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Re-evaluation of the Evidential system of Lhasa Tibetan and its atypical functions

Guillaume Oisel
CNRS - LACITO

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a re-evaluation of the Lhasa Tibetan Evidentials and focuses on its atypical functions with control verbs. I present the use of the intentional egophoric with non-SAPs and control verbs when the speaker refers to personal knowledge and I discuss some of its restrictions. Then, I present the atypical uses of the sensorial, factual and inferential evidentials. Some of these functions have been previously noted by Agha (1993), Tournadre (1994, 1996, 2003), Denwood (1999), Garrett (2001), Vokurková (2008) and DeLancey (1985, 1997, 2001). Based on Tournadre's analysis (2003), in which he explains the correlation between the egophoric and intentionality, I show in this paper that when the degree of intentionality is either not involved (but not unintentional) or is only partly involved, the sensorial, factual and inferential can be used with the SAP and control verbs. I also present the notion of intentionality out of focus and lower intentionality to describe these two cases. Then, I treat 'intentionality out of focus' in greater detail, showing that one can distinguish five different ways of reducing the focus on intentionality.

KEYWORDS

Evidentiality, intentionality

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Guillaume Oisel
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1 Introduction

This paper describes the specific contexts in which evidentials may be used in Lhasa Tibetan. In the first section, I survey the literature on interactions between **evidentiality** and **pragmatics** in Lhasa Tibetan. In the second section, I re-evaluate the analysis of the evidential verb system in Lhasa Tibetan. I focus discussion on the following evidentials: egophoric, sensorial, factual, inferential, mnemic and self-corrective limiting the treatment to control verbs.

As Tibetan lacks verb agreement, and thus has no grammatical subject, the notion of Speech Act Participant (SAP) is more apropos (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977[1975]: 652, 660; Ebert 1987).[1] The SAP refers to the speaker in declaratives and the hearer/addressee in interrogatives. Non-SAPs refers to the hearer and other participants in declaratives and the first person in interrogatives.

The egophoric is usually used with the SAP regardless of his/her core grammatical role (agent, patient, etc.), or the type of verb. In the elaboration of the concept "egophoric," I here focus only on the "intentional" egophoric. The sensorial, factual, inferential and self-corrective – which do not involve **intentionality** - are used with non-SAPs and various types of verbs. The mnemic is not restricted with regard to SAP or non-SAP.

In the third section, I focus on atypical functions of evidentials with control verbs. I present the use of the intentional egophoric with non-SAPs and control verbs when the speaker refers to personal knowledge and I discuss some of its restrictions. Then, I present the atypical uses of the sensorial, factual and inferential evidentials. Some of these functions have been previously noted by Agha (1993), Tournadre (1994, 1996, 2003), Denwood (1999), Garrett (2001), Vokurková (2008) and DeLancey (1985, 1997, 2001). Based on Tournadre's analysis (2003), in which he explains the correlation between the egophoric and intentionality, I show in this paper that when the degree of intentionality is either not involved (but not unintentional) or is only partly involved, the sensorial, factual and inferential can be used with the SAP and control verbs. I present the notion of **intentionality out of focus** and **lower intentionality** to describe these two cases. Then, I treat "intentionality out of focus" in greater detail, showing that one can distinguish five different ways of reducing the focus on intentionality. [2]

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[1] This terminology is in no way meant to evoke 'speech act' as used in speech act theory emanating from J. L. Austin.

[2] This paper is based on fieldwork conducted in Lhasa during the summer of 2005 for my Master dissertation, submitted to University of Paris 8 *Saint-Denis* in the academic year 2005-2006. The PICS 2554 program of

1.1 Evidentiality and pragmatics

In this section, I briefly present the main existing approaches to interactions between evidentiality and pragmatics in Lhasa Tibetan. I begin by describing the approach closest to my own, namely that of Tournadre and LaPolla (2014).[3]

Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) propose a new definition of evidentiality: "the representation of **source and access** to information according to **the speaker's perspective and strategy**" (emphasis mine).[4] In their view, the source of information is either the speaker or someone else, whereas access to information can be:

- the five senses (vision, audition, smell, touch, and taste),
- endopathic feelings (anger, disease, etc.),
- reported speech, hearsay, inference based on different types of evidences (logic, sensory, reported speech, and hearsay),
- memory (at the recognition stage),
- and consciousness (including self-awareness, and novel realization triggered by a logical process, a sensory observation, or a reported speech).

The *subjective perspective and strategy* of the speaker frequently implies the speaker's level of commitment, i.e. an evaluation of the reliability of the source of information which is conceptually distinct from epistemic modality indicating an evaluation of the likelihood (Cornillie 2009: 44; Oisel 2013: 37-40). Other factors to be taken into account in the understanding of evidentiality include intention (synonymous with "volition" in Tourandre 2008: 297), time of acquisition (newly acquired versus assimilated information), field of access (personal versus non-personal), politeness, and speaker's state of mind. Tournadre (2008) treats most of these, but politeness and speaker's state of mind have been effectively ignored in the study of Tibetan languages.

In this paper, I therefore only use the following criteria:

- the type of source and access to information,
- the intention,
- fields of knowledge,
- the epistemic modality (*versus* degrees of commitment)
- the state of mind (retrospection, recognition, novel realization and personal transfer principle),

LACITO/CNRS financed my fieldwork. It was within the framework of the DALLITH project. An earlier presentation of my data was given in November 2006 at the University of Tibet and in May 2009 at SOAS, University of London. My data mostly comprise elicitations from two 25 year old Lhasa born women, but are supplemented by real-life daily conversations I heard or participated in. Subsequently, I compared my data with previous studies and revised aspects of the terminology and analysis. All examples in this paper are given in Tibetan script and in Tournadre's (2003: 42-83) phonological transcription. I am grateful to my supervisor Nicolas Tournadre for having given me the idea to study this topic for my master's degree. I also acknowledge the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. I thank Ray Denning (my previous colleague and friend from Xi'an Jiaotong University, China) and Andrew Womack (Yale University, my archaeologist mate who used to live in Xi'an) for reviewing my English. I also thank Lauren Gawne (La Trobe University) and Randy LaPolla (Nanyang Technological University) for their insightful comments and Nathan W. Hill (SOAS) for the last reviewing and corrections of my English.

[3] Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) is in keeping with the work of Tournadre (2008: 297, 2011) and Oisel (2013).

[4] For more discussions about the notion of evidentiality in linguistics, see Chafe and Nichols (1986); Guentchéva (1996); LTBA 23.2 and 24.1 Special Issue on Person and Evidence in Himalayan Languages; Aikhenvald (2004, 2011); Aikhenvald and LaPolla (2007); Guentchéva and Landaburu (2007), Vokurková (2008) and Oisel (2013).

- the degrees of awareness at various stages,
- and some syntactic criteria (*protasis* versus *apodosis*, focus versus topic) since it is more relevant for this analysis.

2 Typical functions of evidentials

In the present section, I reconsidered the description of Lhasa Tibetan evidentiality using the criteria mentioned above. There are **several evidential markers**: egophoric, sensorial, factual, inferential, mnemic, self-corrective, quotative and hearsay. Until now, Lhasa Tibetan has typically been described as a system with three evidential categories. For example, Hill (2012: 392) describes "personal" (egophoric), "factual" and "testimonial" (sensorial).[5] Table 1 presents Hill's analysis with the transcription and terminology adjusted to the conventions used here.

	future	present	past	perfect
personal (egophoric)	*V-kiyin*	*V-kiyö'*	*V-payin*	*V-yö'*
factual	*V-kire'*	*V-kiyöpare'*	*V-pare'*	*V-yöpare'*
sensorial	-------	*V-kidu'*	*V-song*	*V-sha'*

Table 1. verbal auxiliaries

The disagreement between Hill's three evidential categories and my description is less stark than it may at first seem. Since they are not part of the verbal system, earlier scholarship has generally excluded the quotative-hearsay, which are marked by the suffixes *-s* and *-sa*, both derived from Written Tibetan *zer* 'to say' (see Tournadre 2003: 248).[6] Although I include these two suffixes in the overall system of Lhasa Tibetan evidentials, I also exclude further discussion of them here in order to restrict discussion to verbal suffixes (or auxiliary verb constructions, according to the degree of grammaticalization).

My categories, viz. the egophoric, sensorial, factual, inferential, mnemic, and self-corrective, is still double Hill's three. The greater number of categories in my analysis results from my inclusion of the sensorial future, used for reporting about the future[7] (Oisel 2013: 117-118, note 113; Kalsang et al. 2013: 35), and the epistemic modals described by Vokurková (2008: 348-349), as they are also evidentials. This reevaluation allows me to add the proper category of the inferential, which occurs with all the tense and aspect as well as the mnemic, and the self-corrective categories. I also pointed out another epistemic inferential *-patratu'* (high probability).[8] Vokurková writes of these forms that

[5] Hill's analysis is in turn a modification of Tournadre's (2003) fivefold classification of "egophoric," "assertive" (factual), "testimonial" (sensorial), "revelatory" (for the copula *resha'*), and "inferential" (for the sensorial perfect verbal suffix *sha'*). Tournadre and LaPolla (2014: 2, note 1) also subsume the "revelatory" with the sensorial.

[6] In Tables 1-4, at the end of this paper, I summarize the system according to the tense, aspect and epistemic modality for evidential verbal suffixes as well as the system of evidential copulas, which are beyond the scope of the present study.

[7] In my fieldwork data *resha'* can also be combined with modal verbs or relators: V-*yaresha'* 'will', V-*troresha'* 'be about to', V-*koresha'* 'must', V-*kyuresha'* 'has yet to', V-*nyänresha'* 'be willing to, be going to'. I also consider *–patu'* as a proper evidential, although Vokurková considers it an epistemic modal (Vokurková 2008: 157).

[8] See the video 'women discuss about their dream' on the TH(D)L website. The ending *patratu'* comes from Middle Tibetan *–pa.'dra.par.'dug* (Oisel 2013: 111). In Modern Literary Tibetan, the following similar complex auxiliary verb constructions also occur *-med.pa.'dra'dug, -rgyu.yin.pa.'dra.'dug, etc.* (Oisel 2013) as well as *–yod.pa.yin.'gro* (strong

specifying, "the source of information is not the primary function of epistemic endings. However, according to the results of my fieldwork, they often convey evidential modality" (2008: 158). It is indeed the case if one looks at the epistemic scope which might neutralize the "evidential" one (personal knowledge) notably with the epistemic egophoric *-pa āyin* (see section 3.1). But, they all imply an evidential meaning as her analysis perfectly shows. Besides, regarding these epistemic endings, she gave the following title to a more recent paper *Epistemic modalities and Evidentiality* [...] (Vokurková 2011). Even if the epistemic function may overlap with the evidential one or vice-versa, they both constitute the core meaning of the verbal suffixes or copulas in question, i.e. one is not a sub-category of the other. There is an interaction between these two categories. The mnemic *–yöpayö'* indicates access via memory. The epistemic sensorial *-patu'* indicates access through vision or another sense channel. The degree of probability is very high (effectively certain) in both cases. In the same way, the egophoric indicates access through self-awareness. The sensorial indicates access through the senses. In both cases, they indicate certainty, which is the highest degree in the epistemic scale. The factual do not indicate any source and access, but certainty. It is a true epistemic. However, one should keep it in the evidential-epistemic description, as it is the highest function of the evidential-epistemic system. These evidential-epistemic functions occur with all the tenses and aspects.

I analyzed the *mnemic* and *self-corrective* (Tournadre 2008) as evidentials because the mnemic refers to memory (a type of evidential access) and the self-corrective refers to novel realization (another type of evidential access). Contrary to Vokurková, I do not analyze the mnemic as an egophoric because upon further analysis it does not imply self-awareness or intentionality.

2.1 Egophoric

The egophoric conveys that the speaker refers to information based on his ***self-awareness*** (Tournadre 2011, 2014) or his *phenomenological consciousness* (Oisel 2013). It is the only value with the habitual imperfective *–kiyö'* and control verbs (as well as with non-control verbs like 'to be ill, to see, etc.') (see Tournadre 2003: 200). It can also refer to the speaker's **intention** (Tournadre 2003). Intentionality is related to controllability as indicated by the verb and its tense-aspectual configuration (perfective *–payin*, perfect *–yö',* progressive *–kiyö'*, future *–kiyin*).[9] The egophoric is obligatorily used with the SAP in these two cases.

