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Don't believe in a paradigm that you haven't manipulated yourself! – Evidentiality, speaker attitude, and admirativity in Ladakhi (extended version)

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ABSTRACT

A speaker may conceptualise and represent a situation from three different 'perspectives': epistemic, evidential, and attitudinal. Languages differ in which of these concepts they profile and how a grammaticalised category may be extended to the other two. Modern Tibetic languages including the Ladakhi dialects are said to have grammaticalised evidentiality. However, their 'evidential' systems differ from the typologically more common systems, in that speaker attitude is co-grammaticalised and knowledge based on perception shares properties with knowledge based on inferences. The starting point for the development of this, as it seems, typologically rather uncommon 'evidential system' was a lexical marker for non-commitment (or admirativity): the auxiliary *ɣdug*.

KEYWORDS

Admirative, evidentiality, speaker attitude, Ladakhi, Tibetan, language history

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Don't believe in a paradigm that you haven't manipulated yourself! – Evidentiality, speaker attitude, and admirativity in Ladakhi (extended version)

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1 Introduction¹

Human thinking is truly universal and so is human language: it is, in principle, possible to express any emotion and abstract thought in any language, but all languages differ in how easy (short or elegant) or precise the expression will be, because all languages differ in what conceptualisations are more prominent, and hence, what finds grammaticalisation and what is left to other means of expression. That all human speakers may express the same kind of emotions and thoughts, does not mean, however, that it does not matter linguistically by what means they do so or that it does not matter that they may chose different perspectives from which to shape and express a thought.

Arguing thus that one should better differentiate between the perspectives or categories of EPISTEMIC MODALITY, EVIDENTIALITY, SPEAKER ATTITUDE,² *admirativity* and *mirativity* (the

¹ This article results from a keynote talk for the Workshop on *Evidentiality, Mirativity and Modality* at the 14th *International Conference on Evidentiality and Modality in European Languages*, Madrid 6-8 October 2014 (EMEL14). I am very grateful to the two convenors Agnès Celle (Université Paris Diderot, Sorbonne Paris Cité) and Anastasios Tsangalidis (Aristotle University, Thessaloniki) for their invitation and for the opportunity to contribute to their volume *The Linguistic Expression of Mirativity*, special issue of *Cognitive Linguistics* 15.2 (see Zeisler 2017).

However, the publisher's narrow word limit allowed only a truncated version with hardly any examples. Such limits might be justified for articles on special features of the well-known Standard European languages, but are not very helpful, when it comes to the description of the not yet fully understood 'lesser-known' languages.

I, therefore, greatly appreciate the possibility to develop one's arguments more elaborately in *Himalayan Linguistics*. The only disadvantage is that a journal specialising on 'lesser-known' languages of a lesser-known region is not necessarily noticed by the larger linguistic community, who is in the process of appropriating (and redefining), among others, the concepts of EVIDENTIALITY and *mirativity*. This quite unsatisfying situation and the need to address different audiences should justify the doubling of my contribution into a truncated and an elaborate version.

² These perspectives can be roughly described as focusing on different degrees of possibilities (EPISTEMIC MODALITY) versus focusing on different sources of, and access channels for, the evidence for the content of an utterance (EVIDENTIALITY) versus focusing on the relation between the speaker and the content of the utterance and between the speaker and the addressee (SPEAKER ATTITUDE). See section 3 for an attempt at a more precise definition.

latter two are instantiations of the foregoing category),³ I shall discuss the connections and differences between surprise, sources and access channels of knowledge, and speaker's authority. I shall focus particularly on the role of deviation from 'canonical', 'prototypical', or base constructions as a means to iconically express *admirativity* or *mirativity*.

The discussion will be based on the Tibetic languages,⁴ in particular on data from extensive fieldwork on the Ladakhi dialects, where EVIDENTIALITY and SPEAKER ATTITUDE are co-grammaticalised. This is because the Hill-DeLancey debate of 2012, which triggered some doubts about the validity of the concept of *mirativity*, depends heavily on – still not fully understood – data from 'Lhasa' Tibetan, cf. the workshop call by Celle and Tsangalidis:

Ever since DeLancey's work on Lhasa Tibetan, mirativity has been promoted as a cross-linguistic category which encodes information that is "new or surprising to the speaker". [...] Hill rejects both the category of mirativity and DeLancey's analysis of Tibetan data, claiming that the particle *hdug* encodes sensory evidence, not new information. It seems, then, that the category of mirativity cannot be taken for granted (<http://linguistlist.org/issues/25/25-850.html> accessed 19 February 2014).

I shall therefore start with the DeLancey-Hill debate (section 2). Subsequently, I shall attempt to contrastively define the above-mentioned categories of EPISTEMIC MODALITY, EVIDENTIALITY, SPEAKER ATTITUDE, and two possible instantiations of the latter, namely *admirativity* and *mirativity* (section 3).

In section 4, I shall turn to the Ladakhi data. I shall first introduce the Ladakhi dialects (4.1) before briefly describing the common traits of the more common Tibetic 'evidential' systems, namely the opposition of the auxiliaries *yin/yod*, on the one hand, and *hdug* (or its equivalents), on the other, or, more generally, the opposition of Set 1 and Set 2 markers – with a special focus on the Ladakhi dialects (4.2).

I shall particularly discuss the mirative and not so mirative usages of the allegedly mirative auxiliary *hdug* (4.3). This will be followed by examples of other ways to express *mirativity* or *admirativity* (4.4), many of which are based on the iconic use of *unexpected linguistic signs* to refer to *unexpected extralinguistic situations* or the 'parasitic' extension of grammatical markers (4.4.1), such as tense shift (4.4.2), case marking alternations (4.4.3), word order alternations (4.4.4), and auxiliary shift (4.4.5). 'Non-parasitic' or overt mirative marking is found in exclamatives (4.4.6), in explicit references to surprise (4.4.7), and finally with the marker *sug*, used in the Leh dialect for surprises and in some other Kenhat dialects for counterexpectation (4.4.8). I shall further discuss two verb-verb combinations, which have been described as mirative constructions in the Tabo dialect of Spiti (Hein 2007), but which should better be treated as intensifying constructions (4.5).

This will be followed by a brief outline of the semantic development of the verb *hdug* (4.6), some remarks on the institutionalised misrepresentation and misunderstanding of grammatical features of the so-called 'lesser known' languages in section 5, and finally the conclusion in section 6.

³ I take *mirativity*, defined as the marking of surprise or even only new knowledge, as a subcategory of *admirativity* as defined for the Balkan languages, namely as marking one's mental distance or non-commitment towards a fact or proposition or, in Friedman's (1986) terms, as marking non-confirmativity. See section 2 for a very brief introduction to the Balkan admirative and section 3 for a definition.

⁴ Cf. Tournadre (2014) for this terminology and its definition.

2 Hill vs. DeLancey: is *mirativity* a (universally valid) grammatical category?

The term ‘admirative mood’ (*měnyrě habitore*) as introduced for the Balkan languages does not seem to be overly well-chosen. The admirative *does not* mark the admiration of something or somebody by the speaker (or anybody else), quite on the contrary, it marks the speaker’s mental distance⁵ or non-commitment towards the proposition, be it because he or she has only ‘indirect’ knowledge (inference or hearsay) or because the content of the proposition is somehow awkward and (socially) unexpected (see Friedman 1986). The admirative may thus also signal disappointment, disagreement, irony, or criticism (see Guentchéva 2017). In Albanian, the admirative is the marked construction and stands in opposition to all other tense, modality, or aspectual constructions, which thus have a confirmative character (Friedman 1986).

There is no obvious relation between *admirativity* and EVIDENTIALITY. The speaker takes a particular STANCE or has a particular ATTITUDE: commitment and non-commitment or non-confirmation.⁶ DeLancey (2012: 540) states that the

correct significance of the fact that mirative constructions can occur in both direct and indirect evidential contexts is precisely that it proves that they are not evidentials – direct vs. indirect evidence is the fundamental evidential distinction, so a construction which simply ignores that distinction is not an evidential.

DeLancey (1997), however, narrows the concept of *mirativity* by excluding the indirect knowledge component. He replaces the concept of non-commitment with a mere notion of surprise and further dilutes this notion to any kind of new knowledge acquired via sense perception, irrespective of whether this perception is within the general expectations of the speaker or really a surprise. While DeLancey discusses the use of inferential markers in situations of immediate perception as mirative strategies, e.g. in Hare and in Turkish, his original treatment of modern ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan (or rather the *koiné* spoken in exile) is based only on the experiential marker *hdug*. ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan and all other Tibetic varieties have separate markers for hearsay, inference, and epistemic evaluation, but these are excluded from the discussion, as if inference or hearsay could not lead to new knowledge.

It would follow then that what DeLancey calls *mirative* in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan is elsewhere known as *immediate observation* or even *direct knowledge*. While certainly not intended, the outcome is a parallel terminology for the same kind of opposition: non-perceptive knowledge = non-mirative vs. observed or direct knowledge = mirative. Despite DeLancey’s claim to the contrary, EVIDENTI-

⁵ For the notion of mental distance see also Slobin & Aksu (1982: 196–198). For them, the notion of mental distance is essentially linked to the notion of an unprepared mind. I would think that this is somewhat too narrow. Mental distance can also be associated with the unwillingness to accept a certain situation. Otherwise, their descriptions given on p. 198 hit the point: “One stands back”, “The speaker [...] feels distanced from the situation he is describing”. It is thus a question “of relative closeness of events to one’s ongoing feeling of participation in the here-and-now”. One might also say that it is a question of how much the speaker wants to identify him- or herself with the situation described.

⁶ Aikhenvald (2004: 209) views the Balkan admirative differently. According to her, it would be a non-firsthand evidential with mirative extensions. This, however, is the question. According to Friedman, the main function of the admirative would be non-confirmativity (or non-commitment), and the non-firsthand interpretations would follow from this function, depending on the context. Most probably, Aikhenvald cannot really judge the Balkan data. Neither can I. But I assume that Friedman’s description is correct. Even if it were not, I shall use the terms *admirative* or *admirativity* exactly in this function of non-confirmativity or in my words: non-commitment.

ALITY and *mirativity* would seem to be closely linked in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, and not to be separate categories, and ‘mirative’ would only be one of the values of EVIDENTIALITY.

It should be noted that DeLancey (2012) has acknowledged much of my critique (see below), and is ready to admit that the auxiliary for immediate perception *hdug* belongs to the domain of EVIDENTIALITY rather than being a mirative marker in the strict sense.

Aikhenvald (2012) focuses more on the notions of sudden discovery, surprise, unprepared mind, and counterexpectation, which are more or less the same. The only difference I can think of, is that a real surprise might go along with great emotions, while everything else appears to have a more neutral value and is entailed in the notion of surprise. The surprise etc. may lie on the side of the speaker, on the side of the addressee, or even on the side of the main character of a narrative plot. Aikhenvald (2012) follows DeLancey and adds as fifth element information new to the speaker, the addressee, or the main character of the plot. Earlier, however, Aikhenvald had rightfully uttered doubts whether the notion of new knowledge could be enough for the definition of *mirativity*:

Nambiquara languages have special marking for new information [...]. Is this mirativity? Note that *new information need not necessarily be associated with surprise* (Aikhenvald 2004: 215; emphasis added).

Whatever the case, the sources of knowledge do not play a role, both indirect and direct sources may lead to surprises or simply new insights. *Mirativity* is thus, according to Aikhenvald, a (grammatical) category independent of EVIDENTIALITY. More particularly, both mirative and evidential markers may co-occur.

DeLancey’s work was certainly instrumental in arriving at a better understanding of the auxiliary systems of the Tibetic and other Tibeto-Burman languages, and many scholars working on these languages have adopted the terminology of *mirativity*. Nevertheless, DeLancey and, more generally, the concept of *mirativity* have also met with critique.

Lazard (1999), e.g., suggests subsuming *mirativity* – in the same narrow sense of new knowledge – under ‘mediativity’. The latter concept would comprise inferences, hearsay, and direct sense perception or *mirativity*. Notably, his ‘mediativity’ would comprise both direct and indirect evidence. Elsewhere, the term ‘mediativity’ refers only to indirect knowledge (e.g. in DeLancey 2012: 545), that is, knowledge *mediated* by either inferences or hearsay. Lazard (1999: 95), however, defines it in terms of SPEAKER ATTITUDE: the unmarked constructions indicate that speakers “adhere to their own discourse by virtue of the very laws of linguistic intercourse”, that is, they vouch for it. The marked construction, by contrast indicates the speakers’ “distance from their own discourse” or a “split” between the person who acquired the knowledge (by some unspecified means) and the person who speaks. Lazard’s ‘mediativity’ is thus “not [about] the nature of the source of the speaker’s knowledge of the facts”. It, nevertheless, covers evidential values, indirect on the one side, direct (including mirative) on the other. Accordingly, *mirativity* is not a grammatical category of its own, but only one of the values of Lazard’s ‘mediativity’. The latter term, however, seems to be just another word for marked values of SPEAKER ATTITUDE, in contrast to a neutral representation – or, in fact, another word for *admirativity*.

In his presentation at EMEL14, Mexas (2014) suggested to eliminate the notions of surprise and counterexpectation or non-expectation from the definition of *mirativity* and focus only on the notion of *realisation*, that is, the sudden becoming aware of a fact. One is tempted to agree, because the term *mirativity* is often used all too loosely for constructions where the notion of sur-

prise does not belong to the core meaning, but is only a secondary extension. However, if one deprives the term *mirativity* of the notion of surprise, the term becomes empty, and it would, in fact, be better to abandon it altogether, rather than to try to redefine it. Depending on the language, *realisation* could well be a suitable term for grammatical markers that focus on the sudden becoming aware without connotations of surprise. It should, however, cover both sources of becoming aware: sense perception *and* inference.

Hill (2012) attacked DeLancey sharply, announcing that – as a grammatical category – “mirativity does not exist”, not in Lhasa Tibetan and not in any other language. He extended his verdict to the whole linguistic community: whatever is called *mirativity* or *admirativity* would always be a case of direct sense perception, and hence an instance of EVIDENTIALITY. He, however, preferred to overlook descriptions of a marked use of inferential markers – which are not neutrally used for direct knowledge – as a signal of surprise when applied to cases of immediate sense perception. He also preferred to overlook that cross-linguistically, mirative extensions do not usually appear with markers of direct knowledge, including those for immediate sense perception, except in Tibetic and a few other Tibeto-Burman languages (plus a few languages that have been heavily influenced by Tibetan).⁷ With respect to the Balkan languages, Hill was clearly mistaken: the Balkan *admirative* is not used neutrally for direct knowledge derived from immediate sense perception. Hill was certainly less mistaken in the case of the Modern Tibetic languages, except that it is all but evident what the respective grammatical opposition is about.

Only a short while after the just mentioned publication, Hill (2013) revised his position slightly, allowing *mirativity* to exist in the Tibetic languages as an extended – or ‘parasitic’ (see below) – usage of the marker for perceptive evidence *hdug*. *Mirativity* would thus exist in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, at least as a valid semantic concept. Hill (2015), however, renewed his attacks against DeLancey, ridiculing the latter for reframing his analyses, as if one would not be allowed to develop a better understanding in the course of the ongoing discussions. It may be noted that Hill has so far not conducted any kind of systematic fieldwork in Tibet or among the exile community.

Ten years earlier, Zeisler (2000 and then again 2004: 302f., 657f.) had criticised DeLancey for diluting the concept of *admirativity* as well as for focussing only on the rather misleading notion of *new knowledge*. She had shown that in several Tibetic languages, *mirativity* or perhaps rather *admirativity* in the sense of non-commitment or disbelief might be expressed parasitically through the non-prototypical use of tense markers. More recently, Zeisler (2012a) has shown that positive or negative surprise may be expressed in the Kenhat dialects of Ladakhi parasitically through the non-prototypical use of case markers. Contrary to Hill’s (2012: 390, n. 3) remark, she has never claimed that *mirativity* was a *grammatical* category in Tibetic languages, even though the Ladakhi dialects have markers that express the speaker’s mental distance to a proposition (she accordingly calls them *distance markers*), and even though in the Kenhat dialects, one of these markers is used more specifically for surprise or counterexpectation (see also section 4.4.8 below).

It can now be shown that the non-prototypical use of *all* evidential markers can similarly have a parasitic mirative meaning. In the Shamskat dialects of Ladakhi, even the ego-centred or

⁷ Hill (2013: 52) attacks Aikhenvald on this point, but he also prefers to overlook that Aikhenvald (2004: 228–230, 232) explicitly states that Lhasa Tibetan and Qiang behave differently from all other languages observed. The reason for this anomaly most probably lies in the history of *hdug* as a semantic *admirative* marker in the first place (see below, section 4.6).

non-experiential first-hand markers can be exploited for mirative connotations. This is somewhat contrary to the general expectation that

[f]irst-hand evidentials, or larger evidential systems that encode more specific types of evidence generally cannot be used miratively; these languages usually have other means to express mirative meanings. (Peterson 2013: 21, with reference to Aikhenvald 2004: 195).

Along with many other features, this unexpected outcome may indicate that the Tibetic ‘evidential’ systems are not solely about EVIDENTIALITY, but may have co-grammaticalised other domains.

3 EPISTEMIC MODALITY, EVIDENTIALITY, SPEAKER ATTITUDE, *admirativity* and *mirativity* – an attempt to define what seems to defy definition

The notion of EPISTEMIC MODALITY often covers what I would like to treat as a separate (modal) category, namely SPEAKER ATTITUDE or “the coding of the degree of commitment on the part of the speaker to his/her statement” (de Haan 1999: 83) or of “the degree of confidence the speaker has in his or her statement” (de Haan 2001: 201; cf. also Aikhenvald 2004: 153). According to de Haan (2001: 203) “[e]pistemic modality is concerned with the areas of possibility and necessity ... Possibility and necessity refer to the commitment of the speaker to the truth of what he/she is saying”.

The last sentence contains a somewhat problematic conclusion. One could possibly equally argue that a statement about the possibility or necessity of a fact refers back to the speaker’s sources of knowledge on which they depend. I would further hold that a speaker’s commitment is not only related to the truth of a proposition. There are other, more pragmatic reasons why a speaker may take a distanced or non-committed stance. Particularly in hierarchical societies, the speaker’s commitment may depend on his or her social status. But a speaker may also be taken aback by the social inadequacy of the situation spoken about or otherwise be emotionally involved.

The notions of possibility and necessity, the notions of commitment or evaluation, and the sources of information are distinct perspectives a speaker may have on an event, and they belong to different albeit partly overlapping domains of what could be called modality in the widest sense. It is evident that these domains may not always be clearly distinguished in a given language and that any two of these domains (or all three) may be addressed together by a lexical expression or a grammatical marker.

In the following definitions, I shall thus distinguish basic functions and extended (parasitic) usages. As mentioned by de Haan (see above), markers for EPISTEMIC MODALITY in Standard European languages may have secondary evidential connotations (mostly hearsay) and attitudinal connotations (mostly non-commitment). Evidential markers, on the other hand, may have attitudinal connotations or connotations of uncertainty, but, as Aikhenvald (2004: 186) made it clear, they do not have to. Similarly, Kalsang et al. (2013: 525) argue that the use of Set 2 markers *hdug* or *red* do not weaken an assertion. If one says *Tashi is wearing a blue shirt (as I just see)*, one could not continue saying *but I don’t know he’s wearing it* (cf. their example 10a). As we shall see, the Ladakhi dialects have co-grammaticalised EVIDENTIALITY and SPEAKER ATTITUDE, while having special expressions for guesses and probabilities (that is, EPISTEMIC MODALITY).

- EPISTEMIC MODALITY *basically* deals with hypothetical or even counterfactual situations, in contrast to the attested situations in the real world. It may describe different degrees of likelihood and *in an extended usage*, it can have a hedging function, indicating that the speaker merely makes a guess or an inference. To a certain extent, such expressions may also express different degrees of desirability, which may lead to extended usages, where speakers evaluate their attitude towards a real-world situation or towards their audience.
- SPEAKER ATTITUDE (or STANCE) *basically* deals with the relation between the speaker and the content of the utterance *and* between the speaker and the addressee. Among other things, the speaker indicates his or her commitment in the sense of personal (non-) involvement in, or his or her (non-) identification with a situation, or may convey a judgement about the *credibility* and/or (social) *adequacy* of the content of the statement, both his or her own or that of other persons. Commitment should not only be accounted for in terms of epistemic truth-values. A distanced stance expressed through hedging markers may have to be chosen according to one's social position in the intercommunicative situation or according to the presumed knowledge state of the interlocutors. Taking stance may *secondarily* indicate that the speaker wants to warrant the content by all means or, by contrast, that s/he merely makes a guess or an inference. The expression of a distanced stance may also contain judgements about the likelihood that the content is true.
- A particular instance or marked value of SPEAKER ATTITUDE is *admirativity*, where the speaker conveys a strong notion of non-commitment towards the proposition (see here Friedman 1986, 2012): uncertainty due to indirect knowledge, on the one hand, and surprise, disbelief, embarrassment, on the other. I would think that the notion of disbelief might also cover other, more positive types of surprise and generally the speaker's emotional involvement, such as compassion or joy, as this may also be *too good to be true!*
- *Mirativity* is a more narrowly defined instance of SPEAKER ATTITUDE,⁸ solely marking surprise or unexpectedness (see here DeLancey 1997; Aikhenvald 2012). It is important to note that the notion of surprise essentially belongs to the moment where the particular situation became known, not to the time of the utterance, where the situation may no longer constitute a surprise for the speaker, particularly if s/he has retold the situation again and again. A mirative statement invites the audience to share the erstwhile experience of surprise. In an *extended usage*, a mirative statement can also be a statement about the likelihood of a situation in a particular causal or social context.
- EVIDENTIALITY, finally, *basically* deals with the different sources of, and access channels for, the evidence for the content of an utterance.⁹ According to the standard definitions in the cross-linguistic discussion, the basic types are a) personal or *first hand* experience or *direct*

⁸ Even DeLancey (2012: 541) holds that “categories like the mirative [...] express the speaker's *attitude* toward the proposition” (emphasis added).

