The Military Base and Camptown: Seizing Land "By Bulldozer and Bayonet" and the Transpacific Masculinist Compact

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In "Backbone" (2005), Okinawan poet Tōma Hiroko writes:

> Across the sea from my island I cry out
> Age of Yamato, land battle, Age of America, wire fence, fighter jets
> The man closes his ears and grins
> Blue skies, white beaches, burnt orange roof tiles, tropical lemon-limes, red hibiscus …
>
> The streets bright with neon are the man's playground
> My playground is a would-be place where the wire fence is swept away
> I just want to stand up tall and stride through my backyard[1]

Traversing more than one thousand years of history in invoking the "Age of Yamato" and the "Age of America," the poem highlights how the traditional land battles of the former have long made way for the omnipresent militarist geographies and weapons of the latter. The natural landscape of Okinawa, replete with "white beaches" and "red hibiscus," is ironically juxtaposed with its militarized landscape, overrun with "wire fence[s]," "fighter jets," and "neon lights." Okinawa, in other words, has become the "playground" of the US military, crowding out the narrator's own playground and backyard. The narrator's playground no longer exists because of the ubiquity of US military presence, as metonymically figured by the wire fence. For as long as the wire fence remains, this playground is only a "would-be place." Okinawa, an island chain doubly colonized by Japan and the United States, shoulders the disproportionate burden of US military bases in Japan. It is an island sacrifice zone. Yet in expressing the

possibility of the wire fence being "swept away," and the desire to "stand up tall and stride through my backyard," Tōma's poem leaves open the possibility of an Okinawa imagined otherwise, that "would-be" otherwise. Having this kind of "backbone," as reflected in the poem's title, displays an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

In *Reiterations of Dissent* (2011/2016), an eight-screen installation of different looped video fragments playing simultaneously, Korean diasporic artist Jane Jin Kaisen evokes the violent and spectral history of South Korea's Jeju Island.[2] Given the hegemony of national frames of reference and units of analysis, Okinawa and Jeju are viewed as Japanese and Korean, respectively. They are, however, linked as islands within the Kuroshio Current, the world's second-largest ocean current after the Gulf Stream in the Atlantic. Islands along the current share a distinctive and interconnected oceanic culture and thus in some ways have more in common with one another than with the respective nations of which they are a part.[3] In addition to this interconnectedness via the Kuroshio Current, Jeju is distinct from yet linked to Okinawa insofar as it is also an island subjected to militarist geographies and spatial development policies whose relationship to the mainland is one of subjugation and ongoing contestation. It, too, is an island sacrifice zone. Through what Crystal Mun-hye Baik theorizes as "durational memory" in her illuminating analysis of Kaisen's work, *Reiterations of Dissent* grapples with the buried history of US military atrocities in Jeju and the island's more recent remilitarization. Durational memory constitutes multiple and nonlinear temporalities that are intentionally at odds with official South Korean national history and the chrononormativity of Cold War historiography.[4] *Reiterations of Dissent* displays durational memory through a defamiliarizing array of video images (including US military films), contemporary footage from multinational media outlets, and original documentation shot by Kaisen in Jeju that are constellated across eight looped video fragments or film shorts. In one of these shorts, "History of Endless Rebellion," black-and-white archival footage of armed military vehicles in Jeju's narrow streets, the burning of houses, and the panicked fleeing of villagers is bookended with contemporary footage of a Daewoo bulldozer tearing into a shoreline and of international and local activists clashing with South Korean police as they protest the construction project. These images are paired with this voice-over: "Standing at a distance, the United States subjugated without getting blood on their hands at all, that was 4.3. The naval base is a continuation of this."

What was "4.3," what is the naval base whose construction is being protested, how are these things connected, and why is the United States culpable? The number "4.3" names and refers to the date of the "red hunt" or mass killings and torture of Jeju residents that took place between 1948 and 1954 following an uprising by leftists on April 3, 1948. This anti-Communist massacre began during the post–World War II US military occupation, when the southern part of the Korean Peninsula was under the rule of the US Army Military Government in Korea. The atrocities continued with the South Korean Interim Government, effectively a US puppet. With estimates varying, this devastating counterinsurgency resulted in thirty thousand to sixty thousand

deaths, or 20–30 percent of Jeju's civilian population.[5] The island thus came to be known as "Red Island" and "Island of Rebellion" before its more recent designation in 2005 by the then president Roh Moo-hyun as an "Island of Peace" in remembrance of 4.3. Yet this attempt at reckoning with the atrocity of 4.3, which had actively been suppressed by the US and South Korean governments until they were pressured to launch a formal investigation in the late-1990s, was performative and short-lived. For Roh's government also advocated the construction of a naval base on Jeju. *Reiterations of Dissent* displays fragments from ongoing protests against the construction of the base as one of the ways in which Jeju's strong history of dissent against and difference from mainland South Korea reverberate into the contemporary context. In doing so, and in channeling a "History of Endless Rebellion," Kaisen's critical "durational memory" work is also an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

Jeju's island spatiality and liminal political status tether the island to the external shocks produced by the central government's priorities and policies of capitalist development and militarized neocolonial relationship with the United States. The island is an autonomous subnational island jurisdiction (SNIJ) and self-governing province of South Korea.[6] Dubbed as the nation's "Hawai'i" and located at the southernmost maritime border of South Korea (about ninety kilometers south of the peninsula), Jeju has been developed as a tourist destination by South Korea's central government. More recently, it has been remilitarized from its days as a Japanese military base during World War II, then the site of a brutal anti-Communist purge dictated by the US military, and on through the contested construction of a naval base at the fishing village of Gangjeong. In response to ongoing local and international opposition to the construction of the base, the South Korean government proposed that the base would also have civilian or commercial uses as a port for cruise ships and insisted that its military uses would be strictly South Korean.[7] In other words, the "Jeju Civilian-Military Complex Port" would not be a de facto US military base. Yet although the base is officially under the aegis of the South Korean government, this is merely a technicality. For the base is a site designated as a US cooperative security location. Under the current forms of the Mutual Defense Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and South Korea, "the U.S. state is able to mobilize South Korean military facilities at its own discretion."[8] Accordingly and unsurprisingly, since the completion of the base in February 2016, US naval vessels, including a nuclear-powered attack submarine, have docked there.

Such dockings have witnessed renewed protest and confirmation of the position articulated all along by critics and activists that the true impetus for the base's construction was the US desire to contain China. In October 2018, the Association of Gangjeong Villagers Against the Jeju Naval Base protested the arrival of an armada of warships from thirteen countries, particularly the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier. Linking the atrocities of 4.3 to the naval base, activists declared, "The US military killed Jeju residents back then, this is why we don't want a naval base.… Everyone knows this naval base is made for the US, even though the government insists it isn't.… We

want to hear an apology from the US for the murder of innocents."[9] By laying bare these dynamics, and by demanding an apology from the United States, these Jeju activists upend the sleight of hand of the dominant debtor/creditor relation imposed on South Korea by the United States. They refuse to be interpellated by the injunction to feel gratitude for being "liberated" from Japanese colonialism and Sino-Soviet Communist domination. Instead, the activists radically reveal that the United States is actually the debtor, and they demand repayment in the form of an apology. Yet even as ongoing asymmetries of power determine who can script the sleight-of-hand narrative, and who can evade repayment of the debt even when the sleight of hand is revealed for what it is, the revelation itself and attendant demand for repayment are significant. For these activist refusals enact a performative aesthetics of settler imperial failure through the force and power of the very demand for repayment.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of "Backbone" and *Reiterations of Dissent* because these transpacific cultural works showcase the three related concerns of this chapter. The first concern is the linked yet differential targeting of particular sites in Asia and the Pacific as sacrifice zones or homes to US military bases and camptowns. Islands such as Okinawa and Jeju, though respectively part of East Asian nations that enjoy a relatively privileged subimperial status within Asia vis-à-vis their less powerful neighbors, are especially targeted not only because of their geostrategic locations but also because they are doubly subjugated. Focusing on the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea, sites of heavy US military presence, as pivotal locations of the settler garrison, in this chapter I trace the ways in which transpacific cultural productions connect the land grabs that constitute the US settler state and military empire. That is, the transpacific cultural works in my analysis generate a theory of the different yet linked varieties of land seizure through which what became the fifty states constituting the United States of America were successively incorporated into the white settler nation and through which proliferating Asian and Pacific sites were transformed into the bases and outposts constituting the US military imperium. I theorize how this latter variety of land seizure, for explicit and what has turned out to be perduring military uses, produces America's settler garrison. The cultural works I analyze reveal that while military bases at once manifest and enable the projection of US militarist settler imperial power, they *themselves* also constitute settler projects or settlements.

The second related concern of this chapter is the complex ethics and politics of how to represent the necropolitical contours of the spatial exception that is the military base and its camptown. *Reiterations of Dissent* foregrounds through its formal techniques the complexity of grappling with the buried and silenced history of a murderous US campaign of counterinsurgency or "red purge" that began during the formal US military occupation of what became South Korea. What is at stake is not a simple "recovery" of an invisibilized history into visibility but an interrogation of the ongoing dynamics of US militarist settler imperialism whose sleight of hand is what Baik incisively calls a "beautifying practice," one that alchemically transfigures violence into beneficent nonviolence and, I contend, death into the necessary precondition for

life.10 Alongside this, the transpacific cultural productions I analyze in this chapter also reveal a conjoined representational and epistemological conundrum: the ethics and politics of how to grapple with that which is not invisible but rather problematically hypervisible, objectified, and spectacularized. As the end of formal US military occupation transmogrified into a de facto one via the proliferation of US military bases on South Korean soil, an attendant camptown system of militarized sex work promoted and regulated through what I call a transpacific masculinist compact between the United States and South Korean governments proliferated as well. This was also the case in the Philippines until the base closures in 1992 and remains the case in Okinawa. The network of militarized sex work or "camptown prostitution" in turn generates the question of how we can reckon with camptown sexual violence without spectacularizing it. And how can we work against what Laura Hyun Yi Kang calls the "enforced visibility" of camptown sex workers?[11] In *Traffic in Asian Women*, Kang queries more broadly what it would mean to think through "Asian women" as "bodies of knowledge and ways of knowing rather than resort to benevolent, nominal inclusion or empathetic identification with *those* bodies in pain." She poses "Asian women as method?" as an open-ended question toward deimperializing US interdisciplinary knowledge formations.[12]

The transpacific masculinist compact that at once generates and obscures camptown sexual violence has endured thus far for several decades. The third related concern of this chapter is that this compact, a "military-sexual complex," creates ever-renewed cycles of what is effectively a form of debt bondage for camptown sex workers, many of whom are now trafficked from the Philippines and Southeast Asia, preceded by trafficking from Russia and the former Soviet republics.[13] These trafficked women are a kind of migrant "guest worker," yet the racialized women who labor as sex workers on America's settler garrison are all a kind of guest worker, even when they are laboring in their very hometowns or nations. For the camptown, made in the image of "America Town," is not their town but rather a nonsovereign space made manifest as a militarized factory floor of compelled economic dependence, biopolitical surveillance, and gendered racial and sexual violence. It is within this context of US metapolitical authority that the debt bondage regime is forged. Yet through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure, the transpacific cultural forms I analyze in this chapter encourage us to ask: What debt do we owe camptown sex workers, those who are still living and those murdered by US servicemembers? How are we indebted to them?

In what follows, I provide a brief overview of US bases and basing networks before turning to the Philippines with an analysis of Rachel Rivera's documentary, Sin City Diary (1992). Next, I analyze Okinawan literature: Kishaba Jun's short story "Dark Flowers" (1955), Higashi Mineo's novella Child of Okinawa (1971), and Medoruma Shun's short story "Hope" (1999).[14] I then turn to South Korean and Asian diasporic literature and film: Gina Kim's virtual reality (VR) film *Bloodless* (2017), Ahn Junghyo's *Silver Stallion: A Novel of Korea* (1990), and the documentaries *The Women Outside:*

Korean Women and the U.S. Military (1995) and *Camp Arirang* (1995).[15] This constellation of transpacific cultural texts collectively coheres as a critical archive that contains a significant theory of America's settler garrison and gestures to a future beyond it through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

What Is a Base?

The logic of militarism, as I have observed, is not reducible to strictly military functions; indeed, its ultimate logic and goal are the preservation of military institutions, hierarchies, and values whether or not they are needed for war. As such, bases are no longer temporary wartime structures but have become permanent outposts, or settlements of the settler garrison, whose raison d'être and justification are no longer reducible to questions of military preparedness or necessity. Nor are they contingent on the active existence or waging of actual war(s); instead, the inverted presumption is that "if we build them, wars will come."16 Nor, moreover, are bases contingent on strong congressional oversight. Rather, they have taken on a life of their own. In other words, the permanence of the base itself is a kind of temporal exception; it bespeaks what is effectively a US military occupation. The guest/host metaphor used to describe the United States and the sites on which its bases are located, respectively, obscures and inverts occupation and its attendant power dynamics. The "host" in this instance, far from possessing the power of resources and beneficence connoted by the word, is subjected to a "structural humiliation" vis-à-vis its "guest," the US military.17

We witness on these bases not only military hardware but architectures, infrastructures, personnel, and families of personnel effecting a wholesale spatial transformation of seized Indigenous or local land into virtual "America Towns" or replicas of American suburbs projected overseas. Indeed, on Okinawa, this sprawling complex contains not only headquarter buildings, ammunition depots, hospitals, family housing units, commissaries, and schools but also the facilities and amenities of leisure, entertainment, and recreation that we associate with a comfortable middle-class suburban American life. These include tennis courts, golf courses, swimming pools, baseball and football fields, and bowling alleys. On Okinawa, what soon became "permbase" grew exponentially into the most enormous complex of American military facilities outside the United States, only to be perhaps outdone by the recent expansion of the Camp Humphreys garrison in South Korea that I described in the Introduction.[18] Chalmers Johnson observes that such base amenities include the military equivalents of Disneyland and Club Med, already significant yet ever expanding.[19] In addition to such America Towns and amenities, US military personnel have also in recent years had access to even more exclusive entertainment and getaway spots, such as a ski and vacation center in the Bavarian Alps, a resort hotel in downtown Tokyo, and over two hundred golf courses worldwide, as well as jets to fly them there, including luxury jets in the case of admirals and generals.[20] Crucially, these bases and amenities not only involve the seizure of land but also a US military maritime

regime whose control of the oceanic, as I observed in the Introduction, extends to 52 percent of the earth's surface.