(1) ང་བསམ་བློ་བཏང་གི་ཡོད།

nga s̲amlo tāng-**kiyö'**
I thought VBR-**EGO.IA.**
'I am thinking (about it).' (The speaker is sitting on the bed in the dark and his replying to someone's question 'what are you doing?') (Tournadre and LaPolla 2014: 4) [Self-awareness only]

(2) ང་ཁོང་གི་ནང་ལ་འགྲོ་གི་ཡོད།

nga khōng-ki n̲ang-la tr̲o-**kiyö'**
I he-GEN home-OBL go(pres)-**EGO.IA.**
'I (usually) go/am going to his place.'

probability) versus *-yod.'gro* (weak probability). Further research is required on these types of epistemic evidentials in Literary Tibetan and in Lhasa Tibetan.

[9] For the perfective and the future egophoric, see the examples (27) and (28).

[Self-awareness with the habitual imperfective]
[Intentionality with the progressive]

In questions, the speaker uses the egophoric to directly ask a question of his addressee. The coincidence of first person declaratives with second person interrogatives is a subcase of, what Tournadre and Dorje term the "rule of anticipation" (2003: 111), i.e. the speaker anticipates the evidential of his addressee's answer. Tournadre explains that this "term (which I would trade for a better one) refers to an action which the speaker proposes to achieve for the hearer's benefit" (Tournadre 2008: 296, note 37). The actual speaker (Tournadre 2008: 295 note 35) assumes the intention of the hearer. In other words, a *cognitive notion of empathy* is implied here (Tournadre 2008: 300).

(3) རང་གར་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཡོད།

rang	kh<u>a</u>re	ch<u>e</u>'-**kiyö'**
You	what	do(pres.)- **EGO.IA.**

'What do you do/are you doing?' [Empathy]

Egophoric is a wide category, which also includes the *allocentric*, *experiential* and *receptive egophoric* constructions (Tournadre 2003). I do not present the latter three here.

Epistemic egophorics are presented in the section *personal knowledge* (§3.1) as they are mainly or only used with non-SAPs and do not indicate intentionality. Some of them, *-yong, -yong ngayö', -kiyong ngayö', -kyuyong ngayö'* and *-miyongngä'*, have not been taken into consideration in this analysis as they are not used in general with control verbs and the SAP (Vokurková 2008: 204-208, 274-282).

2.2 Sensorial

The use of the sensorial evidential implies that the speaker was witness to the whole or some part of an event. In Tibetan, this evidential is indicated by various verbal suffixes according to tense and aspect: *-song* (perfective) and *–kitu'*, and its variant *–ki'* (imperfective). These markers are mainly used with non-SAPs.

Access to information via the senses may be visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, or endopathic. The term "endopathic" describes the use of the sensorial non-control verbs indicating an inner feeling or sensation of the SAP (Tournadre 2003: 197).

(4) བློ་བཟང་ཁ་ལས་བཟོ་གིས།

lōpsang	khāla'	s<u>o</u>-**ki'**
Lobzang	food	make(pres)-**SEN.IA.**

'Lobzang prepares/is preparing/was preparing food.'

(5) བློ་བཟང་གིས་ཁ་ལས་བཟོས་སོང་།

lōpsang-ki'	khāla'	s<u>ö</u>'-**song**
Lobzang-ERG	food	make(past)- **SEN.PA.**

'Lobzang prepared food.' (I saw him who did so)

The perfect[10] *-sha'* must be analyzed as sensorial, but usually indicates an inference. The inferential value is related to the aspectual configuration of the perfect (the factual perfect *–yo:re'* can also indicate an inference). The sensorial perfect indicates a sensory inferential or a sensorial resultative according to the context, and is mainly used with non-SAPs. On the one hand, the speaker may have drawn an inference from sensory observation or reported speech. The sensory inferential is either immediate or non-immediate depending on whether the speaker infers his action just after the event or a certain period of time after the event. On the other hand, this marker may also imply that the speaker only observes and focuses his attention on the resulting state of an event.[11]

(6) བློ་བཟང་གིས་ཁ་ལག་བཟོས་བཞག

lōpsang-ki'	khāla'	sö'-**sha'**
Lobzang-ERG	food	make(past)- **SEN.PT.**

'Lobzang prepared food.' (It is ready to eat, but I have not seen him doing so.) [Sensory inferential]

(7) ཁང་པ་གསར་པ་མང་པོ་བརྩིགས་བཞག

khāngpa	sārpa	mangpo	kyap-**sha'**
house	new	a lot of	build(past)- **SEN.PT.**

'Look! Many new houses have been built.' (Tournadre 2003: 193) [Sensory inferential]

(8) བློ་བཟང་ལགས་འདིར་བཞུགས་བཞག

lōpsang-la'	tì:	shu'-**sha'**
Lobzang-HON.	here	stay- **SEN.PT.**

'Lobzang is here (lit. has stayed here).' ("In this statement, the speaker has just discovered Lobzang's presence either by seeing him directly or from various clues (his hat, for example). Alternatively, he might have been aware of his presence for some time but is emphasizing the fact that he is *still* around.") (Tournadre 2003: 194) [Resultative sensorial]

Kalsang et al. (2013: 14, 16) state that for making an inference, one uses *indirect* (inferential, see 2.4 in this paper), and for witnessing an event, one uses *direct evidentials* (sensorial).[12] They offer ten ways to distinguish the use of *sha'* from *tu'* (Kalsang et al. 2013: 16-17) whether they are used as copulas or auxiliary verbs. They describe for the first time, as far as I know, the distinction between witnessing the result of an event or the ending state (*sha'*) versus the event itself or state of affairs (*tu'*) with the "past tense" (Kalsang et al. 2013: 18 ex.25, 33). They also state that *tu'* is unmarked for tense;

[10] Kalsang et al. (2013: 20) argue that *-sha'* is not a *perfect* or *present perfect* as it can be combined with the "auxiliary" (or 'second verb') *tä'* (*bsdad*) indicating *present continuous aspect*. I propose analyzing V-*tä'*+*sha'* (V-*bsdad*+*bzhag*) as a single syntactic unit (i.e. V-*täsha'* (V-*bsdad.bzhag*)) which contrasts with the perfect V-*sha'* (V-*bzhag*).

[11] Kalsang et al. (2013) note that *-sha'* appears to have an inferential meaning when the agent is marked with the ergative case ('agentive/instrumental case' in their terminology). But, it is not compulsory as one can notice it in the case of "P-lability" (Tournadre 2014) in example (7), i.e. a 'hidden agent' (with the ergative) is implied: X has/have built new houses. Besides, the resultative sensorial meaning seems to be triggered by the absolutive case (zero-marked) on the agent (8). More research needs to be done on this matter.

[12] Kalsang et al. analyze *yö'* and *yin* as ego evidentials, *song, sha',* and *tu'* as direct evidentials (the speaker witnessed the event, i.e. sensory access), *re', yökire', yösare',* and *yinsare'* as indirect evidentials, and *re'* and *yo:re'* as neutral evidentials (2013: 1, 4).

one may thus wonder what difference the authors draw between V.-*tu'* and V.-*song* as they are both used for witnessing the event itself.[13]

The future *-yaresha'* and *-pa(tu')* also belong to the sensorial; these suffixes imply an observation of clues in the present which lead the speaker to make an inference about the future. They thus indicate a sensory inferential. They are mainly used with non-SAPs. The difference between these two suffixes is subtle: certainty versus high probability.

(9) ང་དེ་རིང་ཁོང་གི་ནང་ལ་འགྲོ་དགོས་བསམས་བྱུང་། ཡིན་ནའི་ལས་ཁོང་སྨན་ཁང་ནང་ལ་བསྡད་ཡག་རེད་བཞག

khōng mā̃nkang na̲ng-la tä̲'-**yaresha'**
he hospital in-OBL. stay- **SEN.FUT.**
'I thought I had to go to his place today. But he is going to stay at the hospital.' (The speaker has just figured it out based on someone's speech)

(10) ང་དངོས་གནས་བྱས་ན་ཁོང་དང་ཆང་ས་བརྒྱབ་མ་ཐན་ཡིན། ཡིན་ནའི་ལས་ཁོང་བཙོན་ཁང་ནང་ལ་བསྡད་ཡག་རེད་བཞག ཨ་བ།

khōng tshō̃nkang nang-la tä̲'-**yaresha'** āka
he jail in-OBL. stay- **SEN.FUT.** why !
'I was really willing to marry him. But he is going to stay in jail. Why! '(Sad tone, she is crying) (The speaker has just figured it out based on someone's speech)

(11) ཁོང་གིས་ཁ་ལག་བཟོས་པ་འདུག

khōng-ki' khāla' sō̃'-**patu'**
he-ERG food make(past)-**EPI.SEN.FUT.**
'She is certainly going to cook.' (The speaker just saw her going to the kitchen.) (Vokurková 2008: 187)

2.3 Factual

The factual[14] signals that the speaker states a **specific or common fact without indicating the source and the access to information**. From an extra-linguistic point of view, the use of this category does not rule out the possibility that the speaker had specific access to information (inference, reported speech, etc.), but, he does not indicate it. [15] The factual is marked by various suffixes according to tense and aspect (imperfective *–kiyo:re'*, future *–kire'*, perfect *–yo:re'* and perfective *–pare'*). [16]

(12) སྒོ་བཟང་ཁ་ལག་བཟོ་གི་ཡོད་རེད།

lōpsang khāla' so̲-**kiyo:re'**
Lobzang food make(pres)- **FAC.IA.**
Lobzang prepares/is preparing food.

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[13] One may also wonder what the difference is between *red* as an indirect and as a neutral evidential.
[14] I dub Tournadre's "assertive" (2008), the "factual," because "assertive" implies that the speaker considers an utterance true or certain. The factual, egophoric, mnemic and self-corrective lack equivalents in Aikhenvald's categorization of evidentiality (2004). But, the assumption category may correspond to the factual (Oisel 2013).
[15] See Garrett (2001: 22-51), for a detailed analysis of the sub-notions conveyed by *indirect* evidential (factual).
[16] The factual *-pare'* may also be imperfective in combination with a frequency adverb *tshā̃mtsamla* 'sometimes'; more research is necessary. Agha (1993: 224) gives the following example: མཚམས་མཚམས་ལ་ཁོ་རང་ཉི་གྲོག་བརླན་བལྟས་པ་རེད། tshāmtsamla hintri lōnyän tä̃'-pare' 'Sometimes he watched/used to watch Hindi movies.'

The epistemic factual implies that the speaker evaluates a situation as possible without specifying his information source or access (example 13). Nonetheless, the context may indicate that the speaker makes an inference (as in example 14). The epistemic factual is mainly used with non-SAPs, in various tenses and aspects (perfective *-payintro*, perfect *-yöntro*, imperfective *-kiyöntro*, future *-kyuyintro*, etc.).

(13) ཁོང་འགྲོ་གི་ཡོད་འགྲོ

khōng tro-**kiyöntro**
he go (pres.)-**EPI.FAC.IA.**
'Maybe, he will go.' (The speaker doesn't know anything particular about his going.) (Vokurková 2008: 232 ex.394)

(14) ཁོང་ད་ལྟ་སྐྱེག་བརྙན་འདི་ལྟ་གི་ཡོད་འགྲོ

khōng thanta lōknyän ti tā-**kiyöntro**
he now movie this watch (pres.)-**EPI.FAC.IA.**
'She is probably watching the movie.' (The speaker infers from the fact that the movie is a must.) (Vokurková 2008: 237 ex.408)

2.4 Inferential

As opposed to the sensorial perfect *sha'*, which has previously been called 'inferential', the category I refer to with this term is an evidential value that occurs with all tenses and aspects (with the future it generally has a deontic meaning). The inferential also indicates an epistemic modality. An epistemic inferential thus indicates the speaker evaluates a situation as probable in drawing an inference from sensory observation or logic (*-kiyöpatra* versus *-kiyökire'*). With negation, the inferential indicates improbability. It is mainly used with non-SAPs (See Tables 1-2).