⁹ Tournadre (2008: 298) argues that source and access of information should be differentiated because “all the evidentials”, which specify different access channels, “may be followed by a quotation marker”, which specifies a different source. This clearly holds for the Tibetic systems, but certainly not for all languages. I would concur, however, with his misgivings about lumping together second-hand information and inference under the cover-term ‘indirect knowledge’, see also next note.

knowledge, typically acquired through sense perception, b) hearsay, and c) inference, the latter two usually subsumed under *indirect* knowledge.¹⁰ In an *extended usage*, all three types may be used to express a SPEAKER ATTITUDE. That is, type a) expressions may convey a notion of authority or commitment, whereas type b) and type c) expressions may convey a notion of doubt or non-commitment. Type a) and c) may also convey different degrees of probability, and thus of EPISTEMIC MODALITY (see Aikhenvald 2004: 215–324).

The Tibetic languages, the languages influenced by them, and a few independent languages around the world,¹¹ would suggest a fourth type of knowledge, namely intimate or fully assimilated knowledge that presents itself to the speaker as self-evident. This is also known as *egophoric* among the Tibeto-linguists.¹² One should perhaps better call it *ego-centred* knowledge to avoid any misunderstanding that describes a category of personhood. It is expressed by what I shall call ‘Set 1’ markers. It stands in sharp contrast to knowledge based on *mere sense perception* and knowledge based on inferences or guesses. The former is expressed by what I shall call ‘Set 2’ markers, notably *hdug*, the latter by what I shall call ‘evaluative’ markers, see section 4.2 below. The special status of ego-centred knowledge has also been captured by notions such as “performative”, “personal agency”, or “participatory” (see here San Roque & Loughnane 2012: 115 for a brief overview).

Since ego-centred knowledge does not seem to play a crucial role in most languages and, therefore, is not commonly dealt with in the cross-linguistic discussion, it is not immediately apparent whether both ego-centred and perceptual knowledge should be seen as subtypes of *direct* knowledge or whether only one of the two, and then which one, should be associated with *direct* knowledge.

With respect of ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, Saxena (1997: 287) and DeLancey (2001: 372) treat the knowledge represented by the two different sets of evidential auxiliaries (Set 1 and Set 2) as direct knowledge. Saxena draws a person-related distinction between ‘conjunct’ (Set 1) and ‘disjunct’ (Set 2) direct knowledge, while DeLancey distinguishes between direct knowledge of the event as such (Set 2) and direct knowledge of one’s volition (Set 1). DeLancey hints thus at the privileged personal status of knowledge expressed by the Set 1 markers. If, therefore, both markers could be said to indicate direct knowledge, the knowledge expressed by Set 1 markers would be more direct,

¹⁰ I find this notion of ‘indirect’ knowledge extremely counter-intuitive, both from an epistemological and a psychological point of view. Second-hand knowledge is ‘indirect’ only insofar as its content is authored by another ‘source’. However, when quoting directly from a face-to-face interaction, the perception of the speech act is as ‘direct’ as any other perception, which in most cases has its ‘source’ outside of the speaker, in the outside world. What the speaker conveys with a quotative is simply the fact that another person has made a particular statement. How reliable such knowledge may be or rather: as how reliable it is presented, depends on the individual language, and it seems that the notion of indirectness and thus lesser certainty is derived from the reportative constructions of the Standard European languages, which typically have a stronger or weaker connotation of hedging. In Ladakhi, by contrast, the use of the quote marker *lo* indicates that the speaker has heard (or read) the content of the proposition directly, typically as an addressee of the communicative act. If s/he perceived the proposition as a bystander, s/he would typically use the marker for non-visual or less immediate sense perception.

Inferences, on the other hand, are made by the speaker him- or herself, based on his or her internal knowledge states, with or without immediate input from outside (perceptions and hearsay). The primary ‘source’ thus lies within the speaker. The difference between knowledge based on mere sense perceptions, knowledge based on inferences based on immediate perceptive input, and knowledge based mainly on reasoning is gradual.

¹¹ See here the recent volume on ‘egophoricity’, Floyd, Norcliffe, & San Roque (2018).

¹² Strictly speaking, egophoric marking in the sense established by Tournadre (1996) crosscuts the main opposition that will be set up below, see section 4.2.

more personal, more warranted, more committed than that expressed by the Set 2 markers, which is thus automatically less committed and less warranted (see also the discussion further below in section 4.2).

Aikhenvald (2004: 123–130) treats ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan as displaying an opposition of ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ marking, which she interprets as a special kind of person indexing. According to her (p. 145–146, 173), such systems are not evidential in nature and cannot develop into grammatical evidential systems. Accordingly, she excludes the Tibetan markers for ego-centred knowledge from her discussion, although it is exactly these markers that share the cross-linguistic properties of *direct* evidentials, while the markers for immediate perception share some important properties of *indirect* evidentials.

It has been suggested that “[a] form which explicitly indicates direct evidence can only exist in opposition to one or more which expresses indirect evidence” and “the existence of a direct evidential form depends on the contrast with an indirect form, and the two forms divide up the semantic space between them” (DeLancey 2012: 544), but in the Tibetic languages, the semantic space is basically divided between the ego-centred forms and all other markers. The markers for inferences and guesses, although based on the ego-centred markers, belong to the same non-authoritative semantic space as the markers of perceptual evidence.

If one views EVIDENTIALITY with de Haan (2005) as a spatio-temporal deictic category, then the Tibetic ‘evidential’ system could be best described as expressing different degrees of spatial, temporal, and mental distance towards an event. One could possibly say that spatial and temporal distance are subcases of mental distance or non-accessibility. The ego-centred markers would refer to an internal or internalised immediately accessible situation, the experiential markers to an external or not yet internalised situation in spatio-temporal and, thus, mental proximity, and the inferential and other evaluative markers¹³ plus possibly the hearsay markers to an external or not yet internalised situation in greater spatio-temporal and, thus, greater mental distance. Surprising and unacceptable situations would then fall under greater mental distance (cf. also Peterson 2013: 9). Case marking alternations in the Kenhat varieties of Ladakhi and the use of the distance markers in all Ladakhi dialects or, more generally, the extended use of markers for indirect knowledge for *admirativity* seem to reflect such a deictic concept.

However, the possible differentiation of experiential markers into visual and non-visual markers and the possible differentiation of the markers for ‘indirect’ knowledge into inference, quotation, hearsay, and perhaps additional evaluative markers, cannot be covered by the concept of deixis alone. Similarly, deixis alone cannot explain the admirative use of the ego-centred markers in some of the Ladakhi dialects or the use of present tense forms (that is, markers of temporal and mental proximity) to express mental distance.

Talking about *mirativity* in the more narrow sense, there is still some need to define the notions of surprise and/ or counterexpectation more precisely. One should differentiate between a more emotionally loaded concept of surprise as we are confronted with in our daily life, and a more

¹³ “Evaluative” is used here as a cover term for the inferential markers, the ‘distance’ markers for facts not well known, the markers for estimations (or guesses) and probabilities, and the markers for shared knowledge and/ or generally known facts and habits. Except for the ‘distance’ markers and the markers for estimations and probabilities, they do not necessarily have epistemic values. As they are often multifunctional with their functions often partly overlapping, it is almost impossible to delimitate the individual categories. What these forms share, however, is that they indicate that the main speech act participant evaluates the situation s/he talks about in one way or another. In Table 2 below, one can find an overview over the Ladakhi markers for inference, distance, and probability.

neutral concept of counterexpectation as we might find in newspapers or academic discourse. Given their different emotional load, both contexts may trigger quite different linguistic behaviour. According to De Haan (2012: 20), “Mirativity can be defined as the marking of unexpected information, information that somehow *shocks* or surprises the speaker” (emphasis added). Peterson (2016, p. 1331) speaks of surpassing a certain threshold level. This is quite different from mere counterexpectation and even more different from knowledge that is simply new. De Haan (2012: 20f.) demonstrates this with an example from Turkish (already put forward by DeLancey 1997: 37), where the resignation of Ecevit is presented with the *mI*s form, because it was completely unexpected and shocking, whereas the resignation of Nixon is presented with the *dI* form, because it was somehow anticipated. It was nevertheless new information. In a similar vein, Peterson (2013: 4, 5) argues that “unexpectedness, suddenness, and new information, are entailed by surprise” – but not the other way round.

Contrary to DeLancey and Aikhenvald (and all others who might follow them), I do not think that the notion of ‘new knowledge’, whether based on perceptions or inferences, can be included in a meaningful manner in a general concept of *mirativity*, since most of the situations we perceive or infer for the first time come without surprise, as they fit well into our general world knowledge. Most of our perceptions yield a representation of a situation not yet seen as such before, as all factors that make up a complex situation vary, but we usually take this variation as granted and do not take notice of it. Thus, we would talk about all such perceptions in a not very excited manner. Only when our senses are sharpened, e.g., because we are still in the age where everything is simply marvellous or because we are on holidays in a foreign country or because we are art professionals, may we marvel, e.g., at the change of light and shadows caused by the clouds over the barren mountains or at the colourful dresses on the market at a festival season. The art professionals may still talk about such perceptions in an ordinary way, since they would not be surprising for them. Tourists and especially children, however, might get quite excited and may express this excitement according to the means of their respective languages.

If, in some languages, new sense perceptions (and inferences) are, in fact, marked the same way as surprises, then the reason for doing so is not so much the newness of the perception, than the fact that a single perception or only a few perceptions of the same type is or are not enough to state a truth authoritatively, and we may thus most probably deal with a notion of non-commitment or *admirativity* in the original sense, as in the case of the Balkan languages, and as in the case, partly at least, of the Tibetic languages.

Similarly, one should better distinguish between (emotional) surprise and/ or (a more neutral) counterexpectation, on the one hand, and the notion of an ‘unprepared mind’ in the case of sudden events, on the other. Like freshly perceived events, sudden events may not necessarily be surprising, as long as they fit into the overall world knowledge, and extraordinary situations may not necessarily happen all of a sudden.

While every language can express every notion in some or the other way, I am not really convinced that one should link with *mirativity* as a grammatical category each and every expression indicating some kind of non-expected situation, e.g., expressions for events that were about to happen, but then did not (or not as planned), like the *go-to* construction in English (argued for by Vincent and Dalrymple 2014 in their presentation at EMEL14) or the expression ‘it turned out that’ (argued for by Serrano on the same occasion, see now Serrano 2017).

If one does not draw a distinction here, all expressions that indicate a mere beginning, such as *be about*, and all expressions that explicitly express suddenness, such as Ladakhi *hun.med.la* or its

English equivalent *suddenly*, and possibly many intensifiers should be subsumed under *mirativity* (see also the discussion in section 4.5). While the greater part of the linguistic community seems to have no problem with a constant levelling out of all differences, it is nevertheless a fact that the more conceptualisations one includes under one term, the less meaningful it becomes, until it is completely underdetermined and empty.

Furthermore, it seems to be imperative to follow Peterson's (2013, 2017) suggestion, and distinguish clearly between extended and non-extended usages, or in his words: parasitic and non-parasitic usages. In the case of parasitic usages, the mirative (or whatever) connotation is not part of the meaning of a particular expression, construction or grammatical marker. By contrast, non-parasitic usages amount to overt mirative (or whatever) marking (2013: 18).

Peterson (2013: 13) also presents a useful test for this difference. If any intonation, lexical expression, or grammatical marker expresses surprise in a non-parasitic manner, its usage should not allow cancelling: **but actually I am/ was not surprised*. On the other hand, it should be possible to ask the speaker why s/he is surprised, as s/he might have known better. By contrast, if a mirative connotation follows only secondarily from the atypical use of an expression or grammatical marker for another category, such questions should not be possible and one should further well be able to cancel or preclude the mirative implicature (2013: 17).

If we turn this argument on the Tibetic languages, their speakers would be able in most cases of the application of the Set 2 marker *hdug* (or its equivalents in other varieties) to state explicitly that they were not surprised, at all. Most probably, however, nobody would do so, just because nobody expects anybody to be surprised when using *hdug*, since surprise is not part of the basic meaning. For the same reason, nobody would ever challenge anybody and ask why s/he was surprised. On the contrary, speakers would be challenged, if they would not use *hdug* in situations where this is the prototypical choice and where the reason is not obvious through contextual features or intonation. The notion of this challenge would not be **why are you not surprised?*, but on the contrary: *How can you claim to know intimately?* or *Why do you think you can tell me how the world is?* or something along these lines.¹⁴ Hence, *hdug* (or its equivalents) cannot be an overt marker of *mirativity*, but it may have parasitic mirative connotations.

4 Evidentiality and speaker attitude in Ladakhi¹⁵

4.1 The Ladakhi dialects

The Tibetic languages constitute a large language family, comparable at least to the Germanic or the Romance languages. While their overall structure is similar, they vary considerably in certain details. Even the Ladakhi dialects show quite some variation.

¹⁴ Jackson T. Sun, in answering some questions to a draft version he had published on academia.edu (April 2016), made exactly the same point for Taku Tibetan, spoken in Sichuan.

¹⁵ Fieldwork in Ladakh has been conducted in 1994 and 1996 for my dissertation on RELATIVE TENSE, and from 2002 onwards every year for three to four months for various projects. Since my participation in the conference *The Nature of Evidentiality 2012* in Leiden, I have been increasingly paying attention to variation in auxiliary use, and have started inquiring more deeply into the motivation behind different usages. For my current project on *Evidentiality, epistemic modality, and speaker attitude in Ladakhi – Modality and the interface for semantics, pragmatics, and grammar*, see <https://www.uni-tuebingen.de/fakultaeten/philosophische-fakultaet/fachbereiche/aoi/indologie-vgl-religionswissenschaft/mitarbeiter/bettina-zeisler/projekte.html#c290353>.

As the name suggests, ‘Ladakhi’ or *Ladakse skat* is spoken in Ladakh or *Ladaks*,¹⁶ itself a province of the state Jammu & Kashmir in the northwestern corner of India. Its cousin Balti is spoken in Baltistan (in Pakistan) and in some western border areas in Ladakh.

By the linguistic term ‘Ladakhi’, I refer to all West Tibetan varieties spoken within the whole province, except the Balti varieties (excluding also the Tibetic varieties of the refugee community). The Ladakhi varieties fall into two main groups, namely the Shamskat dialects of Lower Ladakh in the north-west (Purik, Sham, Ldumra¹⁷) and the Kenhat dialects of Upper Ladakh in the south-east (Leh, Upper Indus, Lalok, the Changthang dialects at the border to China, Gya-Miru, and Zanskar). One of the main differences between these two groups is that in the Kenhat dialects, no formal distinction is made between an agent and a possessor, whereas in the Shamskat dialects, these two roles are clearly distinguished. There are also countless minor differences. See here Zeisler (2011) for an introduction. Apart from dialectal variation, there also seems to be quite some variation among individuals, which may, in part at least, result from different exposure to cross-dialectal influences as in the case of interregional marriages.

Other scholars have used the term ‘Ladakhi’ in a much more restricted way. Tournadre (2005, 2014) excludes the dialects spoken in Zanskar and Purik, while the ethnologue even excludes the dialects spoken in the Changthang (defined as all areas “east and southeast of Leh”, or “Rong, Rupshu, Stotpa, Upper Ladakhi”).¹⁸ Koshal (1979) refers with the term ‘Ladakhi’ only to the standard variety spoken in and around Leh town. While Koshal’s use is historically appropriate, the definitions used by Tournadre and the ethnologue do not make sense from a linguistic point of view, as the remaining varieties of Sham and Ldumra and Upper Ladakh differ considerably among themselves and from the Leh dialect. The dialects of Purik further form a continuity with western Sham, while the Zanskar dialects pattern with the Upper Indus dialects. The main divide is between the Shamskat and the Kenhat dialect groups. The use of different inferential and epistemic markers largely follows this divide.

¹⁶ As a term for a political entity, “Ladakh” is a colonial fiction. The original (?) name of the region around Leh, *Lata*, was etymologised and transformed into *La.dvags* (ལ་དབས་), which in turn was pronounced in the main Purik dialect as *Ladaɣ*, from where the Urdu and Hindi spellings لداکھ and लद्दाख and the English form *Ladakh* were derived and transferred to the whole region.

The official self-perception that we are all *Ladakspa*, speaking *Ladakse skat*, may gain ground among the younger generations, but it is or was not at all self-understood in the more peripheral regions, especially not in Zanskar and Purik, and in all regions among the elder people.

¹⁷ More commonly known by the exonym Nubra. I shall use here the speakers’ self-designation.

¹⁸ <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/lbj>, <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/can>, last accessed 13.05.2017.




Fig. 1 Dialect areas of Ladakh. Location of places only approximate. Background map courtesy Quentin Devers.

Balti can be associated with the Shamskat group. Pangi, a strangely mixed variety with features of Balti, Zanskari, and remnants of a so far unidentified eastern language, spoken in the Chamba district of Himachal Pradesh can be associated with the Kenhat group. Generally, the Tibetic varieties spoken in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakand (India) and the greater part of the varieties spoken in the Ngari province of Western Tibet (Tibetan Autonomous Region, PR China) can be likewise associated with the Kenhat group.

4.2 *The auxiliary systems of Modern Tibetic languages, in particular Ladakhi*

With the only exception of some dialects of Balti¹⁹ (the western most Tibetic language, spoken in present-day Pakistan), the Modern Tibetic languages generally display a grammatical opposition, which is most often described in terms of ‘evidentiality’. Formally, the basic opposition is between two sets of auxiliaries (including a few bleached verbs).

- (a) Set 1 auxiliaries (*yin* and *yod*) refer to authoritative, self-evident knowledge, not based on immediate perception (neutral category).
- (b) Set 2 auxiliaries (notably *hdug* and its dialectal counterparts, further the directional verbs *soŋ* ‘went’ and *byuŋ* ‘came’, the deposit verb *bžag* ‘deposited’, or similar verbs, alternatively also some special morphemes) refer to knowledge based only or primarily on immediate perception. I shall also include in this set the auxiliary *red*, used in Central and Eastern Tibetan with a supposedly neutral, non-evidential function²⁰. A few languages, particularly most Ladakhi dialects, also differentiate between visual and non-visual perceptions or perhaps rather between the most immediate sense perception (which for most persons is visual perception) and perceptions that are somewhat less immediate.

The whole system, however, also includes the following modes:

- (c) Inferences, guesses, and estimations of probability are represented by various semi-grammaticalised ‘evaluative’ morphemes and auxiliaries (EM),²¹ which typically combine only with the auxiliaries of Set 1. This open set also includes markers for mental distance and markers for the ‘explanatory’ mood and for the ‘of-course’ mood, both instantiations of shared or shareable knowledge.
- (d) Hearsay information is expressed by a cliticised form of the verb *zer* ‘say’ in Central and Eastern Tibetan, and by the still partly lexical verb *lo* ‘say’ in Western Tibetan. The verbs of the reported utterance are given in the grammatical form of the original sentence(s) as in direct speech, but the pronouns are shifted as in indirect speech. Honorific or humilific lexemes may be inserted or replaced according to the relative social position of the reporting speaker (cf. also Tournadre 2008: 301), and similarly, emphasis as expressed through lexical means or flexible case marking (cf. here Zeisler 2012a) may be added or cancelled according to the emotional stance of the reporting speaker.²² Directional expressions, however, are not adjusted.²³

¹⁹ See here the work of Read (1934), Bielmeier (1985), and Jones (2009).

²⁰ Its status is somewhat problematic. Many authors treat *red* as a non-evidential factual marker, used neutrally without reference to the knowledge type or source. It has been accordingly variously termed ‘gnomic’ or ‘indirect assertive’ (Tournadre 1994: 152), ‘assertive’ (Tournadre 2008: 295), or ‘factual’ (Tournadre 2008: 295, Hill 2012: 392). Others, however, have described it as a marker for inferences and generic knowledge (see among others Garrett 2001), whereby it would fall into the next domain (c) of ‘evaluation’ markers, where I would also locate the marker *yod.red*.

²¹ See Table 2 below for an overview over the Ladakhi markers for inference, distance, and probability.