These developments generate a perhaps counterintuitive but productive question: What exactly is a base? Indeed, David Vine begins *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* by posing this very question. While it might initially seem obvious what a base is, definitions and terminology vary widely, with each branch of the military deploying its own preferred terms, such as post, station, camp, and fort. The Pentagon's definition of its generic term, base site, is that it is a "physical (geographic) location"—meaning land, a facility or facilities, or land and facilities—"owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed" by a component of the US Department of Defense (DoD). For his part, Vine explains that in order to avoid linguistic debates and to adhere to the simplest and most widely recognized term, he generally uses "'base' to mean any place, facility, or installation used regularly for military purposes of any kind."[21] I would like to draw our attention to a few key facets of the Pentagon definition of a base. First, there is the explicit inclusion of "land" and not just facilities, which is pertinent to this chapter's analysis of America's settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific. Second, such land and/or facilities are "owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by" the DoD. As I demonstrate in this chapter, an interrogation of how the DoD came to own, lease, or otherwise possess such land in Asia and the Pacific makes visible how military bases are constructed via land seizures and constitute a particular kind of settlement. Moreover, the term lease is misleading in many situations, particularly in places such as Okinawa, where landowners effectively had no choice but to rent their land to the US military at rates they had no power to negotiate. Third, the Pentagon definition is not explicit about the function of a base site; instead, we are to infer its military function because it belongs to and is occupied by some component of the DoD. Vine explicitly names the function as "military purposes of any kind." Yet as capacious as this is, it is even more capacious when we consider, as I elaborated in the Introduction, that US militarism is not reducible to the functions of the military. Rather, militarism exceeds the parameters of war temporally, spatially, and functionally, to the extent that the very existence of America's settler garrison has become the sine qua non of US militarist settler imperial power rather than the fighting of specific wars for national defense. Indeed, as early as 1970, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conceded that, "Once an American overseas base is established it takes on a life of its own. Original missions may become outdated but new missions are developed, not only with the intention of keeping the facility going, but often to actually enlarge it."[22]

Guantanamo Bay in Cuba (seized by the United States during the Spanish-American War in 1898 and leased to the United States in 1903) is generally identified by scholars as the first US military base "abroad." Vine observes that, strangely, scholars tend to overlook the bases created immediately following the Revolutionary War. This is to speak about the hundreds of frontier posts that were instrumental in the westward expansion of the United States, posts that were built on land that was

"very much abroad at the time." The first among these was Fort Harmar in the Northwest Territory, built in 1785, followed by Forts Deposit, Defiance, Hamilton, Wayne, Washington, and Knox in present-day Ohio and Indiana. Though these forts were not semipermanent settlements (of the kind we have witnessed in Asia and the Pacific in the post–World War II conjuncture), they made possible the westward migration of Euro-American settlers via the displacement of Native Americans and the seizure of their lands. By 1830, within the context of President Jackson's "Indian removal policy" of forcing Native Americans to give up their lands east of the Mississippi River, Fort Leavenworth in Kansas was understood to mark the "permanent Indian frontier" and thus the "very western edge of civilization." Yet it was not to be, as this "very western edge" edged ever further westward. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Native Americans who had been forcibly relocated west of the Mississippi by Jackson's removal policy and those already there were met with sixty major forts as well as 138 army posts in the western territories.23 This describes, in other words, the process of "continental imperialism" that I discussed in the Introduction.24

In this way, the US army played a pivotal role in making possible the US settler colonial project across the continent. The "very western edge of civilization" thus encountered the Pacific Ocean. Yet rather than presenting an impasse, this vast oceanic space was opened up for traversal via naval and later air power, with the fabled China market on the mind. Vine notes that the Obama administration's "pivot" to Asia and the Pacific has an original, pre–Civil War antecedent. As early as 1842, President John Tyler possessed a desire to establish Pacific naval bases. Within two years, the United States had opened up five Chinese ports to US trade and military forces through a system of "unequal treaties" imposed on China by the United States as well as European powers. Crucially, as base experts explain, while these treaties did not formally create bases, "they guaranteed forward access to US naval vessels, and enabled the Navy to purchase and establish warehouse facilities in any" of the ports.25 As such, the treaties effectively marked the beginning of what would become a proliferating, metastasizing presence of the US military in Asia and the Pacific. This, in addition to the "opening" of Japan and Okinawa (with Commodore Perry establishing the first US military base in Okinawa); the annexation of Jarvis, Baker, Howland, and Midway Islands; the purchase of Alaska from Russia; and the annexations or seizures of Hawai'i, American Sāmoa, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines all by the end of the nineteenth century, established the United States as a global military power with a particular interest in Asia and the Pacific.26 Although this nineteenth-century militarized globality of the United States pales in comparison to what would emerge out of and after World War II, it demonstrates the longue durée of US militarism in general and a prehistory of the post–World War II contours of America's settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific.

World War II witnessed a significant expansion of the basing network, with the goal of "island hopping" (to use a term coined by the US military) across the Pacific via

Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa in order to bomb Japan. With Japan's defeat, the United States occupied Japan and Korea, establishing bases in both nations while also acquiring former Japanese bases throughout the region. Thus, by 1945, almost half (more than 44 percent) of the total number of US overseas military bases was in the Pacific. Indeed, at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, President Harry Truman gave his full endorsement of the idea of a forward-deployed base network, stating, "Though the United States wants no profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases, which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, we will acquire."27

Although US basing presence did recede significantly immediately after World War II, the Korean War (1950–53), within the context of a rapidly congealing Cold War, provided the impetus for a significant expansion of the basing network. Indeed, Kent E. Calder observes that, "Of all the fateful critical junctures of the past century, the 1943–45 and 1950–53 periods probably shaped global basing profiles most profoundly, with consequences that persist to this day."28 And the signing of bilateral security treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan in the 1950s, though security oriented, served to buttress a broader framework of trans-Pacific political-economic integration. In this framework, the bases were a "linchpin."[29] Yet further, while during the Cold War the bases fulfilled the dual functions of serving as operational staging areas and as tools of strategic deterrence, since the 1970s this military concern has been increasingly coupled with strengthening the security of resource flows such as oil, especially from the Middle East. In effect, this network of bases is designed to be a permanent infrastructure, enabling the post-Fordist shifting of military power from some parts of the world to others with "just in time" efficiency and as dictated by crises that are perceived to pose a threat to US hegemony.[30] More recently, in the post-9/11 period, bases have become important also for "antiterrorist" campaigns and operations. In this so-called war on terror, the military significance of sea and air control has decreased in favor of a capacity for rapid intervention requiring "lighter" yet a greater number of bases distributed across remote regions of the world.[31] Indeed, the US "empire of bases" is so vast that the US military itself does not know the exact total because of poor reporting practices and shifting definitions of what constitutes a base. Grappling with this as well as the Pentagon's secrecy and lack of full transparency, Vine estimates that there are, as I related in the Introduction, approximately eight hundred US bases and "lily pads" (small bases) abroad. Of these, almost three hundred (close to 40 percent) are disproportionately located in Asia and the Pacific.[32]

Crucially, the reigning trope figuring such long-standing US imperial interests and desires in Asia and the Pacific has been the gendered metaphor of sexual conquest or consummation. As far back as 1868, for example, US Navy Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt described the Pacific as "the ocean bride of America" and used the metaphor of heterosexual marriage and sexual consummation: "It is on this ocean that the East

& the West have thus come together, reaching the point where search for Empire ceases & human power attains its climax." In 1882, after orchestrating the treaty that would "open" Korea to US and Western trade, Shufeldt again made recourse to this metaphor, calling the relationship an "amicable intercourse."[33] Yet as I will demonstrate in the analysis that follows, this reigning metaphor of sexual consummation, as problematic as it is, is only the tip of the iceberg in what would become literalized as the provision of militarized sex work to US soldiers across camptowns in Asia and the Pacific, euphemistically called "Rest and Recreation" or "R&R" facilities and zones. This provision, at once promoted, institutionalized, and regulated via what I call the transpacific masculinist compact between the US government and that of the "host" nation or territory, would see sexual relations transmogrify into sexual violence, assault, and sometimes murder perpetrated by GIs against sex workers. Indeed, we witness an epidemic of rape, such that during the Korean War era of the 1950s, the GI slang for R&R leave could also mean "Rape & Restitution" or "Rape and Ruin."[34]

The transpacific cultural productions on bases and camptowns in the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea that I analyze in this chapter allow us to see how such crimes go unpunished via the projection or export of US sovereignty, whose metapolitical authority affords the protection of extraterritoriality (or effective impunity) to US military personnel who commit crimes. The spatial transformation effected via land seizure, making possible the creation of the spatial exception that is the US military base and its attendant camptown, are not only the outposts of an attempted (yet ultimately failed) world security but also the settlements of a presumably temporary (yet stubbornly enduring) kind of world-making in the image of "America Town." Indeed, it is also the projection and export of the American way of life as such. In the cultural works I analyze, these spatial and temporal registers of America's settler exceptions are at once made visible and thwarted through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure, or the crafting and imagining of decolonial and antimilitarist spaces and times that blast open the spatiotemporal continuum of the settler garrison.

An "Inexorable Liaison": The Philippines and the United States

In Rachel Rivera's documentary *Sin City Diary* (1992), Richard Gordon, the mayor of Olongapo City in the Philippines, makes a sobering observation about the city that lies next to Subic Bay, the largest US naval base in Asia until its closure in 1992. He states, "Does the city recognize prostitution? No, but we recognize that there will be that inexorable liaison … the liaison that will have to come about because there is a US facility here, there are navy ships coming here and government but take into consideration that when you have these things going on that you'll be able to regulate it." Mayor Gordon reveals how the military camptown constitutes a spatial exception by highlighting the paradoxical conditions under which sex work is at once

unrecognized or illegal yet regulated. The "inexorable liaison" of which he speaks is a euphemistic reference to the assumption that wherever the US military is based, so too will there be a local provision of "rest and recreation," itself another euphemism for militarized sex work.[35] Yet in such spaces, where the sovereignties of the United States and the host nation would presumably compete, or where the sovereignty of the host nation on whose land the base and its camptown are actually situated should logically reign, the "inexorable liaison" indexes economies of neocolonial dependence, gendered racial violence, and extraterritorial impunity for US military personnel who commit crimes. As I will elaborate in this chapter, the hybrid space that is the military base and its attendant camptown may be an ambiguous contact zone that blurs national boundaries and sovereignties, yet insofar as it is a part of America's settler garrison, US military authority and its own juridical apparatus often trump all else. As such, US military authority, negotiated through formally bilateral yet effectively neocolonial Status of Forces Agreements, functions as a type of metapolitical authority.

Ceded to the United States at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Philippines was subjected to a genocidal war of conquest, with the United States declaring victory and colonial possession in 1902 and lasting until 1946. A central feature of US colonialism and ongoing neocolonialism in the Philippines is military presence.36 Until the withdrawal of the US military in 1992, due in no small part to the end of martial rule in the Philippines and to the activist work of organizations such as General Assembly Binding Women for Reform, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA) and Coalition Against Trafficking of Women-Asia Pacific (CATW-AP), the bases in the Philippines constituted one of the United States's largest and most significant military complexes in the world.[37] Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base were deployed as crucial staging grounds for the Vietnam War and more recently the Gulf War. It is crucial to note that after the 1992 withdrawal, the Philippines was remilitarized by the United States and once again made available as a logistics hub through a series of agreements, specifically the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999, the Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement of 2002, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2014.[38] Such agreements have facilitated the growing presence of US military forces on several "lily pads" in the Philippines, particularly for efforts in combating local insurgents and containing the perceived Chinese threat.[39] Militarized violence such as the 2014 brutal murder in Olongapo of Jennifer Laude, a transgender Filipina woman, by a US marine on leave after participating in joint US-Philippines military exercises, makes crushingly visible how the 1992 base closures failed to extricate the Philippines fully from America's settler garrison. This ongoing history of US military presence in Asia and the Pacific is not unique simply to former colonies like the Philippines, and in addition to remilitarization, the afterlife of base closures includes the ongoing effects of the environmental and ecological devastation wrought by the bases. Given the tendency of the United States to ignore the "polluter pays" principle, cleanup efforts have been difficult.[40]

Just as Olongapo City's mayor Richard Gordon's comments reveal the spatial exception, women who labor as sex workers in military camptowns amplify the temporal exception. In *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia*, a transgeneric text of interviews, critical essays, photo essays, and testimonials by sex workers at US military bases and camptowns in Asia, we hear from eighteen-year-old Lita, who worked at Olongapo: "I thought about our debt in the province. I said, 'Okay, I'll go with him.' I went with him. We went to a hotel."[41] Lita conceives of debt not as an individual one, but a collective "our debt in the province." Debt, as I have been elaborating, is the imposition of a militarist settler imperial temporality that demands and extracts repayment from people like Lita and her family. This compels economic dependence on the US military and the continuing presence of its bases and camptowns. Filmmaker Rachel Rivera's voice-over in *Sin City Diary* further reveals this protracted economy of not only compelled dependence but also gratitude, or the figurative debt that can never be fully repaid: "It was nearly fifty years ago that America gave up its rule here but the US military has since become the country's second largest employer. It's the payoff that's kept us grateful to the foreigner we've learned to love." A sex worker articulates this conundrum in the film: "If the base is gone, I don't know what happens. I think Olongapo is going down. No business here. Nothing. Business in Olongapo is restaurant and bar, if the business is gone, I don't know. I don't know what happen to people here." When the US military did withdraw its forces and shut down the base in 1992, business specifically in Olongapo did disappear, but camptown business as such did not. Just as Filipina women from the provinces had been compelled to follow where the business was to Olongapo, they then found themselves again compelled to follow where the business was, this time away from Olongapo and to bases elsewhere in Asia, especially in South Korea and Okinawa.

The migration of Filipina sex workers out of the Philippines to US military bases and camptowns elsewhere in Asia is but one stream of a much broader system of labor export and remittances. Robyn Magalit Rodriguez argues that the Philippines is a "labor brokerage state," engaging in what some have called legal human trafficking by offering and facilitating the export of Filipinos to be used as a reserve army of labor throughout the globe. The Philippine state's "transnational migration apparatus," complete with a highly developed and efficient bureaucracy, functions much like an export processing zone. Except, in this instance, the export commodity is the human qua worker, one that is highly profitable.[42] This neocolonial labor export system builds upon the US colonial system that preceded it and functions as a "fix" for the unemployment, underemployment, and rural displacement produced in the Philippines as a result of neoliberal restructuring within US-led global capitalism.[43] Here, national debt plays a role, for unlike the United States, the neocolonized Philippine state occupies a subjugated position within ongoing asymmetries of power and is thus beholden to its creditors. Moreover, a significant number of households in the Philippines depends upon the remittances sent back home by family members who work overseas. In 2019,

the amount in US dollars totaled over $35 billion, representing about 9.3 percent of GDP.[44] Just as Lita in *Let the Good Times Roll* is financially burdened by the obligation to help her family repay its debt, millions of overseas Filipina/o workers are burdened by the obligation to contribute to the household income of their families.

