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Introduction

ON A CLEAR, LATE AUGUST afternoon in 1896, a large crowd gathered around the Seattle waterfront against the backdrop of a brilliant firework display, which illuminated the Pacific skies above them, giving the aura of a truly grand occasion. The throng came from all parts of the city, which included its leading citizens—the mayor, the president of the chamber of commerce, and members of the city council—who took their place at the head of the festivities nearest to the water’s edge. A local reporter covering the pageantry noted: “The yells of thousands of people on the docks and the blowing of every steamship whistle for five miles along the waterfront, and the flaunting of innumerable flags to the breeze [that] celebrated the glad event and welcomed the Oriental visitor of the East to the Occident.”¹ The “Oriental visitor” he was referring to was the *Mike Maru*, a transpacific steamship liner belonging to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Company (NYK), which was making its inaugural voyage. Railroad mogul James J. Hill had recently entered an agreement with the Japanese steamship company establishing regular steamship service from Seattle to Hawai’i, Japan, China, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. For years Seattle leaders and boosters had pinned their hopes on becoming a bridge to Asia and the fabled China market. The landmark agreement between Hill’s Great Northern Railway and the NYK, they thought, would finally make this dream a reality. With a twenty-one gun salute blaring in the background, the welcoming committee proclaimed Seattle the gateway to the Orient, the transpacific city where the Orient and the Occident, the East and the West, met and were to be united.

On a day when admiration for “the Orient” was running at a fever pitch, it was hard to believe that this very same port, only a decade earlier,

was the site of a violent campaign to expel Chinese residents from the city. A few steps from where the cheering crowd stood to welcome the *Mike Maru* was where an angry white mob, almost exactly ten years earlier, forcibly held Chinese residents, while awaiting the ship that would deport them back to Asia. This campaign of forcible removal, called “abatement” by contemporaries, was inspired by the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which enshrined into law the idea that the Chinese did not belong, which in turn legitimized the cries that “the Chinese must go.” Indeed, white rioters, in justifying their actions, claimed that the Chinese posed a grave threat to the body politic. “All who have ever come into close contact with them are satisfied that they are not only a most undesirable but a positively dangerous class to any country having free popular institutions.”² The expulsions, then, were seen as an act of self-protection, an effort to secure the racial and political integrity of the nation-state.

Exploring the contradictory impulses represented by these two moments and understanding how they came to mutually shape and define a region underpins this study of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands in the Pacific Northwest. Beginning in earnest with the nineteenth century, the imperatives of capitalist development and imperial expansion integrated this periphery into the world economy. As the region’s vast natural resources came into range, foreign capital and labor rushed in to develop them. The rise and mix of extractive industries drew a diverse collection of people and cultures into contact through new systems of mobility and exchange. This polyglot assemblage, including Chinese merchant contractors, Japanese and European migrant workers, Anglo labor activists, and South Asian and white radicals, propelled the circulation of people, goods, and ideas across boundaries. This process—often captured loosely under the rubric of globalization—expanded the region’s connections with the Pacific world, embedding it firmly within an imperial circuitry of migration, trade and communication in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This book therefore re-imagines these ostensibly “Western” spaces as a critical intersection of colonialism and the Pacific world, where the American West, the Dominion of Canada, the British Empire, and Asia intersected and overlapped. Whereas Western historians have confined borderland studies to bi-national frameworks—as discrete and bounded spaces at the edge of two nations—my study offers a more expansive approach

taking into account regions and historiographies beyond the Americas and, in doing so, re-orient borderlands history to the larger worlds of which it was a part.³ The end of continental expansion did not signal the closing of the frontier, as Frederick Jackson Turner so famously declared, but instead extended its outer limits into the Pacific with Asia and the South Pacific re-imagined as the new “Far West.”⁴ Indeed, as Turner himself later acknowledged, beyond the West was the Orient, where “the long march of westward civilization should complete its circle”—or as historian Gerald Horne puts it, where “the frontier’s closing encountered the dawning of a new age of imperialism.”⁵ Re-orienting the West and the history of the frontier toward the Pacific Rim allows us to complicate the Atlanticist perspective that dominates the writing of American history, opening new fields of vision in which encounters, interactions, and struggles in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic shapes the historical development of North America.⁶