²² See also San Roque, Floyd, & Norcliffe (2018: 62–65). These authors wonder why speakers would not use direct speech and “opt out of deictic shift altogether” (p. 65). The possibility of the above described adaptations to one’s own status and/ or evaluation may be one of the main reasons why semi-direct speech is used and not direct speech. Another reason might be that one does not always remember each single word or particle, rather than the general

All these modes of knowledge relate to the perspective of the main speech act participant (MSAP), that is, the speaker in statements and the addressee in questions.²⁴ What is a psychologically motivated most natural switch in perspective that may be encountered in one way or another in any language,²⁵ should by no means be mistaken as a somewhat odd person category. More specifically, Set 1 auxiliaries are *typically* used for the MSAP's own controlled [+ctr] actions and, *in an extended usage*, for situations in which the MSAP is or was otherwise actively involved, such as situations under the control or responsibility of the MSAP, or situations with which the MSAP is fully acquainted and with which the MSAP identifies. Set 2 auxiliaries (and evaluative markers) are accordingly used for all situations not controlled by the MSAP, that is, [-ctr] events relating to the MSAP and *typically* all [±ctr] events relating to OTHER persons (in the following, all [-ctr] events relating to the MSAP will be treated as OTHER). Set 2 markers, however, compete with evaluative markers for general knowledge, inferences, and estimations and probabilities.

Set 1 auxiliaries are used neutrally in non-finite constructions²⁶ and can be followed by the said evaluative markers, whereas Set 2 auxiliaries are functionally marked, and therefore not commonly used in non-finite constructions (some varieties allow certain exceptions) and with the exception of *red*,²⁷ they cannot be followed by other evaluative markers. However, while Set 1 auxiliaries are formally unmarked, and appear to be functionally unmarked with respect to EVIDENTIALITY in the narrow sense, their usage in finite sentences is rather restricted, so that with respect to finite sentences they are *informationally* marked through their limited frequency.²⁸ They are further functionally marked for intimate or authoritative knowledge and committed statements, that is,

outline of the reported proposition, and that a one-to-one reproduction (or the fiction thereof) is not necessary in the social interaction..

²³ Once, a lady asked me to tell her son to *bring* the cow *hither* (*khjon*) to a field close to where we were talking. Her son was further up the road in the house. From his (and my) perspective, he was supposed to *take* the cow *over there* (*kher*). Nevertheless, I should have used *khjon! lo* '[She] said: bring [the cow] hither!', according to the perspective of the original speaker. When I, ignorant of that rule, switched the perspective according to our positions, her son's facial expression clearly showed that this didn't make sense to him, at all. See also Zemp (2013: 602 with ex. 9 on p. 603) for a similar observation.

²⁴ Creissels (2008) suggests the term 'asserter', Tournadre (2008) the term 'ego' plus anticipatory usage.

²⁵ With respect to endopathic states, e.g., it would be more common to talk about one's own feelings and ask the addressee about his or hers than asking real questions, not just rhetorical ones, about one's own feelings and make assertions about the addressee's feelings (cf. Floyd 2018: 290f.). The same is true in the case of epistemic stances: one would assert what one has seen or inferred oneself and would similarly ask the addressee what she or he has seen or inferred him- or herself, but one would not normally ask the addressee what oneself has seen or inferred and it would be rather presumptuous to make non-hedged assertive statements about what the addressee has seen or inferred. Hence it is not surprising that the same happens also with the most intimate personal knowledge type.

²⁶ This was first observed by Chang et al. (1964: 106f., 135).

²⁷ Cf. the use of *red + hdug* and *red + bžag* in Standard Spoken Tibetan.

²⁸ The markedness of a member of a semantic or grammatical opposition can be defined in several ways. Morphological markedness applies when a linguistic item has more morphological material than the other item(s), e.g. the Set 1 past tense marker stem + *pa.yin* in contrast to the bare stem. Functional markedness applies when an item is specifically used for a particular function and for this function only, such as *hdug* for visual or more immediate sense perceptions and *rag* for non-visual or less immediate sense perceptions. Informational (or statistical) markedness applies when an item is less frequent than the other item(s). Female designations or titles, e.g., are typically less frequent than the male designations, they are thus informationally marked. When the male term is used as a generic term, the female term is also functionally marked, as it excludes male beings. For the different notions of markedness, see Zwicky (1978).

with respect to SPEAKER ATTITUDE.²⁹ It is this paradox, which makes it so difficult for outsiders to understand the system.

Domain	Set 1: MSAP assertive	Set 2: OTHER	
		directly observed	'neutral'
identificatory copula	<i>yin</i>	<i>red</i> ^S , GEM ^L , SEM ^L ³⁰	
future	<i>yin</i>	—	<i>red</i>
past/ anterior ³¹ (stem II)	<i>pa.yin</i>	bleached verbs	<i>pa.red</i>
attributive copula	<i>yin</i>	<i>ɥdug</i>	<i>red</i>
existential, possession	<i>yod</i>	<i>ɥdug</i>	—
present/ simultaneous	<i>yod</i>	<i>ɥdug</i>	—
perfect/ resultative	<i>yod</i>	<i>ɥdug</i>	—
All domains		OTHER	
evaluative markers (EM)		<i>yin, yod</i> + EM, <i>red</i> + <i>ɥdug/bžag</i> ^S	
quotation/ hearsay		<i>verbum dicendi: zer</i> ^S , <i>lo</i> ^L	

Table 1 Prototypical use of prototypical Tibetan ‘evidentials’ (schematic overview)³²

The notion of egophoric marking as defined by Tournadre (1996) for Standard Spoken Tibetan crosscuts the opposition of Set 1 and Set 2 markers set up above. According to his definitions, there are four quite different types of ‘egophoric’ markers:

- (a) The linking verbs and auxiliaries *yin* and *yod*, that is, the Set 1 markers, indicate the MSAP’s active involvement in, and/or responsibility for, and/or intimate acquaintance with, the situation.
- (b) The bleached verb *byun* ‘come’, indicates the MSAP’s passive involvement as being the goal of some kind of movement towards him or her (e.g. when receiving or perceiving some-

²⁹ That is, they can only be used for intimate or authoritative knowledge, but that does not mean that the Set 2 markers or the evaluative markers cannot be used for this type of knowledge. To the contrary, pragmatic considerations, e.g. of social adequacy, may force the speaker to scale down his or her statement through the use of evaluative markers or, less frequently, even the use of Set 2 markers.

³⁰ The GEM or ‘generalised evaluative marker’ (Shamskat *in(t)suk*, Leh *inok*, Kenhat *hinak, hindak*), commonly used in the ‘explanatory’ mood must be used for identifications through visual sense perception, see also examples (2) and (8), while the SEM or ‘special evaluative marker’ (Balti *inman*, Western Purik *inɖak*, Sham *inak*, Kenhat *hindarak, hinrak*) must be used for identifications through non-visual sense-perceptions. One could argue that these identifications actually constitute more abstract inferences as identities cannot be immediately perceived.

³¹ Most Tibetan languages do not have markers for absolute tense (future, past, present), but for relative tense: posterior, simultaneous, anterior to a given reference point, event, or situation. The default reference point, however, is the utterance time, see Zeisler (2004, part II and III) for a detailed discussion.

³² That is, Standard Spoken Tibetan and Ladakhi. The superscripts indicate language- or dialect-specific use: “S” for Standard Spoken Tibetan, “L” for Ladakhi, “K” for some of the more eastern Kenhat dialects of Ladakh. As the auxiliaries undergo phonetic changes and may become contracted and/ or assimilated, I shall use their written equivalents in the general discussion.

thing). *byuy* contrasts with the *allophoric* bleached verb *soy* ‘went’, indicating a movement away from the speaker. In that case, the MSAP may be merely an observer or may be passively involved as the source of the movement (e.g. in the case of losing or forgetting something). Both markers are used for past events or results, directly perceived by the speaker who is not in control of, or responsible for, the situation. As evidential and attitudinal markers, they belong thus to the domain of non-commitment or non-authoritative knowledge, and are treated here as Set 2 markers.

- (c) The still lexical verb *myoy* ‘taste, experience’ indicates that the MSAP has personally experienced a certain situation. As in the case of other perception and mental state verbs, the MSAP is only passively involved, but unlike these other verbs, the experience can only be ascribed to the MSAP. Ladakhi speakers use the verb *šes* ‘know’ in the same context, which, as a lexical verb, is not restricted to the MSAP.
- (d) Endopathic perceptions of body states, such as feeling cold or feeling hunger, and mental states, such as feeling happy or sad (or surprised), are by this definition likewise egophoric, as only the MSAP has privileged access to these states. These perceptions are treated like all other perceptions, that is, they are marked with *hdug* (or its equivalents) in most of the Modern Tibetic languages or by the marker for non-visual sense perception *rag*, as in Ladakhi. In Tournadre’s system, *rag* is, in fact, treated as an ‘egophoric’ marker (and this misleading treatment is followed up in San Roque, Floyd, & Norcliffe 2018: 22f., 43).

The treatment of the last three contexts (b)–(d) as ‘egophoric’ may be useful, particularly for languages in which the same marker is used in all four contexts or where a specific marker is used for any of the contexts (b)–(d), which is then again used only for the MSAP.³³ For the Tibetic languages, the classification as ‘egophoric’ is problematic or at least not very helpful, because *hdug* and *rag* would then be at the same time egophoric and non-egophoric markers, depending on the context. Treating contexts (a)–(d) indiscriminately as egophoric also blurs the main evidential and attitudinal distinction between the MSAP’s intimate knowledge of, active involvement in, or even accepted responsibility for, the situation described with Set 1 markers and all other situations, where the MSAP cannot, or does not want to, claim to have intimate knowledge, active involvement, or responsibility.

The opposition of forms used for the MSAP (Set 1) and OTHER (Set 2) is usually also found in the domain of future tense, although this should fall outside the category of EVIDENTIALITY in a strict sense, and some scholars, e.g. Sun (1993), have thus excluded future tense forms from discussion. But this fact could equally well be taken as evidence that the opposition is not one in terms of EVIDENTIALITY or not of EVIDENTIALITY alone. One may say, however, that Set 1 forms refer to future events planned by the MSAP, whereas Set 2 forms refer to mere predictions, expectations, or inferences, based on some personal observation.

The Tibetic quote markers clearly started grammaticalising later than the evidential markers. The 15th c. *Milaraspa rnamthar*, e.g., shows a not yet fully developed semi-evidential system, that is, a distinction between Set 1 and Set 2 auxiliaries in certain tense forms, but no fixed way of re-

³³ This may be the case in languages where the encoding of the MSAP’s perspective is less flexible and more closely tight to the speech act role. An example for such a language is the Barbacoan language Cha’palaa, spoken in Ecuador, see Floyd (2018).

porting. Similarly there does not seem to be a fixed way of marking inferences: inferences may either be marked with the more or less admirative (*-par*)-*hdug* construction (see also section 4.6) or through various combinations of the auxiliaries (Zeisler 2014, 2018). This is again somewhat against the cross-linguistic expectation that markers of ‘indirect’ evidence grammaticalise before markers of direct evidence, and that quote markers grammaticalise before inferential markers, as suggested by de Haan (2008: 69).

Most of the Tibetic evidential markers are semantically opaque, that is, they have nothing to do with perceptions (*see, hear, feel*) or with mental activities, but are mainly derived from linking verbs, in some varieties additionally from motion and deposit verbs. In particular, in the case of *hdug*, the notion of immediate (visual) perception is expressed by a linking verb, which is derived from a lexical verb with the meaning ‘stay, dwell, sit’. The exceptions are the markers for hearsay or reported speech (*verba dicendi*) and the marker *snaj* ‘appear’, which is used in place of *hdug* in the Ldumra and some Balti dialects and in several Central Tibetan and Amdo varieties. The inferential and distance markers are likewise opaque. Only the probability marker *hgro*, derived from a verb meaning ‘go’ is etymologically transparent, although most speakers would not be aware of this meaning, especially not the Ladakhi speakers, who use a different motion verb.

In his invited speech at the conference Evidentiality and Modality in European languages, Madrid 2014, Ronald W. Langacker has proposed the following four-layered schemes for evidential systems (Fig. 2–Fig. 4). These represent a layered cognitive structure that can be described in terms of mental distance or closeness or as a kind of epistemic hierarchy, starting with the innermost core on the left side and ending with the outermost periphery at the right side. Fig. 2 gives only the abstract conceptual structure, while Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the instantiations in two different languages. In Langacker’s view then, internal knowledge is more central (or perhaps more privileged) than (mere) perception, this again is more central or less peripheral than inference, and the latter is less peripheral than quotation. Similarly direct perception is more central (or privileged) than non-visual perception, etc.




Fig. 2 Substrate (Langacker 2014)




Fig. 3 Eastern Pomo (Langacker 2014)




Fig. 4 Shibipo-Konibo (Langacker 2014)

The Ladakhi system, however, is even more complex, showing at least six, if not – with the distance markers – seven conceptual layers, see Fig. 5. As already mentioned, internal knowledge of one's physical and mental states is treated like other non-visual perceptions. This will be represented by a hatched area. In Ladakhi, the conceptual hierarchy is not necessarily one of epistemic certainty: quotations do not have any connotation of hedging or uncertainty. Rather it is a hierarchy of mental distance and authority, and the content of quotations does not fall under the authority of the speaker.

Except for the last layer of the quote marker, this representation also indicates a conceptual hierarchy in terms of epistemic force: each subsequent layer to the right describes knowledge that is somewhat less certain than the preceding one. The quote marker has been positioned at the right most end, because it is an additional marker that has scope over all others. It also denies authority and responsibility for the content, and in this sense corresponds to the most distanced stance. In a purely epistemic hierarchy, it would share the same position as visual perception: ego > internal > visual, quote > non-visual > inference > distance > estimation, guessing, expressions of probability.




Fig. 5 Conceptual layers of knowledge and authority in Ladakhi

ego	internal	visual	non-visual	inference	distance	probability	quote
Shamskat							
<i>yod</i> <i>yin</i>	<i>rag</i>	<i>hdug</i>	<i>rag</i>	<i>sug</i> ³⁴ <i>bug</i> ³⁶	<i>kha.yin.sug</i> ³⁵	<i>sed, haŋ, (hgro)</i> (<i>thig</i> + AUX) gerundive + AUX <i>tug</i> ³⁷	<i>lo</i>
Kenhat							
<i>yod</i> <i>yin</i>	<i>rag</i>	<i>hdug</i>	<i>rag</i>	<i>tog</i> ³⁸ <i>ka.yin.hag</i> ⁴⁰ <i>hog~hag</i> ⁴¹	<i>sug</i> ³⁹	<i>hgro, haŋ</i> <i>thig</i> + AUX gerundive + AUX	<i>lo</i>

Table 2 Distribution of the markers for the evidential layers in Ladakhi

Recent and less recent research into ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan (Tournadre 1994, Hill 2013) as well as into West Tibetan (Bielmeier 2000, Zeisler 2012b) has further shown that the choice of the markers in question is highly flexible and not always depending on the sources of knowledge. Often, if not always, the choice reflects the commitment the MSAP is willing or is expected to take, as well as notions of voluntary involvement. This question certainly needs further discussion and more detailed research in all Tibetic varieties. Here, I can only speak about the Ladakhi dialects, which show already quite some variation.

This flexibility, which is not only exploited for mirative meanings, but for various pragmatic effects, speaks clearly against any description in terms of conjunct/disjunct or even some kind of

³⁴ Used with present tense forms, past tense, and perfect (spoken /suk/ ~ /sok/ or with epenthetic *t*: /tsuk/ ~ /tsok/, written representation also *tshug*). Also used for generic statements in the ‘explanatory’ mood.

³⁵ Used with stem I (.PRS) or II (.PA) (spoken /kha(i)ntsuk/ ~ /kha(i)ntsok/).

³⁶ For future time reference.

³⁷ For future time reference with a connotation of fear or hope; also used for past time counterfactual situations.

³⁸ Used with past tense. Certain dialects have the alloforms: /tok/, /dok/, /rok/ or /tuk/, /duk/, /ruk/.

³⁹ Used with present tense forms (pronunciation and written representation as in n. 34).

⁴⁰ Used with present tense forms, past tense, and perfect. In Leh, the form appears as /kjak/, elsewhere as /ka(na)k/. The latter form assimilates partly to the preceding syllable final.

⁴¹ For future time reference and generic statements in the ‘explanatory’ mood.

person-related congruence (cf. also Floyd, Norcliffe, San Roque 2018: 50–52). Such descriptions are completely misleading with respect to the Tibetic languages (cf. Tournadre 2008).

The common cross-linguistic notion of *direct* knowledge (as opposed to inference and hearsay) does not really match the Tibetic system: knowledge about one's own controlled actions and about situations under one's control is certainly the most direct knowledge a speaker can have. Bergqvist (2018: 32–33) describes it as “the highest form of direct evidential, outranking forms that target the visual/auditory/sensory perception of the speaker. Sandmann (2018: 177–178) calls it the most immediate. But this type of knowledge is treated differently from immediate perception. To make things even more complicated, intimate or authoritative knowledge is to a certain degree *formally* treated like inferences, guesses, and generally shared knowledge. Both types are expressed by the Set 1 auxiliaries, the former without, the latter with additional morphological material. This might account for an opposition in terms of internal knowledge (ego-centred and inferred) and external knowledge (perceived).

Knowledge based on mere perception, on the other hand, is perceived as not being authoritative or fully reliable and it can well have the semantic function of inferential knowledge, that is, the identity or character of the items of the outer world are inferred from what they look like, which may not correspond to their ‘true’ identity or character. The inferential character of *hdug* in Ladakhi can be demonstrated with its use for internal body states of OTHER. These are only inferred from visible symptoms, such as shivering, yawning, or the like.

As I can judge from remarks by different reviewers on different publications, it seems to be not very intuitive that mere sense perception does not lead to authoritative knowledge. Quite evidently, as one reviewer for this article states, the claim that one has seen something with one's own eyes constitutes a claim of relatively high certainty, but certainty alone does not automatically yield the ‘right’ to make an authoritative assertion.

One aspect of the problem is, in fact, an epistemic one. A single sense perception or a restricted number of sense perceptions of a stranger's behaviour cannot lead to as strong a conviction as, say, a life-long observation of one's family members. Compared to the latter, the conviction that arises from knowledge of one's own volitional actions is again much stronger. As Norcliffe (2018: 326 with further references) stresses, knowledge of others (through observation) always implies the identification of an individuum, and is thus potentially prone to misidentifications.⁴² Selfknowledge, on the other hand, is not in need of identification; it is “immediate and immune to error through misidentification” (Norcliffe 2018: 326). Selfknowledge is furthermore so immediate that it lacks any connotation of possible doubt or of the necessity of justification by reasoning or experiments (I draw this argument from Malcom 1991, who refers to Wittgenstein's essay *On certainty*). The content of such ‘knowing’ (which is no longer knowing in a philosophical sense) is beyond doubt or simply *not at issue* (unhintergebar), that is, it cannot be challenged by others in the sense of *you cannot know this*. Some philosophers go even further, claiming that sense perception is generally not trust-worthy. At least, it *can be* quite misleading, as when we perceive the full moon as having the shape and size of a coin, whereas one can know for sure by inference and reasoning (including

⁴² See also Garrett (2001: 160; ultimately, the argument goes back to Wittgenstein *Philosophical investigations* and *The blue and brown books*).

mathematical calculation) that it is a globe and of much greater size.⁴³ Indirect knowledge *can* thus lead to much more reliable knowledge than direct knowledge.

Another aspect, and the more crucial one, is that of social interaction and the right, so to speak, to claim personal and/ or authoritative knowledge. In Ladakhi and other modern Tibetic languages, there is a fundamental difference between what I can state about myself, my family, or people and things I am responsible for or intimately acquainted with and what I can state about other people or items that I don't know so well. There is additionally a difference between what I can say about my family members and how I want to position myself towards a certain fact concerning them. Reasons of politeness or the feeling of social inferiority will further lead me to scale down my stance of authority, cf. examples (12), (14), and (15) below. Furthermore, Ladakhi speakers commonly use an evaluative marker in the 'explanatory' mood for all kinds of knowledge, including personal one, signalling an invitation to the addressee to share one's knowledge or also indicating that the knowledge in question is, at least theoretically, accessible to everybody. All this has nothing to do with truth and certainty or reliability, but with a prescribed attitude towards the addressee and, within one's 'legal' choices, also with one's personally chosen attitude of identification with, or distance towards, certain facts. Slater (2018: 227), describes this effect similarly as the wish of the speaker "to associate him- or herself closely with the event" or, by contrast to distance him- or herself from the event reported.

Knowledge based on a limited number of sense perceptions can be compared with the accidental outcome of an experiment that cannot be reproduced. However convinced the scientist may be that the outcome is correct because s/he observed it, s/he lacks a generally accepted proof and cannot claim authority. If s/he does, this claim will be rejected. On the other hand, a humble person or a newcomer in the field, might present a well established proof rather cautiously in modest terms.

The same happens when the linguistic tourist in Ladakh, BZ, talks about a situation outside her personal sphere with Set 1 markers as if that situation was not just only observed. While other mistakes often go uncommented, this one may yield quite a sharp reaction. On the other hand, while she may talk about her family and home country with Set 1 markers, this would rather signal her (impolite or arrogant) disinterest in giving further details. Conversely, using an evaluative marker in questions concerning the addressee's personal sphere signals friendly curiosity as opposed to an authoritative inquisition with Set 1 markers.