Neferti Tadiar argues that this debt-propelled and export-oriented strategy has led to the worldwide commodification of women of the Global South through the export and exploitation of their feminized and "cheap" labor power, especially in the sex trade. This sex trade takes both legitimate form (as tourism, hospitality, or mail-order bride businesses) and illicit form (as prostitution). Indeed, the Philippine nation itself has been hyperfeminized, symptomizing the condensation of patriarchy, modern heterosexism, colonialism, and imperialism. In particular, the production of the figure of the prostitute as a feminine ideal "has long been a cultural corollary to commodity fetishism in the age of capitalism."[45] Tadiar observes that for women coerced into what is euphemistically called the "entertainment industry," or in the context of military camptowns called "rest and recreation" zones, the difference between raw material and labor dissolves. For "the prostitute applies her labour power to her own body in the production of herself as a commodity." This process, in which the sex worker is at once raw material, labor, and machine, is a manifestation of the ever-increasing efficiency of global capitalism in hyperexploiting.[46] With militarized sex work in particular, what Katharine H. S. Moon calls "sex among allies," we see the symbiosis between capitalism and militarism that I discussed in the Introduction.[47] We also see that sex workers must contend with the spatial exception of the camptown as a site of competing sovereignties in which US metapolitical authority almost always supersedes local authority. This enables not only effective impunity or immunity for US military personnel perpetrating gendered racial and sexual violence but also an added layer of biopolitical surveillance and control imposed on the sex workers. Here, the process through which the sex worker is at once raw material and labor is particularly fraught.

In *Sin City Diary*, we see the racialized, gendered, and imperial optics through which men who serve in the US military view Filipina sex workers. One white, one Asian American, and two African American servicemen each comment on camera when asked by Rachel Rivera what they think about Olongapo. The white serviceman comments, "Don't come here mom, it's bad." This is followed by an Asian American who claims, "This is like a guy's dream fantasy. I mean you think about it. You come here and a guy is treated like a king." Finally, the second African American serviceman is even more frank when he builds upon the first's remark that it's "fun … like an amusement park" by revealing, "I like your motherfucking women. Their shit is fresh. The women here—you would never find them like this here in America. It's easy, you know what I'm saying." The Asian- and African American men, though racialized as men of color within the United States and thus targeted by white supremacist violence in linked yet distinct ways, also carry the power of their US imperial citizenship and heteropatriarchy with them when they travel overseas, especially to neocolonies like

the Philippines. As such, their remarks about Filipina sex workers are clearly not simply heteropatriarchal but are spoken as the agents of US militarist settler imperialism. Filipinas who labor as camptown sex workers are subjected to these logics and attendant practices. Vexed neocolonial relations, however, instantiate a dialectic of dependency, desire, and betrayal in which US servicemen continue to be viewed as avenues of escape and rescue from poverty.

Yet when US servicemen travel overseas, they not only carry their imperial citizenship but are also vectors of sexually transmitted diseases. The US military thus regulates and subjects the sex workers to biopolitical surveillance. In *Sin City Diary*, we learn about a "social hygiene clinic" run by the city and the US Navy. Women are required to go there every two weeks to get tested for sexually transmitted diseases, and a tracing system subjects the women to further surveillance by providing a way for US sailors to report the names of women whom they suspect of having given them a disease. The US Navy also begins funding HIV tests, but with no plans for actually treating women with AIDS. A woman who reveals on-screen that she had tested positive for HIV says, "I wanted to commit suicide." There couldn't be a starker contrast from the casual comments of the US servicemen and the serious testimonies of Filipina women. What is a hedonic "amusement park" for the former is a necropolitical minefield for the latter. Here, the blurring of raw material and labor in the Filipina's production of herself as a commodity is such that the raw material, her body, is vulnerable to exhaustion in both its senses.

What I have called this transpacific masculinist compact—of securing sexual access for the US military while surveilling and in some cases detaining women to protect the military from venereal disease—has been heightened in the post–World War II era. But it dates back to the Philippine-American War, the US conquest and colonization of the Philippines at the turn of the century.[48] Thus, while US bases in the Philippines were shut down in 1992, this longer genealogy preceding those closures by almost a century, and the escalating export of Filipina migrant labor following those closures as well as the more recent remilitarization of the Philippines, bespeak an enduring transpacific military-sexual complex whose "raw material" is composed not only of seized land but also the very bodies of the women who have been displaced and dispossessed by that seizure.

From this discussion of the Philippines, I turn next to Okinawa, another site on America's settler garrison with an enduring transpacific military-sexual complex. Like the archipelagic Philippines, Okinawa is also an island. Okinawa's dual domination by the United States and Japan has transformed and malformed the island itself into a base. To the extent that Okinawa is still colonized by Japan and is thus disproportionately targeted by US militarist settler imperialism compared to other parts of Japan, it is one among many islands in the Pacific with an Indigenous presence seeking a decolonial and antimilitarist future. From the Philippines to Okinawa and beyond, the vast contours of US "transoceanic militarism" necessitate a decontinentalizing oceanic analytic that can critically apprehend those contours. Craig

Santos Perez writes that "no island is an island because islands exist in dynamic relationality to a larger archipelago and ocean." Moreover, "no island is an island because any island is itself an archipelago, or an 'auto-archipelago'" of complex and multilayered dynamics.[49] This vital inter-island and intra-island relationality, though significantly constituted in part by the dizzying proliferation of US bases, is not reducible to that proliferation. An oceanic analytic can also apprehend the transpacific imaginaries that at once critically diagnose and gesture beyond US militarist settler imperialism through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure.

Okinawa: "The Island Itself Is the Base"

"The military doesn't have bases in Okinawa. The island itself is the base." A navy officer made this observation to Morton Halperin, a high-ranking Pentagon official.[50] Similarly, Saundra Sturdevant argues that, "In many ways, it is a case not of the U.S. having a military presence in Okinawa, but of Okinawans living within a U.S. military preserve."[51] Annexed by Japan in 1879, occupied and controlled by the US military from 1945 until 1972, then "returned" or "reverted" to Japan in 1972, Okinawa's ongoing militarized dispossession is reflective of what Ayano Ginoza calls the "intimacies of US and Japanese empires" and what Lisa Yoneyama calls the "transpacific complicity" between the United States and Japan.[52] It is what I have been calling the transpacific masculinist compact. Although Okinawa constitutes only 0.6 percent (under one percent) of the total land area of Japan, almost 75 percent of US military bases, facilities, and troops in Japan are stationed there. Approximately 20 percent of Okinawa, the main island in the Ryūkyū Archipelago, is occupied by US military bases. Although many had hoped the "Reversion to the Mainland" in 1972 would also reverse this heavy military presence, it was not to be, leading to the question of whether Okinawa serves as the "garbage dump" where mainland Japan and the United States can dispose of their concerns about security.[53] Moreover, in critical recognition of how US militarism produces gendered spaces of violence, such as a militarized sex industry and sexual violence, Suzuyo Takazato argues that Okinawa is the "prostituted daughter of Japan. Japan used her daughter as a breakwater to keep battlefields from spreading over the mainland until the end of World War II. And after the war, she enjoyed economic prosperity by selling the daughter to the United States."[54] Indeed, Japan itself had also been feminized as "America's geisha ally" in its transformation from a racialized and demonized World War II enemy to submissive Cold War junior partner in Asia.[55]

The Cold War alliance between the United States and Japan, indeed an asymmetrical "transpacific complicity" structured by Japan's client state status vis-à-vis the United States, has made possible and desirable the continued expropriation of Okinawa. The 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the US military occupation of Japan, except Okinawa. Moreover, the US-Japan Security Treaty (initially signed in 1960 and automatically renewed since its second signing in 1970) and the Status of

Forces Agreement (SOFA) of this treaty allow the United States to use and control the Okinawan land it seized during the initial phase of the occupation.[56] However, the treaty's Article 6, which allows the United States to station troops in Japan, specifies that it is to be "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security *in the Far East*." Yet since 1990, the marines have been deployed from there repeatedly for wars in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It is important to note that the marines are not a defensive, Far Eastern force but rather an expeditionary attack force.[57]

Although it was nominally incorporated into Japan, a constitutionally pacifist state, Okinawa is effectively an American military colony, "a militarized, dual-colonial dependency of Japan and the United States."[58] Here, it is important to note that Indigenous Okinawans are not Japanese in terms of culture and language but are a colonized and minoritized group.[59] Indeed, Okinawans are racialized by mainland Japanese, who see them as *gai-chi*, or those outside the orbit of central power. Media caricatures of Okinawans persist into the contemporary context, with descriptors such as "*naïve*, *slow*, *lazy*, *uncultured*, *unmannered*, *provincial*, *less civilized,* and so forth."[60] Although in 2019 the Japanese government passed a bill to formally recognize the Ainu of Hokkaidō, Japan's northernmost prefecture, as an Indigenous group and to promote and protect Ainu culture (after the Diet passed a nonbinding resolution in 2008), Indigenous Okinawans (Uchinānchu) have yet to receive formal recognition as either an Indigenous or minority group. Yet, as I will elaborate, there is a growing movement among Okinawans to articulate their Indigeneity within the context of global Indigenous peoples' movements as well as the local context of antibase activism in Okinawa. Ayano Ginoza, Megumi Chibana, and others offer powerful analyses of how feminist and Indigenous frameworks, articulated at the intensely local scale even as they might be connected to broader global movements, have animated the demilitarization movement.[61]

On Okinawa's ongoing doubly colonized condition, Yoneyama observes that Okinawa is a space of at least three overlapping liminalities—epistemically, legally, and materially. These liminalities are captured by Okinawa's ambiguous status as a "liberated yet occupied" space under US occupation in the post–World War II conjuncture.[62] Its legal liminality has effectively functioned to defer its decolonization perpetually, another kind of temporal exception. The post–World War II "transfer" of Okinawa from a defeated Japanese empire to the United States was conditioned by two provisions: the United States' recognition of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and uninterrupted US control over Okinawa continuing through what was initially imagined to be its eventual approval as a United Nations trusteeship. The legal mechanisms of "residual sovereignty" and "pending trusteeship" thus ensured that sovereignty as it pertained to Okinawa would reside outside of Okinawa itself. Yet the very liminality, out of which a "no longer formally colonized but not yet sovereign" Okinawa was created, at once enabled the continuation and disavowal of colonial expropriation and violence.[63] It is this twinned logic of the continuation and disavowal

of the violence through which Okinawa has been transformed into America's settler garrison that is revealed in the Okinawan literature I analyze.

Let us begin with a common Okinawan refrain, that the violent expropriation of their land by the US military was undertaken by "bulldozer and bayonet."[64] Kishaba Jun's short story "Dark Flowers," set during the Korean War (1950–53), links this land seizure in Okinawa to settler colonialism within what became the United States.[65] The story is told from the third-person perspective of Nobuko, a sex worker who labors in a place called "K Town" in the story. When the story was published, readers logically assumed that "K Town" was Koza, a city on Okinawa Island that caters to US military personnel.[66] Describing Nobuko's trip home to the countryside to see and give money to her family, as well as her ambivalent feelings about her transactional relationship with an American GI, the story contains very little action. Instead, it is a powerful meditation on the spatial transformation of Okinawa from a predominantly agricultural land to a dense network of military bases and towns at a pivotal earlier moment in the US occupation and the Cold War, when the Korean War called for an expansion of an already heavily militarized presence. "Dark Flowers" generates a crucial analytic for apprehending the connected yet distinct land seizures that have come to constitute US settler state power and its specific formation as a settler garrison state in the post–World War II era. Moreover, Kishaba's short story imagines a future beyond such settler seizures by gesturing to the possibilities of a transpacific, transwar, and transcolonial Indigenous solidarity between Okinawans and Native Americans.

As Nobuko takes an uneventful walk to her friend's place, we see Okinawa's "weird landscape":

> To get to Michiko's room, Nobuko had to walk along the asphalt military highway, turn at the corner gas station, go down a gravel road lined on both sides with tire repair shops, car washes, and other stores, then walk in the direction of the seacoast along narrow footpaths between rice paddies. Here and there among the paddies were rows of brand-new houses, built on gravel landfills, with gleaming red-tile roofs. It made for a weird landscape. . . . They were, without a doubt, fine houses. But by this time none of the farmers, who'd been relocated here in this forced migration, were living inside. Instead, they lived in tin-roof shacks that had been built onto the kitchens or put up in the backyards. The interiors of these "fine houses" had been partitioned into eight-by-eight foot private rooms where yellowed bras and dresses in many colors now hung outside the windows, fluttering in the wind. At night these "fine houses" became bars and cabarets. (101–02)

This "weird" checkerboard of rice paddies, houses with red-tile roofs, and tin-roof shacks is a blueprint of US military land seizures, and the multiple displacements and forced migrations of farmers bespeak the transformation of Okinawa from a self-sustaining agricultural economy to one increasingly dependent on the US military.[67] The Battle of Okinawa during World War II obliterated much of the island and killed almost one-third of its population. Forced into internment camps and resettled after the war, then forced to migrate from one part of Okinawa to another multiple times, forced again out of their houses with red-tile roofs and into makeshift tin-roof shacks, more and more Okinawans are compelled to make their living within the terms of a distorted military economy and war "boom." The repurposed house with a red-tile roof, now a bar, a cabaret, and a brothel, was itself the site to which Okinawan farming families were displaced, yet it soon also becomes the site from which those families are again displaced so that they can survive.

The "weird landscape" described in "Dark Flowers" is a geography of militarism, or the landscape of America's settler garrison. By defamiliarizing this landscape within the context of what has become an unrelentingly quotidian militarized presence and infrastructure in Okinawa, the story provides a critical mapping of the land that must be expropriated in order for military settlement to occur. As I have suggested, the US military (not just its personnel but extending to dependent family members and contractors) are not settlers in the classic sense. There is, however, a permanence to the enduring spatial logic and architecture of military bases, camptowns, and facilities. This, coupled with the sheer amount of actual space they take up, constitutes a type of settlement that violently displaces and dispossesses the Indigenous population. Land, livelihood, and way of life had been intricately connected for Indigenous Okinawans. The making of America's settler garrison severs this connection and tethers Okinawans to the distorted auspices of the US Department of Defense.

