tantas naciones “desarrolladas”, sino brindar oportunidades como fuente de seguridad a través de la redistribución de tierras para uso comunal. La implementación del sistema ejidal fue tan expansiva que, para la década de 1980, existían más de 28,000 ejidos en todo el país, que contenían más de tres millones de hogares y comprendían la mayor parte de la tierra arable de México (*The Reform of Article 27* 1994, 327).

Tanto en Estados Unidos como en México, los gobiernos federales propusieron el concepto de tenencia de la tierra como un medio para controlar y apaciguar a la población. La propiedad de una vivienda suburbana en los Estados Unidos y los derechos usufructuarios del ejidal en México proporcionaron una ilusión de autosuficiencia y seguridad nacional. A medida que los ciudadanos estadounidenses construyeron riqueza personal a través de los derechos de propiedad y los ciudadanos mexicanos se beneficiaron de la subsistencia agrícola a través de los derechos de usufructo comunales, sus respectivos gobiernos inculcaron percepciones ideológicamente distintas de la necesidad de la tierra –o la urgencia de definir una relación de los ciudadanos con la tierra–, a fin de promover agendas proteccionistas de seguridad

have fled the cities for the suburbs to self-segregate from Black residents who have increasingly bought houses in once majority-White neighborhoods. Detroit's population, in particular, is today only half of what it once was; during the first decade of the twenty-first century alone, the city lost 25.7 percent of its residents, more than any other formerly industrialized city. As a result, Detroit quickly became a national symbol of housing discrimination and residential segregation. In 2013, *The New York Times* described Detroit as a city of "700,000 people, as well as... tens of thousands of abandoned buildings, vacant lots and unlit streets" (Davey and Walsh 2013). In June of 2013, the municipal government stopped making payments on some of its unsecured debts, including public-sector pension obligations. Detroit's emergency financial manager was ultimately unable to negotiate with the city's creditors, unions, and pension boards and filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection on July 18, 2013. As the municipal government failed to provide basic services to its taxpayers, the city unwittingly broke the public's trust and looked to the private sector for salvation.

In Mexico, the widespread effects of globalization came in large part with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Acquiescence to the conditions of NAFTA came on the heels of decades of slowing agricultural production and declining economic performance throughout the country. Membership in NAFTA signified a seat at the table of global trade and an increasingly important role in international financial markets at a time when Mexico most needed it. As a condition of signing the treaty, however, Mexico had to make some significant changes to tariffs on crops – tariffs that contributed to crop-pricing controls and were part of the state's investment in the financial wellbeing of the countryside. The process of dissolving tariffs on crops signaled the disinvestment of the state in smaller local economies as a tradeoff for entry into a bigger economic pool. In keeping with its new neoliberal posture, the Mexican legislature then took aim at the *ejidos*, a major recipient of the subsidies now threatened by NAFTA (Lagos and Goodman 2005, 14–18).

In 1992, in preparation for joining NAFTA, the Mexican legislature voted to revise the 27th article of the constitution in order to allow for the dissolution of *ejidos* through privatization so long as deregulatory acts were deemed "in the wider social interest or for social benefit" ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 329). Since then, *ejidos* have slowly but surely been divided and lost through privatization, often being sold to private developers and, in turn, sold to elite foreign investors (Kelley 1994, 543–44). In the two years after the reform passed, the process of liquidating common lands was further accelerated by NAFTA.

estatal a través de las personas y seguridad social a través de la tierra.

GLOBALIZACIÓN Y ESTADO EMPRESARIAL: DEBILITAMIENTO DE LOS GOBIERNOS Y AUMENTO DE LA PRIVATIZACIÓN

A medida que la planificación del uso de la tierra se volvió cada vez más global, los flujos acelerados de capital a través de las fronteras internacionales llevaron a la creación de mercados inmobiliarios transnacionales. Según el geógrafo David Harvey, la riqueza y el poder global se centralizan en manos de unos pocos empresarios a través de los procesos de privatización, financiarización, gestión y manipulación de las crisis y redistribuciones estatales. En su libro de 2012, *Rebel Cities: from the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*, Harvey argumenta que "la acumulación de capital individualizada y sin regular amenaza perpetuamente con destruir los dos recursos básicos de propiedad común que sustentan todas las formas de producción: el trabajador y la tierra" (Harvey 2012, 80).

En los Estados Unidos, la globalización liberó la restricción de la estabilidad espacial, –es decir, la nacionalización de las empresas comerciales–, y facilitó aumentos dramáticos en la movilidad transnacional del capital, mientras que el posfordismo enfatizó las nuevas tecnologías de la información y el surgimiento de la economía de servicios. Surgió una nueva clase social, la clase profesional-gerencial. En 1973, los miembros de la Organización de Países Árabes Exportadores de Petróleo (*Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC)) proclamaron un embargo de petróleo, que provocó una crisis petrolera, o shock, con muchos efectos a corto y largo plazo en la política y en la economía global. La crisis del petróleo, –junto con el aumento de la competencia de los mercados extranjeros, el fin del *boom* de la posguerra y el aumento de la privatización–, hicieron que la producción en masa a través de la división del trabajo no fuera competitiva. A medida que Estados Unidos pasó de una economía fordista basada en la manufactura a una economía basada en servicios posfordistas, las desigualdades sociales entre la nueva clase profesional-administrativa (es decir, trabajadores de cuello blanco) y la clase trabajadora establecida (es decir, trabajadores de cuello azul) se hizo cada vez más evidente. Mientras tanto, la inversión del gobierno federal en "un conjunto completamente nuevo de industrias ... condujo a un cambio extraordinario en el centro de gravedad industrial de la nación lejos del corazón" (Markusen 1991, 230).

Mientras muchas metrópolis manufactureras que alguna vez estuvieron en auge, como Cleveland, Detroit, Buffalo y Pittsburgh, se desaceleraron drásticamente en las décadas de 1950 y 1960,

The agreement created a much more competitive agricultural market, often to the detriment of small-scale Mexican farmers, driving many communities of *ejidatarios* to contract with large-scale agricultural companies (Lagos and Goodman 2005, 83; Kelly 1994, 561–70; Covert 2017, 152–53). The pivot toward international supply markets, including the importation of many goods and foodstuffs, and international tourism, including the establishment of Mexico's National Fund for Tourism Development (FONATUR) in 1973, played a significant role in shifting the occupancy of historically *ejidal* lands from poor and indigenous Mexican nationals to American tourists and elderly expatriates – individuals less likely to learn Spanish, intermarry, or otherwise enmesh themselves in the community (Buchenau 2001, 43; OECD 2017; Covert 2017, 164–65).

This is exactly what happened to Ejido de Zihuatanejo in 1973, when the Mexican government, through FONATUR, expropriated its landholdings in order to develop the Ixtapa–Zihuatanejo region for tourism. In exchange for the nearly 1,000 acres of land taken from the *ejidatarios*, then-president Luis Echeverría promised the *ejidatarios* two parcels each plus 20 percent of the profits from the sale of the land. Today, the lands once belonging to Ejido de Zihuatanejo are dominated by luxury homes, resorts, and golf courses; however, the government has yet to pay the *ejidatarios* for the land. Members of the

región ha luchado por adaptarse a las nuevas condiciones económicas y demográficas. Muchos trabajadores han huido de los Grandes Lagos hacia el oeste estadounidense en busca de empleo en nuevas industrias manufactureras. Al mismo tiempo, muchos residentes blancos han huido de las ciudades hacia los suburbios para auto-segregarse de los residentes negros que han comprado cada vez más casas en vecindarios que alguna vez fueron en su mayoría de blancos. La población de Detroit, en particular, es hoy la mitad de lo que fue; tan solo durante la primera década del siglo XXI, la ciudad perdió el 25,7 por ciento de sus residentes, más que cualquier otra ciudad anteriormente industrializada. Como resultado, Detroit se convirtió rápidamente en un símbolo nacional de discriminación y segregación residencial. En 2013, The New York Times describió a Detroit como una ciudad de “700.000 habitantes, además de... decenas de miles de edificios abandonados, lotes vacíos y calles sin iluminación” (Davey y Walsh 2013). En junio de 2013, el gobierno municipal dejó de realizar pagos de algunas de sus deudas no garantizadas, incluidas las obligaciones de pensiones del sector público. El gerente financiero de emergencia de Detroit finalmente no pudo negociar con los acreedores, los sindicatos y las juntas de pensiones de la ciudad y solicitó la protección por bancarrota del Capítulo 9, el 18 de julio de 2013. El fracaso del gobierno municipal al no brindar servicios básicos a sus contribuyentes



Figure 2a. post-industrial urban farm in Detroit

Figura 2a. suburbios norteamericanos de posguerra

Ejido de Zihuatanejo have protested the injustice for years, playing recordings recounting their history on loop in English and Spanish and carrying banners that translate to: "Tourist friend, you are walking on lands stolen by FONATUR from the Ejido de Zihuatanejo." Ongoing activism by *ejidatarios* from the former Ejido de Zihuatanejo has drawn support from the neighboring *ejidos* of Coacoyul, Agua de Correa and El Zarco, some with similar grievances, whose members now join in the protests (Paterson 2018).

In both Detroit and Mexico, globalization has adversely affected the working population. Systemic disinvestment in urban Detroiters through the combination of labor exploitation and suburban subsidization and systemic disinvestment in rural Mexicans through neoliberal land-use reform have left local communities reeling from increasing socioeconomic inequality. Corporations in Detroit have offshored labor and rejected unions to support their bottom line, while many *ejidatarios* in Mexico have dissolved their *ejidos*, seeking short-term economic payoffs to the detriment of long-term stability – the typical playbook, as it were, of neoliberal investment patterns. In Detroit, social security through land has been compromised; many residents have lost their jobs, and property values have plummeted due to deindustrialization and outmigration, respectively. In Mexico, usufructuary land has been parceled and platted in preparation for purchase. In both cases,

rompió involuntariamente la confianza del público y llevo a la ciudad a buscar la salvación en el sector privado.

En México, amplios efectos de la globalización se produjeron en gran parte con la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) en 1994. La aceptación de las condiciones del TLCAN se produjo inmediatamente después de décadas de desaceleración de la producción agrícola y deterioro del desempeño económico en todo el país. La membresía en el TLCAN significó un asiento en la mesa del comercio global y un papel cada vez más importante en los mercados financieros internacionales en un momento en que México más lo necesitaba. Sin embargo, como condición para firmar el tratado, México tuvo que hacer algunos cambios significativos en los aranceles sobre los cultivos, aranceles que contribuían al control de precios de los cultivos y eran parte de la inversión del estado en el bienestar financiero del campo. El proceso de disolución de los aranceles sobre los cultivos señaló la desinversión del estado en las economías locales más pequeñas como una concesión para ingresar a un mayor fondo económico. De acuerdo con su nueva postura neoliberal, la legislatura mexicana apuntó a los ejidos, como uno de los principales receptores de los subsidios ahora amenazados por el TLCAN (Lagos y Goodman 2005, 14-18).

En 1992, en preparación para unirse al TLCAN,



Figure 2b. granja urbana postindustrial en Detroit

Figura 2b. ejido recientemente industrializado en Michoacán

citizens' loss of landed security, in terms of either land access or value, has engendered cynicism and a deep distrust in government, ultimately leading to the rise of supply-side economic policies that overwhelmingly favor businesses and the wealthy.

LOCALIZATION OF THE GLOBAL: URBAN FARMS AND ECO-EJIDOS

Dewar and Epstein note that “the loss of the strong manufacturing economy has weakened the economic links among many parts of the region and contributed to uneven development” in the form of “deteriorating infrastructure, loss of natural areas as suburban development spreads, differing impacts of national fiscal and economic policies, and varying connections to global markets and immigration streams” (Dewar and Epstein 2007, 109). Changes in land use, whether in practice or in name only, have disproportionately affected locally embedded communities. Local communities, in turn, search for ways to reassert control over their land, even in the face of global capital.

The Detroit of today stands as a shadow of its former self in the heart of the eroding American Rust Belt. “Rust” refers to deindustrialization – or economic decline, population loss, and urban decay – due to the shrinking of the region’s once-powerful industrial sector. Deindustrialized Detroit elicits nostalgia for a bygone time and place – specifically, the fame of the twentieth-century Motor City – and simultaneously inspires hope for mixed-use streetscapes and adaptive-reuse projects. In Detroit, top-down hegemonic control now comes from outside rule, as wealthy white suburbanites begin to redevelop the historic downtown. Meanwhile, sensing a threat to their livelihood, poor and minority urbanites attempt to preserve their underserved communities. Returning to the patterns of the Industrial Revolution, capitalism once again spatially segregates the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; billionaire businessmen spend significant amounts of money ensuring that the government is complicit in their activities.

Bedrock Detroit LLC is a full-service commercial real estate firm based in downtown Detroit specializing in the strategic development of urban cores. Bedrock’s portfolio contains around one hundred properties and, over the last eight years, has invested and allocated a total of \$5.6 billion into 82.7-percent-black Detroit (Feloni and Lee 2018). Bedrock’s owner, Dan Gilbert, lives in 86.2-percent-white Franklin, Michigan, a village known for its vintage downtown, nearby cider mill, and large, estate-style homes situated on ravines. Gilbert emphasizes that he has bought scores of downtown properties and spent several billion dollars of his own money to redevelop them, even arranging for his own surveillance team because he could not count on cash-strapped Detroit to provide one.

la legislatura mexicana votó para revisar el artículo 27 de la constitución a fin de permitir la disolución de los ejidos a través de la privatización, siempre que los actos de desregulación se consideraran “en el interés social más amplio o en beneficio social”. (“*The Reform of Article 27*, 994, 329”). En los dos años posteriores a la aprobación de la reforma, el TLCAN aceleró aún más el proceso de liquidación de tierras comunales. El acuerdo creó un mercado agrícola mucho más competitivo, a menudo en detrimento de los pequeños agricultores mexicanos, lo que llevó a muchas comunidades de ejidatarios a firmar contratos con empresas agrícolas a gran escala (Lagos y Goodman 2005, 83; Kelly 1994, 561-70; Covert 2017, 152–53). El giro hacia los mercados internacionales de suministro, incluyendo la importación de muchos bienes y alimentos, y el turismo internacional, al igual que el establecimiento del Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Turístico de México (FONATUR) en 1973, desempeñaron un papel importante en el cambio de la ocupación de tierras históricamente ejidales de ciudadanos mexicanos pobres e indígenas a turistas estadounidenses y expatriados de edad avanzada, individuos con menos probabilidades de aprender español, casarse entre sí o involucrarse en la comunidad (Buchenau 2001, 43; OCDE 2017; Covert 2017, 164–65).

Esto es exactamente lo que le sucedió al Ejido de Zihuatanejo en 1973, cuando el gobierno mexicano, a través de FONATUR, expropió sus predios para desarrollar la región Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo para el turismo. A cambio de los casi 1,000 acres de tierra arrebatados a los ejidatarios, el entonces presidente Luis Echeverría les prometió dos parcelas cada una más el 20 por ciento de las ganancias de la venta de la tierra. Hoy en día, las tierras que alguna vez pertenecieron al Ejido de Zihuatanejo están dominadas por casas de lujo, complejos hoteleros y campos de golf; sin embargo, el gobierno aún tiene que pagar a los ejidatarios por la tierra. Los miembros del Ejido de Zihuatanejo han protestado por la injusticia durante años, reproduciendo grabaciones que relatan su historia en modo loop, tanto en inglés como en español, y portando pancartas que dicen algo como: “Amigo turista, estás caminando por tierras robadas por FONATUR al Ejido de Zihuatanejo”. El activismo continuo de los ejidatarios del antiguo Ejido de Zihuatanejo ha recibido el apoyo de los ejidos vecinos de Coacoyul, Agua de Correa y El Zarco, algunos con agravios similares, cuyos miembros ahora se unen a las protestas (Paterson 2018).

Tanto en Detroit como en México, la globalización ha afectado negativamente a la población trabajadora.

La desinversión sistémica en los habitantes urbanos de Detroit a través de la combinación de explotación laboral y subsidios suburbanos, y la desinversión sistémica en los mexicanos rurales a

However, Gilbert fails to mention that he has received corporate subsidies from the bankrupt city: In 2010, he received \$50 million in state tax breaks to relocate Quicken headquarters from the suburbs to downtown, and in 2017, he advocated a “transformational brownfield plan” in the Michigan legislature to collect taxpayer dollars for a skyscraper he wants to build on the former location of Detroit’s famous Hudson’s Department Store (Dalmia 2017).

As downtown Detroit undergoes rapid redevelopment, the land bordering downtown remains more vacant than active. Local residents find the vacant land useful for growing many varieties of fruits and vegetables and subsequently transform the empty lots into individual, community, and school gardens in addition to larger-scale farms like the Oakland Avenue Urban Farm in Detroit’s North End. Not unlike the *ejidal* system of usufructuary land-use sorting for the sake of subsistence, these urban farms or “agrihoods” – agriculture-centered collectives in the middle of urban neighborhoods – supply fresh produce and food education to underserved communities and help reverse decades of disinvestment (Perkins 2017).² The simultaneous redevelopment of downtown and agriculturalization of urban neighborhoods marks a citywide return to local spatial stability even as capital becomes increasingly global.

In most Mexican cities today, *ejidal* land is now the single most important source of urbanizable land, *tabulae rasae* for development (“The Reform of Article 27” 1994, 238). Many *ejidos* have fallen into disarray due to factors ranging from blatant governmental hostility or corrupt self-governance, often blamed on the *comisario ejidal* (ejido commissioner), to a constant inability to compete with larger agricultural producers. Because *ejidos* now lag behind the cities growing all around them – particularly in terms of infrastructure development including water and electricity – they are now widely considered an unviable, informal form of land tenure; subsequently, they are increasingly vulnerable to formalization via privatization (Lagos and Goodman 2005, 67–77). Furthermore, *ejidos* within urban territories are frequently developed extralegally by private actors, most often for housing, and thus conurbated with existing city fabric, producing urban sprawl.³ Estimates of illegal *ejidal* formalization are around 50 percent for most cities in Mexico (“The Reform of Article 27” 1994, 238).

In other parts of the country, like the idyllic peninsula of Baja California, which boasts clear geospatial benefits for tourism and development, the privatization of *ejidal* land has been even more rapid. Even before the 1992 land reform, *ejidatarios* were easily persuaded into the transnational real estate market, leasing their lands for American development as in the case of Ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú. The lease of Ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú, an

través de la reforma neoliberal del uso de la tierra ha dejado a las comunidades locales tambaleándose por la creciente desigualdad socioeconómica. Las corporaciones en Detroit han deslocalizado la mano de obra y han rechazado a los sindicatos para apoyar sus resultados, mientras que muchos ejidatarios en México han disuelto sus ejidos, buscando recompensas económicas a corto plazo en detrimento de la estabilidad a largo plazo, los libretos, por así decirlo, de los patrones de inversión neoliberales. En Detroit, la seguridad social a través de la tierra se ha visto comprometida; muchos residentes han perdido sus trabajos y el valor de las propiedades se ha desplomado debido a la desindustrialización y la emigración, respectivamente. En México, la tierra usufructuaria ha sido parcelada y planeado en preparación para la compra. En ambos casos, la pérdida de la seguridad de la tierra por parte de los ciudadanos, en términos de acceso o valor de la tierra, ha engendrado cinismo y una profunda desconfianza en el gobierno, lo que en última instancia ha llevado al surgimiento de políticas económicas que favorecen a la oferta y, de manera desproporcionada a las empresas y a los adinerados.

LOCALIZACIÓN DE LO GLOBAL: GRANJAS URBANAS Y ECO-EJIDOS

Dewar y Epstein señalan que “la pérdida de la solidez económica de la manufactura ha debilitado los vínculos económicos entre muchas partes de la región y ha contribuido a un desarrollo desigual” en forma de “infraestructura en deterioro, pérdida de áreas naturales a medida que se extiende el desarrollo suburbano, diferentes impactos de políticas fiscales y económicas nacionales, diversas conexiones con los mercados mundiales y las corrientes de inmigración” (Dewar y Epstein 2007, 109). Los cambios en el uso de la tierra, ya sea en la práctica o en su nombre, han afectado de manera desproporcionada a las comunidades localmente arraigadas. Las comunidades locales, a su vez, buscan formas de reafirmar el control sobre sus tierras, incluso frente al capital global.

El Detroit de hoy se erige como una sombra de lo que fue en el corazón del erosionado Cinturón de Óxido Estadounidense (o Cinturón Industrial). *Rust* (en español óxido) se refiere a la desindustrialización, o al declive económico, a la pérdida de población y la decadencia urbana, debido a la contracción del otrora poderoso sector industrial de la región. La Detroit desindustrializada suscita nostalgia por un tiempo y un lugar pasados – específicamente, la fama de la Ciudad del Motor del siglo XX –, y simultáneamente inspira esperanza los paisajes urbanos de uso mixto y proyectos de reutilización adaptativa. En Detroit, el control hegemónico top-down ahora proviene de una norma externa mientras los habitantes blancos ricos de los suburbios comienzan a rehabilitar el

ejido located eighty-five miles from the Mexican-U.S. border, ended in claims of illegal development due to the fact that not every rightful *ejidatario* had signed off on the transaction. Ultimately, the error led to the largest eviction in Mexico's history, dislocating 150 households and costing upwards of \$25 million. Many of the tenuous transactions involving *ejidos* have ended in what real estate agents and scholars often describe as "horror stories," wherein un-deeded property transactions result in evictions, reversals, and great financial loss, often for the expatriates living on the land (Kraul 1999; Weiner 2000). Even though the disaster of Ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú predates the 1992 reform, by nature of its scale and basis in communal property rights, it is the primary cautionary tale regarding *ejidal* development today. Nevertheless, as time passes since the 1992 reform, former fears are being forgotten, and *ejidos* are increasingly becoming prey to foreign exploitation ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 228–331).

One final consideration in thinking through the *ejido* as a system of land tenure in opposition to conventional property is its value to broader society. Beyond serving as a protection for the livelihood of campesinos (rural peasants) and a bulwark against inequity, *ejidos* today increasingly serve as environmental safe havens, protecting fragile ecologies from the ravages of capitalistic development ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 332). Ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez demonstrates how politically backed, communally controlled spatialities can serve one of their original and most foundational purposes, "to regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible to appropriation, in order to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth" (Const. Art. 27). Ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez in Baja California Sur lies next to the Laguna San Ignacio, one of the very last untouched nurseries of the Pacific grey whale. *Ejidatarios* have been major actors in the push for conservation, granting easements on their lands and monitoring protections. Their actions have since been a boon for the *ejido* economically, resulting in a burgeoning eco-tourism industry and a shift toward community-backed holistic changes to waste management, artisanal crafts, small-scale farming, energy independence, and public education and health reform (Blair 2018). In effect, the Ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez is experiencing a renaissance in the provision of landed security through the *ejidal* system – not as a fungible, financial asset, à la the neoliberal reform of Article 27, but as grounds for participating in the international service economy.

In both the United States and Mexico, urban redevelopment is determined at greater scales. The cycle of capitalist segregation repeats, as the wealthy once again exercise control over the space of the underserved. Detroit's inability to maintain

centro histórico. Entre tanto, al percibir una amenaza para su sustento, los habitantes de las zonas urbanas pobres y minoritarias intentan preservar sus comunidades desatendidas. Volviendo a los patrones de la Revolución Industrial, el capitalismo vuelve a segregar espacialmente a la burguesía y al proletariado; los empresarios multimillonarios gastan grandes cantidades de dinero para asegurarse de que el gobierno sea cómplice de sus actividades.

Bedrock Detroit LLC es una empresa de bienes raíces comerciales de servicio completo con sede en el centro de Detroit que se especializa en el desarrollo estratégico de núcleos urbanos. El portafolio de Bedrock contiene alrededor de cien propiedades y, durante los últimos ocho años, ha invertido y asignado un total de \$ 5.6 mil millones en un 82.7 por ciento en el Detroit negro (Feloni y Lee 2018). El propietario de Bedrock, Dan Gilbert, vive en Franklin, Michigan, un pueblo con un 86,2 por ciento de blancos, conocido por su centro histórico, un molino de sidra cercano y grandes casas, estilo finca, situadas en barrancos. Gilbert enfatiza que compró montones de propiedades en el centro y gastó varios miles de millones de dólares de su propio dinero para reconstruirlas, incluso organizando su propio equipo de vigilancia porque no podía contar con seguridad municipal, ya que Detroit tenía problemas de liquidez. Sin embargo, Gilbert no menciona que ha recibido subsidios corporativos de la ciudad en bancarrota: en 2010, recibió \$ 50 millones en exenciones de impuestos estatales para trasladar la sede de Quicken de los suburbios al centro de la ciudad, y en 2017, abogó por un "plan transformador de zonas industriales abandonadas" en la legislatura de Michigan para recaudar fondos públicos y construir un rascacielos en la antigua ubicación del famoso almacén Hudson de Detroit (Dalmia 2017).

A medida que el centro de Detroit experimenta una rápida reurbanización en el terreno que lo bordea, este permanece más vacío que activo. Los residentes locales le dan uso al terreno vacío para cultivar muchas variedades de frutas y verduras y, posteriormente, transforman los lotes vacíos en huertos individuales, comunitarios y escolares, además de granjas de mayor escala como *Oakland Avenue Urban Farm* en el vecindario North End de Detroit. No tan diferente al sistema ejidal de clasificación del uso de la tierra usufructuario en aras de la subsistencia, estas granjas urbanas o "agrihoods" –colectivos centrados en la agricultura en el medio de los vecindarios urbanos– suministran productos frescos y educación alimentaria a las comunidades desatendidas y ayudan a revertir décadas de desinversión (Perkins 2017).² La remodelación simultánea del centro de la ciudad y la agriculturización de los vecindarios urbanos marca un retorno a la estabilidad espacial local en toda la ciudad, incluso cuando el capital se vuelve cada vez más global.

En la mayoría de las ciudades mexicanas de hoy,

the infrastructure of suburban sprawl invites the return of Industrial Age corruption and the blurring of corporation and state. Meanwhile, Mexico's *ejido* system persists in bits and pieces around the nation, crippled by governmental disinvestment and elite privatization but not wholly gutted due to the system's key tenant of self-governance on a community scale. In both cases, the illusion of security through financialization persists, as foreign investors increasingly supplant the government in terms of real, regulatory, spatial protections that cannot be upended by shifts in the market. Nonetheless, there is a note of self-determinism that rings clear from both contexts in the form of Detroit's urban farms and the ecological turn taken by some *ejidos*. Usufructuary land rights, whether tactical and insurgent or constitutionally backed, are cropping up again with a renewed exuberance, staving off the pressures and the failures of privatization and instead providing for human flourishing as well as ecological soundness.

In conclusion, the sense of security that land provides – whether as places of habitation, tracts for subsistence, or spaces of economic production – is long established, ultimately leading to the private property regime that exists, or is being currently promulgated, across much of the world today. However, our understanding is beginning to shift: Whether by dint of catastrophic environmental threat or in response to the abuse of the commons by centuries of industrial and extractive processes, a return in ideology and practice to the paradigmatic resilience of landscape seems to be redefining the view of private property in the contemporary zeitgeist and reviving more necessarily collective, and even empathetic, enterprises of land tenure. Change is evidenced by the bottom-up, tactical emergence of Detroit's urban farms and the concurrent revitalization of the *ejido* as a system of environmental stewardship. While urban farming stands as a practical response to urban blight and a protest against rampant redevelopment for the benefit of the few, the *ejido* is finding a way to return to its origins as a stabilizing spatial force, both socially and ecologically. Both grassroots initiatives, based not only in the communal or collective land use but also in the nurturing qualities inherent in land, must be understood as a response to our current environmental crisis. As such, these initiatives emerge as some of the first semblances of a new "landed security" based not on necessary subsistence, claims of status, or even market value but an understanding of the actual insecurity that humans pose to the land and, by extension, to themselves.⁴ Borrowing from Bruno Latour, humans have moved beyond the national, through the global, and on to the planetary – in other words, a turn from an expansionist ideology toward a recognition of the finitude of the planet and its resources. State and private interests

la tierra ejidal es ahora la fuente más importante de tierra urbanizable, tabula rasa para el desarrollo ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 238). Muchos ejidos han caído en desorden debido a factores que van desde la evidente hostilidad gubernamental o el autogobierno corrupto, a menudo atribuido al comisario ejidal (comisionado ejidal), hasta la constante inhabilidad de competir con los productores agrícolas más grandes. Debido a que los ejidos se quedan atrás con respecto a las ciudades que crecen a sus alrededores, – particularmente en términos de desarrollo de infraestructura, incluyendo agua y electricidad –, por lo tanto, son ampliamente considerados una manera informal e inviable de tenencia de la tierra; esto conlleva a que cada vez sean más vulnerables a la formalización a través de la privatización (Lagos y Goodman 2005, 67-77). Además, los ejidos dentro de los territorios urbanos con frecuencia son desarrollados extralegalmente por actores privados, en su mayoría, para viviendas y, por consiguiente, conurban con el tejido de la ciudad existente, produciendo una expansión urbana³. Las estimaciones de formalización ejidal ilegal son alrededor del 50 por ciento para la mayoría de las ciudades de México ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 238).

En otras partes del país, como la idílica península de Baja California, que se jacta de tener claros beneficios geoespaciales para el turismo y el desarrollo, la privatización de tierras ejidales ha sido aún más rápida. Incluso antes de la reforma agraria de 1992, los ejidatarios fueron fácilmente persuadidos de ingresar al mercado inmobiliario transnacional, arrendando sus tierras para el desarrollo estadounidense, como en el caso del ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú. El arrendamiento del Ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú – situado a ochenta y cinco millas de la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos–, terminó en reclamos de desarrollo ilegal debido al hecho de que no todos los ejidatarios legítimos habían firmado la transacción. Al final, el error condujo al desalojo más grande en la historia de México, que desintegró a 150 hogares y costó más de \$25 millones. Muchas de estas frágiles negociaciones, las cuales involucran ejidos, han terminado en lo que los agentes inmobiliarios y los académicos a menudo describen como "historias de terror", como, por ejemplo, transacciones donde queda la propiedad sin escriturar y el resultado son desalojos, revocaciones y grandes pérdidas financieras, a menudo para los expatriados que viven en la tierra (Kraul 1999; Weiner 2000). A pesar de que el desastre del Ejido Colonia Esteban Cantú es anterior a la reforma de 1992, por la naturaleza de su escala y su base en los derechos de propiedad comunal, esta 'moraleja' es la principal advertencia sobre el desarrollo ejidal en la actualidad. Sin embargo, a medida que pasa el tiempo desde la reforma de 1992, los temores anteriores se están

still find land squarely at the center of a sense of security; now, however, it is incumbent upon them to provide for and sustain land as a means of human and more-than-human flourishing (Latour 2018, 33–58).

ENDNOTES

- 1 Central to this discourse have been Matthew Desmond's *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2016) and Richard Rothstein's *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017). This discourse extends to social justice advocacy work, one example being the Eviction Lab at Princeton University.
- 2 Much has been written about the rise of urban farms and "agrihoods" in Detroit. See, for example: LaCroix, Catherine J. 2010. "Urban Agriculture and Other Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking City." *The Urban Lawyer* 42, no. 2: 225–85; Crane, Jeff. 2018. "Raising Change: Community Farming as Long-Term Ecological Protest." In *The Nature of Hope: Grassroots Organizing, Environmental Justice, and Political Change*. Edited by Char Miller and Jeff Crane. Boulder: University of Colorado Press; Quizar, Jessi. 2018. "Working to Live: Black-Led Farming in Detroit's Racialized Economy." In *Racial Ecologies*. Edited by Nishime Leilani and Williams Kim D. Hester, 76–89. Seattle: University of Washington Press. While urban farms, like the Oakland Avenue Urban Farm in Detroit's North End, appear to be focused more on food security, "agrihoods," like the Michigan Urban Farming Initiative, also in Detroit's North End, appear to be focused more on land development.
- 3 Much has been written about the materiality of "enclosure" and the process of "enclosure" as one of "accumulation by dispossession" and, ultimately, neoliberal globalization. See, for example: Blomley, Nicholas. 2007. "Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges." *Rural History* 18, no. 1: 1–21; Blomley, Nicholas. 2008. "Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor." *Social and Legal Studies* 17: 311–331; Vasudevan, Alex, et al. 2008. "Spaces of Enclosure." *Geoforum*, 39, no. 5: 1641–1646; Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Furthermore, some of the discourse on "enclosure" explicitly examines these land grabs through a critique of colonialism. See, for example: Fields, Gary. 2011. "Enclosure Landscapes: Historical Reflections on Palestinian Geography." *Historical Geography* 39: 182–207; Fields, Gary. 2017. *Enclosure: Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror*. Oakland: University of California Press.

olvidando y los ejidos se están convirtiendo cada vez más en presa de la explotación extranjera ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 228–331). Una última consideración al pensar en el ejido como un sistema de tenencia de la tierra en oposición a la propiedad convencional es su valor para la sociedad en general.

Más allá de servir como una protección para el sustento de los campesinos y un baluarte contra la inequidad, los ejidos hoy sirven cada vez más como refugios ambientales seguros, protegiendo a las ecologías frágiles de los estragos del desarrollo capitalista ("The Reform of Article 27" 1994, 332). El ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez demuestra cómo las espacialidades políticamente respaldadas y controladas comúnmente pueden servir a uno de sus propósitos originales y más fundacionales, "regular la utilización de los recursos naturales susceptibles de apropiación, con el fin de conservarlos y asegurar una distribución más equitativa de la riqueza pública" (Const. Art. 27). El ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez en Baja California Sur se encuentra junto a la Laguna San Ignacio, uno de los últimos criaderos vírgenes de la ballena gris del Pacífico. Los ejidatarios han sido actores importantes en el impulso de la conservación, otorgando servidumbres en sus tierras y monitoreando las protecciones. Desde entonces, sus acciones han sido una bendición para el ejido económicamente, lo que desencadenó una creciente industria del ecoturismo, con cambios holísticos, respaldados por la comunidad, atendiendo la gestión de residuos, la artesanía, la agricultura a pequeña escala, la independencia energética, la educación pública y la reforma sanitaria (Blair 2018). En efecto, el Ejido Luis Echeverría Álvarez está experimentando un renacimiento en la provisión de seguridad territorial a través del sistema ejidal, no como un activo financiero fungible, al estilo de la reforma neoliberal del artículo 27, pero como base para participar en la economía de servicios internacional.

Tanto en los Estados Unidos como en México, la reurbanización se determina a escalas mayores. El ciclo de segregación capitalista se repite, ya que los ricos ejercen una vez más el control sobre el espacio de los desatendidos. La incapacidad de Detroit para mantener la infraestructura de la expansión suburbana invita al regreso de la corrupción de la era industrial y la borrosidad entre corporaciones y estados. Mientras tanto, el sistema ejidal de México persiste por pedazos en todo el país, paralizado por la desinversión gubernamental y la privatización de la élite, pero no completamente eviscerado debido al sistema clave de inquilino y de autogobierno a escala comunitaria. En ambos casos, la ilusión de seguridad a través de la financiarización persiste, ya que los inversionistas extranjeros suplantán cada vez más al gobierno en términos de protecciones espaciales reales y regulatorias que no pueden ser

4 In addition to urban farming, methods of retaining increases in value for the public in the United States include community land trusts, profit sharing arrangements, linkage fees, tax increment financing, and community benefits agreements. See also: Susan Fainstein. 2012. "Land Value Capture and Justice." In *Land Value Capture and Land Policies*. Edited by Gregory Ingram and Yu Hung Hong, 21–40. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

trastocadas por cambios en el mercado. No obstante, hay una nota de autodeterminismo que suena claro en ambos contextos en la forma de las granjas urbanas de Detroit y el giro ecológico adoptado por algunos ejidos. Los derechos usufructuarios sobre la tierra, ya sean tácticos e insurgentes o respaldados constitucionalmente, están surgiendo nuevamente con una exuberancia renovada, evitando las presiones y los fracasos de la privatización y, en cambio, están proporcionando el florecimiento humano y la solidez ecológica.

En conclusión, la sensación de seguridad que proporciona la tierra, –ya sea como lugares de habitación, tramos de subsistencia o espacios de producción económica–, está establecida desde hace mucho tiempo, lo que, en última instancia, condujo al régimen de propiedad privada que existe, o que se está promulgando actualmente, en gran parte del mundo.

Sin embargo, nuestra comprensión está comenzando a cambiar: ya sea a fuerza de una amenaza ambiental catastrófica o en respuesta al abuso de los bienes comunes por siglos de procesos industriales y extractivos, un retorno en la ideología y la práctica a la resiliencia paradigmática del paisaje parece estar redefiniendo la visión de la propiedad privada en el "zeitgeist" contemporáneo y revivir empresas más necesariamente colectivas, e incluso empáticas, de tenencia de la tierra.

El cambio se evidencia en el surgimiento táctico *Bottom-up* de las granjas urbanas de Detroit y la revitalización concurrente del ejido como un sistema de administración ambiental. Mientras que la agricultura urbana se erige como una respuesta práctica a la plaga urbana y una protesta contra el desarrollo rampante en beneficio de unos pocos, el ejido está encontrando la manera de regresar a sus orígenes como una fuerza espacial estabilizadora, tanto social como ecológica. Ambas iniciativas de los 'movimientos de base' o grassroots, fundamentadas no solo en el uso comunal o colectivo de la tierra sino también en las cualidades de sustento inherentes a la tierra, deben entenderse como una respuesta a nuestra actual crisis ambiental. Como tales, estas iniciativas emergen como algunas de las primeras semejanzas de una nueva "seguridad de la tierra" basada no en la subsistencia necesaria, reclamos de estatus o incluso en el valor de mercado, sino en la comprensión de la inseguridad real que los humanos representan para la tierra y, por extensión, a sí mismos.⁴ Teniendo en cuenta las palabras de Bruno Latour, los humanos se han movido más allá de lo nacional, a través de lo global y luego a lo planetario; en otras palabras, un giro desde una ideología expansionista hacia el reconocimiento de la finitud del planeta y sus recursos. Los intereses estatales y privados todavía encuentran la tierra, directamente, en

el centro de una sensación de seguridad; ahora, sin embargo, les corresponde proveer y mantenerla como un medio de florecimiento humano y más que humano (Latour 2018, 33–58).