(15) ཁོང་ཚིག་བྱས་ན་ཁ་ལཱཝ་བཟོ་གི་ཡོད་པ་འདུ།

khōng cīkcäna khāla' so-**kiyöpatra**
he perhaps meal cook(pres.)-**EPI.SEN.-INF.IA.**
'She is perhaps cooking.' (The speaker can smell some food a little bit.) (Vokurková 2008: 243 ex.421)

(16) ཁོང་ཕལ་ཆེར་ཟ་གི་ཡོད་ཀྱི་རེད།

khōng phā:ce: sa-**kiyökire'**
he probably eat (pres.)-**EPI.LOG.-INF.IA.**
'She will probably eat [it].' (The speaker bases himself on the fact that she usually eats it.) (Vokurková 2008: 225 ex.378)

There are also other specific verbal suffixes for indicating an epistemic inferential and high probability (high improbability with negation). As Vokurková (2008: 249-266, 282-294) describes them well and they do not appear to indicate evidential values per se, they are not treated here. [17]

[17] Forms like *-kiyösare'* are mainly used in the Tibetan diaspora and correspond to the forms used in Lhasa like – *kiyöpatra* (Vokurková 2008).

2.5 Mnemic

The mnemic implies a more or less *vague recollection* of an event or state by the speaker, as well as probability. I analyze it as an evidential since the access to information is the **memory** of the speaker.[18] The mnemic is used with both the SAP and non-SAPs. It is used with all the tenses and aspects (see Tables 1-2).

This evidential is used as copulas (Oisel 2013) as well as verbal suffixes (Vokurková 2008: 197-204).

(17) ང་ལྷ་སར་ཉི་མ་གསུམ་བསྡད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་ཡོད།

nga lhāsa: nyi̲ma sūm tä̲'-**kiyöpayö'**
I Lhasa-OBL day three stay-**MNEM.IA.**
'As far as I remember, I will stay in Lhasa for three days.' (The speaker is going to many places. So he does not remember exactly how long he will stay in each place.) (Vokurková 2008: 199 ex.309)

(18) ཁོང་ཆུ་ཚོད་གཉིས་པར་ཡོང་གི་ཡོད་པ་ཡོད།

khōng chu̲tsö' nyīpa: yo̲ng-**kiyöpayö'**
he o'clock second-OBL come-**MENM.IA.**
'She should come at two o'clock.' (She called and said she would come. The speaker thinks it is at two that she is coming but he is not sure.) (Vokurková 2008: 202 ex.320)

2.6 Self-corrective

This rare evidential category has hitherto been incompletely analyzed. Tournadre first mentions it in his description of the copulas *yi̲npare'* (essential), *yö̲pare'*, and *yö̲payinpare'*–the latter two both existential, respectively distinguishing a logical process versus someone's speech (2003: 377).[19] Vokurková notices the perfective *–payinpare'* (2008: 98, note 97), the perfect *–yöpare'*, imperfective *–kiyöpare'*, and future *–kyuyinpare'* (Vokurková 2008).

According to Tournadre (2003) these suffixes "imply the speaker has just realized that he was mistaken or that he was hitherto unaware of what he is asserting." Vokurková (2008) gives a similar definition: "the speaker only now gets to know something and that the reality is different from what he previously thought. The sentence is obligatorily introduced by the interjection *alas* (*ālä'*) 'oh' " (Brackets are mine). I analyze these suffixes as evidential because they imply the speaker refers to his consciousness at the novel realization stage after he made an inference triggered by a logical process or someone else's speech. This stage of awareness leads the speaker to realize his mistakes. Like self-awareness (for the egophoric), novel realization (for the self-corrective) is one of several evidential accesses to information. The self-corrective seems to be used only with non-SAPs.

[18] Tournadre (2003: 378) analyzed the mnemic as a proper category, but did not included it in the evidential system. I propose the analysis of the mnemic as an evidential in Oisel (2013).

[19] I do not add the self-corrective into the summary Table as it seems to occur only in declarative utterances; further research is required.

(19) ཨ་ལས་ཀ་སའི་ཀ་ལག་རང་གིས་བཟོས་པ་ཡིན་པ་རེད།

āliä' khāsä: khāla' **rang-ki'** sö'-**payinpare'**
oh yesterday - GEN meal **you -ERG** make(past)-**SC.PA.**
'Oh, so it was you who cooked yesterday's meal.' (The speaker has just been told so. He thought it was someone else.) (Vokurková 2008: 98 note 97)

3 Atypical functions of evidentials

In this section I treat atypical functions of evidentials. I first describe the context in which the intentional egophoric marker is used with non-SAPs and control verbs. This case occurs when the speaker refers to personal knowledge.

Following this, I focus mainly on the different contexts in which the factual, sensorial and inferential are used with the SAP and control verbs. I indicate within brackets the author's name who had already and clearly noticed some of these atypical uses with the SAP and control verbs, when their analysis or translation, correspond to the notions I present here.

- intentionality out of focus
    - personal transfer principle (Tournadre 2003; Denwood 1999; Garrett 2001; Vokurková 2008)
    - retrospection
    - emphatic assertion
    - recognition (Tournadre 1994; Vokurková 2008)
    - novel realization (Vokurková 2008)
- lower intentionality
    - external constraint (Agha 1993; Denwood 1999; Garrett 2001; Vokurková 2008)
    - internal constraint (Tournadre 1996; Garrett 2001)

3.1 Personal knowledge

When used with non-SAPs and a control verb the egophoric conveys the speaker's personal knowledge (Tournadre 2003) about his immediate world. The egophoric essential copula *yin* may

also imply the speaker's **personal involvement**[20] (naming someone, transfer of ownership); as a result, this use is often associated with "I," but not necessarily. [21]

(20) ཁོང་ངའི་ནང་ལ་ཕེབས་ཀྱི་ཡོད།

khōng ngä: nang-la phēp-**kiyö'**
He I-GEN home-OBL come(hon.)-**EGO.IA.**
'He comes to my place (in general).' [*Habitual imperfective*] (Tournadre 1996: 223)

(21) ཁོང་གིས་ང་ལ་གཞས་བསླབ་གནང་གི་ཡོད།

khōng nga-la shä' lāpnang-**kiyö'**
He I-OBL. songs teach(hon.) -**EGO.IA.**
'She is teaching me songs (now).' [*Progressive*] (Denwood 1999: 137)[22]

(22) ངའི་བུ་དེབ་བཀླགས་ཡོད།

ngä: phu thep lō'-**yö'**
I-GEN. son book read-**EGO.PT.**
"My son has read the book." (Agha 1993: 99)[23]

(23) ལྷ་མ་ངའི་ནང་ལ་བསྡད་ཡོད།

lhāma ngä: nang-la tä-**yö'**
Lhama I-GEN. home-OBL. stay-**EGO.PT.**
'Lhama has stayed/is/has been staying in my place.' (Tournadre 1996: 245)

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[20] Garrett (2001: 141) shows that "no first-person argument is necessary for the Tibetan performatives to be felicitous".

a) ཁྱེད་རང་གི་མིང་རྡོ་རྗེ་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་ཡིན།

khyērang-ki ming-la torce nāmkyä: **yin**
you-GEN. name Dorje Namgyal **be(ego.)**
'Your name is Dorje Namgyal.' (I'm naming you.) [Lama speaking]

b) མོ་ཏ་འདི་ཁྱེད་རང་ལ་ཡིན།

motra ti khyērang-la **yin**
car this you-OBL. **be(ego.)**
'This car is for you.' (I'm giving it to you) [Transfer of ownership].

Tournadre (2003: 110) offers an example similar to the last one of Garrett:
c) འདི་ཁྱེད་རང་གི་གསོལ་ཇ་ཡིན།

ti khyērang-ki sō:ca **yin**
this you-GEN. tea(hon.) **be(ego.)**
'This is your tea.' (The tea I made for you or I intend you should drink)

[21] See also the broader and more inclusive notion of *immediate knowledge* in Garrett (2001) or *immediate reflexive knowledge* in (Kalsang et al., 2013). For a discussion on *groundless knowledge* versus *immediate knowledge*, see Garrett (2001: 201-205), and for a discussion on *self-knowledge* versus *other-knowledge*, both included in the broader notion of immediate knowledge, see also Garrett (2001: 206).

[22] See also Garrett for the same kind of aspectual distinction (2001: 188-189 ex.102-103).

[23] Agha uses the term *speaker-association* (as well as *personal perspective* for other examples).

Denwood (1999: 137) analyzes example (21) as **self-centred viewpoint** according to his chart (Denwood 1999: 151). As far, I understand, *self-centred viewpoint* (*yö'* with the first person, the SAP) corresponds to the speaker's point of view of his own action and the *other-centred viewpoint* (*tu'* with the second/third person) indicates the speaker's point of view on someone else's action. Therefore, in this example, the self-centred viewpoint terminology (*yö'*) seems to be problematic **with non-SAPs**. The type of knowledge criterion, personal knowledge, is thus more appropriate here for analyzing this example.

Contrary to the intentional egophoric (perfect *-yö',* imperfective *-kiyö'*), the epistemic egophorics, *-payö'*[24] *-āyö'* and *-ki āyö'*[25], usually occur with non-SAPs (Vokurková 2008: 196, 211, 218).

(24) སང་ཉིན་བཀྲ་ཤིས་ཀྱིས་ཚེ་རིང་ལ་རོགས་པ་བྱེད་པ་ཡོད།

sāngnyin **trāshi'-ki'** tshēring-la r<u>o</u>kpa ch<u>e</u>'-**payö'**
tomorrow **Tashi-ERG** Tshering-OBL. help VBR.(pres.)-**EPI.EGO.FUT.**
'As far as I know, tomorrow Tashi will certainly help Tshering.' (The speaker is privy to certain information, e.g. he talked with someone before) (Agha 1993: 226)

(25) ཁོང་ནང་ལ་བཞུགས་འདུག་གས། ཕལ་ཆེར་གཞུགས་ཡ་ཡོད།

khōng n<u>a</u>ng-la sh<u>u</u>'-tu'-kä' phā:ce: sh<u>u</u>'-**āyö'**
he home-OBL stay(hon.)-SEN.PT.-QT. probably stay(hon.)**-EPI.EGO.PT.**
'Is he at home? I doubt it.' (The speaker bases himself on his personal knowledge of that person's habits.) [Perfect, *with a present reading*] (Vokurková 2008: 212 ex.344b)

(26) དེང་སང་ཁོང་བཞུགས་ཀྱི་ཨ་ཡོད།

th<u>e</u>ngsang **khōng** sh<u>u</u>'-**ki.āyö'**
recently **he** stay(hon.)-**EPI.EGO.IA.**
'I doubt he is at home these days.' (lit.: I doubt he stays at home these days.) [Imperfective] (Vokurková 2008: 214 ex.349)

Agha (1993: 226) analyzes example (24) as a personal perspective (*payö'*) versus impersonal perspective (*patu'*), i.e. there is (no) speaker-involvement serving as the evidentiary warrant for this epistemic judgment. One must be circumspect with Agha's notion of involvement. The speaker, here, does not commit himself regarding the validity or certainty of the event or the reliability of the source of information or his responsibility. He predicts an event, which he knows, is not sure to occur. Thus, he commits himself regarding the type of knowledge he shares with the addressee, hence the notion personal knowledge instead of *personal perspective.* I changed Agha's translation. I instead used Vokurková's terminology. Notice that Agha analyses the epistemic *-payö'* as a future, but it can also indicate a "past" (perfective) (Vokurková 2008: 164, 193), contrary to *-patu'* (Vokurková 2008: 177). It is combined with the present stem for the future reading and with the past stem for the past reading (Vokurková 2008: 193).