But if the story of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands was about a world in motion, it was also a story about bordered polities and empires. Connections and transformations wrought by a globalizing world kindled a countermovement to solidify national borders among white settler societies in Canada and the United States, who together elaborated new forms of sovereignty in an attempt to control Asian migration across the Pacific and across landed borders in North America.⁷ The multi-national effort at Asiatic exclusion codified immigration and boundary controls as rightful prerogatives of the nation-state, which in turn reconstructed racial and national borders through its practical enforcement. The historiography on modern borders in North America has focused largely on the U.S.-Mexico border, showing us how the racialization of Mexican immigrants variously as “illegal aliens” and “alien citizens” went hand in hand with state assertions of territorial sovereignty on the southern boundary.⁸ In stark contrast, the boundary shared by Canada and the United States has been historically imagined as the longest unguarded border in the world, and thus rarely, if ever, problematized as site of contest or power.

Yet it was the struggle over Asian migration across the northern boundary that gave rise to the first sustained emphasis on border policing and surveillance in the Americas. By relocating the historical origins of the border from the southern to the northern boundary, this book shows how this process was transnational in scope, involving a contest over Asian migration

that extended across the Pacific world. In doing so, my study highlights the contingent process of the territorial state, and considers the multiple and overlapping sites—the local, the national, and the imperial—that shaped its formation. By examining U.S. efforts to extend migration and border controls to Canada, Hawai'i, and the Philippines and British surveillance of imperial subjects in the North American West, my book demonstrates the ways border enforcement was inextricably tied to competing imperial projects in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁹ Following a spate of recent scholarship that shows the extent to which modernity was first worked out in the colonies—styled as “laboratories of modernity”—I argue that key surveillance principles and apparatuses of the modern state were forged in the crucible of empire.¹⁰ Thus, even as the migration of people and capital across borders gave rise to a fluid regional world with shifting boundaries, Canada, Britain, and the United States sought to police such global flows through hardened borders, restrictive immigration laws, and state systems of surveillance and control.

These dueling impulses—to reach outwards, collapse boundaries, and integrate formerly disparate regions through boundless expansion, on the one hand, and to police movement across boundaries through bounded and delimited spaces, on the other—were formed dialectically constituting one of modernity's enduring paradoxes in which the global and the national were fashioned together.¹¹ In the Pacific Northwest, the tensions and contradictions arising from this global/local nexus were mediated and resolved, although never entirely, through the working and reworking of race. The imperatives of a “white man's country” that justified settler expansion and the exploitation of markets and labor abroad also at once rendered national boundaries at home inviolable and racially exclusive.¹² As one prominent western booster declared: “The Pacific Coast is the frontier of the white man's world, the culmination of the westward immigration which is the white man's whole history. It will remain the frontier so long as we guard it as such . . . Unless it is maintained there, there is no other line at which it can be maintained . . .”¹³

The territorializing processes of state formation and the de-territorializing prerogatives of capital were therefore inextricably intertwined, cohering into dual sides of an imperial project. As Amy Kaplan has explained: “The American Empire has long followed a double impetus to construct boundaries and patrol all movement across them and to break down those borders through the desire for unfettered expansion.”¹⁴ Following her insight, this book demonstrates how the quest for an

“Open Door” Empire in Asia—borrowing historian William Appleman Williams’ evocative metaphor for U.S. imperialism—was coupled with a strategy of closure at home to form the double-edge of Anglo-American imperialism in the Pacific.¹⁵ This double vision became constitutive of an imperial fantasy, one that performed essential ideological work on behalf of the empire.