In the system of Tibetic languages, knowledge based on mere sense perception overarches the boundary between direct and indirect knowledge in the cross-linguistic sense and shares the property of non-commitment with indirect knowledge. Its markers may thus also have mirative connotations, see Table 3. The latter table is not meant to insinuate that there is only one evidential system among the non-Tibetic languages, or that there is only one uniform evidential system among the Tibetic languages. The main point here is to visualise the treatment of expressions for immediate sense perceptions in the cross-linguistic discussion as opposed to how we should treat the expressions for sense perceptions in most Tibetic languages.

⁴³ This argument is found in Al-Ghazali (*Al-munqidh min ad-dalāl*) and Descartes (*Meditationes de prima philosophia*), but a similar devaluation of mere sense perception was also promoted by Platon.

Type/language	Direct		Indirect (\pm mirative connotations)	
cross-linguistic EVIDENTIALITY	own activities	observed situations	inference	second hand information
Tibetic/Ladakhi	own/ controlled activities	observed situations	inference	second hand information
		(\pm admirative connotations ⁴⁴)	(-admirative)	
	Authoritative		Non-authoritative	

Table 3 Basic evidential oppositions in comparison

A similar set of oppositions has also been described for a several other languages. Some Mongolian, Turkic, and Sinitic languages of the Amdo Sprachbund adopted the Tibetic system (Georg 2001, Sandmann & Simon 2016 with further references, Fried 2018). Even Khalkha Mongolian seems to have developed towards a Tibetic system, Brosig (2018). ‘Participatory’ knowledge as a separate category has been described for a few other languages, such as the New Guinea Highlands languages Oksapmin, Foe, and Fasu (San Roque & Loughnane 2012, see also Floyd, Norcliffe, & San Roque 2018). However, it is not always clear how far the marker for (visual) sense perception would involve connotations of non-commitment in these languages.

Table 1 above gives only a over-simplified picture. Under certain conditions, forms that are listed for the MSAP (+ctr) can be used for OTHER and *vice versa*. Such usages are less frequent and highly marked, indicating a pragmatically licensed or even enforced situational loss of control or authority of the MSAP or a pragmatically licensed situational acquisition of control or authority over OTHER by the MSAP.

In Table 4 the non-prototypical usages are given in shaded cells. Brackets indicate that the usage is quite rare and/ or may be restricted to the Ladakhi dialects.

⁴⁴ In Ladakhi, all verbal forms can have admirative overtones when used in a non-prototypical way, see § 4.4.1. However, it is more common for the markers of immediate sense perception and inferences to appear with these overtones, than for the markers of personal or authoritative knowledge. Admirative usage with the Set 1 markers is not accepted by all speakers and may be restricted to particular dialects. Nothing can be said about other Tibetic languages.

Domain	Set 1:		Set 2:		
	<i>yin / yod</i>		<i>hdug / rag</i>		<i>red</i>
identificatory copula	MSAP	OTHER	—		OTHER MSAP
future	MSAP	OTHER	—		OTHER MSAP
past/ anterior	MSAP	OTHER	—		OTHER MSAP
attributive copula	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	(MSAP)	OTHER MSAP
existential, possession	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP	—
present/ simultaneous	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	(MSAP)	—
perfect/ resultative	MSAP	OTHER	OTHER	MSAP	—
All domains			Other markers:		
Evaluative markers (EM) ⁴⁵			OTHER		MSAP
Quotation/hearsay			OTHER		(MSAP)

Table 4 Prototypical and non-prototypical use of Central and Western Tibetan ‘evidentials’

In view of the Ladakhi data, one could perhaps replace the notions of MSAP and OTHER with the stance of assumed authority or commitment and the non-authoritative or non-committed stance. The authoritative or committed stance would be the restricted and hence informationally marked category, cf. Table 5.

Arguably, the main opposition is between authoritative or committed statements and non-authoritative or non-committed statements. On the side of non-commitment, there is only a gradual difference between knowledge based on immediate sense perception (which involves some kind of inference as to its reliability), knowledge based on inferences (themselves based on immediate sensual input), and knowledge based on more abstract reasoning. As a result, the Ladakhi markers for sense perception and those for inference based on immediate sensual input are to a certain extent interchangeable. Historical evidence suggests that the markers for visual perception and those for inference and/ or distance (non-commitment) are etymologically related (see also section 4.6), and it further seems that the actual experiential markers grammaticalised only when the erstwhile admiring markers lost part of their apparentative or experiential component.

⁴⁵ See Table 2 above for an overview over the Ladakhi markers for inference, distance, and probability.

Domain	Non-experiential Set 1 / compound forms: <Set 1 + EM>		Experiential Set 2
	Authoritative/ committed	Non-authoritative/ non-committed, polite, kindly	
	self-centred, intimate	inference etc.	perception
identificatory copula	<i>yin</i>	< <i>yin</i> + EM>	(< <i>yin</i> + GEM>)
future	<i>yin</i>	<gerundive + <i>yin</i> > / < <i>yin</i> + EM>	—
past/ anterior (stem II)	<i>pin</i> (< <i>pa.yin</i>)	+ EM	∅
attributive copula	<i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i>	< <i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i> + EM>	<i>hdug</i> / <i>rag</i>
existential, possession	<i>yod</i>	< <i>yod</i> + EM>	<i>hdug</i> / <i>rag</i>
present/ simultaneous	<i>yod</i> / <i>yin</i>	< <i>yod</i> / <i>yin</i> + EM>	<i>hdug</i> / <i>rag</i>
perfect/ resultative	<i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i>	< <i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i> + EM>	<i>hdug</i> / <i>rag</i>
prospective	<i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i>	< <i>yin</i> / <i>yod</i> + EM>	<i>hdug</i> / <i>rag</i>
All domains		External authority: quotation/ hearsay <i>verba dicendi</i>	

Table 5 Pragmatically conditioned use of ‘evidentials’ in Ladakhi

4.3 *Mirative and not-so-mirative usages of the auxiliary hdug in Ladakhi*⁴⁶

It is certainly true that *hdug*, the marker for visual perception, *can* have a connotation of mild surprise, particularly when it is used in a non-typical way (but as I shall show below, this is not restricted to the use of *hdug* alone). The same holds for the use of *rag*, the marker for non-visual perception. The standard mirative situation, also described by DeLancey, is that upon looking into one’s purse or upon grasping around in one’s pocket the speaker realises that s/he has not any money with him/her or that s/he finds some coins against his/her expectation. In such cases, it is only natural that the perceptive channels dominate the choice of the auxiliary – as there is no other channel available – due to lack of memory. Lack of memory is further incompatible with an authoritative stance. In example (1), the doubling of the linking verb intensifies the notion of surprise.

- (1) Teya (FD 2013)
o *ŋa·(:)* *pene* *duk-mi-nuk.*
 intj I.AES money have.S2v-NG-have.S2v⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Most of the examples that will be presented in the following are elicited. These are marked with “FD” (Field Data). Other examples come from recordings and from my observations and interactions in the field.

⁴⁷ The existential linking verbs take different case frames, depending on whether they describe only the localisation or existence of an item or the possession of an item. In the first case, the location is typically marked by a semantically more specific postposition (*in*, *at*, *on*, etc.). In the second case, the ‘location’ is the (experiencer) subject, marked with the aesthetic as subject case.

no-a·(:) *ʃi* *no-et?*
 buy-NLS·LOC what buy-S1e=PRS⁴⁸

‘Oh (I see), I have no money [with me], at all. [So] how can I buy anything?’

Both markers appear also with an *admirative* meaning of, e.g., embarrassment, as in the following example from an oral version of the Kesar epic. The main personage is a trickster figure, who, particularly in his youth, hides his divine nature under the disguise of an ugly and, in the eyes of his contemporaries, illegitimate child. He is thus deprived of his heritage, a fact about which he complains:

(2) Stok (1996, *Kesar epic*)

ta *ŋa-nik* *ama* *Gogza* *Lam·e* *ʃhugu,*
 now I-TOP mother Gogza Lamo·GEN child

mōan-i *ʃanʃhuk* *inok.*
 woman.bad-GEN street.child be.GEM

ŋa·(:) *ʃfig-ek* *mane* *mi-rak.*
 I·AES one-LQ ever NG-have.S2nv

ŋaza·(:) *mane* *sakjat* *mane* *mi-ruk. [...]*
 we.excl·AES ever land ever NG-have.S2v

neza-s [...] *tene* *ŋa·(:)-aŋ* *sakjat-ʃfik* *sal-gos-(s)ok!*
 you.excl-ERG then I·LOC-FM land-LQ hon.give-must-INF

‘Now, as for me, I am just mother Gogza Lhamo’s child, I am just a street child, born to a despicable mother. *To my dismay*, I do not possess a single thing (on my body), at all! *To our dismay*, we [mother and I] do not have any land, at all! [...] You folk [...] have to give me a piece of land!’

In the context of the story, the speaker does not just find out about these facts, but is certainly familiar with them. One could thus have expected the use of the non-experiential form *yod* for the meaning ‘have’ in both cases. The use of the experiential forms *rag* and *hdug* has an admirative connotation: the speaker does not approve the situation. He challenges his uncles and claims his share of land. The surprising (and embarrassing) fact is the social situation as such, not just something newly perceived. While *hdug* refers to potentially visible items, the landholdings, *rag* refers to items the speaker could carry and thus feel close to his body, such as dresses, jewellery, weapons, or silver. The generalised evaluative marker (GEM) *yin.nog* can have a deferential, polite function. It may also have the connotation: *as everybody knows*. In this context, it is likewise used with a mira-

⁴⁸ Note, the equal sign “=” does not mark clitics, but a functional equivalence relation (i.e., “functions as”, e.g., present, as in this case). The verbal tense and modal categories consist of complex combinations of morphemes that often do not have a describable function of their own and may vary in different contexts. E.g., there is no present tense morpheme, but only different present tense constructions (stem + auxiliary, stem + NLS + auxiliary, or stem + CNT + auxiliary), the negation of which is different (stem + NLS + negated auxiliary). Similarly, there is no ‘perfect’ morpheme, but only a perfect construction (stem + CP + auxiliary, negated in several ways: the most common is: stem + CP + negated auxiliary – this construction may have also a different compound reading, some dialects prefer thus: negated stem + NLS + auxiliary, while with certain verbs also the construction: negated stem + CP + auxiliary is allowed). The nominaliser and the auxiliaries are the same in the present tense and perfect construction. Without auxiliary, the conjunct participle is commonly used to join clauses. See also the section Abbreviations and conventions at the end.

tive connotation, in place of *hdug*, which cannot be used as an identificatory copula (cf. also example (8)).

More often, *hdug* and *rag* are used rather neutrally, just to specify through which presently *dominant* information channel the information is processed:

(3) Leh (daily interaction)

<i>tharmos-inaṅa</i>	<i>ṽa</i>	<i>taruṅ</i>	<i>rag-a</i>	<i>mi-rak?</i>
thermos.flask-PPOS.LOC	tea	still	exist.S2nv-QM	NG-exist.S2nv

‘Is there still [some] tea in the thermos flask or not?’

While uttering this sentence, the speaker might take up the flask and shake it to feel whether there is some liquid left. S/he might also expect the addressee to do so or to have done so a moment before. If s/he would take out the cork and peep through the opening or if s/he expects the addressee to do so, s/he would use the existential verb for visual experience *hdug*:

(4) Leh (daily interaction)

<i>tharmos-inaṅa</i>	<i>ṽa</i>	<i>taruṅ</i>	<i>dug-a</i>	<i>mi-nuk?</i>
thermos.flask-PPOS.LOC	tea	still	exist.S2v-QM	NG-exist.S2v

‘Is there still [some] tea in the thermos flask or not?’

The speaker would not be surprised if the answer were either yes or no, and s/he would not expect the addressee to be surprised, when finding out about the fact. The answer does not contain any unexpected content. Quite often, the question is of a more rhetorical nature, rather than about new information.

The speaker may also use the non-experiential form *yod*, if s/he does not want to make a closer inspection, but rather tries to recall the last state of the flask or if s/he wants the addressee to do so. This would be particularly common when asking about the tea or water in the addressee’s cup. It is expected that unlike in the case of the thermos flask, where one can easily lose track of the filling state, particularly if several people take from it, the addressee has a clear memory about the filling state of his or her cup and does not need to check. The answer would be as expected or unexpected as in the other two cases.

(5) Gya (daily interaction)

<i>ṅeraṅ-a</i>	<i>taruṅ</i>	<i>ṽhuhol</i>	<i>ḥor-a?</i>
hon.you-AES	still	water.boiled	have.S1e-QM

‘Do you still have [enough] boiled water?’ (The addressee is expected to know without looking.)

Just when I reached Ladakh in 2014, my landlady told me about some other guests, who had left for trekking the day before:

(6) Leh (2014, conversation)

<i>khon</i>	<i>trekiṅ-a</i>	<i>soṅ-ste-jot</i>	[...]
they	trekking-LOC	go.PA-CP-S1e=PERF	

<i>khon-e</i>	<i>ḍgola</i>	<i>bor-te-duk</i>
they-ERG/GEN	bag	put-CP-S2v=PERF

‘They have gone/ went trekking. [...] They have left/ left their bags [in the room over there].’

What immediately caught my ear was the use of different auxiliaries for the two elements of a complex situation, which as a whole could be expected to be based on the same type of knowledge. I knew already, that if part of the event left the visual field or, with de Haan (2005), the deictic space of the speaker, the auxiliary *hdug* could no longer be used. In such cases, the choice of auxiliaries does not indicate a difference in terms of the newness or even unexpectedness of the situation, but simply the accessibility or non-accessibility of the whole situation via sense perception (cf. also Zeisler 2012b, exx. 38 and 39). Since the persons had gone trekking, they were no longer accessible to visual experience. As two friends confirmed the next day, the use of *hdug* in the first part of the statement “does not make sense” (Khardong, Teya FD 2014) and would be ungrammatical.

What puzzled me, however, was the use of *hdug* in the second part of the sentence, because when my landlady uttered the sentence, we were sitting in the kitchen and the bags were supposed to be in the store room. Neither of us could see them. When I asked my friends about this usage, they found it perfectly in order, but had difficulties to explain the reason. The first answer was that the bag “has to be there, we have to see it” (Khardong, FD 2014), which obviously did not fit the situation. Another option, suggested by me on the base of earlier fieldwork and accepted by my friends, was that the visual experience of the bag in the store room could be made again at any time, that is, the situation was still in a way accessible to visual experience (cf. Zeisler 2012b, ex. 37) – in contrast to the persons who were far away from the house.

However, when I put the question differently, namely whether the auxiliary *yod* could also be applied, it turned out that in this specific context, the usage would not be related to the kind of experience, that is the invisibility of the bags. The use of *yod* would rather implicate that the speaker “is responsible for the bags and has to take care” (Khardong, FD 2014).

Interestingly enough, when my landlady talked about the situation ten days later, she said casually:

- (7) Leh (2014, conversation)
kh·e *ɕzola* *bor-te-jot*.
 s/he·GEN/ERG bag put-CP-**S1**e=PERF
 ‘S/he has left/ left his/her bag(s) [in the room over there].’

While there was no change in the way, she had acquired the knowledge, s/he apparently no longer had access to the visual impression of the first days, and she drew the knowledge only from her memory. The loss of visual access could then override the notion of non-responsibility. Alternatively, one might say that she became used to the presence of the bag(s) to the extent that it or they fell into her conceptual sphere of possessing (though not of owing). A further possible interpretation is that the situation was no longer at issue, because she had already told me about it.

While walking in a traditional Ladakhi dress, I happened to overhear some passers-by commenting among themselves this unusual or surprising situation:

- (8) Anonymous (2014, overheard)
kho *ʃhiringjalpa* *inok!* / *intsok!*
 s/he foreigner be.GEM be.GEM(Sham)
 ‘[But] she is a foreigner!’

It should be noted that in this context of identification, neither *hdug* nor *yod* could be used (see also Table 1 above). The speakers thus used the generalised evaluative marker in a situation of immediate visual experience to indicate their surprise (cf. also line 2 of example (2)).

When I tried to emulate this situation with my friends, asking them what they would say, if they suddenly saw an elephant through the window, a rather unlikely event in Ladakh, they gave me a version that focused on the activity of the animal rather than on the identity. The verb had the auxiliary *hdug*, just as DeLancey would have expected:

- (9) Teya (FD 2014)
karkuŋ-p-iaŋ *laŋpoŋŋhe* *ŋha-ruk!*
 window-DF·PPOS.LOC elephant go.PRS-**S2v**=PRS
 ‘Through (lit. in) the window, (I see) an elephant walking!’

However, when I discussed this example with another informant from Domkhar, it turned out that in the dialects of Lower Ladakh, one could use both *hdug* and *yod* in this situation. The auxiliary *hdug* would be used when the speaker, who observes the situation alone, tries to draw the attention of the addressee to this situation. *yod* would be used when both speaker and addressee are observing the event together.⁴⁹ This was later also confirmed by the speaker from Teya:

- (10) Domkhar (FD 2014)
ŋtos-aŋ! *ar-ekana* *laŋpoŋŋhe* *ŋh-et!*
 look.IMP-DM over.there·PPOS.ABL⁵⁰ elephant go.PRS-**S1e**=PRS
 ‘Look, over there, there is an elephant walking!’

- (11) Domkhar (FD 2014)
ar-ekana *laŋpoŋŋhe* *ŋh-et,* *d-o-a!*
 over.there·PPOS.ABL elephant go.PRS-**S1e** that·DF-LOC
 ‘Wow, [look] at that,⁵¹ over there, there is an elephant walking!’

These examples show in a nutshell that various different factors trigger the choice of the auxiliaries:

- *hdug* is typically used for newly perceived situations relating to OTHER. Its usage may go along with a weaker or stronger notion of surprise or non-commitment, as in (2) and (9), but this is not the standard usage.
- The use of *hdug* is not obligatory in unexpected situations, *yod* can or must be used as well, depending on the dialect and the presumed knowledge state of the addressee, examples (10) and (11).
- Where *hdug* (and *yod*) cannot be used, namely in identifications, the generalised evaluative marker is used with the same connotation of surprise, as in (8).⁵²

⁴⁹ This effect seems to be restricted to the dialects of Sham, Mulbekh (western Purik), Turtuk (eastern Balti) and the Balti dialect surveyed by Jones (2009), most probably Kharmang (eastern Balti).

⁵⁰ The ablative marker takes the form /na/ in Balti, Purik, and the Sham dialects. In these dialects, the ablative marker is homophonous with the comitative marker /na/.

⁵¹ For the exclamative usage of the locational marker, cf. also section 4.4.6 below.

- Furthermore, the choice of *hdug* does not always depend on the newness of the experience, but on the re-accessibility of the situation via sense perception, examples (6) and (7).
- The choice of the Set 1 and Set 2 markers may also depend on whether the speaker claims or accepts responsibility for the situation, cf. the comments to example (6).
- The choice of the Set 1 and Set 2 markers may also be socially conditioned and may thus depend on whether the speaker wants or feels allowed to make an authoritative statement, see (12) below.

In the case of well-known generic facts and habits of OTHER, both *yod* and *hdug* are common. *yod* emphasises that the MSAP is well acquainted with the situation, that s/he assumes authority (e.g. in a warning statement), that the situation belongs to his or her cultural sphere, that the situation is exceptionless, or that it applies to a limited set of individuals. For example, if one uses *yod* in the statement *all cats catch mice*, the set of ‘all cats’ is restricted to the cats in the neighbourhood or in the village. One would use *hdug* (or an evaluative marker) when speaking about *all cats in the world*, just because one hasn’t seen all of them. A fictional mouse mother, however, could warn her children authoritatively with the auxiliary *yod* that *beware, all cats in the world catch mice!* And the same would hold for warnings uttered by not so fictional human parents or teachers.

By contrast, *hdug* may indicate that the situation is not fully exceptionless or that it applies to a non-limited set of individuals – hence the MSAP does not feel to have enough authority to make a general claim. *hdug* may also indicate that the MSAP wants to distance him- or herself from a well-known habit or custom within the family or his or her cultural sphere. In all such cases, *hdug* does not convey the notion that the knowledge of the habit or generic fact is new (or even surprising), rather it conveys a strong notion of non-commitment.

In example (12), the use of *hdug* is triggered by considerations of politeness: using the auxiliary *yod*, would have left Standzin, who was present, no chance to save face, as it would have indicated that the habit is exceptionless and also that the speaker has a better, more authoritative, knowledge about the character of Standzin than Standzin himself.

(12) Teya (2014, conversation)

<i>Standzin-la</i>	<i>spera</i>	<i>manbo</i>	<i>zer-na,</i>	<i>rdzet-yha-ruk.</i>
Standzin-LOC	speech	much	say-COND	forget-go.PRS-S2v=PRS

‘If you tell Standzin (too) many things, there is a chance that [he] forgets [half/ most/ all of it].’⁵³

When talking about a visible result of a non-witnessed event, both the markers for immediate perception and inference may be used.

(13) Domkhar (FD 2014)

<i>nono</i>	<i>malts-eanna</i>	<i>lanjs-e</i>	<i>joŋ-tsana,</i>
younger.brother	bed·PPOS.ABL	rise-CP	come-when

⁵² Another context, where *hdug* cannot be used in the Ladakhi dialects, would be that the speaker is on a journey and due to some complications suddenly finds him- or herself at an unexpected place. While speakers of Standard Spoken Tibetan might use *hdug* in this situation (Nicholas Tournadre, p.c.), Ladakhi speakers can only use *yod* plus an inferential marker.