[24] It also has a *boulic/desiderative meaning*, 'I hope I did' (Vokurková 2008: 160) like *-āyong* 'I wish he did not/I did' (Vokurková 2008: 218-219)

[25] Denwood (1999: 151, 164) spells them *-e.yod* and *-kyi-e.yod.*

As seen above, imperfective *-kiyö'* and perfect *-yö'* can be used with non-SAPs and control verbs, and epistemic egophorics *-payö', -ki āyö'* and *-āyö'* are even preferable.[26] But, the egophoric future *-kiyin* and perfective *-payin* cannot be used with non-SAPs and control verbs as "the speaker cannot *directly* [*immediately*] know anybody else's intentions, which is why non-first-person subjects [non-SAP] are prohibited" (Garrett 2001: 150, emphasis mine). Garrett sees here a distinction between "weak ego" for those constructions that permit non-SAPs and "strong ego" for those that preclude them (2001: 178-205). Tournadre (2008: 296, note 38) reformulates Garrett's terminology as "narrow scope egophoric" versus "wide scope egophoric." I prefer to refer to "personal knowledge scope," rather than "egophoric scope" since self-awareness and intentionality are not involved.

What triggers this opposition between narrow versus wide scope personal knowledge is the "aspectual factors block certain possibilities in some constructions" (Garrett 2001: 105). As he says (Garrett 2001: 165) the *first person knowledge is immediate* i.e. the personal knowledge of the speaker is calculated according to his perspective (immediate environment). There is a link between the immediacy of the knowledge and the speaker's temporal perspective.

To describe aspect, one must refer to a perspective, namely the speaker's (Tournadre 2004: 28); a perspective implies a temporal landmark (T). There is also an aspectual landmark (R), which corresponds roughly to the event/state the speaker talks about. Among the several aspects, some are calculated according to a landmark and others are not. The perfect implies an aspectual landmark *R.* which is related to the speaker's perspective at *T* (i.e. the result of a past action exists in the present). The present imperfective implies an aspectual landmark *R,* which fuses with the speaker's perspective at *T* (i.e. the event is still in progress); one can thus use the egophoric perfect or imperfective with non-SAPs. As the perfective refers to a "far past" *R* (i.e. the past landmark is disconnected from the speaker's perspective), and the future refers to *irreal* R (i.e. the future landmark does not exist yet in the mind of the speaker), one cannot use the egophoric perfective or future with non-SAPs. In other words, the egophoric perfective and future are prohibited with non-SAPs because non-SAPs's action is not accessible in the immediate personal environment of the speaker. Instead, a perfect and (present) imperfective event can be evaluated as personal knowledge as non-SAPs's action is accessible in the immediate personal environment of the speaker. One may ask why the epistemic egophoric *–payö'* implies the notion of personal knowledge when it is used with a future reading, whereas the intentional future egophoric *-kiyin* does not. The reason is the epistemic egophoric *-payö'* implies a present inference of a near future action (Vokurková 2008: 192). It implies an aspectual landmark *R.* which is related to the speaker's perspective at *T.* Thus, the near future is a mirror image of the perfect, whereas in the perfect one draws an inference about the past based on present evidence, for the near future one draws an inference about the future based on present evidence.

The following examples (Garrett 2001: 163) show that the egophoric future *-kiyin* and perfective *-payin* can be used with the SAP, but not with non-SAPs, and control verbs.[27]

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[26] The epistemic egophoric *-āyong* is in general used with the SAP instead of *-ki āyö'* (Vokurková 2008: 220).

[27] Contrary to Lhasa Tibetan, in Dege Tibetan (I use here my terminology.), the egophoric future *-le*□*:* (*-le.yin* in Written Tibetan) and perfective *-z*□*:yin* (*-zin.yin*) can be used with non-SAPs (Häsler 2001 : 14-15 ex. 34-35). According to Häsler (2001: 14-15), "the ultimate cause of the action, the INITIAL ACT OF VOLITION lies with the speaker. It is the speaker who will cause the other person to do the action", I thus interpret these uses as a case of a **personal involvement** of the speaker (i.e. a performative), and not as a personal knowledge. Therefore, there is no personal knowledge scope here preventing the use of the egophoric future and perfective.

(27) སང་ཉིན་ ང་/ *ཁོང་ ཁྱེད་རང་གི་ནང་ལ་ཡོང་གི་ཡིན།

sāngnyin **nga/** ***khōng*** khyērang-ki nang-la yong-**kiyin**
tomorrow **I/** ***he*** you-GEN. house-OBL. come-**EGO.FUT.**
'Tomorrow I'll come to your house./ *He'll come to your house.' [Intentionality]

(28) ཁ་ས་ ང་/ *ཁོང་ ཁོང་གི་/ *ཁྱེད་རང་གི་ ནང་ལ་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན།

khāsa **nga/** ***khōng*** khōng-ki/ *khyērang-ki* nang-la chin-**payin**
yesterday **I/** ***he*** he-GEN./ *you-GEN.* house-OBL. go(past)-**EGO.PA.**
'Yesterday I went to his house.'/*He'll come to your house.' [Intentionality]

Despite the observation that the narrow scope personal knowledge does not allow the use of the SAP and control verbs due to an aspectual restriction, the epistemic scope may allow it with the epistemic egophoric perfective *–pa āyin*. As Vokurková (2008: 166 ex. 220) notices, the first example with *–āyö'* has no epistemic scope, the second one with *-pa āyin* is ungrammatical, and the third one with the latter is grammatical because it highlights the adverbial of time/place (i.e. difference in epistemic scope). [28]

(29) ཁོང་སྒྲིབས་ཨ་ཡོད།

khōng lēp-**āyö'**
he arrive-**EPI.EGO.PT.**
'I doubt she has (already) arrived.' (She went to Ngari. It is very far.
The speaker bases himself on personal knowledge.)

(30) * ཁོང་སྒྲིབས་པ་ཨ་ཡིན།

khōng** lēp-**pa āyin
he arrive-**EPI.EGO.PA.**
Intended: 'I doubt she arrived.'

(31) ཁོང་ /ཁ་ས་/ལྷ་ས་ སྒྲིབས་པ་ཨ་ཡིན།

khōng *khāsa/ lhāsa:* lēp-**pa āyin**
he yesterday / Lhasa-OBL arrive-**EPI.EGO.PA.**
'I doubt it is yesterday/in Lhasa that she arrived.' (i.e. She arrived but probably not yesterday/not in Lhasa).

In the last example, the personal knowledge scope is neutralized by the epistemic scope with the perfective. In other words, the speaker may question and assess some parts of an event, which is not immediate from his temporal perspective, but not the event itself.

[28] See also Vokurková (2008: 214 ex.351, 215 ex.352, 216 ex.354b, 221 ex.368)

3.2 Intentionality out of focus

The notion of intentionality out of focus (Oisel 2006 and Tournadre 2008) involves two possible foci (i.e. mental spaces) where the speaker's attention may rest. The first is the intentionality of the speaker's act, when it is in focus the speaker uses an egophoric with the SAP and a controllable verb as in §2.1. The second possible focus is **the performance of the action or its result**. In the latter case, the speaker does not focus his attention on the intention of his act, hence the term of "intentionality out of focus."[29] However, cases of "intentionality of focus" do not require that the speaker acts unintentionally: in this usage there is no "first person effects" (Aikhenvald, 2004: 219-237) implying lack of control, volition, intention or awareness here. I prefer to keep this notion for my description of lower-intentionality; see §3.3.

A few authors have noticed "intentionality out of focus" previously. In his discussion of the sensorial with the SAP, Denwood remarks that it "is sometimes claimed by Tibetans that *–song* indicates the end part of the action was witnessed, but not necessarily the beginning" (1999: 144). In her treatment of Ladakhi Zeisler (2012) also uses a similar terminology. The author describes the atypical functions of *directly observed* auxiliaries (set II): "Conversely, the SAP may use set II auxiliaries with [+control] verbs to defocus from his or her intentions and to focus on some outer conditions or to indicate his or her lack of genuine intentionality." As for the lack of genuine intentionality, it refers to the deontic modality (§3.3.1).

In such a context, the speaker can also use the factual and the inferential as well as the sensorial with the SAP and control verbs.

Intentionality out of focus includes five sub-categories:

- personal transfer principle (with the factual and the sensorial)
- retrospection (with the sensorial)
- emphatic assertion (with the factual)
- recognition (with the epistemic inferential and the sensorial perfect)
- novel realization (with the epistemic inferential and the sensorial perfect)

3.2.1 Personal transfer principle

The speaker uses the personal transfer principle[30] when he **presents himself as doing something from an outsider's perspective** i.e. the speaker transfers his point of view and sees an image of himself at a different time or space. Potential contexts include a movie depicting oneself, looking at a picture, a dream, an imaginary situation involving oneself, narratives of one's previous lives, a prediction or prophecy. Denwood (1999: 136, 150) and Tournadre (2003: 196) mention the first and third of these contexts. The context of looking at the mirror (Tournadre 2003: 196) is not in my data,

[29] Similarly, see *the cognitive model structure of event structure* of DeLancey (1990) – *Act of Volition* > *Act* > *Event* > *Resultant State* – and the notion of *mental spaces* in Faucaunier (1985). I substituted the notion of *volition* (see also Tournadre 1994, 1996, 2001) by the notion of *intention* like Tournadre (2003, 2008) did for auxiliary verb constructions (or suffixes) in order to avoid any confusion with *volitional* lexical verbs. The latter is synonymous of *control verbs* in this paper.

[30] "Mental Transfer" in Vandeloise (1984, 196), Langacker (1987:131) and Kwon (2003)

but it is surely possible. Vokurková (2008: 190) notes the prediction and prophecy contexts with the sensorial future.

In Lhasa Tibetan, the personal transfer principle is indicated by the factual or the sensorial, which does not imply the speaker's intention, and control verbs.[31]

- *Movie context*

(32) རང་ར་བྱེད་ཀི་རེད། རྩོག་ཙམ་སྒུག་ས་ཨ། ངའི་མདའ་ཐེངས་གཅིག་རྒྱག་གི་རེད།

rang khare che'-kire'
You what do.(pres.)-FAC.IA.
tēts ku'-a **nga** menta thēng' cīk kya'-**kire'**
a little wait(imp.)-IMP. **I** gun times one VBR.(pres.)-**FAC.IA.**
'What are you going to do (in the next scene)? Wait a minute! I am going to fire once.'

(33) མདངས་དགོང་བརླན་འཕྲིན་ནང་ངས་རྩེས་གར་འབྲལས་སོང་།

tangkong nyäntrin nang-la **ngä'** tö'ka: thrāp-**song**
yesterday night television on-OBL **I-ERG.** drama perform-**SEN.PA.**
'Yesterday night, I was in a drama show on TV.'

- *Picture context*

(34) དཔར་གི་ནང་ལ་ང་རྒྱལ་རྒྱག་གི་ཡོད་རེད།

pār-ki nang-la **nga** kyā: kya'-**kiyo:re'**
picture-GEN in-OBL **I** swimming VBR.(pres.)-**FAC.IA.**
'In this picture, I was swimming'

(35) དཔར་འདི་ནང་ལ་ང་ཞྭ་མོ་འདི་གོན་གི་འདུག ང་ཡ་མཚན།

pār ti nang-la **nga** shamo ti kön-**kitu'** nga yamtsän
picture this in-OBL **I** hat this wear-**SEN.IA.** I be amazed
'I am wearing/I was wearing this hat in this picture. It's amazing!'

- *Dream context*

(36) གཉིད་ལམ་གི་ནང་ལ་ངས་ཐ་མག་འཐེན་སོང་།

nyīlam-ki nang-la **ngä'** thāma' thēn-**song**
dream-GEN in-OBL **I-ERG** tobacco VBR-**SEN.PA.**
'I smoked/have smoked a cigarette in my dream.'

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[31] This type of transfer is "partial" as it is not indicated by personal pronouns (See the section *Internal constraint* > *no awareness*, for the use of the complete transfer in Tibetan), whereas in English and in French it is a "complete transfer" as it is applied to second ("**Tu** travailles toute la journée et **tu** te fais blâmer en plus !", in a speaker's discussion of his own day, cf. Kwon 2003) or third pronouns ("**The person** uttering this sentence is quite intelligent." [The speaker is congratulating himself], "Don't lie to **your mother**!" [The mother is talking to her child], see Langacker 1987: 131) with their respective verb form referring to the speaker

(37) གཉིད་ལམ་གྱི་ནང་ལ་ང་སྣད་ཆ་མང་པོ་བཤད་གིས།

nyīlam-ki nang-la **ngä** kā'ca mangpo shā'-**ki'**
dream-GEN in-OBL **I** conversation a lot talk-**SEN.IA.**.
'I was talking a lot in my dream.'