This making of America's settler garrison by "bulldozer and bayonet" began during World War II's Battle of Okinawa in 1945, when the military violently seized large tracts of land and bulldozed or otherwise demolished many houses, family graves, and sacred sites.[68] Within a year, it had taken possession of forty thousand acres and 20 percent of the island's arable land. By 1950, this had risen to 40 percent, displacing approximately 250,000 Okinawans, or almost half the island's population.[69] In this process of dispossession and displacement, the United States determined both the land-use rules and land values.[70] Such a seizure of land, at once unilateral, uncompensated, and orchestrated on a massive scale, was in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention's Article 46 prohibiting the confiscation of private property.[71] In 1953, to legitimize the confiscations of land, the US military issued Ordinance No. 109 (Land Acquisition Procedure), which outlined the terms for acquiring new leases, "including the ability to take private land with armed force in the case of noncompliance."[72] After "reversion" to Japan in 1972, the Japanese Diet passed a land-use law called the "Special Measures for Law and Land Required by the U.S. Military

Bases." Under this law, landowners are mandated to lease their land to the government of Japan, which in turn subleases it to the US military for no charge.[73]

The seizure of Indigenous Okinawan land by "bulldozer and bayonet," the production of the "weird landscape" limned in "Dark Flowers," was met with a dramatic series of protests in the mid-1950s by local resident farmers. Crucially, one forgotten yet significant series in this earlier moment of ongoing antibase activism that continues to this day is the Isahama land struggle. In Isahama, a region in the center of Okinawa Island, farming women articulated a radical set of demands based on their Indigenous place-based relations to the land and social relations to one another. In her stunning analysis of this struggle, Wendy Matsumura notes that the women did not fight explicitly for the removal of the bases. Yet the radicality of their demands can be apprehended by focusing on what they did explicitly fight for, which was the preservation of Isahama as a place and the social relations they had created to build it together. Through a Marxist feminist lens, Matsumura argues that the "Women's Appeal," in demanding continued access to farmlands, rejected altogether the very terms of compensation that dominated official negotiations among the landowner representatives (who were male), the local government of the Ryūkyū Islands, and the US military. This privileging of access to farmlands, rather than monetary compensation, radically articulated an Indigenous worldview that was not only anticapitalist but also revealed a prescience about the precarity of wage labor within a US-dictated military economy. By centering relationship to land rather than money as the condition that would secure their livelihood and more broadly the social reproduction and well-being of their larger community, the women forcefully articulated an Indigenous resistance to dispossession and capitalist enclosure. Plots of paddy land, even tiny ones, made it possible for them to harvest rice for sale, and it also crucially gave them access to "what they described as inexhaustible supplies of water for laundry, cooking, farming, drinking, and so on. In their appeal, the women called themselves some of the 'happiest people in all of Okinawa' for living in a place where water did not have to be purchased."[74]

In thus shifting the very terrain and terms of struggle by rejecting the imposition of US militarist settler imperialism's property regime on ever-growing parts of Okinawa, the "Women's Appeal" was not simply pointing to land and water as physical resources. Indeed, as Matsumura argues, the women's insistence on the incalculability or impossibility of converting what they would lose into a monetary sum (which goes beyond simply contesting the undervaluation of the land by the United States) points to how such losses would not only be tangible but also crucially intangible.[75] As I see it, the women were insisting on the incalculable value of a specifically Indigenous place-based epistemology, ontology, and mutuality of being situated on land that they had collectively rebuilt after the previous wartime displacements of World War II and the devastating Battle of Okinawa. Moreover, as "Dark Flowers" reveals, women in particular were being subsumed into wage labor within US military bases and camptowns, particularly into service work and militarized

sexual labor, at the very same moment of the "Women's Appeal." The emergence of the "fallen woman" trope as a social problem, increased biopolitical surveillance, and vulnerability to sexual violence—these were some of the processes that the Isahama women farmers were attempting to preempt. In so doing, what they were striving to protect was not just livelihood but also autonomy and the very ground that makes possible mutuality. Such mutuality or lateral sociality, as I have been suggesting, is an alternative form of debt.

This earlier moment in Indigenous Okinawan resistance to the imposition of what Brenna Bhandar calls the "colonial lives of property" at once challenges and amplifies what would become the fast-growing contours of America's settler garrison on Okinawa and beyond.[76] Indeed, as Mark L. Gillem observes, this is a "mortgaged empire." However, "at least one thing comes cheaply—the land America's outposts occupy."[77] This militarist thirst for land, which has grown unquenchably in the post–World War II era, is expressed aptly by Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, a retired US Army colonel and historian, who writes, "Foreign real estate has the same attraction for American defense planners that Nimitz-class aircraft carriers do for admirals and B-2 stealth bombers and heavy Abrams tanks do for generals. They can never have enough."[78] It is no wonder, then, that the DoD refers to its vast network of bases, structures, and facilities as a "worldwide real property portfolio."[79] And in this way, the island of Okinawa was remade from self-sufficient agricultural villages to military-dependent Cold War suburbs with new forms of spillover—"clamor, calamity, contamination, and crime."[80]

Okinawa's "weird landscape" is the landscape of what I have been calling the spatial exception, in this case the strategic centerpiece or "keystone of the Pacific" of a vast network of bases constituting America's settler garrison. The land grab in Okinawa, the flagrant violation of the 1907 Hague Convention I noted above, and the continued occupation of that land after the 1972 reversion give witness to the US settler state's metapolitical authority. As I will elaborate later, this authority not only pertains to the violent means through which land was acquired but also the acts of violence perpetrated by US military personnel on that land against local populations. When US military personnel are stationed overseas, extraterritoriality, or adjudication by US military courts as opposed to local national courts, goes with them. What also travels with them is "America Town," or the spatial model of a suburb.[81] Unsurprisingly, this spatial model of the suburb, with a focus on conformity and consumption, requires great amounts of land.

Franchised shopping, that sine qua non of the American suburb, has also become the sine qua non of the American outpost, what Johnson calls a "consumerist Sparta."[82] Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), the biggest franchise, was established in 1985 to meet what was then the purchasing needs of over 11.5 million "authorized" consumers spread across US military installations throughout the globe. Dictating development plans on every base, AAFES builds shopping malls, called base or post exchanges (bx on an air force base or px on an army post) that are the "military

equivalent of Wal-Mart."[83] AAFES's demand for bigger stores and even bigger parking lots in service of industrial-scale retail consumption and its prioritization of profit over all other planning concerns for the "host" base give new meaning, as Gillem argues, to the phrase "military-industrial complex."[84] This phrase can no longer refer just to the weapons industry; it must also include the military equivalent of Walmart. "America Town" is where US military personnel and their families live while stationed overseas, and this town is accompanied by an "R&R" entertainment area catering to the US military, often a camptown.

In "Dark Flowers," we see the early design of an entertainment district or camptown that is at once the site not only of US militarism but also of cultural imperialism. Yet the story thwarts conventional assumptions about what kind of consumers and spectators the locals, in this case the Okinawans, might be. Nobuko spends time with her boyfriend, a GI named Joe, in the entertainment district: "K was the main business district in the middle part of Okinawa Island. It had the shabby postwar look of a town born and grown up along the military highway that ran through it from north to south. Its streets were lined up with a jumble of souvenir shops, movie theaters, foreign import-export companies, bars, game centers, vendors' stalls, and brothels—all fronted with signs written in English. Hidden behind its neat, modern buildings were countless one-story shacks" (103). "Dark Flowers" dwells at relative length on the American film that Nobuko and Joe watch and contains a detailed plot summary of a group of white settlers heading west, led by Gregory Peck, in a convoy of covered wagons. Their great challenge as they cross the prairie is a tribe of "Indians," whom the Peck character almost single-handedly annihilates. This unnamed film in the story could be a combination of the many epic Westerns that Gregory Peck appeared in starting in the 1940s. Interestingly, it could be a version of the "The Plains" sequence starring Peck in the grand epic *How the West Was Won* (1962), released several years after the publication of "Dark Flowers" in 1955. Author Kishaba marks here what became a familiar trope in the genre of the Western—the manifest destiny of white settlers heading west, led by a heroic man who defends the group against many dangers, including and especially "savage Indians." This trope attempts to cover over the very question of "how the West was won"—through the settler colonial genocidal conquest of Native Americans and the theft of their land.

Yet as "Dark Flowers" illuminates through the ekphrastic description of this film, the genre of the Western and the trope of the heroic and pioneering white settler cannot fully predict or contain oppositional spectatorial practices, interpretations, and identifications. After the summary of the film's diegesis, "Dark Flowers" reveals how it has been interpreted by Nobuko. Rather than identifying with the white settlers, in particular the Peck character's female romantic interest, Nobuko identifies with the massacred Indians: "Why did the Indians have to be massacred, Nobuko asked herself. It had filled her with anger to see them desperately defending their homeland as old Indian women died in terror, young Indian men tumbled to their deaths from cliffs, and camera close-ups showed the faces of men trampled to death after falling from their

horses. Why would Indians ever agree to perform in such a film, she wondered. The whole thing made her sick" (105). In naming the massacre as a massacre, the annihilation as an annihilation, the story names US settler colonial violence as that of genocidal conquest of Indigenous populations. Moreover, multiple references to the encounters between settlers and Indians as that of Indians "defending their homeland" draw the reader's attention to the settler theft of Native land. In doing so, the story exposes one of the foundations of international law, the doctrine of terra nullius ("land belonging to no one") as a legal fiction abetting the white settler "discovery" of "empty" land.

Nobuko's anger and ultimate disgust, her questioning of why "the Indians [had] to be massacred," indeed her recognition of their humanity as "old Indian women" and "young Indian men" who die in "terror" on-screen, expose the failure of the ideological labor of US cultural imperialism on the settler garrison. Not only is Nobuko angry but the "whole thing made her sick," and she wonders why "Indians [would] ever agree to perform in such a film." On this point, Michelle H. Raheja develops a theory of "redfacing" in *Reservation Reelism: Redfacing, Visual Sovereignty, and Representations of Native Americans in Film*. Emphasizing the complex performances of Hollywood Indians negotiating a circumscribed context of uneven power relationships with European American filmmakers and producers, Raheja argues that "redfacing signals the ways in which the work of Indigenous performers, like that of the trickster, is always in motion and therefore creates acts that operate ambiguously, acts that open themselves up for further reading and interpretation."[85] The dying Indians that Nobuko sees on-screen, though compelled to play the role of the "vanishing Indian," a reigning trope in the settler colonial imaginary, indeed open up further reading and interpretation on Nobuko's part. She questions why they would take such roles, yet that very querying, the very disagreement she has with their decision, registers the alternative and critical interpretations that redfacing can generate.

"Dark Flowers" does not end with Nobuko's sympathetic feelings about the massacred Indians. Indeed, the story establishes a compelling point of identification between the Indians and the Okinawans. After viewing the film, Nobuko cannot forget the faces of the Indian men:

> Then, walking alone, she again recalled the faces of the Indian men in the movie. They brought back a horrible memory. It had been a sweltering dawn in mid-July when she witnessed this brutal scene. Just before sunrise, across the military highway from her room, she'd seen the faces of men and women huddled together, trembling with rage. They had just been dragged outside the barbed-wire fence that now surrounded their land, and the young men among them were being arrested. She had seen it with her own

> eyes. And she could still hear the endless clanging of an alarm bell at dawn as everything these people owned was being taken from them. "Gregory Peck, 'Mr. Handsome.' Hah! What a fraud," Nobuko grumbled to herself. (106)

In having the film trigger Nobuko's memory of this horrible scene, "Dark Flowers" establishes a connection between the genocidal conquest of Native Americans and the dispossession and criminalization of Indigenous Okinawans. The story thus links the violence of settler colonialism to the militarized violence of the settler garrison and also links the theft of Indigenous lands on what became the "domestic" United States to that of its military empire in Asia and the Pacific. The "barbed-wire fence that now surrounded their [Okinawan] land" marks the militarized enclosures that would increasingly dispossess and displace Indigenous Okinawans. Indeed, "fence-line landscapes," "detour mentalities," and "checkpoint cultures" are now all too common features of militarist spatialities and geographies.[86] This renders all the more prescient the "Women's Appeal" of the Isahama women farmers in recognizing what the loss of access to their farmlands would ultimately mean.

"Dark Flowers" gestures to the possibilities of a global Indigenous solidarity and linked decolonized future by making these Indigenous place-based transpacific connections and affective identifications through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. Moreover, it interrogates the temporality of settler colonialism. The slaughter of Native Americans in the story's film depicts a historical period about a century or several decades before the roundup of Okinawans that Nobuko recalls. Yet if we are to recall settler colonialism's ongoing "present tenseness," if you will, it conjoins with the post–World War II formation of military empire and of the settler garrison in Asia and the Pacific. As such, decolonization for both Native Americans and Okinawans resides in the future. Despite different histories (including, for example, that Okinawa has a triangulated history with its colonizer Japan and with that nation's client state status vis-à-vis the United States), what I hope to have demonstrated are the recursive workings of settler violence. These recursive workings are the projections of settler state power overseas as also increasingly a militarist and imperialist transnational garrison state power. In turn, those projections also at times rebound in renovated forms to the "domestic" sites of the settler state.

These recursive workings of power are also those of resistance to that power. We have seen this with Nobuko's oppositional interpretation of the film. Her ultimate pronouncement is that Gregory Peck qua "Mr. Handsome" is a "fraud." This lays bare the fraud that is US militarist settler imperialism, or the sleights of hand through which metapolitical authority functions. Moreover, at the end of "Dark Flowers," we see that such critical disidentifications are not unique to Nobuko. Through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure, we are here reminded that Okinawan resistance has been there all along, in step with and in opposition to the metastasizing contours of America's settler garrison, as with the "Women's Appeal" of the Isahama women farmers.

Nobuko's brother, it turns out, is part of a reading circle that discusses not only books but also "organizing" and "unions" (109).

Having focused my foregoing discussion of "Dark Flowers" on the spatial exception that is the settler garrison, I turn now to an analysis of Higashi Mineo's novella *Child of Okinawa* and its critical imagining of the temporal as well as spatial exceptions. Told through the eyes of Tsuneyoshi, an adolescent boy, and set in 1950s Okinawa, the novella depicts the island's increasing dependence on the military-service economy. Displaced to a town next to a large air force base, Tsuneyoshi's family undergoes a series of failed business ventures, including a noodle shop and grocery store, before deciding to go into the bar (and effectively a brothel) business. Here, in the business that also doubles as a home, young Tsuneyoshi witnesses and must sometimes give up his bed for the bar's sex workers and their GI clients. *Child of Okinawa* demonstrates how in the linked economy of figurative and financial debt, the US military incorrectly assumed that Okinawans would feel indebted to the occupying power for providing the protection of a military-service economy. Tsuneyoshi's displacement from his own bed, the claustrophobia-inducing ways in which the military-service economy encroaches upon ever-greater spaces and lives, reveals that what is assumed to be protection and beneficence is actually compelled dependence via the wholesale destruction of a previously self-sufficient agricultural economy and way of life. One significant feature of this compelled dependence, as we shall see, is a transpacific masculinist compact in which Okinawan men control sex workers through the mechanism of perpetual debt, or an effective debt bondage system of sexual labor. As pithily observed by Kyle Kajihiro, in "the military economy, some 'get paid,' while others 'pay the price.'"[87]

This transpacific masculinist compact is forged through the US military's demand for sexual labor and Okinawa's provision of it.[88] Yet it is an asymmetrical compact because it is taking place within a US settler garrison, itself already colonized by Japan. Tsuneyoshi's father, complicit in this compact, is compelled to participate because, in his words, as lousy a business as it might be, "There's no use complaining. It's how we eat, you know" (81). The debt scheme through which he plans to extract profit from the sex workers is not his own unique brainchild; rather, it is the general economic form and logic of America's settler garrison. After his father learns his new trade from a man already in the business of managing bars, Tsuneyoshi recounts the afternoon when he came from school to find that the "girls had arrived" (85). He overhears his father telling his mother how he intends to maximize profit: "'See, you make loans to the girls who bring in lots of money. That way they have to keep working for you to pay off their debts. Of course, nobody lends money to the girls who can't sell, so they just drift around from bar to bar.' He talked so matter-of-factly about women who are lured into debt and then held like slaves. How could he sit there and gossip about their misery while chewing his food with such pleasure?" (86). As I will elaborate further in my discussion of South Korean camptowns, this debt bondage system, an effective form of indentured sexual slavery, is such that it is virtually

impossible to pay off the loans completely.[89] Even an adolescent Tsuneyoshi can see the cruelty of this system, observing that "women … are lured into debt and then held like slaves." He sympathizes with the women's misery and cannot fathom how his father can derive pleasure from it.