⁵³ The notion of ‘there is a chance’ or even ‘danger’ results from the compounding with the verb *cha* (/ʃha/) ‘go’.

sa namkha·(:) laŋs-e-duk. / laŋs-(s)ok.
 hair sky·LOC rise-CP-S2v=PERF rise-INF

‘When [my] younger brother got out of bed and came (in), [his] hair stood on end (lit. rose towards the sky).’

According to the informant, the use of the experiential perfect with *hdug* indicates that the state endures and/ or has been observed for a while. The use of the inferential past, by contrast, focuses more on the (non-witnessed) transformation and the fact that one observes the resulting state just now (Domkhar, FD 2014). That means, however, that the knowledge expressed by the inferential past might be newer and possibly more surprising than the knowledge expressed by the experiential perfect with the auxiliary *hdug*.

Furthermore, there are contexts, where *hdug* is preferred over *yod* (and the GEM) for reasons of politeness. These usages are typically dialect-specific.

When speakers of the central dialects (spoken in and around Leh) meet on the road, the casual question *What are you doing?* takes the Set 2 marker *hdug* for the MSAP. The answer, however, is again with the Set 1 marker *yod*. In (14) from an educational radio play, two women have met on the road, talking about their daily business. A third woman comes onto the scene and utters the first question. After a discussion developed about junk food, another person, this time male, enters the scene and utters the second question.

(14) Leh (*nanyhsaŋsi digrim* 2015-06-21)

F3: «*dzule, niska fi dzad-(d)uk?*» ...
 greetings both what hon.do-S2v=PRS

M1: «*ja dzule, tshaŋka fi dzad-(d)uk le,*
 intj greetings all.three what hon.do-S2v=PRS hon

raŋtrug-a not-fas-i spera-rik taŋ-a?
 own.child-AES harm-GRD-GEN speech-LQ give-QM

‘F3: «Hello, what are [you] two doing [here]?» ... M1: «Hey, hello, what are the three of you doing [here], talking about what is harmful to one’s children?»’

The use of *hdug* in the above example is rejected by speakers of the more peripheral dialects in the east and west. Speakers of the western peripheral dialects, like Domkhar, however, may prefer *hdug* in contexts, where it is unacceptable for speakers from the central and eastern dialects.

(15) a. Domkhar (FD 2014)

ŋeraŋ-a kampjuŋar ŋul-ba-ŋan-(n)ug-a?
 hon.you-AES computer drive-NLS-be.able-S2v=PRS-QM

‘Do you by chance know/ Have you ever learned how to operate/ work on a computer?’

b. Domkhar (FD 2014)

ŋeraŋ-a kampjuŋar ŋul-ba-ŋan-b-at-a?
 hon.you-AES computer drive-NLS-be.able-NLS-S1e=PRS.HAB-QM

‘Are you able to operate/ work on a computer?’

According to the informant, the second construction (b) with the Set 1 marker *yod* (in the authoritative habitual *ba.yod* construction), is common among equals, but it is quite direct and, therefore, not suitable when addressing a person of higher status. Conversely, when a question of

type (b) is uttered by a person of higher status, it conveys the connotation of an expectation that the answer should be *yes*. Speakers may have difficulties to say *no* in such situations, and may thus try to avoid the answer or even resort to a lie. With the first construction (a) with the Set 2 marker *hdug*, the speaker expects less from the addressee, the question is more open to a negative answer, and it is thus easier for the addressee to say *no*.⁵⁴ Version (b) with the Set 1 marker *yod*, however, can also be used as a rhetorical question or even as an exclamation of surprise: *You are really able to work on a computer?!*

4.4 Other ways of expressing surprise and/or emotional involvement

4.4.1 Iconic marking of surprise and emotions

In many languages, the notion of surprise or counterexpectation, particularly if associated with some kind of positive or negative emotion, can be expressed *iconically* by the use of an unexpected or at least not prototypical choice of grammatical forms.

The choice of a grammatical form is unmarked if the form is usual or normal, i.e. if it appears more frequently than others, the choice is marked, when the form is unusual, i.e. less often or rarely employed, metaphorically used, or even violating the general rules. It thus signals a special meaning and a special emphasis, not conveyed by the normal use (Smith 1991: 16).

In other words, if functionally loaded expressions or grammatical forms are used in non-standard contexts or in deviation from the normal, ‘canonical’, or prototypical distribution or if conventions and grammatical rules are violated wilfully (e.g. in using an intransitive verb transitively⁵⁵), this *unexpected* usage sends a strong signal to the audience, that something is not exactly the way it should be.

The signal could be simply an intralinguistic one, indicating that the speaker is switching between foreground and background in a narration or that s/he switches between different interlocutionary moods. Weinrich (1964) speaks of ‘tense metaphors’ for the use of the ‘wrong’ tense forms in the respective interlocutionary moods of narrating and discussing (*Erzählen und Besprechen*). But the signal could also refer to extralinguistic facts, indicating that the reported or narrated fact is not exactly in conformity with the physical laws or the social expectations of speaker and/ or addressee. Instead of a metaphorical usage, one could also say that an unexpected linguistic sign *iconically* refers to an unexpected extralinguistic situation.

In the Tibetic languages, the iconic signals of emphasis comprise tense markers, case alternations, word order alternations, and shift of auxiliaries. Such non-prototypical choices not only

⁵⁴ See also Fried (2018: 220) for quite similar usages of the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ markers (corresponding to Set 1 and Set 2 respectively) in questions in Mangghuer. As the opposition between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ markers was acquired through the influence of Amdo Tibetan, one can presume that similar pragmatic usages of the Set 1 and Set 2 markers are found among speakers of Amdo Tibetan.

⁵⁵ German speakers, e.g., might say *er/sie wurde gestorben* ‘s/he was died’, to indicate that the person who committed suicide or died of cancer was somehow pushed into this act or state. This is not a usage sanctioned by the speech community, as in the case of *er/sie wurde gegangen* or *ist gegangen* worden ‘s/he was/ has been gone’, i.e. ‘was/ has been fired’, but everybody would immediately understand the motivation behind the deviation from convention or prescribed rules.

express surprise, but often have a contrastive function. However, these two functions are not easy to differentiate, particularly since the emphasis on a contrast often includes a notion that the situation is not entirely as expected, while surprises imply that the situation stands in contrast with the *usual* behaviour. In any case, the notion of surprise, emotional involvement, and/ or contrast is merely parasitic on the non-prototypical usage and the contextual features.

4.4.2 Tense shift (parasitic admirativity)

Already in Classical Tibetan, we find the conventional use of present tense forms in past time narratives. Either the bare present stem or a semi-progressive construction is used. The latter apparently intensifies the effect of the tense shift. One typical situation is that a narrated personage comes to a particular place and looks at an ongoing situation as if looking through a window. Another typical situation is that a new personage enters the scene. In Zeisler (2000 and 2004), I have termed this the *window-effect* and the *coming-onto-the-scene*. In both cases, we deal with a new situation for the listener/ reader, and in the first case at least, also with a new, typically unexpected situation for the main protagonist. Tense shift, thus, can express *mirativity* in the narrow sense as defined by DeLancey.

Tense shift is also commonly used to highlight contrast. Present tense forms, are furthermore almost obligatory when describing emotions. Emotions stand in contrast to ordinary or neutral behaviour, and there seems to be a connotation of surprise and even embarrassment associated with this contrast. One should perhaps remember that in many Asian societies the open display of emotions is (or at least was) not much appreciated. Tense shift can thus also express *admirativity* in the wider sense as defined by Friedman. In the following, I shall give only a few examples of the latter usage.

In the first example from Classical Tibetan, (16), a kind of old fairy-hag asks the main personage, whether he knows a certain religious text only by heart or whether he also understands it. She shows great happiness when he answers the first part of the question positively. He thinks he would do her a pleasure, if he also affirms the second part, even though this is not quite true. The lady accordingly shows her utter despair. Both reactions, and particularly the second one, come as a surprise to the main character, and they would certainly also affect the reader of the text.⁵⁶

(16) *Nāropa*

«tshig	šes-sam	don	šes»	zer
word	know-QM	meaning	know	say
«tshig	šes»	gsunṣ-pa-s		
word	know	hon.speak.PA-NLS-INS		
mo	dgaḥ-nas	rgod-ciṅ	hphag	
she	be.happy-ABL	laugh-CNT	joke.PRS	
mkhar.ba	nam.mkha-r	bteg-nas	gar	<u>byed-ciṅ-hdug</u> [...]
stick	sky-LOC	lift.PA-ABL	dance	do.PRS-CNT-exist.EVD=PGR.PRS

⁵⁶ Tibetan is written in an *abugida*, with graphical syllables set apart from each other by a punctuation sign. This will be represented here word-internally with a dot. Syllabic morphemes will be set apart by a hyphen, morphemes that appear inside a graphic syllable, however, will be treated as non-segmentable and will be set apart by a small plus sign: “.”.

«*ŋa-s don yaŋ šes*» *gsuŋs-pa·hi* |
 I-ERG meaning also know hon.speak.PA-NLS·GEN
mo ma-dgaḥ-ba ṅu-žin lus sprug
 she NG-happy-NLS cry.PRS-CNT body shake.PRS
mkhar.ba sa-la rdebs-šing-hdug-pa-las |
 stick earth-LOC throw.down.PRS-CNT-exist.EVD=PGR.PRS-NLS-ABL

‘When [the old woman] asked him: «Do [you] understand the words or do [you also] understand the meaning?», [Nāropa] answered: «[I] understand the words». Thereupon happily, she laughs and jokes. Holding up her stick into the sky, she is [even] dancing. [...] «I also understand the meaning», when [he] had said this, being unhappy, she cries and shakes her body. With a clash, she is [even] throwing the stick to the earth, and therefore ...’ (*Nā.ro.pa*; ed. Grünwedel 1933: 60-61/19a2-3)

Example (17) is a variant of the tale of Potiphah’s wife. The queen’s advances have been rejected by the royal priest. The furious behaviour of the queen might perhaps be accepted as typical for women by a male writer and reader, but is, nevertheless, bewildering and not adequate for a queen and, of course not acceptable, at all, when concerning a holy priest. Note the fine psychological contrast, which is achieved through the presentation of her raging with a present tense form as expression of the queen’s uncontrolled, but real emotions and the presentation of her unruly, mendacious, but quite controlled behaviour with past tense forms.

(17) *Legend of the queen*

btsun.mo·s bsams-pa «šin.tu sñiŋ na-nas |
 queen·ERG think.PA-NLS very heart be.ill-ABL
slob.dpon khyod kyaŋ ḥjig.rten mi.yul ḥdir |
 teacher.master you also world human.country here
ŋa-yis bstan.pa snub-kyi» zer-nas-su |
 I-ERG teach.FUT-NLS destroy.PRS-GEN/EMPH say-ABL-ABL⁵⁷
tshig ṅan smras-te khyim-du log-nas-soŋ |
 word bad speak.PA-CP hon.house-LOC return-ABL-go.PA
lha.babs skad zer ḥdre.babs-nas zer smyo |
 god.possessed speech say demon.possessed-ABL say rage.PRS
sgrog.bu bcad-de šam.bu phral-nas-su |
 drawstring cut.PA-CP flounce tear.PA-ABL-ABL
ḥdziŋs-pa-ḥi tshul-du lus.po sen.rjes byas |
 fight.PA-NLS-GEN manner-LOC body nail.trace make.PA
ḥphrig-ciŋ ṅus-pa·s ḥkhor-rnams druŋ-du byuŋ |
 be.excited-CNT cry.PA-NLS-INS attendant-PL front-LOC appear.PA

‘The queen thought: «[My] heart suffers a lot (lit. is very ill). Therefore, in this world, in this land of men, [I] will, certainly, destroy the doctrine as well as you, the master!», saying this, she returned home, uttering imprecations. Shouting like someone possessed by a god or someone possessed by a demon, she rages. Having cut off the trousers’ drawstring

⁵⁷ This a complex form of the ablative with an additionally ablative or instrumental morpheme **su* or **so*, as found in several Western Tibetan dialects of Himachal Pradesh (Spiti, Nako, Poo) and Upper Ladakh (e.g., Cemre and Gya-Miru), see here also Zeisler (2011: 281–285).

and torn off the flounces, she applied [on] [her] body traces of fingernails, as if there had been a fighting. Excited and crying, she appeared before [her] attendants.’ (*Btsun.moḥi bkaḥ.thaṅ.yig*, ed. Laufer 1911: 52.9-13)

Example (18) is part of a Solomon-type judgement. The unexpected behaviour of the real and loving mother is contrasted through tense shift with the rather expectable rude behaviour of the false mother:

- (18) *Dbyigpacan*
- | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| <i>bu·ḥi</i> | <i>ma</i> | <i>ma-yin-pa</i> | <i>de·s-ni</i> | | | |
| boy·GEN | mother | NG-be-NLS | that·ERG-TOP | | | |
| <i>bu-la</i> | <i>sñiṅ.rje</i> | <i>med-pa·s</i> | | | | |
| boy-LOC | compassion | NG.exist-NLS-INS | | | | |
| <i>snad-kyis</i> | <i>mi-dogs-te</i> | <i>mthu</i> | <i>ci</i> | <i>yod-pa·s</i> | <i>draṅs-so</i> | |
| hurt-INS | NG-fear-CP | force | what | exist-NLS-INS | pull.PA-SF | |
| <i>bu·ḥi</i> | <i>ma</i> | <i>gaṅ</i> | <i>yin-pa</i> | <i>de·s-ni</i> | <i>bu-la</i> | <i>byams.pa·s</i> |
| boy·GEN | mother | who | be-NLS | that·ERG-TOP | boy-LOC | love·INS |
| <i>snad-kyis</i> | <i>dogs-te</i> | <i>stobs-kyis</i> | <i>thub-kyan</i> | | | |
| hurt-INS | fear-CP | strength-INS | be.equal-although | | | |
| <i>drag-tu</i> | <i>mi-ḥdren-no</i> | | | | | |
| strong-LOC | NG-tear.PRS-SF | | | | | |

‘The one who was not the mother of the boy was without any compassion for [him] and, therefore, not fearing to hurt [him], [s/he] pulled with all [her] force. [But] the one who was the mother of the boy, because of [her] love for [him], feared to hurt [him], and although equal in strength, *by contrast/ surprisingly*, [she] **does not pull** with strength.’ (Hahn 1985: 214.25-27)

The Modern Tibetic languages practically show the same types of narrative conventions, but the present tense forms in a past narrative usually receive an additional evaluative marker, which most probably moderates the connotation of newness or mental closeness or accessibility. In the Lower Ladakhi dialects, the marker *khan.yin.sug* (see Table 2 with n. 35 above) indicates that the speaker distances him/herself from the content, because it refers to an event that happened long ago (that is, not in the speaker’s lifetime) and/ or about which s/he knows only through hearsay. The marker also appears to underline the connotation of surprise, but this is rather the effect of the surprising content, not of the marker. Another marker, *sug* (see n. 34 above) indicates more neutrally that the information is inferred or at least not derived from personal observation. In Central Ladakhi, *sug* has, in fact, a mirative function (see section 4.4.8). The following example is from a written text, which originated in Lower Ladakh. In this text, the marker *sug* is used (with the spelling *tshug*) only to highlighten a surprising or funny situation.

The main hero, the same as in example (2), actually of heavenly origin, is a jester, who in the disguise of a poor, untouchable, and/ or foolish child plays his tricks on friends and enemies alike, to the great pleasure of the narrator and his or her audience. Here, he pretends not to know how to mount a horse.

(19) Kesar epic from Khalatse

<i>kho</i>	<i>soŋ-ste</i>	<i>rgyab-na</i>	<i>žon-nad-tshug-pa</i>		
s/he	go.PA-CP	behind-ABL	mount-S1e=PRS-DST-NLS		
<i>mi</i>	<i>tshaŋ.ma·s</i>	<i>hab.rgod</i>	<i>btajs</i>		
people	all-ERG	laughter	give.PA		
<i>de.nas</i>	<i>kho</i>	<i>mdun-la</i>	<i>soŋ-ste</i>		
then	he	front-LOC	go-CP		
<i>rnam.chog-la</i>	<i>htham-ste</i>	<i>žon-nad-tshug</i>			
ear-LOC	hold.on-CP	mount-S1e=PRS-DST			
<i>de.nas</i>	<i>a.bā</i>	<i>soŋ-ste</i>	<i>«khyod</i>	<i>bu.ŋan</i>	<i>khyo.raŋ</i>
then	father	go.PA-CP	you	boy.nasty	you.self
<i>da-tshug.pa</i>	<i>rta-la</i>	<i>žon-mi-šes-mkhan-žig</i>		<i>yin-na</i>	
now-until	horse-LOC	ride-NG-know-NLS-LQ		be.S1c-QM	
<i>hdi.phyogs-na</i>	<i>žon»</i>	<i>zer-te</i>	<i>bslabs-pa</i>		
this.side-ABL	mount	say-CP	tell.PA-NLS		
<i>de.nas</i>	<i>kho</i>	<i>srib.cig-la</i>	<i>žon-te</i>		
then	he	moment-LOC	mount-CP		

‘He went [there], and **when [he] is, truly, [trying to] mount** from behind, all people burst into laughter. Then he went to the front and holding on to the ears, he **is, truly, [trying to] mount**. Thereupon the father came: «You nasty boy!, don’t you know yet how to mount? Mount this side!», being told [so], then he mounted in no time, and ...’ (Francke 1905-41, VII: 283.11-15)

In example (20), not only the sight of the demon is surprising and frightening. The behaviour of the hero is likewise surprising and ridiculous, as he is trembling like a child.

(20) Kesar epic from Khalatse

<i>de.nas</i>	<i>ñid-di.skyil.la</i>	<i>soŋ-ste</i>			
then	sleep-PPOS.LOC	come-CP			
<i>dbugs</i>	<i>naŋ-du</i>	<i>hthen-za.na</i>	<i>sa</i>	<i>rdo.ba</i>	<i>ci</i> <i>yod-mkhan</i>
breath	inside-LOC	draw.PRS-when	earth	stone	what exist-NLS
<i>tshaŋ.ma</i>	<i>sna.khuŋ-naŋ.la</i>	<i>hkhyer-rad-tshug</i>			
all	nose.hole-PPOS.LOC	take.away.PRS-S1e=PRS-DST			
<i>dbugs</i>	<i>phi.sta-la</i>	<i>phiŋ-tsa.na</i>			
breath	outside-LOC	throw.out.PRS-when			
<i>yaŋ</i>	<i>tshaŋ.ma</i>	<i>phiŋ-ste-khyoŋ-ŋad-tshug</i> [...]			
also	all	throw.out.PRS-CP-bring.hither.PRS-S1e-DST			
<i>Ke.sar-la</i>	<i>bdud</i>	<i>mthoŋ-ste</i>	<i>hjigs-te</i>	<i>hđar-rad-tshug-pa</i>	
Kesar-AES	demon	see-CP	fear-CP	tremble.PRS-S1e=PRS-DST-NLS	

‘And then, [the demon] was sound asleep, **and lo!** when(ever) he drew the breath in, earth, stones, and whatever was [around], everything, **is taken away** into his nostril! **And lo!** when(ever) he breathed out, then, again, everything **is thrown out!** [...] As soon as Kesar caught sight of the demon, he was afraid, and while he is, **indeed, trembling (all over) ...**’ (Francke 1905-41, IV: 186.13-19)

4.4.3 Case alternation (parasitic admirativity)

Particularly the Kenhat dialects of Upper Ladakh (including Leh) have a very flexible system of case marking. There is a tendency not to use overt markers for events on the lower or middle ranges of the semantic transitivity hierarchy, especially not in contexts that are spatially, temporally, or mentally close to the speaker. By “mentally close” I mean that the situation is viewed as natural or certain, and is not in any way emphasised or emotionally loaded. The use of an overt case marker, where it is not obligatory, thus often conveys the connotation that the event is either temporally or spatially dislocated or that it is in some way or another exceptional. One of the connotations could be that the subject did something in contrast to other persons or in contrast to some other behaviour, but quite often, an additional connotation is that the speaker is in one way or another emotionally involved with dismay, joy, compassion, or simply surprise (Zeisler 2012a).

In the Shamskat dialects of Lower Ladakh, one finds this kind of case marking alternation mainly with ‘inagentive’ verbs, here /khjut/ ‘be able to do some work’.⁵⁸

- (21) Domkhar (FD 2005)
daruŋ ta apimeme-ŋun / apimeme-ŋun-la khjut-en-(n)uk.
 still now grandparent-PL grandparent-PL-AES able.to.work-CNT⁵⁹-S2V=PRS
 ‘The grandparents can still work.’

According to the informant, the sentence with the unmarked subject conveys a neutral statement of the grandparents’ ability as an attribute. The aesthetic marker might then emphasise the ability of the grandparents or express some kind of surprise or a positive or negative affectedness of the speaker. The informants from Gya-Mīru gave a slightly different description: The sentence with the unmarked subject is used neutrally, when the person spoken about is in front of our eyes, otherwise the aesthetic marker is to be used (indicating here the spatial distance). The aesthetic marker can also be used, when the person is nearby, but the speaker wants to indicate his or her surprise or otherwise emotional involvement or some kind of contrast (Gya-Mīru, FD 2010). On a more abstract level, one can say that the unmarked construction is used for a neutral statement, whereas the aesthetic construction indicates some sort of surprise (Gya-Mīru, FD 2009).