NOTAS FINALES

- 1 Un elemento central de este discurso ha sido *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City* de Matthew Desmond (Nueva York: Crown Publishing Group, 2016) y *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America* (Nueva York: Liveright Publishing de Richard Rothstein Corporation, 2017). Este discurso se extiende al trabajo de defensa de la justicia social, un ejemplo es el Laboratorio de Desalojos de la Universidad de Princeton.
- 2 Mucho se ha escrito sobre el auge de las granjas urbanas y las “agrihoods” en Detroit. Ver, por ejemplo: LaCroix, Catherine J. 2010. “Urban Agriculture and Other Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking City.” *The Urban Lawyer* 42, no. 2: 225–85; Crane, Jeff. 2018. “Raising Change: Community Farming as Long-Term Ecological Protest.” In *The Nature of Hope: Grassroots Organizing, Environmental Justice, and Political Change*. Edited by Char Miller and Jeff Crane. Boulder: University of Colorado Press; Quizar, Jessi. 2018. “Working to Live: Black-Led Farming in Detroit’s Racialized Economy.” In *Racial Ecologies*. Edited by Nishime Leilani and Williams Kim D. Hester, 76–89. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Mientras que las granjas urbanas, como Oakland Avenue Urban Farm en el North End de Detroit, parecen estar más enfocadas en la seguridad alimentaria, las “agrihoods”, como la Iniciativa de Agricultura Urbana de Michigan, también en el North End de Detroit, parecen estar más enfocadas en el desarrollo de la tierra.
- 3 Mucho se ha escrito sobre la materialidad del “encerramiento” y el proceso de “encerramiento” como uno de “acumulación por despojo” y, en última instancia, globalización neoliberal. Ver, por ejemplo: Blomley, Nicholas. 2007. “Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges.” *Rural History* 18, no. 1: 1–21; Blomley, Nicholas. 2008. “Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor.” *Social and Legal Studies* 17: 311–331; Vasudevan, Alex, et al. 2008. “Spaces of Enclosure.” *Geoforum*, 39, no. 5: 1641–1646; Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Además, parte del discurso sobre el “cercado” examina explícitamente estos acaparamientos de tierras a través de una crítica del colonialismo. Ver, por ejemplo: Fields, Gary. 2011. “Enclosure Landscapes: Historical Reflections on Palestinian Geography.” *Historical Geography* 39: 182–207; Fields, Gary. 2017.

Enclosure: Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. Oakland: University of California Press.

- 4 Además de la agricultura urbana, los métodos para retener los aumentos de valor para el público en los Estados Unidos incluyen fideicomisos de tierras comunitarias, acuerdos de participación en las ganancias, tarifas de vinculación, financiamiento de incrementos de impuestos y acuerdos de beneficios comunitarios. Véase también: Susan Fainstein. 2012. "Land Value Capture and Justice." In Land Value Capture and Land Policies. Edited by Gregory Ingram and Yu Hung Hong, 21–40. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

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IMAGES

Figure 1a:

Moss, Brian. "Levittown and the Suburban Dream of Postwar New York." *New York Daily News*. August 14, 2017. <https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/levittown-suburban-dream-postwar-new-york-article-1.820845>.

Figure 1b:

Herrera, Esther. "Señalan riesgos en ejidos por la reforma energética." *Milenio*. January 19, 2015. <http://www.milenio.com/estados/senalan-riesgos-en-ejidos-por-la-reforma-energetica>.

Figure 2a:

Sands, David. "Looking back on a decade of growth in Detroit's urban ag movement." *Model D Media*. September 14, 2015.
<http://www.modeldmedia.com/features/10-years-urban-ag-091415.aspx>.

Figure 2b:

Ejido Verde. Untitled. *Poco a Poco*. Undated. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59966ee4cd0f68504835c1f8/t/5b00868388251b93762a8f47/1526761107545/EJIDO+VERDE_WEB-8.jpg?format=1000w.

The Winter Quarters

Rayne Laborde








Almeria, Spain.

80,000 acres of greenhouses farmed primarily by undocumented laborers provide 1/3 of Europe's fresh produce. Greenhouses stretch to the town, to the sea, and up mountains; dominating and commercializing the desert terrain.

Continued on page 145



Feeding the Urban Leviathan

Felipe Orensanz

ABSTRACT:

Mexico City, a crowded and sprawling metropolis of 22 million residents, is not only one of the world's most populated urban settlements but also one of the most vulnerable. Overburdened by a centuries-long series of compounding crises, Mexico City has always lived on the verge of an imminent and irreversible collapse. Water scarcity, floods, earthquakes, pollution, violence, traffic, overpopulation, and health issues have all taken their toll on a city that has, nonetheless and against all odds, managed to survive. When the first wave of COVID-19 hit in early 2020, Mexico City faced a hitherto overlooked threat: food insecurity. One of the communities hardest hit by the pandemic was the central wholesale market, *Central de Abasto*, which controls 80 percent of the food bought, sold, and consumed throughout the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico. This article takes a close look at the political, economic, and ideological causes and effects of Mexico City's over-centralized model of food supply and distribution and how it has added to its state of permanent crisis.

URBAN CRISES, OLD AND NEW

Between April and June 2020, Mexico City's wholesale market, known simply as *Central de Abasto* or Supply Center, became one of the COVID-19 pandemic's local hotspots. The market was so devastated that in a matter of weeks, its daily sales dropped by as much as 75 percent, sending a city more than used to living on the edge into an unprecedented state of widespread panic (Vela 2020). At the core of these concerns was one deeply alarming fact: 80 percent of the food consumed throughout the sprawling metropolis, from large-scale supermarkets to the city's 329 neighborhood *mercados*, high-end restaurants, 18,000 taco stands, and innumerable local mom-and-pop stores, is supplied by *Central de Abasto* (Rodríguez 2018). While it is now obvious that even the slightest disruption in the market's day-to-day operations could have a devastating effect on the city's ability to survive, the unexpected crisis caused by COVID-19 seemed to catch *Central de Abasto*, and the entire city, off-guard and added an entirely new layer to the state of imminent collapse that has haunted Mexico City for centuries.

Until now, starvation has not been part of the picture. Rather, the city's recurrent doomsday predictions – labelled by writer Carlos Monsiváis as “catastrophe chauvinism” (Monsiváis 2016, 19) – revolve around four scenarios:

Alimentando al Leviatán Urbano

Felipe Orensanz

RESUMEN

La Ciudad de México, una metrópolis poblada y en expansión de 22 millones de habitantes, no solo es uno de los asentamientos urbanos más poblados del mundo, sino también uno de los más vulnerables. Sobrecargada por una serie de crisis agravantes que se prolongaron durante siglos, la Ciudad de México siempre ha vivido al borde de un colapso inminente e irreversible. La escasez de agua, las inundaciones, los terremotos, la contaminación, la violencia, el tráfico, la superpoblación y los problemas de salud han cobrado su precio en una ciudad que, sin embargo y contra todo pronóstico, ha logrado sobrevivir. Cuando llegó la primera ola de COVID-19 a principios de 2020, la Ciudad de México enfrentó una amenaza hasta ahora pasada por alto: la inseguridad alimentaria. Una de las comunidades más afectadas por la pandemia fue el mercado mayorista central, la *Central de Abasto*, que controla el 80 por ciento de los alimentos comprados, vendidos y consumidos en toda el Área Metropolitana del Valle de México. Este artículo analiza de cerca las causas y efectos políticos, económicos e ideológicos del modelo excesivamente centralizado de suministro y distribución de alimentos de la Ciudad de México y cómo esto ha sumado a su estado de crisis permanente.

CRISIS URBANAS, VIEJAS Y NUEVAS

Entre abril y junio de 2020, el mercado mayorista de la Ciudad de México, conocido simplemente como *Central de Abasto* o *Centro de Abastecimiento*, se convirtió en uno de los puntos álgidos locales de la pandemia COVID-19. El mercado estaba tan devastado que, en cuestión de semanas, sus ventas diarias cayeron hasta en un 75 por ciento, enviando a una ciudad más que acostumbrada a vivir al límite a un estado de pánico generalizado sin precedentes (Vela 2020). En el centro de estas preocupaciones había un hecho profundamente alarmante: el 80 por ciento de los alimentos consumidos en toda la expansiva metrópolis, desde supermercados a gran escala hasta los 329 mercados de la ciudad, restaurantes de alta categoría, 18,000 puestos de tacos e innumerables tiendas familiares son abastecidas por la *Central de Abasto* (Rodríguez 2018). Si bien ahora es obvio que incluso la más mínima interrupción en las operaciones diarias del mercado podría tener un efecto devastador en la capacidad de la ciudad para sobrevivir, la crisis inesperada causada por el COVID-19 pareció atrapar a la *Central de Abasto*, y a toda la ciudad, con la guardia baja y agregó una capa completamente nueva al

1. Will Mexico City die of thirst? For centuries, the city has turned primarily to the aquifer of the now extinct Texcoco lake (on which the city was built) to quench its growing thirst. But it is precisely the former lake's water table that keeps Mexico City afloat. Consequently, the city's softer terrains have seen gradual subsidence of up to 30 feet. Despite recent efforts to curb over-extraction and recharge the region's aquifers, about 50 percent of the city's water consumption still comes from underground, while the remainder is pumped in from the distant *Lerma-Cutzamala* system. To make matters worse, up to 40 percent of the drinking water that flows into the city is lost through leaks in its badly damaged and often makeshift infrastructure.¹
2. Will Mexico City drown in its own waste? Little has changed since near-biblical floods in 1629 submerged the city for five full years, killing some 30,000 residents. Despite its apparent modern prowess, present-day Mexico City sits, and always will sit, in the bottom of a closed basin. As a result, all excess water must be artificially pumped out. During the summer months, heavy rainfall adds even more pressure to an overstressed system that pumps the sewage of 22 million people around the clock. Strikingly, what keeps the city from drowning is the work of one man, Julio César Cu Cámara, the last of the city's sewer divers, who routinely plunges into the city's wastewater to prevent pumps from clogging (Orensanz 2012).
3. Will Mexico City be crushed under the weight of its own rubble? Three decades after the deadly 8.1-degree earthquake that struck the city on September 19, 1985, and killed an estimated 20,000 residents, physical scars of the earthquake are still widely visible, especially in the hard-hit downtown boroughs.² The earthquake's epicenter was in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of the state of Michoacán; but as soon as it reached Mexico City's jelly-like subsoil, it produced a series of highly destructive vibrations (known, accordingly, as the *Mexico City Effect*). In 2017, another earthquake, ironically also on September 19, killed over 200 people and toppled dozens of buildings, reminding its citizens that the city is poorly prepared for another major seismic blow. According to many predictions, an even deadlier earthquake lurks somewhere in the shadows of the

1. For a general overview of Mexico City's historically complex relationship to water, see Matthew Vitz's 2018 book *A City on a Lake: Urban Political Ecology and the Growth of Mexico City* (Vitz 2018).
2. One of the best accounts of the 1985 earthquake and its many social and political aftermaths is Carlos Monsiváis's 2005 book *No sin nosotros* (Monsiváis 2005).

estado de colapso inminente que ha perseguido a la Ciudad de México durante siglos.

Hasta ahora, la inanición no ha sido parte del panorama. Más bien, las predicciones apocalípticas de la ciudad son recurrentes, –etiquetadas por el escritor Carlos Monsiváis como “chovinismo catastrófico” (Monsiváis 2016, 19)–, giran en torno a cuatro escenarios:

1. ¿Morirá de sed la Ciudad de México? Durante siglos, la ciudad ha recurrido principalmente al acuífero del ahora extinto lago Texcoco (sobre el cual se construyó la ciudad) para saciar su creciente sed. Pero es precisamente el nivel freático del antiguo lago lo que mantiene a flote a la Ciudad de México. En consecuencia, los terrenos más blandos de la ciudad han experimentado un hundimiento gradual de hasta 30 pies. A pesar de los recientes esfuerzos para frenar la extracción excesiva y recargar los acuíferos de la región, alrededor del 50 por ciento del consumo de agua de la ciudad todavía proviene del subsuelo, mientras que el resto se bombea desde el distante sistema Lerma-Cutzamala. Para empeorar las cosas, hasta el 40 por ciento del agua potable que fluye hacia la ciudad se pierde a través de fugas en su infraestructura muy dañada y, a menudo, improvisada¹
2. ¿Se ahogará la Ciudad de México en sus propios desechos? Poco ha cambiado desde que las inundaciones casi bíblicas de 1629 sumergieron a la ciudad durante cinco años completos, matando a unos 30.000 residentes. A pesar de su aparente destreza moderna, la actual Ciudad de México se sienta, y siempre se sentará, en el fondo de una cuenca cerrada. Como resultado, todo el exceso de agua debe bombearse artificialmente. Durante los meses de verano, las fuertes lluvias agregan aún más presión a un sistema sobrecargado que bombea las aguas residuales de 22 millones de personas durante las 24 horas. Sorprendentemente, lo que evita que la ciudad se ahogue es el trabajo de un hombre, Julio César Cu Cámara, el último de los buzos del alcantarillado de la ciudad, que habitualmente se sumerge en las aguas residuales de la ciudad para evitar que las bombas se atasquen (Orensanz 2012).
3. ¿Será aplastada la Ciudad de México bajo el peso de sus propios escombros? Tres décadas después del mortal terremoto de 8.1 grados que azotó a la ciudad el 19 de septiembre de 1985 y mató a unos 20.000 residentes, las cicatrices

1. Para obtener una descripción general de la relación históricamente compleja de la Ciudad de México con el agua, consulte el libro de Matthew Vitz de 2018, *A City on a Lake: Urban Political Ecology and the Growth of Mexico City* (Vitz 2018).

near future.

4. Will Mexico City choke to death on its own fumes? Though the city's air quality has improved markedly over the past decades, it still constitutes a major health hazard. As recently as May 2019, the local government issued an environmental emergency alert when the city's air was worsened by a series of nearby wildfires. Outdoor activities were called off, and additional restrictions were applied to all motor vehicles, which are currently responsible for approximately 60 percent of the city's air pollutants. There seem to be no small-scale solutions to this problem, especially because of the horseshoe-shaped ring of mountains that traps the city's fumes within the basin. Many recent proposals for solving Mexico City's air crisis, like engineer Heberto Castillo's idea of drilling tunnels into the surrounding mountain ranges to install a colossal system of artificial ventilators, have been taken to such radical extremes that they appear to be pulled out of an uninspired sci-fi novel.³

Over the years, other, less likely but equally frightening scenarios, have been added to the mix of dystopian prophecy: escalating violence (in 2019, an average of 650 crimes were reported each day, including 40 daily crimes against life and limb);⁴ paralyzing traffic (in 2010, IBM ranked Mexico City the world's most painful city for commuters);⁵ limitless growth (Mexico City is currently ranked fifth among the world's largest urban concentrations);⁶ and rising health concerns (about half of the city's residents are said to have modest to severe weight issues).⁷ Today,

3. The work of Nobel Prize recipient Mario J. Molina is especially helpful for understanding Mexico City's ongoing pollution crises. See, for example, *Air Quality in the Mexico Megacity*, coedited with Luisa T. Molina (Molina and Molina 2002).

4. This number only includes crimes officially reported to and registered by Mexico City's Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia de la Ciudad de México 2020).

5. See IBM's Commuter Pain Index, which is comprised of ten key issues: 1) commuting time, 2) time stuck in traffic, 3) price of gas is already too high, 4) traffic has gotten worse, 5) start-stop traffic is a problem, 6) driving causes stress, 7) driving causes anger, 8) traffic affects work, 9) traffic so bad driving stopped, and 10) decided not to make a trip due to traffic (IBM 2011).

6. According to the organization City Mayors, the world's five largest urban areas in 2020 were Tokyo (37.28 million), Mumbai (25.97 million), Delhi (25.83 million), Dhaka (22.04 million), and Mexico City (21.81 million) (City Mayors, n.d.).

7. One recent study found that "almost seven million people were overweight, and five million people were clinically obese—a total of 56% of the city's population

físicas del terremoto aún son ampliamente visibles, especialmente en los distritos del centro de la ciudad más afectados.² El epicentro del terremoto fue en el Océano Pacífico, frente a las costas del estado de Michoacán; pero tan pronto como alcanzó el subsuelo gelatinoso de la Ciudad de México, produjo una serie de vibraciones altamente destructivas (conocidas, en consecuencia, como el Efecto Ciudad de México). En 2017, otro terremoto, irónicamente también el 19 de septiembre, mató a más de 200 personas y derribó decenas de edificios, recordando a sus ciudadanos que la ciudad está mal preparada para otro gran golpe sísmico. Según muchas predicciones, un terremoto aún más letal acecha en algún lugar en las sombras del futuro cercano.

4. ¿Se asfixiará la Ciudad de México con sus propios gases tóxicos, por efecto de la polución? Aunque la calidad del aire de la ciudad ha mejorado notablemente en las últimas décadas, todavía constituye un peligro importante para la salud. Ya en mayo de 2019, el gobierno local emitió una alerta de emergencia ambiental cuando el aire de la ciudad empeoró por una serie de incendios forestales cercanos. Se suspendieron las actividades al aire libre y se aplicaron restricciones adicionales a todos los vehículos de motor, que actualmente son responsables de aproximadamente el 60 por ciento de los contaminantes del aire de la ciudad. Parece que no hay soluciones a pequeña escala para este problema, especialmente debido al anillo de montañas en forma de herradura que atrapa los humos de la ciudad dentro de la cuenca. Muchas propuestas recientes para resolver la crisis del aire de la Ciudad de México, como la idea del ingeniero Heberto Castillo de perforar túneles en las cordilleras circundantes para instalar un colosal sistema de ventiladores artificiales, han sido llevadas a extremos tan radicales que parecen sacadas de una novela de ciencia ficción sin inspiración.³

A lo largo de los años, se han agregado otros escenarios, menos probables, pero igualmente

2. Uno de los mejores relatos del terremoto de 1985 y sus múltiples secuelas sociales y políticas es el libro de 2005 de Carlos Monsiváis "No sin nosotros" (Monsiváis 2005).

3. El trabajo del ganador del Premio Nobel Mario J. Molina es especialmente útil para comprender la actual crisis de contaminación de la Ciudad de México. Véase, por ejemplo, *Air Quality in the Mexico Megacity*, coedited with Luisa T. Molina (Molina and Molina 2002). Véase, por ejemplo, *Calidad del aire en la megaciudad de México*, coeditado con Luisa T. Molina (Molina y Molina 2002).

most visions of the city's future simply consist of predicting which prophecy will become a reality and give the agonizing city its *coupe de grace*.

Overwhelmed by the onslaught of endlessly compounding crises, the pressing issues of food security and food supply and distribution systems (FSDSs) have seemed to slip under the city's radar.^{8,9} As Gerardo Torres Salcido accurately points out, "despite the importance of food in the economic, social, and cultural life of urban communities, research on food supply policies has been practically relegated since the 1990s in favor of other major public policy issues." (Torres Salcido 2003, 11). For example, the most comprehensive analysis of present-day Mexico City, Gustavo Garza's mammoth 2000 collaborative book *La Ciudad de México en el fin del segundo Milenio*, ignores the issue of FSDSs altogether. Its fifth chapter, which focuses entirely on infrastructure and public utilities, includes articles on power, water, fuel, transportation, telecommunications, education, health, safety, cultural activities, tourism, and waste but fails to address the city's vast and complex food supply and distribution networks (Garza 2000).

WHOLESALE SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION IN MEXICO CITY: AN OVERVIEW

As the first wave of COVID-19 began to take its toll on Central de Abasto, the "urban leviathan," as Diane Davis describes Mexico City (Davis 1999), started to go hungry, and everyone looked to the city's central

of around 21 million." (Masse 2015).

8. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life". In addition, the FAO highlights four key dimensions necessary for ensuring food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability (Food and Agriculture Organization 2006).
9. The FAO defines urban food supply and distribution systems as "complex combinations of activities, functions and relations (production, handling, storage, transport, process, package, wholesale, retail, etc.) enabling cities to meet their food requirements. These activities are performed by different economic agents (players): producers, assemblers, importers, transporters, wholesalers, retailers, processors, shopkeepers, street vendors, service providers (credit, storage, portage, information and extension), packaging suppliers, public institutions (e.g. city and local governments, public food marketing boards, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Transport) and private associations (e.g. traders, transporters, shopkeepers and consumers)." (Aragrande and Argenti 2001).

aterradores, a la mezcla de profecía distópica: violencia en aumento (en 2019, se reportaron un promedio de 650 delitos cada día, incluidos 40 delitos diarios contra la vida y las extremidades);⁴ tráfico paralizante (en 2010, IBM clasificó a la Ciudad de México como la ciudad más dolorosa del mundo para los viajeros);⁵ crecimiento ilimitado (la Ciudad de México ocupa actualmente el quinto lugar entre las concentraciones urbanas más grandes del mundo);⁶ y problemas de salud crecientes (se dice que aproximadamente la mitad de los residentes de la ciudad tienen problemas de peso, moderados a graves).⁷ Hoy en día, la mayoría de las visiones del futuro de la ciudad consisten simplemente en predecir qué profecía se convertirá en realidad y le dará a la agonizante ciudad su corte de gracia.

Abrumados por la avalancha de crisis que se agravan sin cesar, los problemas urgentes de la seguridad alimentaria y los sistemas de suministro y distribución de alimentos (food security and food supply and distribution systems (FSDS)) parecen haber pasado desapercibidos por la ciudad.^{8,9} Como acertadamente señala Gerardo Torres Salcido, "a pesar de la importancia de la

4. Esta cifra solo incluye los delitos denunciados y registrados oficialmente por la (Procuraduría General de Justicia de la Ciudad de México 2020).
5. Consulte el Commuter Pain Index de IBM, que se compone de diez cuestiones clave: 1) el tiempo de viaje, 2) el tiempo atascado en el tráfico, 3) el precio de la gasolina ya es demasiado alto, 4) el tráfico ha empeorado, 5) el tráfico de arranque y parada es un problema, 6) conducir causa estrés, 7) conducir causa enojo, 8) el tráfico afecta el trabajo, 9) el tráfico es tan malo que la conducción se detiene y 10) decidió no hacer un viaje debido al tráfico (IBM 2011).
6. Según la organización City Mayors, las cinco áreas urbanas más grandes del mundo en 2020 fueron Tokio (37,28 millones), Mumbai (25,97 millones), Delhi (25,83 millones), Dhaka (22,04 millones) y Ciudad de México (21,81 millones) (City Mayors, nd).
7. Un estudio reciente encontró que "casi siete millones de personas tenían sobrepeso y cinco millones de personas eran clínicamente obesas, un total del 56% de la población de la ciudad de alrededor de 21 millones". (Masa 2015).
8. Según la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO), "la seguridad alimentaria existe cuando todas las personas, en todo momento, tienen acceso físico y económico a alimentos suficientes, inocuos y nutritivos que satisfagan sus necesidades dietéticas y preferencias alimentarias para una vida activa y saludable". Además, la FAO destaca cuatro dimensiones clave necesarias para garantizar la seguridad alimentaria: disponibilidad, acceso, utilización y estabilidad (Organización de las

market in search of answers. Spanning 800 acres (Figure 1), an area slightly smaller than New York's Central Park, Central de Abasto is by far the largest wholesale market in the world (its two closest, yet distant, competitors are France's Rungis International Market with a total of 573 acres and Spain's *Mercamadrid* with 435).¹⁰ Over a given year, it is visited by as many people as live in all of Mexico. Meanwhile, on an average day, it welcomes approximately half a million visitors (the entire population of major U.S. cities like Miami, Kansas City, or Atlanta), and during peak shopping seasons like Lent, Mother's Day, Christmas, or *Día de Muertos* (Day of the Dead), the number of daily visitors can spike far beyond 600,000.

Over 20,000 people took part in the construction of the market, which required a total of 12 million cubic feet of concrete, 78,000 tons of steel, 70 million cubic feet of excavated soil, and 16 million square feet of plywood for formwork. All this material was rolled into a built area of 6.5 million square feet divided into eight main sections: food and groceries, fruit and vegetables, empty containers, meat and poultry, transfer warehouses, flowers, auctions, and sleeping quarters. Central de Abasto is so large that it has its own zip code, its own radio station, two healthcare clinics, and its own solid waste processing plant (on a single day, the market produces around 140 tons of trash). To help visitors navigate the market's endless network of spaces, the city called in urban wayfinding expert Lance Wyman, who had developed other large-scale graphic projects in Mexico City, including the Mexico 68 Olympics and the city's subway system. It seems almost unavoidable to describe Central de Abasto without resorting to the worn-out cliché of "a city within a city."¹¹

Day in and day out, 3,500 trailer trucks rush through its bustling streets, and close to 60,000 automobiles scramble from one end to another trying to secure one of its 3,224 parking spaces. Meanwhile, an indefatigable army of nearly 14,000 hand-cart operators zigzag its endless corridors transferring 30,000 tons of produce, a quarter of the market's total storage capacity, in single loads that can weigh up to 900 pounds each. Market activity translates into a business of nine billion U.S. dollars, primarily cash, that flows in and out of the market year-round.

10. Unless specified otherwise, all data in this section is from the book *Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México*. La más grande del mundo (Rodríguez 2018) and from Central de Abasto's official website (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México, n.d.).

11. As Alonso Ruvalcaba states, referencing Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges, "Central de Abasto contains everything that Mexico City contains, but it does so vertiginously, like an *Aleph*." (Ruvalcaba 2018, 22).

alimentación en la vida económica, social y cultural de las comunidades urbanas, la investigación sobre políticas de abastecimiento de alimentos ha quedado prácticamente relegada desde la década de 1990 a favor de otros grandes temas de política pública" (Torres Salcido 2003, 11). Por ejemplo, el análisis más completo de la Ciudad de México actual, el gigantesco libro colaborativo de Gustavo Garza en 2000, *La Ciudad de México en el fin del segundo Milenio*, ignora por completo el tema de los FSDS. Su quinto capítulo, que se centra exclusivamente en la infraestructura y los servicios públicos, incluye artículos sobre energía, agua, combustible, transporte, telecomunicaciones, educación, salud, seguridad, actividades culturales, turismo y residuos, pero no aborda el vasto y complejo suministro de alimentos de la ciudad y de las redes de distribución (Garza 2000).

ABASTECIMIENTO Y DISTRIBUCIÓN MAYORISTA EN LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO: UNA VISIÓN GENERAL

Cuando la primera ola de COVID-19 comenzó a pasar factura a la Central de Abasto, el "leviatán urbano", como Diane Davis describe la Ciudad de México (Davis 1999), comenzó a pasar hambre y todos miraron al mercado central de la ciudad en busca de respuestas. Con una extensión de 800 acres (Figura 1), un área ligeramente más pequeña que el Central Park de Nueva York, la Central de Abasto es, por mucho, el mercado mayorista más grande del mundo (sus dos competidores más cercanos, pero distantes, son el mercado internacional de Rungis de Francia con un total de 573 hectáreas y Mercamadrid de España con 435).¹⁰ Durante un año determinado, es visitado por

Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación, 2006).

9. La FAO define los sistemas urbanos de suministro y distribución de alimentos como "combinaciones complejas de actividades, funciones y relaciones (producción, manipulación, almacenamiento, transporte, proceso, envasado, mayoristas, minoristas, etc.) que permiten a las ciudades satisfacer sus necesidades alimentarias. Estas actividades son realizadas por diferentes agentes económicos (actores): productores, ensambladores, importadores, transportistas, mayoristas, minoristas, procesadores, comerciantes, vendedores ambulantes, proveedores de servicios (crédito, almacenamiento, porteo, información y extensión), proveedores de empaques, instituciones públicas. (por ejemplo, gobiernos municipales y locales, juntas públicas de comercialización de alimentos, Ministerio de Agricultura, Ministerio de Transporte) y asociaciones privadas (por ejemplo, comerciantes, transportistas, comerciantes y consumidores)". (Aragrande y Argenti 2001).

10. Salvo que se especifique lo contrario, todos los datos de esta sección son del libro *Central de Abasto de*

Nationwide, only the Mexican Stock Exchange moves more money in an average year. Unsurprisingly, the high concentration of people and cash has produced one of the city's largest criminal hotbeds; muggings, kidnappings, and extortions are rampant (Fuentes 2020).¹² In response, the market was equipped with its own police station, from which a total of 180 officers are deployed over three, different 8-hour shifts, as well as a customized surveillance center that controls a network of over 600 CCTV cameras and 100 panic buttons strategically laid out throughout the market's 800 acres.

Central de Abasto is only the latest of Mexico City's long history of megamarkets, and each of the city's major eras has relied on the recurring strategy of centralized supply to satisfy its growing appetite.¹³ In general terms, it has three main predecessors: first, the great market of Tlatelolco during the pre-Columbian period, which distributed goods from all over Mesoamerica and was colossal even by today's standards;¹⁴ second, the market known as *El Parián* during the Spanish colonial period, which took over after the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521 and supplied a wide range of local and imported products from Europe and Asia for the city's increasingly Europeanized population;¹⁵ and third, the network of

12. To make matters worse, Central de Abasto lays in the heart of Mexico City's most violent borough, Iztapalapa, which in 2019 alone had a total of 38,185 reported crimes (Procuraduría General de Justicia de la Ciudad de México 2020).
13. A good starting point for understanding the general history of Mexico City's markets is the book *Caminos y mercados de México* edited by Janet Long Towell and Amalia Attolini Lecón (Long and Attolini 2017).
14. Conquistador Hernan Cortes once estimated that Tlatelolco welcomed up to 60,000 visitors on any given day. A rich description of Tlatelolco market, and Tenochtitlan's public life in general, can be found in the letters that Cortes sent to King Charles V between 1519 and 1526. Regarding Tlatelolco, Cortes states, "This city has many public squares, in which are situated the markets and other places for buying and selling. There is one square twice as large as that of the city of Salamanca, surrounded by porticoes, where are daily assembled more than sixty thousand souls, engaged in buying, and selling; and where are found all kinds of merchandise that the world affords, embracing the necessities of life." He then goes on to describe in amazing detail the infinite range of products and services bought and sold throughout the sprawling market (Cortes 1866).
15. For a history of El Parián and other markets in and around the city's main square, see *Los mercados de la Plaza Mayor en la Ciudad de México* by Jorge Olvera Ramos (Olvera 2007)

tantas personas como viven en todo México. Mientras tanto, en un día promedio, recibe aproximadamente a medio millón de visitantes (toda la población de las principales ciudades de Estados Unidos como Miami, Kansas City o Atlanta), y durante las temporadas pico de compras como Cuaresma, Día de la Madre, Navidad o Día de Muertos, el número de visitantes diarios puede superar los 600.000.

Más de 20.000 personas participaron en la construcción del mercado, que requirió un total de 12 millones de pies cúbicos de concreto, 78.000 toneladas de acero, 70 millones de pies cúbicos de suelo excavado y 16 millones de pies cuadrados de madera contrachapada para encofrado. Todo este material se instaló en un área construida de 6.5 millones de pies cuadrados dividida en ocho secciones principales: alimentos y abarrotes, frutas y verduras, contenedores vacíos, carnes y aves de corral, almacenes de transferencia, flores, subastas y dormitorios. La Central de Abasto es tan grande que tiene su propio código postal, su propia estación de radio, dos clínicas de salud y su propia planta de procesamiento de residuos sólidos (en un solo día, el mercado produce alrededor de 140 toneladas de basura). Para ayudar a los visitantes a navegar la interminable red de espacios del mercado, la ciudad llamó al experto en señalización urbana Lance Wyman, quien había desarrollado otros proyectos gráficos a gran escala en la Ciudad de México, incluidos los Juegos Olímpicos de México 68 y el sistema de metro de la ciudad. Es casi imposible describir la Central de Abasto sin recurrir al gastado cliché de "una ciudad dentro de una ciudad".¹¹ Día tras día, 3,500 camiones de remolque recorren sus bulliciosas calles y cerca de 60,000 automóviles se mueven de un extremo a otro tratando de asegurar uno de sus 3,224 espacios de estacionamiento. Mientras tanto, un ejército infatigable de casi 14.000 operadores de carros de mercado zigzaguean por sus interminables corredores transfiriendo 30.000 toneladas de productos, una cuarta parte de la capacidad total de almacenamiento del mercado, en cargas individuales que pueden pesar hasta 900 libras cada una. La actividad del mercado se traduce en un negocio de nueve mil millones de dólares estadounidenses, principalmente en efectivo, que entran y salen del mercado durante todo el año. A nivel nacional, solo la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores

la Ciudad de México. La más grande del mundo (Rodríguez 2018) y del sitio web oficial de Central de Abasto (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México, s.f.).

11. Como afirma Alonso Ruvalcaba, refiriéndose al escritor argentino Jorge Luis Borges, "Central de Abasto contiene todo lo que contiene la Ciudad de México, pero lo hace vertiginosamente, como un Aleph". (Ruvalcaba 2018, 22).

continuously morphing commercial spaces known as *La Merced* during the independent era, which dominated the city's supply between the demolition of El Parián in 1844 and the construction of Central de Abasto in 1982.¹⁶

While the market of La Merced managed to survive most of Mexico City's mid-twentieth century modernization process, by the late 1970s, it had been outgrown by a megacity whose population was already over 10 million.^{17, 18} The non-stop flow of people and goods in and out of La Merced had begun to paralyze the city's downtown district and ended up fast-tracking the decision to build a new market. To decompress the city's overcrowded central boroughs, Central de Abasto was built in the easternmost outskirts of the city on a vast agricultural network of canals and chinampas, the traditional Aztec manmade islands.

Central de Abasto opened its doors on November 22, 1982, in a ceremony led by then-President José López Portillo one week before the end of his presidential term (a typical move in Mexican politics, popularly referred to as *inauguritis*). Despite the pressing need for the market, Central de Abasto got off to an unexpectedly slow start due to the country's ongoing crisis. For most of 1982, Mexico had been desperately trying to recover from one of the worst economic recessions in its modern history, which put a devastating end to the period known as the *Mexican Miracle*, that spanned roughly from 1940 to 1970 and during which the country experienced an unprecedented economic boom. Many of the market's unique features, including Lance Wyman's now-iconic identity and wayfinding system, were never fully implemented; and its first tenants had to accept special incentives to occupy the half-empty megastructure. But Central de Abasto eventually overcame its sluggish start and soon took over as the city's primary food supply and distribution gateway.

(DE)CENTRALIZING THE CENTRAL MARKET

During the four decades between its inauguration in 1982 and the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 – a period

16. For an overview of La Merced, see the work of sociologist Héctor Castillo Berthier, especially his book *La Merced: el comercio mayorista de alimentos en el Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México* (Castillo 2017).

17. To this day, La Merced continues to play a key role in the city and is its largest retail market.

18. La Merced's last architectural upgrade was planned and designed by architect Enrique del Moral and opened to the public on September 23, 1957. At this point, Mexico City's population was around five million (5,426,000 according to the 1960 census); two decades later it had more than doubled in size (12,991,131 according to the 1980 census) (Garza and Ruiz Chiapetto 2000).

mueve más dinero en un año promedio. Como es de esperarse, la alta concentración de personas y dinero en efectivo ha producido uno de los focos de delincuencia más grandes de la ciudad; son rampantes los asaltos, secuestros y extorsiones (Fuentes 2020).¹² En respuesta, el mercado se equipó con su propia comisaría, desde la que se despliegan un total de 180 agentes en tres turnos diferentes de 8 horas, así como un centro de vigilancia personalizado que controla una red de más de 600 cámaras CCTV y 100 de botones de pánico estratégicamente distribuidos en los 800 acres del mercado. La Central de Abasto es solo el último de la larga historia de megamercados de la Ciudad de México, y cada una de las principales épocas de la ciudad se ha basado en la estrategia recurrente de suministro centralizado para satisfacer su creciente apetito.¹³ En términos generales, tiene tres antecesores principales: primero, el gran mercado de Tlatelolco durante el período precolombino, que distribuía mercancías de toda Mesoamérica y era colosal incluso para los estándares actuales;¹⁴ segundo, el mercado conocido como El Parián durante el período colonial español, que asumió el control después de la caída de Tenochtitlan en 1521 y abasteció una amplia gama de productos locales e importados de Europa y Asia para la población cada vez más europeizada de la ciudad;¹⁵ y tercero, la red de espacios comerciales en continua transformación

12. Para empeorar las cosas, Central de Abasto se encuentra en el corazón del distrito más violento de la Ciudad de México, Iztapalapa, que solo en 2019 tuvo un total de 38,185 delitos denunciados (Procuraduría General de Justicia de la Ciudad de México 2020).

13. Un buen punto de partida para comprender la historia general de los mercados de la Ciudad de México es el libro *Caminos y mercados de México* editado por Janet Long Towell y Amalia Attolini Lecón (Long y Attolini 2017).

14. El conquistador Hernán Cortés estimó una vez que Tlatelolco recibía hasta 60.000 visitantes en un día cualquiera. Una rica descripción del mercado de Tlatelolco, y de la vida pública de Tenochtitlán en general, se puede encontrar en las cartas que Cortés envió al rey Carlos V entre 1519 y 1526. Respecto a Tlatelolco, Cortés afirma: "Esta ciudad tiene muchas plazas públicas, en las que se ubican los mercados y otros lugares de compra y venta. Hay una plaza dos veces mayor que la de la ciudad de Salamanca, rodeada de pórticos, donde diariamente se reúnen más de sesenta mil almas, dedicadas a comprar y vender; y donde se encuentran toda clase de mercancías que el mundo ofrece, abarcando las necesidades de la vida." Luego continúa describiendo con asombroso detalle la infinita gama de productos y servicios comprados y vendidos en todo el mercado en expansión (Cortés 1866).

during which Mexico City's population grew from 14 million to 22 million – Central de Abasto managed to feed the increasingly hungry metropolis on a day-to-day basis without any major setbacks. Then COVID-19 hit; and while the pandemic didn't have a long-term impact on the market or the city's FSDSs, it unveiled an array of hidden or neglected vulnerabilities that raised previously unasked questions regarding the state of the once all-powerful market.¹⁹ Until 2020, the mere idea of being home to the world's largest wholesale market appeared to give the city's residents a collective sense of inexhaustible food supply. No one seemed to suspect that Central de Abasto's size could, in fact, become the city's new Achilles heel.

As food shortages became visible and widespread during the pandemic's peaks, fears of a generalized food crisis in the face of the city's crippled FSDSs spread quickly throughout the entire metropolitan area.²⁰ Concerns forced both local and federal governments to specifically address the long-neglected issue of food security. In April of 2020, Mexico's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development published a series of FAQs regarding the impact of COVID-19 on the country's food supply (Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2020). One month later, Mexico City's mayoress, Claudia Sheinbaum, delivered a statement in which she insisted that the city was well-protected against any possible food shortage. To back up her claims, Sheinbaum praised the healthy state of Central de Abasto, but also hinted at its potential vulnerabilities by stating that it was being closely monitored by government officials. (El Economista 2020).