- *Imaginary context*

(38) དཔེར་ན་ཆ་བཤག་ན་ངས་ཁ་ལག་བཟོས་པ་རེད་དེ།

pē:na chāsha'na **ngä'** khāla' sö'-**pare'**-ta
For example **I-ERG**. meal perpare(past)-**FAC.PA.**-QT.
'For example, let's say I cooked!'

- *Previous life context*

(39) ངཚེ་སྔན་མ་ས་ཆ་འདིར་ཡོང་པ་རེད།

ngä tshē ngānma sāca tī: yong-**pare'**
I life before place here come-**FAC.PA.**
'I came here in (my) previous life.'

(40) ཚེ་སྔན་མ་ས་ཆ་འདིར་ངས་སྒོམ་མང་པོ་བརྒྱབ་སོང་།

tshē ngānma sāca tī: **ngä'** kom mangpo kyap-**song**
life previous place here **I-ERG** meditation a lot VBR(past)-**SEN.PA.**
'I meditated/have meditated a lot in this place in my previous life.'

- *Predictions or prophecy context*

(41) ངདགེ་རྒན་བྱེད་པ།

ngä kekän che'-**pa**
I teacher do(pres.)-**EPI.SEN.FUT.**
'certainly become a teacher.' (The speaker predicts his future.) (Vokurková 2008: 190 ex.289b)

(42) ངར་བཟི་པ།

ngä rasi-**pa**
I be drunk-**EPI.SEN.FUT.**
'I will certainly get drunk.' (The speaker is drinking too much *chang*.) (Vokurková 2008: 190 ex.289a)

In all the examples above, the intentional egophoric would have been inappropriate because the speaker's intention is not involved in these contexts; the speaker instead focuses on the performance of his action.

3.2.2 Retrospection

In retrospection, the speaker **looks back** on **his own actions**, particularly with *a feeling of pride or regret*. This function only works with the sensorial perfective *-song*, the SAP and control verbs.

In all these situations, the speaker focuses his attention on the performance of his action, but he does not stress his former intention or his lack of intention hence the use of a sensorial with the SAP and control verbs. The egophoric perfective *-payin* or perfect *-yö'* could have been used, but in that case, the speaker would have focused on his intention rather than his performance.

- *Following intentional actions*

In the example below, the woman looks back on her action. She bought pants, which she is really proud of.

(43) དང་ཁོས་ཐུང་དངོས་གནས་ཉོས་སོང་།

ta **ngä'** khötung ngõnä' nyö'-**song**
now **I-ERG** pants really buy(past)-**SEN.PA.**
'I have (finally) bought (these) pants.' (Feelings of pride)

Tournadre (1996: 197) presents another type of example with the question tag *–nga*. The speaker looks back on his own action and he calls the listener to confirm the fact in question as if he had witnessed it. This is supporting the rule of anticipation (Tournadre and Dorje 2003: 111) or the cognitive notion of empathy (Tournadre 2008: 300). The listener might participate and confirm, *chin-song, chin-song* 'You DID!', to please the speaker who needs 'face'.

(44) ང་ལྷ་སར་ཕྱིན་སོང་ང་།

nga lhāsa: chin-**song**-nga
I Lhasa-OBL go(past)-**SEN.PA.**.-QT.
'I went to Lhasa, didn't I?' or 'I have been to Lhasa [Lit.: I have gone], haven't I?'

In the next example, the speaker made a promise to quit smoking. But, in the end, he cannot keep his promise. He thus looks back on his action with a feeling of regret.

(45) ཨ་ཁ། ངཿཐམཁ་འདོད་གིས། ཡིན་ནའི་ལས་དམ་བཅའ་བཞག་སོང་། དཔེ་བསཁགས་སོང་། སྐྱོལ་མ་ལཁགས། ངཿཐམཁ་ཉོ་གར་ཕྱིན་ན་འགྲིག་གི་རེད་པས། འགྲིག་གི་མ་རེད། ཁའི་ས་ཁྱེད་རང་གིས་ངར་དམ་བཅའ་བཞག་པ་རེད།

ngä' tamca sha'-**song** pē sā'-song
I-ERG promise VBR-**SEN.PA.** example accumulate-SEN.PA.
- 'Oh! I want to smoke. But, I made a promise. Oh! I set an example (*in a sarcastic sense*) Drolma! Is it okay if I am going to buy cigarettes?'
- 'No! You made me a promise yesterday.'

Denwood provides a further example, which I see as a case of regret. He remarks that with "negative polarity, this type of clause can convey the idea that perhaps the act should have happened" (1999: 144). Examples (43-45) show that this use is not restricted to negative polarity as Denwood thought.

(46) ང་ཚོས་སྒོ་རྒྱབ་མ་སོང་།

ng<u>a</u>-tshö' k<u>o</u> ky<u>a</u>p-**ma-song**
I-PL. door VBR.(past)-**NEG.SEN.PA.**
"We didn't close the door (Perhaps we ought to have done)'

- *Following lower-level of consciousness (automatic processing like habit)*

Denwood (1999: 137, 143) gives the following example. By habit, the speaker read the letter (probably loudly) whereas he should not have.

(47) ངས་ཡི་གེ་ཀློག་སོང་།

ng<u>ä</u>' y<u>i</u>ke lō'-**song**
I-ERG. letter read-**SEN.PA.**
'I read the letter (without meaning to).'

In examples (46) and (47), Denwood (1999: 142) analyzes *song* as a non-evidential and *other viewpoint*, which is problematic as the speaker gives his point of view on **the performance of his own action** (*self-centred viewpoint*) and not of someone else's action (*other-centred viewpoint*).

In the next example (Bailey and Walker 2004), the speaker realizes his behavior was not appropriate. The use of an egophoric would also be odd here as the speaker says 'never mind'.

(48) ད་རེས་ (ངས་) ཁྱེད་རང་ལ་སྐུ་ལས་བཟོས་སོང་། དགོངས་འགལ་མེད་པ་ཅིག

t<u>a</u>re' (**ng<u>ä</u>'**) khyērang-la kūlä' s<u>ö</u>'-**song**
this time (**I-ERG.**) you-OBL. difficulties(hon.) VBR.(past)- **SEN.PA.**
'I bothered you today. Never mind!'

- *Following an altered state of consciousness (fatigue)*

In the following example, the woman speaking stresses her lack of attention, notably with the word *atsi* 'oh!'. She looks back on what she did with a feeling regret.

(49) ཨ་ཙི། ང་དཔེ་བསགས་སོང་། ངས་རྒྱུ་ཆ་ཚང་མ་བླུགས་སོང་།

ātsi *ng<u>a</u>* pē sā'-*song* **ng<u>ä</u>'** ky<u>u</u>ca tshāngma lū'-**song**
why! *I* example accumulate-***SEN.PA.*** **I-ERG.** ingredients all pour-**SEN.PA.**
'Why! I am so useless (lit.: I set an example). I have poured all the ingredients.'

DeLancey (1985, 1997, 2001) discusses a number of similar examples which he describes as unintentional events. I analyze them as retrospection occurring after an altered stage of consciousness rather than a case of non-intentionality. In the first example, the verb *cā'* 'to break (intentionally)' is combined with the sensorial perfective *-song*. Complete lack of intentionality would require another construction, namely a non-control verb *chā'* 'to get broken' and the sensorial perfect *-sha'*.

(50) ངས་དཀར་ཡོལ་བཅག་སོང་།

ngä' kāryö: cā'-**song**
I-ERG cup break intentionally-**SEN.PA.**
'I broke up the cup (accidentally).' (DeLancey 1985: 66 ex.8; 1990: 300, 308)

(51) ངས་ཇ་བོས་སོང་།

ngä' cha phö:-**song**
I-ERG tea spill-**SEN.PA.**
'I spilled tea (inadvertently).' (DeLancey 1997: 45 ex.37)

(52) ངས་ཁོ་དབྱིལ་སོང་།

ngä' khō tril-**song**
I-ERG he knock down-**SEN.PA.**
'I knocked him down (unintentionally).' (DeLancey 2001: 372 ex.5b)

I suspect the last two examples as a case of retrospection on an event caused by inadvertence, but as the context is missing in all of DeLancey's examples, it is hard to say.

3.2.3 Emphatic assertion

Emphatic assertion occurs when the speaker insists on the performance of his action in presenting it as a specific or well-known fact, hence the use of the factual.

In the following example, a monk living in Lhasa talks about his trip to Dharamsala in India where the Tibetan government in exile is based, despite it being forbidden for Tibetans in China to go there. In this example the speaker in making a **provocative statement** to his addressee and to focus on the dangerousness of his act.

(53) ལོ་༡༩༩༨་ང་ཏ་རམ་ས་ལ་ལ་ཕྱིན་པ་རེད།

lo 1998 **nga** daramsala-la chin-**pare'**
year 1998 **I** Dharamsala-OBL go(past)-**FAC.PA.**
'I went to Dharamsala in 1998.'

The example above contrasts with the next one, in which the speaker tells his addressees, whom had not seen him for a while, what he has been up to. In this case the egophoric is used.

(54) ང་ལྷ་ས་ལ་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན།

nga lhāsa-la chin-**payin**
I Lhasa-OBL go(past)-**EGO.PA.**
'I went to Lhasa.'

In the next example[32], the speaker insists on the fact he did not get married to the girl in question even if people cannot believe it.

(55) རེད། ང་གཉིས་ཆང་ས་བརྒྱབ་ཡོད་མ་རེད།

re̲' **ngan̲yi'** chāngsa kyan̲-**yo:mare'**
be(fac.) **we two** marriage VBR.(past)-**NEG.FAC.PT.**
'Correct! We aren't married.'

If someone had not asked him to confirm it, he would have used the egophoric and said the following:

(56) ང་གཉིས་ཆང་ས་བརྒྱབ་མེད།

ngan̲yi' chāngsa kyan̲-**me'**
we two marriage VBR.(past)-**NEG.EGO.PT.**
'We aren't married (unfortunately).'

Agha touches upon emphatic assertion in his discussion of the copula *re'*, writing that "the speaker speaks impersonally about himself … To speak this way is to speak of the self impersonally, detachedly, as if to say 'that is simply the way things are'." (1993:175)[33]

Referring to Agha's example *nga̲ lōptrawa re̲'* 'I'm a student.' (1993:174), Garrett remarks that factual verbs "can also be used to make neutral or objective statements of fact about oneself" (2001: 43). The two authors' comments about the copula *re'* support my analysis of the factual, *-pare'* and *–yo:mare'*, although I would rather analyze Agha's example as an emphatic assertion rather than a neutral statement. To answer Garrett's question (2001: 44, note 8) regarding his notion of *impersonalization*, what triggers the use of the factual with the SAP is the speaker insisting on the performance of his action in presenting it as a specific or well-known fact.

3.2.4 Recognition

Recognition is the final stage of the memory. As described previously, memory is a proper evidential access and category. Recognition may occur with various evidentials (epistemic inferential perfect and sensorial perfect) all implying an inference and several degrees of epistemic modality, which is not marked by the mnemic (*yöpayö'*, etc.). These evidentials are used with the SAP and (non-) control verbs.

Regarding the use of the epistemic inferential *–yösare'*, Vokurková says the "sentences with the first person subject [the SAP] often imply that the speaker does not remember the action well" (2008: 269), i.e. it conveys a lower probability or possibility.

In the examples below, the speaker remembers what he probably did after having drawn an inference based on a logical process V-*yökire'*, V-*payinkire'* (epistemic logical inferential) or a visual observation V-*patra*, V-*yösare'*, V-*kiyösare'* (epistemic sensory inferential).

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[32] in DALLITH website, Video 08 'Dadron and Purdron'

[33] See also the notion of *emotional distance* with the use of *re̲'*, in Chang and Chang (1984) and Garrett (2001: 188).