Consumption verbs are by preference construed with an unmarked subject argument in the Kenhat dialects of Ladakh. When using an ergative marker for the subject, the expression is highly emphatic, cf. (22).

- (22) Gya-Mīru (FD 2008/10)
fan / fan-e thak thuŋ-gak,
 snow.leopard snow.leopard-ERG blood drink-INF
fa za·(:)-ma-nak.
 meat eat.PRS·NLS-NG-INF
 ‘Snow leopards [only] drink the blood; they n[ever] eat the meat.’⁶⁰

⁵⁸ ‘Inagentive’ verbs are intransitive or transitive verbs that describe situations that lack an active instigator or agent. Inagentive transitive verbs, among them verbs of perception and verbs or complex expressions of ability, are linked to an experiencer subject, in Ladakhi and Balti typically marked with the aesthetic, whereas in other Tibetic varieties, the experiencer is marked with the ergative. The subject of intransitive inagentive verbs typically remains unmarked, but may receive the aesthetic marker in admirative contexts.

⁵⁹ In the dialects of western Sham and Purik, the continuative morpheme is obligatory with the auxiliaries *hdug* and *rag*. In that combination, it does not lead to a progressive reading.

Giving neutral information, like in a schoolbook, only a construction with the unmarked subject (/ʃan/) would be used. The ergative marker can be used to emphasise that the whole blood is drunk (which may also implicate a connotation of surprise) or to indicate that one is emotionally involved, e.g., surprised about the fact or angered (Gya-Mīru, FD 2010).

An interesting alternation is observed with verbs of filling. The medium-construction *sth. fills with/ is full of* would usually take the instrumental or genitive for the medium of filling, but if the event is unexpected or if unexpected media have filled the container, the comitative is used:

(23) Domkhar (FD 2014)

<i>papu</i>	<i>ʃharʃhu-s</i>	/	<i>ʃharʃhu-na</i>	<i>gaŋ-sok.</i>
woollen.shoe	rain.water-INS		rain.water-COM	get.filled-INF

‘The woollen shoes got filled with/ are completely full of rain water.’ (With the instrumental: this was (almost) expected, because we had put the shoes outside, although we had seen that the weather was not good. / With the comitative: this comes as a surprise, since we were not aware that it was going to rain.)

4.4.4 Word order alternations (parasitic admirativity)

The Tibetic languages are OV languages, with a relatively free word order. In conformity with the thema-rhema structure, the constituents can be shifted from their usual or neutral place. That is, what is already given comes first (or is elided), what is new comes closest to the verb. Shift away from the prototypical order adds an extra strong contrastive focus on the last element. Such contrasts often implicate a notion of positive or negative surprise.

(24) a. Gya-Mīru (FD 2013)

<i>mī</i>	<i>ŋābgja-zik</i>	<i>ʃhulog-ne</i>	<i>tshe</i>	<i>thar.</i>
person	500-LQ	flood-ABL	life	escape

‘About 500 people saved [their] lives/ escaped from the flood (neutral statement).’

b. Gya-Mīru (FD 2013)

<i>ʃhulog-ne</i>	<i>mī</i>	<i>ŋābgja-zik</i>	<i>tshe</i>	<i>thar.</i>
flood-ABL	person	500-LQ	life	escape

‘From the flood, *to our surprise/ luckily*, about 500 people could escape.’

4.4.5 Auxiliary shift (parasitic admirativity)

As already mentioned in section 4.3, the choice of an experiential marker in a situation where a non-experiential marker is expected can have an admirative function, cf. example (2) above. The same holds for the use of inferential or other evaluative markers, cf. example (8) above and the following example:

⁶⁰ Snow leopards prefer drinking blood to eating meat. If they get only one goat, as in their natural habitat, they will certainly eat the animal. But if they come across a flock of goats in a shed, they will kill all of them, drink the blood, and leave the flesh untouched. They are thus a great nuisance for livestock herders, and statements about their behaviour may have an aggressive overtone.

(25) Gya-Miru (FD 2005)

<i>daŋ</i>	<i>ŋɛ</i>	<i>ŋɛraŋ-eduna</i>				
yesterday	I-ERG	hon.you-PPOS.LOC				
<i>ane</i>	<i>ʃhondrol-a</i>	<i>ʃante</i>	<i>māt-pen.</i>			
aunt	Chondrol-LOC	very	talk.bad-RM			
<i>han!</i>	<i>ŋ·e</i>	<i>ʃhon-la</i>	<i>ŋɛraŋ-a</i>	<i>zer-hanak.</i>		
intj	I-ERG/GEN	vain-LOC	hon.you-LOC	say-DST		
<i>kho</i>	<i>tōt-ʃe-zik</i>	<i>duk,</i>	<i>sokpo</i>	<i>mī-nuk.</i>	<i>juzu</i>	<i>he,</i>
s/he	laud-NLS-LQ	be.S2v	bad	NG-be.S2v	please	intj
<i>ŋ·e</i>	<i>pēra</i>	<i>zer-han</i>	<i>tshayma</i>	<i>sem-a</i>	<i>mā-khur!</i>	
I-ERG/GEN	speech	say-NLS	all	mind-LOC	NG-carry=PRHB	

'Yesterday, I said something very negative about aunt Chondrol in your presence. Sorry! I told (lit: must have told) you [this] without any reason! S/he is [only] to be lauded, she is not bad at all. Please, forget about all that I have said!'

The use of the distance marker *ka.yin.hag* (here in the assimilated form /hanak/) indicates the speaker's embarrassment, not so much about the fact that s/he had said something bad, but that s/he did that without any reason.

In the dialects of Lower Ladakh, the opposite can also be observed, albeit less frequently: the use of the non-experiential marker *yod* in situations of immediate visual observation, where the experiential marker *hdug* would be normally used, can likewise have an admirative function, indicating surprise and some sort of embarrassment. One may say, however, that in such situations, the speaker takes an authoritative stance, accusing the addressee or third person.

Outside everyday conversations, that is, during elicitation or in narratives, examples with the non-experiential marker *yod* for situations of immediate visual observation are extremely rare. Before starting the current project, I came across less than 10 examples out of 23,000 elicited sentences and not one in the ca. 50 hours of transcribed recordings. All examples in this sub-section, except (32)–(34), were offered spontaneously, as the elicitation was concerned with sentence patterns, not with auxiliary use.

In examples (26) and (30), *yod* is used in assertions about 2P = OTHER, the other examples concern 3P, likewise = OTHER. All examples in this sub-section, except (28) and (34) describe new situations just being observed. The speaker is not responsible for these situations, which could otherwise license the use of *yod* for OTHER. In all cases, the unexpected use of *yod* indicates surprise and/ or embarrassment.

(26) Teya (FD 2013)

<i>ʃtos-aŋ!</i>	<i>tsamfik</i>	<i>kha</i>	<i>rdan-et!</i>
look.IMP-DM	how.much	mouth	open.wide.PRS-S1e=PRS

'Look, how [you] are (/ [s/he] is) yawning!' (2P (/ 3P) = OTHER)

(27) Domkhar (FD 2013)

<i>pitse·(:)</i>	<i>ʃok-na</i>	<i>ʃh·et.</i>	<i>bila·(:)</i>	<i>hjaŋspa</i>	<i>joŋ-et!</i>
mouse·GEN	life-ABL	go.PRS·S1e=PRS	cat·AES	fun	come.PRS-S1e=PRS

'The mouse is going to die. [But] the cat is having fun!' (A proverb, used when a person enjoys the pain of another, e.g., swinging around a child, although s/he is crying; 3P = OTHER)

(28) Domkhar (FD 2013)

mifēs *rgufēs* *kho-a* *fēs-et!*
 people.know nine/all.know s/he-AES know.PRS-S1e=PRS

‘S/he knows everybody, and I really mean *everybody!*’ (3P = OTHER)

(29) Domkhar (FD 2014)

las *řtsokpo* *fō-se,*
 work bad do-CP

daruŋ-ni *kho-s* *rdoŋ* *stan-et!* / *stan-en-(n)uk.*
 still-TOP s/he-ERG face show.PRS-S1e=PRS show.PRS-CNT-S2v=PRS

‘Having performed [such] bad deeds,⁶¹ s/he still [dares to] show [his/her] face! / s/he [nevertheless] still shows [his/her] face.’ (3P = OTHER)

In this case, the use of *yod* indicates that the speaker is surprised *and* angry with that person, thinking: *s/he should not be able to show his/her face; it is unbelievable, why is nobody doing anything against it*, etc. Additionally, *yod* can be used when both the speaker and the addressee are observing the situation, but this is not a necessary condition. *hdug* would be used when the speaker is surprised, but not particularly angry, and when the speaker wants to convey the message to somebody who hasn’t seen it.

The non-experiential auxiliary *yod* may also be used in sarcastic speech, independent of the input source:

(30) Domkhar (FD 2014)

sil- *khoraŋ* *-ma-sil-ba,* *fē:l* *soŋ-se,*
 study.PRS itself NG-study.PRS-NLS fail go.PA-CP

ta *kheraŋ-a* *thatpo* *jot!* / *joŋ-et!*
 now you-AES happy have.S1e come.PRS-S1e=PRS

‘Now that [you] have failed after not even touching the books, you are surely satisfied! / you will surely be satisfied!’ (Sarcastic speech; 2P = OTHER)

(31) Domkhar (FD 2014)

aba-naŋ *ama-s* *dziŋzmo* *ʔaŋ-ba-na,*
 father-COM mother-ERG fighting give.PRS-NLS-ABL

ta *khōŋ-i* *phruŋu-a* *skitpo* *jot!* / *joŋ-et!*
 now they-GEN child-AES happiness have.S1e come.PRS-S1e=PRS

‘As the parents are fighting, their child is surely happy! / will surely be happy!’ (Speaker and addressee are standing outside a house from which they hear the shouting of the parents and in between the crying of a child; 3P = OTHER)

The following examples similarly show that *yod* is preferred in expressions of anger and surprise, independent of whether the event refers to an MSAP, as in example (32) or to OTHER as in example (33). Example (34) shows that the connotation of anger and/ or surprise overrides the (authoritative) habitual meaning, for which the dialects of Lower Ladakh have a specific form /-pat/ ~ /-bat/ (< *pa/ba-yod*).

⁶¹ This might be promiscuous behaviour or the person might have been stealing.

- (32) Teya (FD 2014)
*daruaŋ rul-e-duk-se-jod-a, wa?!
 still rot-CP-stay-CP-S1e=PERF-QM xcl*
 ‘Hey, are you still sleeping (lit: have you been keeping rotting)?!’ (2P in question = MSAP)
- (33) Teya (FD 2014)
*wa, khiri nono daruaŋ rul-e-duk-se-jot!
 xcl you.self.GEN younger.brother still rot-CP-stay-CP-S1e=PERF*
 ‘Hey, your younger brother is still sleeping (lit: has been keeping rotting)?!’ (3P = OTHER)
- (34) Teya (FD 2014)
*ŋ-i nono zaktan rul-e-duks-taŋ-et!
 I.GEN younger.brother every.day rot-CP-stay.PA-give-S1e=PRS*
 ‘My brother stays (lit: keeps rotting) too long in bed, every day!’ (3P = OTHER)

In the Kenhat dialect of Gya-Miru, however, the notion of immediate observation overrides the connotation of anger. The non-experiential form *yod* can be used for a more general statement, similar to that in example (28),⁶² whereas in all other cases, the auxiliary for visual perception, *hdug*, should be used (Gya-Miru, FD 2014).

4.4.6 Exclamatives (non-parasitic admirativity)

The Tibetic languages have a special exclamative form: the dative-locative (or allative) marker *la* is added mainly to nominalised adjectivals, occasionally also to nouns, yielding the meaning “what an X!”. The most prominent example from Classical Tibetan is found in the name of Tibet’s most famous *yogi*, Milaraspa. One of his ancestors had allegedly subdued a very self-confident demon, and the latter could then only wail in amazement *mi-la mi-la* ‘What a man! What a man!’ This expression of despair became the nickname of the ancestor and subsequently the family name. The use of the dative-locative marker can most probably be explained as an ellipsis implying a command ‘look!’ with the corresponding verb *lta* requiring the dative-locative marker for the target of the attention, cf. also example (11) above. Spanish has a nice semantic parallel: the imperative *mira* look! is used in exclamatives (Sánchez López 2017).

In the Ladakhi dialects, this exclamative combines also with verbs. While the form *-la* appears in Leh and in the eastern part of Lower Ladakh, the exclamative marker takes the form *-ra* in the dialect of Gya-Miru. The marker is not attested in the Domkhar dialect of western Lower Ladakh.

Furthermore, common exclamations such as /ama-le-(le)!/ ‘Oh mother!’, /améja!/ ‘By the flesh of [my] mother!’,⁶³ /kunjuk sum!/ ‘By the Three Jewels’,⁶⁴ or /la lamaraŋ konjok!/ ‘Hey, lama and

⁶² In the Kenhat dialects, one cannot differentiate between the use of the Set 1 marker *yod* for an authoritative statement about a habit or general fact and between a possible emphatic usage. At least one Kenhat speaker stated that the use of the Set 1 marker *yod* in sentences like (28), imply that one knows the person and his/her habit well (FD 2017).

⁶³ The marked accentuation pattern shows that it is to be treated as one exclamative word. If it were two words, the accentuation should be /ámé já/.

⁶⁴ This refers to the Buddha, his teaching, and the community of the believers.

García Macías (2016: 93f.) suggests that exclamatives differ from miratives in that “[m]iratives convey surprise with respect to a state of affairs, but they do not involve a scalar extent” (2016: 94), whereas exclamatives would “always make reference to a scalar extent” and would “not function well with non-gradable properties” (2016: 93). However, it is certainly not true that exclamatives always refer to scalar properties. Simple exclamations, such as *Oh my god!* or */améʃa!* refer to nothing directly; indirectly they refer to the situation observed as a whole. Furthermore, in example (35), as well as in the above mentioned exclamation *mi.la!* ‘What a man!’, the reference is to non-scalar entities. Similarly, in examples (37) and (39) the exclamation refers to the situation observed as a whole. Scalarity, if there is any involved, would at best concern the expectedness or unexpectedness of the situation. Nevertheless, one might say with García Macías (2016: 108) that referential exclamatives, such as *what a man!*, express “surprise towards a salient property of a particular entity, event or situation”, whereas miratives express “that the whole or some part of the information conveyed was previously [...] surprising”.

Exclamatives could further be distinguished from miratives in that they do not need to have grammatical markers specifically expressing surprise, whereas miratives, by contrast, should have specific grammatical markers for indicating the surprise (García Macías 2016: 108).

4.4.7 Explicit references to surprises (non-parasitic admirativity)

Explicit reference to surprise is probably the most common strategy in Standard European languages. This is a much less common strategy in Tibetic languages. I have not yet seen any such expression in Classical Tibetan, but there are certainly expressions similar to those found in the Ladakhi dialects in other Modern Tibetic languages. In the Ladakhi dialects, one can use the adjectives */yamtshan/* ‘strange’, */halafas/* ‘unbelievable’, or the Arabic loan */heran/* ‘astonished’ to characterise an event as strange or surprising. These adjectives are either followed by a marker (*hdug* or *rag*) for a present tense ascription or by the verb ‘go’ in order to refer to a past situation or to also express that oneself has become surprised or astonished, example (40). There is even a verb */halas/* ‘be surprised, ridicule, criticise (sth non-conventional or unexpected)’.

(40) Teya (FD 2010)

<i>ɲaf·i</i>	<i>kansalar-is</i>	« <i>jul-iphia</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>ʃo-et,</i>
we.excl·GEN	councillor-ERG	village-PPOS	that.over.there	do.PRS-S1e=PRS
<i>d·o</i>	<i>ʃo-et.»</i>	<i>zer-e,</i>	<i>kha</i>	<i>ʃays.</i>
that·DF	do.PRS-S1e=PRS	say-CP	mouth	take.PA
<i>ɲafʃa</i>	<i>ʃikʃig-a</i>	<i>rden</i>	<i>ma-fes.</i>	
we.excl	single-AES	truth	NG-believe	
<i>inaŋ</i>	<i>kho-s</i>	<i>ʃi</i>	<i>tshaŋma</i>	<i>ʃos.</i>
but	s/he-ERG	what	all	do.PA
<i>ɲafʃa</i>	<i>tshaŋma·(:)</i>	<i>heran</i>	<i>soŋ.</i>	
we.excl	all-AES	surprised	go.PA	

‘Our councillor promised⁶⁸ to do this and that for the village. Not a single person among us believed this. But he did everything. [So] we were really surprised.’

⁶⁸ The expression *kha laŋ* often implies that the promise is not very serious.

4.4.8 And surprise: the Leh dialect of Ladakh does have a marker for surprise.

As Koshal (1979) already described (although erroneously with the form /tshuk/⁶⁹), the marker *sug* is used in the dialect of Leh and surroundings almost exclusively as a marker of unexpected situations. Most crucially, it is not used for inferences. While I have found difficulties to elicit the marker, because my informants just cannot pretend to be overly surprised when they are not, Rebecca Norman (p.c.) has confirmed the usage. See here examples (41)–(43).

(41) Leh (adapted from Koshal 1979: 218)

neraŋ-a hindi khjen-at-suk!?
 hon.you-AES Hindi hon.know-S1e=PRS-DST

‘So, you know Hindi?!’ (The speaker is surprised).

(42) Leh (adapted from Koshal 1979: 219)

ŋ·e ʃhaŋ thuŋ-in-jot-suk!
 I·ERG chaŋ drink-CNT-S1e=PGR.PRS-DST

‘[Oh!] I was just was going to drink *chaŋ* [barley beer] (without realising that it was wrong)!’ (The speaker did not drink.)

(43) Shey (FD 1996)

ʃtos, gjalpo skjod-at-suk!
 look.IMP king hon.come-S1e=PRS-DST

‘Look! The king is coming!’ (The speaker has not expected to see the king in this moment or s/he might be emotionally moved after waiting so long.)

Koshal (1979: 217–225) postulates a functional split between the uses of *sug* for each person. With 3P, the marker would be confined to narrations (where it might possibly signal that the content does not belong to the personal experience of the narrator or even might signal the general unreliability of the narrated content). With 2P and 2P only, the marker would express surprise. – This has been accepted uncritically by other scholars (e.g. Hein 2007: 199; she likewise gives the erroneous spelling *ts^huk*). – With 1P, the marker would convey the meaning that the speaker was about to do something, realising only in the last moment that it was wrong. cf. example (42). While I have some doubts with respect to this last interpretation, it would still imply a connotation of embarrassment or surprise on the part of the speaker.

As one can see from examples (43) to (45), *sug* as a mirative marker or a marker for counterexpectation can be used with both 2P and 3P. Unfortunately, I don’t know how *sug* is used in narrations in the Leh dialect. Judging from the Shamskat data, the use of *sug* with 3P in narrations either serves to mark individual facts as surprising, as in example (19) above, to moderate the use of present tense markers in other conventional usages, or, somewhat more neutrally, to mark the whole narration as something doubtful, not quite true, or at least non-witnessed and hence non-confirmable (see here also Zeisler 2004: 653–663). Evidential values may be bleached in conven-

⁶⁹ This is most probably based on a local writing convention, where the form is rendered as *tshug*. However, in most dialects, the form is never aspirated, even not in the Sham dialects that do not show regular de-aspiration in non-first syllables. Only Purik shows regular aspiration (Zemp 2017: 274). The epenthetic *t*-element is contextually triggered by a preceding *n* (hence *yin.sug* > /in-t-suk/) and *l*, and less regularly by a preceding *r*. Compare, e.g., the form *soŋ.sug* (/soŋ-sok/) ‘apparently went’. When following the Set 1 marker *yod*, the *t*-element belongs to the preceding element (hence /jot-suk/). Of course, the combinations with *yin* and *yod* are by far the most frequent ones, and this may have lead to the reanalysis by local scribes and scholars.

tionalised narrative usage (Aikhenvald 2004: 313), and the same should be true for attitudinal values. Even if the Leh dialect would allow the marker *sug* for 3P only in narrations, this would still fall under *admirativity*. Already Francke (1901: 38) describes the combination of the copula *yin* with *sug* as a ‘dubitative’.

The use of *sug* in the Shamskat dialects differs somewhat: it is used for inferences based on visual input; with the copula, it is used in polite and gentle speech in the ‘explanatory’ mood, when talking about facts that are certain and/ or generally known as well as when explaining facts the addressee do not know; in combination with *khan + yin > /kha(i)ntsok/*, it functions as a distance (or admirative) marker, indicating that the speaker does not want to, or cannot vouch for the content for whatever reason; *sug* is also used for merely imagined situations; finally, it may be used for counter-expectation and surprise.

I observed the marker *sug* occasionally also with a speaker from Gya-Mīru for situations that were explicitly against one’s expectations, but, on the other hand, not really big surprises, examples (44)–(46). However, when directly asked about surprising situations, she explained that she would either use the distance marker *kha.yin.hag* (realised as assimilating /kanak/ or /kak/) for non-confirmative information or an exclamative form (on which above, section 4.4.6). The distance marker also appears, when the surprise is combined with a feeling of apprehension or regret, example (47).