Throughout its history, Mexico City has managed to satisfy its food demands simply by upscaling the size of its central wholesale markets. The city's mere survival seems to be a valid argument in favor of a highly centralized model of supply and distribution. However, the hard blow that COVID-19 delivered to the single lifeline provided by Central de Abasto

19. Shortly after the first COVID-19 wave peaked, Central de Abasto bounced back to pre-pandemic numbers by implementing a robust strategy of testing, contact tracing, and isolation (Luhnow and Montes 2020). In and around the market, signs were put up alerting citizens of the potential risk of entering the site, while its main entrance boasted a billboard-sized banner that read: "warning! you are entering a high-contagion area. use hand sanitizer. keep your distance." Local authorities even sent brigades of popular wrestlers—or luchadores—who roamed the market enforcing the proper use of face masks among visitors and employees.

20. According to some sources, for example, food shortages tripled during the pandemic's critical periods compared to pre-pandemic levels (Noguez 2021).

conocida como La Merced durante el período de la independencia, que dominó la oferta de la ciudad entre la demolición de El Parián en 1844 y la construcción de la Central de Abasto en 1982.¹⁶

Si bien el mercado de La Merced logró sobrevivir a la mayor parte del proceso de modernización de la Ciudad de México a mediados del siglo XX, a fines de la década de 1970 había sido excedido por una megaciudad cuya población ya superaba los 10 millones.^{17, 18} El flujo continuo de personas y mercancías que entraban y salían de La Merced había comenzado a paralizar el distrito del centro de la ciudad y terminó acelerando la decisión de construir un nuevo mercado. Para descomprimir los distritos centrales superpoblados de la ciudad, la Central de Abasto se construyó en las afueras, más al este de la ciudad, en una vasta red agrícola de canales y chinampas, las artificiales islas tradicionales aztecas.

La Central de Abasto abrió sus puertas el 22 de noviembre de 1982, en una ceremonia encabezada por el entonces presidente José López Portillo una semana antes del final de su mandato presidencial (un movimiento típico en la política mexicana, popularmente referido como inauguritis). A pesar de la apremiante necesidad del mercado, la Central de Abasto tuvo un comienzo inesperadamente lento debido a la actual crisis del país. Durante la mayor parte de 1982, México había estado tratando desesperadamente de recuperarse de una de las peores recesiones económicas de su historia moderna, que puso un final devastador al período conocido como el Milagro Mexicano, que se extendió aproximadamente de 1940 a 1970 y durante el cual el país experimentó un boom económico sin precedentes. Muchas de las características únicas del mercado, incluido el ahora icónico sistema de

15. Para conocer la historia de El Parián y otros mercados en y alrededor de la plaza principal de la ciudad, vea *Los mercados de la Plaza Mayor en la Ciudad de México* por Jorge Olvera Ramos (Olvera 2007).

16. Para una descripción general de La Merced, consulte el trabajo del sociólogo Héctor Castillo Berthier, especialmente su libro *La Merced: el comercio mayorista de alimentos en el Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México* (Castillo 2017).

17. Hasta el día de hoy, La Merced continúa desempeñando un papel clave en la ciudad y es su mayor mercado minorista.

18. La última remodelación arquitectónica de La Merced fue planeada y diseñada por el arquitecto Enrique del Moral y se abrió al público el 23 de septiembre de 1957. En este punto, la población de la Ciudad de México tenía alrededor de cinco millones (5.426.000 según el censo de 1960); dos décadas después, su tamaño se había más que duplicado (12.991.131 según el censo de 1980) (Garza y Ruiz Chiapetto 2000).

highlighted the need to bring FSDS alternatives into the conversation. Recent research on FSDSs tends to back up this claim. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for example, has expressed the need to decentralize urban food supply in cities of a certain size and structure. Regarding wholesale market planning in urban contexts, the FAO criticizes the single-market approach and favors a multiple-market solution in cases where “there are many small-scale retailers, with premises scattered throughout the city; if retailers’ transport facilities are inadequate; and if roads are highly congested” (Tracey-White 1991).²¹ All these issues, especially retail scatteredness and traffic congestion, are more than prescient in a place like Mexico City, where an estimated 200,000 food retailers are spread throughout an area of over 3,000 square miles and traffic has been ranked as the worst in the world.²² More specifically, a 2019 report on Central de Abasto’s current state, presented by the federal government’s Center for Sustainable Rural Development and Food Sovereignty Studies, which conducts collaborative research on sustainable development and food sovereignty, reached similar conclusions to the FAO regarding FSDS centralization.²³ The report’s key recommendation

21. Tracey-White writes, “The first decision that needs to be considered is whether it is necessary to concentrate all wholesaling activities at a single site. It may be possible for an existing market to serve the central area of a town and for outer suburban areas to be served by a new market. Alternatively, the scale of a city may favor more than one outer wholesale market, which may serve either the needs of producers bringing produce from different directions or the needs of retailers in a city with widely dispersed retail areas.” (Tracey-White 1991)

22. Rankings are a calculation of retailers based on data from the 2019 economic census conducted by Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021); the physical size of the city varies depending on criteria. This number considers the entire land area of the boroughs and municipalities that define the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico. Data retrieved from Mexico’s Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, n.d.); for a detailed analysis of Central the Abasto’s impact on Mexico City’s traffic, see the work of Luis Chias Becerril and Socorro Romero Valle (Chias and Romero 2003).

23. In its study, the Center for Sustainable Rural Development and Food Sovereignty Studies stated that “more than 35 years after its creation, Central de Abasto has serious hygiene, safety, transport, health, and environmental problems; today it has a negative impact on the health of the people who go there to buy

identificación y señalización de Lance Wyman, nunca se implementaron por completo; y sus primeros inquilinos tuvieron que aceptar incentivos especiales para ocupar la megaestructura medio vacía. Pero la Central de Abasto finalmente superó su lento comienzo y pronto se convirtió en la principal puerta de entrada de suministro y distribución de alimentos de la ciudad.

(DES) CENTRALIZANDO EL MERCADO CENTRAL

Durante las cuatro décadas transcurridas entre su inauguración en 1982 y la crisis del COVID-19 en 2020, —un período durante el cual la población de la Ciudad de México aumentó de 14 millones a 22 millones—, la Central de Abasto logró alimentar a la metrópolis cada vez más hambrienta, día a día, sin mayores contratiempos. Luego golpeó el COVID-19; y si bien la pandemia no tuvo un impacto a largo plazo en el mercado o los FSDS de la ciudad, reveló una serie de vulnerabilidades ocultas o desatendidas que suscitaron preguntas no planteadas anteriormente sobre el estado del mercado una vez todopoderoso.¹⁹ Hasta 2020, la mera idea de albergar el mercado mayorista más grande del mundo parecía dar a los residentes de la ciudad una sensación colectiva de suministro inagotable de alimentos. Nadie parecía sospechar que el tamaño de la Central de Abasto podría, de hecho, convertirse en el nuevo talón de Aquiles de la ciudad.

A medida que la escasez de alimentos se hizo visible y generalizada durante los picos de la pandemia, los temores de una crisis alimentaria generalizada frente a los FSDS paralizados de la ciudad se extendieron rápidamente por toda el área metropolitana.²⁰ Las preocupaciones obligaron tanto a los gobiernos locales como a los federales a abordar

19. Poco después de que la primera ola de COVID-19 alcanzó su punto máximo, Central de Abasto se recuperó a los números anteriores a la pandemia al implementar una estrategia sólida de pruebas, rastreo de contactos y aislamiento (Luhnow y Montes 2020). En y alrededor del mercado, se colocaron carteles que alertaban a los ciudadanos del riesgo potencial de ingresar al sitio, mientras que su entrada principal lucía un cartel del tamaño de una valla publicitaria que decía: “¡Advertencia! está entrando en una zona de alto contagio. use gel desinfectante. Mantenga su distancia.” Las autoridades locales incluso enviaron brigadas de luchadores populares —o luchadores— que deambulaban por el mercado imponiendo el uso adecuado de máscaras faciales entre visitantes y empleados.

20. Según algunas fuentes, por ejemplo, la escasez de alimentos se triplicó durante los periodos críticos de la pandemia en comparación con los niveles previos a la pandemia (Noguez 2021).

was that Central de Abasto “be decentralized to its periphery, either completely to a single place or divided into marketing sectors in different places.” (CEDRSSA 2019, 21-22).

Though Mexico City is not entirely new to infrastructural decentralization, only a handful of truly large-scale efforts exist, some of which provide helpful precedents and references in terms of alternative ways of distributing people, information, and goods in the city.²⁴ For example, in the early 1970s, Mexico’s Ministry of Communications and Transportation decided to reorganize Mexico City’s long-distance bus system, which until then operated mostly out of the city’s traffic-jammed central boroughs, by building four terminals in cardinal points along the outskirts of the city: *Terminal de Autobuses del Norte* to the north, *Terminal de Autobuses del Sur* (or *Taxqueña*) to the south, *Terminal de Autobuses del Poniente* (or *Observatorio*) to the east, and *Terminal de Autobuses de Pasajeros de Oriente* to the west. When the Autonomous Metropolitan University (*Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana*), one of the country’s leading public higher education institutions, was created in 1974, it was conceived as three separate campuses that followed a distributional logic similar to that of the city’s bus terminals: *Azcapotzalco* to the north, *Xochimilco* to the south, and *Iztapalapa* to the east. In 2005 a fourth campus was built in the city’s westernmost borough, *Cuajimalpa*.²⁵

Some efforts have been made to apply similar

or sell, of those who work there, and of the population neighboring the market.” (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable y la Soberanía Alimentaria 2019, 21-22).

24. This is a triad that Francois Ascher refers to as the *P.I.G. System*: “The history of cities has been marked by the history of techniques for transporting and storing people, information and goods. This system of mobilities, which we call the *P.I.G. System*, constitutes the core of urban dynamics, from writing to the Internet, through the wheel, the printing press, the railroad, the telegraph, reinforced concrete, ultra-high temperature processing, pasteurization, and refrigeration, the streetcar, the elevator, the telephone, the automobile, the radio, etc.” (Ascher 2004, 20).
25. Although the official argument behind the Autonomous Metropolitan University’s decentralized model was the need to bring higher education closer to the city’s most marginalized and impoverished areas, some have insisted that it was fueled by a divide-and-conquer strategy following the widespread 1968 anti-government student protests that ended in the tragic Tlatelolco Square massacre. At the time, the National University’s central campus (*Ciudad Universitaria*) acted as a key gathering and organizing point during the protests.

específicamente el tema de la seguridad alimentaria, descuidado durante mucho tiempo. En abril de 2020, la Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural de México publicó una serie de preguntas frecuentes sobre el impacto del COVID-19 en el suministro de alimentos del país (Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2020). Un mes después, la alcaldesa de la Ciudad de México, Claudia Sheinbaum, presentó un comunicado en el que insistió que la ciudad estaba bien protegida contra cualquier posible escasez de alimentos. Para respaldar sus afirmaciones, Sheinbaum elogió el estado saludable de Central de Abasto, pero también insinuó sus posibles vulnerabilidades al afirmar que estaba siendo monitoreado de cerca por funcionarios del gobierno (El Economista 2020).

A lo largo de su historia, la Ciudad de México ha logrado satisfacer sus demandas de alimentos simplemente aumentando el tamaño de sus mercados mayoristas centrales. La mera supervivencia de la ciudad parece ser un argumento válido a favor de un modelo de suministro y distribución altamente centralizado. Sin embargo, el duro golpe que dio el COVID-19 al salvavidas proporcionado por la Central de Abasto destacó la necesidad de incorporar alternativas a los FSDS en la conversación. Las investigaciones recientes sobre los FSDS tienden a respaldar esta afirmación. La Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)), por ejemplo, ha expresado la necesidad de descentralizar el suministro urbano de alimentos en ciudades de cierto tamaño y estructura. En cuanto a la planificación del mercado mayorista en contextos urbanos, la FAO critica el enfoque de mercado único y favorece una solución de mercado múltiple en los casos en los que “hay muchos minoristas de pequeña escala, con locales repartidos por la ciudad; si las instalaciones de transporte de los minoristas son inadecuadas; y si las carreteras están muy congestionadas” (Tracey-White 1991).²¹ Todos estos problemas, especialmente la dispersión de las tiendas minoristas y la congestión del tráfico, son más que proféticos en un lugar como la Ciudad de México, donde se estima que 200,000 minoristas de alimentos

21. Tracey-White escribe: “La primera decisión que debe considerarse es si es necesario concentrar todas las actividades de venta al por mayor en un solo sitio. Es posible que un mercado existente sirva al área central de una ciudad y que las áreas suburbanas exteriores sean atendidas por un nuevo mercado. Alternativamente, la escala de una ciudad puede favorecer más de un mercado mayorista externo, que puede satisfacer las necesidades de los productores que traen productos de diferentes direcciones o las necesidades de los minoristas en una ciudad con áreas minoristas muy dispersas” (Tracey-White 1991).

decentralization strategies to Mexico City's FSDSs. Most notably, in the mid-nineties, a couple of smaller wholesale markets were built in the peripheral municipalities of Ecatepec and Tultitlán, with the idea of improving food distribution throughout the metropolitan area's rapidly sprawling northern districts. While some scholars suggest that secondary wholesale markets like those in Ecatepec and Tultitlán can eventually lead the way towards developing new alternatives to Central de Abasto's lasting hegemony (Torres Torres 1999, 97), many others are far more skeptical, insisting that the true solution to the city's food insecurity requires radically restructuring the city's FSDSs and not simply rearranging, or even expanding, its network of wholesale markets (Echanove 2003, 84; Chias 2003, 142; Morales 2003, 95-97). The key argument behind this critique is the idea that food insecurity in the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico is not simply an infrastructural issue but the result of a growing economic and political monopolization of the city's highly profitable FSDSs.

For example, in her research on fruit and vegetable production and distribution in Mexico City, economist Flavia Echanove found that a powerful minority consisting of 4 percent of Central de Abasto's wholesalers controlled approximately 80 percent of the produce sold there (Echanove 2003, 75). Unable to independently access the city's tightly controlled distribution chains, local farmers have no other option than to operate through Central de Abasto's predatory middlemen. By the time their produce, often harvested only a few miles away, reaches local supermarkets, the price can be as much as ten times what farmers were initially paid. During high-demand seasons, such as Lent or Christmas, the price of popular local products like *nopales* (prickly pear or paddle cactus) and *romeritos* (seepweed) can increase up to 3,000 percent (Pérez 2008).

ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND IDEOLOGICAL CENTERS: MEXICO CITY AS AXIS MUNDI

The markedly centralized nature of Mexico City's FSDSs is anything but an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, it is deeply rooted in a long history of highly hierarchical power structures that date back to pre-Columbian times and reach deep into the city's foundational myth. The ancient city-state of Mexico-Tenochtitlan, Mexico City's predecessor, was built in the middle of an island in the middle of a lake and based on the idea of a promised land singled out by the gods. In this sense, it was conceived as an *axis mundi*, the center of the known universe. Even the city's name is an expression of the notion of centrality: the most accepted version of Mexico's toponym translates to 'the place in the middle of the moon' (from a combination of Nahuatl words: *metzli*, moon;

se distribuyen en un área de más de 3,000 millas cuadradas y el tráfico ha sido clasificado como el peor del mundo.²²

Más específicamente, un informe de 2019 sobre el estado actual de la Central de Abasto, presentado por el Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible y Soberanía Alimentaria del gobierno federal, que lleva a cabo investigaciones colaborativas sobre desarrollo sostenible y soberanía alimentaria, llegó a conclusiones similares a las de la FAO con respecto a la centralización de los FSDS.²³ La recomendación clave del informe fue que la Central de Abasto "se descentralice hacia su periferia, ya sea completamente en un solo lugar o dividida en sectores de comercialización en diferentes lugares" (CEDRSSA 2019, 21-22). Aunque la Ciudad de México no es completamente nueva en la descentralización de la infraestructura, solo existen unos pocos esfuerzos verdaderamente a gran escala, algunos de los cuales brindan precedentes y referencias útiles en términos de formas alternativas de distribuir personas, información y bienes en la ciudad.²⁴

22. Las clasificaciones son un cálculo de los minoristas basado en datos del censo económico de 2019 realizado por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía de México (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2021); el tamaño físico de la ciudad varía según los criterios. Este número considera toda la superficie territorial de los distritos y municipios que definen el Área Metropolitana del Valle de México. Datos recuperados de la Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales de México (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, s.f.); Para un análisis detallado del impacto del Abasto Central en el tráfico de la Ciudad de México, vea el trabajo de Luis Chias Becerril y Socorro Romero Valle (Chias y Romero 2003).

23. En su estudio, el Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible y Soberanía Alimentaria señaló que "a más de 35 años de su creación, la Central de Abasto tiene serios problemas de higiene, seguridad, transporte, salud y medio ambiente; hoy tiene un impacto negativo en la salud de las personas que van allí a comprar o vender, de quienes trabajan allí y de la población vecina al mercado". (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable y la Soberanía Alimentaria 2019, 21-22).

24. Esta es una tríada a la que Francois Ascher se refiere como el Sistema P.I.G.: "La historia de las ciudades ha estado marcada por la historia de las técnicas de transporte y almacenamiento de personas, información y mercancías. Este sistema de moviidades, que llamamos Sistema P.I.G., constituye el núcleo de la dinámica urbana, desde la escritura hasta Internet, pasando por la rueda, la imprenta, el ferrocarril, el telégrafo, el hormigón armado, el procesamiento

xictli, center; and *co*, place).

Mexico-Tenochtitlan's spatial layout further expressed this idea of hyper-centrality. For example, the entire city grew outward from a central citadel that housed what Alfonso Reyes refers to as a "triple unit" formed by the palace, temple, and marketplace. The citadel was both the starting point of the city's main roads and the intersection of its four great districts or *campan* – Moyotla, Teopan, Atzacualco, and Cuexpopan (Reyes 2002, 19).²⁶ Even today, the central citadel is the point where the country's kilometer zero or zero-mile marker is located.

The triple unit's largest and most significant structure was the temple, known as *Templo Mayor*, which was the utmost expression of the city's *axis mundi*. As Eduardo Matos Moctezuma has pointed out, Templo Mayor was "the navel and fundamental center of the universe's structure, the place where the vertical and horizontal planes crossed, that is, the passage to the higher celestial levels and to the underworlds, as well as the place from which the four corners of the universe depart." (Matos Moctezuma 2018, 29). Interestingly, food supply and distribution were key elements of the mythical hyper-center. *Templo Mayor* was a double pyramid, each half representing two deities and two holy mountains: Huitzilopochtli (god of war) and Coatepec (mountain of the serpents) on one side and Tlaloc (god of rain and agriculture) and Tonacatepetl (mountain of sustenance) on the other. According to the Aztecs, Tonacatepetl mountain was the place that contained the whole of the known world's food supply (Matos Moctezuma 2018, 60). In a city so profoundly marked by mythology, both ancient and modern, the hyper-concentration of FSDSs in its great central markets, from Tlatelolco to El Parián to La Merced to Central de Abasto, seems to bear the marks of the myth of Tonacatepetl as the universe's single source of food supply.

The conception of the city as an *axis mundi* has

26. In *The City in History*, Lewis Mumford highlights the importance of the same triad in other ancient urban settlements. Mumford writes, "Certainly, by the time the archaeologist's spade unearths a recognizable city, he finds a walled precinct, a citadel, made of durable materials, even if the rest of the town lacks a wall or permanent structures. This holds from Uruk to Harappa. Within that precinct he usually finds three huge stone or baked-brick buildings, buildings whose very magnitude sets them aside from the other structures in the city: the palace, the granary, and the temple." (Mumford 1961, 37). The triad can be read as a spatial expression of the notion of power proposed by authors like Norberto Bobbio, who famously identified three basic forms of power: political (accumulation of force), economic (accumulation of wealth) and ideological (accumulation of ideas and information) (Bobbio 2005, 110-111).

Por ejemplo, a principios de la década de 1970, la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transporte de México decidió reorganizar el sistema de autobuses de larga distancia de la Ciudad de México, que hasta entonces operaba principalmente en los distritos centrales congestionados de tráfico de la ciudad, mediante la construcción de cuatro terminales en puntos cardinales a lo largo de las afueras de la ciudad: Terminal de Autobuses del Norte al norte, Terminal de Autobuses del Sur (o Taxqueña) al sur, Terminal de Autobuses del Poniente (u Observatorio) al este y Terminal de Autobuses de Pasajeros de Oriente al oeste. Cuando la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, una de las principales instituciones públicas de educación superior del país, fue creada en 1974, se concibió como tres campus separados que seguían una lógica distributiva similar a la de las terminales de autobuses de la ciudad: Azcapotzalco al norte, Xochimilco al sur e Iztapalapa al este. En 2005 se construyó un cuarto campus en el distrito más occidental de la ciudad, Cuajimalpa.²⁵ Se han realizado algunos esfuerzos para aplicar estrategias de descentralización similares a los FSDS de la Ciudad de México. En particular, a mediados de los noventa, se construyeron un par de mercados mayoristas más pequeños en los municipios periféricos de Ecatepec y Tultitlán, con la idea de mejorar la distribución de alimentos en los distritos del norte del área metropolitana que se expanden rápidamente. Si bien algunos académicos sugieren que los mercados mayoristas secundarios como los de Ecatepec y Tultitlán pueden eventualmente liderar el camino hacia el desarrollo de nuevas alternativas a la hegemonía duradera de la Central de Abasto (Torres Torres, 1999, 97), muchos otros son mucho más escépticos e insisten en que la verdadera solución a la inseguridad alimentaria de la ciudad requiere una reestructuración radical de los FSDS de la ciudad y no simplemente reorganizar, o incluso expandir, su red de mercados mayoristas (Echanove 2003, 84; Chias 2003, 142;

de ultra alta temperatura, la pasteurización y la refrigeración, el tranvía, el ascensor, el teléfono, automóvil, radio, etc." (Ascher 2004, 20).

25. Aunque el argumento oficial detrás del modelo descentralizado de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana fue la necesidad de acercar la educación superior a las áreas más marginadas y empobrecidas de la ciudad, algunos han insistido en que fue impulsado por una estrategia de divide y vencerás luego de las protestas estudiantiles contra el gobierno generalizadas de 1968 que terminaron en la trágica masacre de la plaza Tlatelolco. En ese momento, el campus central de la Universidad Nacional (Ciudad Universitaria) actuó como un punto clave de reunión y organización durante las protestas.

left a deep and long-lasting imprint on Mexico's social imagination as well as its central power structures.²⁷ Throughout major historical shifts, the city's centers have been re-signified time and time again; but the underlying, centralized nature of the city has seldom been challenged in any significant way. On the contrary, every new expression of central powers tends to be not only big and bold but bigger and bolder than the one before. Architecture, urban planning, and infrastructural development have been cornerstones of the generalized process of recentralization. Most of Mexico City's large-scale urban projects, both public and private, are the result not only of the growing needs of the city's population but also of the growing boastfulness of its upper echelons. This ego-trip has sent the city into a centuries-long spiral of urban monumentality that peaked under the uninterrupted 71-year reign of the quasi-dictatorial Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or PRI). During this period, the government's unprecedented concentration of power fostered an equally unprecedented concentration of people, information, and goods in a series of colossal urban projects led by a handful of larger-than-life architects and planners like Mario Pani and Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.²⁸

The PRI monopolized Mexico's federal government from 1929 until 2000, when rightist candidate Vicente Fox won the presidential election. The PRI's final years in power were marked by the gradual decline of its once invulnerable political apparatus and by the gradual emergence of new rivaling forces across the entire political spectrum. By the mid-nineties, the PRI's monolithic control over Mexico City began to splinter into a fiercely contested battleground between left, right, and center.

A tipping point came in 1997, when the Federal District or *Distrito Federal*, Mexico City's political and administrative perimeter, held popular elections for

27. Today, for example, Mexico City exerts an enormous centripetal force over the country, not unlike that of ancient Tenochtitlan over most of Mesoamerica. Not only is Mexico City the seat of the federal government (and of virtually all federal-level institutions), but its metropolitan area concentrates 17 percent of the country's population, 18 percent of its workforce, and close to a quarter of its gross domestic product. (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015, 5).

28. Some examples include Mario Pani and Enrique del Moral's 1952 main campus for Mexico's National University (which covers a total of 1800 acres), Pani's 1964 *Nonoalco-Tlatelolco* housing development (initially home to some 80,000 residents), and Pedro Ramírez Vázquez's Guadalupe Basilica (visited each year by over seven million people).

Morales 2003, 95-97). El argumento clave detrás de esta crítica es la idea de que la inseguridad alimentaria en el Área Metropolitana del Valle de México no es simplemente un problema de infraestructura, sino el resultado de una creciente monopolización económica y política de los FSDS altamente rentables de la ciudad. Por ejemplo, en su investigación sobre la producción y distribución de frutas y hortalizas en la Ciudad de México, la economista Flavia Echanove encontró que una poderosa minoría compuesta por el 4 por ciento de los mayoristas de la Central de Abasto controlaba aproximadamente el 80 por ciento de los productos vendidos allí (Echanove 2003, 75). Al no poder acceder de forma independiente a las cadenas de distribución estrictamente controladas de la ciudad, los agricultores locales no tienen otra opción que operar a través de los intermediarios depredadores de la Central de Abasto. Cuando sus productos, que a menudo se cosechan a pocos kilómetros de distancia, llegan a los supermercados locales, el precio puede ser hasta diez veces superior al que se les pagó inicialmente a los agricultores. Durante temporadas de alta demanda, como Cuaremas o Navidad, el precio de productos locales populares como los nopales (higo chumbo o nopal) y romeritos (suaeda) pueden aumentar hasta en un 3.000 por ciento (Pérez 2008).

SOBRE LOS CENTROS POLÍTICOS, ECONÓMICOS E IDEOLÓGICOS: LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO COMO AXIS MUNDI

La naturaleza marcadamente centralizada de los FSDS de la Ciudad de México es todo menos un fenómeno aislado. Por el contrario, está profundamente arraigado en una larga historia de estructuras de poder altamente jerárquicas que se remontan a la época precolombina y se adentran profundamente en el mito fundacional de la ciudad. La antigua ciudad-estado de México-Tenochtitlán, antecesora de la Ciudad de México, fue construida en medio de una isla, entre un lago y basada en la idea de una tierra prometida señalada por los dioses. En este sentido, fue concebida como un axis mundi, el centro del universo conocido. Incluso el nombre de la ciudad es una expresión de la noción de centralidad: la versión más aceptada de la toponimia de México se traduce como 'el lugar en medio de la luna' (de una combinación de palabras náhuatl: metztli, luna; xictli, centro; y co, lugar).

El diseño espacial de México-Tenochtitlán expresó aún más esta idea de hipercentralidad. Por ejemplo, toda la ciudad creció hacia afuera a partir de una ciudadela central que albergaba lo que Alfonso Reyes llama una "unidad triple" formada por el palacio, el templo y el mercado. La ciudadela era tanto el punto de partida de las carreteras principales de la ciudad como la intersección de sus cuatro grandes distritos o campan: Moyotla, Teopan, Atzacolco y Cuicuilco (Reyes 2002, 19).²⁶ Incluso hoy, la

the very first time and was won by the leftist politician Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.²⁹ Until then, the city's mayors, called *regentes* (regents), were designated directly by the president, making Mexico City a political extension of the federal government. In addition, from the late 1970s on, Mexico City began sprawling beyond the administrative perimeter of the Federal District and into the neighboring states of Mexico and Hidalgo, which made its political map even more complex.³⁰ Although a handful of political reforms have tried to create integrated metropolitan commissions and programs to plan the city's future beyond political divisions, they have all fallen through the cracks of the metropolitan area's ever-changing geopolitical patchwork.³¹ Central de Abasto might have been the last of the old PRI's urban megaprojects, but the following regimes have all tried to leave their mark on Mexico's capital city through an ongoing display of power-wielding projects, from Alberto Kalach's Vasconcelos Library (promoted by the rightist government of President Vicente Fox) to Norman Foster's recently called-off new international airport (promoted by the centrist government of President Enrique Peña Nieto) to the Chapultepec "cultural forest" (promoted by the leftist government of current President Andrés Manuel López Obrador).

MEXICO CITY'S FSDS POLICIES AFTER THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

Although Central de Abasto first opened its doors in

29. The name was officially changed from *Distrito Federal* to *Ciudad de México* (or CDMX) in January 2016 as part of a reform aimed at granting the city greater political and economic autonomy.

30. The Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico is currently comprised of Mexico City's sixteen boroughs, plus fifty-nine municipalities of the State of Mexico and one municipality of the state of Hidalgo (Consejo Nacional de Población 2018, 104-113).

31. In 1993, for example, five major metropolitan commissions were officially created: Metropolitan Commission for Water and Sanitation (*Comisión de Agua y Drenaje del Área Metropolitana*), Metropolitan Commission of Transportation (*Comisión Metropolitana de Transporte y Vialidad*), Metropolitan Commission of Public Security and Justice Procurement (*Comisión Metropolitana de Seguridad Pública y Procuración de Justicia*), Metropolitan Commission of Human Settlements (*Comisión Metropolitana de Asentamientos Humanos*), and Metropolitan Commission for the Environment (*Comisión Ambiental Metropolitana*). A few years later, in 1999, these five commissions published the Development Program for the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico (*Programa de Ordenación de la Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México*) (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1999).

ciudadela central es el punto donde se encuentra el kilómetro cero o el marcador de cero millas del país. La estructura más grande y significativa de la unidad triple era el templo, conocido como Templo Mayor, que era la máxima expresión del axis mundi de la ciudad. Como ha señalado Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, el Templo Mayor fue "el ombligo y centro fundamental de la estructura del universo, el lugar donde se cruzaban los planos vertical y horizontal, es decir, el paso a los niveles celestes superiores y a los inframundos, así como el lugar de donde parten las cuatro esquinas del universo" (Matos Moctezuma 2018, 29). Curiosamente, el suministro y la distribución de alimentos fueron elementos clave del mítico hipercentro. El Templo Mayor era una pirámide doble, cada mitad representaba dos deidades y dos montañas sagradas: Huitzilopochtli (dios de la guerra) y Coatepec (montaña de las serpientes) en un lado y Tlaloc (dios de la lluvia y la agricultura) y Tonacatepetl (montaña de sustento) en el otro. Según los aztecas, la montaña Tonacatepetl era el lugar que contenía todo el suministro de alimentos del mundo conocido (Matos Moctezuma 2018, 60). En una ciudad tan profundamente marcada por la mitología, tanto antigua como moderna, la hiperconcentración de FSDS en sus grandes mercados centrales, desde Tlatelolco a El Parián a La Merced a Central de Abasto, parece llevar las marcas del mito de Tonacatepetl como la única fuente de suministro de alimentos del universo. La concepción de la ciudad como axis mundi ha dejado una huella profunda y duradera en el imaginario social de México, así como en sus estructuras centrales de poder.²⁷

26. En *The City in History*, Lewis Mumford destaca la importancia de la misma tríada en otros asentamientos urbanos antiguos. Mumford escribe: "Ciertamente, para cuando la pala del arqueólogo desentierra una ciudad reconocible, encuentra un recinto amurallado, una ciudadela, hecha de materiales duraderos, incluso si el resto de la ciudad carece de murallas o estructuras permanentes. Esto es válido desde Uruk hasta Harappa. Dentro de ese recinto suele encontrar tres enormes edificios de piedra o ladrillo cocido, edificios cuya misma magnitud los distingue de las demás estructuras de la ciudad: el palacio, el granero y el templo" (Mumford 1961, 37). La tríada puede leerse como una expresión espacial de la noción de poder propuesta por autores como Norberto Bobbio, quien identificó tres formas básicas de poder: político (acumulación de fuerza), económico (acumulación de riqueza) e ideológico (acumulación de ideas y información) (Bobbio 2005, 110-111).

27. Hoy, por ejemplo, la Ciudad de México ejerce una enorme fuerza centrípeta sobre el país, no muy diferente a la de la antigua Tenochtitlán sobre la mayor parte de Mesoamérica. La Ciudad de México no solo

1982, the decision to build a new wholesale market in Mexico City was officially publicized as far back as 1970, when President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz signed a decree that outlined both the general urban and architectural program of the market's master plan and its specific location (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970a, 29-33).³² The next step came a decade later, in 1981, when President José López Portillo created the National Supply System (*Sistema Nacional para el Abasto*), a robust program through which the federal government addressed the urgent issue of the country's food supply. In the opening paragraph, López Portillo states that "among the development programs undertaken by the Executive Power under my administration, priority is given to those related to the production of food for general consumption and the inputs required for its production, as well as those that allow for efficiency in its handling, transportation, storage, conservation and, in general, in the entire marketing process to reach the final consumer with sufficiency, timeliness and fair price." (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1981). The National Supply System is structured around four basic strategies, the last of which focuses on FSDS infrastructural development: organization, guidance, and financing; information and standardization; transportation and communication; and markets and warehouses. Regarding markets and warehouses, it states that "the supply system shall have a national network of markets integrated by 1. Storage Centers, 2. Wholesale Markets, and 3. Retail Markets." (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1981).

Since the implementation of the National Supply System in 1981 and the construction of Central de Abasto a year later, neither the city's food supply and

32. The decree established the expropriation of close to 400 privately-owned plots in the outskirts of Iztapalapa that added up to a little over 800 acres (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970a, 29-33). The expropriation was made official in a second decree published later that year (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970b, 109-110). According to the second decree, the new market was to contain "main elements such as wholesale, chain store, and general warehouses, cold storage plants, grain depots, facilities for independent producers, as well as exchange and auction areas; auxiliary elements such as administrative and retail centers, maintenance and supply facilities, restaurants and cafeterias, security facilities, entrance gates and similar services; all these elements must be connected and supported by distribution spaces and components such as streets, parking lots and railroad networks; and complementary elements such as bus and taxicab stations, freight services, assistance centers, civic and social-recreational services, food industries and others of the same nature and utility." (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1979a, 29)

A lo largo de importantes cambios históricos, los centros urbanos han cobrado nuevos significados, una y otra vez; pero la naturaleza centralizada y subyacente de la ciudad rara vez ha sido cuestionada de manera significativa. Por el contrario, cada nueva expresión de los poderes centrales tiende a ser no solo grande y audaz, sino más grande y audaz que la anterior. La arquitectura, el urbanismo y el desarrollo de infraestructuras han sido piedras angulares del proceso generalizado de recentralización. La mayoría de los proyectos urbanos a gran escala de la Ciudad de México, tanto públicos como privados, son el resultado no solo de las crecientes necesidades de la población de la ciudad, sino también de la creciente jactancia de sus niveles superiores. Este viaje del ego ha llevado a la ciudad a una espiral de monumentalidad urbana de siglos de duración que alcanzó su punto máximo bajo el reinado ininterrumpido de 71 años del casi dictatorial Partido Revolucionario Institucional o PRI. Durante este período, la concentración de poder sin precedentes del gobierno fomentó una concentración igualmente sin precedentes de personas, información y bienes en una serie de colosales proyectos urbanos liderados por un puñado de arquitectos y planificadores de gran envergadura como Mario Pani y Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.²⁸

El PRI monopolizó el gobierno federal de México desde 1929 hasta 2000, cuando el candidato de derecha Vicente Fox ganó las elecciones presidenciales. Los últimos años del PRI en el poder estuvieron marcados por el declive gradual de su antes invulnerable aparato político y por el surgimiento gradual de nuevas fuerzas rivales en todo el espectro político. A mediados de los noventa, el control monolítico del PRI sobre la Ciudad de México comenzó a fragmentarse en un campo de batalla ferozmente disputado entre la izquierda, la derecha y el centro.

Un punto de inflexión llegó en 1997, cuando el Distrito Federal, el perímetro político y administrativo de la Ciudad de México, celebró por primera vez elecciones populares y las ganó el político de izquierda

es la sede del gobierno federal (y de prácticamente todas las instituciones a nivel federal), sino que su área metropolitana concentra el 17 por ciento de la población del país, el 18 por ciento de su fuerza laboral y cerca de una cuarta parte de su producto interno bruto (Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos 2015, 5).

28. Algunos ejemplos incluyen el campus principal de 1952 de Mario Pani y Enrique del Moral para la Universidad Nacional de México (que cubre un total de 1800 acres), el desarrollo de viviendas Nonoalco-Tlatelolco de 1964 de Pani (inicialmente hogar de unos 80,000 residentes) y la Basílica de Guadalupe de Pedro Ramírez Vázquez (visitada cada año por más de siete millones de personas).

distribution policies nor its basic infrastructures have undergone any significant upgrades or improvements. At the local level, the outdatedness of FSDS policies is far more striking and worrisome. For example, Mexico City's markets are currently regulated by an operating code issued in 1951, when the city's population was a little over three million (it is now almost eight times larger) and Central de Abasto's predecessor, La Merced, had not even been built (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1951). One exception is Central de Abasto's internal code, which has been revised and updated regularly (the last time in 2007), although it is focused solely on the market's general operating rules and regulations and does not address the broader scope of the city's FSDSs (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México 2008).

The decades-long neglect of the country's food supply and distribution policies, especially of the National Supply System, coincides with Mexico's neoliberal turn, which began to take shape during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and was fully implemented by his successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), mainly through entry into NAFTA in 1994. As David Harvey points out, after 1992, Mexico was especially hard-hit by a "wave of privatization" that "catapulted a few individuals (such as Carlos Slim) almost overnight into Fortune's list of the world's richest people" (Harvey 2005, 17). Harvey adds that Mexico "was one of the first states drawn into what was going to become a growing column of neoliberal state apparatuses worldwide" – that is, indebted countries who "in return for debt rescheduling" were "required to implement institutional reforms, such as cuts in welfare expenditure, more flexible labor market laws, and privatization" (Harvey 2005, 29). Infrastructural systems, including those linked to food supply and distribution, became one of the country's most coveted assets and were quickly deregulated and privatized.³³ As Lorenzo Meyer puts it in the seminal book *Historia general de México*, these new policies:

required not only the dismantling of protectionist barriers but also the privatization of most of the State enterprises, with the notable exception of *Petróleos Mexicanos* (which, however, was forced to put its petrochemical branch on the market) and *Comisión Federal de Electricidad* [Mexico's Federal Power Company]; but banks, ports, telecommunications, railroads, airlines, sugar mills, and warehouses, among many others, were put in private hands in an extremely short period. (Meyer 2000, 899).