Child of Okinawa reveals how even in the earlier years of the construction of America's settler garrison on Okinawa, a debt bondage system was already developing. Women are disproportionately rendered vulnerable to this system. Already vulnerable to gendered racial and sexual violence at the hands of their American GI clients as well as their Okinawan bar/brothel owners, through the debt bondage system the women are subjected to another linked economic violence. In the face of physical violence or the threat of it, they are compelled to pay off their debts. However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, the United States can practice an effective debt imperialism by rolling over its massive national debt indefinitely, thereby granting to itself a temporal exception, or an exemption from the homogeneous time of repayment that it imposes on everyone else at multiple scales, whether individuals or whole nations.

This temporal exception is linked to the spatial exception. If even Tsuneyoshi's own bed is not exempt from the reach of the military-service economy, neither is the neighborhood he explores. Littered everywhere are both the growing edifices of US bases, facilities, and surrounding enclaves as well as the all-too-real remnants and traces of the brutality of the Battle of Okinawa. The lacerated ecology and topography of the island, its "weird landscape" or geography of militarism, is littered with various forms of military hardware. Tsuneyoshi chances upon a wooden box hidden in the weeds among some gravestones that he thought was filled with canned goods. Yet it contained ten rifles instead. His grandfather had to live in a tent after the war because his house had been demolished in order to build a runway, yet the runway that was built in only a week was never used for an attack on the Japanese mainland because it surrendered after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So instead, the runway becomes a space on which gathered weapons and ammunition are piled, then later dumped into the ocean. Tsuneyoshi's grandfather obtains a temporary job from the US military gathering up ammunition from the area, yet he is paid not in dollars but canned goods and cigarettes. When he then tries to resume farming in the tiny plot that remains of his field, only "shriveled bulbs covered with fuzz" will grow (109).

The spatial exception that is the settler garrison operates not only through this scarred landscape but also through a nonexistent or skewed juridical process. *Child of Okinawa* reveals the quotidian and unpunished acts of violence perpetrated against Okinawans by US soldiers. Tsuneyoshi witnesses and hears about these acts. His father's second cousin, a taxi driver, crashes into a telephone pole when his three US soldier passengers harass him while he is driving, one of them stamping on his accelerator foot and all three yelling, "Hurry hurry, hubba hubba!" (96). This vehicular incident calls to mind a much harsher actual 1963 incident in which a US marine driving a truck ran over and killed a twelve-year-old Okinawan boy. The US military court found

this marine not guilty. Tsuneyoshi also overhears a conversation between his mom and Michikō, who works in his dad’s bar, about what has happened to Michikō’s friend Chiiko, who also works in a bar. A US soldier had a crush on Chiiko, but she would not go out with him. For that, he tosses a grenade into her bar, disfiguring her face with burns all over. These are the everyday acts of violence with impunity that Okinawans are subjected to at the hands of US soldiers. Women like Chiiko and Michikō are vulnerable to gendered racial and sexual violence. The pervasiveness of such violence makes it quotidian, yet this very ordinariness hides its extraordinary horror and terror. During the US occupation, the US military possessed ultimate civil and criminal jurisdiction over everyone on the island, both soldiers and civilians. Cases with American defendants were rarely prosecuted, and even when they were, sentences were relatively light despite guilty pleas to serious offenses.[90] Even after reversion to Japan in 1972, US military authority was not radically overturned because of Japan’s client-state relationship with the United States and concessions such as the SOFA.

Gendered racial and sexual violence in the form of rape, a particular concern in the immediate postwar years, has been an ongoing issue in Okinawa. Nonexistent or radically curtailed justice for those who are subjected to it amplify the logics of what I have been calling metapolitical authority within the spatial exception. Nobuko Karimata, the former managing director of the Okinawa Women’s Foundation and the former director of the Okinawa Women’s Comprehensive Center, recalls of the immediate postwar years:

> “The Americans are coming! The Americans are coming! Hide!” That’s what we used to scream when we heard the clang of the village bell….. In the immediate postwar years, there was a huge bell in each village. If it rang once, that meant there was a meeting in town. If it rang continuously, that signaled a problem, namely that an American soldier was in the neighborhood. Sometimes the soldiers entered residential areas to rape women. In fact, there were so many cases of rape in those early postwar years that whenever we spotted an American on our streets, we thought for sure he was a rapist.[91]

If Nobuko Karimata’s recollection provides stark testimony of an earlier period in this long-standing gendered racial and sexual violence perpetrated by the US military, the 1995 case of the abduction and gang rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by three US military servicemen has generated renewed protest. The perpetrators, Navy Seaman Marcus Gill, Marine Private Rodrico Harp, and Marine Private Kendric Ledet, were initially taken into US military custody because of extraterritoriality, which gives legal jurisdictional authority to US military courts (and not Japanese courts) even though the crimes were committed on Japanese soil. As I have related, extraterritoriality, a common provision in US SOFAs with its host nations, extends US

sovereignty beyond the territory of the United States and effectively negates local sovereignty wherever the US military stations itself. As such, it is a significant feature of US militarist settler imperialism, and in particular the power projected onto the settler garrison. Yet because of massive public outrage over the 1995 rape, the men were eventually turned over to the local authorities. Their trial and conviction in Japanese courts in Okinawa were unprecedented since the beginning of the US occupation a half century earlier. Gill and Harp were each given seven-year sentences on convictions of abduction and rape, while Ledet received a six-and-a-half-year sentence on a slightly lesser charge.

Yet this particular court conviction, precisely because it was such a departure from the norm and even then was only produced via mass protest, is in many ways the placeholder for a justice yet to come rather than a justice fulfilled.[92] Writing on the judicialization of the political and the fissure between the legibility and illegibility of violence, Yoneyama highlights the limits of redress and the need to rethink the idea of "justice" beyond the juridical. Even as the post-1990s "transborder redress culture" traversing Japan and the United States has belatedly rendered legible previously illegible forms of violence, this legibility can be read more as a trace of ongoing forms of US-Japanese interimperial violence and less as the achievement of a capaciously reconceived justice.[93]

In his short story "Hope," critically acclaimed Okinawan writer Medoruma Shun grapples with this impasse.[94] The 1995 rape serves as a backdrop for "Hope," published on June 26, 1999, in the *Asahi Shimbun*, a major Japanese newspaper. In this notably short short story, the unnamed protagonist, an Okinawan young man, commits an unthinkable act of violence by abducting and strangling to death the young son of a US serviceman. He then kills himself via self-immolation. Between these two killings, we are provided a glimpse into what motivated the protagonist. The story is on one hand disturbingly and profoundly devoid of hope despite its title. Yet on the other hand, if we are willing to interrogate why nonviolent resistance has been understood to be the only morally and ethically defensible form of political resistance, then Medoruma's story offers some hope for challenging our understanding of what separates violence from nonviolence and of the presumption that we are inhabiting a space and time of "post-violence."

The protagonist of "Hope" radically mocks and challenges the inefficacy of peaceful protest in Okinawa. He mails anonymously this declaration to the office of his local newspaper: "'*What Okinawa needs now is not demonstrated by thousands of people or rallies by tens of thousands but the death of one American child*'" (21, emphasis in original). The comparison here of thousands of Okinawan lives to one American life would suggest an asymmetry in terms of numerical calculation. Yet what the protagonist's declaration amplifies is a more profound asymmetry—not in terms of the counting of lives but in the valuation of lives. The actions, decolonial aspirations, and curtailed lives of a thousand or indeed even an infinite number of Okinawans cannot ever be worth more than the value of the life of one American child. This is the

calculus of US militarist settler imperialism. It is both the arithmetic and grammar driving violence on America's settler garrison. Moreover, as I elaborate in what follows, "peaceful" protest within a structure thoroughly saturated by violence also implies a profound asymmetry that can function to abet the colonizer's instrumental distinction between "violence" and "nonviolence." This monopoly, not only over violence itself but also over the very epistemological registers of what gets recognized as (legitimate or illegitimate) violence in the first place, is itself a kind of meta-violence.

Why kill the American child, as opposed to his parent(s)? If we examine the child as a figure or trope, there are two reigning qualities ascribed in particular to the white child: innocence and futurity. Racialized or colonized children, especially Black and Brown children, are not allowed to be "children" in this sense. In the face of hypercriminalization and genocidal practices, they are not allowed to enjoy the privileges of the presumption of innocence or be the precious bearers of futurity. These privileges, and not just qualities or characteristics in this context, can only condense on the figure of the white child. Medoruma's protagonist, in killing the white American child, radically challenges any claims of American nonculpability (innocence) and articulates a decolonial and antimilitarist aspiration of extinguishing continued US military presence (futurity) in Okinawa.

A photograph of the protagonist's anonymous declaration is printed on the front page of the newspaper, and the murder is the lead story on the six o'clock news. As to be expected, both Japanese and US officials express outrage and revulsion, which leads the protagonist to think to himself:

> That Okinawans—so docile, so meek—could use such tactics was something the bastards had never even imagined. Okinawans, were, after all, a people who followed their leaders and, at most, held "anti-war" or "antibase" rallies with polite protest marches. Even the ultraleft and radical factions staged, at most, "guerilla warfare" that caused no real harm and never out terrorism or kidnapping against people in power or mounted armed attacks. Okinawans were like maggots who clustered around the shit of land rents and subsidy monies splattered by the bases. And Okinawa was called a "peace-loving, healing island." It made me want to puke. (22)

Here, the protagonist interrogates the racialization of Okinawans, by both the United States and Japan, as precisely a peace-loving, nonmilitant, and docile "island" people.[95] He also calls to task landowners who lease land to the US military and thus directly profit from its continued presence in Okinawa. Base workers who receive subsidies are also implicated. The use of the organic metaphors of maggots and shit to describe economic dependence on the US military, what I have called the distorted auspices of the Department of Defense, amplifies the literal disfigurement of Okinawa

effected by its contortion into America's settler garrison. The scarred landscape I analyzed earlier, the ecological harm done to the land, air, and waters of Okinawa, the militarized harm done to Okinawan multispecies life—these have compelled Okinawans to be "maggots" feeding off of a topography littered with "shit."

Despite the victory of the 1995 rape case, and a continuing history of vocal protest on multiple scales, the presence of the US military in Okinawa has remained stubbornly persistent.[96] Mass demonstrations against land seizures, rallies in the 1960s on a variety of issues, the 1987 human chain of approximately twenty-five thousand people around Kadena Air Base, massive demonstrations following the 1995 rape incident—these all give witness to collective Okinawan aspirations for a demilitarized if not decolonized future. A notable movement was the so-called one-tsubo antimilitary landlords' campaign initiated in 1982. The campaign's goal is captured by its slogan, "Change the military bases into places for life and productivity!" Tsubo is a traditional Japanese measure equal to the size of two tatami mats (about 3.3 square meters or 35.52 square feet), and the campaign supported antibase landlords by buying and sharing one tsubo or less of their land.[97] This strategy increased the number of antibase landowners through the purchase of land just big enough on which to lie down. The campaign can thus be seen as a creative act of land redistribution, repossession, or collectivization. Moreover, in solidarity with other linked movements in areas similarly subjected to hypermilitarization, feminist movements in particular have called for demilitarization rather than realignment or relocation. Much of this collective movement work has been done through the formation of organizations and networks such as Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), the Okinawa Peace Network, and the East-Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network Against Militarism.[98] Building upon Black feminist Patricia Hill Collins's theorization of "interlocking oppressions," Kozue Akibayashi writes that the work of OWAAMV constitutes an "*island feminism*, which suggests a challenge to the interlocking of military violence and colonial violence in its fundamental critique and a challenge to patriarchy."[99]

In "Hope," the protagonist's utter disgust and total impatience with these and other means of peaceful protest lead to a conjoined homicide and suicide. He mutters to himself that "*Only the worst methods get results*" (22) and kills himself at the site of the rally where eighty thousand people gathered to protest the 1995 rape of the twelve-year-old girl. Calling the rally "farcical," and feeling no remorse or "even any deep emotion," he explains that, "Just as fluids in the bodies of small organisms that are forced to live in constant fear suddenly turn into poison, I had done what was natural and necessary for this island" (23). Such a logic of what is natural and necessary, along with another organic metaphor of how being forced to live in constant fear turns small organisms into poison, suggests that in order for Okinawa and Okinawans to live and thrive, the US military must die/leave. This formulation echoes Glen Coulthard's "Five Theses on Indigenous Resurgence and Decolonization" in the conclusion of his book *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of*

Recognition. In his second thesis, "Capitalism, No More!," Coulthard concludes that "for Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die."[100] Medoruma's "Hope" suggests a similar relation of mutual exclusivity between Okinawa(ns) and the US military. As the agent of processes of violent dispossession, environmental contamination, and compelled dependence on militarized maldevelopment, the US military is literally and figuratively poisoning Okinawa and Okinawans. In order to reverse this antisymbiotic, poisonous, and warped ecosystem—in which the US military thrives by parasitically extracting labor, land, and resources from Okinawa—the US military must go away. In the face of a persistent refusal of a US military withdrawal, "Hope" hopes to instigate one through the protagonist's act of killing. His dramatic self-immolation, moreover, accelerates the already-poisoned condition of Okinawans.

"Hope" thus generates complex questions about violence, in particular the relationship between colonial violence and anticolonial counterviolence.[101] The US military possesses the global monopoly on "legitimate" violence, formally through the waging of war and less visibly through questionable impositions of metapolitical authority. Yet this violence obscures the violence of the prior and ongoing means through which the US military has come to monopolize the use of "legitimate" violence in the first place. This is to speak about the making, remaking, and astounding growth of the US military and its capability. It is to speak, in other words, about how the bases of empire, or settler garrisons like Okinawa, are made, viz, violent processes of land seizure, dispossession, displacement, and compelled dependency. It is to inquire into the conditions of possibility of US military capability and settler imperial projections of power. Within this context, the temporal demarcation between violence (a time of declared war) and postviolence (a time of negotiated peace) becomes blurred. For the US military's very existence, whether or not it is engaged in a campaign, operation, or war, is made possible by the violent processes I have just named. In this sense, just as, to invoke Patrick Wolfe again, we can think of settler colonialism as a structure and not merely an event, militarist settler imperial violence is a structure and not just an event.[102] And the "natural and necessary" outcome of this violence, "Hope" suggests, is counterviolence. As such, "Hope's" aesthetics of settler imperial failure not only amplifies the violence that is US militarist settler imperialism but also reveals that this violence in turn begets more violence. Yet these multiple violences should not be conflated.