(57) ང་ས་ཆ་འདིར་སྡིབས་ཡོད་ཀྱི་རེད།

ng<u>a</u> sāca t<u>i</u>: lēp-**yökire'**
I place here come-**EPI.LOG.-INF.PT.**
'I guess I probably came to this place.' (The speaker doesn't remember the place but he travelled in this region.) (Vokurková 2008: 226 ex.381)

(58) ང་ཆུ་ཚོད་གཉིས་པ་ཙམ་ལ་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་ཀྱི་རེད།

ng<u>a</u> chūtsö' nyīpa tsām-la l<u>o</u>**'-payinkire'**
I o'clock second about-OBL. return- **EPI.LOG.-INF.PA.**
'It is probably around two o'clock that I came back.' (The speaker went to a party last night. Somebody is asking him whether he came home at two. But he doesn't remember exactly.) (Vokurková 2008: 227 ex.383)

(59) ང་ས་ཆ་འདིར་སྡིབས་པ་འདུ།

ng<u>a</u> sāca t<u>i</u>: lēp-**patra**
I place here come-**EPI.SEN.-INF.PA.**
'It seems I have come to this place (before).' (The place looks familiar to the speaker.) (Vokurková 2008: 244 ex.425)

(60) ལྟོས་ཨ། ང་བོད་ཟས་འདི་ཟ་སྐྱོང་ཡོད་སར་རེད།

tō̆−ā **nga** phō̆sä' t<u>i</u> s<u>a</u> nyōng-**yösare'**
look(imp.)-IMP. **I** Tibetan meal this eat(pres.) SV.**-EPI.-SEN.-INF.-PT.**
'Look! I probably have eaten this Tibetan meal.' (It looks familiar to the speaker.) (Vokurková 2008: 271 ex.492a)

(61) ང་ར་བཟི་དུས་ཞབས་བྱོ་བརྒྱབ་ཀྱི་ཡོད་སར་རེད།

ng<u>a</u> r<u>a</u>si-tü sh<u>a</u>ptro ky<u>a</u>p-**kiyösare'**
I be drunk-when dance VBR.(past)-**EPI.-SEN.-INF.-IA.**
'I probably dance when I am drunk.' (The speaker does not know what he does when he is drunk. However, he has some hints, e.g. his feet and body hurting the following day.) (Vokurková 2008: 272 ex.496)

Vokurková (2008: 171 ex.234) gives another example with the epistemic factual perfect – *yöntro:* in which the memory of the speaker is triggered by no specific access (hence the use of the factual), but this construction implies a lower probability than do those provided immediately above.

(62) གཟའ་ལྷག་བར་ངས་བརྙན་འཕྲིན་བལྟས་ཡོད་འབྱོད།

s<u>a</u>tawa: **ng<u>ä</u>'** nyäntrin tä̆'-**yöntro:**
Monday –OBL. **I-ERG** television look(past)-**EPI.-FAC.PT.**
'I do not think I watched TV last Monday.' (The speaker does not remember if it was Monday or some other day when he watched TV.)

Tournadre (1994: 71) notes the use of the sensorial perfect *-sha'* (also implying an inference value) in the same kind of situation. The memory of the speaker is here triggered by someone else's speech. Contrary to the previous examples, this construction conveys certainty.

(63) འོ། ངའ་གིར་ཕྱིན་བཞག

o **nga** phāki: chin-**sha'**
right **I** over there go(past)-**SEN.PT**.
That's right! I have been there. [Agreement]

In the next example,[34] the speaker recognizes that it is his hand-writing on the paper. Based on his own observation, he thus infers that he wrote it.

(64) ཡིག་འདི་ངས་བྲིས་བཞག

yike ti **ngä'** thri'-**sha'**
letter this **I-ERG** write-**SEN.PT.**
'**I** wrote this letter.' [Surprise]

In this context, the use of the intentional egophoric would have been odd and would have indicated the speaker wrote the letter on purpose.

3.2.5 Novel realization

Novel realization suggests the speaker **has just realized** that he was mistaken, he did not pay attention (altered stage of consciousness), he did not know (no awareness) or he was sleeping (subconscious awareness). His awareness occurs after having drawn an inference triggered by a direct observation (visual, touch, etc,), a feeling or reported speech.

- *After being mistaken*

As seen previously (§2.6), the self-corrective (*yöpare'*, etc.) communicates awareness as the access to information. The use of a negative form of an epistemic inferential (*mepatra*, etc.) with the SAP may also convey the same notion. Nonetheless, there is a subtle difference between the use of a self-corrective and epistemic inferential. The first implies a novel realization triggered by a logical process in the speaker's mind or someone's speech, whereas the second implies novel realization based on feeling (endopathic access). Vokurková (2008: 166 ex.221) gives the following examples which show an epistemic scope difference. This usage appears restricted to non-control verbs.

(65) ངར་ཆམ་པ་བརྒྱབ་མེད་པ་འདུ།

nga: chāmpa kyap-**mepatra**
I-OBL cold VBR.(past)-**EPI.-SEN.-INF.-PT.**
'I don't seem to have caught a cold.' (The speaker thought he had but it seems he is all right.)

[34] Communication of Nicolas Tournadre

(66) ངར་ཆམ་པ་བརྒྱབ་པ་མིན་པ་འདུ།

nga: chāmpa kya̲p-**pamänpatra**
I-OBL cold VBR.(past).-**EPI.-SEN.-INF.-PA.**
'It does not seem to be a cold I have caught.' (The speaker thinks he has some other illness. He bases his statement on a direct observation.)

- *Following an altered stage of consciousness*

Novel realizations also occur with the sensory inferential perfect *–sha'*, the SAP and controllable-verbs. In the following example, the speaker has just realized he did something without paying attention. He draws an inference triggered by touching his backside and noticing it is wet.

(67) རྐུབ་ཀྱི་རློན་པ་རེད་བཞག ཨ་ལའི། ངརྐུབ་ཀྱི་འདིར་བསྡད་བཞག

kūpkya' lõ̲npa re̲sha' ālä: **nga̲** kūpkya' ti̲: tä̲-**sha'**
chair wet be.(sen.) oh **I** chair this-OBL stay-**SEN.PT.**
'Why! The chair is wet! Oh! I have sat/I sat on this chair.'

In the next example, the speaker had an appointment with his friend. As the latter was late, the speaker waited. As soon as his friend arrived, the speaker realized the exact amount of time he had waited. He inferred that by looking at his watch. One may guess that the speaker pretends to have just realized it as he might have looked at it several times while getting impatient.

(68) ཨ་བཀ དམ་སྐར་མ་སུམ་བཅུ་བསྒུགས་བཞག

āka **ngä̲'** kārma sūmcu ku̲'-**sha'**
oh **I-ERG**. minutes thirty wait-**SEN.PT.**
'Oh! I have waited thirty minutes.'

- *Following subconscious awareness*

Novel realizations also occur after a speaker has performed an action **while sleeping:** thus was not aware of it until he awoke. He just realized and saw the result of his subconscious act (inference based on visual access).

(69) མདངས་དགོང་གཉིད་ལམ་ནང་ལ་དམ་གོས་ཐུང་ཕྱིད་བཞག

ta̲ngkong nyīlam na̲ng-la **ngä̲'** khö̲tung phī-**sha'**
last night dream in-OBL **I-ERG** pants take off-**SEN.PT.**
'Why! I have taken off my pants in my sleep (Lit.: in my dream) last night.' (The speaker is looking at his pants close to the bed.)

- *After no awareness*

Novel realization may also occur after the speaker was not aware at all of eating meat, having wanted to respect his vegetarian diet. If the speaker had used the egophoric perfect *-yö'* or perfective *-payin* instead of sensorial perfect *-sha'*, this would have meant he ate meat with full self-awareness.

(70) ངས་ཤ་བཟས་བཞག

ngä' shā sä'-**sha'**
I-ERG meat eat(past)-**SEN.PT.**
'(Gosh!) I ate meat.'

The next example, from Tournadre (2008: 199), also shows an absence of awareness. The speaker was not conscious of having killed an insect. Then *he realized* his mistake; a devote Buddhist ought not to take life unnecessarily.

(71) ངས་འབུ་བསད་བཞག

ngä' pu sā'-**sha'**
I-ERG. insect kill-**SEN.PT.**
'Why! I've killed an insect.'

Denwood offers a similar example, but with a non-control verb *lus* 'be left behind', illustrating the absence of awareness of the speaker: "In the case of *-shag* [*sha'*] with first-person subject (the SAP), the act must *have been unconscious* at the time it took place" (1999: 160) (emphasis mine).

(72) ངའི་ཉི་གདུགས་ལུས་བཞག

ngä: nyitu' lü'-**sha'**
I-GEN. umbrella be left- **SEN.PT.**
'I've left my umbrella behind. (I must have, as it's not here)'
It could also be translated as follows: 'My umbrella was left behind.'

According to Denwood's chart (1999: 151), the use of *-sha'* (*-tu'*), implies *other-centred viewpoint*, i.e. the speaker's point of view on someone else's action. As noticed previously, this criterion cannot be applied here.

Another case of novel realization may also take place when the speaker has not been told about his friends' plan to go out to a Tibetan cabaret. He has just figured it out based on their speech. Here, it is the modal sensorial future (inferential) *-nyänresha'* 'be willing to' which is used.

(73) ཨ་ཙི། དེ་རིང་ཡོད་པ། ང་ཚོའི་སློབ་གྲྭས་རྒྱུད་པ་དེ་ཀྱང་འགང་གཱ་ནང་མར་འགྲོ་མ་བཏ་རེད་བཞག

ātsi thering yö'-pa:
well! today be(ego.)-QT.
nga-tshö: lōptro' nyīngpa the khyäkang nangma: tro-**nyänresha'**
I-PL-GEN. school mates old that Kyekang cabaret go(pres.)-**SEN.FUT.**
'Well! All of us old school mates are going to the *nangma*[35] (lit.: our old school mates –me included-). Today, right?'

[35] In DALLITH website, Video 08 'Dadron and Purdron'

In this context, the use of the intentional egophoric would have been odd notably with an interjection like *āka, ātsi*, etc. 'Why!', insisting on the speaker's novel realization.

3.3 Lower intentionality

Lower intentionality conveys that a speaker's intention is not the main cause of the performance of his act (contrary to the egophoric) i.e. he acts under either external constraint (lack of free will) or internal constraint (altered stage of consciousness, subconscious awareness and no awareness).[36] In all cases, the speaker uses the SAP, control verbs and the following evidential markers depending on one of the two sub-functions of lower intentionality:

- factual, sensorial (inferential) in apodoses and epistemic inferential in the case of an external constraint
- factual in the case of an internal constraint

3.3.1 External constraint

This context mainly occurs with the factual as the speaker makes **a statement regarding his lack of free will** (deontic modality) **and lack of "genuine** intentionality.**"** Other evidentials like the epistemic inferentials and the sensorial may be used, but for the latter only in apodoses.

- *Lack of free will*

The deontic modality conveys that the speaker acted under an **external constraint:** necessity or obligation.

In the following example, the speaker is under a moral obligation when she uses the factual perfective *–pare'*. She cannot give up his commitment, which she made with regard to his interlocutor. If she could do so, she would have used the egophoric perfective *-payin*.

(74) ཚེ་རིང་ཁ་རེ་བྱས་སོང་། ངས་སྐར་མ་མང་པོ་བསྒུགས་པ་རེད་དྲ།

tshēring khare chä'-song **ngä'** kārma mangpo ku'-**pare'**-ta:
Tshering what do(past)-SEN.PA. **I-ERG.** minutes a lot wait-**FAC.PA.**-QT.
'Tshering![37] What happened? I waited/have been waiting for you a long time, eh?' (My girlfriend is scolding me)

In the next example, the speaker uses the factual future *-kire'* because he has no choice in this strained conversation, whereas, at first, he was not willing to cooperate in using the negation of the egophoric future in the first sentence *-kimän*. If he really wanted to stay, he would have employed the egophoric future *-kiyin* instead of the factual future *-kire'*.

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[36] I make a distinction here between unawareness and non-intentionality. The latter implies the use of non-control verbs with non-intentional evidential markers (factual, sensory, and inferential) which I do not deal with in the present paper.

[37] This is my Tibetan name "Tshering Namgyal" given by my Tibetan "godfather" after looking at the palm of my hands in 2003 in Nepal.