However, if the dream of accessing lucrative markets abroad and delineating precise and stable borders at home was clear and unambiguous, the reality of empire was far more complex and messier. Operating on the edges of the imperium, American and British empire builders struggled with distance, their progress being impeded by a lack of ready access to capital and human resources. To overcome these limitations, they turned to Asian ethnic contractors, merchants, and smugglers, who facilitated exchanges and movements that were crucial to Euro-American imperial expansion in the Pacific. The empire, as Tony Ballantyne reminds us, was “a structure, a complex fabrication fashioned out of a great number of disparate parts that were brought together into a new relationship.”¹⁶ Asian intermediaries played a vital role in integrating these disparate parts into a functioning whole. In coordinating the flow of labor, capital, and goods across an empire that was spread across vast distances, they were the ones to maintain the lifeblood of the imperial system. As this suggests, despite their global pretensions, there was a wide gap between Anglo-American empires that were imagined as such and the reality of their capacity for such reach. The incorporation of an Asian middle elite into Anglo-American imperialism was a tacit acknowledgment of this reality.

But if their labor helped to propel the empire forward, their activities mobilizing people and resources also sparked wide-ranging struggles that would fragment, and, at times, undermine the imperial project. Thus, even as their transnational movements and practices more tightly bound the region into widening imperial circuits of power and culture, they also became, as historian Arif Dirlik points out, “a source of opposition and division economically, politically, and culturally” that lay to bear the “contradiction between the Pacific as Euro-American invention and its Asian content.”¹⁷ This contradiction would reveal the fissures between empire and nation, between an imperial impulse to incorporate diverse peoples and cultures, if always hierarchically and unevenly, and a nationalist envisioning for homogenous communities in which state and nation overlapped neatly, as Asian intermediaries organized an imperial system of mobility and

exchange that challenged the imagined integrity of the nation-state. The development of modern border regimes should therefore also be seen in this light, as an effort to manage the at times conflicting interests of empire and nation. These tensions, moreover, created subversive opportunities for contract laborers, migrant smugglers, and radical activists.¹⁸ Re-fashioning the networks that knit together the empire into pathways of resistance and avenues for negotiating Euro-American imperialism, these subaltern groups would pursue a transnational politics from below. The incorporation of this “Asian content,” would, then, serve to both perpetuate and de-stabilize the empire, producing in the Pacific, a “radically unequal but also radically de-centered world.”¹⁹

THE OUTLINES OF A PACIFIC WORLD

The transpacific connections and patterns of global exchange that grew out of Anglo-American ascendance to constitute the western U.S.-Canadian borderlands mapped onto coordinates of migration and trade first established by the Spanish Empire. That is, before the Pacific was an “Anglo-Saxon lake” it was a “Spanish lake.”²⁰ The Manila galleon trade, which connected China, Spain, and its far-flung empire in the Americas through new trade and commercial networks, traced the outline of an emergent Pacific world beginning in the late sixteenth century. Vessels departed New Spain (what is today Mexico) with cargoes of manufactured goods, tools, munitions, and silver and returned from China with tea, silk, porcelain, and spices, stopping over in the Philippines in each direction and establishing for the first time “substantial and continuous trade across the Pacific Ocean.”²¹ Within this system of commerce, a powerful China—which was a regional hegemon in its own right at the center of a dynamic tributary trading system in Asia—figured prominently.²² It was, after all, the desire for Chinese goods that propelled global trade in the early modern period. With the China trade serving as its structuring logic, Acapulco, Manila, and Canton emerged as intersecting nodal points in what historians consider to be the first global system of trade through which the Spanish and Chinese Empire expanded and grew rich. This far-flung trade network established some of the economic, political, and cultural relationships that gave the Pacific its initial configuration as a region.