Counterviolence brings to mind the biblical notion of "an eye for an eye," the principle of vengeance, revenge, or retaliation. In *Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth*, Margaret Atwood reminds us that the word revenge, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is derived from the Latin revindicare. And revindicare is derived from vindicare, which means to justify, rescue, liberate, or emancipate, as in liberating an enslaved person. Thus, "to revenge yourself upon someone is to reliberate yourself, because before doing the revenge, you aren't free. . . . The score that needs to be settled is a psychic score, and the kind of debt that can't be paid with money is a psychic debt. It's a wound to the soul."[103] Seen in this light, we might say

that "Hope's" engagement with the ethics of counterviolence is an ethics of liberation. In turn, revenge is connected to figurative debt when we consider society's rationale for incarceration: that criminals need to "pay for their crimes," that is pay their "debt to society," via a prison sentence or execution. If society is the creditor in this scheme and criminals are the debtors, how exactly is society receiving a repayment of the debt from criminals by locking them up or executing them? Atwood argues that society receives a psychic payment that basically amounts to vengeance.[104] In this dominant debtor/creditor scheme, the protagonist in "Hope" would be the debtor or criminal for killing the child. Yet the protagonist prevents the creditor, in this instance the US military, from obtaining its payment or vengeance by killing himself.

"Hope" thus upends even as it reveals how a debtor/creditor scheme undergirds carcerality and the differential criminalization of various forms of violence. If we go back to the etymology of revenge, we see that even as dominant power structures write themselves into the story as the creditors who settle the score or exact vengeance by locking up or executing criminals, we can imagine otherwise. That is, who owes what to whom in this story? Who is the creditor? "Hope" imagines a world in which the criminal might actually be the creditor, the figure who is owed revenge or reliberation. This is a radical rewriting of the dominant debtor/creditor narrative and related carceral regimes through an aesthetics of settler imperial failure. Indeed, as I elaborated in Chapter 1, in a sleight of hand or role reversal, the colonizer becomes the creditor and the colonized becomes the debtor. "Hope" reverses this role reversal; it settles the score or corrects the sleight of hand by reminding us, to cite Fanon again, that "Europe is the literal creation of the Third World."[105]

Yet on the settler garrison of Okinawa, even when the structure of violence seems to have responded to mass protest, we witness again the stubborn intractability of that structure. In 1996, as a result of the vocal and massive protest following the rape of the twelve-year-old girl, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa Agreement was signed. It called for the relocation of Futenma, a US Marine Corps Air Station, to the Henoko district of Naga City. This entails a move from a congested area of central Okinawa to a pristine area in the north that is rich with coral reefs and the dugong, an endangered species protected under Japan's Cultural Preservation Act and an important Okinawan symbol of abundance. Ongoing protests delayed the construction of the Henoko base, and in 2012 the United States agreed to deploy elsewhere nine thousand of its eighteen thousand marines in Okinawa. In 2014, an international petition to cancel the planned base gained attention, and that same year 80 percent of Okinawans expressed their opposition to the construction, forming the All Okinawan Council (AOC).[106]

Yet preliminary base construction began in August 2014, with the then Japanese prime minister Abe announcing a year later in August 2015 the suspension of construction for one month because of rising tensions. In July 2017, Okinawa prefecture filed a lawsuit against the central government of Japan in another attempt to halt the base relocation, citing as the basis of the suit a permit that expired on March

31 allowing the breaking of the coral reef in Oura Bay at Henoko. Okinawa also filed an injunction to suspend the ongoing construction while litigation was pending. Suits have also been filed to protect the dugong, with the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeals affirming in August 2017 the right of Okinawan citizens as well as US and Japanese conservation groups to sue the US military for failing to consider adequately the effects of the base construction on the dugong.[107] Though this favorable legal ruling might have offered a glimmer of hope, it is tempered by what Jacques Derrida calls the "force of law"—the violence that law itself can enact by way of foreclosing justice rather than delivering it.[108] Indeed, in December 2018, landfill work began at Camp Schwab, the marine base at Henoko, that will facilitate the relocation and closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.[109] Then, in February 2019, in a first-of-its-kind prefecture-wide referendum on the issue, 72 percent of voters in Okinawa voted against the planned relocation. However, the referendum is legally nonbinding, and the central government of Japan is ignoring the referendum vote and proceeding with construction of the offshore replacement facility at Henoko beside Camp Schwab.110

More recently, in early 2021, volunteer excavators searching for the remains of the victims of the Battle of Okinawa still scattered within the soil of the site of the battle (the southern part of the island) demanded that Japan's defense ministry halt the clearing of that land. Soil from this land will be used for a reclamation project to build an offshore runway at the Henoko base. The volunteer excavators' demand came on the heels of a previous attempt to prevent the clearing of the land, a petition submitted to Prime Minister Suga in late 2020. This petition, signed by about five hundred family members who lost relatives in the Battle of Okinawa, requested that the soil from the battle's site not be used to build the base at Henoko. According to a 2016 law, the Japanese government is responsible for collecting the remains of soldiers and civilians who died in World War II.[111] Yet the use of the soil containing the bones of war victims is not only a violation of this law but an affront to the human dignity of the dead and of their survivors. As in the film *Parasite*, it is another instance of the postmortem temporality of a capitalist and militarist cruelty that follows some even into their deaths. It is a variety of what Laurel Turbin Mei-Singh calls "geographies of desecration."[112]

The recent Henoko protests constitute a local articulation of Okinawan Indigeneity within and inspired by two linked contexts: the local context of the Japanese government's formal recognition of the Ainu of Hokkaidō in northern Japan as an Indigenous group and the global context of what has emerged as a broader Indigenous rights movement, an important achievement of which was the passage of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Megumi Chibana observes that the ecological focus of the Henoko protests is an appeal not only for environmental protection but also for the cultural and spiritual connection that Okinawans have with Henoko. In other words, the appeal is an expression of a place-based Indigeneity resisting the disruption of "Okinawans' ontological relationship with nature and their guardians."[113] Recognizing that discussions of

Indigeneity in Asia can be quite complex, and that there are disagreements over whether Indigeneity is an appropriate political tool for Okinawan self-determination, Chibana departs from an "identity politics" focus that privileges the question of who is Indigenous. Rather, the focus is on questions of local agency to investigate when, how, and to what extent Okinawans have taken up various aspects of Indigeneity to practice self-determination.[114] Thus, although what we name as Indigenous is a relatively new political subjectivity for Okinawans, this genealogy of Indigenous Okinawan place-based activism against colonial property regimes and US militarist settler imperialism stretches back to the immediate post–World War II era of the Isahama "Women's Appeal." Yet it was not until 1996 that Okinawan or Uchinānchu assertions of Indigeneity at the supranational level began taking place, largely with delegations to the un Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). The Association of the Indigenous Peoples in the Ryūkyūs (AIPR) has been at the forefront in working to achieve the international recognition of Okinawans as Indigenous.[115]

From this discussion of how transpacific Okinawan literature grapples with America's settler garrison and its temporal and spatial exceptions, I turn now to transpacific South Korean literature and film and focus specifically on the military camptown. Japan colonized both Okinawa and Korea, yet unlike Okinawa, Korea was not "incorporated" into the Japanese nation-state as a prefecture, and the US military occupation of South Korea only lasted from 1945 until 1948. But soon thereafter, in 1950, the Korean War erupted, and US troops have been stationed permanently in South Korea since 1955. Crucially, as of this writing, wartime operational control of the South Korean military still remains under the command of the US military. Although it was agreed that the United States would return wartime operational command to the South Korean military in 2012, it has been postponed and is now scheduled to occur in 2022. That is, South Korea continues to exist in the distended shadow of US neocolonialism and is also home to a heavy US military presence.

South Korea: Militarized Sex Work and Debt Bondage

Bloodless (2017), a multiple award-winning VR experimental documentary film written and directed by diasporic Korean filmmaker Gina Kim, grapples with the complex aesthetics and ethics of how to represent egregious acts of sexual violence on the military camptown (gijichon in Korean). *Bloodless* deploys the technique of virtual reality to re-create the last living moments of Yun Keum Yi, a twenty-six-year-old US military camptown sex worker in South Korea who was brutally murdered by a US soldier in 1992.[116] A US-South Korea coproduction with a transnational crew, Bloodless was shot on location in Dongducheon in Gyeonggi Province, home to a US military base forty kilometers north of Seoul where the murder took place.[117] Running twelve minutes in length, the immersive experience of virtual reality places the viewer into the camptown's alleys. The film opens with a day shot. We see a dog pick up a bone and drop it after hearing the off-camera sound of shattering glass. We wonder what

has just happened when the camera cuts to a silent intertitle, small white text on a uniformly black background providing the film's framing of sorts: "Since the Korean War (1950–53), US military bases have spawned almost 100 'camp towns,' often squalid places inhabited by an estimated one million sex workers from Korea and other parts of Asia. The crimes perpetrated here by US servicemen and others impact those who live on the margins of Korean society."

We are then transported to the entrance of the Dongducheon camptown, euphemistically called a "Special Tourism Zone for Foreigners." We feel helpless, unable to control any of the action even as we are immersed in it. Yet unlike traditional two-dimensional films, we can control our own gaze by focusing on any part of the 360-degree environment. This feeling of total control and simultaneous lack of control is at once utterly immersive and disorienting. Day turns into night. We see the dimly lit alleys and businesses, mostly rundown bars and clubs of the camptown. But we cannot see her, Yun Keum Yi. We are still left wondering, with a sense of foreboding as if in a horror film, of what might transpire next and whether the sound of shattering glass we heard earlier is significant. We begin to hear her footsteps and try to turn in the direction of their sound even as the 360-degree experience of VR and the sonic form of echoing effects make it difficult to detect that direction. We finally catch a glimpse of her, in high heels and a black dress, only to have her disappear. She is frustratingly and spookily out of our grasp. She is a ghostly and haunting presence evading our full view, a "digital uncanny."[118] Yet suddenly, she appears right up close, so that we cannot but see her, and she goes through us. We turn around, and there she is, staring us down and sighing deeply. She disappears yet again, and we find ourselves in a cramped, claustrophobic motel room less than seventeen square feet (1.6 square meters), with barely any furniture. We see empty Coke and beer bottles scattered on the yellow floor and a full-length mirror. Slowly, we begin to see what appears to be blood seeping out from the burgundy floral-patterned blanket on the floor. At some point, reflected in the full-length mirror, we see that the spreading pool of blood on the floor is coming from a body. Yet we cannot see the whole body; we see only a part of a leg. The buzzing of the overhead fluorescent lights that we hear is interrupted by the sound of the woman's footsteps and then the return of the sound of shattering glass that we heard at the opening of the film.

Yun Keum Yi's murdered and mutilated body is an obscured and oblique appearance, visible only partially as a reflected image in the mirror. *Bloodless* only hints at the details of her gruesome murder. Yet our bearing witness to the violence of her death is at once inescapable and disorienting because we are immersed, trapped, as it were, in the claustrophobic confines of her tiny room through the medium of virtual reality filmmaking. At the same time, *Bloodless* also gestures to the impossibility of bearing witness in a full and fully ethical manner because the formal device of VR is such that it allows us as viewers a certain degree of control in where to focus our gaze. The reflected image in the mirror of Yun Keum Yi's murdered body might thus escape our gaze altogether. Why this obscured, oblique, and spectral appearance of Yun's

body, which is at once a kind of disappearance that immersively places the viewer at the scene of the crime?

I begin this discussion of US bases and camptowns in South Korea with *Bloodless* because it foregrounds the vexed problematic of the "enforced visibility" of camptown sex workers through a vertiginous revisioning of the brutal violence of the camptown. Identified simply as "the woman" in the credits of *Bloodless*, Yun was certainly not the first camptown sex worker to be killed, yet her case was made to be hypervisible. It garnered support from a diverse range of organizations that formed the "Committee on the Murder of Yun Geum-i by American Military in Korea," which later led to the formation of the "National Campaign for Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea."[119] This took place within the context of growing critiques among South Koreans throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s of both their own government and the United States. Anti-imperialist sentiment and desire condensed on the violated and murdered body of Yun. In an unprecedented move, the American GI who committed the murder was tried in South Korean courts as opposed to the standard practice of virtual impunity effected by the rights of extraterritoriality enjoyed by the US military via its SOFA with South Korea. As Grace M. Cho observes, this case marked a turning point. The camptown sex worker, pejoratively called yanggongju ("Western princess") and exiled to the shadows as a figure of national shame symbolizing South Korea's neocolonized status vis-à-vis the United States, was welcomed home as the nation's daughter. Yet the image of Yun's violated body, graphic and overcirculated, turned into a "transnational macrospectacle" even as her case became a rallying point for diasporic Korean feminists as well as anti-American activists in South Korea.[120] Mindful of this problematic, filmmaker Gina Kim refuses to circulate Yun's violated body yet again. With heightened attentiveness to this representational, ethical, and political conundrum, Kim revisits the 1992 murder through her haunting virtual reality film in order to draw attention to the enduring presence of the US military, and of military violence, in South Korea. Although the spectacular circulation of the image of the gendered racial violence inflicted upon Yun's body is unique, the very fact of that violence is not, for US military bases and attendant camptowns in South Korea still number close to one hundred.

While a first-year college student in South Korea, Kim took part in the mass protests demanding that the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) extradite the US soldier so that he could undergo a trial in the South Korean court system. Eventually, he was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison by a South Korean court. Kim's director's statement on Bloodless relates:

> We put posters on walls and marched while spreading flyers to civilians. The graphic and disturbing image of the crime scene was printed on each flyer. Every time I saw Yun Keum Yi's brutally mutilated body being endlessly reproduced in posters and flyers, I saw her dignity being once again

> destroyed. For 25 years, I have struggled to find a way to make a film about this tragic incident. But I kept coming up against the fact that I could not cinematically represent the story without exploiting the image and thereby reproducing the original violence itself. But with VR, the viewer is no longer a passive spectator, who can take voyeuristic pleasure from a spectacle in front of them (and at a distance). Upon realizing the potential of the VR, I came up with a way to tell the same violent story, without showing and exploiting the image of her.[121]

Kim's deployment of VR to amplify the gendered racial and sexual violence inflicted by the US military without spectacularizing that violence and the South Korean woman's murdered body is complex. For it turns out that the US military played a significant role in funding the development of VR technology because of the potential for its military applications. Indeed, the US military has been using VR both for training recruits and for treating PTSD.[122] Kim is thus attempting to "weaponize" a technological weapon developed by the US military against that very military.