33. It is no coincidence, for example, that Mexico's richest families today all have direct or close ties to the country's key FSDSs (Forbes 2021).

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.²⁹ Hasta entonces, los alcaldes de la ciudad, llamados regentes, eran designados directamente por el presidente, haciendo de la Ciudad de México una extensión política del gobierno federal. Además, a partir de finales de la década de 1970, la Ciudad de México comenzó a extenderse más allá del perímetro administrativo del Distrito Federal y hacia los estados vecinos de México e Hidalgo, lo que hizo que su mapa político fuera aún más complejo.³⁰ Aunque un puñado de reformas políticas han intentado crear comisiones y programas metropolitanos integrados para planificar el futuro de la ciudad más allá de las divisiones políticas, todos han caído en las grietas del entramado geopolítico en constante cambio del área metropolitana.³¹ La Central de Abasto podría haber sido el último de los megaproyectos urbanos del antiguo PRI, pero los siguientes regímenes han tratado de dejar su huella en la ciudad capital de México a través de una exhibición continua de proyectos de poder, incluyendo la Biblioteca Vasconcelos de Alberto Kalach (promovida por el gobierno derechista del presidente Vicente Fox), el nuevo aeropuerto internacional de Norman Foster (promovido por el gobierno centrista del presidente Enrique Peña Nieto) que ha sido recientemente cancelado, y el "bosque cultural" de Chapultepec (promovido por el izquierdista gobierno del actual presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador).

POLÍTICAS DE FSDS DE LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO DESPUÉS DEL GIRO NEOLIBERAL

Aunque Central de Abasto abrió sus puertas por primera vez en 1982, la decisión de construir un nuevo mercado mayorista en la Ciudad de México fue difundida oficialmente ya en 1970, cuando el presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz firmó un decreto

29. El nombre fue cambiado oficialmente de Distrito Federal a Ciudad de México (o CDMX) en enero de 2016 como parte de una reforma destinada a otorgar a la ciudad una mayor autonomía política y económica.

30. El Área Metropolitana del Valle de México está actualmente compuesta por los dieciséis distritos de la Ciudad de México, más cincuenta y nueve municipios del Estado de México y un municipio del estado de Hidalgo (Consejo Nacional de Población 2018, 104-113).

31. En 1993, por ejemplo, se crearon oficialmente cinco comisiones metropolitanas importantes: Comisión de Agua y Drenaje del Área Metropolitana, Comisión Metropolitana de Transporte y Vialidad, Comisión Metropolitana de Seguridad Pública y Procuración de Justicia, Comisión Metropolitana de Asentamientos Humanos, Comisión Ambiental Metropolitana. Unos años más tarde, en 1999, estas cinco comisiones publicaron el Programa de Ordenación de la Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1999).

Privatization radically changed the way food was supplied and distributed throughout the city. As policies openly favored private interest over public, traditional markets (*mercados*), flea markets (*tianguis*), and corner shops were gradually overpowered by both national (Aurrerá, Gigante, Comercial Mexicana), and foreign (Walmart, Carrefour, H-E-B) supermarket chains. For example, one study shows that between 1993 and 1998, the number of supermarkets in Mexico grew 173 percent. In contrast, it found that during that same period, the number of independent food retailers grew by a mere 10 percent (Morales 2003, 91).

Today, both public and independent retailers are an important part of the city's FSDSs, especially in peripheral and low-income neighborhoods; and a growing number of direct-to-consumer supply chains, including farmers' markets, community-supported agriculture programs, and online retail, have been implemented throughout the city. However, public, independent, and direct-to-consumer chains still fall short of providing a truly counter-hegemonic alternative to the city's food supply and distribution monopolies, which continue to have a strong grip on most large-scale supply and distribution infrastructures, leaving little if any room for implementing shorter and more equitable food supply chains.^{34, 35}

FINAL NOTES

After decades of turning a blind eye to the issue of food insecurity, in early 2020 Mexico City was violently reminded that it had no significant food source other than its central market, and that it was much closer to a major hunger crisis than it had ever imagined. As COVID-19 ripped through Mexico City, it exposed the innermost vulnerabilities of Central de Abasto and the overall shortcomings of the city's FSDSs. Still, Central de Abasto's emergency was only the latest in a series of recent crises that have once again focused the spotlight on Mexico City's hyper-centralized infrastructural systems.

34. For example, Central de Abasto is governed by a technical committee comprised of twelve local government officials and twelve representatives elected from among the owners of the market's shops and warehouses (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México 2008, 4).

35. According to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, a short food supply chain "means a supply chain involving a limited number of economic operators, committed to co-operation, local economic development, and close geographical and social relations between producers, processors and consumers" (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2013).

que delineaba tanto el programa general urbano y arquitectónico del plan maestro del mercado como su ubicación específica (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970a, 29-33).³² El siguiente paso llegó una década después, en 1981, cuando el presidente José López Portillo creó el Sistema Nacional para el Abasto, un programa robusto a través del cual el gobierno federal abordó el problema urgente del suministro de alimentos del país.

En el siguiente párrafo, López Portillo señala que "entre los programas de desarrollo que lleva adelante el Poder Ejecutivo bajo mi administración, se priorizan los relacionados con la producción de alimentos de consumo general y los insumos necesarios para su producción, así como los que permiten la eficiencia en su manejo, transporte, almacenamiento, conservación y, en general, en todo el proceso de comercialización para llegar al consumidor final con suficiencia, oportunidad y precio justo". (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1981). El Sistema Nacional de Abastecimiento se estructura en torno a cuatro estrategias básicas, la última de las cuales se centra en el desarrollo de la infraestructura del FSDF: organización, orientación y financiamiento; información y estandarización; transporte y comunicación; por último mercados y almacenes. En cuanto a los mercados y almacenes, establece que "el sistema de abastecimiento contará con una red nacional de mercados integrada por 1. Centros de Almacenamiento, 2. Mercados Mayoristas y 3. Mercados Minoristas". (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1981).

32. El decreto estableció la expropiación de cerca de 400 parcelas de propiedad privada en las afueras de Iztapalapa que sumaban un poco más de 800 acres (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970a, 29-33). La expropiación se oficializó en un segundo decreto publicado ese mismo año (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1970b, 109-110). Según el segundo decreto, el nuevo mercado debía contener "elementos principales como mayoristas, cadenas de tiendas y almacenes generales, frigoríficos, depósitos de granos, instalaciones para productores independientes, así como áreas de intercambio y subasta; elementos auxiliares como centros administrativos y comerciales/ de ventas minoristas, instalaciones de mantenimiento y abastecimiento, restaurantes y cafeterías, instalaciones de seguridad, puertas de entrada y servicios similares; todos estos elementos deben estar conectados y apoyados por espacios de distribución y componentes como calles, estacionamientos y redes ferroviarias; y elementos complementarios como estaciones de buses y taxis, servicios de carga, centros asistenciales, servicios cívicos y socio-recreativos, industrias alimentarias y otros de la misma naturaleza y utilidad". (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1979a, 29)

In 2010, for example, off-season rains collapsed one of the retaining walls of the key sewage channel known as *Canal de la Compañía*, causing severe floods throughout the secondary basin of *Valle de Chalco*, one of the city's most impoverished and neglected settlements. Over 11,000 housing units in Valle de Chalco were unexpectedly hit by a sudden deluge of wastewater that reached up to six feet above street level. In late 2018, a repair job gone wrong in the city's Lerma-Cutzamala water supply system left a quarter of its population without running water for days. On January 9, 2021, almost a year after the COVID-19 outbreak at Central de Abasto, a major fire ravaged the Mexico City Metro's Central Control Station (*Puesto Central de Control* or PCC), shutting down six of the city's twelve subway lines and crippling the entire metropolitan area for weeks.

In the face of these ever-changing scenarios, Mexico City's future is as uncertain as ever. As emergencies continue to pile up, so have questions regarding the ability of Mexico City's strained infrastructures to resist the city's compounding crises and to hold back its over-predicted collapse. Against the checkered backdrop of the metropolitan area's dominant political, economic, and ideological power structures, it is unclear how the city will manage to break away from the centuries-long hegemony of its centralized model of urban and infrastructural development.

The issue of Mexico City's food supply and distribution is especially uncertain, since there is so much catching up to do in terms of FSDS research, policymaking, planning, and implementation. But among local scholars, city officials, planners, and residents alike, Central de Abasto's 2020 COVID-19 crisis seems to have sparked a renewed interest in the long-neglected issue of food security, which might provide the much-needed starting point for building more reliable and equitable food supply and distribution systems. Meanwhile, the urban leviathan's survival will continue to depend on the sole lifeline provided by the mighty, yet aging, Central de Abasto.

Desde la implementación del Sistema Nacional de Abastecimiento en 1981 y la construcción de la Central de Abasto un año después, ni las políticas de abastecimiento y distribución de alimentos de la ciudad ni sus infraestructuras básicas han experimentado arreglos o mejoras significativas. A nivel local, la obsolescencia de las políticas de FSDS es mucho más sorprendente y preocupante. Por ejemplo, los mercados de la Ciudad de México están actualmente regulados por un código operativo emitido en 1951, cuando la población de la ciudad era un poco más de tres millones (ahora es casi ocho veces más grande) y el predecesor de la Central de Abasto, La Merced, ni siquiera se había construido. (Diario Oficial de la Federación 1951). Una excepción es el código interno de la Central de Abasto, que ha sido revisado y actualizado periódicamente (la última vez en 2007), aunque se centra únicamente en las reglas y regulaciones generales de funcionamiento del mercado y no aborda el alcance más amplio de los FSDS de la ciudad (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central del Abasto de la Ciudad de México 2008). El descuido de décadas de las políticas de suministro y distribución de alimentos del país, especialmente del Sistema Nacional de Abastecimiento, coincide con el giro neoliberal de México, que comenzó a tomar forma durante la presidencia de Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) y fue plenamente implementado por su sucesor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), principalmente a través de su ingreso al TLCAN (Tratado de Libre Comercio América del norte) en 1994. Como señala David Harvey, después de 1992, México se vio especialmente afectado por una "ola de privatización" que "catapultó a unas pocas personas (como Carlos Slim) casi de la noche a la mañana en la lista de Fortune de las personas más ricas del mundo" (Harvey 2005, 17). Harvey agrega que México "fue uno de los primeros estados atraídos a lo que se iba a convertir en una columna creciente de aparatos estatales neoliberales en todo el mundo", es decir, países endeudados que "a cambio de la reprogramación de la deuda" estaban "obligados a implementar reformas institucionales, tales como recortes en el gasto social, leyes del mercado laboral más flexibles y privatización" (Harvey 2005, 29). Los sistemas de infraestructura, incluidos los relacionados con el suministro y la distribución de alimentos, se convirtieron en uno de los activos más codiciados del país y fueron rápidamente desregulados y privatizados.³³ Como dice Lorenzo Meyer en el libro seminal *Historia general de México*, estas nuevas políticas:

33. No es una coincidencia, por ejemplo, que las familias más ricas de México hoy en día tengan vínculos directos o estrechos con los principales FSDS del país (Forbes 2021).

Requirieron no solo el desmantelamiento de las barreras proteccionistas, sino también la privatización de la mayoría de las empresas estatales, con la notable excepción de Petróleos Mexicanos (que, sin embargo, se vio obligada a poner en el mercado su rama petroquímica) y la Comisión Federal de Electricidad [Compañía Federal de Energía de México]; pero bancos, puertos, telecomunicaciones, ferrocarriles, líneas aéreas, ingenios azucareros y almacenes, entre muchos otros, se pusieron en manos privadas en un período sumamente breve (Meyer 2000, 899).

La privatización cambió radicalmente la forma en que se suministraban y distribuían los alimentos en toda la ciudad. A medida que las políticas favorecían abiertamente el interés privado sobre el público, los mercados tradicionales, los mercadillos o tianguis y las tiendas de barrio fueron gradualmente dominadas por cadenas de supermercados nacionales (Aurrerá, Gigante, Comercial Mexicana) y extranjeras (Walmart, Carrefour, HEB). Por ejemplo, un estudio muestra que entre 1993 y 1998, el número de supermercados en México creció 173 por ciento. En contraste, encontró que durante ese mismo período, el número de minoristas independientes de alimentos creció apenas un 10 por ciento (Morales 2003, 91). Hoy en día, tanto los minoristas públicos como los independientes son una parte importante de los FSDS de la ciudad, especialmente en los barrios periféricos y de bajos ingresos; y se ha implementado en toda la ciudad un número creciente de cadenas de suministro directas al consumidor, incluidos los mercados de agricultores, los programas agrícolas apoyados por la comunidad y la venta minorista en línea. Sin embargo, las cadenas públicas, independientes y directas al consumidor siguen sin ofrecer una alternativa verdaderamente contrahegemónica. Además, los monopolios de suministro y distribución de alimentos de la ciudad a gran escala, siguen dejando poco o ningún espacio para implementar cadenas de suministro de alimentos más cortas y equitativas.^{34, 35}

34. Por ejemplo, la Central de Abasto está dirigida por un comité técnico compuesto por doce funcionarios del gobierno local y doce representantes elegidos entre los propietarios de las tiendas y almacenes del mercado (Fideicomiso para la Construcción y Operación de la Central de Abasto de la Ciudad de México 2008, 4)

35. Según el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo de la Unión Europea, una cadena de suministro de alimentos corta "significa una cadena de suministro en la que participan un número limitado de operadores económicos, comprometidos con la cooperación, el desarrollo económico local y las estrechas relaciones geográficas y sociales entre los productores, procesadores y consumidores" (Parlamento Europeo y Consejo de la Unión Europea 2013).

NOTAS FINALES

Después de décadas de hacer la vista gorda ante el tema de la inseguridad alimentaria, a principios de 2020 se le recordó violentamente a la Ciudad de México que no tenía una fuente de alimentos significativa más que su mercado central, y que estaba mucho más cerca de una gran crisis de hambre de lo que jamás había imaginado. A medida que COVID-19 arrasó la Ciudad de México, expuso las vulnerabilidades más íntimas de la Central de Abasto y las deficiencias generales de los FSDS de la ciudad. Aún así, la emergencia de Central de Abastos fue solo la última de una serie de crisis recientes que una vez más ha puesto el foco en los sistemas de infraestructura hipercentralizados de la Ciudad de México.

En 2010, por ejemplo, las lluvias fuera de temporada derrumbaron uno de los muros de contención del canal de alcantarillado clave conocido como Canal de la Compañía, provocando graves inundaciones en toda la cuenca secundaria del Valle de Chalco, uno de los asentamientos más empobrecidos y abandonados de la ciudad. Más de 11,000 unidades de vivienda en el Valle de Chalco fueron golpeadas inesperadamente por un repentino diluvio de aguas residuales que alcanzó hasta seis pies sobre el nivel de la calle. A fines de 2018, un trabajo de reparación que salió mal en el sistema de suministro de agua del sistema Lerma-Cutzamala de la ciudad dejó a una cuarta parte de su población sin agua corriente durante días. El 9 de enero de 2021, casi un año después del brote de COVID-19 en la Central de Abasto, un gran incendio devastó la Estación de Control Central del Metro de la Ciudad de México o PCC, cerrando seis de las doce líneas de metro de la ciudad y paralizando toda el área metropolitana durante semanas. Frente a estos escenarios cambiantes, el futuro de la Ciudad de México es tan incierto como siempre. A medida que las emergencias continúan acumulándose, también lo hacen las preguntas sobre la capacidad de las tensas infraestructuras de la Ciudad de México para resistir las crisis agravantes de la ciudad y contener su colapso varias veces predicho. En el contexto accidentado de las estructuras de poder político, económico e ideológico dominantes del área metropolitana, no está claro cómo la ciudad logrará romper con la hegemonía de siglos de su modelo centralizado de desarrollo urbano e infraestructural.

El tema del suministro y distribución de alimentos en la Ciudad de México es especialmente incierto, ya que queda mucho por hacer en términos de investigación, formulación de políticas, planificación e implementación del FSDS. Pero entre los académicos locales, los funcionarios de la ciudad, los planificadores y los residentes por igual, la crisis del COVID-19 de Central de Abasto en 2020 parece

haber despertado un interés renovado en el tema de la seguridad alimentaria, olvidado durante mucho tiempo, que podría proporcionar el, muy necesario, punto de partida para la construcción de sistemas de suministro y distribución de alimentos más fiables y equitativos. Mientras tanto, la supervivencia del leviatán urbano seguirá dependiendo de la única línea de vida proporcionada por la poderosa, aunque envejecida, Central de Abasto.

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The Winter Quarters

Rayne Laborde





Planning, Violence, and Crisis in Sociohistorical Perspective: Crime, Capital, Commodities, and Cartelization in Tancítaro, Michoacán

Stefan Norgaard

ABSTRACT:

Social life in Mexico's state of Michoacán is consumed by a crisis of violence. Highlighting critical planning, this paper presents a grounded, local history of the municipality of Tancítaro, Michoacán, which has the highest concentration of avocado production globally. It analyzes violence in Tancítaro in light of the production of space, uneven development, and the spatial politics of land. This quantitative and archival research, coupled with theoretical explanations of violence, suggests that considerations of crisis and planning require situated analyses with ethnographic methods and embedded fieldwork that cross geographic scales and disciplinary boundaries emphasizing perspectives of affected community residents.

INTRODUCTION

Residents of the state of Michoacán, México live in ongoing crisis. Though imperfect, statistics on total crimes, federal crimes against public health (drug trafficking), "other" miscellaneous crimes, and intentional homicides (murders) in Michoacán have increased precipitously in two recent periods: the early 1990s and mid-2010s (see figures 1 and 2). Indeed, violence in Michoacán today has soared to some of the highest rates in Mexico (INEGI, 2021; Piccato, 2017). What explains this crisis of rising violence in Michoacán, and what can scholars and planning practitioners learn about violence there and in general through a critical planning lens? Complementing quantitative and historical explanations for violence at the state level, this paper places critical planning theory in the foreground, looking specifically at how the production of space, uneven development, and the spatial politics of land affect types and forms of violence that are themselves local and spatially situated.

I define key terms that animate my research and analytic approach and situate them in relevant planning literature. First, drawing on Lefebvre (1974), the production of space means processes through which social relations—of capitalism or of class struggle—are inscribed and reinscribed in city-making and urbanization. Brenner and Elden (2009) extend Lefebvre's concept to interlocked, planetary geographies of contestation and resistance. Key to both Lefebvre and Brenner and Elden's concepts

Planificación, violencia y crisis en perspectiva sociohistórica: Crimen, capital, mercancías y cartelización en Tancítaro, Michoacán

Stefan Norgaard

RESUMEN

La vida social en el estado mexicano de Michoacán está consumida por una crisis de violencia. Destacando la planificación crítica, este documento presenta una historia local fundamentada del municipio de Tancítaro, Michoacán, que tiene la mayor concentración de producción de aguacate a nivel mundial. Analiza la violencia en Tancítaro a la luz de la producción del espacio, el desarrollo desigual y la política espacial de la tierra. Esta investigación cuantitativa y de archivo, junto con explicaciones teóricas de la violencia, sugiere que las consideraciones de crisis y planificación requieren análisis situados con métodos etnográficos y trabajo de campo integrado que atraviesa escalas geográficas y límites disciplinarios enfatizando las perspectivas de los residentes de la comunidad afectada.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Los residentes del estado de Michoacán, México viven en una crisis permanente. Aunque imperfectas, las estadísticas sobre delitos totales, delitos federales contra la salud pública (narcotráfico), "otros" delitos diversos y homicidios intencionales (asesinatos) en Michoacán han aumentado vertiginosamente en dos períodos recientes: principios de la década de 1990 y mediados de la de 2010 (ver figuras 1 y 2). De hecho, la violencia en Michoacán hoy se ha disparado a algunas de las tasas más altas de México (INEGI, 2021; Piccato, 2017). ¿Qué explica esta crisis de aumento de la violencia en Michoacán y qué pueden aprender los académicos y los profesionales de la planificación sobre la violencia allí, y en general, a través de un lente de planificación crítica? Complementando las explicaciones cuantitativas e históricas de la violencia a nivel estatal, este artículo sitúa la teoría crítica de la planificación en primer plano, mirando específicamente cómo la producción del espacio, el desarrollo desigual y la política espacial de la tierra afectan los tipos y formas de violencia que son en sí mismas locales y que se encuentran situadas espacialmente.

Defino términos clave que animan mi enfoque analítico y de investigación, y los sitúo en la literatura de planificación relevante. En primer lugar, basándome en Lefebvre (1974), la producción de espacio significa procesos a través de los cuales las relaciones sociales—del capitalismo o de la lucha de clases— se inscriben y reinscriben en la construcción de ciudades

of the production of space is the idea that spatial inscription can occur 'from above' and 'below,' meaning that powerful actors like states and cartels, as well as ordinary city residents, play active yet contested roles in shaping city spaces and urbanization processes. Second, to define critical planning, I draw on Yiftachel's (1988) typology arguing that positive and normative planning approaches often "described as irreconcilable" actually

complementarily assist planning practitioners (23). Yiftachel proposes that planning theory "describe and explain the planning of urban land-use planning, provide knowledge for practising planners, and enlighten planning students and stimulate research" (24). Sanyal (2008), citing Friedmann (1994: 33), encourages planners to be "critical about criticality" and calls for critical planning that is constructive, useful for practice, and empowering for action (144). However, Forsyth (2021) writes, "planning theory also covers a range of topics, and its definition is contested" (155). Likewise, the definition of critical planning theory is a matter of dispute. In this paper, critical planning is my aspirational approach to research and inquiry, emphasizing the complementarity of descriptive and interpretive methods; situated historical analysis grounded in critical political economy; attention to land, property, and spatial production; and actionable lessons for researchers and planning practitioners. Through this critical planning approach, I argue that violence in Tancitaro serves as a means (by both the powerful and less powerful) of controlling territory and its accumulated surplus and as a technology to contest spatial hegemony.

Conventional explanations for violence in Michoacán consider the recent historical role of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) (Beittel, 2020). In Michoacán, DTOs and TCOs are fluid in form and territorial scope and include the Knights Templar (*Caballeros Templarios*) and *La Familia Michoacana*; the Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez/CFO, and Gulf Cartels; *Los Zetas*, *Beltrán Leyva*, and the *Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generación*. Beittel (2020) argues that "Mexican... DTOs pose the greatest crime threat" in the Western




Figure 1. Total Crimes in Michoacán and México, 1926–2008. By author. Sources: Data from Piccato et al. (2017), Calderón et al. (2019), INEGI (2021).

Figura 1. Crímenes totales en Michoacán y México, 1926–2008. Por autor. Fuentes: Datos de Piccato et al. (2017), Calderón et al. (2019), INEGI (2021).

de la ciudad, desempeñan roles activos pero cuestionados en la configuración de los espacios de la ciudad y de los procesos de urbanización. En segundo lugar, para definir la planificación crítica, me baso en la tipología de Yiftachel (1988) argumentando que los enfoques de planificación positiva y normativa a menudo "descritos como irreconcilables" en realidad ayudan de manera complementaria a los profesionales de la planificación (23). Yiftachel propone que la teoría de la planificación "describe y explica la planificación del uso del suelo urbano, proporciona conocimientos a los planificadores en ejercicio, ilumina a los estudiantes de planificación y estimula la investigación" (24). Sanyal (2008), citando a Friedmann (1994: 33), alienta a los planificadores a ser "críticos con la criticidad" y pide una planificación crítica que sea constructiva, útil para la práctica y empoderadora para la acción (144). Sin embargo, Forsyth (2021) escribe, "la teoría de la planificación también cubre una variedad de temas, y su definición es cuestionada" (155). Asimismo, la definición de teoría crítica de la planificación es motivo de controversia. En este artículo, la planificación crítica es mi enfoque aspiracional a la investigación y la indagación, enfatizando la complementariedad de los métodos descriptivos e interpretativos; análisis histórico situado y fundamentado en la economía política crítica; atención a la tierra, la propiedad y la producción espacial; y lecciones prácticas para investigadores y profesionales de la planificación. A través de este enfoque de planificación crítica, sostengo que la violencia en Tancitaro sirve como un medio (tanto de los poderosos como de los menos poderosos) para controlar el territorio y su excedente acumulado, y como una tecnología para disputar la hegemonía espacial.

y de urbanización. Brenner y Elden (2009) extienden el concepto de Lefebvre a geografías planetarias interconectadas de oposición y resistencia. La clave para los conceptos de producción de espacio de Lefebvre, y de Brenner y Elden es la idea de que la inscripción espacial puede ocurrir 'desde arriba' y 'de abajo', lo que significa que actores poderosos como estados y carteles, así como los residentes comunes

hemisphere (1–3). Panner (2012) writes that “the business is moving away from monolithic cartels toward a series of mercury-like mini-cartels” (99). According to both Beittel (2020) and Panner (2012), as organizations change scope and function, violence toward state and civilian actors grows.

Grandmaison (2013) and Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) encourage readers to problematize the causes and explanations for violence in both historically situated and structural ways, with explanations tied to local context and to specific dynamics of social mobilization and organization. Grandmaison (2013) writes, “from one village to another, [cartels] behavior, their motivations, and their scale of organization differ,” noting the role of local self-defense groups (*autodefensas*) and vigilante community police forces (*policías comunitarias*) in shaping heterogeneous dynamics of violence. Indeed, even as violence has increased recently in Michoacán, dynamics and rates of violence differ significantly by municipality. A localized and contextual approach is not new to historic inquiry: in Michoacán, González’s *Pueblo en Vilo* (1968) is a local history (*microhistoria*) of San José de Gracia that explores social structure across historical moments. Geographically and historically situated accounts of violence complement statewide quantitative accounts and reveal interesting deviations and local stories. Indeed, this paper attempts to shed light on violence in Tancitaro through situated and quantitative accounts.

Davis (2009) writes that “it may be time to re-think prevailing assumptions about non-state armed actors and consider a new analytical agenda for studying who they are and what their impact is on security and violence in the contemporary era” (224). For instance, neoliberalization and state downsizing have changed the interests and capacities of state actors to engage in violence. Davis (2020) encourages planning scholars to explore violence across inherited binaries: formal and informal, licit and illicit, including political and economic networks across geography and spatial scale (211–213). To understand the crisis of violence in Michoacán, planning theorists and scholars must examine links among profit, power, and planning in the threat and practice of violence.

Following in the footsteps of

Las explicaciones convencionales de la violencia en Michoacán consideran el papel histórico reciente de las organizaciones de tráfico de drogas (OTD) y las organizaciones criminales transnacionales (OCT) (Beittel, 2020). En Michoacán, las ODT y OCT son fluidas en forma y alcance territorial e incluyen a los Caballeros Templarios, La Familia Michoacana; los Cárteles de Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez / CFO, y del Golfo; Los Zetas, Beltrán Leyva y el Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación. Beittel (2020) argumenta que “las OTD mexicanas ... representan la mayor amenaza delictiva en el hemisferio occidental (1-3). Panner (2012) escribe que “el negocio se está alejando de los carteles monolíticos hacia una serie de mini carteles similares al mercurio” (99). Según Beittel (2020) y Panner (2012), a medida que las organizaciones cambian de alcance y función, crece la violencia hacia actores estatales y civiles.

Grandmaison (2013) y Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) alientan a los lectores a problematizar las causas y explicaciones de la violencia, tanto de manera histórica como estructural, con explicaciones ligadas al contexto local y a dinámicas específicas de movilización y organización social. Grandmaison (2013) escribe, “de un pueblo a otro, el comportamiento [de los carteles], sus motivaciones y su escala de organización difieren”, señalando el papel de los grupos de autodefensas locales y de las fuerzas de las policías comunitarias en la conformación de dinámicas heterogéneas de violencia. De hecho, aunque la violencia ha aumentado recientemente en Michoacán, la dinámica y las tasas de violencia difieren significativamente por municipio. El enfoque localizado y contextual no es novedoso para la investigación histórica: en Michoacán, *Pueblo en Vilo* (1968) de González es una historia local (*microhistoria*) de San José de Gracia que explora la estructura social a través de momentos históricos.

Los relatos de violencia situados geográfica e históricamente complementan los relatos cuantitativos de todo el estado y revelan desviaciones e historias locales interesantes. De hecho, este artículo intenta iluminar la violencia en Tancitaro a través de relatos cuantitativos y situados.

Davis (2009) escribe que “puede ser el momento de repensar supuestos predominantes sobre




Figure 2. Homicides in Michoacán and Mexico, 2008–2020. By author. Source: Data from INEGI (2021).

Figura 2. Homicidios en Michoacán y México, 2008-2020. Por autor. Fuente: Data de INEGI (2021).

Grandmaison (2013) and Álvarez Rodríguez (2020), this paper considers violence as a socio-historical process with distinctively local, contextually grounded dynamics. I also consider Davis' (2020) call to critically examine the relationships among crises, sovereignties, and power across territorial scales. Therefore, I focus this inquiry on a single municipality, Tancitaro, which between 2009 and 2015 experienced some of the highest rates of violence in Mexico (INEGI, 2021). Tancitaro has the world's highest municipal-level avocado production as a critical node in Michoacán's "Tierra Caliente" belt of Hass avocados (Salazar-García, 2005: 32–33).

If one were to engage only the ruling methodologies on violence in Mexico, one might erroneously assume that levels of statewide violence in Michoacán were even throughout the territory or connected to basic features of the state or region. However, municipal-level violence did not afflict Tancitaro as severely as the rest of Michoacán in the 1990s and early 2000s, when violence was concentrated in the state's northwest and coast. During the 1990s and early 2000s, today's avocado plantations were highland forests. Changing import-export policies and consumer tastes elsewhere led to land-use change and violence. Rates of violence in Tancitaro from 2009 to 2015 were high. Journalists and political officials were targets. Today, violence continues against workers in the municipality even though *autodefensas* and *policías comunitarias* defend landowning growers. Violence no longer threatens industry profits. Rates of violence in Michoacán suggest that violence is implicated in the production of space and resultant dynamics of uneven development.

Figure 3 provides a broad-based attempt to account for local, situated explanations of violence. Figure 3 demonstrates how Tancitaro's land-based dynamics and Michoacán's distinctive local ecologies drive types and forms of violence alongside traditional explanations that center TCOs. Indeed, the production of space, uneven development, and the spatial politics of land contribute to this explanation of Tancitaro's crisis: Tancitaro's experiences with violence intricately connect structural adjustment and agricultural liberalization, avocado-based profit, political realignment, tacit governing alliances, and socioeconomic responses. Lefebvre (1974) argues that "the exploitation of productive land" economically underpins use and exchange value that determine the production of space (328). Key to understanding violence in Tancitaro is a sharp focus on territorial restructuring of land regimes; as shifting regimes relate to political fragmentations and contested sovereignties and the resultant dynamics that produce profits captured by DTOs and TCOs. Local ecologies and demand from elsewhere inform commodity production and circulation. The connections between

los actores armados no estatales y considerar una nueva agenda analítica para estudiar quiénes son y cuál es su impacto sobre la seguridad y la violencia en la era contemporánea" (224). Por ejemplo, la neoliberalización y la reducción del tamaño del estado han cambiado los intereses y las capacidades de los actores estatales para participar en la violencia. Davis (2020) anima a los académicos de la planificación a explorar la violencia a través de binarios heredados: formal e informal, lícito e ilícito, incluidas las redes políticas y económicas a través de la geografía y la escala espacial (211-213). Para comprender la crisis de violencia en Michoacán, los teóricos y académicos de la planificación deben examinar los vínculos entre lucro, poder y planificación en la amenaza, y la práctica de la violencia.

Siguiendo los pasos de Grandmaison (2013) y Álvarez Rodríguez (2020), este artículo considera la violencia como un proceso sociohistórico con dinámicas distintivamente locales, basadas en el contexto. También considero el llamado de Davis (2020) para examinar críticamente las relaciones entre crisis, soberanías y poder a través de escalas territoriales. Por lo tanto, enfoco esta investigación en un solo municipio, Tancitaro, que entre 2009 y 2015 vivió una de las tasas más altas de violencia en México (INEGI, 2021). Tancitaro tiene la producción de aguacate más alta del mundo a nivel municipal, y es un nodo crítico en la región productora de aguacates Hass, la "Tierra Caliente" de Michoacán (Salazar-García, 2005: 32-33).

Si uno empleara solo las metodologías dominantes para estudiar la violencia en México, se podría asumir erróneamente que los niveles de violencia en todo el estado de Michoacán son equitativos a través del territorio o conectados a características básicas del estado o la región. Sin embargo, la violencia a nivel municipal no afectó a Tancitaro tan severamente como al resto de Michoacán en la década de 1990 y principios de la de 2000, cuando la violencia se concentró en el noroeste y la costa del estado. Durante la década de 1990 y principios de la de 2000, las plantaciones de aguacate de hoy eran bosques. Los cambios en las políticas de importación y exportación, y los gustos de los consumidores en otros lugares llevaron a cambios en el uso de la tierra y en la violencia. Las tasas de violencia en Tancitaro de 2009 a 2015 fueron altas. Los periodistas y los funcionarios políticos fueron objetivos de actos criminales. Hoy, la violencia continúa contra los trabajadores del municipio a pesar de que las autodefensas y las policías comunitarias defienden a los terratenientes. La violencia ya no amenaza los retornos de la industria. Los índices de violencia en Michoacán sugieren que la violencia está implicada en la producción de espacio y la dinámica resultante de desarrollo desigual.

types and forms of violence and commodity capitalism are mediated through two distinct pathways: political and social. New political leaders disrupt or create intricate balances of elite-cartel networks and relationships, themselves connected to power and profit. Moreover, local social organization and mobilization against organized crime create dynamics where violence varies interchangeably in relation to capital, commodities, and political and social coalitions.

Beyond local, situated analyses of violence, research suggests that explanations of crisis in the planning profession require ethnographic methods and embedded fieldwork and indicates that researchers should consider various explanations for routine violence-as-crisis across geographic scales and disciplinary boundaries.

Ethnography, through its reflexive practice, allows scholars and readers of critical planning research to understand subjective experiences of violence as they affect people of different race, class, and gender identities. As Roy (2005, 2009) and Segato (2003, 2008) argue, violence shapes and reinforces identity-based inequalities along lines of race, class, and gender. Ethnographic methods can function as a bottom-up social history, inserting community members' experiences, perceptions, and engagements with Mexican violence into our understanding of violence. Indeed, local community members and residents are too often sidelined from historiographies of crisis, even as they bear the brunt of social disruption. Scholars should emphasize these perspectives to help understand how the systematic control of space, production profit, and violence have affected local farmers, workers, and civilians. Above all, the interplay between violence, planning, and crisis remains dynamic, as should epistemologies and frameworks for understanding them.

I begin with a note on methods and a brief, statewide analysis of violence in Michoacán that shows how violence has increased in two distinctive phases. Then, I reveal how focusing on DTOs raises more questions than answers about variations in violence and about why rates of violence are high in some places and not elsewhere. In section two, I consider Tancitaro's local history; divisions of

La Figura 3 presenta un amplio intento de contabilizar explicaciones localizadas y situadas de la violencia.

La Figura 3 demuestra cómo la dinámica terrestre de Tancitaro y las ecologías locales distintivas de Michoacán impulsan tipos y formas de violencia junto con las explicaciones tradicionales que centran a las OCT. De hecho, la producción de espacio, el desarrollo desigual y la política espacial de

la tierra contribuyen a esta explicación de la crisis de este municipio en particular: las experiencias de Tancitaro con la violencia conectan intrincadamente el ajuste estructural y la liberalización agrícola, las ganancias basadas en el aguacate, el realineamiento político, las alianzas de gobierno tácito y las respuestas socioeconómicas. Lefebvre (1974)

sostiene que “la explotación de la tierra productiva” sostiene económicamente el uso y el valor de cambio que determinan la producción del espacio (328). La clave para entender la violencia en Tancitaro es la necesidad de un enfoque en la reestructuración de los regímenes territoriales; ya que los regímenes cambiantes se relacionan con las fragmentaciones políticas y las soberanías en disputa, y la dinámica resultante que produce ganancias capturadas por las ODT y las OCT. Las ecologías locales y la demanda de otros lugares informan la producción y circulación de productos básicos. Las conexiones entre los tipos y formas de violencia, y el capitalismo mercantil están mediados por dos vías distintas: la política y la social. Nuevos líderes políticos alteran o crean intrincados equilibrios de redes y relaciones con la élite y los carteles, conectados ellos mismos al poder y a las ganancias. Además, la organización social local y la movilización contra el crimen organizado crean dinámicas donde la violencia varía indistintamente en relación con el capital, los productos básicos y las coaliciones políticas y sociales.

Más allá de los análisis situados de la violencia, la investigación sugiere que las explicaciones de la crisis en la profesión de planificación requieren métodos etnográficos y trabajo de campo integrado, e indica que los investigadores deben considerar varias explicaciones para la violencia rutinaria como crisis a través de escalas geográficas y límites disciplinarios.




Figure 3. Causes and Explanations of Violence in Tancitaro. By author.

Figura 3. Causas y explicaciones de la violencia en Tancitaro. Por autor.

capital and labor; and dynamics of land, production, commodities, and inequality. In section three, I consider theoretical contributions on critical planning and crisis to ask what planning scholars and practitioners might collectively learn about violence as an historical and social form in Tancitaro. I conclude with a call to future researchers and planners to attend to local community perspectives.

A NOTE ON METHODS

The paper draws on quantitative and qualitative material, employing descriptive statistics of violence at the municipal, state, and national levels; a newspaper discourse analysis of violent events in Tancitaro; a review of academic literature on Tancitaro; and a literature review of critical planning theory focusing on violence and planning in crisis. Original quantitative analysis of violence at the state and national levels draws on data from Piccato et al. (2017), Calderón et al. (2019 and 2020), and *INEGI* (2021); data on avocado production in Mexico from Erickson and Owen (2020) and Salazar-García et al. (2020); and data on municipal-level violence from *INEGI* (2021). I complement these scholars' quantitative methods with a literature review of planning theory on violence, a review of scholarship on Tancitaro from official sources, and a newspaper discourse analysis. Local newspapers advance a place-based approach to how journalists and Tancitaro residents perceived and experienced local violence. I selected articles based on their discussions and perceptions of locally organized violence. Finally, I draw on the limited existing scholarship that does utilize ethnographic methods, by Álvarez-Rodríguez (2020), Román Burgos (2020), and Grandmaison (2013), and scholarship from Noria Research.