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, aspiring imperial powers contested Spanish dominance in the region. At first, this took the form of attacks on Spanish vessels associated with the Manila galleon trade as well as raids on Spanish settlements lying on the Pacific. Yet what started out as little more than a nuisance soon evolved into a more direct challenge to Spanish hegemony in the region as the Dutch, Portuguese, French, and the British all vied to expand into Asia and the South Pacific, seeking to exert influence in regions that were previously understood to be the exclusive sphere of the Spanish Empire. The British, in particular, pushed aggressively into the area, initiating exploratory campaigns—including the famous voyages of James Cook—that would eventually lead to the “discovery” of New Caledonia, Easter Islands, and the Hawaiian Islands, among other places in the Pacific.²³

In the quest for new overseas markets and trade routes to Asia, opposing European rivals joined the Spanish in mapping, naming, and defining the area in their terms, imposing their vision of the Pacific in the process. In this regard the Pacific was more of an ideological construct than a spatial or geographic reality that reflected the conglomeration of discourses and ideas underpinning the strategy of empire. As Arif Dirlik has forcefully argued, “there is no Pacific region that is an “objective” given, but only a competing set of ideational constructs that project upon a certain location on the globe the imperatives of interest, power, or vision.”²⁴ The Pacific, he insists, “is not so much a well-defined idea as it is a discourse that seeks to construct what is pretended to be its point of departure, a discourse that is problematized by the very relationships that legitimize it.”²⁵ The various Euro-American formulations of the Pacific, as a “Spanish Lake,” “British Lake,” and, most recently, as an “American Lake,” were, then, discursive strategies that sought to create a reality of what they purported to represent.

These Euro-American imaginings of the Pacific did go not uncontested, of course. Pacific islanders and other peoples native to the region challenged the notion of the Oceania as a vast, empty space bereft of “human civilization” prior to European “discovery,” insisting that the Pacific was a place of human motion, creativity, and interconnections long before their arrival. In other words, they rejected the idea that the history of the region—that is a consciousness of the Pacific—only began or sprung up with Euro-American intervention. Understanding that to name and to narrate was to conquer and to dominate, the indigenous peoples of the Pacific put forth their own claims to the region, which, Tongan writer Epeli Hau’ofa envisioned as “a

large world in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected much later by imperial powers.”²⁶ By doing so, Hau’ofa and other native critics of western imperialism offered an alternative genealogy of the “Pacific”—a world that was neither of colonizers and the colonized nor of centers and peripheries.

Still, as Dirlik himself readily acknowledges, European expansion gave rise to interactions and exchanges from which concrete relationships arose to endow the Pacific with a semblance of geographical or spatial unity. Indeed, the movements and the networks generated by western, and to a lesser extent, Japanese, imperialism integrated disparate spaces in the Pacific into a regional structure though, admittedly, one with fluid and shifting boundaries. The transpacific shuttle of people and commodities initiated by the Spanish galleon trade was made denser through a succession of foreign incursions that introduced new nodal points around which new circuits of trade, culture, and communication emerged. These linkages and transformations produced some of the world’s first globetrotters: Chinese seamen sailing on the Manila galleon ships made their way to far-flung places in the Americas and the South Pacific; natives from Hawai’i and the Pacific Islands found themselves on American, British, and Russian vessels engaged in whaling and the fur trade; and locally extracted commodities such as silver, gold, fur, pelts, and sandal wood were traded across the Pacific. Not unlike the Atlantic, the histories of empires, regions, and nations around the Pacific were mutually imbricated through encounters generated by global migration, imperial rivalries, international trade, and cross-cultural interactions and exchange.²⁷

The Pacific Northwest first became involved in this larger world—emerging as yet another link in the chain of an ever-expanding global economy—through the fur trade, which linked the region and its people to Asia, Hawai’i, and the Atlantic Northeast. Russian explorers initiated this process in the eighteenth century, when they happened upon the region while in search of the elusive Northwest Passage to China, and became aware of its economic potential. More specifically, they had discovered the commercial viability of sea otter pelt, finding that, as one of the few foreign items in demand in China, it could be exchanged for prized silks and spices. The fur trade established the structuring logic of the region, one that endured in the extractive economy of later years. Russian monopoly over the Northwest fur trade, institutionalized through the Russian-American Company, was quickly challenged by the Spanish, and later the British, the French, and the

hard-charging Yankees. The modern Pacific Northwest, therefore, emerged out of intense imperial contest, as a product of foreign powers vying for control of the lucrative fur trade.