Though the potential of VR technology has been more commonly discussed and deployed for its ability to produce immersive experiences of fantastical entertainment or consumption (such as games, shopping, and real estate) or travel to desired locations throughout the world, there is a parallel discussion of VR's potential as an "empathy machine" that exceeds conventional narrative forms.[123] Indeed, the tagline for *Bloodless* is "Experience what cannot be said," and for Kim VR means a "completely new way of creating empathy."[124] Her ethics of representation are such that for over twenty-five years, she grappled with the challenge of how to tell Yun's story in a nonexploitative way that upturns the voyeurism of the cinematic medium. As Kim relates in an interview, "We really wanted to be truthful to the actual event, but at the same time we aren't simply re-enacting the violence … as a matter of fact there is absolutely no violence in my film."[125] For her, VR technology makes possible this inescapably immersive yet highly oblique or inferred representation of an unimaginably gruesome violation of a woman's body and life. She observes that *Bloodless* is thus not a documentary but rather a poetic and indirect rendition of this violation.[126] This nongeneric form, this aesthetics of settler imperial failure, allows viewers to "experience," as opposed to view voyeuristically from a distance, the pain of others not through sentimental identification but as witnesses.[127] Yun's haunting and disorienting footsteps in that dimly lit alley—a carefully produced stereophonic soundscape of "de-spatialized sound"—sensorially enjoin us to reckon with the continuing presence of the US military in South Korea, a reckoning with the violence of that presence.[128] *Bloodless* thus works against the "enforced visibility" of camptown sex workers, even as it is compelled by a desire to bring attention to the pressing issue of militarized sexual violence and murder. The film also enjoins us to ask: What do we

owe Yun Keum Yi and others like her? Kim gestures to a response in explaining what motivates her work: "The image on the flyer still haunts me, motivating me to return to these non-sovereign spaces and the many women exiled there whose voices have yet to be heard."[129]

If *Bloodless* thus provides a complex rendering of the violence that occurs within such nonsovereign spaces long after their proliferation and management via the transpacific masculinist compact, Ahn Junghyo's celebrated *Silver Stallion: A Novel of Korea* (1990) offers a critical genealogy of US military presence in South Korea by focusing on the early days of the establishment of what became an extensive and regulated camptown system.[130] The original 1986 Korean-language publication was translated by the author himself, and Soho Press in the United States published it in 1990. This transpacific text depicts what becomes of the residents of Kumsan, a rural farming village, as the Korean War (1950–53) encroaches ever deeper into their daily lives. The village is confronted with the arrival of sex workers who serve un and US soldiers. In highlighting the agency of these women and their collisions with traditional patriarchal authority in the village, *Silver Stallion* reveals the early stages of US imperial violence and militarism in South Korea, or transformations that would produce what Seungsook Moon calls South Korea's "militarized modernity."[131] This would witness a proliferation of US bases and attendant camptowns, effectively colonized spaces. On this spatial exception of the settler garrison, US authority, a metapolitical authority, has the power to negate local South Korean sovereignty by defining the scope of law and politics.

Silver Stallion reveals the early makings of the infrastructure and personnel that would come to constitute the vast network of camptowns in South Korea. In this earlier era, camptown sex workers are not subjected to government regulation or surveillance, leaving room for a certain entrepreneurial agency and initiative. Early in the novel, Ollye, a young widow with two children, is raped by US soldiers. Subjected to vicious village gossip, she is treated as an outcast, a defiled woman whose experience of sexual violence is considered a source of shame. Old Hwang, the county chief, embodies this patriarchal stance. He could not "visit Ollye and offer her words of consolation. He could not free himself from the thought that, victim or not, she was a dirty woman. Loss of feminine virtue, under any circumstance, was the most profound shame for a woman …" (67–68).

In narrating how Ollye later becomes a sex worker and staging clashes between Old Hwang and the new women who arrive, *Silver Stallion* exposes how the intersection of sexual violence and sex work within a militarized context generates complex negotiations of circumscribed choice and agency. Soon after Ollye's rape, the village residents are confronted with the arrival of "strange" women, whom they learn are sex workers serving un and US soldiers. Ahn writes:

> What the Yankee wives had said proved to be true. The
> Yankee wives were on the move constantly, traveling up

> and down the country with the bengkos [big noses]; whenever the soldiers moved to a new place, they would pack up and migrate with their "steady customers" or "temporary husbands." They were scouting for their new business sites near the base the Americans were about to build on Cucumber Island. That afternoon and the next morning, more "U.N. ladies" came across the river looking for a house to let, but not a single farmer would discuss the matter with them. The villagers respected Old Hwang's instructions. Besides, nobody wanted the indecent women, who associated with the rapist soldiers, to live next door. (107)

Sister Serpent, a sex worker who had already purchased a house in the village before the villagers had been warned, has a confrontation with Old Hwang: "'What the hell does this old cock think he is anyway?' said Sister Serpent, not a bit intimidated. 'An mp or something? What right did you have to tell us to stay away from this place? I bought this house with my own money, and nobody is going to drive me out of my own house. You think you can treat me like dirt because I'm a whore, but, you fucking bastard, you'll see that you have it all wrong'" (111). Refusing to represent these women as abject victims, the novel instead emphasizes their acts of survival, persistence, and defiance of patriarchal authority in a rapidly changing landscape. By amplifying the entrepreneurial energy and agency of women like Sister Serpent, Ahn exposes an early moment in what would later congeal as a highly regulated, surveilled, and institutionalized system of camptown sex work. It is one that is yet to be captured by the metapolitical authority of US militarist settler imperial power.

Yet within the novel, we begin to see the contours of what would soon become the exceptional space of the camptown:

> Omaha was not the only sign that was put up in the islet. Somebody erected a sign in the shape of a milepost that, like the Omaha sign, carried both in English and Korean the words "Texas Town," at the entrance to another village a few hundred yards distant from Camp Omaha's main gate. This second village was not constructed by the bengko [big nose] soldiers, but by dozens of Korean carpenters and workers brought in from the town. With broken planks from ammunition boxes, tin plates from beer cans and sturdy cardboard from C-ration cartons, a team of two or three carpenters worked a miracle, creating one shanty a day. Built wall-to-wall, the board shacks on the barren slope looked like one big beehive. As the shanties were completed one after another the Yankee wives, carrying big bulging

> suitcases, came to Texas Town. Soon the shanty town was fully occupied by the prostitutes. (109–10)

Here, we see in "Texas Town" an improvised prototype of what would rapidly become institutionalized by the early 1960s as the camptown, adjacent to the bases' "America Towns."[132] Though we might say that military supplies and rations are creatively "repurposed" as building materials for shanties, their overall function of ultimately serving the US military remains the same. The "miracle" of the ultrarapid construction of the shanties, their appearance one after another, bespeaks what would fast become the metastasizing proliferation of US bases and camptowns in South Korea. Indeed, as Katharine H. S. Moon writes, "sex among allies," or the buying and selling of sex between Americans and Koreans, has been a staple of US-South Korea international relations since the Korean War and the permanent US troop presence in South Korea since 1955.[133]

In what has become a sine qua non of US-South Korea relations, camptown sex work in South Korea is sponsored, negotiated, and regulated by the US and South Korean governments. Camptown sex workers have been viewed as occupying the role of "cultural ambassadors" in their interactions with American servicemembers.[134] Although sex work is prohibited and illegal in South Korea, the promotion of regulated camptown sex work has been the effective exception to that rule.[135] Korean nationals, except registered sex workers, are legally barred from camptown clubs and bars catering to US soldiers. Moreover, as I have related, camptowns and bases are governed under extraterritoriality, rendering them as virtual US territories where South Korean sovereignty ceases to exist.[136] Indeed, as Johnson writes, "America's foreign military enclaves, though structurally, legally, and conceptually different from colonies, are themselves something like micro-colonies in that they are completely beyond the jurisdiction of the occupied nation." Extraterritoriality, negotiated via SOFAs, is a modern legacy of the nineteenth-century imperialist practice vis-à-vis China, extracted at gunpoint because white men refused to submit to what they perceived to be the barbarity of Chinese law.[137]

In addition to being a significant feature of US-South Korea geopolitical relations, the influx of American dollars generated by camptown sex work has benefitted South Korea's development, economy, and modernity. Even as this is symptomatic of US militarist settler imperial domination over South Korea, it has in turn contributed to South Korea's relatively privileged subimperial status within Asia, especially vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Yet the singular and uncritical focus on the "miracle" of South Korea's ultrarapid economic development, called the "Miracle on the Han River," elides its contradictions and violently uneven contours and effects. Jin-kyung Lee writes that two dimensions have been overlooked in studies of South Korean development—sexuality and race, and in particular what she calls the "proletarianization" of sexuality and race. Race, gender, sexuality, class, and Korean ethnonationality articulate with one another in the context of a transnational racial

hierarchy in ways that generate a class of workers specifically for productive and socially reproductive labors.[138] Camptown sex work is a particular type of this kind of marginal transnational proletarian labor, and Lee argues moreover that it is a necropolitical labor insofar as it is labor extracted from lives that are disposable or condemned to death. In this instance, any "fostering" of life that occurs is already conditioned by disposability and is limited to serving labor demands. The coercive economic, physical, and psychological conditions that camptown sex workers are subjected to exist on a continuum with more overt forms of sexual violence. The disturbing frequency with which camptown sex workers are murdered "can be viewed as a material extension of [the] figurative violence" of the symbolic erasure or murder of the sex worker's subjectivity at once required by and resulting from the commercialization of sex.[139] Indeed, as I observed about the murder of Yun Keum Yi, while the attention it drew might have been unique, the fact of the murder itself of a disposable gendered racial, sexualized, and proletarianized laboring body was unremarkable. For as Lee argues, necropolitical laborers are already condemned to death, so their actual death is simply the material extension of that prefigured and figurative death.

If America's settler garrison as a spatial exception is thus the site of a proletarianized labor at once gendered racial, sexualized, and necropolitical that is made possible by the deprivation of local sovereignty and submission to the metapolitical authority of the United States, the attendant temporal exception of debt imperialism deprives women of their futures. I now turn to an analysis of the camptown's relationship to this temporal exception of debt imperialism by focusing on two Asian American documentary films, *Camp Arirang* (1995) and *The Women Outside: Korean Women and the U.S. Military* (1995). I begin with a consideration of the fraught power dynamics as well as the politics and ethics of representation in documentary films such as these. While Kim's challenge leading up to the making of Bloodless, as I discussed earlier, was how to represent the dead (how not to recirculate the image of Yun Keum Yi's gruesomely violated body in a voyeuristic way that would itself be a form of violence), the challenge in *Camp Arirang* and *The Women Outside* is how to represent the living. These films attempt to center the voices and perspectives of camptown sex workers themselves, interspersed with talking head commentary from academics, former members of the US military, and activists. As I demonstrate, the very problematics and challenges of representation generated by these films are themselves an index of the power of the transpacific masculinist compact between the US and South Korean governments in creating the exceptional space of the camptown where sex work is facilitated, regulated, and legal yet illicit and morally condemned everywhere else.

What does it mean to attempt to give voice to camptown sex workers, some of whom do not wish to disclose their identities or even to be captured by the filmmakers at all? Although militarized sex work is a staple feature of US-South Korea geopolitical relations, the women who are compelled to provide that labor are judged and cast

aside by South Korean society. Indeed, as Eun-Shil Kim writes, even though camptown sex workers are Korean women, "their bodies are deterritorialized as Korean." Within Korea's patriarchal system, the woman's body is obtained through the male family member—the father, husband, or son. So according to this system, "the bodies of women who sell their bodies to American soldiers in exchange for money are no longer the territory of the Korean nation or race."[140] Thus cast outside of traditional patriarchal norms, they undergo a civil or social death; it is a deterritorialization from the Korean nation that results in the loss of civil protection and social recognition. Yet as laboring bodies within the spatial exception that is the camptown, they are subjected to its governmentality as brokered through the transpacific masculinist compact between the South Korean and US governments. This governmentality comes in the form of surveillance, mandatory checks for sexually transmitted diseases, and often a debt bondage labor system. In this way, deterritorialization from the Korean nation via the politics of heteropatriarchal and neo-Confucian respectability is conjoined with a reterritorialization to the camptown via the metapolitical authority of US militarist settler imperialism.

This double bind, as it were, of deterritorialization and reterritorialization is particularly onerous when we consider the diplomatic significance of camptown sex work in US-South Korea geopolitical relations and its multiscalar economic significance to the nation, to the laboring women's families, and to the women themselves. Moreover, the post-1965 Korean American population, though constituted in significant part by women who married US soldiers and sponsored the migration of multiple family members, would rather keep buried the conditions of its own making. This is also an unacknowledged debt, for it is, as Cho writes, the shame of the "diaspora of camptown."[141] Yet still, faced with the reduction of US troop presence in the 1970s, camptown establishments began sending their "madams" and sex workers to military sites within the domestic United States (heavily concentrated in the South) via brokered marriages with US servicemen. By the 1980s, this Korean American sex trade spread to other parts of the United States, with militarized sex work proliferating and taking form as illicit massage parlor businesses catering to local troops. In this way, just as there is a "diaspora of camptown," the camptown itself is what Yuri W. Doolan calls a "transpacific phenomenon."[142]

In her trenchant analysis of *Camp Arirang* and *The Women Outside*, Laura Hyun Yi Kang foregrounds these fraught issues of representation and representability. What are the problematics of Korean American women attempting to represent Korea and Korean women (in particular a group of impoverished and subaltern women) through the medium of expository documentary film?[143] Kang highlights the vexed contours of the documentary form as a seemingly unmediated yet heavily mediated form, compounded by the dynamics of uneven power/knowledge in the "presumed urgency" to represent exploited and silenced groups who putatively "cannot represent themselves." She argues that even as these films can be seen as anti-imperialist articulations of a transnational feminist solidarity, the productive force of

such significant Korean American critiques of US imperialism, immigration policy, and racialized and sexualized labor regimes is attenuated by what is often a problematic representation of Korean sex workers. These women appear in the films as the most visible bodies on display and as the object of analysis and commentary by "expert" talking heads.[144] Ultimately, Kang contends that rather than a wholesale refusal to represent, the challenge is to not efface the material specificities and differences of positionality, power, and privilege between the documentarian and the documented. This would "temper the impulse toward any grandiose, homogenizing and disembodied claims about and on behalf of those Korean women sex workers."[145]

Mindful of Kang's important critique, what interests me about *Camp Arirang* and *The Women Outside* is precisely not any grandiose claims they might make about and on behalf of camptown sex workers, but specifically what the films amplify about regimes of debt in the spatial exception of the camptown created by the transpacific masculinist compact between the US and South Korean governments. This compact, moreover, though formally bilateral, is driven by the power of US militarist settler imperialism. Indeed, the significance of the imposition of regimes of debt in relation to complex questions about volition and agency were highlighted in a recent South Korean court case in which dozens of former camptown sex workers filed a lawsuit against the South Korean government, demanding that the government acknowledge its significant role in creating, managing, and regulating a vast network of camptown sex work. In 2017, the Central District Court in Seoul issued a landmark ruling that, though falling short of the admission and apology that the women sought, did recognize that the South Korean government had acted illegally and in violation of human rights in detaining camptown sex workers and forcing them to undergo treatment for sexually transmitted diseases during the 1960s and 1970s. The government was ordered to pay each of the fifty-seven plaintiffs the equivalent of $4,240 as compensation for physical and psychological damage. After the ruling, one of the plaintiffs, sixty-two-year-old Park Young-ja, highlighted how the women had effectively been conscripted as "comfort women" for the US military and held in a state of debt bondage: "They say we walked into gijichon [the camptown] on our own, but we were cheated by job-placement agencies and were held in debt to pimps. I was only a teenager and I had to receive at least five G.I.s every day with no day off. When I ran away, they caught and beat me, raising my debt."[146] This case highlights the "transpacific complicity" of the South Korean government and represents a limited victory for the plaintiffs. Yet in doing so, it simultaneously amplifies the asymmetrical power relations undergirding the transpacific masculinist compact between South Korea and the United States. In this instance, the US government, or the agent of US militarist settler imperialism, was not and could not be named as a codefendant.