(44) Gya-Mīru (FD 2010)

ŋ·e *ŋeraŋ* *ſam-a* *ħot-kan* *ʃē-at-pen,*
 I·ERG hon.you Šam-LOC exist.S1e-NLS do-S1e-RM=IMPF
ħinaŋ *ŋeraŋ* *lē-a* *ħot-suk.*
 but hon.you Leh-LOC exist.S1e-DST

‘I had been thinking (lit: doing) you were/ are in Šam, but you apparently were/ are in Leh.’

(45) Gya-Mīru (FD 2012)

ŋ·e *kho* *rarzi* (*ħin-kan*) *ʃē-at-pen.*
 I·ERG s/he goatherd (be.S1c-NLS) do-S1e-RM=IMPF
tē-zane, *[i:ʃhar* *ħin-tsuk.*
 look-when teacher be.S1c-DST

‘I had been thinking that s/he was a goatherd. (Lit. ‘I did <s/he (being) goatherd>.’) But on a closer look, s/he turned out to be a teacher.’

(46) Gya-Mīru (FD 2014)

ŋeraŋ-a *ħindi* *ʃe-at-suk?!*
 hon.you-AES Hindi know-S1e=PRS-DST
ʃe-a-me-kanak *sam.*
 know-NLS-NG.exist.S1e=PRS-DST think.PA

‘You know Hindi?! I had been thinking that you might not.’

(47) Gya-Mīru (FD 2014)

o! *i-re* *ʃhaŋ* *ħin-kanak!* *ŋe* *i-re* *maŋ-pin* *sam-de,*
 excl this-DF chaŋ be.S1c-DST I-ERG/GEN this-DF NG.be.S1c-RM think-CP
nāŋmera *thuŋ-a-rak.*
 carelessly drink-NLS-S2nv=PRS

‘Oh! This is *chaŋ* [barley beer]! I was just (about) to drink [this] without paying attention, assuming that this is not [*chaŋ*].’

With respect to the act of drinking, the informant used the auxiliary for non-visual perception *rag* to indicate that she was only aware of the movement of her hand, since she did not pay attention to her action. With respect to this semi-automatic act, there is no connotation of surprise implied. The surprising fact lies in identifying the content of the cup. For this, *rag* cannot be used, but when speaking more neutrally the special evaluative marker (SEM): *yin.da.rag* (/hındarak/) would be used.

The marker *sug* is used in Gya-Mīru also for mere guesses, cf. example (48). Furthermore, in some Upper Ladakhi dialects, such as Gya-Mīru, *sug* can be used for imagined situations, as when suggesting play roles, (49). In other Upper Ladakhi dialects, however, the distance marker *ka.yin.hag* (realised as assimilating /ka(na)k/ or as non-assimilating /kjak/) is used.

(48) Gya-Mīru (FD 2007)

<i>naniŋ</i>	<i>kh·e</i>	<i>pəlaŋ-a</i>	<i>peŋse</i>	<i>demo-zik</i>	<i>hot-suk,</i>
last.year	s/he·GEN	cow-AES	calf	nice-LQ	have.S1e-DST
<i>taŋlo</i>	<i>mi-nuk.</i>				
this.year	NG-have.S2v				

‘It appears to me that his/her cow had a nice calf last year, [but] this year [it] does not have any.’ (The speaker found out about last year’s calf just now or is merely guessing.)

(49) Gya-Mīru (FD 2015)

<i>khjoraŋ</i>	<i>gjaŋpo</i>	<i>hin-tsuk.</i>	<i>khjoraŋ</i>	<i>thi-seha</i>	<i>dar-a-hot-suk.</i>
fam.you	king	be.S1c-DST	fam.you	throne-PPOS.LOC	sit-NLS-S1e-DST
<i>ŋa</i>	<i>lōŋpo</i>	<i>hin-tsuk.</i>	<i>s·eha</i>	<i>dar-a-hot-suk.</i>	
I	minister	be.S1c-DST	ground-PPOS	sit-NLS-S1e-DST	

‘[Let’s play.] You are/ shall be the king. You shall sit on the throne. I am/ shall be the minister. [I] shall sit on the earth.’

4.5 Expressions of heightened intentionality and lowered agentivity

Hein’s (2007) claim that Tabo Tibetan (spoken in the Spiti valley of Himachal Pradesh) has two markers of *mirativity* has been widely quoted in the literature. Tabo Tibetan is relatively close to the Kenhat dialects of Upper Ladakh, but differs in various details. I am, therefore, not in a position to refute or confirm her claim. However, one of the constructions she mentions, the “extended mirative morpheme *-taŋ*”, is found with identical functions in all Ladakhi dialects. The morpheme in question, basically the verb ‘give’ (*btan*) is added directly to the main verb, or to the ‘past’ stem. It displays merging or assimilation in Tabo, but not in the Ladakhi dialects. That we formally deal with a serial verb construction and not just with a morpheme becomes clear from the fact that *btan* shows vowel ablaut *o* in commands, whereas the preceding verb remains unchanged. Like in all cases of verb-verb combinations, whether based on a mere verb stem in the first element or an adverbial form (the so-called conjunctive participle), the last element functions like a full verb, taking all finite and non-finite tense or modal markers.

In the Ladakhi dialects (and in Tabo Spiti alike), the basic function of the combination with *btan* is to indicate that the event happened with heightened intentionality or force. This may

implicate that the agent acted with a particular positive or negative intention and it may further implicate that the agent acted against the wishes or against a well-meant advice of the speaker or other persons. Particularly with destructive verbs, the general connotation is that the agent acted against social expectations, e.g., /sat-taŋs/ '[s/he] killed, but [s/he] shouldn't have done it'. Hence the possible notion of surprise and embarrassment.

However, this notion of *admirativity*, is at best the secondary outcome of the combination of *btan* with negatively connotated verbs or negatively connotated contexts. The combination with *btan* is by no means restricted to such negatively connotated verbs. In fact, the combination is quite common in imperatives, indicating that the addressee should act freely without being shy or that one should do it quickly or urgently: /ŋi koreaŋ thuŋs-t°oŋ!/ '(Don't hesitate,) just drink from my cup!', /ŋa(:) st°aks-t°oŋ!/ 'Please support me, won't you?', etc. Accordingly, the combination functions as an intensifier, indicating that the action happened definitely or with some force or negative outcome, independently of the question whether this event was expected or not. This intensifying function may or may not be accompanied by a connotation of suddenness.

(50) Domkhar (FD 2013)

egzam-iaŋ *kho* *sper-eaŋ* *kha* *hjaŋs-pa*,
exam-PPOS.LOC s/he speech-PPOS.LOC mouth be.busy-NLS

phiŋs-ŕaŋs.

throw.out.PA-give.PA

'[S/he] was thrown out **instantly**, because s/he kept talking (lit: had the mouth busy in speech) during the exam.'

There is nothing surprising about the fact, and the speaker may present it neutrally, even without showing *Schadenfreude*. The student might not have been surprised either, knowing the rules, although s/he might have been quite embarrassed. But this is not the point. The main point is that the teacher did not hesitate to throw the student out – and that with a good reason! –, and that s/he may have used some kind of force. That is, while the simple verb /phiŋs/ might be used when the teacher simply shouted 'get out!', the complex form /phiŋst°aŋs/ would almost obligatorily be used when the teacher walked behind the student or even physically pushed him/her out (Domkhar, FD 2014).

(51) Domkhar (FD 2014)

aŋmo-s *khimsa* *stan-ijoga* *zdus-ŕaŋs*.
Aŋmo-ERG sweepings carpet-PPOS.LOC sweep.PA-give.PA

'Aŋmo swept the dirt **quickly** under the carpet.'

Here, the complex form emphasises that the lady acted quickly. She was in a haste, because guests were coming unexpectedly. – A situation quite familiar to many of us! – There is no implicature that this violates social expectations, and there is no connotation of surprise, at all.

(52) Domkhar (FD 2014)

themsk-ekana *but-pa-na*,
stair-PPOS.ABL fall-NLS-ABL

phrug-i *puksmo* *fus-(s)ok*. / *fus-ŕaŋs-(s)ok*.
child·GEN knee get.scratched.PA-INF get.scratched.PA-give.PA-INF

‘Having fallen from the stairs, the child’s knee must have got scratched lightly. / must have got scratched **severely**.’

Here, the verb *btəŋ* combines with an impersonal inagentive reading of the agentive verb *ʃu* ‘scratch off, skin’. There is no connotation of surprise, not even a connotation of suddenness in either variant. The only difference between the simple verb and the complex construction is that the knee got scratched either lightly or severely. That is, the verb *btəŋ* merely has an intensifying function, indicating a greater impact through greater force.

The other verb-verb combination cited by Hein (2007) as a mirative marker likewise has a close counterpart in the Ladakhi dialects. Like in Tabo, *soŋ*, the suppletive past tense form of the verb ‘go’, is joined to an inagentive verb to express a negative outcome about which nothing can be done anymore.

In Tabo, this suppletive verb is merged with an emphatic marker */-a/ ~ /-pa/*, leading to the form */-saŋ/* (Hein 2007: 201). Again, having not studied the Spiti dialects, it is not possible for me to judge the correctness of Hein’s description. One may ask, however, whether a semantically restricted auxiliary verb or morpheme can be a grammatical marker, at all. It seems that it is mainly the morpheme */-a/ ~ /-pa/*, which conveys the mirative connotation, as it can appear independently with an exclamative or mirative function. The morpheme seems to be identical with the Tabo question marker, and may have developed its exclamative function from rhetorical questions. Alternatively, the exclamative morpheme might correspond to the Ladakhi emphatic morpheme */-pa/ ~ /-ba/*, which can follow any verb form. The latter one does not seem to be related to the Ladakhi question marker, which appears only in the form */-a/*.

In the Ladakhi dialects, the combination with *soŋ* does not have a particular mirative connotation. It should be noted that the verb *cha* (*/tʃha/*), *soŋ* ‘go’ can have various functions in verb-verb combinations. With type-movement verbs it specifies the direction (in contrast to *yoŋ* (*/joŋ/*) ‘come’). In the eastern Kenhat dialects, like in Central Tibetan, it can have an evidential value, indicating that the event was witnessed by the speaker.

In the Shamskat dialects, the verb may also turn an agentive activity into a non-agentive result. E.g., the verb *bsad* (*/sat/*) ‘kill’, if used alone, always indicates that the killing was done intentionally, even if the agent is not specified. The combination */satsəŋ/*, on the other hand, indicates that the killing happened accidentally, and it is not possible to express an agent in the ergative case (Domkhar, FD 2014). In the *Kesar Epic* originating around 1900 from Khalatse in Lower Ladakh, the combination was also used with an explicit agent. Like the combination with inagentive verbs, it indicated that the outcome was unwanted and/ or irreversible.

Additionally, the past tense form *soŋ* may have an intensifying meaning in the Ladakhi dialects, expressing that something happened to a greater extent or completely, that the event happened either all of a sudden or also more slowly than the event expressed by the simple verb, further that the speaker (or somebody else) could perhaps have done something about it, but did not out of neglect, or that the result is irreversible, so that nothing could be done about it anymore. These meanings vary from verb to verb and also from context to context. In certain cases, if some kind of movement is implied, the intensifying function combines with a directional component, indicating the direction away from the speaker, and in such cases, *cha, soŋ* ‘go’ may be replaced by *yoŋ* ‘come’, if an item moves towards the speaker. The connotations of irreversibility and neglect certainly implicate a notion of regret and perhaps also some kind of embarrassment, but I would think that this is a concomitant feature that would follow from any kind of negatively connotated verb.

It should be noted that in the Ladakhi dialects, these functions are restricted not only to inagentive verbs (or inagentive readings of agentive verbs), but also to verbs with an inherent negative connotation of unwantedness. The positively connotated inagentive verb *thar* ‘get out, get free’, e.g., cannot be combined with *soŋ* in this emphatic function (Domkhar, FD 2014). This is in accordance with the fact that in the Ladakhi dialects, the present tense form *cha* likewise combines with inagentive verbs of the unwanted type to indicate that there is danger that something happens, cf. also example (12) above. One would not use an expression ‘there is danger’ with a positively connotated verb. If one understands the combination with the past tense form *soŋ* accordingly as ‘the danger that something happens has been fully realised’, then it is understandable, why *soŋ* in this emphatic function does not combine with positively connotated verbs.

When used in conditional clauses, verb-verb combinations with *cha* have the connotation of ‘by chance’ or ‘in the unlikely event’. In this function, *cha* can also combine with agentive verbs, if these imply a negative outcome, e.g. /sukatis naŋ mea tuks-ŋha-na/, ‘if by chance somebody sets fire to the house (lit. sets the house in fire)’, and similar cases. But it cannot combine with agentive verbs if they are positively connotated, e.g. */aŋmos ŋalak thrus-ŋha-na/ ‘in the unlikely case that Aŋmo should do the dishes’.

As in the case of the intensifier *btaŋ*, the notion of suddenness does not depend on the combination with *soŋ*, cf. example (53). The adverb *hun.med.la* ‘suddenly’ can appear also with the simple verb. On the other hand, the simple verb may be followed by a description of how the situation was solved, whereas the compound form is often followed by the remark that nothing could be done about the situation.

(53) a. Domkhar (FD 2014)

<i>daŋ</i>	<i>skjoŋtse·(:)</i>	<i>sarpo</i>	<i>(hunmedla)</i>	<i>but.</i>
yesterday	candle-GEN	wick	(suddenly)	fall
<i>dena</i>	<i>ŋa-s</i>	<i>phiŋs-pin.</i>		
then	I-ERG	take.out.PA-RM		

‘Yesterday the wick of the candle (suddenly) sank [into the wax]. [But] then I took it out.’

b. Domkhar (FD 2014)

<i>daŋ</i>	<i>skjoŋtse·(:)</i>	<i>sarpo</i>	<i>(hunmedla)</i>	<i>but-soŋ.</i>
yesterday	candle-GEN	wick	(suddenly)	fall-go.PA
<i>ŋa·(:)</i>	<i>phiŋ-ba-ma-ŋan.</i>			
I·AES	take.out.PRS-NLS-NG-be.able			

‘Yesterday the wick of the candle (suddenly) sank [into the wax] **irreversibly**. I could not take it out again.’

According to the informant, both constructions indicate that the event happened all of a sudden, and it would thus not be necessary to explicitly use the word for ‘suddenly’. While the simple verb in (53a) represents the event rather neutrally, the complex construction in (53b) emphasises the irreversibility, and it may also have the connotation, at least in this case, that it was the speaker’s own mistake, because s/he was fiddling around with the flame.

The following two examples likewise demonstrate the function of *soŋ* as an intensifier. In example (54), the simple verb in the first alternative indicates that the person stepped or broke

through the surface, while the combination with *soŋ* in the second alternative indicates that the person happened to step or break through to a greater extent, that is, deeper.

- (54) Domkhar (FD 2006)
- | | | | | | |
|------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|---|--------------------|
| <i>ŋ·i</i> | <i>kaŋba</i> | <i>frol-p·iaŋ</i> | <i>hor.</i> | / | <i>hor-soŋ.</i> |
| I·GEN | foot | corridor-DF·PPOS.LOC | step.through | | step.through-go.PA |
- ‘I stepped / stepped **deeply** [into a hole] in the corridor.’

If the person stepped into mud, the simple verb would also indicate that it was quite easy to retract the foot, whereas the complex construction would indicate that it was rather difficult (Domkhar, FD 2014).

In example (55), the complex construction indicates a greater intensity of fear. There is again no connotation of suddenness, not to speak of surprise.

- (55) Domkhar (FD 2014)
- | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|
| <i>tshan-la</i> | <i>Aŋmo-a</i> | <i>l̥ʃaŋ·me</i> | <i>zdoŋbo</i> | <i>mi-a</i> | <i>thoŋ-se,</i> |
| night-LOC | Aŋmo-AES | tree·GEN | trunk | man-LOC | see-CP |
- | | | | | |
|--------------|------------|---|--------------------|------------|
| <i>droks</i> | <i>lo.</i> | / | <i>drok(s)-soŋ</i> | <i>lo.</i> |
| be.scared | QOM | | be.scared-go.PA | QOM |
- ‘In the night, Aŋmo took a tree trunk for a man, and was scared, / and was **totally** terrified, [she] said.’

I would think that in all such cases of intensification, the notion of *mirativity* is overstretched, and one should not treat *btəŋ* and *soŋ* as *grammatical markers*. At the most, one could subsume their usage under possible admirative *strategies*, although one should better treat these verbs simply as intensifiers.

One reason is the semantic and contextual restriction and the fact that the notion of unexpectedness, surprise, or even anger is a concomitant feature of the negative meaning of the main verb. In the case of *soŋ*, its use is not just restricted to inagentive verbs, but to verbs with an unwanted outcome, and at least in some dialects, it may even be applied to agentive verbs with an unwanted outcome to yield a meaning of involuntariness.

Another reason, in the case of *btəŋ*, is that an expression like /waŋ taŋse ʃos/, literally ‘[s/he] did it by giving power/ force’ similarly expresses that the agent acted with heightened intentionality, against one’s wishes, often also against one’s advice, and, of course, against one’s expectations. Does this connotation of /waŋ taŋse/ ‘acting with force’ make it a mirative marker?

In the Ladakhi dialects, there are also a few other intensifying verb-verb combinations, which may convey a notion of surprise. E.g. the verb *dbyug* (/hjuk/) indicates that somebody walks or works very fast. If combined with the directional vector verbs *cha* ‘go’, *yoŋ* ‘come’, *hkhyoŋ* (/khjoŋ/) ‘bring’, or *hkhyer* (/khet/) ‘take away’, the resulting meaning is that the person walks or works extremely fast, in an unusual, unexpected, or unbelievable speed (Domkhar, FD 2014).

Furthermore, the Ladakhi dialects have a host of onomatopoeic and intensifying expressions, several of which indicate that an event happened all of a sudden, allowing the connotation that the mind of the observer was not prepared for it, and/ or that the event happened completely, which in case of destructive events typically indicates the speakers embarrassment (see Zeisler 2008: 361). If such expressions would fall under the notion of *mirativity*, then, certainly, all adverbs and phrases like English *suddenly*, *all of a sudden*, *out of the blue*, etc. and the Ladakhi counterpart

hun.med.la would be mirative, as well. If – as is to be feared – all such expressions should be counted as ‘true’ miratives, what kind of *mirativity* are we actually talking about? And what is gained?

4.6 *The historical dimension: ḥdug as a semantic marker of non-commitment*

The original meaning of *ḥdug* as a lexical verb was ‘stay, dwell, sit’. It is not very apparent how a position verb can develop into a marker of (visual) experience. However, as I argue elsewhere (Zeisler 2014, 2018), *ḥdug* as a lexical verb originally described a non-permanent situation of some duration, in contrast to the existential verb *yod* ‘exist, be located (at a certain place)’, which related an item to a location either in general or for the moment focussed upon.

This difference in temporal reference was exploited for an opposition in terms of a generally valid truth, based on general or intimate knowledge (*yod*), and a preliminary truth, based on the mere appearance of things (*ḥdug*). Relatively early, most probably already in the period of Old Tibetan (mid 7th to late 10th or early 11th c.), periphrastic constructions with *(-par)-ḥdug* were used for doubtful or non-confirmable facts as well as for reasoning or guessing and (perception-based) inferences, (56). The *(-par)-ḥdug* construction thus originally had an admirative value, although I would take it as a semantic derivation, which had not yet grammaticalised. The construction could be best translated as ‘it appears/ appeared as if’ or ‘it seems/ seemed that’. Like in the Modern Tibetic languages, negation has scope only over the reported fact, but unlike the Modern Tibetic languages it is still the lexical verb that is negated, not the auxiliary.

(56) *Milaraspa* (15th c.)

<i>da</i>	<i>bla.ma</i>	<i>ḥdi-s-ni</i>	<i>ḥbul.ba</i>	<i>med-pa-r</i>
now	lama	this·ERG·TOP	gift	NG.have-NLS·LOC
<i>gdams.ṅag</i>	<i>mi-gnaṅ-ba-r-ḥdug</i>			
teaching	NG-grant-NLS·LOC-exist.EVD			
<i>gžan-du</i>	<i>phyin-ruṅ</i>	<i>ḥbul.ba</i>	<i>mi-dgos-pa-ni</i>	<i>mi-yoṅ</i>
other-LOC	go-possible	gift	NG-want-NLS-TOP	NG-come.PRS
<i>nor</i>	<i>med-pa-s</i>	<i>chos-ni</i>	<i>mi-thob-pa-r-ḥdug</i>	
wealth	NG.have-NLS·INS	religion-TOP	NG-get-NLS·LOC-exist.EVD	

‘Now, without a gift, this *lama* is **not likely to bestow**⁷⁰ the teachings [on me] (perception-based inference). [But] even if I go to somebody else, it is not possible (lit. it does not come) [that that he] does not want a gift. Having no wealth, **it seems that I won’t get** any religious teachings (reasoning, guess).’ (*Mi.la.ras.paḥi rnam.thar*, ed. de Jong 1959: 68.6–7.)