The land-based fur trade transformed this corner of the Northern Pacific into a contact zone in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where foreign bodies, diseases, and commodities met and meshed with long established indigenous populations whose diverse and complex societies went back to at least 12,000 B.C.²⁸ With neither party possessing monopoly over violence and with their interests mostly aligning, early relations between Europeans and Native peoples in the Pacific Northwest were generally defined by negotiation and accommodation, punctured by the occasional outburst of violence. Within this framework of reciprocal relations, British, Russian, and French traders forged alliances with different Native groups based on terms of trade that were generally favorable to both sides.²⁹ This inter-cultural system of reciprocity was further cemented through sex, marriage, and the invention of fictive kin relations.³⁰ These encounters, moreover, produced new networks of economic and social relations that progressively wedded the region to a larger Pacific world. For example, migratory patterns established through the movement of Hawaiian and Pacific Island laborers, and commodity chains that made the Pacific Northwest a vital link in a mercantile nexus integrating the fur trade, whaling, and the China trade, brought the “Pacific” to the Northwest.³¹

As foreign encroachments intensified, indigenous peoples in the Pacific Northwest, who were by no means a monolithic group and thus had their own differences and divisions to contend with, responded with varying strategies of accommodation and resistance, ranging from securing alliances with Europeans through marriage to playing rival traders off one another to violent uprisings. In this context of competing imperial powers—one without a clearly established hegemon—these strategies, embodying Native agency, proved to be effective in keeping the Europeans at bay, at least for a time anyway. Gradually, however, foreign incursions, in particular, with the introduction of disease and guns, established what historical geographer Cole Harris has called a “protocolonial presence” in which the “balance of power” had “tilted inexorably toward” the Euro-American outsiders.³²

With the ascendancy of Anglo-American power in the mid-nineteenth century, this protocolonial presence gave way to a full-fledged colonial order. The Spanish, despite earlier claims to the region, failed to assert sovereignty

north of California during this period and finally ceded existing claims to the United States in 1819.³³ Propelled by its growing investment in the fur trade, the United States established itself as a dominant power in the region.³⁴ The British, similarly, leveraged its commercial might, bolstered through the Hudson Bay Company, to beat out French and Russian rivals. Following several near confrontations, the two remaining imperial rivals came to an agreement in 1846, establishing the U.S.-Canadian boundary at the forty-ninth parallel. The fixture of national-state borders was followed by settlement and closure, processes that enabled Anglophone powers to consolidate colonial authority in the region. As sovereign power, with white settlers serving as its shock troops, reached deeper into the vast, hinterland spaces of the Pacific Northwest, it generated and sustained a geography of exclusion, where “the indigenous other would be tucked away, given as little land as possible, marginalized in its own territory.”³⁵

America’s imperial forays into the region were part of an expansionist thrust that remade the Pacific into a vast American lake by the late nineteenth century, superseding the British, whose own imperial outreach led to the creation and development of the white settler outposts of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and their subsequent integration into a larger Pacific world. This imperial drive was fueled by the growing belief that the destiny of the United States lay in controlling the Pacific. In this vision, the development of America’s western frontiers and U.S. projections into the Pacific were closely linked, as the Pacific became a logical extension of Manifest Destiny. Not long after the signing of the Oregon Treaty, which set the Washington-British Columbia boundary in 1846, William Seward predicted that, “the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond will become the chief theatre of events in the world’s greatest hereafter.”³⁶ As Secretary of State, Seward pursued policies—acquiring Alaska from Russia in 1867 and following that up with the Burlingame Treaty with China the next year—that laid the foundation for U.S. dominance in the Pacific.