(75) རང་སྡོད། ང་བསྡད་གི་མིན། མི་དགོས། རང་སྡོད། ཡ་ཡ། ངས་བསྡད་ཀྱི་རེད།

rang tö' **nga** tä'-**kimän** mu-ko'
you stay(imp.) **I** stay-**NEG.EGO.IA.** NEG(pres.)-want
rang tö' yaya **ngä'** tä'-**kire'**
you stay(imp.) alright **I-ERG.** stay-**FAC.IA.**
- 'You! Stay!'
- 'I won't stay. I don't want.'
- 'Stay!' (Threatening voice)
- 'Okay! Okay! I will stay.' (Frightened voice)

Denwood (1999: 135, 138, 152) offers a similar example. He analyzed it as other-centred viewpoint, i.e. the speaker's point of view on someone else's action. I would rather analyze this example as no-centred viewpoint since the speaker has no choice (deontic modality of *re'*). In other words, the speaker will do it because it is addressee's willing and viewpoint which are implied here.

(76) སང་ཉིན་ལས་ཀ་འདི་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རེད།

sāngnyin läka ti che'-**kire'**
tomorrow work this do(pres.)-**FAC.FUT.**
'I shall be doing this work tomorrow (whether I like it or not/I have no option).'

Agha (1993: 219) also noticed the same kind of example implying the deontic modality. The author says it ascribes *a sense that the speaker's seeing the movie is contingent on* ***some external state of affairs****. [...] is considered to be the affirmation of a contingent 'involuntary-result'* (the bold is mine). The external state of affairs refers here to the speaker acting under an external constraint (somebody else's permission). However, I believe it is rather the affirmation of a contingent deontic-result and not of a contingent involuntary one.

(77) ང་སློབ་བརྙན་རྟ་གི་རེད།

nga lōknyän tā-**kire'**
I movie look(pres.)-**FAC.FUT.**
'I will watch the movie (if he gives me the opportunity).'

The example above implies a conditional protasis. As Garrett (2001: 44-46) shows; only the factual can occur in counterfactual apodoses, even with the SAP. For Tournadre this "point is very significant to understand the evidential system of Tibetan or other Tibetic languages, but it remained largely unnoticed" (2008: 302). Nonetheless, as Vokurková (2008: 181, 265) points out, an egophoric may sometimes occur in an apodosis, [38] as in the following example.

(78) ངར་དངུལ་ཡོད་ན་ཡུལ་སྐོར་ལ་འགྲོ་གི་ཡིན།

nga: ngü: yö'-na yü:kor-la tro-**kiyin**
I-OBL. money exist-if travel-OBL go(pres.)-**EGO.FUT.**

[38] See also the use of the epistemic egophoric *-āyong* in an apodosis in Vokurková (2008: 183 ex.271)

'If I have money, (I) will travel.'

In the example below, which I encountered in the wild, a pair of lovers tease each other. The man is nude. The woman is explaining to her boyfriend that she will turn on the light if he does not kiss her. The woman is joking. She does not intend to do it. However, she pretends not to have the choice hence the deontic. If she had the real intention of doing it, she would have used the egophoric –*kiyin* in the apodosis.

(79) སྐུ་སྐྱིད་སྐུ་སྐྱིད། ང་ངོ་ཚ་གྱིས། རང་ངར་འོ་མ་བརྐྱལ་ན་ངས་གློག་བཞུ་སྤར་གྱི་རེད། ཧ་ཧ།

kūci' kūci' ng<u>a</u> ng<u>o</u>tsa-ki'
please! I be ashamed-ENDO.IA.

r<u>a</u>ng ng<u>a</u>: <u>o</u> m<u>a</u>-kyǟ:-na
you I-OBL kiss NEG(past.)-deliver-if
ng<u>ä</u>' lōkshu pār-**kire'** hā hā
I-ERG light turn on-**FAC.FUT.** ha ha
The man: 'Please! Please! I'm ashamed. (Don't switch on the light!).'
The woman: 'If you don't kiss me, I will turn on the light. Ha! Ha!'

Contrary to Garrett, Vokurková (2008: 144 ex.178, 191 ex. 292) shows that the sensorial perfective -*song* and the epistemic sensorial future -*patu'* (inferential) can also occur with the SAP in apodoses. Similarly, to the factual, the sensorial also indicates a deontic meaning triggered by its use in the apodoses.

(80) ངར་དངུལ་མེད་ཙང་མ་གཏོགས་ངས་མོ་ཊ་ཉོས་ཚར་སོང་།

ng<u>a</u>: ngǖ: m<u>e</u>'-tsang m<u>a</u>-tō' **ng<u>ä</u>'** m<u>o</u>tra ny<u>ö</u>' tshār-**song**
I-OBL. money not have-because except **I-ERG.** car buy (past) SV.-**SEN.PA.**
'If I had had money, I would have already bought a car (and I *and you* would have noticed it).'[39]

The use of the sensorial -*song* above instead of the factual –*pare'* may indicate in this context that the speaker insists on the hypothetical and observable performance of his action vis-à-vis his addressee (i.e. intentionality out of focus).

(81) ང་བོད་སྐད་སློབ་སྦྱོང་བྱེད་མཁན་ཡིན་ན་བོད་ལ་ཕྱིན་པ།

ng<u>a</u> ph<u>ö</u>kä' lōpcong ch<u>e</u>'-nyänyin-na ph<u>ö</u>'-la ch<u>i</u>n-**pa**
I Tibetan language study do(pres.)-be willing to-if Tibet-OBL. go(past)-**EPI.SEN.FUT.**
'If I studied/wanted to study Tibetan, (I) would certainly go to Tibet.'[40]

[39] I add the adverb already to the translation of the author corresponding to the modal/second verb –*tshār* as well as the brackets.
[40] I add 'I wanted to study' for the translation of the modal construction V-*nyänyin* (without an egophoric value as there is not in subordinated clauses).

Here the use of the epistemic sensorial inferential *–pa(tu')* may indicate that the speaker focuses on the hypothetical and observable clues he would have, to make such an inference regarding an alternative future.

The deontic modality may occur with epistemic inferentials, the SAP and control verbs. As Vokurková notices for epistemic modality in general "sentences with the first person subject [the SAP] often imply that the action does not depend on his will" (2008: 269). In the two following examples, there is an opposition between the epistemic logical inferential versus epistemic sensory inferential.

(82) ངའོ་མཚོང་ལྷ་རྩེར་བཙའ་ཞི་ཡོད་ཞི་རེད།

ng<u>a</u> t<u>o</u>kong lhātse: t<u>ä</u>'-**kiyökire'**
I tonight Lhatse-OBL. stay-**EPI.LOG.-INF.-IA.**
'(I presume) I will most probably stay in Lhatse tonight.' (The speaker is going to the border. It depends on the road conditions and the traffic, not on his own will, where he will have got by tonight and thus where he will stay.) (Vokurková 2008: 229 ex.387)

(83) ངས་རྡོ་རྗེ་ལྷ་གར་ལ་འགྲོ་རུ་བཏུག་གི་ཡོད་པ་འདུ།

ng<u>ä</u>' t<u>o</u>rce ky<u>a</u>kar-la tr<u>o</u>-ru cū'-**kiyöpatra**
I-ERG. Dorje India-OBL. go(pres.)-REL. PERF.**–EPI.SEN.-INF.-IA.**
'It seems I will let Dorje go to India.' (The speaker bases himself on the change of the political situation that he can observe. It seems to be better than before.) (Vokurková 2008: 242 ex.420)

(84) ངའཚོགས་འདུར་ཀ་འགྲོ་ལྷ་ཡིན་པ་འདུ།

ng<u>a</u> (tshōktu:) tr<u>o</u>-**kyuyinpatra**
I (meeting-OBL.) go(pres.)-**EPI.-SEN.-INF.-FUT.**
'It seems I will have to go (to the meeting).' (The speaker knows that no one else is going but that someone definitely has to go. So he infers that he himself will have to go.) (Vokurková 2008: 170 ex.229b)

3.3.2 Internal constraint

This type of situation only occurs with the factual. The speaker makes **a statement emphasizing the fact that these events take place according to several stages of awareness and the lack, more and less high, of intentionality**. One may thus wonder why the examples given above for novel realization and some examples for retrospection and recognition, which also occur according to several stages of awareness (and degrees of lower intentionality), are not classified with the following ones. As seen previously, the main function of the sensorial with the SAP and control verbs is to indicate the speaker's retrospection process regarding the performance of his act. As for the function of inferentials, it refers to the speaker's recognition stage or his novel realization, after having drawn an inference, of the result of the performance of his act. In other words, as the access to information is not specified with the factual, the speaker focuses on the nature of the event determined by the degree of awareness and intentionality, and not on the mental process.

Notice that the speaker does not use any interjection with the factual (like *älä', äka, ätsi*, etc. 'Why! Well! Gosh!'). The interjections are usually combined with inferentials for conveying the

notion of recognition and novel realization as well as with the sensorial perfective for conveying the notion of retrospection.

- *Altered stage of consciousness*

In this type of context, the speaker did not pay attention to what he does for various reasons due to anger or drunkenness. These behaviors mitigate the speaker's intention and controllability of his acts, which is marked in the various control verbs.

Note that in these following contexts the use of an egophoric is either inappropriate or incorrect.

In the following example with the factual, although the speaker broke the vase of his own free will, the factual perfective *–pare'* used with a controllable verb lightens intention of his action. [41] Yet the speaker may stress his complete volition during his fit of anger by using the egophoric perfective *–payin* in the same context.

(85) ང་ཁོང་ཁྲོ་ལང་དུས་ངས་བུམ་པ་འདི་བཅག་པ་རེད།

nga khōngtro lang-tü' **ngä'** phumpa ti cā'-**pare'**
I anger VBR.-when **I-ERG** vase this break intentionally-**FAC.PA.**
'I broke this vase when I was angry.'

In the next example, the speaker (a girl) could have used the egophoric perfective *–payin* to indicate that she was fully aware of what she said, but it would have meant she did it on purpose and could have controlled herself which is not the case here.

(86) ང་ར་བཅི་བསྡད་དུས་ཙོམ་པར་ངས་གྲོགས་པོ་ཡ་འབྱེལ་བཤད་མང་པོ་བརྒྱབ་པ་རེད། ཡིན་ནའི་ཁོང་ཉན་གྱི་མི་འདུག

ngä' throkpo-ya treshä' mangpo kyap-**pare'**
I-ERG. friend-OBL explanation a lot VBR(past)-**FAC.PA.**
'I gave a lot of explanations to my (male-) friend when I was drunk. But, he didn't listen to me.'

- *Subconscious awareness*

In this situation, the speaker emphasizes the fact that he did something while sleeping.

(87) གཉིད་ལམ་གྱི་ནང་ལ་ངས་སྐད་ཅ་མང་པོ་བཤད་པ་རེད།

nyīlam-ki nang-la **ngä'** kāca mangpo shā'-**pare'**
dream-GEN in-OBL **I-ERG.** conversation a lot VBR.-**FAC.PA.**
'I talked a lot in my sleep' (in Tibetan, the expression referring to this situation is *gnyid.lab.brgyab* 'talk in one's sleep')

[41] DeLancey (1985; 1990) offers a similar example with the same verb, *cā'* 'to break (intentionally)', and the sensory perfective *-song*. See the section 3.2.2 for a discussion on intentionality out of focus *versus* no-intentionality.

- *No awareness*

Garrett offers the following example of someone being amnesiac with the factual *–pare'*, which he analyzes it as an *indirect evidential* with an *inferential* value: "Imagine an amnesiac studying a sheet of paper with two columns: the left column has a list of names, and the right column tells us, for each person, where he went for holiday last year. Fortunately our amnesiac knows his own name (Tashi), so he looks for his name on the list, and then finds out where he went, thinking out loud as follows:" (2001: 40) Here, the speaker insists on his absence of awareness.

(88) བཀྲ་ཤིས་New York ལ་ཕྱིན་པ་རེད།

trāshi' New York-la ch̲in-**pare'**
Tashi New York-OBL. go(past)-**FAC.PA.**
'Tashi went to New York.'