SITUATING THE INQUIRY: STATEWIDE VIOLENCE IN MICHOACÁN

Statewide, the crisis of violence in Michoacán was highest in two periods: first, in the early 1990s and, again, from the 2010s to the present (figures 1 and 2). According to Calderón et al. (2019), Morelia, Michoacán's capital, was among the ten most violent cities in Mexico from 2013 to 2014 (24). Michoacán was ranked sixth in organized-crime homicides from 2017 to 2018 (29) and first overall as the state with the most politicians and public officials murdered from 2005 to 2018 (31–32). According to *INEGI* (2021), the average rate of intentional homicides in Mexico was 15.60 per 100,000 people (36,685 fatalities); in Michoacán, it was 20.55 per 100,000 people (2,062 fatalities) (figure 2). Statewide statistics indicate distinct periods of consistently high violence, with TCO activity directed at public leaders as one of multiple specific and acute forms of violence.

Explanations for statewide violence often note the breakdown and subsequent reconstitution of DTOs

La etnografía, a través de su práctica reflexiva, permite a los académicos y lectores de la planificación crítica comprender experiencias subjetivas de violencia que afectan a personas de diferentes razas, clases e identidades de género. Como argumentan Roy (2005, 2009) y Segato (2003, 2008), la violencia da forma y refuerza las desigualdades basadas en la identidad, en función de raza, clase y género. Los métodos etnográficos pueden funcionar como una historia social *Bottom-up*, insertando las experiencias, percepciones y compromisos de los miembros de la comunidad con la violencia mexicana en nuestra comprensión de esta. De hecho, los miembros de la comunidad local y los residentes son a menudo marginados de las historiografías de crisis, incluso cuando son los más afectados por los trastornos sociales. Los académicos deben hacer énfasis en estas perspectivas para ayudar a comprender cómo el control sistemático del espacio, las ganancias de la producción y la violencia han afectado a los agricultores, trabajadores y civiles locales. Sobre todo, la interacción entre violencia, planificación y crisis sigue siendo dinámica, al igual que las epistemologías y los marcos para comprenderlas.

Comienzo con una nota sobre métodos y un breve análisis estatal de la violencia en Michoacán que muestra cómo la violencia ha aumentado en dos fases distintas. Luego, revelo cómo centrarse en las ODT plantea más preguntas que respuestas sobre las variaciones en la violencia y las razones por las cuales las tasas de violencia son altas en algunos lugares y no en otros. En la sección dos, considero la historia local de Tancitaro; divisiones de capital y trabajo; dinámica de la tierra, la producción, los productos básicos y la desigualdad. En la sección tres, considero contribuciones teóricas sobre planificación crítica y crisis para indagar qué académicos y profesionales de la planificación podrían aprender colectivamente sobre la violencia como una forma histórica y social en Tancitaro. Concluyo con un llamado a los futuros investigadores y planificadores para que presten atención a las perspectivas de la comunidad local.

NOTA SOBRE LOS MÉTODOS

El documento se basa en material cuantitativo y cualitativo, empleando estadísticas descriptivas de la violencia a nivel municipal, estatal y nacional; un análisis del discurso periodístico sobre hechos violentos en Tancitaro; una revisión de la literatura académica sobre Tancitaro; y una revisión de la literatura sobre la teoría crítica de la planificación centrada en la violencia y la planificación en crisis. El análisis cuantitativo original de la violencia a nivel estatal y nacional se basa en datos de Piccato et al. (2017), Calderón et al. (2019 y 2020) e *INEGI* (2021); datos sobre la producción de aguacate en México de Erickson y Owen (2020) y Salazar-García et al.

after 2006, when violence abated and then increased. Beittel (2020) argues that “fragmentation that began in 2010 and accelerated in 2011 redefined the ‘battlefield’ and brought new actors, such as Los Zetas and the Knights Templar, to the fore” (28–29). The 2016 fragmentation and reconfiguration of *La Familia Michoacán* led to additional territorial skirmishes (28–29). By 2018, an array of smaller organizations was active, with some once-small groups growing responsible for significant violence. Grandmaison (2014) argues that reconfiguration continues presently and that *autodefensas* themselves ought to be considered in a “phase of ‘democratization of violence,’ as opposed to the near monopoly previously exerted [by larger cartels like the Knights Templar].” Beittel and Grandmaison’s explanations consider the first wave of violence in Michoacán as driven by cartelization and major DTOs, while a second wave of violence (2009–present) is driven more by fragmented and contested sovereignties and smaller armed groups.

Yet, spatial and social inconsistencies abound in statewide dynamics of violence in Michoacán. For example, municipal-level homicide data in Michoacán suggest that murders are clustered in specific zones; most cities in the state have not reported any yearly homicides by criminal organizations, while other cities have reported many (Caldéron et al., 2020). Using statewide quantitative indicators for violence over time binds thinking to the state of Michoacán rather than highlighting local centers of violence with distinctive political geographies and economic networks. However, Álvarez Rodríguez’s preliminary ethnographic research in Michoacán (2020) suggests practices of violence vary according to clusters or belts. In the state of Nayarit, Morris (2020) cites the changing role of land regimes, NAFTA, and reduced agricultural subsidies (liberalization) in explaining opium production in Nayarit. Lopez (2021) examines the “strategically vital” location of Fresnillo, Zacatecas next to key highways to explain high rates of violence; Zacatecas borders eight states and sits between Pacific ports and Northern Mexican states along the U.S. border. Local examinations can draw out contextual factors explaining violence relating to production networks, political and social power dynamics, and agro-ecological features that help explain why violence is or is not present.

Tancitaro is one local center of violence in Michoacán. The city has a reputation as the “avocado capital of Mexico” for good reason, as it leads the world in avocado production per area (Erickson and Owen, 2020; Salazar-García, et al., 2020). Tancitaro also has among the highest levels of police interventions, defined by INEGI (2021) as actions by state and municipal police of both alleged and committed crimes within their jurisdiction, in the state. Unlike most other cities with high agricultural

(2020); y datos de violencia a nivel municipal del INEGI (2021). Complemento los métodos cuantitativos de estos académicos con una reseña sobre la violencia dentro de la literatura de planificación, una reseña de investigación sobre Tancitaro a través de fuentes oficiales y un análisis del discurso de los periódicos. Los periódicos locales presentan un enfoque basado en el lugar de cómo los periodistas y los residentes de Tancitaro percibieron y experimentaron la violencia local. Seleccioné artículos basados en sus discusiones y percepciones de la violencia organizada localmente. Finalmente, me baso en los limitados estudios existentes que sí utilizan métodos etnográficos, de Álvarez-Rodríguez (2020), Román Burgos (2020) y Grandmaison (2013), y en la erudición de Noria Research.

SITUANDO LA INVESTIGACIÓN: LA VIOLENCIA ESTATAL EN MICHOCÁN

A nivel estatal, la crisis de violencia en Michoacán fue mayor en dos períodos: primero, a principios de la década de 1990 y, nuevamente, desde la década de 2010 hasta la actualidad (gráficos 1 y 2). Según Calderón et al. (2019), Morelia, la capital de Michoacán, estuvo entre las diez ciudades más violentas de México de 2013 a 2014 (24). Michoacán ocupó el sexto lugar en homicidios por delincuencia organizada de 2017 a 2018 (29) y el primero en general como el estado con más políticos y funcionarios públicos asesinados de 2005 a 2018 (31–32). Según el INEGI (2021), la tasa promedio de homicidios intencionales en México fue de 15,60 por 100.000 habitantes (36.685 muertes); en Michoacán fue de 20,55 por 100.000 habitantes (2.062 muertes) (figura 2). Las estadísticas estatales indican distintos períodos de alta violencia constante, con las actividades de las OCT dirigidas a líderes públicos como una de las múltiples formas específicas y agudas de violencia.

Las explicaciones de la violencia en todo el estado a menudo señalan el colapso y la posterior reconstitución de las ODT después de 2006, cuando la violencia disminuyó y luego aumentó. Beittel (2020) sostiene: “la fragmentación que comenzó en 2010 y se aceleró en 2011 redefinió el ‘campo de batalla’ y trajo nuevos actores, como Los Zetas y los Caballeros Templarios, a un primer plano” (28–29). La fragmentación y reconfiguración de *La Familia Michoacán* en 2016 dio lugar a escaramuzas territoriales adicionales (28–29). Para 2018, una serie de organizaciones más pequeñas estaba activa, y grupos que alguna vez fueron pequeños se volvieron responsables de una violencia significativa. Grandmaison (2014) argumenta que la reconfiguración continúa en la actualidad y que las *autodefensas* mismas deberían ser consideradas en una “fase de ‘democratización de la violencia’, en contraposición al

production in the state, Tancitaro receives few direct farmer subsidies per area through Mexico's Program of Direct Supports to the Farmland regime (PROCAMPO).¹ Since PROCAMPO payments are decoupled from production and tied to hectares, data suggest high-profit production in a relatively compact spatial footprint, with select estate-owners benefitting. Additionally, Tancitaro has experienced high-level political assassinations in recent years (Calderón et al., 2019: 31–32). In light of the city's characteristics, how might Tancitaro's crisis of violence stem from socio-historical experiences of planning and the production of space?

SOCIOHISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENCE IN TANCÍTARO

HISTORICIZING VIOLENCE IN TANCÍTARO

In Tancitaro, high levels of avocado production and high levels of violence go hand in hand. Salazar-García et al. (2020) show that the municipality is ranked number one in avocado production per area globally, and Erickson and Owen (2020) reveal how avocado demand and profit have increased after new 2016 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rules increased imports from Tancitaro to the U.S. (6). Michoacán now produces 80 percent of avocado production in Mexico and nearly half of avocados worldwide (USDA, 2018). Since avocados generate nearly \$2.4 billion of revenue for Mexico, Dehghan (2019) argues that new, expansive TCOs like the Jalisco New Generation and Los Cuinis are actively profiting from this new commodity, which Stevenson (2019) calls “green gold.” Avocado consumption in the United States is increasing annually, accompanied by organized criminal organizations in the industry's supply chain.

Why is avocado production concentrated in Michoacán's belt region and in specific municipalities like Tancitaro? Perez Montesinos (2014) finds that Michoacán's *meseta purépecha* has a unique soil and climate, perfect for specific varieties of avocado production, in part because of “forest cover, volcanic soils, and escarpments” that each “combine to make water distribution fairly imbalanced” with noted rainy and dry seasons (79). The distinctive type of Hass avocados that Americans love requires unique and rare agro-ecological conditions present in a small number of places like Tancitaro.

The arenas of contestation for the production of space are land and property regimes. Land and property regimes underpin transitions from commonly held *ejido* lands to opium production and networks in Nayarit (Morris 2020). In Tancitaro, rapid fluctuations in the use value of land due to global

casi monopolio ejercido anteriormente [por carteles más grandes como los Caballeros Templarios]”. Las explicaciones de Beittel y Grandmaison consideran que la primera ola de violencia en Michoacán fue impulsada por la cartelización y las principales ODT, mientras que una segunda ola de violencia (2009-presente) fue impulsada más por soberanías fragmentadas y disputadas, y grupos armados más pequeños.

Sin embargo, abundan las inconsistencias espaciales y sociales en las dinámicas de violencia a nivel estatal en Michoacán. Por ejemplo, los datos de homicidios a nivel municipal en Michoacán sugieren que los asesinatos se agrupan en zonas específicas; la mayoría de las ciudades del estado no han reportado ningún homicidio anual por parte de organizaciones criminales, mientras que otras ciudades han reportado muchos (Calderón et al., 2020). El uso de indicadores cuantitativos estatales para la violencia a lo largo del tiempo vincula el análisis al estado de Michoacán en lugar de resaltar los centros locales de violencia con geografías políticas y redes económicas distintivas. Sin embargo, la investigación etnográfica preliminar de Álvarez Rodríguez en Michoacán (2020) sugiere que las prácticas de violencia varían según los grupos o regiones. En el estado de Nayarit, Morris (2020) cita el rol cambiante de los regímenes agrarios, el TLCAN y la reducción de los subsidios agrícolas (liberalización) para explicar la producción de opio en este estado. López (2021) examina la ubicación “estratégicamente vital” de Fresnillo, Zacatecas junto a carreteras clave para explicar los altos índices de violencia; Zacatecas limita con ocho estados y se encuentra entre los puertos del Pacífico y los estados del norte de México a lo largo de la frontera con Estados Unidos. Los exámenes locales pueden extraer factores contextuales que expliquen la violencia relacionada con las redes de producción, las dinámicas de poder político y social, y las características agroecológicas que ayudan a explicar por qué la violencia está presente o no.

Tancitaro es un centro local de violencia en Michoacán. La ciudad tiene la reputación de ser la “capital del aguacate de México” por una buena razón, ya que es líder mundial en producción de aguacate por área (Erickson y Owen, 2020; Salazar-García, et al., 2020). Tancitaro también cuenta con uno de los niveles más altos de intervenciones policiales, definidas por el INEGI (2021) como acciones de policías estatales y municipales de delitos alegados y cometidos dentro de su jurisdicción, en el estado. A diferencia de la mayoría de las otras ciudades con alta producción agrícola en el estado, Tancitaro recibe pocos subsidios directos a los agricultores por área a través del Programa de Apoyos Directos al Régimen de Tierras Agrícolas de México (PROCAMPO)! Dado que los pagos de PROCAMPO están desacoplados de

1. PROCAMPO provides direct subsidies to Mexican farmers per hectare.

avocado demand and the USDA rule change led to contestations over who might benefit from these lands' surplus and changed how land was valued, patrolled, and treated. Territorial restructuring in Nayarit due to NAFTA and changing subsidy regimes affected production and profit incentives and resultant land uses. However, Perez Montesinos (2014) finds that ejidos and haciendas were uncommon in Tancítaro. Instead, *rancherías* (with a few dozen to a few thousand residents), *pueblos*, *villas*, and *ciudades* home to *purépecha* Indigenous communities (88) animate the region. Tancítaro, considered a *villa*, includes smaller *pueblos* (89). Maldonado Aranda (2013) notes that Michoacán long had a reputation as a "peripheral, indomitable, indolent" place (48) and that an extensive effort of infrastructure-building and development starting in 1947 helped "integrate" the area with the rest of Mexico through road and power networks. Extensive scholarship on Michoacán during the twentieth century shows sustained agrarian and religious violence beginning in the 1920s. Tancítaro's story differs from that of the region: the most notable forms of violence include inter-*pueblo* elite contests in the 1810s, and violence over secure access to communal woodlands and forest revenue in the 1920s and beyond (Maldonado Aranda, 2013: 66, 286), highlighting the need to understand violence's specificity.

The first wave of statewide violence in Michoacán corresponds with the rise of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and late liberalization, which led to new public-private alliances with brokers across industries, and an increase in cartelization (figure 1). Maldonado Aranda (2013) writes, "Commodity production and exports made not only agricultural entrepreneurs and political bosses wealthy, but also drug-traffickers, who took advantage of the new infrastructure and commercial networks to grow and transport their products" (48). Schumacher et al. (2019) note the role of PROCAMPO subsidies in providing direct payments to farmers due to inequalities caused by state restructuring, arguing that PROCAMPO subsidies directly shaped local dynamics of violence in Michoacán, decreasing violence as farmers gained income through the subsidies. Tancítaro saw neither high rates of violence nor high rates of PROCAMPO subsidies in the first wave of statewide violence. Calderón et al. (2019) argue that "homicides [in the 1990s' wave were] regionally concentrated in the major drug trafficking zones in the northwest and the Pacific Coast" (4). Indeed, in the 1990s, spatial analysis by Barsimantov and Antezana (2008) reveals that most land surrounding the city was still highland pine-oak forests that would only later be deforested to avocado plantations as demand soared (1–2). A primary newspaper search concerning the period of this first wave reveals articles on seismic

la producción y vinculados al número de hectáreas, los datos sugieren una producción de alta rentabilidad en una huella territorial relativamente compacta, con los propietarios de fincas seleccionados beneficiándose. Además, Tancítaro ha experimentado asesinatos políticos de alto nivel en los últimos años (Calderón et al., 2019: 31–32). A la luz de las características de la ciudad, ¿cómo podría surgir la crisis de violencia de Tancítaro a partir de experiencias sociohistóricas de planificación y producción del espacio?

DIMENSIONES SOCIOHISTÓRICAS DE LA VIOLENCIA EN TANCÍTARO

HISTORIZACIÓN DE LA VIOLENCIA EN TANCÍTARO

En Tancítaro, los altos niveles de producción de aguacate y los altos niveles de violencia van de la mano. Salazar-García y et al. (2020) muestran que el municipio ocupa el puesto número uno en producción de aguacate por área a nivel mundial, y Erickson y Owen (2020) revelan cómo la demanda y las ganancias de aguacate han aumentado después de que las nuevas normas del Departamento de Agricultura de EE. UU. (USDA) de 2016 aumentaron las importaciones de Tancítaro a Estados Unidos (6). Michoacán ahora produce el 80 por ciento de la producción de aguacate en México y casi la mitad de los aguacates en todo el mundo (USDA, 2018). Dado que los aguacates generan casi \$ 2.4 billones de ingresos para México, Dehghan (2019) argumenta que las nuevas OCT expansivas como Jalisco Nueva Generación y Los Cuinis se están beneficiando activamente de este nuevo producto, al que Stevenson (2019) llama "oro verde". El consumo de aguacate en los Estados Unidos aumenta anualmente, acompañado por organizaciones delictivas organizadas en la cadena de suministro de la industria.

¿Por qué la producción de aguacate se concentra en la región de Michoacán y en municipios específicos como Tancítaro? Pérez Montesinos (2014) encuentra que la meseta Purépecha de Michoacán tiene un suelo y un clima únicos, perfectos para variedades específicas de producción de aguacate, en parte debido a "la cubierta forestal, a los suelos volcánicos y a la escarpadura", que cada uno "se combina para hacer que la distribución del agua esté bastante desequilibrada" con notables estaciones lluviosas y secas (79).

El tipo distintivo de aguacate Hass que adoran los estadounidenses requiere condiciones agroecológicas únicas y raras presentes en una pequeña cantidad de lugares como Tancítaro.

Las arenas de disputa por la producción de espacio son los regímenes de propiedad y de tierra.

1. PROCAMPO otorga subsidios directos a los agricultores mexicanos por hectárea.

volcanic activity near Tancitaro but not violence. Tancitaro's crisis of violence does not historically map onto statewide statistics in Michoacán.

PROFIT AND POLITICAL NETWORKS

Even as Tancitaro avoided dramatic early violence, statewide violence in Michoacán's first wave led to the formation of criminal organizations fluid in scope and territorial reach. As Tancitaro's avocado industry began to boom, shaped by demand for this 'super food' in the United States (Dehghan, 2019; Stevenson, 2019), and agricultural liberalization policies opened new import-export regimes, violence followed (Erickson and Owen, 2020). Starting in 2009 and 2010, a series of newspaper articles conveyed the city's political violence.

The article "Tancitaro's Cabinet Resigns Due to Fear in December 2009" opens with the stark claim that no one wants to govern in Tancitaro and notes the recent resignation of the city's mayor, Trinidad Meza (*El Universal*, 2010). The article portrays a municipality in shambles, with city leaders fearful to provide basic public functions, citing confrontations between TCOs and police. *El Universal* notes with disbelief that violence is taking place in a city known for its successful avocado production and highlights its strategic geographic location between the Coast, Tierra Caliente, and the West. Gustavo Sánchez Cervantes assumed the position of mayor shortly after the large-scale resignation of Trinidad Meza's government, saying, "We will ask the government of the republic for its collaboration so that the Federal Police continue to protect the municipality. I have no enemies, I am a primary school teacher and I like karate, that's why I accept the position."²

The article "Pedradas, Mayor of Tancitaro Killed" begins by stating that around 10:30am the next Monday, Gustavo Sánchez Cervantes and his secretary were found stoned to death, tied by the hands and blindfolded (*El Universal*, 2010). Although the article notes that Tancitaro had seen clashes over several years between armed groups, and police ambushes, reporters stop short of asking what happened to the mayor just days after taking office. It is unclear whether organized crime groups were responsible for his death, if Cervantes's appeal to Mexico's formal state concerned crime groups, or whether Cervantes was merely a casualty in a cross-group territorial dispute.

Beyond events in September 2010, reporting in Tancitaro reveals a remarkably rapid rise in local violence connected to politics, profit, and various mobilizations toward spatial control. Reporting steered clear of quotes or perspectives from any organized crime group, despite noting multiple territorial

Estos regímenes sustentan las transiciones de las tierras ejidales de propiedad común a la producción y las redes de opio en Nayarit (Morris 2020). En Tancitaro, las rápidas fluctuaciones en el valor del uso de la tierra debido a la demanda global de aguacate y el cambio en la norma del USDA llevaron a disputas sobre quién podría beneficiarse del excedente de estas tierras y cambiaron la forma en que se valoraba, patrullaba y trataba la tierra. La reestructuración territorial en Nayarit debido al TLCAN y los cambios en los regímenes de subsidios afectaron los incentivos a la producción y las ganancias, y también a los usos de la tierra resultantes. Sin embargo, Pérez Montesinos (2014) encuentra que los ejidos y las haciendas eran poco comunes en Tancitaro. En cambio, las rancherías (con unas pocas docenas a unos pocos miles de residentes), pueblos, villas y ciudades que albergan a las comunidades indígenas purépechas (88) animan la región. Tancitaro, considerada una villa, incluye pueblos más pequeños (89). Maldonado Aranda (2013) señala que Michoacán tuvo durante mucho tiempo la reputación de ser un lugar "periférico, indómito e indolente" (48) y que un extenso esfuerzo de construcción y desarrollo de infraestructura a partir de 1947 ayudó a "integrar" el área con el resto de México a través de redes viales y eléctricas. Un extenso estudio sobre Michoacán durante el siglo XX muestra una violencia agraria y religiosa sostenida a partir de la década de 1920. La historia de Tancitaro difiere de la historia de la región: las formas más notables de violencia incluyen disputas de élite entre pueblos en la década de 1810, y por el acceso seguro a los bosques comunales, por los ingresos forestales en la década de 1920 y más allá (Maldonado Aranda, 2013: 66, 286), por lo anterior es importante destacar la necesidad de comprender la especificidad de la violencia.

La primera ola de violencia estatal en Michoacán corresponde al auge de las políticas de ajuste estructural (PAE) y la liberalización tardía, que condujo a nuevas alianzas público-privadas con intermediarios en todas las industrias, y a un aumento de la cartelización. Maldonado Aranda (2013) escribe: "La producción y exportación de productos enriqueció no solo a los empresarios agrícolas y jefes políticos, sino también a los narcotraficantes, quienes aprovecharon la nueva infraestructura y redes comerciales para cultivar y transportar sus productos" (48).

Schumacher et al. (2019) señalan el papel de los subsidios de PROCAMPO en la provisión de pagos directos a los agricultores debido a las desigualdades causadas por la reestructuración estatal, argumentando que los subsidios de PROCAMPO moldearon directamente la dinámica local de violencia en Michoacán, disminuyéndola a medida que los agricultores obtenían ingresos a través de los subsidios.

Tancitaro no vio altos índices de violencia ni altos

2. Translated from Spanish by author.

disputes. The cabinet resignation article included a twenty-four-hour news embargo, testifying to the sensitive nature of events locally and beyond. The full cabinet resignation and death of Mayor Cervantes raise questions about the relationships among organized crime, political power, planning, and service delivery in Tancitaro.

Violence in Tancitaro was present yet stable prior to 2010. Previously, local officials and cartels worked together to manage and expropriate a portion of the avocado industry's profits. However, the rise of Cervantes as a supposedly independent mayor challenged the existing spatial hegemony of municipal power and cartels, increasing violence as prominent political officials were threatened or killed, and new market entrants sought their own avocado surplus. Cervantes's rise to power upset the dominant regime of spatial production, giving way to violence. Lithicum (2019) traces the organization of new groups like the Viagras that splintered off from existing cartels and sought territorial control and profit in avocados, either extorting growers or controlling aspects of the supply chain themselves. Economic factors and flare-ups set up a dynamic whereby small farmers struggled to contend with multiple, inchoate, violent cartels. Indeed, during these years embattled small farmers engaged in vigilante violence of their own, seeking to ward off armed cartels and continue production.

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION TOWARD COUNTER-CONDUCTS

In the wake of worsening violence from 2009 to 2015, small farmers and other marginalized community members in Tancitaro mobilized, culminating in the creation of institutions to counter top-down violence. During that period, cartels and vigilante groups kidnapped young people, set fire to local avocado packaging and processing facilities, and were even accused of murdering a local, pregnant schoolteacher (Flannery, 2017). Residents, led by local growers, set up the Tancitaro Public Security Force (CUSEPT), which placed checkpoints (*filtros*) and armed guards in and around the municipality (Watson, 2017). Through social mobilization and organization, and with support from Mexico's federal government, Tancitaro's growers fought violence, creating their own collective threat of violence in response.

CUSEPT remains in full force. These self-defense groups, privately funded by wealthy business owners, amount to what Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) calls "armed groups protecting the rural bourgeoisie." Security is merely another cost of doing business in Tancitaro's avocado agro-industry, a cost that is ultimately passed on to exporters and international consumers. Even now that the city's self-defense group has been formed and is reportedly successful, police interventions in Tancitaro are high; and rates of homicides and other violent incidents remain high.

índices de subsidios de PROCAMPO en la primera ola de violencia estatal. Calderón et al. (2019) argumentan que "los homicidios [en la ola de la década de 1990] se concentraron regionalmente en las principales zonas de tráfico de drogas en el noroeste y en la costa del Pacífico" (4). De hecho, en la década de 1990, el análisis espacial de Barsimantov y Antezana (2008) revela que la mayor parte de las tierras que rodean la ciudad seguían siendo bosques de pino y roble que solo más tarde serían reemplazados por plantaciones de aguacate a medida que la demanda se disparara (1-2). Una búsqueda primaria en los periódicos sobre el periodo de esta primera ola revela artículos sobre actividad sísmica volcánica cerca de Tancitaro, pero no sobre violencia. Históricamente, la crisis de violencia de Tancitaro no aparece en las estadísticas estatales de Michoacán.

REDES DE GANANCIAS Y POLÍTICAS

A pesar de haber evitado la primera ola de violencia en Tancitaro, la violencia a nivel estatal en Michoacán llevo a la formación de organizaciones criminales fluidas en cuanto a su ámbito y alcance territorial. A medida que la industria del aguacate de Tancitaro comenzó a florecer, moldeada por la demanda de este 'súper alimento' en los Estados Unidos (Dehghan, 2019; Stevenson, 2019), y las políticas de liberalización agrícola abrieron nuevos regimenes de importación y exportación, siguió la violencia (Erickson y Owen, 2020). A partir de 2009 y 2010, una serie de artículos periodísticos transmitieron la violencia política de la ciudad.

El artículo "Gabinete de Tancitaro Renunció por Temor en Diciembre de 2009" abre con la cruda afirmación que nadie quiere gobernar en Tancitaro y destaca la reciente renuncia del alcalde de la ciudad, José Trinidad Meza (El Universal, 2010). El artículo retrata a un municipio en caos, con líderes de la ciudad temerosos de realizar funciones públicas básicas, citando enfrentamientos entre las OCT y la policía. El Universal observa con incredulidad que la violencia está ocurriendo en una ciudad conocida por su exitosa producción de aguacate y destaca su ubicación geográfica estratégica entre la Costa, Tierra Caliente y el Oeste. Gustavo Sánchez Cervantes asumió el cargo de alcalde poco después de la renuncia a gran escala del gobierno de José Trinidad Meza, diciendo: "Pediremos al gobierno de la república su colaboración para que la Policía Federal siga resguardando el municipio. Yo no tengo enemigos, soy un profesor de primaria y me gusta el karate, por eso acepto el puesto."

El artículo "Matan a Pedradas al Alcalde de Tancitaro" comienza señalando que alrededor de las 10:30 a.m. del lunes siguiente, Gustavo Sánchez Cervantes y su secretario fueron encontrados apedreados hasta la muerte, atados de las manos

Nevertheless, international journalists like Grillo in the *New York Times* (2020) describe the situation in Tancitaro as stable.

Violence no longer threatens the productive capacity of elite avocado producers, but violence remains a crisis instilling fear in Tancitaro's residents. As noted, there is a paucity of research on violence in Michoacán that engages community voice through reflexive methods. Work by Álvarez Rodríguez (2020), Grandmaison (2013), and Román Burgos (2020) fill this gap through community-embedded research that affords new perspectives. For example, Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) writes in her ethnographic field journal that a local resident, Ana, is now detached from violence; Ana observes, "There have always been deaths here." Román Burgos (2020) writes that "[in Tancitaro,] the self-defense group is funded by avocado growers according to an understanding of safety that ignores the experiences of laborers and harvesters working in the orchards, as well as workers in Hass avocado packing plants." Tancitaro's avocado growers are fighting a specific type of profit-threatening violence by invoking the threat of violence, and the self-defense groups are predicated on profit to fund efforts to deflect violence. Indeed, the self-defense groups have themselves caused violence to workers in dogged defense of smooth neoliberal production, as Villareal (2018) has documented using photojournalistic methods. Grower-funded efforts inadvertently cause violence toward workers in spite of public media accounts of violence abating. Violence in Tancitaro is connected to profit, which is driven by factors like American consumer demand and the role of the Mexican and American federal governments in supporting specific agricultural exports and imports. Grillo (2020) and Erickson and Owen (2020) connect violence in Tancitaro to USDA restrictions on avocados that limit export cultivation areas to bounded geographies and avocado types dominant in Tancitaro. USDA policy limits avocado supply and produces scarcity, making profits high and geographically bounded, attracting cartels.³

Tancitaro's crisis follows a different timeline from violence in the rest of Michoacán, with different causal factors and explanations. Figure 3 explains how distinct político-juridical and social pathways

3. Enacted in 2016, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the USDA regulated quarantine pests which restricted the avocado trade to 24 municipalities in Michoacán, including Tancitaro (Erickson and Owen, 2020: 6).
4. See Román Burgos (2020) and Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) who engage local residents disconnected from DTOs and TCOs and avocados, who have lost friends and family members to violence, and whose lives remain shaped by violence.

y con los ojos vendados (El Universal, 2010).

Aunque el artículo señala que Tancitaro había visto enfrentamientos durante varios años entre grupos armados y emboscadas policiales, los reporteros no se detienen a preguntar qué sucedió con el alcalde pocos días después de asumir el cargo. No está claro si los grupos del crimen organizado fueron responsables de su muerte, si la apelación de Cervantes al estado formal de México se refería a grupos criminales, o si Cervantes fue simplemente una víctima en una disputa territorial entre grupos.

Más allá de los eventos de septiembre de 2010, los reportajes en Tancitaro revelan un aumento notablemente rápido de la violencia local relacionada con la política, las ganancias y diversas movilizaciones hacia el control espacial. La presentación de informes se ha mantenido al margen de las citas o perspectivas de cualquier grupo del crimen organizado, a pesar de señalar múltiples disputas territoriales. El artículo de renuncia del gabinete incluía un embargo de noticias de veinticuatro horas, lo que atestigua la naturaleza sensible de los eventos a nivel local y más allá. La renuncia total al gabinete y la muerte del alcalde Cervantes plantean interrogantes sobre las relaciones entre el crimen organizado, el poder político, la planificación y la prestación de servicios en Tancitaro.

La violencia en Tancitaro estaba presente pero estable antes de 2010. Anteriormente, los funcionarios locales y los carteles trabajaron juntos para administrar y expropiar una parte de las ganancias de la industria del aguacate. Sin embargo, el ascenso de Cervantes como alcalde, supuestamente independiente, desafió la hegemonía espacial existente del poder municipal y los carteles, aumentando la violencia a medida que destacados funcionarios políticos fueron amenazados o asesinados, y los nuevos participantes del mercado buscaron su propio excedente de aguacate. La subida al poder de Cervantes trastornó el régimen dominante de producción espacial, dando paso a la violencia. Lithicum (2019) rastrea la organización de nuevos grupos como los Viagras que se separaron de los carteles existentes y buscaron el control territorial y las ganancias en los aguacates, ya sea extorsionando a los productores o controlando aspectos de la cadena de suministro. Los factores económicos y los estallidos establecieron una dinámica en la que los pequeños agricultores lucharon para hacer frente a múltiples carteles incipientes y violentos. De hecho, durante estos años los pequeños agricultores en conflicto se involucraron en su propia violencia vigilante, buscando ahuyentar a los cárteles armados y continuar la producción.

MOVILIZACIÓN SOCIAL HACIA CONTRA-CONDUCTAS

A raíz del agravamiento de la violencia de 2009 a 2015, pequeños agricultores y otros miembros de la

shape violence in Tancítaro in ways that are intricately connected to global agricultural demand and consumer taste and, more broadly, linked to critical planning questions around the production of space and property.

The case of Tancítaro reveals how multinational capital, the Mexican federal and local state, the police and army, DTOs and TCOs, and industry growers are all active agents in the production and suppression of violence and of crisis, all while local civilians are too often caught in the crossfire as casualties.⁴ The changing levels of violence in Michoacán and Tancítaro suggest that violence is implicated in the production of space and resultant dynamics of uneven development, mediated by political economy, and subject to dynamics of social mobilization and organization. Yet, to enhance understanding of the links between violence and its theoretical underpinnings, further research, drawing on situated, local histories and ethnographies, is required. Attending to Indigenous communities and farmers' perspectives and subjective experiences of violence is especially critical in shaping a sufficiently complex historiography.

THEORIZING PLANNING AND CRISIS FROM TANCÍTARO'S STORY

What does the case of Tancítaro reveal about violence in Michoacán and more broadly about planning and crisis? Here, I engage critical planning theory on crisis and violence through scholarship by Arendt (1970), Davis (2009, 2020), Lefebvre (1974), Roy (2005, 2009), and Segato (2003, 2008) to reveal how crises of violence produce and reproduce space, blurring the lines between state and market; formal and informal; and DTOs, TCOs and self-defense groups. Since violence is connected to power and profit, but is also a "weapon of the weak" in response to hegemony (Scott 1985, 350), it defies monolithic understanding as a social and historical force.

Arendt (1970) examines how violence changed in the twentieth century, growing more technologized. Arendt differentiates between power and violence, noting that "the extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All" (42). In short, Arendt sees power as something that is, at best, collaborative and socially produced. Violence, by contrast, does not always require collective efficacy; in fact, violence can dismantle it. In Michoacán's statewide violence, violence increases just after state rescaling and structural adjustment. As state power grows weaker, and as service-delivery demands grow greater to become what Arendt (1970) might call "unmanageable" (84), dueling sovereignties between DTOs and TCOs and the state have resulted in increased violence. However, the case of Tancítaro may reveal something different: violence and power can also work in concert, supporting a producer class

comunidad marginada de Tancítaro se movilizaron, culminando con la creación de instituciones para contrarrestar la violencia que genera el modelo *top-down*. Durante ese período, cárteles y grupos vigilantes secuestraron a jóvenes, prendieron fuego a las instalaciones locales de empaque y procesamiento de aguacate e incluso fueron acusados de asesinar a una maestra de escuela local embarazada (Flannery, 2017). Los residentes, liderados por agricultores locales, establecieron Seguridad Pública de Tancítaro (CUSEPT), que colocó puestos de control (filtros) y guardias armados en y alrededor del municipio (Watson, 2017). A través de la movilización y organización social, y con el apoyo del gobierno federal de México, los productores de Tancítaro lucharon contra la violencia, creando su propia amenaza colectiva de violencia, en respuesta.

CUSEPT permanece en plena vigencia. Estos grupos de autodefensa, financiados con fondos privados por ricos empresarios, equivalen a lo que Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) llama "grupos armados que protegen a la burguesía rural". La seguridad es simplemente otro costo de hacer negocios en la agroindustria del aguacate de Tancítaro, un costo que finalmente se transfiere a los exportadores y consumidores internacionales. Incluso ahora que se ha formado el grupo de autodefensa de la ciudad y, según los informes, tiene éxito, las intervenciones policiales en Tancítaro son numerosas; y las tasas de homicidios y otros incidentes violentos siguen siendo altas.

Sin embargo, periodistas internacionales como Grillo en el *New York Times* (2020) describen la situación en Tancítaro como estable.

La violencia ya no amenaza la capacidad productiva de los productores de aguacate élite, pero sigue siendo una crisis que infunde miedo a los habitantes de Tancítaro. Como se señaló, hay una escasez de investigación sobre la violencia en Michoacán que involucre la voz de la comunidad a través de métodos reflexivos. El trabajo de Álvarez Rodríguez (2020), Grandmaison (2013) y Román Burgos (2020) llenan este vacío a través de investigaciones integradas en la comunidad que brindan nuevas perspectivas. Por ejemplo, Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) escribe en su diario de campo etnográfico que una residente local, Ana, ahora está desvinculada de la violencia; Ana observa: "Aquí siempre ha habido muertes". Román Burgos (2020) escribe que "[en Tancítaro,] el grupo de autodefensas es financiado por los productores de aguacate de acuerdo con un entendimiento de seguridad

2. Promulgado en 2016, el Servicio de Inspección de Sanidad Animal y Vegetal del USDA reguló las plagas cuarentenarias que restringían el comercio de aguacate a 24 municipios de Michoacán, incluido Tancítaro (Erickson y Owen, 2020: 6).

in line with Arendt's (1970) conception of a plutocratic and democratic state (70–75). Tancitaro's violence blurs police and cartel, industry association and state regulator. Violence in Tancitaro is produced in such a way as to counter other, vigilante forms of violence. Violence, like political and economic power, can be collectively produced or haphazardly deployed. Bernstein (2012) writes that, "the only viable constraint on such abuses is engaged public critical discussion where there is vigorous debate about the pros and cons of any proposed justification" (7). Did public, inclusive debates around violence in Tancitaro lead to the city's self-defense forces? Or, by contrast, were the responses themselves violent, acting beyond justification?