This imagining of America as a Pacific power was continued in the thought and practice of future U.S. statesmen and policymakers including Seward’s protégé John Hay and future president Theodore Roosevelt, who were convinced that the “Age of the Atlantic is passing” and the “Age of the Pacific is here.” These abstractions were given coherent form in the Open Door policy, which served as the guiding logic for a “New Empire.”³⁷ As opposed to its imperial predecessors, which were territorially-based and, thus, predicated on the acquisition of formal colonies, this “New Empire”

was about opening overseas markets, extending capitalist relations, and projecting power through commercial dominance. This did not preclude a territorial empire as attested by U.S. seizure of Hawai'i, Cuba, and the Philippines in 1898. However, in this imperial design, formal colonies supported and advanced the cause of an informal empire of capital by serving as stepping-stones to Asia and the China markets.

That the American empire was not an empire in the classic territorial sense—vacillating between “formal” (i.e. Philippines and Hawai'i) and “informal” elements (i.e. Chinese treaty ports)—has generated rancorous debate about its exact nature, from those claiming that the United States held no empire at all to those saying that it was an empire with no limits.³⁸ But as Ann Laura Stoler points out: “Oscillation between the visible, secreted, and opaque structures of sovereignty are common features [of imperial rule].”³⁹ The slippery logic and the seemingly contradictory character of U.S. empire building, she argues, reflected a concerted strategy of imperial rule, as part of a repertoire of colonial power and in this regard the American empire operated much like other modern empires, which “thrive[d] on such plasticities and reproduce[d] their resilience through the production of exceptions.”⁴⁰ How these “oscillations” between territorial and nonterritorial expansion and between clarified and blurred imperial sovereignties depended “on moving categories, parts, and populations,” and how they constituted the geographies, routes, and coordinates that integrated formerly disparate regions, communities, and peoples into an American empire that was seemingly everywhere and nowhere is a central concern of this book.⁴¹

TRANSPACIFIC BORDERLANDS AND BOUNDARIES

The political and spatial realignment and the integrative networks attending the formation of an American Lake progressively pulled the Pacific Northwest deeper into the orbit of the Pacific world. The history of U.S. expansionism is often split into two, distinct phases: continental expansion, on the one hand, and overseas empire, on the other, with Western historians studying the former and diplomatic historians and scholars of international relations researching the latter.⁴² And while a few scholars have been able to bridge the fields by identifying important continuities between the two, most continue to analyze frontier expansion and overseas empire building as

separate and relatively autonomous processes.⁴³ But we know, for instance, that the development of the North American West would not have been possible without overseas Asian labor and markets, which were made accessible and forced opened by Euro-American imperial incursions into East Asia and the South Pacific. As such, frontier expansion and overseas empire-building were inextricably intertwined—the development of one being utterly dependent on the other.

This book therefore approaches the western U.S.-Canadian borderlands from a Pacific perspective, delving into the myriad of worldly connections that brought the region into focus in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In mapping these connections, the narrative travels between locations tracking the pathways to and from the Pacific Northwest borderlands to distant and diverse places, from the sugar-cane plantations of Hawai'i to the hinterlands of the Canadian West, from the British Colonial Office in India to remote sites along the U.S.-Canadian boundary, where we will encounter overseas Chinese merchants starting businesses on the peripheries of empire; Japanese migrant workers eluding state borders to obtain jobs; and imperial agents tracking South Asian anti-colonial activists across the Pacific. Taking such an approach allows me to bring together the local sociopolitical relationships of a North American borderland with the transnational movements, networks, and discourses of a Pacific world.