Here, as I mentioned above in referring to the personal transfer principle (3.2.1), it is a complete transfer, which is implied. In this example, Tashi is identified as the SAP, i.e. the speaker could have said 'I' instead of his own name as Garrett (2001: 41) notices:

(89) ངབཀྲ་ཤིས་ཡིན། དྲུས་ཙང་ངNew York ལ་ཕྱིན་པ་རེད། /* ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན།

ng̲a trāshi' y̲in ch̲etsang **ng̲a** New York-la ch̲in-**pare'** / * ch̲in-**payin**
I Tashi be(ego.) therefore **I** New York-OBL. go(past)-**FAC.PA.**/ *go(past)-**EGO.PA.**
'I am Tashi.' 'Therefore I went to New York.'

In the next example, the speaker was not aware that he had gone to Lhasa, because he was a baby at that time, but his trip is well known among his relatives (Chang and Chang 1980: 17; Tournadre, 1996: 197, Garrett 2001: 42). The egophoric perfective would have suggested he had been aware and took the trip intentionally.

(90) ངལྷ་སར་ཕྱིན་པ་རེད།

ng̲a lhāsa: ch̲in-**pare'**
I Lhasa-OBL go(past)-**FAC.PA.**
'I went to Lhasa.'

At the end of this paper, I summarized the degree of intentionality according to the type of evidentials in Table 5. A cross indicates uses listed in this paper.

4 Conclusions

I presented a re-evaluation of the evidential system of Lhasa Tibetan in using the new definition of Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) based on source and the access to information plus the subjective strategy and the perspective of the speaker. There are eight evidential categories. But, I only dealt with six of them (egophoric, sensorial, factual, inferential, mnemic and self-corrective) marked by verbal suffixes and/or auxiliary verb constructions instead of two, three or four. I also clarified the distinction between self-awareness, intentionality, personal knowledge and personal involvement. I

specified the access to information for the mnemic and self-corrective: memory and novel realization, respectively.

I show that personal knowledge scope (Garrett's weak and strong ego) is triggered by the aspectual configuration, i.e. the relation between the immediacy of the knowledge and the speaker's temporal perspective. I also showed that this scope can be neutralized by the epistemic scope with the perfective. In other words, the speaker may question and assess some parts of an event, which is not immediate from his temporal perspective, but not the event itself.

I explained that the atypical functions of evidentials reveal different degrees of intentionality, when used with control verbs and the SAP. The different degrees of intentionality are defined through two different notions: "intentionality out of focus" and "lower intentionality." "Intentionality out of focus" includes the sub-notions: personal transfer principle, retrospection, emphatic assertion, recognition and novel realization. "Lower intentionality" includes external versus internal constraint situations. These degrees of intentionality trigger the use of some atypical evidentials with the SAP and control verbs, notably the correlation between retrospection and the sensorial, emphatic assertion and lower intentionality with the factual, recognition and novel realization with the inferentials.

The findings of this study concur with Tournadre (2008) arguments against use of the concept of "conjunct"/"disjunct" in Tibetan, which had been previously used by DeLancey (1992);[42] a pragmatic or a cognitive explanation for Tibetan evidentials is superior (Garrett 2001), and merits further application to other Tibetic varieties and indeed languages outside of the Tibetic family.[43]

Abbreviations

EPI	epistemic modality	MNEM	mnemic
EGO	egophoric	NEG	negation
ego.	egophoric copula	NOM	nominalizer
ENDO	endopathic	OBL	oblique case
ERG	ergative case	PA	perfective aspect
FAC	factual	PERF	performative auxiliary
fac.	factual copula	PT	perfect aspect
FUT	future	past	past stem
GEN	genitive case	pres	present stem
Hon.	honorific particle	QT	question tag
hon.	honorific word	SC	self-corrective
IA	imperfective aspect	SEN	sensorial

[42] Hargreaves (2005) who rejects the approach of Hale (1980) also implicitly challenges this concept in Newari. Even Hale himself now accepts Hargreaves position (see Hale and Shreshta 2006: 55-56).

[43] Some works already propose this type of analysis of evidentiality and point out some of these atypical uses of evidentials, for instance Zeisler (2012) for Ladakhi (India). Sun (1993), Häsler (2001), and Gawne (2013, 2014, forthcoming) also noticed some of these special uses of evidentials in *mDzo.dge A.mdo* Tibetan (China), *sDe.dge Khams* Tibetan (China), and Yolmo (Nepal) respectively. My unpublished data on the Sherpa language (Nepal) is similar, but it needs further research. It will be also interesting to apply it to Tibeto-Burman languages (Newari of Kathmandu and Sunwar), and to linguistic groups which do not belong to Tibeto-Burman family like the Barbacoan languages notably Awa Pit (Curnow, 2002) and Tucanoan languages like Tatuyo of Colombia. Vandeloise (2003) mentioned some particular cases of evidentials in Tatuyo, which are explained by the mental illness of the speaker.

imp.	imperative stem	sen.	sensorial copula
IMP	imperative particle	SEN.-INF	sensory inferential
LOG.-INF	logical inferential	SV	second verb (modal)
LIT	literally	VBR	verbalizer

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Guillaume Oisel
guillaume.oisel@gmail.com

evidentials	**egophoric**		**sensorial**	**factual**		**inferential**		**mnemic**
evidential sub-categories			**inferential, endopathic, mnemic (with the perfect/the SAP)**	**inferential, reported speech, hearsay, mnemic (with the epistemic perfect and the SAP)**		**sensorial, mnemic (with the SAP)**	**logic, mnemic (with the SAP), sensorial (with strong probability perfective)**	
epistemic values	*sure, real*	*strong probability* ***vs .*** ***high probability*** ***vs .*** *weak probability*	*sure, real, high probability (with future)*	*sure, real*	*weak probability*	*strong probability* ***vs .*** *weak probability* ***vs .*** ***high probability***	*strong probability* ***vs .*** *weak probability*	*strong probability*
perfective	*-payin* *-cung* *-nyong*	*-yong* ***vs .*** *-payö'* ***vs .*** *-(yön) tokapo yö'*	*-song*	*-pare'*	*-payintro* *-pamäntro:*	*-(payin)patra* *-payinsare'* ***vs .*** *-payin sotu'* *-payin tokapo tu'* ***vs .*** *-patratu'*	*-payinkire'* ***vs .*** *-payin tokapo re'*	*-payinpayö'*
perfect	*-yö'*	*-yong ngayö'*	*-sha'* *-tu'*	*-yo:re'*	*-yötro* *-metro:*	*-yöpatra*; *-yösare'* ***vs .*** *-yö sotu'* *-yön tokapo tu'*	*-yökire'* ***vs .*** *-yön tokapo re'*	*-yöpayö'*
imperfective	*-kiyö'*	*-kiyong ngayö'*	*-ki'* *-kitu'*	*-kiyo:re'* *-pare'*	*-kiyötro* *-kimetro:*	*-kiyöpatra* *-kiyösare'* ***vs .*** *-kiyö sotu'* *-kiyön tokapo tu'*	*-kiyökire'* ***vs .*** *-kiyön tokapo re'*	*-kiyöpayö'*
future	*-kiyin* *-co'* *-ko'* *-yong*	*-yong* *-kyuyong ngayö'* ***vs .*** *-miyongngä'* *-payö'*	*-pa(tu')* *-yaresha'*	*-kire'*	*-kyuyintro* *-kyumäntro:* *-tro*	*-kyuyinpatra* *-(kyuyin)sare'* ***vs .*** *-(kyuyin)sotu'* *-(yin)tokapo tu'*	*-kyuyinkire'* ***vs .*** *-(yin)tokapo re'*	*-kyuyinpayö'*

Table 1. Evidential Verbal Suffixes (Affirmative)

evidentials	**egophoric**		**sensorial**	**factual**		**inferential**		**mnemic**
evidential sub-categories			**inferential, endopathic**	**inferential, reported speech, hearsay**		**sensorial, self-corrective (with the SAP)**	**logic**	
epistemic values	***false***	***strong improbability vs . high improbability***	***false***	***false***	***(high) improbability***	***strong improbability vs . high improbability***	***strong improbability vs . high improbability***	***strong improbability***
perfective	*ma-V* *-macung*	*-miyong* ***vs .*** *-pame'* *-pa āyin* *-yön tokapo me'*	*-masong*	*-ma+V-pare'*	*-pamäntro* *-payintro:*	*-pamänpatra* *-ma-V-patra* *-payinsamare'* **vs.** *-payin somintu'* *-payin tokapo mintu'*	*-payinkimare'* **vs.** *-payin tokapo mare'*	*-payinpame'*
perfect	*-me'*	*-yong ngame'* ***vs .*** *-āyö'*	*-mintu'*	*-yo:mare'*	*-metro* *-yötro:*	*-mepatra* *-yösamare'* ***vs .*** *-yö somintu'* *-yön tokapo mintu'*	*-yökimare'* ***vs .*** *-yön tokapo mare'*	*-yöpame'*
imperfective	*-kime'*	*-kiyong ngame'* ***vs .*** *-ki āyö'* *-kiyön tokapo me'*	*-kimintu'*	*-kiyo:mare'*	*-kimetro* *-kiyötro:*	*-kimepatra* *-kiyösamare'* ***vs .*** *-kiyö somintu'* *-kiyön tokapo mintu'*	*-kiyökimare'* ***vs .*** *-kiyön tokapo mare'*	*-kiyöpame'*
future	*-kimän*	 *-āyong* *-kyu āyin*	*-pamintu'* *-yaremintu'*	*-kimare'*		*-samare'* ***vs .*** *-so mintu'* *-tokapo mintu'*	 *-tokapo mare'*	

Table 2. Evidential Verbal Suffixes (Negative)

evidentials	**egophoric**		**sensorial**	**factual**		**inferential**		**mnemic**
evidential sub-categories			**inferential**	**inferential, reported speech, hearsay**		**sensorial**	**logic**	
epistemic values	***sure, real***	***strong probability***	***sure, real***	***sure, real, strong probability (with epistemic adverbs and existential)***	***weak probability***	***strong probability vs . weak probability***	***strong probability vs . weak probability***	***strong probability***
essential	*yin*	*yong*	*resha'*	*re'*	*yintro mäntro:*	*yinpatra yinsare'* **vs .** *yin sotu' yin tokapo tu'*	*yinkire'* **vs .** *yin tokapo re'*	*yinpayö'*
existential	*yö'*	*yong ngayö'*	*tu'*	*yo:re'*	*yötro metro:*	*yöpatra yösare'* **vs .** *yö sotu' yön tokapo tu'*	*yökire'* **vs .** *yön tokapo re'*	*yöpayö'*

Table 3. Evidential Copulas (Affirmative)

evidentials	**egophoric**		**sensorial**	**factual**		**inferential**		**mnemic**
evidential sub-categories						**sensorial**	**logic**	
epistemic values	***false***	***strong improbability vs. high improbability***	***false***	***false***	***(high) improbability***	***strong improbability vs. high improbability***	***strong improbability vs. high improbability***	***strong improbability***
essential	*mä̲n*	*mi̲yong vs. āyin*	*re̲mintu'*	*ma̲re'*	*yi̲ntro: mä̲ntro*	*mä̲npatra yinsamare' vs. yi̲n somintu' yin tokapo mintu'*	*yi̲nkimare' vs. yi̲n tokapo mare'*	*yi̲npame'*
existential	*me̲'*	*yo̲ng ngame' vs. āyö'*	*mi̲ntu'*	*yo̲:mare'*	*yö̲tro: me̲tro*	*me̲patra yö̲samare' vs. yö̲ somintu' yö̲n tokapo mintu'*	*yö̲kimare' vs. yö̲n tokapo mare'*	*yö̲pame'*

Table 4. Evidential Copulas (Negative)

Contexts		*Degrees of intentionality*	Evidentials				
			Intentional Egophoric	Factual	Sensorial	Sensorial (Inferential)	Epistemic inferential
Intentionality		*involved*	+				
Intentionality out of focus	***Personal transfer***	*not involved*		+	+	+	
	Retrospection				+		
	Emphatic assertion			+			
	Recognition					+	+
	Novel realization					+	+
Lower intentionality	***External constraint***	*half involved*		+	+	+	+
	Internal constraint			+			

Table 5. Summary of the Atypical Functions of Evidentials in Lhasa Tibetan