The admirative value of *ḥdug* is also postulated by DeLancey (2012: 556), although he does not underpin his intuition with data from Old or Classical Tibetan. His suggestion, however, that “[s]ince ‘*dug* is the innovative form, and nothing in its subsequent history suggests any association with indirectivity, the most likely inference is that it began as a simple mirative” is not quite true. The *(-par)-ḥdug* construction was associated with inferences and reasoning from the very beginning.

An etiologic tale from the mid-11th c. shows that the notion of uncertain knowledge could also be applied to misperceptions – of narrated third persons, (57). A newly built temple had a

⁷⁰ Literally: ‘it seems that this lama does not bestow’. The evidential or epistemic value itself cannot be negated in Tibetic languages, even when the negation particle shifts to the auxiliary.

glossy blue floor, which reflected everything like water. When seeing it for the first time, the ministers or the king did not dare to enter, thinking it was real water. Their misperception is rendered with the *(-par)-hdug* construction and is typically introduced by a perception verb, here the honorific verb *gzigs* ‘see; look’ or by a verb that describes an act that leads to a perception, such as opening a door. In (57), the perceived event is also subordinated to a perception verb, so that one may also think of an ordinary indirect propositional construction.

(57) *The Temple of Magical Appearance*

<i>rgyal.po·s</i>	<i>hphrul.snay-gi</i>	<i>sgo</i>	<i>phye-nas</i>	<i>gzigs-pa·s</i>
king.ERG	magic.appearance-GEN	door	open.PA-ABL	hon.look-NLS-INS
<i>chu-ru</i>	<i>hdug-pa·r</i>	<i>gzigs-nas</i>		
water-LOC	exist.EVD-NLS-LOC	hon.see-ABL		
<i>nay-du</i>	<i>gšegs-ma-nus-te</i>			
inside-LOC	hon.go-NG-be.able-CP			

‘When the king opened the door of the [temple of] Magical Appearance and looked, [he] saw [the floor] as if it was water, so [he] did not dare to go inside.’ (*Ma.ñi bkah.hbum*, ca. 1050; Martin 2013: 27.)

Some time before the 13th century, the notion of ‘mere appearance’ and ‘uncertain perception’ then shifted to the notion of ‘having been observed (for the first time)’, again of any person, not just the MSAP. Such ‘indirect’ perceptions still tended to be introduced by perception-related verbs. Finally, after the 15th c., when the periphrastic auxiliary constructions fully grammaticalised, the auxiliary *hdug* got restricted to facts the MSAP (merely) observed in contrast to facts s/he could vouch for, and more generally to references to OTHER in present tense and present perfect constructions. Past tense and even more so future tense constructions lagged behind: in the *Mi.la.ras.parnam.thar*, there is only one future tense construction, used indiscriminately for both MSAP and OTHER. Similarly, the two past tense constructions, one with the bare stem and the other with the stem + nominaliser + *yin*, are both used for both MSAP and OTHER, although there is a preference to use the more complex construction with the MSAP, and the bare stem with OTHER (for more details see Zeisler 2018).

5 Chinese whispers:⁷¹ conceptual fuzziness and the ‘lesser known’ languages

The discovery of a new grammatical ‘category’ in one language often inspires the linguistic community to find similar semantic strategies, if not grammatical distinctions, elsewhere. In this process, more often than not, the distinction between grammatical ‘categories’ and semantic conceptualisations gets blurred, while the original definition gets broadened until it becomes meaningless. At least, it overlaps with other semantic concepts to such an extent, that it becomes difficult to keep them apart. One example is the discovery of EVIDENTIALITY and *mirativity* as grammatical ‘categories’ outside the Standard European languages.

⁷¹ This is an old children’s game, known in German as *Stille Post* (‘silent mail’): several children stand in a row, the first child whispers something into the ear of the second, and this one then conveys what s/he understood to the next child, and so on. In the end, the original message is usually completely distorted.

Part of the problem is that grammatical ‘categories’ are not categorical or clear-cut, but fuzzy, and the usage of the respective forms often extends into other semantic domains. The semantic domains are even less easy to delimit, precisely because they may find expression in so many different ways within and across languages, among them also secondary or extended usages of grammatical markers. Furthermore, even if we are able to define particular semantic concepts or grammatical categories unambiguously, languages may not always follow our desire for neatness and may lump together under one grammatical treatment what belongs to different conceptual domains. Such blurring may reflect the fact that ordinary speakers are not much concerned about these differences, but it may also result diachronically from language internal developments or from linguistic contact.

A more serious problem is that, in contrast to the few well-studied ‘great’ languages, there have always been very few experts for the countless ‘lesser-known’ or under-described languages. Earlier, the respective experts (mostly missionaries) struggled hard to describe a given language in terms of Latin or Greek grammar. Whatever new terminology they developed, they developed it not in view of a universal grammar, but in view of the individual language at hand. Nowadays, the experts are supposed to describe a given language in terms of the ‘universal grammar’ of English or with the help of the toolkit prepared by typologists.

Unfortunately, typologists do not (and cannot) know in detail all those languages, from which they derive their generalisations, and they do not always understand how a descriptive term really applies to that very language for which it was developed, and how misleading the term eventually may be, relying solely on second- or even third-hand evidence.⁷² Or perhaps, this does not really matter for the general argument. *The good thing about being a typologist is that you don't have to bother with the details of a particular language*, in such or only a slightly different wording Martin Haspelmath once mused in public.⁷³ Even if this was spoken tongue in cheek, there is more truth to it than we would like. Similarly, theoretically-oriented linguists often want to see the big picture, the system, and they tend to be less interested in the details of everyday usage. However, it is often the recalcitrant details, which force us to rethink our categorisation.

⁷² A case in point is Aikhenvald's (2004: 53, 211) uncritical acceptance of Koshal's (1979) terminology for the evidential system of Ladakhi in terms of “reported” (= Set 1 marker *yod*), “direct observation” (= Set 2 marker *hdug*), “experienced” (= Set 2 marker *rag*), and “inferred”. Unaware of Koshal's somewhat idiosyncratic use of “reported”, Aikhenvald takes “reported” in the sense of a quote marker, but the latter is not described by Koshal. What Koshal probably meant is a kind of neutral statement, unmarked for evidential values. Quite apparently, Aikhenvald had only second hand information of Koshal's description, and never had a look at the data. This can be easily inferred. She did not cite Koshal, but Bhat (1999: 72-3), who gives the identical description of Ladakhi evidential markers in exactly the same order: reported, observed, experience, inferred. It is equally apparent that Bhat likewise didn't have a look at the data, otherwise he should have seen that Koshal's “reported” is consistently used for first person reference in statements and not for second-hand information.

Unfortunately, much of the earlier descriptions of Lhasa Tibetan and its evidential system focus only on the Set 1 and Set 2 auxiliaries. As Aikhenvald did not consult a more recent reference grammar, such as Tournadre & Sangda Dorje (1998), the Lhasa Tibetan quote marker /-s(e)/ has likewise escaped her attention. She appears to have relied solely on DeLancey, but the latter usually focuses on the contrast between Set 1 and Set 2 markers and never intended to give a description of the whole system. It is quite unfortunate that in his most recent publication on the topic, DeLancey (2018) again does not mention the quote marker nor any of the evaluative markers for inferences and various grades of probabilities.

⁷³ Workshop on using standardized word lists in linguistic data collection, Gothenburg, 26 October 2010.

The individual expert, who tries to make sense of the general terms, does so necessarily again in an individual way, because each language has a different set of oppositions or at least different cut-off points for the same type of oppositions. Through family similarities the terminology is extended, and by this process one may get from the Albanian or Macedonian admirative via the North American languages Washo and Hare to the ‘evidential’ system of the Tibetic languages (see here DeLancey 2001), and via the Tucanoan system one may end up with Spanish and, finally, English, which apparently cannot be thought of not having any grammatical ‘category’ found in other languages. Along the way, however, one loses one’s sense for the differences in detail between the respective conceptualisations and, even more importantly, for the difference between a grammatical opposition here and some semantic nuances there.

What is adding to the resulting confusion is that, in contrast to the erstwhile missionaries, nowadays an individual researcher typically writes a descriptive grammar of a hitherto non-documented language as a qualification thesis with only limited exposure to the subject. The description cannot go deep into details, because it has to cover as many aspects of the language as possible and perhaps also because the time slot allotted for that task is rather short and the researcher has no previous knowledge of a related language. If the individual researcher goes on to write genuine articles (and not just spin-offs of the thesis) about some particular aspects of the language, these are usually confined to 20 or 25 book pages, half of which will be dedicated to background information and theoretical issues, and hence there is usually not enough space to go much further into the details. As a result, even the particular grammatical feature described, looks quite neat and less complex than it is. It is these simplified versions that feed back into the cross-linguistic discussion and the typologists’ generalisations, closing the vicious circle.

6 Conclusion

With respect to the Tibetic languages and the debate on *mirativity*, it seems thus that neither DeLancey (in his original approach) nor Hill is entirely wrong and neither of them is entirely right. While *hdug* never grammaticalised as a mirative marker in the Tibetic languages (except possibly in the reduced form *sug* in Leh), and clearly neither *admirativity* nor *mirativity* are *universally* valid *grammatical* categories – pro Hill, contra DeLancey – the admirative connotations of *hdug* in the Tibetic languages are not simply a secondary extension of *hdug* in non-typical settings – pro DeLancey, contra Hill –, but are most probably due to the erstwhile *semantic* admirative function of *hdug*.

Depending on the actual cut-off points in the particular varieties, the Tibetic ‘evidential’ systems could possibly equally well, if not better, be explained as systems of SPEAKER ATTITUDE, with the plain Set 1 markers expressing (authoritative) confirmation and all other markers expressing non-commitment. This comes quite close to the system described by Friedman (1986, 2012), except that the domain of *admirativity* or non-commitment is split up into various evidential (and epistemic) categories, e.g. in Ladakhi: visual or most immediate perception, non-visual or less immediate perception, inference, the detached ‘explanatory’ mood, guesses about probabilities, and additionally also quotation and hearsay information.

While this speaks in favour of DeLancey’s original proposal, his narrow definition of *mirativity* does not capture the basically non-confirmative value of the *(-par)-hdug* construction as inherited by the modern varieties. The fact that the opposition between *hdug* and *yod* (or the Set 2

and Set 1 makers in general) is an opposition not only in terms of EVIDENTIALITY, but also, or, depending on the particular language, even predominantly, in terms of SPEAKER ATTITUDE, explains the extreme flexibility displayed by the system in the Modern Tibetic languages.

The Modern Tibetic 'evidential' systems are perhaps not good models for the cross-linguistic discussion of EVIDENTIALITY, because they are not pure systems, but combine different aspects, such as the opposition between the MSAP and OTHER, SPEAKER ATTITUDE and questions of politeness and social status, EVIDENTIALITY, and, like in Central Tibetan, questions of volitionality and directionality. Or, could it be that, precisely because of this mixture, the Tibetic languages are one of the best models available? After all, it is quite unlikely that EPISTEMIC MODALITY, EVIDENTIALITY, and SPEAKER ATTITUDE are clear-cut grammatical categories, not to speak of clear-cut semantic conceptualisations.

The Tibetic languages may also serve as a warning that short overview articles on 'lesser known' languages necessarily represent the facts in an over-simplistic manner, especially when the handful of examples given consist of single sentences taken out of their context. Elicited sentences are particularly dangerous, as the researcher usually does not know, what kind of situation or background information the speaker has in his or her mind. Those among the readers who neither know the language nor the culture, can guess this even less. The discussion of individual features of a language out of the context of the full system may lead to further misunderstandings. One should also be aware that even the most detailed linguistic analysis – including the present one – can only be preliminary, if merely a handful of individuals, or, in the best case, a dozen, work (continuously) on a particular language or dialect. Cross-linguistic generalisations built on such shaky ground may collapse sooner rather than later.

The Ladakhi data further shows that typological generalisations may not be helpful when it comes to understand how speakers handle their individual language. While it might be tempting to search for over-arching categories, one should also be aware that the broader the category, the less telling it is, and the differences between the individual languages might get lost in the end. Furthermore, one would still have to define the various elements that trigger particular semantic choices or that set up a particular grammatical opposition in a particular language.

To my understanding, EPISTEMIC MODALITY, EVIDENTIALITY, and SPEAKER ATTITUDE correspond to three quite different and independent perspectives a speaker may take towards an event and/ or the audience, even if each of them can have secondary applications that spill over into one of the other domains.

Mirativity and *admirativity* are best understood as specific instantiations of SPEAKER ATTITUDE towards the reported event *and* towards the audience. They have basically nothing to do with EVIDENTIALITY in the sense of marking different sources or access channels of knowledge, except that evidential markers can be exploited for parasitic mirative strategies or that evidential markers may develop out of mirative markers, as one can demonstrate for Classical Tibetan. Further, as in the case of co-grammaticalisation of SPEAKER ATTITUDE and EVIDENTIALITY, the domain of non-commitment may be split up into various domains related to the different access channels and sources of knowledge.

Mirative markers in the narrow sense mark the surprise of the speaker or of a narrated character at the time of the first encounter with the surprising situation. The situation itself is not necessarily evaluated and the statement not necessarily hedged. However, the audience is invited to share the surprise.

Admirative markers in the wider sense indicate that the content of the proposition is somewhat unreliable for the speaker him/herself for reasons of evidence, social adequacy, or because the situation was otherwise against the general or individual expectation or world knowledge. The speaker thus does not want to make a commitment with respect to the proposition. The notion of surprise may also go along with more positive feelings, such as compassion and happiness, and the Ladakhi speaker, when applying admirative strategies in general, indicates that the person talked about is negatively or positively affected by the situation, that the speaker feels with that person, or that the speaker him/herself is negatively or positively affected.

Grammatical marking of SPEAKER ATTITUDE seems to be relatively rare in the languages of the world. It seems that the lexical means to express one's commitment or evaluation of the facts are sufficient or even more adequate than the more restricted grammatical choices. It is therefore not very likely to find grammatical systems that focus on a particular subset of SPEAKER ATTITUDE, such as surprise. I would rather think that *surprise* (or even mere counterexpectation) is too narrow a concept to grammaticalise easily.

At this point, I should like to emphasise the need to distinguish more strictly between merely lexical expressions and grammatical markers of any given function. One would not include time adverbials, like *yesterday* or *earlier* under the grammatical category of TENSE. One would not include nouns such as *man* vs. *woman* or *bull* vs. *cow* under the grammatical category of GENDER, rather than the gender-driven agreement markers. One may talk about *temporality* in a wider sense, but what does one gain by lumping tense constructions and time adverbials together?

I have been talking about both *mirativity* and *admirativity* in the wider sense of a semantic concept. Unfortunately, there is not yet a term that could exclusively refer to the corresponding grammatical categories. Let me tentatively call them "MIRE" and "ADMIRE". If one does not include time adverbials under the grammatical category of TENSE etc., then why should one include lexical expressions like *wow!*, *surprisingly*, etc. under a grammatical category of MIRE or ADMIRE (cf. also Aikhenvald's 2004: 148 insistence on grammaticalised categories)? And what would one gain by lumping together the Balkan ADMIRE construction with mirative adverbs, exclamations, or intonations? The same holds for evidential notions. Again there is no terminological distinction between *evidentiality* in the wider sense as a semantic concept and EVIDENTIALITY as a grammatical category.

Clearly overstretching the notion of 'grammatical', Peterson (2013: 18, 33) suggests that overt expressions of surprise, such as, e.g., illocutionary words or verbs of surprise, would constitute *grammatical* instantiations of *mirativity*. He further suggests that mirativity is a universally valid category, simply because surprise is a universally attested human emotion (2013: 3, 12). If this argument were valid, and if *lexical* expressions of surprise were *grammatical* instantiations of mirativity, we should be able to find in the languages of the world the grammatical categories of happiness and sadness in the overt expressions of joy and grief, such as *sadly*, *regrettably*, *fortunately*, and *I am glad that*, precisely because happiness and sadness are universally attested human emotions.

Unlike Peterson, I do not see any linguistic necessity to grammaticalise expressions for emotions, surprise being only one of them. Why should it actually matter more for the communication whether one is surprised or not than whether one is happy or sad?

What is certainly more important for human communication are indicators for the credibility (not only in terms of truth values) of any given propositional content, and it might thus be more promising to return to the broader concept of *admirativity* or non-commitment as an instantiation of SPEAKER ATTITUDE, as it would encompass *mirativity* anyhow. I would expect that

grammatical markers of *admirativity* are more likely to be found cross-linguistically than grammatical markers of mere surprise, and similarly, that one would find more admirative than strictly mirative strategies.

One might expect that markers of EVIDENTIALITY are not restricted with respect to temporal reference, except perhaps with respect to future time reference (the future cannot be seen, let alone known, it can only be presumed), although Aikhenvald (2004: 261, 264–266) claims that evidential markers are more likely to occur in past tense than in other tenses, and no language would have more evidential distinctions in non-past tenses than in past tenses.⁷⁴ Markers of EPISTEMIC MODALITY and SPEAKER ATTITUDE, on the other hand, are more likely to appear with tense forms outside the narrative mode,⁷⁵ that is, particularly with tense forms that refer to the utterance time (present tense and present perfect), and, in the case of EPISTEMIC MODALITY, also to future time.

In the Tibetic languages, the opposition between *yin/ yod* and *hdug* or between Set 1 and Set 2 markers developed first in the present tense and present perfect constructions, while the development of the corresponding past and future tense constructions lagged behind. This may again point to the fact that the Tibetic system has more to do with SPEAKER ATTITUDE than with EVIDENTIALITY proper. The fact that the Tibetic systems are extremely flexible may further point into this direction.

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⁷⁴ I am not fully convinced, particularly since Aikhenvald does not discriminate between a past tense, a perfective, and a (present) perfect. This becomes evident when she writes:

An explanation for this connection between perfective [!] or past [!] and evidentiality has been suggested by Comrie (1976: 110): ‘the semantic similarity (not of course identity) between perfect and inferential lies in the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but via its results, ...’ (p. 264).

Comrie talks about a perfect, not the perfective aspect (which is not necessarily limited to past tense), and also not about a past tense. The perfect (note that the non-qualified term always implies a *present* perfect) belongs to the domain of present time reference: in most languages, it refers to a *presently* enduring resulting state and to situations of *present* relevance. As the perfect belongs to the domain of non-narrative discourse, the above mentioned semantic relationship between a perfect and an inferential might indicate that also evidentiality, at least inference, primarily belongs to this domain, just like SPEAKER ATTITUDE and EPISTEMIC MODALITY.

⁷⁵ See here Weinrich (1964) for possible differences in the choice of tense forms between *Erzählen* (narrating) and *Besprechen* (discussing).

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

The Leipzig Glossing Rules will be followed only partially. In particular, I shall not discriminate between suffixes and clitics, as this difference does not play any role for the argument. I will further treat the Tibetic languages as natural languages, having words and not only individual syllables. Hence I will present, what I judge as words, as one entity, and I will also not break down what I treat as postpositions, namely case marked relator nouns, typically, but not always, joined to their head by a genitive (or perhaps only oblique) marker. I take the liberty to follow here Roland Bielmeier's (1985: 92–94) analysis and his treatment of the postpositions as part of the intonation unit 'word'. Small caps will be reserved for grammatical elements. Abbreviations for semantic categories or derivations, e.g. "hon" for 'honorific', will not be rendered in small caps.

As the temporal constructions may consist of several elements – which may even differ in negation – the compound function of these constructions – a solution for this problem is missing in the Leipzig Glossing Rules – will be summed up by the equal sign.

ā	high tone	COND	conditional
ḁ	low tone	CP	conjunct participle marker
x.x	dot: 1. marks word-internal boundary of written syllables in the example text line; 2. indicates an implied form, such as the Tibetic stem forms; 3. segments compound elements in glosses	DF	definiteness marker
·	indicates a non-segmentable morpheme	DM	directive marker
-	indicates a segmentable morpheme	DST	distance marker
=	functions as	EM	evaluative marker
ABL	ablative case marker or postposition	EMPH	emphatic marker
AES	aesthetive (=dative subject marking)	ERG	ergative (=instrumental subject marking)
CNT	continuative marker	EVD	evidential- <i>cum</i> -admirative marker: <i>hdug</i>
		excl	exclusive plural
		fam	familiar
		FD	field data
		FM	focus marker

FUT	future	PL	plural
GEM	generalised evaluative marker	PPOS	postposition
GEN	genitive	PGR	semi-progressive
GRD	gerundive	PRS	present, present stem
HAB	habitual	QM	yes/no question marker
hon	honorific form	QOM	quotation marker
hum	humilific form	RM	remoteness marker ⁷⁶
IMP	imperative	S1c	Set 1 marker: copula <i>yin</i>
IMPF	imperfect	S1e	Set 1 marker: existential linking verb <i>yod</i>
INF	inferential marker	S2v	Set 2 marker for visual perception: <i>hdug</i>
INS	instrumental	S2nv	Set 2 marker for non-visual perception: <i>rag</i>
intj	interjection	SEM	special evaluative marker
LOC	locational case marker or postposition	SF	sentence final marker
LQ	limiting quantifier (a, some)	TOP	topic marker
NG	negation marker	xcl	exclamation marker
NLS	nominaliser		
PA	past, past stem		
PERF	(present) perfect		

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⁷⁶ It shifts the event further into the past and is used to derive imperfect forms from present tense forms, but it is also used as a Set 1 marker for the MSAP's past actions.

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