Within this regional structure in which the global and the local were bound together, the port cities of Seattle and Vancouver served as the primary gateways between the Northwest borderlands and the Pacific world, constituting central nodes through which capital, labor, and commodities flowed in and out of the region. This book, then, unpacks the “bundles of relationships” that embedded the U.S.-Canadian borderlands in the Pacific world by tracing the local and global circulation of people, ideas, and material goods that transformed Seattle and Vancouver into Pacific Rim cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴⁴ This study is not, however, a detailed urban history of either city. Rather it focuses on each city's role as an imperial hub for the myriad movements and relationships that connected its surrounding hinterland world of labor and extraction (associated with railway construction, logging, fishing, and mining) to an outside world of trade and commerce. Historians have identified the dialectical relations between city and country, and more recently between city and suburb, to great effect, unearthing previously hidden connections between those spaces.⁴⁵ I propose here, albeit in a limited fashion, to extend these spatial dialectics to the

city and the world, showing how Seattle and Vancouver emerged as global cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴⁶ Asian merchants, labor contractors, transportation agents, and immigrant smugglers within these two cities performed key intermediary functions, mediating movement and exchange between the city and the hinterland, between the city and world, and between the periphery and the center. “In this way,” as historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright write, “they were the ones to produce the resources for global integration, creating in the process a more integrated world, albeit not exactly as Western imperialists had intended.” By highlighting the multiple and varied ways these Asian go-betweens engaged “Western power in complex patterns of collaboration and resistance, [and] accommodation and cooptation,” this book shows how the Pacific Northwest, rather than being a spatial-geographical given, was animated by border-crossings of various kinds.⁴⁷

These border-crossings set off an intense contest in which the forces of globalization and nationalization collided. The U.S.-Canadian boundary became the primary site of this struggle with Asian ethnic labor recruiters, white labor activists, East and South Asian migrants, and local civil servants locked in protracted struggle over the permeability of the border. The rapid circulation of people, goods, and resources kindled a countermovement to harden national borders in the Pacific Northwest even as these movements integrated the region into a larger Pacific world. The border emerged from expanding imperial relations and struggles to demarcate the boundaries of a “White Pacific” in which race and empire was instantiated in and through space and geography.⁴⁸ The extension of U.S. commercial and political power into the Pacific introduced new problems of unregulated mobility and movement for the modern state, which prompted new strategies of state management and control in turn. Policing America’s Empire involved the construction of transpacific borders, which defined an outer limit against the encroachment of an Asia-Pacific world while simultaneously consolidating a territorial boundary between Canada and the United States.

By extending U.S. history to Canada and the Pacific, my study offers the first sustained account of the double movement—border-crossings that drew previously disparate communities into contact, on the one hand, and the racial and national borders that were constructed in response, on the other—that defined the Pacific Northwest borderlands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The quest for boundless markets and growth and the simultaneous emergence of increasingly bounded nations were not

antithetical historical developments locked in a zero-sum relationship, as some scholars have contended, but instead they were mutually imbricated processes. The chapters that follow, then, is about how the western U.S.-Canadian borderlands evolved in the context of a larger Pacific world, describing how the region emerged from the dialectics of globalization and nationalization, mobility and immobility, and inclusion and exclusion.

The book begins with the role of Chinese merchant contractors in the development of the Pacific Northwest, showing how they facilitated the region's transition from a gold-rush society to a diversified resource-based colony with an incipient settler society. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Pacific Northwest underwent a period of rapid economic expansion with resource extraction and railroad construction leading the way. Overseas Chinese, flowing through the widening networks of labor and capital produced by Euro-American imperial expansion into the Pacific, supplied the labor force to energize economic development and growth in this corner of North America. Chapter 1 looks at how Chinese merchants, who themselves arose from the ranks of migrant labor, seized on openings arising out of capitalist development and imperial expansion to construct a transnational system of labor recruiting. In furnishing overseas labor, and later opening overseas markets, these select immigrants became incorporated into a managerial elite, functioning as critical intermediaries in a budding empire of capital. The chapter concludes by examining how white racial hysteria, in the aftermath of passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, produced the first modern border scare in the United States.

In the wake of Chinese exclusion and the anti-Chinese riots, the region's industrialists and entrepreneurs turned increasingly to Japanese merchants to meet their labor needs. As I discuss in Chapter 2, Japanese labor-supply firms including the Oriental Trading Company and the Furuya Company expanded on migratory links first established by the Chinese by producing circuits of labor in and through America's newly acquired empire in the Pacific. More specifically, it looks at how Seattle-based Japanese merchants combined multiple and overlapping imperial spaces to defy and evade state power across the Pacific, coalescing around Japan, Hawai'i, and Western Canada and the United States. In mapping this far-flung geography of labor alongside the movement of goods, the first two chapters show how the exploitation of Asian labor and the opening of East Asian markets went hand in hand in the colonial development of the Pacific Northwest.