Davis (2009, 2020) takes contested sovereignties and state fracture as contexts for a growing academic conversation on "the assumed relationship between poverty, weak or unstable states and the proliferation of non-state armed actors" (Davis 2020, 221). Yet, as Davis shows, non-state armed actors have growing presences in both 'developed' and 'less developed countries,' and indeed explode the very idea (reiterating Benedict Anderson) of the nation as an imagined community. Non-state armed actors exist in networks that are trans-local and supra-local. A case in point is the avocado industry, which launches local producers and suppliers into global networks of agricultural regulators, multilateral trade policymakers, government officials, and violence entrepreneurs. Davis writes, "In a globalizing world it may be easy for citizens to detach themselves from the idea of the nation-state as the primordial site for political allegiance and sovereignty, and instead become tied to alternative, 'imagined communities' grounded in local realities even if the latter are transnationally connected" (Davis 2020, 214). In Tancitaro, local realities and political-economic dynamics center on land-use patterns and production regimes for avocado production connected to transnational networks, with high profit at stake. The state is just one of many mediators seeking profit at this interface. Alongside Davis' concepts of sovereignty and allegiance vis-à-vis violence, Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" (1996), proposes a distinction between legal, state-sanctioned violence (mythic violence) and spontaneous violence (divine violence) (Bernstein 2012). According to Benjamin (1996), "If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law destroying" (350). Any universal or monolithic approach to violence must contend with its multiple and opposing purposes.

Lefebvre's (1974) concept of the production of space proposes a triad of argumentation: "spatial practice" represents continuity and cohesion of society members' relationships to a space; "representations of space" are tied to relations of production and the order that imposes on space

que ignora las experiencias de los trabajadores y recolectores que trabajan en los huertos, así como trabajadores en plantas empaquetadoras de aguacate Hass".

Los productores de Tancitaro están luchando contra un tipo específico de violencia que amenaza sus ganancias, a su vez, la amenaza de la violencia, y los grupos de autodefensa se basan en las ganancias con el fin de financiar esfuerzos para desviar la violencia. De hecho, los propios grupos de autodefensa han causado violencia a los trabajadores, en defensa obstinada de la fluida producción neoliberal, como ha documentado Villarreal (2018) utilizando métodos de fotoperiodismo. Los esfuerzos financiados por los productores provocan inadvertidamente violencia contra los trabajadores a pesar de que los medios públicos informan que la violencia está disminuyendo. La violencia en Tancitaro está relacionada con las ganancias, que son impulsadas por factores como la demanda de los consumidores estadounidenses y el papel de los gobiernos federales de México y Estados Unidos en el apoyo a las exportaciones e importaciones agrícolas específicas. Grillo (2020) y Erickson y Owen (2020) relacionan la violencia en Tancitaro con las restricciones del USDA sobre los aguacates, limitando las áreas de cultivo de exportación a geografías determinadas y a ciertos tipos de aguacates dominantes en Tancitaro. La política del USDA limita el suministro de aguacate y produce escasez, haciendo que los beneficios sean altos y limitados geográficamente, atrayendo a los carteles.²

La crisis de Tancitaro sigue una línea temporal diferente a la violencia en el resto de Michoacán, con diferentes factores causales y explicaciones. La Figura 3 explica cómo las distintas vías político-jurídicas y sociales dan forma a la violencia en Tancitaro de maneras que están intrincadamente conectadas con la demanda agrícola global y el gusto del consumidor y, más ampliamente, vinculadas a cuestiones críticas de planificación en torno a la producción de espacio y propiedad.

El caso de Tancitaro revela cómo el capital multinacional, el estado federal y local mexicano, la policía, el ejército, las ODT y OCT, y los productores industriales son agentes activos en la producción y supresión de la violencia y de la crisis, mientras que los civiles locales, son con demasiada frecuencia, atrapados en el fuego cruzado como víctimas.³ Los cambiantes niveles de violencia en Michoacán y Tancitaro sugieren que la violencia está implicada en

3. Véase Román Burgos (2020) y Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) que involucran a los residentes locales desconectados de las DTO y TCO y los aguacates, que han perdido amigos y familiares a causa de la violencia, y cuyas vidas siguen moldeadas por la violencia.

from above; and “representational space” reveals the “clandestine or underground side of social life” that might imagine something else for spaces and society as a whole (33). These contested spatial-production processes have “a frightening capacity for violence...maintained by a bureaucracy which has laid hold of the gains of capitalism in the ascendent and turned them to its own profit” (52). Lefebvre also notes, “The violence of power is answered by the violence of subversion” (23), which is at play in twentieth century Mexico over struggles for power and profit in industries ranging from marijuana to opium to avocados. Avocado production in Tancítaro is associated with violence because its material production requires the active representation and control of space, producing crises. However, the fact that there is little “subversion” beyond alternative groups of elites looking for power (cartels, vigilante groups, the self-defense groups) should raise a question whether “representational space” is at play in Tancítaro and its avocado industry or whether local instances of violence take place removed from the Lefebvrian ideals of class struggle and power-sharing from below. The case of Tancítaro suggests that violence can also take place between multiple visions for different hegemonic representations of space. Workers and local residents are framed as passive victims of violence without imagined alternative structures of their own.

Roy (2009) engages questions of informality and the production of space, arguing that “informality is a deregulated rather than unregulated system” (83). State and business actors strategically benefit from certain sectors and systems led by charismatic leaders rather than rules-based bureaucratic states. In Mexico, consider the overlapping bureaucracies of planning; the army; and federal, state, and local police as deliberately underregulated agencies that allow for autonomy and discretion. Additionally, the “strategic use of states of exception” (Roy 2005, 153) allows for both the production of violence and innovative efforts by state and market actors to counter it. Avocados are a legal commodity across contexts (unlike cocaine), yet dynamics of violence in their circulation mirror illicit goods. Avocado production requires specific agro-ecological conditions, local to geographies like Michoacán’s Tierra Caliente, which speaks to scarcity and economic control of violence. In Tancítaro, control of avocado commodities and profit and provision of security services are ambiguous, allowing state actors to cash in on violent accumulation and dispossession and offering state actors more autonomy and discretion. The conceptual and epistemic limits of violence should have planning theorists and scholars

la producción de espacio y la dinámica resultante de desarrollo desigual, mediada por la economía política y sujeta a dinámicas de movilización y organización social. Sin embargo, para mejorar la comprensión de los vínculos entre la violencia y sus fundamentos teóricos, se requiere más investigación, basándose en historias y etnografías locales situadas. Atender las perspectivas de las comunidades indígenas y de los agricultores, y las experiencias subjetivas de violencia son cruciales para dar forma a una historiografía suficientemente compleja.

TEORIZANDO LA PLANIFICACIÓN Y LA CRISIS A PARTIR DE LA HISTORIA DE TANCÍTARO

¿Qué revela el caso de Tancítaro sobre la violencia en Michoacán y más ampliamente sobre planificación y crisis? Aquí, utilizo la teoría de la planificación crítica sobre crisis y violencia a través de la erudición de Arendt (1970), Davis (2009, 2020), Lefebvre (1974), Roy (2005, 2009) y Segato (2003, 2008) para revelar cómo las crisis de violencia producen y reproducen el espacio, desdibujando las fronteras entre estado y mercado; formal e informal; ODT, OCT, y grupos de autodefensa. Dado que la violencia está relacionada con el poder y las ganancias, pero también es un “arma de los débiles” en respuesta a la hegemonía (Scott 1985, 350), desafía la comprensión monolítica como fuerza social e histórica.

Arendt (1970) examina cómo cambió la violencia en el siglo XX, volviéndose cada vez más tecnificada. Arendt diferencia entre poder y violencia, señalando que “la forma extrema de poder es Todos contra Uno, la forma extrema de violencia es Uno contra Todos” (42). En resumen, Arendt ve el poder como algo que, en el mejor de los casos, es colaborativo y producido socialmente. La violencia, por el contrario, no siempre requiere eficacia colectiva; de hecho, la violencia puede desmantelarla. La violencia en el estado de Michoacán aumenta justo después del cambio de escala estatal y del ajuste estructural. A medida que el poder del estado se debilita y las demandas de prestación de servicios aumentan hasta convertirse en lo que Arendt (1970) podría llamar “inmanejable” (84), el duelo de soberanías entre las ODT y las OCT y el estado ha provocado un aumento de la violencia. Sin embargo, el caso de Tancítaro puede revelar algo diferente: la violencia y el poder también pueden trabajar de manera concertada, apoyando a una clase productora en línea con la concepción de Arendt (1970) de un estado plutocrático y democrático (70-75).

La violencia de Tancítaro desdibuja a la policía y al cartel, a la asociación industrial y al regulador estatal. La violencia en Tancítaro se produce de tal manera que contrarresta otras formas de violencia vigilante. La violencia, como el poder político y económico, puede producirse colectivamente o

5. Translated from Spanish by author.

6. Translated from Spanish by author.

consider whether ambiguity regarding “to whom things belong” can be strategically useful for states (155).

Segato, examining femicide in post-1980s Ciudad Juárez, argues that strategic neoliberal exceptions create a totalitarian culture of territorial domination and control produced by the potent combination of economic extraction and political domination, linked with longstanding cultures of misogyny (2003). The victims are hundreds of women, deemed “generic” and “exposable” (9).⁵ Segato (2008) connects the baron’s absolutist territorial dominion associated with feudal times to contemporary Juarez, writing: “in the more than terrible contemporary postmodern, neoliberal, post-state, post-democratic order, the baron became capable of almost unrestricted control of his territory as a consequence of the uncontrolled accumulation characteristic of the border expansion region” (94).⁶ Considering Segato’s description of barons, consider Mexican revolutionary “heroes” like Pancho Villa or Emilio Zapata; *pistoleros* and *caciques* of post-revolutionary Mexico; and *narcotraficantes* in the late twentieth century. The power of these individuals and groups, argues Segato, amounts to that of a second, parallel state with deep networks of loyalty and relationships in capital, commerce, and law enforcement (92). Tancitaro may suggest a very different picture: local groups have resisted the power of multinational capital. Nonetheless, the thirst for territorial control has gone hand in hand with avocado production, as local deforestation, land dispossession, and theft reveal. Even as the political-economic regimes of neoliberalism, foreign trade, and political impunity are supra-local, they touch down distinctively in Tancitaro.

As Arendt (1970) argues, violence tilts the scales of the great equalizer of death. Violence, the threat of violence, and states of exception that allow for superseding norms and laws are all endemic to Tancitaro and Tancitaro’s local experiences of violence. Violence is experienced in local clusters as a dynamic process; as a result, spatializing the extents and various embodied and perceptual forms of violence must occur as violence is defined and its relationship to critical planning theory and practice is theorized. Violence in Tancitaro is unpredictable; it has affected politicians, journalists, small growers, and civilians. Crises can be strategically (and haphazardly) deployed to serve different interests. In short, the case of Tancitaro reveals few neat conceptual justifications for violence but many overlapping and at times contradicting enactments of violence – a crisis that is contextually grounded and historically rooted.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I follow calls from Grandmaison (2013) and Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) and highlight a critical-planning approach to mix descriptive and interpretive

desplegarse al azar. Bernstein (2012) escribe que, “la única restricción viable para tales abusos es la discusión crítica pública comprometida donde hay un debate vigoroso sobre los pros y los contras de cualquier justificación propuesta” (7). ¿Los debates públicos e inclusivos sobre la violencia en Tancitaro condujeron a las fuerzas de las autodefensas de la ciudad? O, por el contrario, ¿fueron las respuestas en sí mismas violentas, actuando más allá de la justificación?

Davis (2009, 2020) toma a las soberanías controvertidas y la fractura estatal como contextos para una creciente conversación académica sobre “la supuesta relación entre pobreza, estados débiles o inestables y la proliferación de actores armados no estatales” (Davis 2020, 221). Sin embargo, como muestra Davis, los actores armados no estatales tienen una presencia creciente tanto en los países “desarrollados” como en los “menos desarrollados” y, de hecho, hacen explotar la idea misma (reiterando Benedict Anderson) de la nación como una comunidad imaginada. Los actores armados no estatales existen en redes que son translocales y supralocales. Un ejemplo de ello es la industria del aguacate, que lanza a los productores y proveedores locales a redes globales de reguladores agrícolas, formuladores de políticas comerciales multilaterales, funcionarios gubernamentales y empresarios de la violencia. Davis escribe: “En un mundo globalizado, puede ser fácil para los ciudadanos separarse de la idea del estado-nación como el sitio primordial para la lealtad política y la soberanía y, en cambio, vincularse a la alternativa de ‘comunidades imaginadas’ basadas en realidades locales incluso si estás están conectadas transnacionalmente”(Davis 2020, 214). En Tancitaro, las realidades locales y las dinámicas político-económicas se centran en los patrones de uso del suelo y en los regímenes de producción para la producción de aguacate, conectados a redes transnacionales, con altas ganancias en juego. El estado es solo uno de los muchos mediadores que buscan ganancias en esta interfaz. Junto a los conceptos de soberanía y lealtad de Davis frente a la violencia, la “Crítica de la violencia” de Benjamin (1996) propone una distinción entre violencia legal sancionada por el estado (violencia mítica) y violencia espontánea (violencia divina) (Bernstein 2012). Según Benjamin (1996), “Si la violencia mítica es la que hace la ley, la violencia divina es la que destruye la ley” (350). Cualquier enfoque universal o monolítico de la violencia debe enfrentarse a sus múltiples y opuestos propósitos.

El concepto de producción del espacio de Lefebvre (1974) propone una triada de argumentación: la “práctica espacial” representa la continuidad y cohesión de las relaciones de los miembros de la sociedad con un espacio; las “representaciones del

methods and consider violence in a thick, grounded-historical form with implications for practice. I consider the crisis produced by violence in Tancitaro in light of history, social relations, and political economy. At first blush, Tancitaro's story is clear: a small municipality leads the state with high per-capita rates of violent crime (*INEGI 2021*) and leads the world in agro-industrial clusters and avocado production (Piccato et al. 2017; Salazar-García 2005, 32–33). However, Tancitaro's story is more complex. Even as land-based dynamics and distinctive local ecology drive profit and conflict, so too do political fragmentations, contested sovereignties, and counter-conducts by local growers and the state that generate their own countervailing dynamics of violence. In Tancitaro, actors from above and below pursue different forms of spatial practice to shape control of avocado surplus. Technologies of land and property ownership, uneven development, and territorial control pair with technologies of violence (armed patrols, militia groups) to implicate violence within the production of space (Lefebvre 1974).

In Tancitaro, and elsewhere, violence blurs the lines between state and market, formal and informal, licit and illicit, and DTO and TCO and state-sanctioned militia. Affected community residents are caught in the crossfire, framed as tragic victims of contests of territory, commodity, and profit living at the margins of a fragile and combustible agro-industrial goliath. Planning scholarship on violence should instead place local residents' perspectives and stories in the foreground. Refocusing scholarship inevitably requires new methods of research, data collection, and narrative-building. Drawing on community perspectives can provide insights on local iterations, enactments, and emplacements of violence at the municipal level.

This paper suggests that understanding crisis and planning requires local, situated analyses with ethnographic methods and embedded fieldwork. Ethnography, even more than local history, can help conceptualize an embodied understanding of violence through the experiences, narratives, and perceptions of community members themselves in a way that quantitative indicators of violence, even at the local level, cannot. Future research on Tancitaro, and on planning and crisis more generally, should consider various explanations for crises across geographic scales and disciplinary boundaries. Planning researchers and practitioners must frame violence as contextual to and constitutive of spatial production and center the voices, perspectives, and subjectivities of affected community residents.

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espacio" están ligadas a las relaciones de producción y al orden que impone al espacio desde arriba; y el "espacio de representación" revela el "lado clandestino o soterrado de la vida social" que podría imaginar algo más para los espacios y la sociedad en su conjunto (33). Estos procesos de producción espacial controvertidos tienen "una capacidad aterradora para la violencia ... mantenida por una burocracia que se ha apoderado de las ganancias del capitalismo en su propio beneficio" (52). Lefebvre también señala que "la violencia del poder es respondida por la violencia de la subversión" (23), que está en juego en el México del siglo XX gracias a las luchas por el poder y las ganancias en industrias que van desde la marihuana al opio, pasando por los aguacates. La producción de aguacate en Tancitaro está asociada a la violencia porque su producción material requiere la representación activa y el control del espacio, produciendo crisis. Sin embargo, el hecho de que exista poca "subversión" más allá de los grupos alternativos de elites que buscan el poder (carteles, grupos vigilantes y autodefensas) debería cuestionar si el "espacio representacional" está en juego en Tancitaro y su industria del aguacate, o si se producen instancias locales de violencia alejadas de los ideales lefebvrianos de lucha de clases y reparto del poder desde abajo. El caso de Tancitaro sugiere que la violencia también puede darse entre múltiples visiones para diferentes representaciones hegemónicas del espacio. Los trabajadores y los residentes locales se enmarcan como víctimas pasivas de la violencia sin estructuras alternativas imaginarias propias.

Roy (2009) aborda cuestiones de informalidad y la producción de espacio, argumentando que "la informalidad es un sistema desregulado más no un sistema *no regulado*" (83). Los actores estatales y empresariales se benefician estratégicamente de ciertos sectores y sistemas dirigidos por líderes carismáticos en lugar de estados burocráticos basados en reglas. En México, considere las burocracias superpuestas de planificación; el ejército; y la policía federal, estatal y local como agencias deliberadamente subreguladas que permiten la autonomía y el criterio. Además, el "uso estratégico de los estados de excepción" (Roy 2005, 153) permite tanto la producción de violencia como los esfuerzos innovadores de los actores estatales y del mercado para contrarrestarla. Los aguacates son una mercancía legal en todos los contextos (a diferencia de la cocaína), sin embargo, la dinámica de la violencia en su circulación refleja los productos ilícitos. La producción de aguacate requiere condiciones agroecológicas específicas, con asociaciones locales

4. Traducido del español por el autor.

5. Traducido del español por el autor.

"Violence in Mexico" was formative for me, and his quantitative contributions to measuring violence inspire this paper. I also wish to thank Columbia University Professor Hiba Bou Akar, whose theoretical work and scholarship on urban planning, violence, and crisis has been foundational to my academic journey. Thanks to Harvard Kennedy School Professor Quinton Mayne, whose political-scientific approaches to process sequencing and historical-institutional changes ground my analysis. Finally, I appreciate the dedicated work of the UCLA Critical Planning Journal (CPJ) team, including anonymous reviewers and the editorial team, for incisive and supportive feedback on countless drafts.

a geografías como Tierra Caliente de Michoacán, que implica escasez y control económico de la violencia. En Tancítaro, el control de los productos básicos del aguacate, las ganancias y la provisión de servicios de seguridad son ambiguos, lo que permite a los actores estatales sacar provecho de la acumulación y del despojo, y les permite más autonomía y criterio. Los límites conceptuales y epistémicos de la violencia deberían hacer que los teóricos de la planificación y los académicos consideren si la ambigüedad con respecto a "a quién pertenecen las cosas" puede ser estratégicamente útil para los estados (155). Segato, al examinar el feminicidio en la Ciudad Juárez posterior a la década de 1980, sostiene que las excepciones neoliberales estratégicas crean una cultura totalitaria de dominación y control territorial producida por la potente combinación de extracción económica y dominación política, vinculada con culturas de misoginia de larga data (2003). Las víctimas son cientos de mujeres, consideradas "genéricas" y "exponibles" (9).⁴

Segato (2008) conecta el dominio territorial absolutista del barón asociado con los tiempos feudales con la Juárez contemporánea, escribiendo: "en el más que terrible orden posmoderno, neoliberal, pos estatal y posdemocrático contemporáneo, el barón se volvió capaz de un control casi irrestricto de su territorio como consecuencia de la acumulación incontrolada característica de la región de expansión fronteriza" (94).⁵ Considerando la descripción que hace Segato de los barones, consideremos a los "héroes" revolucionarios mexicanos como Pancho Villa o Emilio Zapata; pistoleros y caciques del México posrevolucionario; y narcotraficantes a finales del siglo XX. El poder de estos individuos y grupos argumenta Segato, equivale al de un segundo estado paralelo con profundas redes de lealtad y relaciones en el capital, el comercio y la aplicación de la ley (92). Tancítaro puede sugerir un cuadro muy diferente: los grupos locales se han resistido al poder del capital multinacional. Sin embargo, la sed de control territorial ha ido de la mano de la producción de aguacate, como revelan la deforestación local, el despojo de tierras y el robo. Si bien los regímenes político-económicos del neoliberalismo, el comercio exterior y la impunidad política son supralocales, aterrizan de manera distintiva en Tancítaro.

Como argumenta Arendt (1970), La violencia inclina la balanza del gran equalizador de la muerte. La violencia, la amenaza de violencia y los estados de excepción que permiten la sustitución de normas y leyes son endémicos de Tancítaro y de las experiencias locales de violencia de esta población. La violencia se experimenta en los grupos locales como un proceso dinámico; como resultado, la espacialización de las extensiones y las diversas formas de violencia encarnadas y perceptivas debe

ocurrir a medida que se define la violencia y se teoriza su relación con la teoría y la práctica de la planificación crítica. La violencia en Tancitaro es impredecible; ha afectado a políticos, periodistas, pequeños productores y civiles. Las crisis pueden desplegarse estratégicamente (y al azar) para servir a diferentes intereses. En resumen, el caso de Tancitaro revela pocas justificaciones conceptuales claras para la violencia, pero muchas representaciones de violencia superpuestas, y en ocasiones contradictorias, una crisis que se basa en el contexto y tiene raíces históricas.

CONCLUSIÓN

En este artículo, sigo las llamadas de Grandmison (2013) y Álvarez Rodríguez (2020) y destaco un enfoque de planificación crítica para mezclar métodos descriptivos e interpretativos y considerar la violencia en una forma densa, históricamente fundamentada con implicaciones para la práctica. Considero la crisis producida por la violencia en Tancitaro a la luz de la historia, las relaciones sociales y la economía política. A primera vista, la historia de Tancitaro es clara: un pequeño municipio lidera el estado con altas tasas de delitos violentos *per cápita* (INEGI 2021) y también es líder mundial en agrupaciones agroindustriales y producción de aguacates (Piccato et al.2017; Salazar-García 2005, 32–33). Sin embargo, la historia de Tancitaro es más compleja. Incluso cuando las dinámicas basadas en la tierra y la ecología local distintiva impulsan las ganancias y los conflictos, también lo hacen las fragmentaciones políticas, las soberanías en disputa y las contraconductas de los agricultores locales y el estado que generan sus propias dinámicas de violencia compensatorias. En Tancitaro, los actores de arriba y de abajo persiguen diferentes formas de práctica espacial para moldear el control del excedente de aguacate. Las tecnologías de la tierra y de la propiedad de bienes, el desarrollo desigual y el control territorial se combinan con tecnologías de violencia (patrullas armadas, grupos de milicias) para implicar la violencia dentro de la producción del espacio (Lefebvre 1974).

En Tancitaro, y en otros lugares, la violencia desdibuja las líneas entre estado y mercado, formal e informal, lícito e ilícito, ODT y OCT, y milicias sancionadas por el estado. Los residentes de la comunidad afectada están atrapados en el fuego cruzado, encuadrados como víctimas trágicas de combates de territorio, mercancía y ganancia, que viven al margen de un goliath agroindustrial frágil y combustible. En cambio, la planificación académica sobre la violencia debería poner en primer plano las perspectivas y las historias de los residentes locales. Reenfocar la investigación requiere inevitablemente nuevos métodos de investigación, recopilación de datos y construcción de narrativas. Basarse en las

perspectivas de la comunidad puede proporcionar información sobre las iteraciones locales, las promulgaciones y los emplazamientos de la violencia a nivel municipal.

Este documento sugiere que la comprensión de la crisis y la planificación requiere análisis locales y situados con métodos etnográficos y trabajo de campo integrado. La etnografía, incluso más que la historia local, puede ayudar a conceptualizar una comprensión vivida de la violencia a través de las experiencias, narrativas y percepciones de los propios miembros de la comunidad de una manera que los indicadores cuantitativos de violencia, incluso a nivel local, no pueden. Las investigaciones futuras sobre Tancitaro, y sobre planificación y crisis en general, deberían considerar varias explicaciones para las crisis a través de escalas geográficas y límites disciplinarios. Los investigadores y profesionales de la planificación deben enmarcar la violencia como contextual y constitutiva de la producción espacial y centrar las voces, perspectivas y subjetividades de los residentes de la comunidad afectada.

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Popular Participation as a Path to Transformative Land Regularization: the Case of Fortaleza

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ABSTRACT

The right to housing is a constitutional right in Brazil. In order for it to be fully complied with, the Estatuto da Cidade provides tools for democratic public administration, one of which is land regularization. However, in the urban policies of Fortaleza, a certain selectivity has been observed in what is considered subject to regularization, losing its transformative potential. This happens when initiatives to make regulations more flexible in response to demands of large economic groups are prioritized- contradicting the understanding of the social function of urban property. This work seeks to analyze land regularization initiatives in the city, and to what extent their transformative potential relies on popular participation.

INTRODUCTION

Informality in land use, whether in architectural, urban or legal terms, is an important characteristic of Brazilian cities. Resulting from structural factors, it is neither limited to a sector of society nor to the issue of rapid population growth. It is an expanding phenomenon around the world, and predominates in diverse settings. Informality is not restricted to low-income urban settlements, but is also present in middle and upper class neighborhoods, as shown by the growing literature on the subject (Roy 2005; Rolnik 1999; Rocco and Ballegooijen 2019; Fernandes 2011). It is, in fact, a structural process related to the construction of cities, even though under the eyes of the law it is described as an exception, it ends up becoming the rule. In this sense, referring to precarious urban settlements as “informal settlements” becomes an incomplete description, echoing the idea of stigmatization of these spaces (Rocco and Ballegooijen 2019; Fernandes 2011). Unfortunately, land regularization policies increasingly adopted in Latin America are still based on the assumption that urban informality is a result of poverty.

In conversation with this body of work, this paper focuses on land regularization policies in Fortaleza, seeking to identify its capacity to create socio-spatial inclusion. Scholars argue that the transformative potential of regularization initiatives relies on a complementary relationship between institutional policies of popular participation and the insurgent

A Participação Popular Como Caminho Para Uma Regularização Fundiária Transformadora: O Caso De Fortaleza

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RESUMO

O direito à moradia é um direito constitucional no Brasil. Para que seja cumprido de forma plena, o Estatuto da Cidade prevê ferramentas de gestão democrática, sendo uma delas a regularização fundiária. Têm-se observado, entretanto, que as políticas urbanas de Fortaleza apresentam certa seletividade no que é considerado passível de regularização, perdendo seu potencial transformador. Isso acontece quando se prioriza iniciativas de flexibilização das normativas que atendem às demandas de grandes grupos econômicos - contrariando o entendimento da função social da propriedade urbana. Este trabalho procura analisar iniciativas de regularização fundiária em Fortaleza e em que medida seu potencial de transformação depende da participação popular.

INTRODUÇÃO

A informalidade no uso do solo, seja ela no âmbito arquitetônico, urbanístico ou jurídico, é uma importante característica das cidades brasileiras, decorrente de fatores estruturais, que não estão limitados a um setor da sociedade e não se encerram na questão do rápido crescimento populacional. Trata-se de um fenômeno em expansão no mundo inteiro, que predomina em diversos cenários. Informalidade não se restringe a assentamentos urbanos de população de baixa renda, fazendo-se presente também em bairros de classe média e alta, como aponta a crescente literatura sobre o tema (Roy 2005; Rolnik 1999; Rocco e Ballegooijen 2019; Fernandes 2011). Ela seria, na verdade, um processo estrutural de construção das cidades, no qual aquilo que aos olhos da lei é descrito como exceção, acaba virando regra. Diante disso, se referir a assentamentos urbanos precários como “assentamentos informais” torna-se uma apreensão incompleta, reverberando a ideia de estigmatização desses espaços (Rocco e Ballegooijen 2019; Fernandes 2011). Infelizmente as políticas de regularização fundiária crescentemente adotadas na América Latina ainda partem do pressuposto da informalidade urbana como resultado da pobreza.

No sentido de dialogar com este corpo de conhecimento, este trabalho debruça-se sobre as políticas de regularização fundiária em Fortaleza, buscando identificar sua capacidade de inclusão

practices of interested residents, especially those in a situation of socio-spatial vulnerability, conferring visibility to their demands. Here, it is understood that a participatory approach would bring the real city closer to the legal city, by attending to social justice and reducing socio-spatial inequalities. It then becomes important to investigate how state tools for land regularization can fulfill transformative and inclusive roles in contexts with high degrees of urban informality.

The discussion in this paper, is based on results obtained through participant observation of the process of implementation of land regularization initiatives and the regulation of land use and occupation in the city of Fortaleza, including the design of the Law on Parceling/Subdivision and Land Use (Lei de Parcelamento, Uso e Ocupação do Solo) (LPUOS), in addition to representing the Federal University of Ceará on the Permanent Commission for the Evaluation of the Master Plan (CPPD) between 2013-2015 and 2017-2019. Added to this is our participation in technical assistance practices, linked to university extension initiatives.

Technical assistance to housing movements took place in 1) two spaces of political articulation in Fortaleza, the “Frente de Luta por Moradia Digna” and the “Campo Popular o Plano Diretor”, in which participant observation was carried out; 2) in the territory of Grande Bom Jardim, including the participation of the authors in the team that prepared the Integrated Land Regularization Plan for the Special Zone of Social Interest of Bom Jardim (Plano Integrado de Regularização Fundiária da Zona Especial de Interesse Social¹ do Bom Jardim - PIRF de ZEIS Bom Jardim);² and finally, 3) in the Beco da Galinha community, through monitoring and helping residents with practices of resistance to forced removal.

Complementing this approach, in addition to bibliographical and documentary research, we carried out five semi-structured interviews with: a resident of the Beco da Galinha community; a resident of Grande Bom Jardim working in a resident's association in Nova Canudos; an architect with experience in land regularization processes in the city, including Nova Canudos; a lawyer who works with land regularization demands at the Office of Human Rights and People's

1. The Special Zones of Social Interest (Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social - ZEIS) are an urban planning instrument provided for by the City Statute, which aims to demarcate areas in the urban territory intended mainly for land and urban regularization and the provision of social interest housing (HIS). For these zones, the urban parameters are renegotiated through a specific plan.
2. The final products of the PIRF da ZEIS Bom Jardim is available at: <https://zonasespeciais.fortaleza.ce.gov.br/>.

socioespacial. Argumenta-se que a potencialidade transformadora das iniciativas de regularização está condicionada a uma relação de complementaridade entre as políticas institucionais de participação popular e as práticas insurgentes dos moradores interessados, especialmente daqueles em situação de vulnerabilidade socioespacial, conferindo visibilidade às suas demandas. Entende-se que uma abordagem participativa conferiria maior aproximação entre a cidade real e a cidade legal, na perspectiva de atender à justiça social e à diminuição de desigualdades socioespaciais. Interessa aqui investigar de que forma os instrumentos urbanísticos para fins de regularização fundiária previstos pelo Estado podem cumprir papéis transformadores e inclusivos em contextos com alto grau de informalidade urbana.

A discussão será realizada a partir de resultados obtidos por meio do acompanhamento de disputas em torno da implementação de instrumentos urbanísticos de regularização fundiária e regulamentação de uso e ocupação do solo na cidade de Fortaleza, como a construção da Lei de Parcelamento, Uso e Ocupação do Solo (LPUOS), além da representação da Universidade na Comissão Permanente de Avaliação do Plano Diretor (CPPD) entre 2013-2015 e 2017-2019. Soma-se a isso as práticas de assessoria técnica, ligadas à extensão universitária.

Estas práticas de assessoria aos movimentos de moradia ocorreram em 1) dois espaços de articulação popular em Fortaleza: a Frente de Luta por Moradia Digna e o Campo Popular o Plano Diretor, nos quais foi realizada observação participante; 2) junto ao território do Grande Bom Jardim, incluindo a participação das autoras na equipe que elaborou o Plano Integrado de Regularização Fundiária da Zona Especial de Interesse Social¹ do Bom Jardim (PIRF da ZEIS Bom Jardim);² e 3) por fim no território Beco da Galinha, por meio do acompanhamento e auxílio à comunidade nas ações de resistência à remoção forçada.

Complementarmente, além de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, foram realizadas cinco entrevistas semiestruturadas com: um morador da comunidade do Beco da Galinha; com uma moradora do Grande Bom Jardim atuante nas organizações comunitárias da Nova Canudos; uma arquiteta que

1. As Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social (ZEIS) são um instrumento urbanístico previsto pelo Estatuto da Cidade, que visa demarcar áreas no território urbano destinadas, principalmente, à regulação fundiária e urbanística e à provisão de habitações de interesse social (HIS). Para essas zonas, os parâmetros urbanísticos são repactuados por meio de Plano específico.
2. Os produtos finais do PIRF da ZEIS Bom Jardim estão disponíveis em: <https://zonasespeciais.fortaleza.ce.gov.br/>.

Legal Advisory Frei Tito de Alencar (Escritório de Direitos Humanos e Assessoria Jurídica Popular Frei Tito de Alencar - EFTA) responding to requests for repossession; and a lawyer, and former advisor (2013-2019) to the land regularization sector of the Municipal Housing Development Secretariat of Fortaleza (Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Habitacional de Fortaleza - Habitafor), a municipal body responsible for implementing the land regularization policy for social interest housing purposes.

To discuss the transformative potential of land regularization initiatives in Fortaleza, the article is divided into four parts. The first is a dialogue between current theories, reviewing and discussing the literature on the potential and limitations of popular participation in view of the challenges of land regularization policies. This discussion contextualizes the cases and defines the concepts used. The second part deals with empirical research about the city of Fortaleza, in which the results of land regularization policies in the city are presented, using the case of Beco da Galinha to deepen our analysis. Following this, the third part presents the case of the community of Nova Canudos, in the territory of Grande Bom Jardim, which offers a demonstration of the potential for social transformation arising from land regularization policies. The fourth and last part constitutes the final considerations of this work. We use the research results to reflect on the ways in which the potential of land regularization processes are expanded when initiatives for popular participation and mobilization are undertaken.

CONTEXTUALIZATION: PARTICIPATION AND LAND REGULARIZATION IN BRAZILIAN METROPOLI

The City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade - EC), Federal Law 10,257/2001, regulates articles 182 and 183³ of the Federal Constitution of 1988, that refer to urban policy. The City Statute establishes that cities with more than 20 thousand inhabitants must have a Master Plan⁴ that follows the principles of participation and democratic management. It is considered an important step towards the democratic management of Brazilian cities. This is mainly due to the establishment of basic democratic principles, such as participatory planning and the social function of property, and to the policies that legitimize and legalize informal settlements, known as land tenure regularization. Land regularization occurs in the legal sphere by granting property ownership through tools such as Adverse

3. Articles 182 and 183 of the 1988 Federal Constitution outline Brazilian urban policy.

4. O artigo 41 do Estatuto da Cidade estabelece que: "o plano diretor é obrigatório para cidades: I – com mais de vinte mil habitantes". BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

soma experiências em processos de regularização fundiária na cidade, inclusive na Nova Canudos; uma advogada popular que trabalha com demandas de regularização fundiária em resposta a pedidos de reintegração de posse no Escritório de Direitos Humanos e Assessoria Jurídica Popular Frei Tito de Alencar (EFTA); e um advogado, ex-assessor (2013-2019) do núcleo de regularização fundiária da Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Habitacional de Fortaleza (Habitafor), órgão municipal responsável por implementar a política de regularização fundiária para fins de habitação de interesse social.

Para discutir o potencial transformador das iniciativas de regularização fundiária em Fortaleza, o artigo se divide em quatro partes. A primeira refere-se a uma discussão teórica, na qual se revisará e discutirá a literatura referente às potencialidades e limitações da participação popular perante os desafios das políticas de regularização fundiária. Esta discussão contextualiza os casos e define conceitos utilizados. A segunda parte trata das situações empíricas sobre a cidade de Fortaleza, nas quais se apresentam os resultados da pesquisa sobre as políticas de regularização fundiária da cidade, aprofundando-se no caso do Beco da Galinha. Em seguida, a terceira parte apresenta o caso da comunidade de Nova Canudos, no território do Grande Bom Jardim, que demonstrou o potencial de transformação social advindo de políticas de regularização fundiária. A quarta e última parte constitui as considerações finais deste trabalho. Utilizamos os resultados da pesquisa conduzida para refletir sobre os modos como o potencial dos processos de regularização fundiária se alarga quando iniciativas de participação e mobilização popular são empreendidas.

CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO: PARTICIPAÇÃO E REGULARIZAÇÃO FUNDIÁRIA NAS METRÓPOLES BRASILEIRAS

O Estatuto da Cidade (EC), Lei Federal 10.257/2001, regulamenta os artigos 182 e 183³ da Constituição Federal de 1988, referentes à política urbana. O Estatuto da Cidade institui que cidades com mais de 20 mil habitantes devam possuir um Plano Diretor,⁴ que deve seguir os princípios da participação e da gestão democrática. É considerado um importante passo no sentido da gestão democrática das cidades brasileiras. Isso se dá principalmente pelo estabelecimento de princípios democráticos básicos, como o planejamento participativo e a função social da propriedade, e dos instrumentos que legitimam e

3. Os artigos 182 e 183 da Constituição Federal de 1988 dispõem sobre a política urbana brasileira.

4. O artigo 41 do Estatuto da Cidade estabelece que: "o plano diretor é obrigatório para cidades: I – com mais de vinte mil habitantes". BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

Possession and Special Use Concession for Housing Purposes (Usucapião e Concessão de Uso Especial para Fins de Moradia - CUEM), allowing the flexibility of land subdivision parameters, and establishing new building parameters, the latter two through Special Social Interest Zones (Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social - ZEIS).

The Statute describes participation in the context of urban planning as a prerogative of the population in processes such as the “formulation, execution and monitoring of urban development projects, plans and programs.”⁵ According to the National Urban Development Policy, designed to increase direct democracy and developed after the City Statute, municipalities must adopt Urban Development Councils, Public Hearings, and Neighborhood Impact Assessments, in addition to participating in the National City Conference System (Souza 2002). Furthermore, all other urban development tools provided within the Statute also require social control, making it necessary to guarantee “the participation of communities, movements and civil society entities.”⁶

The National System of Urban Development, which is based on the ideals of participation and of social control, was formally dismantled by the Michel Temer (MDB) administration in 2016 after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (PT). However, even before this milestone of Brazilian political authoritarianism, the legal requirement of popular participation seems not to have been sufficient to promote a broad public debate on the future of cities.