Chapter 3 focuses on the anti-Asian politics and agitation of white Euro-American and Canadian workers in the Pacific Northwest. It reveals how riotous working-class activism and the Pacific Northwest story of Asians as the “indispensable enemy” was part of imperial movements that connected proletarian racism in the Washington-British Columbia borderlands to like movements in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. By re-locating the process of white-working class formation to a transnational context, this chapter bridges the intellectual divide between critical whiteness studies on one hand and colonial and postcolonial studies on the other, and in doing so, shows how white identity was a product of inter-colonial exchanges that spanned the Pacific world.

But if a Pacific world of migration figured prominently in anti-Asian labor politics, emerging as a space for transnational whiteness, Chapter 4 examines how it also spawned radical movements as white and South Asian activists attempted to wage transnational campaigns around anti-racism and anti-colonialism. For white labor leaders associated with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the Pacific provided a crucible for imagining a radical Asian manhood worthy of class inclusion and solidarity. Paying especially close attention to the discursive strategies that the IWW employed to incorporate Chinese, Japanese, and South Asian workers into the labor movement, this chapter explains why these efforts to achieve interracial unity ultimately failed. Similarly, some of India’s most radical nationalists, organizing and traveling across revolutionary circuits across the Pacific, transformed the borderland spaces of the Pacific Northwest into a hotbed for anti-colonial insurgency. South Asian revolutionaries exploited the fluidity of the border to disseminate and circulate anti-British literature, smuggle arms and explosives, and recruit members on both sides of the border. This chapter focuses on these radicals, their ideas, and their political struggles, showing how they profoundly shaped and were shaped by movements being staged across the Pacific world.

Chapter 5 examines how anxiety over illegal Asian migration and insurgent radicalism gave rise to national and imperial systems of surveillance and control. The United States, the Dominion of Canada, and the British Empire joined forces to create a dense, multi-state policing and intelligence apparatus by which to regulate the movement of Asian migrants, gather information on their communities, and thwart the circulation of subversive politics, which generated new geographies of exclusion in turn. The border was therefore elaborated against the racialized figures of the illegal Asian immigrant and the

menacing South Asian insurgent in a process in which the boundaries of race and nation were mutually constructed in the Pacific Northwest. This process brought various state officials, imperial agents, and departments together as part of an inter-imperial border enforcement regime.

State intervention may have ushered in an era of the border, when the movement of Asian migrants was highly restricted and regulated, but it still left open the door to commercial exchange and flows of goods and capital to and from Asia. In the epilogue I return to the central contradiction that defined the Pacific Northwest borderlands, revealing how dreams of fabled Asian markets continued unabated in the wake of solidifying borders as the pursuit of greater economic integration and intercourse with Asia stood alongside a deep and abiding disdain for Asian bodies. Thus, the proliferation of border controls and immigrant regulations was, paradoxically, accompanied by a dramatic expansion in trade and commercial relations between the North American West and the Asia-Pacific Rim.

This is a story, then, of the contradictory coexistence of globalization and nationalization, of the ways these two powerful forces at once collided and merged in the Pacific Northwest borderlands, which brings us back to the two scenes on the Seattle waterfront paired in the opening. The hero's welcome for the *Mike Maru* and the campaign for Chinese expulsion were inextricably intertwined in a dialectical process in which the deterritorializing forces of globalization and the territorializing processes of national-state formation developed in tandem to spawn diverse and divided societies in the Pacific Northwest. It was thus a world in motion amidst a world of borders, brought into existence by transnational trade and cosmopolitanism as well as racial pogroms and the border patrol in which the global and the national were mutually constituted.