5. Quote translated from, “formulação, execução e acompanhamento de planos, programas e projetos de desenvolvimento urbano”. The second article of the City Statute establishes that: “. The purpose of urban policy is to give order to the full development of the social functions of the city and of urban property, based on the following general guidelines: II - democratic administration by means of participation by the population and the representative associations of the various sectors of the community in the formulation, execution and monitoring of urban development projects, plans and programmes.” BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001. English translation of the City Statute can be accessed here: https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/default/files/CA_Images/CityStatuteofBrazil_English_Ch6.pdf

6. The fourth article of the City Statute establishes that: artigo 4 do Estatuto da Cidade estabelece que: “For the purposes of this Law, the following instruments among others shall be employed: §3. The instruments foreshadowed in this article which require expenditure of municipal funds shall be subject to social control as a way of guaranteeing the participation of communities, movements and civil society entities.” BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

legalizaram os assentamentos informais, conhecidos como regularização fundiária. A regularização fundiária ocorre no âmbito jurídico, conferindo a posse da propriedade por meio de instrumentos como Usucapião e Concessão de Uso Especial para Fins de Moradia (CUEM), permitindo a flexibilização de parâmetros de parcelamento do solo e lidando com o estabelecimento de novos parâmetros edilícios, estes últimos por meio das Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social (ZEIS).

O Estatuto descreve a participação no contexto do planejamento urbano como uma prerogativa da população em processos como a “formulação, execução e acompanhamento de planos, programas e projetos de desenvolvimento urbano”.⁵ De acordo com a Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento Urbano pós Estatuto da Cidade, os municípios devem adotar Conselhos de Desenvolvimento Urbano, Audiências Públicas, Estudos de Impacto de Vizinhança além de participar do Sistema Nacional de Conferências das Cidades visando a democracia direta (Souza 2002). Ademais, todos os outros instrumentos de desenvolvimento urbano nele previstos também dependem de controle social, sendo necessário garantir-se “a participação de comunidades, movimentos e entidades da sociedade civil”.⁶

É certo que o Sistema Nacional de Desenvolvimento Urbano que se apoia na participação e no ideário do controle social tem sido desmontado formalmente desde o governo Michel Temer (MDB), a partir de 2016, após o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff (PT). Entretanto, mesmo anteriormente a este marco rumo ao autoritarismo político brasileiro, o requerimento legal da participação popular parece não ter sido suficiente para a promoção de um debate público amplo sobre os rumos das cidades. Se por um lado, pode-se argumentar que isso se deve aos sinais

5. O artigo 2 do Estatuto da Cidade estabelece que: “a política urbana tem por objetivo ordenar o pleno desenvolvimento das funções sociais da cidade e da propriedade urbana, mediante as seguintes diretrizes gerais: II – gestão democrática por meio da participação da população e de associações representativas dos vários segmentos da comunidade na formulação, execução e acompanhamento de planos, programas e projetos de desenvolvimento urbano”. BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

6. O artigo 4 do Estatuto da Cidade estabelece que: “para os fins desta Lei, serão utilizados, entre outros instrumentos: § 3º Os instrumentos previstos neste artigo que demandam dispêndio de recursos por parte do Poder Público municipal devem ser objeto de controle social, garantida a participação de comunidades, movimentos e entidades da sociedade civil. BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

On the one hand, it can be argued that this is a sign of deterioration in urban democratic management at the national level, which started with the departure of Olívio Dutra from the Ministry of Cities in 2005. On the other hand, on a more theoretical level, some Brazilian authors have pointed to the limits and paradoxes of participation in urban policies, even in democratic political contexts (ie Kapp and Baltazar 2012; Bassul 2010; Bois and Milagres 2021).

In order to envision participation as an instrument of social control by citizens, Souza (2002) differentiates the ideal of direct democracy from the practice of representative democracy prevalent in most Western societies. He argues that the democratic political regime implemented in the Western World presents distortions by “alienating decision-making power in favor of others” (pp 325). To respond to this limitation, Souza (2002) defends the constant monitoring of State actions aimed at collective political autonomy. However, this is not a simple task, considering that this political ideal has also been appropriated by conservative sectors.

The participatory tools, aimed at democratizing the urban development decision-making process, were originally part of the political agenda of progressive sectors of Brazilian society, but little by little the conservative sectors moved from critiquing towards defending them and even promoting initiatives of popular participation. Bois and Milagres (2021 based on Dagnino, 2004) identify a kind of perverse confluence between the interests of “sectors linked to the democratic project” and those “connected to the neoliberal project,” in the sense that both claim to reduce the centrality of the State in the decision-making process. Bassul’s (2010) pioneering study corroborates this thesis by revealing the change in attitude of some actors linked to the Brazilian real estate industry during the development process of the City Statute in the post-Constitution period. Based on his work analyzing the content of parliamentary amendments to the original EC bill, he highlighted cases in which these same actors, who were clearly conservative and historically opposed to any curbs on property rights, called for mandatory participation in the proposed planning tools. This is the case of a proposal by Secovi-SP in 1999 that suggested the requirement that the management of urban operations be “compulsorily shared with representation from civil society” (Bassul 2010, 84).

In the same sense, Kapp and Baltazar (2012) develop a case study in Belo Horizonte whose results point out how institutional participation can move away from citizen autonomy. They demonstrate that participation is used to legitimize a pre-set agenda, rather than providing decision-making tools for residents, so that they can set and modify rules. They defend the practice of autonomous

de deterioração da gestão democrática urbana a nível nacional, com a saída de Olívio Dutra do Ministério das Cidades ainda em 2005, num nível teórico, por outro lado, alguns autores brasileiros já apontam limites e paradoxos da participação no âmbito das políticas urbanas mesmo em contextos políticos democráticos (i.e Kapp e Baltazar 2012; Bassul 2010; Bois e Milagres 2021).

No sentido de vislumbrar a participação como um instrumento de controle social dos cidadãos, Souza (2002) diferencia o ideário da democracia direta da prática de democracia representativa prevalente na maior parte das sociedades ocidentais. Ele argumenta que o regime político democrático implementado no mundo ocidental apresenta distorções por “alienar o poder decisório em favor de outrem” (pp 325). Para responder a esta limitação, Souza (2002) defende o constante monitoramento das ações do Estado visando à autonomia política coletiva. Entretanto, não se trata de uma tarefa simples, tendo em vista que esta bandeira também tem sido apropriada por setores conservadores.

Os instrumentos de participação e democratização das decisões sobre a cidade foram originalmente uma pauta dos setores progressistas da sociedade brasileira, porém aos poucos os setores conservadores passaram de uma atitude crítica à sua defesa e até mesmo à promoção de iniciativas de participação popular. Bois e Milagres (2021 apud Dagnino 2004) identificam uma espécie de confluência perversa entre os interesses dos “setores ligados ao projeto democrático” e aqueles “ligados ao projeto neoliberal”, no sentido de que ambos reivindicam a diminuição da centralidade do Estado no processo decisório. O estudo pioneiro de Bassul (2010) corrobora com esta tese ao revelar a mudança de atitude de setores ligados ao capital imobiliário brasileiro durante a tramitação da proposta de lei do Estatuto da Cidade no período pós-Constituição. Baseado em seu trabalho de análise do conteúdo das emendas parlamentares ao projeto de lei do EC durante a tramitação do projeto, ele identifica essa mudança de atitude dos setores conservadores, destacando casos em que estes mesmos setores clamam pela obrigatoriedade da participação. Este é o caso de uma proposta do Secovi-SP em 1999 que sugere a exigência de que a gestão das operações urbanas fosse “obrigatoriamente compartilhada com representação da sociedade civil” (Bassul 2010:84).

No mesmo sentido, Kapp e Baltazar (2012) apontam, por meio de seu estudo de caso em Belo Horizonte, como a participação institucional pode se afastar da autonomia cidadã. Elas demonstram que a participação é usada para legitimar uma agenda pré-estabelecida, ao invés de fornecer ferramentas de decisão para os moradores, de modo que eles possam estabelecer e modificar regras. Elas defendem a

participation, closer to the ideal of the right to the city as conceptualized by Lefebvre, instead of the instrumentalized participation recurrently adopted in Brazilian cities.

The insertion of the neoliberal logic in the planning of Brazilian cities, resulting from the restructuring of capitalist production that has been taking place since the end of the 20th century, has weakened the public sphere, making it difficult to implement the ideals of democratic urban policy (Maricato 2007; Arantes 2006) and deteriorating the potential for inclusion in institutional spaces of participation and collective decision-making. In order to differentiate this “colonizing” version of participation from that with greater potential for social transformation, Vainer (2009) draws attention to the issue of making the conflict visible. According to him, the recognition of urban conflicts in the public sphere is an important tool to reveal existing inequalities and to open up fronts for change in political management. Consensus, sought by institutional strategic planning paradigms, presupposes a “unified, without gaps” city. In this view, the city is being accepted as a simplified subject, devoid of any complexities (Vainer 2009).

The dangers of the movement to selectively incorporate the agendas of groups excluded from the urban public debate have also been registered in the international literature. Based on case studies in South Africa, Miraftab (2004) documents occasions in which, given the limitations of the spaces for dialogue created by institutions - which she calls “invited spaces”, vulnerable actors create extra-government and/or grassroots movements to discuss and develop their own ways of thinking about the city in “invented spaces”.

Thus, critical urban studies have pointed out that participation in urban planning can be used to dominate and homogenize agendas. The public debate, therefore, only has the potential for transformation if it considers the claims of vulnerable groups in the construction of public policies. Here, transformation is understood as a path committed to inclusion and socio-spatial justice. However, the reality of Brazilian cities is that the demands of residents informally occupying territory are not usually considered in the hegemonic institutional political debate. In a context of widespread urban informality, how can transformative popular participation be fostered if the voice of vulnerable groups is often not legitimized due to (among other factors) their irregular land tenure status?

The current context in which residents of precarious informal settlements are stigmatized results from an urbanization model that was developed in the mid-twentieth century and accompanied by a loss in legislative enforcement capacity and the State's reduced capacity to exercise urban control

prática de uma participação autônoma, mais próxima ao ideal do direito à cidade conforme conceituado por Lefebvre, ao invés da participação instrumentalizada adotada de forma recorrente nas cidades brasileiras.

A inserção da lógica neoliberal no planejamento das cidades brasileiras, resultante da reestruturação da produção capitalista que vem ocorrendo desde o fim do século XX, tem enfraquecido a esfera pública, dificultando a implementação do ideário da política urbana democrática (Maricato 2007; Arantes 2006) e deteriorando o potencial de inclusão nos espaços institucionais de participação e decisão coletiva. No sentido de diferenciar a participação “colonizadora” daquela com maior potencial de transformação social, Vainer (2009) chama atenção para a questão da visibilização do conflito. Segundo ele, o reconhecimento dos conflitos urbanos na esfera pública é uma importante ferramenta para revelar as desigualdades existentes e para abrir frentes de mudança na gestão política. O consenso, trabalhado pelo planejamento estratégico institucional, pressupõe uma cidade “unificada, sem brechas”, havendo aceitação da cidade como sujeito simples (Vainer 2009).

Os perigos deste movimento de incorporação seletiva das pautas dos grupos excluídos pelo debate público urbano também têm sido registrados na literatura internacional. Apoiando-se em estudos de casos na África do Sul, Miraftab (2004) documenta ocasiões em que, diante das limitações dos espaços de diálogo criados pela institucionalidade, que denomina de espaços convidados (“invited spaces”), atores vulneráveis criam organizações extra-governamentais e/ou movimentos de base para discutir e desenvolver suas próprias formas de pensar a cidade em espaços inventados (“invented spaces”).

Assim, estudos urbanos críticos têm apontado que a participação em planejamento urbano pode ser usada para dominar e homogeneizar as pautas. O debate público, dessa forma, só tem potencial de transformação se considerar reivindicações de grupos vulneráveis na construção de políticas públicas. Aqui, a transformação é entendida como um caminho comprometido com a inclusão e a justiça socioespacial. Porém, na realidade das cidades brasileiras, as demandas da população que ocupa o território de maneira informal não costumam ser consideradas no debate político institucional hegemônico. Num contexto de ampla informalidade urbana, como fomentar a participação popular transformadora, se a voz de grupos vulneráveis é frequentemente deslegitimada devido, entre outros fatores, ao seu status de irregularidade fundiária?

O atual contexto de estigmatização dos moradores em assentamentos informais precários resultam de um modelo de urbanização que se desenvolveu a partir de meados do século

(Cardoso 2003; Moretti and Amore 2019). Late Brazilian industrialization, coupled with the insertion of a post-war capitalist logic, directed the attention and resources of public policy to investments in the promotion of economic development, imposing limits to investments in the social field. In the recent context of the rise of neoliberal ideas, the “Welfare State” becomes even more limited, therefore incapable of keeping up with the process of modernization of the built environment (Arantes 2006). The social minimums established by the Welfare State become non-universal and non-homogeneous in the Brazilian context, instead they generally serve a restricted portion of the population, groups with greater economic power, intensifying, for example, disparities in access to the formal land market and urban infrastructure (Cardoso 2003; Rolnik 1999).

The dualist notion between formality and informality has been questioned by the literature, which tries to understand them as two interdependent and related concepts. In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish informality and illegality. While informality can be conceptualized as activities that do not adhere to institutional rules and therefore do not have social protection from the State, illegality is an activity that expressly contradicts current social and civil norms (Smolka and Mullahy 2007). Thus, authors such as Rocco and Ballegooijen (2019) and Mukhija and Loukaitou-Sideris (2014) argue that the concept of informality has a paradoxical character and can act in an exploratory or transformative way, depending on the social actors who practice it. Furthermore, as noted above, it is wrong to relate informality only to poverty, since it is found in a wide spectrum of informal socio-spatial realities (Roy 2005; Fernandes 2011; Freitas 2017). It is important, therefore, to recognize a pre-existing legal pluralism operating in informal territories, which concerns, for example, the origin of their formation, the existing tenure systems, the consolidation of occupations, the purchase agreements, sale and rental of land, and legal norms in force, such as official land subdivision (Fernandes 2011; Sousa Junior 2019). The overlap of these and other factors reveal complex scenarios, which characterize informality in a much more comprehensive way than the legality-illegality binomial.

The legitimacy of informal urbanization, that is, its potential for social transformation, occurs in cases where it contradicts legal norms due to a context of deprivation, and lack of alternatives, rather than a premeditated infringement of the law aimed at some type of personal advantage arising from the circumvention of the law (Cardoso 2007). It is often due to the lack of knowledge of regulations, which is combined with the lack of alternatives in the face of the institutional incapacity of the Public Authority for urban control (Cardoso 2003). On the other hand,

acompanhado da perda de capacidade de enforcement⁷ da legislação e do reduzido controle urbano exercido pelo Estado (Cardoso 2003; Moretti e Amore 2019). A industrialização tardia brasileira, aliada à inserção numa lógica capitalista pós-guerra, direcionou a atenção e os recursos do Poder Público para investimentos na promoção do desenvolvimento econômico, o que trouxe limites ao investimento no campo social. Na conjuntura recente de ascensão do ideário neoliberal, o “Estado Protetor” se torna ainda mais limitado, portanto incapaz de acompanhar o processo de modernização do ambiente construído (Arantes 2006). Os mínimos sociais estabelecidos pelo Estado de bem-estar social se tornam não-universais e não homogêneos no contexto brasileiro, ao passo que são providos a uma parcela restrita da população, em geral aos grupos de maior poder econômico, intensificando, por exemplo, disparidades de acesso ao mercado formal de terras e às infraestruturas urbanas (Cardoso 2003; Rolnik 1999).

A noção dualista entre formalidade e informalidade tem sido questionada pela literatura, que tenta entendê-los como dois conceitos interdependentes e relacionados. Neste sentido, cabe distinguir informalidade e ilegalidade. Enquanto a informalidade pode ser conceituada como atividades que não aderem às regras institucionais e por isso não possuem proteção social do Estado, a ilegalidade é uma atividade que expressamente contradiz as normas sociais e civis vigentes (Smolka e Mullahy 2007). Assim, autores como Rocco e Ballegooijen (2019) e Mukhija e Loukaitou-Sideris (2014) defendem que o conceito de informalidade possui um caráter paradoxal, podendo agir de forma exploradora ou transformadora, a depender dos atores sociais que a praticam. Além disso, como constatado anteriormente, é equivocado relacionar a informalidade somente à pobreza, uma vez que é constatada em um largo espectro de realidades socioespaciais informais (Roy 2005; Fernandes 2011; Freitas 2017). Importa, assim, reconhecer um pluralismo jurídico pré-existente operando sobre os territórios informais, que diz respeito, por exemplo, à origem de sua formação, aos sistemas de posse vigentes, à consolidação das ocupações, aos pactos de compra, venda e aluguel da terra e às normas jurídicas vigentes, como o parcelamento oficial do solo (Fernandes 2011; Sousa Junior 2019). A sobreposição desses e outros fatores revelam cenários complexos, que caracterizam a informalidade de forma muito mais abrangente que o binômio legalidade-ilegalidade.

A legitimidade, ou o potencial de transformação social da urbanização informal, se dá nos casos em que se constrói e se urbaniza sem considerar os parâmetros legais num cenário de falta de opções, não

7. Capacidade de aplicação das leis.

neighborhoods that concentrate middle and high-income populations in central areas do not fully comply with the current land use and occupation rules.

The criminalization that hangs specifically over low-income informal settlements makes security of tenure one of the most recurrent claims of the population in situations of socio-spatial vulnerability, often manifesting as a desire for “*papel da casa*” (an expression used by residents to refer to a document that attests to the tenure security of their house). In addition to protection against forced evictions, security of tenure has an enormous symbolic potential for demonstrating belonging to a community. It is not uncommon to see an increase in the quality of the urban environment and the motivation for civic participation by residents after the start of land regularization actions in precarious informal settlements located in disputed spaces in large urban centers (see, for example, a report in Fernandes and Freitas 2020). Thus, the status of informality entails the absence of social protection by the State, which produces several other problems: environmental, social, political, access to public services, etc. This is mainly due to the stigmatization and qualification of these residents as non-citizens (Freitas 2019; Fernandes 2011).

Fernandes (2011) argues that, instead of opposing legitimacy and legality, one should focus on building an inclusive legal order, which respects informal processes - something already indirectly addressed by the 1988 Constitution treatment of the right to housing as a “*fundamental right*”. In this sense, Fernandes (2011) argues that denying regularization for informally built settlements is not politically sustainable. On the other hand, the author raises the fact that the indiscriminate regularization of irregular situations devoid of the principles of the social function of property can end up reinforcing segregation and exclusion, feeding the vicious cycle of illegality, instead of fighting it. In addition, the author suggests thinking about land regularization in an integrated manner, recognizing its connection with other processes, such as housing improvements and requalification of the urban environment. By understanding these relationships as inseparable from the urban environment, there is greater potential for urban inclusion and improvement in the quality of life of residents. This broader understanding also complies with the planning principle of democratic use of urban land established in the Statute of the City. Another essential element to meet such a principle is to consider local specificities of each settlement.

Thus, it can be seen that the regularization of informal settlements and social participation in the decision-making process of urban policy are complementary. In the reality of everyday urban management practices, however, these are often

se caracterizando como infração premeditada da lei, ou que vise algum tipo de vantagem pessoal advinda da burla da lei (Cardoso 2007). Frequentemente ela se deve ao desconhecimento das normativas, que se alia à falta de alternativas frente à incapacidade institucional do Poder Público de controle urbano (Cardoso 2003). Por outro lado, bairros que concentram população de renda média e alta em zonas centrais, não apresentam anuência completa às normas de uso e ocupação do solo vigente.

A criminalização que paira especificamente sobre assentamentos informais de baixa renda torna a segurança de posse uma das reivindicações mais recorrentes da população em situação de vulnerabilidade socioespacial, manifestada, muitas vezes, pelo desejo do *papel da casa*. Para além de proteção a despejos forçados, a segurança de posse possui um enorme potencial simbólico de pertencimento em uma coletividade. Não são incomuns episódios onde a qualidade ambiental urbana e a própria motivação por participação cívica de moradores aumentou após o início de ações de regularização fundiária de assentamentos informais precários localizados em espaços disputados nos grandes centros urbanos (ver por exemplo um relato em Fernandes e Freitas 2020). Assim, o status de informalidade acarreta a ausência de proteção social do Estado que produz diversos outros problemas: ambientais, sociais, políticos, de acesso a serviços públicos etc. Este é proveniente, principalmente, da estigmatização e entendimento desses moradores enquanto não-cidadãos (Freitas 2019; Fernandes 2011).

Fernandes (2011) argumenta que, ao invés de contrapor legitimidade e legalidade, deve-se focar na construção de uma ordem jurídica inclusiva, que respeite os processos de informalidade - algo já abordado indiretamente pela Constituição de 1988 quando trata como fundamental o direito à moradia. Nesse sentido, Fernandes (2011) defende que não regularizar assentamentos informais não é politicamente sustentável. Por outro lado, o autor alerta para o fato de que a regularização indiscriminada das situações irregulares destituída dos princípios da função social da propriedade pode acabar por reforçar segregação e situações de exclusão capazes de alimentar o ciclo vicioso da ilegalidade, ao invés de combatê-lo. Além disso, o autor sugere pensar na regularização da terra de forma integrada, reconhecendo sua ligação com outros processos, como o de melhorias habitacionais e de requalificação do meio urbano. Ao entender essas relações como indissociáveis do meio urbano, há maior potencial de inclusão urbana e melhoria na qualidade de vida dos moradores, na busca de cumprir o princípio do uso democrático dos instrumentos de planejamento urbano previsto pelo Estatuto.

dissociated. Contributing to this debate on the transformative potential of urban planning, our approach analyzes the case of Fortaleza with a focus on the relationship between these two pillars of democratic urban management in Brazil: participation and regularization.

FORTALEZA: PLANNING AND SPACES OF DISPUTE

Urban planning in the city of Fortaleza is governed by a set of laws. The most influential ones are: the Participatory Master Plan (PDPFor) and the Law on Parceling/Subdivision and Land Use (LPUOS), whose implementation is led by different municipal bodies. The PDPFor, approved in 2009, is representative of the new generation of master plans post-EC. This new generation questions the technocratism of previous planning models, and delves into issues proposed by the Statute, such as popular participation, the social function of property, and the debate on the legitimacy of precarious informal settlements (Freitas 2019; Machado 2014; Pequeno e Freitas 2012). These new planning paradigm formally incorporated legal instruments aimed at the urban inclusion of vulnerable groups into the 2009 PDPFor. Although the 2009 PDPFor provided legal tools with greater potential for inclusion and advances towards a participatory decision-making process (Machado 2014), their implementation fell short of the expectations of the

Também é relevante, nesse sentido, considerar as especificidades locais de cada assentamento.

Percebe-se assim que a regularização de assentamentos informais e a participação social no processo decisório da política urbana são complementares. Na realidade prática da condução da gestão urbana, entretanto, estes são frequentemente dissociados. Contribuindo para o debate sobre o potencial transformador do planejamento urbano, a abordagem aqui pretendida analisa o caso de Fortaleza com um foco na relação entre estes dois pilares da gestão urbana democrática no Brasil: participação e regularização.

FORTALEZA: PLANEJAMENTO E ESPAÇOS DE DISPUTA

O planejamento urbano na cidade de Fortaleza é regido por um conjunto de leis. As mais influentes incluem o Plano Diretor Participativo (PDPFor) e a Lei de Parcelamento, Uso e Ocupação do Solo (LPUOS), cuja elaboração é encabeçada pelos diferentes órgãos municipais. O PDPFor, datado do ano de 2009, é representativo da nova geração de planos diretores aprovados pós EC. Esta nova geração busca deixar de lado o tecnocratismo e se aprofundar em questões propostas pelo Estatuto, como a participação popular, a função social da propriedade e o debate sobre a legitimidade dos assentamentos informais precários (Freitas 2019; Machado 2014; Pequeno e Freitas




Figure 1. Land regularization initiatives conducted by the Municipality of Fortaleza, through Habitafor, from 2013 to 2020. Source: Prepared by the authors from Habitafor, 2021.

Imagem 1. Iniciativas de regularização fundiária conduzidas pela Prefeitura Municipal de Fortaleza, por meio da Habitafor, no período de 2013 a 2020. Fonte: Elaborado pelas autoras a partir de Habitafor, 2021.



Figure 2. Land regularization plan for properties linked to the Vila do Mar project. Source: Habitafor, 2018.

Imagem 2. Recorte da planta de regularização fundiária de imóveis ligados ao projeto do Vila do Mar. Fonte: Habitafor, 2018.






social movements who participated in their design. In addition, several changes made to the original proposal further curbed its transformative potential.

Institutional land regularization initiatives aimed at securing tenure and carried out by Habitafor (see Figure 1), the municipal Housing Agency, present a series of limitations, especially because they only tackle the legal sphere of legalizing property. Generally, they issue individual property titles, disregarding the need for urban qualification of the settlements. Interviews with two attorneys involved in implementing this policy attest to these limitations. While the respondent who worked for Habitafor's land regularization sector argued that this was an achievement of the residents of the city's occupations, the other interviewee, a lawyer who works with the Frei Tito de Alencar Office (EFTA) defending residents who suffer eviction processes, recognizes the insufficiency and slowness of the land regularization initiatives carried out by the last two administrations.

The structure of the municipal agency creates its own limitations. Habitafor is a small agency, which, in many cases, works with outsourced contracted professionals. This leads to the fragmentation of processes and the difficulty in controlling procedures in a cohesive way - as part of a whole. The lack of transparency also becomes a problem because it hinders residents' monitoring of the processes, creating distance between public policy and its social function when implementing this instrument. Another aggravating factor is the lack of communication between municipal bodies that work with tangential

2012). O novo paradigma de planejamento fez com que instrumentos jurídicos que visavam a inclusão urbana de grupos vulneráveis fossem incorporados ao PDPFor 2009. Embora o PDPFor 2009 tenha previsto instrumentos com grande potencial de inclusão, resultado de avanços na direção de um processo decisório participativo (Machado 2014), a implementação destes foi bastante aquém do esperado pelos movimentos sociais que participaram da sua construção. Para além da demora em sua implementação, observa-se no período após a sua implementação diversas alterações em sua proposta original.

As iniciativas institucionais de regularização fundiária visando a segurança de posse são conduzidas pela Habitafor (ver imagem 01), órgão municipal de Habitação, e apresentam uma série de limitações, em especial por atuarem apenas no âmbito jurídico, da legalização da propriedade. Geralmente, são emitidos títulos individuais de propriedade, desconectados da necessidade de qualificação urbanística do território. Entrevistas com dois advogados que atuam com a implementação desta política atestam estas limitações. Enquanto o entrevistado que atuou núcleo de regularização fundiária da Habitafor assegura que esta é uma conquista dos moradores das ocupações da cidade, a outra entrevistada, a advogada popular que atua junto ao Escritório Frei Tito de Alencar (EFTA) da Assembleia Legislativa do Ceará na defesa dos moradores que sofrem processos de despejos, reconhece a insuficiência e a lentidão dos processo de

 <h1 style="margin: 0;">Prefeitura de Fortaleza</h1> <p style="margin: 0;">Secretaria Municipal do Desenvolvimento Habitacional de Fortaleza</p>	
 <p style="margin: 0;">FOTO DA FACHADA DO IMÓVEL</p>	 <p style="margin: 0;">COMUNIDADE VILA DO MAR / PIRAMBU - QUADRA 68 - ESCALA: 1/2500 PLANTA DE LOCALIZAÇÃO CARTOGRÁFICA OFICIAL DA PMF - B09</p>
 <p style="margin: 0;">PLANTA DO IMÓVEL GEORREFERENCIADA</p>	
<p style="margin: 0;">ENDEREÇO DO IMÓVEL: COMUNIDADE VILA DO MAR</p>	
<p style="margin: 0;">BENEFICIÁRIO:</p>	<p style="margin: 0;">CPF:</p>
<p style="margin: 0;">ÁREA: 81,17 m² ESC: 1/275</p>	
<p style="margin: 0;">RESPONSÁVEL TÉCNICO</p> <p style="margin: 0; text-align: center;">  KARISIA C. VIANA ANDRADE ARQUITETA E URBANISTA CAU: 183053-8 </p>	
<p style="margin: 0;">OBS: TRABALHO REALIZADO EM ATENDIMENTO AO PROGRAMA DE REGULARIZAÇÃO FUNDIÁRIA URBANA - EXECUTADO COM EQUIPAMENTOS GNSS E ESTAÇÃO TOTAL (TOPOGRAFIA GEORREFERENCIADA)</p>	
<p style="margin: 0;">DATA: FEVEREIRO/2018</p>	

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Figure 3. File of the descriptive memorial process for land title regularization of one of the houses in Vila do Mar.
Source: Habitafor, 2018.

Imagem 3. Ficha do processo de memorial descritivo para regularização fundiária de uma das casas do Vila do Mar.
Fonte: Habitafor, 2018.

issues, such as the Secretariat of Urbanism and Environment (SEUMA) and the Planning Institute of Fortaleza (IPLANFOR).

The testimonies of the interviewed lawyers and the architect, who worked on several land regularization processes in the city, identified the difficulty in applying urban norms and codes designed for the formal city to territories that have not developed following the same logic. This does not mean, however, that the solution is overly flexible rules, which could result in the regularization of precarious situations.

The regularization initiatives that have been carried out by the Municipality of Fortaleza (PMF) in the last two terms (see Figure 1), have focused on solving tenure insecurity issues through individual titles. It reinforces private property as a model and impoverishes its housing rights policies by limiting itself to a single dimension⁷ of the full land regularization process.

An example of this is the process of land regularization in Vila do Mar, a settlement on the coast of Fortaleza, which contains a majority of the 7 thousand properties regularized by the City in the last 8 years. The lot regularization plan in Figure 2 illustrates how the use of this instrument is linked more to the resolution of land conflicts caused by urban intervention - a road opening - than to a commitment to improving the quality of the precarious built environment. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, residents continue to inhabit small plots, often accessed through narrow roads, and located in an extremely dense urban context. Thus, Habitfor regularization processes have formalized precariousness, not only disregarding minimum standards for housing quality, but also refraining from establishing land use guidelines for the future development of the area, thus perpetuating the lack of urban control.

In this sense, at the municipal level, the regulation of Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS) through specific plans denominated - "Integrated Land Regularization Plans" (PIRFs), seem to present a somewhat more complete view of the implications of land regularization, as they articulate in the context of other dimensions of the phenomenon of urban informality and seek the effective participation of the

7. The 7 dimensions of the right to adequate housing were established by the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee (Comitê de Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais - CESCR), through General Comment No. 4, which develops the content of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (PIDESC), to which Brazil is a signatory. They are: tenure security, habitability, access to services and infrastructure, adequate location, affordable cost, accessibility and cultural adequacy.

regularização fundiária conduzidos pelas duas últimas gestões administrativas.

A própria estrutura de atuação do órgão municipal já apresenta algumas limitações. A Habitfor é um setor pequeno, que trabalha em muitos casos com profissionais terceirizados. Isso leva à fragmentação dos processos e à dificuldade de controle dos procedimentos de forma coesa, como parte de um todo. A pouca transparência também se torna um problema por dificultar maior aderência da população aos processos, revelando distanciamento da política pública com a função social na gestão deste instrumento. Além disso, outro agravante é a falta de comunicação entre os órgãos municipais que trabalham com questões tangenciais, como a Secretaria de Urbanismo e Meio Ambiente (SEUMA) e o Instituto de Planejamento de Fortaleza (IPLANFOR).

Além disso, identificou-se, nos depoimentos dos advogados entrevistados e da arquiteta, que já atuou em diversos processos de regularização fundiária na cidade, que há dificuldade de se aplicar uma legislação pensada para a cidade formal em territórios que não se desenvolvem seguindo as mesmas lógicas. Ao mesmo tempo, isso não significa, entretanto, que a solução se dê por regras demasiadamente flexíveis, o que poderia resultar numa regularização de situações precárias.

As iniciativas de regularização que têm sido realizadas pelo Prefeitura Municipal de Fortaleza (PMF) nas duas últimas gestões (ver imagem 01), tem enfoque na resolução de questões de insegurança de posse por meio da titulação individual. Reforça a propriedade privada como modelo e empobrece suas políticas de direito à moradia, ao se limitar a apenas uma das dimensões⁸ do processo de regularização fundiário pleno.

A exemplo disto, destaca-se o processo de regularização fundiária ligado ao projeto do Vila do Mar, na orla de Fortaleza, que concentra a maior parte dos 7 mil imóveis regularizados pela Prefeitura nos últimos 8 anos. Analisando a planta dos lotes a serem regularizados (Imagem 02) é possível constatar que o uso deste instrumento está muito mais atrelado à resolução dos conflitos fundiários causados pela intervenção urbana do que ao comprometimento com a melhoria da qualidade de vida dos moradores. Como é mostrado nas imagens 02 e 03, os moradores

8. As 7 dimensões do direito à moradia adequada foram estabelecidas pelo Comitê de Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais (CESCR), por meio do Comentário Geral nº 4, que desenvolve o conteúdo do Pacto Internacional de Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais (PIDESC), do qual o Brasil é signatário. São elas: segurança de posse, habitabilidade, acesso a serviços e infraestrutura, localização adequada, custo acessível, acessibilidade e adequação cultural.

residents.

ZEIS efforts toward a more comprehensive approach to regularization of needs based informality, contrasts with other movements that waive land use codes in response to real estate industry demands. Our process of participant observation of urban politics in Fortaleza revealed a strong effort of the SEUMA Agency towards flexibility in current land use parameters in order to meet the interests of the productive sector. This stands in sharp contrast to the persistence of viewing precarious settlements of informal origin through a criminalizing lens. Through our participation in the CPPD, we identified that tools of urban control, such as the verification of compliance with the permeability rate parameters, building coverage and setbacks, for example, are described by SEUMA Architects as bureaucracy to be overcome. These instruments are, in fact, necessary steps for the construction of a plan that delivers quality in the urban environment.

Furthermore, instruments that allow for flexible urban parameters, such as Consortium Urban Operations⁸ (Operações Urbanas Consorciadas - OUCs)⁹ and the Onerous Grant of Right to Build and Change of Land Use (Outorga Onerosa de Direito de Construir e Alteração de Uso),¹⁰ have been widely used

continuum habitando lotes pequenos, cujo acesso se dá muitas vezes por meio de vias estreitas, em um contexto urbano extremamente densificado. Dessa forma não há, no processo, cautela para não formalizar precariedades, nem iniciativa de estabelecer orientações de uso e ocupação do solo para o desenvolvimento futuro da área, perpetuando assim o descontrole urbanístico.

Nesse sentido, no âmbito municipal, a regulamentação das Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social (ZEIS) por meio de planos específicos, os Planos Integrados de Regularização Fundiária (PIRFs), parecem apresentar uma visão um pouco mais completa sobre as implicações da regularização fundiária, pensada, nesse caso, de maneira articulada a outras dimensões e buscando participação efetiva dos moradores.

No contexto da regularização urbanística, chama atenção um movimento no sentido da flexibilização dos parâmetros de uso e ocupação do solo vigentes para atender os interesses do setor produtivo, que contrasta com a persistência de um olhar criminalizador sobre os assentamentos precários de origem informal. A partir da nossa participação na CPPD foi possível identificar que os instrumentos de controle urbanístico, como a verificação da anuência aos parâmetros de taxa de permeabilidade (índice de aproveitamento e recuos), por exemplo, são encarados pelos técnicos representantes do setor público como uma burocracia a ser vencida. Estes instrumentos são, na verdade, etapas necessárias para a construção de um planejamento que entregue qualidade do meio ambiente urbano.

Ademais, instrumentos de flexibilização de parâmetros urbanísticos, como as Operações Urbanas Consorciadas⁹ (OUCs)¹⁰ e a Outorga Onerosa de

8. The minutes of the 98th meeting of the Permanent Commission for the Evaluation of the Master Plan (Comissão Permanente de Avaliação do Plano Diretor - CPPD), held on May 29, 2018, record the approval of the report of the new OUCs in Fortaleza. In the report shown at the meeting, which presented the study for the development of the Operations, it states that "the value of the land, the real estate dynamics, and the income patterns point out where business can be viable," in the sense that the private sector should not be harmed by investing in territories that are poorly equipped with urban infrastructure, where there would be little financial return and a high "business risk." Both documents are available at: <https://urbanismoemeioambiente.fortaleza.ce.gov.br/urbanismo-e-meio-ambiente/513-98-reuniao-da-cppd>.

9. Articles 32 to 34 of the City Statute define the instrument of Consortium Urban Operations, as consisting of a "set of interventions and measures coordinated by the municipal government, with the participation of owners, residents, permanent users and private investors, with the objective of achieving structural urban transformations, social improvements and environmental valuation in an area." They must be implemented through a specific municipal law. BRAZIL. Federal Law 10,257, of July 10, 2001.

10. Articles 28 to 31 of the City Statute define the instrument of the Onerous Grant of Right to Build and Change of Land Use, to consist of the demarcation of "areas in which the right to build may be exercised

9. A ata da 98ª reunião da Comissão Permanente de Avaliação do Plano Diretor (CPPD), realizada no dia 29 de maio de 2018, registra a aprovação do relatório das novas OUCs em Fortaleza. No relatório mostrado em reunião, que apresentou o estudo para o desenvolvimento das Operações, está descrito que "o valor da terra, a dinâmica imobiliária, e os padrões de renda apontam onde os negócios podem ser viáveis", no sentido de que a iniciativa privada não pode ser prejudicada ao investir em territórios pouco providos de infraestrutura urbana, nos quais haveria pouco retorno financeiro e um alto "risco de negócio". Ambos documentos estão disponíveis em: <https://urbanismoemeioambiente.fortaleza.ce.gov.br/urbanismo-e-meio-ambiente/513-98-reuniao-da-cppd>.

10. Os artigos 32 a 34 do Estatuto da Cidade definem o instrumento das Operações Urbanas Consorciadas, que consistem em um "conjunto de intervenções e medidas coordenadas pelo Poder Público municipal, com a participação dos proprietários,

as a way of planning the city, while, in fact, they were originally designed to configure specific interventions within a region. Such practices, which should be the exception rather than the rule, occur more frequently for the benefit of privileged economic groups, as can be seen from their spatial distribution throughout the city. These instruments are designed to contribute to a better distribution of urban infrastructure throughout the city, through Public-Private Partnerships, but have been implemented in higher-income areas, usually already well served by urban infrastructure, according to data from IBGE and the Municipality itself. In the case of these spaces, property developers generally have the power to choose their status of informality, under the pretext of being a means to achieve economic and urban development. These specific instances of informality, when not already agreed to by the State, are, at least, treated with greater permissiveness by it.

Another practice of flexibility in urban regulations adopted by the 2009 PDPFor is the ZEIS instrument. Its inclusion was an important achievement for residents, the result of their struggle and mobilization around this agenda (Machado 2014; Pequeno e Freitas 2012). However, until 2019, very little was achieved after the approval of the Plan. In 2019, the process of implementing the Integrated Land Regularization Plans (PIRFs) began for 10 territories defined as ZEIS and considered priorities. The decade-long delay between the creation of a ZEIS policy and the first significant step towards its implementation contrasts with the speed of implementation of the States' partnerships with the private sector. In addition, this first step should be attributed to housing movement actions that built great political influence through popular and legal pressure (Freitas 2015; Brasil 2016), in a process that could be classified by Miraftab (2012) as an "invited space of dialogue." Part of this process can be found in the minutes of the Public Hearing called by the Public Ministry of the State of Ceará on October 17, 2018.

In addition to the leniency in ZEIS regulation, there were cases of negligence, in which the Government itself was silent in relation to the protection of these Zones, instead municipal urban management made room for the real estate market, and even public works, threatening the integrity of ZEIS territories and allowing removals of houses protected by these polygonal areas.

This occurred, for example, in Beco da Galinha, part of the Verdes Mares Community, in the Papicu neighborhood, a central area of the city. The

above the adopted basic use coefficient, or in the which will be allowed to change the use of the land, against consideration to be provided by the beneficiary." BRAZIL. Federal Law 10,257, of July 10, 2001.

Direito de Construir e Alteração de Uso,¹¹ têm sido amplamente utilizados como modo de planejar a cidade, enquanto, na verdade, são originalmente pensadas para configurarem intervenções pontuais no território. Tais práticas, que deveriam ser a exceção e não a regra, ocorrem com maior frequência em benefício de grupos econômicos privilegiados, como é possível observar a partir de sua incidência espacial na cidade. Esses instrumentos são pensados com o intuito de contribuir com a melhor distribuição de infraestrutura urbana pelo território, por meio de Parcerias Público Privadas, mas têm sido implementados em áreas de renda mais alta, usualmente já bem servidas de infraestrutura urbana segundo o que é levantado pelo IBGE e pela própria Prefeitura. No caso destes espaços, geralmente os promotores imobiliários têm poder de escolha quanto à situação de informalidade, sob pretexto de ser um meio para se chegar a fins de desenvolvimento econômico e urbano. Essas informalidades específicas, quando não pactuadas com o Estado, são, pelo menos, tratadas com maior permissividade por ele.

Outra prática de flexibilização da normativa urbana adotada pelo PDPFor 2009 é o instrumento da ZEIS. Sua inclusão foi uma conquista importante para seus moradores, fruto de sua luta e mobilização em torno dessa pauta (Machado 2014; Pequeno e Freitas 2012). Entretanto, muito pouco foi feito desde a aprovação do Plano até 2019. Nesta data se iniciou o processo de execução dos Planos Integrados de Regularização Fundiária (PIRFs), para 10 territórios definidos como ZEIS, considerados prioritários. A demora de uma década entre sua criação e um primeiro passo significativo para sua implementação contrasta com a celeridade da implementação dos instrumentos que se apoiam em parceria com o setor privado. Além disso, esse primeiro passo deve ser atribuído à ação dos movimentos de moradia que construíram um cenário de pressão popular e jurídica de grande incidência política (Freitas 2015; Brasil

moradores, usuários permanentes e investidores privados, com o objetivo de alcançar em uma área transformações urbanísticas estruturais, melhorias sociais e a valorização ambiental". Elas deverão ser implementadas mediante Lei municipal específica. BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

11. Os artigos 28 a 31 do Estatuto da Cidade definem o instrumento da Outorga Onerosa de Direito de Construir e Alteração do Uso, que consiste na demarcação de "áreas nas quais o direito de construir poderá ser exercido acima do coeficiente de aproveitamento básico adotado, ou nas quais será permitida alteração de uso do solo, mediante contrapartida a ser prestada pelo beneficiário". BRASIL. Lei Federal 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001.

community, demarcated as ZEIS by the 2009 PDPFor, experienced the removal of about 90 houses to open a public road, a component of the Binário of Avenida Santos Dumont and Rua Desembargador Lauro Nogueira. Feeling aggrieved by a negligible indemnity offer that was insufficient to buy another house in the same neighborhood, residents sought out the State of Ceará's Public Defender. According to the testimony of the interviewed resident, it was only during the process of defending against imminent removal without fair compensation that the families realized that they were living inside a ZEIS. They joined resistance movement groups receiving popular technical assistance in architecture and urbanism. Using a Capstone Design Proposal that had been previously developed for the neighborhood (Breder 2016), a group of volunteer architects developed a counterproposal to the City's road project, which, together with the participation of researchers from the Department of Transport Engineering at UFC in public hearings, contributed to the establishment of fair indemnities compatible with the real value of the houses.

The Municipal Infrastructure Office (Secretaria Municipal de Infraestrutura - SEINF), in response to the Public Defender's Office (Official Letter 1903148/OF of March 14, 2019), affirmed the removal as the only viable option to carry out the project, arguing that Beco da Galinha was not located within the ZEIS polygon of Verdes Mares, and therefore not "protected".

As can be seen in Figure 4, prepared with data from the City itself, however, the removed dwellings are within the ZEIS polygon. It is noteworthy that, even if, in fact, the houses were not covered by the ZEIS, the decision by the Public Power is not justified from the point of view of protecting residents' constitutional right to housing.

In addition, residents reported that municipal agents even offered very different compensation amounts for similar houses. According to them, this was a deliberate strategy by public agents to demobilize the community's struggle to remain in the neighborhood. Residents' political practices were not enough to avoid removal. However, the negotiation between the community, along with their advisors, and the City resulted in an increase in the value of compensation, which, in several cases, came close to the market value of the land.

Situations like this, which are counter to the recognition of the right to the city on which the PDPFor is based, illustrate the persistence of a criminalizing gaze towards low-income informal territories. Their condition of urban and legal irregularity, together with a precarious urban pattern, make these territories available for consideration as land for the works and investments of the "planned" city.

2016), num processo que poderia ser classificado por Mirafteb (2012) como um "invited space of dialogue". Parte desse processo pode ser consultada na ata de Audiência Pública convocada pelo Ministério Público do Estado do Ceará no dia 17 de outubro de 2018.¹²

Para além da leniência na sua regulamentação, houveram casos de negligência, em que o próprio Poder Público foi omissivo em relação à proteção dessas Zonas, onde a gestão urbana municipal abre espaço para que o mercado imobiliário, e até obras públicas, ameçassem a integridade dos territórios, permitindo que remoções tenham sido efetivadas de casas dentro destas poligonais protegidas.

Isso ocorreu, por exemplo, no Beco da Galinha, integrante da Comunidade Verdes Mares, no bairro do Papicu, zona nobre da cidade. A comunidade, demarcada como ZEIS pelo PDPFor 2009, sofreu remoção de cerca de 90 casas para a abertura de uma via pública, componente do Binário da Avenida Santos Dumont e da Rua Desembargador Lauro Nogueira. Ao se sentirem lesados com uma oferta de indenização irrisória, insuficiente para comprarem outra habitação no mesmo bairro, os moradores procuraram a Defensoria Pública do Estado do Ceará. Conforme depoimento do morador entrevistado, foi apenas durante o processo de defesa contra a remoção iminente sem justa compensação que as famílias descobriram que moravam dentro de uma ZEIS. Somaram-se ao movimento de resistência grupos de assessoria técnica popular em arquitetura e urbanismo. Fazendo uso de um trabalho final de curso previamente elaborado para o bairro (Breder 2016), o grupo desenvolveu uma contraproposta ao projeto viário da Prefeitura, que, junto com a participação de pesquisadores do Departamento de Engenharia de Transportes da UFC nas audiências públicas sobre o projeto, contribuíram para o estabelecimento de indenizações justas e compatíveis ao valor real das casas.

A Secretaria Municipal de Infraestrutura (SEINF), em resposta à Defensoria (Ofício 1903148/OF de 14 de março de 2019), afirmou a remoção como a única opção viável para concretizar o projeto, argumentando inclusive que o Beco da Galinha não se encontraria dentro da poligonal da ZEIS da Verdes Mares, não estando "protegido".

Como pode ser verificado na Imagem 04, elaborada a partir de dados da própria Prefeitura, entretanto, as habitações removidas se encontram dentro da poligonal. Vale ressaltar que, mesmo se, de fato, as casas não fossem contempladas pela ZEIS, a decisão do Poder Público não estaria justificada do ponto de vista da proteção ao direito constitucional à

12. Na ata, encaminha-se marcar reuniões e oficiar os órgãos municipais responsáveis e a Câmara dos Vereadores para dar início ao processo dos PIRFs.




Figure 4. Houses in Beco da Galinha removed and impacted by the work of Binário. Source: PMF (2009); PMF (2010); PMF (2018). Prepared by the authors.

Imagem 4. Casas do Beco da Galinha removidas e impactadas com a obra do Binário. Fonte: PMF (2009); PMF (2010); PMF (2018). Elaborado pelas autoras.

Given this context of rights violation and neglect of the spatial demands of vulnerable urban groups by municipal bodies responsible for the daily management and production of urban space, popular mobilizations have been organized in the city in order to politically influence the processes of decision-making and conferring voice to vulnerable residents such as Beco da Galinha dwellers, who, in the end, managed to mitigate their losses. Thus, in 2014, collaboration between leaders and community organizations, entities, popular movements and technical advisors, the “Frente de Luta por Moradia” (Fight for Decent Housing Front - FLMD) was born. Its main purpose has been to join forces in the fight for the right to the city and housing in Fortaleza.

Over the years, the actions undertaken by the FLMD have produced achievements for these historically neglected groups. Many of them are linked to the rights of residents of informal popular settlements and the constant demand for popular participation in official decision-making processes, enabling public debate on city planning processes. The institutional spaces for participation lose strength when they fail to recognize existing conflicts in the city and when the general recommendations of the EC are set aside by the municipal administration, creating the necessity for popular movements to constantly dispute for their rights.

moradia.

Além disso, os moradores relataram que agentes municipais chegaram a oferecer valores de indenizações bastante discrepantes para casas similares. Segundo eles, esta era uma estratégia deliberada dos agentes públicos para desmobilizar a luta comunitária pela permanência no bairro. A remoção não pôde ser evitada. Entretanto, a negociação entre a comunidade e as assessorias e a Prefeitura resultou em um aumento do valor das indenizações, que, em diversos casos, chegou a ser próximo ao valor real da terra.

Situações como essa, que chegam a ir na contramão do reconhecimento do direito à cidade no qual o PDPFor se baseia, ilustram a persistência de um olhar criminalizador sobre os territórios informais de baixa renda. Sua condição de irregularidade urbanística e jurídica, aliadas ao padrão urbanístico precário, fazem com que estes territórios sejam considerados terra disponíveis para as obras e investimentos da cidade planejada.¹³

Dado esse contexto de violação de direitos, e de negligência das demandas espaciais dos grupos

13. Aqui entende-se “planejada” como pensada pelo planejamento urbano oficial, ligado ao Poder Público, apesar de compreender-se que há outras formas de planejamento fora do âmbito estatal.

THE PERIPHERY OF FORTALEZA: GRANDE BOM JARDIM AND NOVA CANUDOS

Grande Bom Jardim is a territory located in the periphery of Fortaleza, in the southwestern part of the city, comprising 5 neighborhoods within which are several land occupations that originated from low-income informal communities. Historically, this region has received little attention and investments by the government, leading to the current context of infrastructure, housing, and urban precariousness; it is one of the areas in Fortaleza with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI), according to IBGE (2010).

Urban informality is present in much of the territory of Grande Bom Jardim. Although the tension from land disputes and the threat of removal for speculative reasons is not as constant as in more centrally located popular settlements such as Beco da Galinha (see Figure 5), the informal status of the settlements produces negative consequences for residents. In addition to insecurity of tenure, difficulty in accessing public services is common, such as accessing health centers or basic sanitation services. These situations create a scenario of absences that is often justified by the institutional and financial incapacity of the State, furthering the marginalization of these territories (Freitas 2019). This happens even in ZEIS areas that are already demarcated by the Master Plan for future regularization.

Faced with this scenario of urban exclusion, often produced by the asymmetrical planning practice itself, the residents of Grande Bom Jardim organized themselves. They formed movements and collectives to mitigate the effects of exclusionary policies affecting their community.

These organizations have developed strategies to ensure urban rights to residents. Examples include the Popular Plan for ZEIS Bom Jardim (Freitas et al 2019) - used as a reference in the PIRF - and the "Saneamento Já!" Campaign (Sanitation Now!). Both are headed by local leaders and rely on the assistance of groups from the Federal University of Ceará, such as the Tutorial Education Program in Architecture and Urbanism (ArqPET), for developing short, medium, and long-term claims. The residents of Grande Bom Jardim also exercise expressive participation in popular spaces for discussions about the city, such as the FLMD, mentioned above.

The Nova Canudos community, located within the Bom Jardim ZEIS polygon, is one of the main components for social mobilization and urban struggle in the territory. As reported by the interviewee, a participant in one of these community organizations operating in the region, the historical absence of social assistance policies in Nova Canudos created a context for popular organization around residents' priority agendas, such as the absence of bathrooms in houses and an environmental sanitation system in the

urbanos vulneráveis por parte de órgãos municipais responsáveis pela gestão cotidiana de produção do espaço urbano, algumas articulações populares foram se organizando na cidade, a fim de incidir politicamente nos processos de tomada de decisão e ter voz no processo decisório, a exemplo dos moradores do Beco da Galinha que, no final das contas, conseguiram mitigar suas perdas. Desse modo, em 2014, a partir da articulação entre lideranças e organizações comunitárias, entidades, movimentos populares e assessorias técnicas, nasceu a Frente de Luta por Moradia Digna (FLMD). Seu principal intuito, desde então, tem sido o de unir forças na luta pelo direito à cidade e à moradia em Fortaleza.

Ao longo dos anos, as ações empreendidas pela Frente de Luta produziram algumas conquistas para esses grupos historicamente negligenciados. Muitas delas estão ligadas aos direitos de moradores de assentamentos populares informais e à constante demanda por participação popular nos processos oficiais de tomada de decisão, viabilizando debate público sobre os caminhos a serem tomados no planejamento da cidade. Os espaços institucionais de participação perdem força quando deixam de reconhecer conflitos existentes na cidade e as recomendações gerais do EC são deixadas de lado pela gestão municipal, tornando-se necessária uma constante disputa por parte dos movimentos populares.

A PERIFERIA DE FORTALEZA: GRANDE BOM JARDIM E A NOVA CANUDOS

O Grande Bom Jardim é um território localizado na área periférica de Fortaleza, na zona sudoeste da cidade, compreendido por 5 bairros dentro dos quais existem diversas ocupações e comunidades. Historicamente, esta região tem recebido pouca atenção e investimentos por parte do Poder Público, apresentando precariedades infraestruturais, habitacionais e urbanas, sendo esta uma das áreas da cidade com menor Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano (IDH) de Fortaleza, segundo o IBGE (2010).

A informalidade urbana está presente em boa parte do território do Grande Bom Jardim. Apesar de não haver um cenário de tensões constantes referentes às disputas de terra e ameaça de remoção por questões especulativas, como acontece em assentamentos populares mais centrais na cidade de Fortaleza, como no Beco da Galinha (ver Imagem 05), o status de informalidade dos assentamentos traz consequências negativas para os moradores. Para além da questão da insegurança de posse, é comum que haja dificuldade de acesso a serviços públicos, como atendimento em postos de saúde ou implementação de infraestrutura urbana. Essas situações criam um cenário de ausências que também é frequentemente justificado pela incapacidade




Figure 5. The value of residential land in the city of Fortaleza: positioning of Beco da Galinha and Grande Bom Jardim. Source: SEINF/PMF (2015). Prepared by the authors.

Imagem 5. O valor do solo residencial na cidade de Fortaleza: posicionamento do Beco da Galinha e do Grande Bom Jardim. Fonte: SEINF/PMF (2015). Elaborado pelas autoras.

community. In 2005, they mobilized for the inclusion of community demands in the Participatory Budget (Orçamento Participativo - OP) during the first term of Mayor Luizianne Lins (PT). In 2008, the residents, with the support of the NGO Cearah Periferia, started a land regularization process for the community.

Thus, aware of their rights to tenure security, residents actively participated in the public debate around the preparation of the 2009 PDPFor demanding their settlement be assigned as ZEIS. Residents understood the potential of this planning tool, which, in addition to the already desired land title regularization, could promote other public investments that, in their view, were more of a priority. The final version of PDPFor includes not only Nova Canudos, but also the immediate surroundings of the community. The continuous participation of residents in implementing the ZEIS has made the "ZEIS do Bom Jardim" (as the polygonal area that includes Nova Canudos is known) one of the 10 priority ZEIS in the city of Fortaleza.

The demarcation of the ZEIS and, more recently, the elaboration of the PIRFs of the 10 priority ZEIS in Fortaleza were instances of the few significant public initiatives towards democratization of land regularization in the city. The experience of residents in Nova Canudos reveals that the ZEIS delineation process only occurred due to their political demands, which required overcoming various

institucional e financeira do Estado, consolidando a marginalização destes territórios (Freitas 2019). Isso ocorre mesmo no território da ZEIS, já demarcado pelo Plano Diretor para futura regularização.

Diante desse cenário de exclusão urbana, produzida muitas vezes pela própria prática assimétrica do planejamento, os moradores do Grande Bom Jardim se organizam em entidades. Eles formam movimentos e coletivos para mitigar os efeitos das políticas excludentes no território.

Tais organizações comunitárias têm desenvolvido estratégias para assegurar direitos urbanos aos moradores do território. Alguns exemplos são o Plano Popular da ZEIS Bom Jardim (Freitas et al 2019) - usado, inclusive, como referência no PIRF - e a Campanha "Saneamento Já!". Ambos são encabeçados por lideranças locais, e contam com assessoria de grupos da Universidade Federal do Ceará, como o Programa de Educação Tutorial em Arquitetura e Urbanismo (ArqPET), pautando reivindicações de curto, médio e longo prazo. Os moradores do Grande Bom Jardim também exercem expressiva participação nos espaços populares de discussão sobre a cidade, como a Frente de Luta por Moradia Digna, acima citada.

A comunidade Nova Canudos, localizada na ZEIS do Bom Jardim, é um dos principais expoentes da mobilização social e luta urbana no território. Segundo relatado pela entrevistada, participante de uma

institutional barriers in order to achieve its definitive implementation.

The Integrated Land Regularization Plan (PIRF) design process for ZEIS Bom Jardim, carried out in 2019, followed a series of pre-existing initiatives in the territory, which considered regularization as a multidimensional process involving urbanization, infrastructure, housing, public spaces, etc. as demanded by the consolidated community organization. Land titling within the ZEIS is one of the main objectives of the PIRF. However, in the ZEIS utopia (see Figure 6), titling is not seen as an ultimate goal, as security of tenure must always be allied to issues of quality of housing and urban space. In viewing land tenure regularization, housing improvements, and urban qualification as inseparable processes, they are strengthened, in the sense of being transformative, putting urban inclusion into practice and bringing lasting improvements to the quality of life of residents.

The process of preparing the PIRF had several components, starting with a socioeconomic, physical-environmental, urban and land tenure analysis of the area, passing through the proposal for Special Regulation, the Land Titling Plan, the Urban Design Plan, the Work and Income Generation Plan and the Social Participation and Development Plan. It began in 2019 through a partnership between Iplanfor (Institute of Planning of Fortaleza) and the Universities of Fortaleza - and in the case of Bom Jardim, the Federal University of Ceará. For each component there were workshops, in which, within the time and resource constraints of the Plan's contracting context, residents were able to participate and give their opinion, making decisions together with the team, complementing technical and community perspectives.

The products, relying on materials already prepared by the community about the territory, gained richness and depth through debate, the conflict of ideas, and the visibility of popular demands. In short, the process that was carried out and accompanied by popular participation, sought to give some autonomy to the residents.

After the completion of the PIRF process, another initiative for land regularization in Nova Canudos was conducted, this time, by the PIRF team architects in partnership with local leaders. When the Council of Architecture and Urbanism (CAU/CE) issued a public notice, in 2020, for proposals for Technical Assistance in Social Interest Housing - including housing improvements and land regularization -, the practitioners prepared a proposal aimed at regularization of the settlement. Although the PIRF itself already guarantees the protection rights of a ZEIS, institutional processes can be slow and bureaucratic, and the edict was seen as a way to realize tenure security for the community, who already

destas organizações comunitárias atuantes na região, a ausência histórica das políticas de assistência social na Nova Canudos provocou um contexto de organização popular em torno das pautas prioritárias dos moradores, como a ausência de banheiros nas habitações e de um sistema de saneamento ambiental na comunidade. Já em 2005, houve organização popular em torno da inclusão das demandas da comunidade no Orçamento Participativo (OP) do primeiro mandato da prefeita Luizianne Lins (PT). Em 2008, os moradores contaram com o apoio da ONG Cearah Periferia¹⁴ para dar início a um processo de regularização fundiária para a comunidade.

Assim, cientes de seus direitos à segurança de posse, os moradores participaram ativamente do debate público em torno da elaboração do PDPFor 2009, tendo como um dos objetivos a delimitação da comunidade como ZEIS. Os moradores compreendiam o potencial deste instrumento que, além da já almejada regularização fundiária, poderia promover outros investimentos públicos que, em sua visão, seriam ainda mais prioritários. A versão final do PDPFor conta com a inclusão não só da Nova Canudos, mas de uma poligonal que inclui o entorno imediato da comunidade. A contínua participação dos moradores pela implementação da ZEIS fez com que a ZEIS do Bom Jardim (como é conhecida a área da poligonal que inclui a Nova Canudos) se tornasse uma das 10 ZEIS prioritárias da cidade de Fortaleza.

A demarcação das ZEIS e, mais recentemente, a elaboração dos PIRFs das 10 ZEIS prioritárias de Fortaleza foi uma das poucas iniciativas públicas significativas no sentido da democratização do instrumento da regularização fundiária na cidade. A experiência dos moradores da Nova Canudos revela que o processo de regulamentação da ZEIS só ocorreu devido à reivindicação política dos moradores, no sentido de superar algumas das diversas barreiras institucionais existentes para a sua implementação definitiva.

Assim, o processo de construção do Plano Integrado de Regularização Fundiária (PIRF) da ZEIS Bom Jardim, realizado em 2019, soma-se a uma série de iniciativas pré-existentes no território, que já pensavam urbanização, infraestrutura, moradia, espaços públicos etc, e que, também, já possuíam uma organização comunitária consolidada. A regularização fundiária na ZEIS é um dos principais objetivos do PIRF. Entretanto, na utopia da ZEIS (ver Imagem 06), a regularização é encarada não como um objetivo final, pois a segurança de posse tem que estar sempre aliada às questões da qualidade da moradia e do espaço urbano. Enxergando a regularização fundiária,

14. O Cearah Periferia é uma ONG, fundada em 1991, que apoia e assessora movimentos populares urbanos de Fortaleza.



Falar de ZEIS é falar de vida, garantir a qualidade do espaço que forma a comunidade da vila, ZEIS é moradia, também é ter esperança, é falar de afeto e garantir um futuro para nossas crianças. O terreno da ZEIS é uma zona prioritária da cidade, E afirmamos a importância disto, promovendo encontros, encantos e debates.

Falar de ZEIS é falar de amor que tem que ser dito, e é garantir socialmente na prática, todos os nossos direitos políticos. A ZEIS é garantia de vida, saneamento adequado, e áreas de lazer, priorizando a moradia, a escola,

meu povo e você. A ZEIS é a Zona Especial de Interesse Social, uma luta política para garantir nossa estrutura prática para vivenciar os espaços da cidade, e nosso bairro natal. ZEIS é por veiz, a afirmação pra vocês de que local de moradia é local de memória e afeto, Afirmar a ZEIS é também ver que o povo é esperto. E o povo tá ligado, que é importante tá preparado pra quando o momento chegar, de votar e ser votado, neste mundo cão, de quem vai nos representar. A luta da ZEIS, embora vocês agora na vez está aprendendo o que é, vem de muito tempo, de gente que muito antes estava se organizando com

muita fé. Vem desde 2009, e embora tanto enrole, enrole, conseguimos pautar na prefeitura, que às vezes se faz de doida, merece uns puxão de oreia, e quem sabe um pé na bunda!

A ZEIS também afirma e dá direito ao papel da casa própria, o documento que na lei te diz o local que você mora. E o local que a gente mora, é um local importante na nossa formação, todos os direitos para todas as pessoas, que incluem ruas pavimentadas, casas com fossas sépticas, preservação das áreas verdes e qualidade na educação. Pra aprender de vez, que com o povo da

ZEIS, não tem brincadeira ou enrolação, a ZEIS é coisa séria, aqui não tem miséria, tem criança e muito amor no coração. Então prioriza a vida, porque a ZEIS é ainda, nossa maior afirmação política do afeto, que local de moradia é lugar de memória, de vivência pessoal e de gente com o coração aberto. Falar de ZEIS é falar de amor, e com você eu sei que aonde for, verei que viemos regando há muito tempo uma linda flor.

ZEIS – Wesley Lobo

#AgoraéNossaZEIS
#ZEISéMoradiaDigna

Figure 5. Illustration of the ZEIS Bom Jardim Urban Plan, which makes up the PIRF, the official plan for the area agreed with the residents, and a poem about ZEIS written by an artist from the Nova Canudos region. Source: Instagram (@ZEISBOMJARDIM) and IPLANFOR/PMF. Prepared by the authors.

Imagem 5. Ilustração do Plano Urbanístico da ZEIS Bom Jardim, que compõe o PIRF, plano oficial para a área pactuada com os moradores, e poema sobre a ZEIS redigido por um artista da região da Nova Canudos. Fonte: Instagram (@ZEISBOMJARDIM) e IPLANFOR/PMF. Elaborado pelas autoras.

uses this claim as a guide for their struggles.

In an interview with one of the creators of the proposal, it was possible to gain a closer view of the regularization process, its potential and its challenges, specifically for the territory of Bom Jardim. Reflecting on other experiences with land tenure regularization in the city, which were conducted using different methodologies, the interviewee highlighted the importance of resident participation for the viability of the process - from a logistical point of view, but also from the need for dissemination of knowledge about the process and project.

FINAL REMARKS

Brazilian urban legislation is considered one of the most progressive in the world, with the City Statute being one of its greatest symbols. However, the Brazilian State demonstrates limited capacity to implement its legal principles and determinations aimed at the democratic management of cities. Contradicting current Right to the City Legislation, policies implemented have been able to reinforce socio-spatial inequalities, especially when linked to neoliberal values.

Popular participation, one of the pillars of the City Statute, has been underestimated, if not completely neglected, in the decision-making processes of urban policy in Fortaleza. This context leaves us increasingly distant from citizen autonomy (Souza 2002), and from the possibility of collective decision-making in public processes, policies, and resources. The debated city has been represented as a simple entity, lacking complexity, contradicting the existing urban experiences as described by Vainer (2009).

The influence of this perspective in the agenda of urban informality, a prevailing reality in Brazilian metropolises, results in a gap between land regularization policies and the necessary dialogue with residents and users of the existing built environment. When faced with institutional limitations regarding official participatory processes (invited spaces, as defined by Miraftab (2004)), these communities begin to constitute their own invented spaces for the production of the city, acting simultaneously through direct action and institutional struggle (Bois and Milagres 2021). Thus, the forgotten city is also being planned, now by these actors, and regularization, like so many other urban agendas, starts to be contemplated by those who live and know the informal city. Suffice to say that public administration would have much to gain by legitimizing these spaces and putting itself in the position of listener.

The comparative analysis of the two community case studies - Beco da Galinha and Nova Canudos - gives us some important insights. In Beco da Galinha, residents built an invented space with the support of actors such as the Public Defender's Office and

as melhorias habitacionais e a qualificação urbana como processos indissociáveis, elas se potencializam no sentido de serem transformadoras, colocando em prática a inclusão urbana e trazendo melhorias duradouras na qualidade de vida dos moradores.

O processo de elaboração do PIRF possui várias etapas, começando com um diagnóstico socioeconômico, físico-ambiental, urbanístico e fundiário da área, passando pela proposta de Normatização Especial, o Plano de Regularização Fundiária, o Plano Urbanístico, o Plano de Geração de Trabalho e Renda e o Plano de Participação e Desenvolvimento Social. Se iniciou em 2019 por meio de uma parceria entre o Iplanfor (Instituto de Planejamento de Fortaleza) e as Universidades de Fortaleza¹⁵ - no caso do Bom Jardim, a Universidade Federal do Ceará. Em cada uma de suas etapas, contou com oficinas, nas quais, dentro das limitações de tempo e recurso do contexto de contratação do Plano, os moradores puderam participar e opinar, tomando decisões em conjunto com a equipe, havendo complementação das visões técnica e comunitária.

Os produtos, assim, se apoiando também nos materiais já elaborados pela comunidade sobre o território, ganharam riqueza e profundidade por meio do debate, do conflito de ideias e da visibilização das reivindicações populares. Em suma, o processo realizado, acompanhado de participação popular, buscou dar certa autonomia aos moradores.

Mesmo depois de finalizado o processo de elaboração do PIRF, mais uma iniciativa para a regularização fundiária da comunidade da Nova Canudos foi conduzida, desta vez, pelas arquitetas da equipe do PIRF em parceria com as lideranças locais. Quando o Conselho de Arquitetura e Urbanismo (CAU/CE) lançou edital, em 2020, para propostas de Assistência Técnica em Habitação de Interesse Social - incluindo melhorias habitacionais e regularização fundiária -, as técnicas elaboraram uma proposta, que foi contemplada, visando a regularização fundiária do assentamento. Apesar do próprio PIRF já garantir esse direito para a ZEIS, os processos institucionais podem ser lentos e burocráticos, e se viu no edital uma saída para a efetivação da segurança de posse da comunidade que já trazia essa reivindicação como pauta de suas lutas.

Em entrevista com uma das idealizadoras da proposta, foi possível apreender uma visão mais aproximada do processo de regularização,

15. Três Universidades da cidade de Fortaleza foram contratadas pelo Iplanfor para elaborar os PIRFs de 9 das 10 ZEIS eleitas prioritárias, com exceção da ZEIS Dionísio Torres, que ficou a cargo do próprio Instituto. São elas: Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC), Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE) e Universidade de Fortaleza (Unifor).

popular technical assistance to combat the official decision-making process for the qualification of the urban environment that did not include them. This is also the case at Nova Canudos, which for years had been organized around public policies that did not depend on the (in)action of the State. Here, however, organized action was already established, in a more consolidated manner, through the constant action of residents engaged in urban struggles.

Furthermore, by differentiating the mobilization processes of each of the two communities, the potential for participation (whether offered or achieved) in land tenure regularization policies becomes evident. On the one hand, the research made clear the limits of institutionalized participation in Fortaleza, where regularization and flexibility in urban regulation by the municipal government is much faster when in the interest of the productive sector, compared to the regularization/urbanization of low-income precarious settlements, which face more institutional barriers. On the other hand, both communities had to mobilize to have their interests met by local state agencies. Residents of the Nova Canudos community have a consistent history of fighting for urban agendas and systematically organize themselves in order to gain visibility for their demands, even going through processes of political formation. Through their practices, they have reversed the closure of a health center located in the community, which was expected to happen due to lack of maintenance. They also became a priority ZEIS and took some important steps towards full, or transformative, land tenure regularization. In the case of Beco da Galinha, residents did not form a consolidated political organization around the ZEIS and mobilization took place on an ad hoc basis as a reaction to the threat of forced removal - even so, they were able to mitigate the losses of the resettlement process.

In both cases, participation and political mobilization created gains for vulnerable citizens - even if at different scales. If we compare the regularization projects carried out by the Nova Canudos leaders with the traditional land regularization initiatives carried out by the Municipal Housing Agency, as is the case of Vila do Mar, on the periphery of Fortaleza, the greatest transformative potential of ZEIS' public policy is evident, especially concerning the inclusion of the urbanistic dimension of the policy. The participatory process, whether inside or outside the institutional framework, is a powerful way for the application of urban instruments to meet the principles of socio-spatial justice. By broadening the discussions and incorporating conflict as an important part of the construction of public policies, progress is made towards planning according to the demands of the real city, as opposed to those idealized by

suas potencialidades e desafios, especificamente no território do Bom Jardim. Ela acumula outras experiências com regularização fundiária na cidade, que foram conduzidos a partir de metodologias distintas, e destaca, nesse sentido, a importância da participação dos moradores da comunidade para a viabilidade do processo - do ponto de vista logístico, mas também da necessidade da disseminação do entendimento em torno do que está sendo realizado.

CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

A legislação urbana brasileira é considerada uma das mais progressistas do mundo, sendo o Estatuto da Cidade um de seus maiores símbolos. Há, entretanto, pouca capacidade por parte do Poder Público de implementação dos seus princípios e determinações legais, que vão no sentido da gestão democrática das cidades. As políticas públicas implementadas, na contramão da lei, vêm sendo vetores de um planejamento urbano que tende a reforçar desigualdades socioespaciais, especialmente quando ligadas a valores neoliberais.

A participação popular, um dos pilares do Estatuto da Cidade, vem sendo menosprezada, quando não completamente negligenciada, nos processos de tomada de decisão da política urbana de Fortaleza. Esse contexto nos deixa cada vez mais distantes da autonomia cidadã (Souza 2002), e da possibilidade de decisão coletiva sobre os processos, políticas e recursos públicos - tornando a cidade que está sendo debatida, ao contrário da cidade real, em um sujeito simples e sem complexidade, como define Vainer (2009).

O debate disso na pauta da informalidade urbana, realidade prevalecente nas metrópoles brasileiras, resulta, em muitos casos, num distanciamento entre as políticas de regularização fundiária e o necessário diálogo com os moradores e usuários da cidade real. Estes, ao se depararem com as limitações institucionais no que tange aos processos participativos oficiais (os *invited spaces*, como define Miraftab (2004)), passam a constituir seus próprios espaços inventados de produção da cidade, atuando concomitantemente por meio da ação direta e da luta institucional (Bois e Milagres, 2021). Assim, a cidade esquecida também vai sendo planejada, agora por esses agentes, e a regularização, como tantas outras pautas urbanas, passa a ser pensada por quem vive e conhece a cidade informal. Não é grande contrassenso dizer que a gestão pública teria muito a ganhar legitimando esses espaços e se colocando em lugar de escuta.

A análise comparativa dos estudos de caso das duas comunidades apresentadas - Beco da Galinha e Nova Canudos - nos permite algumas apreensões importantes. No Beco da Galinha, os moradores construíram um espaço inventado, contando com

technocratic urban plans.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the situation studied also illustrates the importance of thinking about a new legal order that considers the current logic of urban informality. It is necessary to enable regularization processes that can guarantee control of the quality of the urban environment, in order to combat – and not reproduce – inequalities, as pointed out by Fernandes (2011). The adequacy of the legal urban norms and their transformative potential are made possible when they are thought of in an integrated manner, developing public policies based on existing demands, and opening decision-making processes to debate and the effective participation of residents - its main subjects.

o apoio de agentes como a Defensoria Pública e assessorias técnicas populares, já que o processo decisório oficial sobre a qualificação do ambiente urbano não os incluiu. Isso também acontece na Nova Canudos, que há anos já se organiza em torno de políticas públicas sem depender da (in)ação do Estado. Aqui, porém, a ação organizada já está estabelecida de forma mais consolidada, por meio da constante atuação dos moradores no âmbito das lutas urbanas.

Além disso, ao diferenciar os processos de mobilização de cada uma das duas comunidades, o potencial da participação (seja ela oferecida ou conquistada) nas políticas de regularização fundiária se evidencia. Por um lado, a pesquisa deixou claro os limites da participação institucionalizada até o momento em Fortaleza, onde a abertura do Poder Público municipal para a regularização e flexibilização da normativa urbanística é muito mais célere no âmbito da regularização fundiária de interesse do setor produtivo, se comparada à regularização/urbanização dos assentamentos precários de baixa renda, que enfrenta muito mais barreiras institucionais. Por outro lado, as duas comunidades tiveram que se mobilizar para ter seus interesses pautados pela ação pública. Os moradores da comunidade da Nova Canudos têm um consistente histórico de luta por pautas urbanas, e sistematicamente se organizam no sentido de dar visibilidade às suas demandas, passando, inclusive, por processos de formação política. Com suas práticas, já conseguiram reverter o fechamento de um posto de saúde localizado na comunidade, que estava previsto para acontecer devido ao processo de sucateamento que vinha enfrentando. Também se tornaram ZEIS prioritária e deram alguns passos importantes no sentido da regularização fundiária plena, ou transformadora. No caso do Beco da Galinha, não havia organização política consolidada dos moradores em torno da ZEIS, e a mobilização aconteceu de maneira pontual, uma reação frente à ameaça de remoção forçada - mas ainda assim foi possível mitigar as perdas do processo de reassentamento.

Em ambos os casos a participação e mobilização política apresentam ganhos para os cidadãos em situação de vulnerabilidade - mesmo que em diferentes escalas. Se compararmos os projetos de regularização tocados pelas lideranças da Nova Canudos com as iniciativas tradicionais de regularização fundiária conduzidas pela Prefeitura, como é o caso do Vila do Mar, na orla de Fortaleza, é evidente o maior potencial transformador da política pública da ZEIS, especialmente pela inclusão da dimensão urbanística no projeto. O processo participativo, seja ele dentro ou fora da institucionalidade, é um caminho potente para que a aplicação de instrumentos urbanos atendam

aos princípios da justiça socioespacial. Ao ampliar as discussões e incorporar o conflito como parte importante da construção de políticas públicas, se avança no sentido de planejar atendendo às demandas da cidade real, em contraponto àquelas idealizadas pelos planos urbanísticos tecnocráticos.

Por fim, é importante destacar que a situação estudada ilustra, também, a importância de se pensar em uma nova ordem jurídica, que funcione segundo a lógica vigente da informalidade urbana. É necessário viabilizar processos de regularização que possam garantir um controle de qualidade do ambiente urbano, de forma a combater - e não reproduzir - desigualdades, conforme aponta Fernandes (2011). A qualidade da norma e seu potencial de transformação são viabilizados quando ela é pensada de maneira integrada, elaborando políticas públicas a partir das demandas existentes, e abrindo os processos decisórios ao debate e à participação efetiva dos moradores - seus principais sujeitos.

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