Camp Arirang prominently features Yun Ja Kim, who was a camptown sex worker and "madam" for twenty-five years. In 1987, a friend paid off her procurer ("pimp"), allowing her to pursue a new life as a missionary. As the film relates, unlike others who prefer anonymity, Kim was willing to discuss life as a camptown sex

worker. She and the filmmakers go to America Town at Kunsan Air Base, where she used to live and work. Here, Kim recollects the stress caused by the system of debt bondage: "I had to work at the club till I paid off my debts. Whenever American GIs came in, I urged them to buy drinks. Every sale counts towards the debts. It's very stressful. So whether giving them massages or nuzzling up close, we have to persuade American GIs to buy alcohol. We only get 20 percent of any business we make." In *The Women Outside*, it is explained that while many women are kidnapped and held against their will, many more are held by debt.[147] And as revealed by Katharine H. S. Moon in *Camp Arirang*, the lives of camptown sex workers are circumscribed by a system of debt bondage. In some cases, even before their arrival at the clubs, they have been set up with a room, furniture, and clothing by the club owners. This inaugurates not only debt but a system of debt bondage insofar as the debts for these living expenses accrue at such a rate, thousands of dollars, that they cannot ever be fully repaid in most instances. It is a vicious cycle in which the women are then compelled to keep working at the clubs indefinitely. They are compelled to repay their debt through the threat or actual use of violence. "Slicky boys" or gangster figures are hired by "madams" to rough up the women if they do not pay back their debt.

Although the United States can reserve for itself the exceptional temporality of debt imperialism, of not having to pay back its enormous and escalating debt, the homogeneous time of repayment is imposed on camptown sex workers. This disciplinary temporality of debt bondage strengthens the indispensability of camptown sex work to US militarism in South Korea, yet camptown women themselves are dispensable. They are treated as disposable bodies, the raw material that can easily be replaced. They are, in other words, performing necropolitical labor. South Korea's uneven development has produced a population of women who are compelled into camptown sex work by financial exigencies like debt and the need to support their families. Contending with both the spatial exception that is the camptown and the temporal exception of debt imperialism, these women are disparaged as yanggalbo ("Western whore") and yanggongju ("Western princess"). Yet as I have observed, they have played a pivotal role in US-South Korea relations and have significantly made possible the post–World War II migration of Koreans to the United States through the sponsorship of multiple family members.[148]

Even as this Korean diasporic cinematic archive reveals the force of deprived sovereignties and futures, it also contains an aesthetics of settler imperial failure that gestures to alternative spaces and times that such deprivations cannot fully obliterate. In *Camp Arirang*, we see Yun Ja Kim's three-room house, which she shares with her mother. Kim has converted this house into a center for Amerasian children, the True Love Mission.[149] These children, the mixed-race offspring of US military personnel, largely abandoned by their fathers, are in many cases prevented from attending school because of discrimination.[150] At True Love Mission, they receive an alternative education, learning English from student volunteers. While some viewers might be critical of and find disturbing the Christian religiosity as well as the "claiming of

America" taught in Yun Ja Kim's lessons, we can also view this pedagogy and site of alternative collective caretaking as constituting a time beyond compelled debt repayment and a space beyond compelled deference to US metapolitical authority. Indeed, in a reversal of the debtor/creditor relation, the children are taught that they are entitled to a repayment of the debt that America and their American fathers owe them. That is, they have been left behind by their fathers, and they are taught to desire a future in America, not South Korea. This is a pedagogy of another trajectory of debt repayment.

In giving visibility to the children who have been left behind and in holding their absent fathers accountable, Camp Arirang calls to mind the camptown as a space of what Lee calls an "imperial translocality." This imperial translocality is constituted by movements of people: the continuous influx and outflow of US soldiers, the migration of Korean military brides to the United States, the return of these brides to South Korea in cases of divorce, the Amerasian children left behind in South Korea by US servicemen, and the migration of these children to the United States as adoptees. The camptown as an imperial translocality is also constituted by the social relations and networks generated by these movements of people.[151] Indeed, as I have written elsewhere, Korean American novels such as Heinz Insu Fenkl's *Memories of My Ghost Brother* (1996) and Nora Okja Keller's *Fox Girl* (2002) give narrative form to this imperial translocality and to the "diaspora of camptown."[152]

Rather than unquestioningly accepting the negation of South Korean sovereignty, Yun Ja Kim expresses a desire to challenge the seat of US sovereign power itself, the US Congress. She states, "Someday, if God leads me to US Congress, I'll tell them about camptown women and children. This situation has continued for more than fifty years and it's still happening today." What might at first appear to be the expression of a naïve hope is instead an act of powerful testimony and bearing witness. It also reminds viewers that even the US Congress is not fully cognizant of the Pentagon's activities on America's settler garrison. Moreover, an act of resistance that began at the intimate scale of Yun Ja Kim's home through the transformation of that private sphere into the site of an alternative inhabitation of space and time generates a transpacific imaginary, a "scaling up" to the transnational and global scale of bearing witness before the US Congress. This multiscalar enactment and imagining gesture to a different kind of politics, akin to what Sasha Davis conceives of as a project whose aim is toward "expanding circles of affinity" and a departure from a politics based on hegemony and, I would add, identity.[153] Kim chooses to focus on providing an alternative education for children while their mothers are at work at the camptown, even though she herself is not a mother. By way of helping other women who are mothers, she also imagines a different future by caring for the generational bearers of that future. This expanded ethic of care, teaching, and collective parenting, as well as this transgenerational scope, creates a circle of affinity not based on circumscribed identity, consanguinity, or self-interest but on the protracted presence of the US military in South Korea. If the US network of bases proliferates globally, and if the

projection of US militarist setter imperial power threatens to respect no bounds, then the Venn diagram of circles of affinity is overwhelmingly constituted by unions and intersections. These convergences point toward not only the global scale of US militarist settler imperialism and its concentration in Asia and the Pacific but also the relationalities, responsibilities, and resistances that it has in turn generated.

Thus, while we see Yun Ja Kim escaping debt bondage and thriving, I close this chapter by observing that many like her do not share the same fate. Indeed, the haunting presences and absences of camptown women make America's settler garrison a site of ungrieved and ungrievable loss, both of the women's actual lives in some cases and in others of lives that might have thrived beyond compelled dependence on militarized maldevelopment and subjection to debt bondage, biopolitical surveillance, and sexual violence. This is another sense in which the space and time of America's settler garrison is exceptional, where a loss cannot be grieved as a loss. In the next chapter, I turn to the POW camp, focusing on how Ha Jin's novel *War Trash* generates a theorization of the POW camp as another spatial exception through which US militarist settler imperial power constitutes and renovates itself.

Notes

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1 Tōma, "Backbone," 221–22.

2 Jane Jin Kaisen, a multimedia visual artist, is a transnational and transracial adoptee who was born in Jeju and adopted by a family in Denmark. *Reiterations of Dissent* was first showcased in 2011 as part of a solo exhibition, *Dissident Translations*, in Denmark at Århus Kunstbygning. In 2016, the original five-screen installation was expanded to eight screens or channels and exhibited at the Leeum Samsung Museum of Art in Seoul, South Korea.

3 The Kuroshio Current starts off along the east coast of Luzon, Philippines; passes through Taiwan; the Ryūkyū Islands of Japan (Okinawa); the East China Sea and the Zhoushan Archipelago; Jeju Island of South Korea; and continues along the western and eastern coasts of mainland Japan. See Hyun, "Maritime and Island Culture along the Kuroshio Current," 167–70.

4 Baik, *Reencounters*, 131.

5 Gwon, "Remembering 4/3 and Resisting the Remilitarization of Jeju," 238; Baik, *Reencounters*, 31.

[6] For an analysis of how Jeju's political and economic autonomy are comprised by South Korean mainland policies, see Kim, S-P., "Mainland Develop Policy in an Autonomous Subnational Island Jurisdiction."

[7] For analyses of protests against the construction of the Jeju naval base, see Yeo, "Realism, Critical Theory, and the Politics of Peace and Security; Gwon, "Remembering 4/3 and Resisting the Remilitarization of Jeju."

[8] Baik, *Reencounters*, 142. The base has an Aegis ballistic missile defense system, twenty warships, submarines, and an American-designed missile-intercepting system.

[9] Crystal Tai, "Jeju Activists Protest over Visit by Warships," *South China Morning Post*, October 14, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2168417/jeju-jittery-us-warship-visit-reminds-islanders-dark-chapter. For coverage of a previous protest in November 2017 against the docking of the USS Mississippi, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, see Heo Ho-joon, "American Nuclear Submarine Enters Jeju Naval Base," Hankyoreh, November 24, 2017, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/820635.html.

[10] Baik, *Reencounters*, 15.

[11] Kang, *Compositional Subjects*, 201.

[12] Kang, *Traffic in Asian Women*, 35, emphasis in original. Kang's formulation of "Asian women as method?" echoes yet also departs from the title of Kuan-Hsing Chen's important book, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (2010).

[13] On the "military-sexual complex," see Nagel, *Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality*, 193. On the trafficking of sex workers, see Cheng, *On the Move for Love*.

[14] Kishaba Jun's real name is Kishaba Chōjun. "Dark Flowers" was originally published in a 1955 issue of *Ryūdai bungaku* (University of the Ryūkyūs Literature), an activist student literary magazine, and was reprinted a year later in *Shin Nihon bungaku*, a national monthly publication known as well for its political radicalism. Child of Okinawa first appeared in a December 1971 issue of *Bungakkai* (Literary World) magazine. In 1972, it was awarded an Akutagawa Prize, one of Japan's most prestigious literary prizes. The novella was then reprinted by Bungei Shunjū press as the title work of a hardback volume of Higashi's fiction in 1972 and again in 1980 as a paperback edition. In 1983, a Japanese film loosely based on *Child of Okinawa* was released. Directed by Shinjō Taku and entitled (in English) *Okinawan Boys*, this film garnered widespread praise. "Hope" originally appeared in the June 26, 1999, issue of the *Asahi Shimbun*, a major Japanese newspaper.

[15] *Silver Stallion* was first published in Seoul in 1986, then translated from Korean by the author. For a useful documentary of how US military bases in Texas, Hawaiʻi, Guam,

Puerto Rico, Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines impact the lives of women, see *Living Along the Fenceline* (2011), directed by Lina Hoshino and Gwyn Kirk.

16 This is the title of David Vine's introductory chapter in *The United States of War*.

17 On the guest/host metaphor, see Broudy and Simpson, "Naming and Framing in (Post)Colonial Okinawa," 81. On "structural humiliation," see Lummis, Afterword, "Defining the Situation," 281.

18 Rabson, Introduction, *Okinawa*, 9, emphasis added. The Korean War spurred the building of this vast Okinawan complex to accommodate the massive influx of US military and civilian personnel.

19 Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 25.

20 Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 5.

21 Quoted in Vine, *Base Nation*, 4.

22 Quoted in Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 152.

23 Vine, *Base Nation*, 19, 22.

24 See Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*.

25 Quoted in Vine, *Base Nation*, 23.

26 Vine, *Base Nation*, 22–24.

27 Truman, quoted in Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 15.

28 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 34.

29 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 24. On the notable absence of US military bases in Taiwan, Chih-ming Wang argues that they are "not so much absent as displaced to Okinawa and Guam." See "Teaching American Studies in Taiwan," 389.

30 Davis, *Empire's Edge*, 48.

31 Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 33.

32 "Lily pads" are small bases under ten acres in size or valued at under $10 million in value. See Vine, "Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776–2019." According to Vine's list, the breakdown of US overseas bases and lily pads in Asia and the Pacific by country/territory is as follows: American Sāmoa—1; Cambodia—1; Guam—53; Japan—120; Johnston Atoll—1; South Korea—80; Marshall Islands—11; Northern Mariana Islands—5; Philippines—8 (all lily pads since the base closures in 1992); Singapore—2; Thailand—2; Wake Island—1.

[33] Shufeldt, quoted in Kindig, "Violent Embrace."

[34] Kindig, "Violent Embrace."

[35] Katharine H. S. Moon writes that in Olongapo and Angeles, where the US Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were respectively located until the 1992 withdrawal of US forces, virtually no industry existed except the "entertainment" business, with approximately 55,000 registered and unregistered sex workers and a total of 2,182 registered R&R establishments. Further, while US forces withdrew in 1992, their approximately fifty thousand Amerasian children were left behind, with an estimated ten thousand of them living in Olongapo. The law firm of Cotchett, Illston, and Pitre in Burlingame, California, filed a class-action suit against the US government on behalf of these Amerasian children in March 1993. See *Sex Among Allies*, 33, 35.

[36] Santos, "Gathering the Dust." Santos writes, "The U.S-R.P. [Republic of the Philippines] Military Base Agreement (MBA) technically expired on 16 September 1991. This signals the termination of forty-four years of overt US military presence in the country. Signed in 1947, a year after the US colonial rule officially ended in the archipelago, the MBA has always been regarded as a bugbear of the supposed independent status of the Philippines" (33).

[37] Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 12. As I noted in the Introduction, the bases at their height employed nearly seventy thousand Filipinos and thirteen thousand US military personnel. Clark Field, established in 1903, became the second-largest US airbase on the planet, while Subic Bay, in turn, grew to be the largest American naval facility outside the United States.

[38] For an analysis of how the former base now operates as the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), conceptualized as a "global borderland," or a "spatialized unit of globalization" characterized by foreign-local encounters and the coexistence of two or more legal systems, see Reyes, *Global Borderlands*. As Reyes relates, the SBFZ, a tourism and business destination (with complexes including a tiger zoo, a water park, tourist resorts, universities, an international high school, shipping and manufacturing facilities, an upscale mall, and three gated residential communities), is also a popular dock for foreign ships, including US military ships.

[39] Simbulan, "People's Movement Responses to Evolving U.S. Military Activities in the Philippines," 174; and Vine, "Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776–2019."

[40] For an analysis of the consequences of US base closures in South Korea, including the US government's failure to abide by the "polluter pays" principle, see Kim, C. J., "Bases That Leave."

[41] Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, *Let the Good Times Roll*, 79–80. Kang takes Sturdevant and Stoltzfus to task for neglecting "to take up thorny questions of their own

representational motivation and practice." For Kang, their text is one among many examples of the uncritical staging of an "enforced visibility" of women in militarized sex work and sex tourism. See *Compositional Subjects*, 204, 201. Though I agree with Kang, I cite Lita's comment about debt because it is a powerful articulation of debt conceived in collective terms rather than individual.

[42] Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export*, x, xii, 142, xiv. Profit is generated by workers' remittances that total millions of US dollars, and by the bureaucratic processing fees charged by migration agencies.

[43] Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export*, 142.

[44] According to figures from the World Bank, in the past twenty years, remittances to the Philippines as a percentage of GDP peaked at 12.7 percent in 2005, but the total amount each year in dollars has been escalating dramatically. In 2019, it was more than $35 billion. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=PH. According to the results of the 2019 Survey on Overseas Filipinos of the Philippine Statistics Authority, a government agency of the Philippines, the number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) is estimated to be 2.2 million. See https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-filipinos.

[45] Tadiar, Fantasy-Production, 50, 49.

[46] Tadiar, Fantasy-Production, 56.

[47] Moon, K. H. S., *Sex Among Allies*.

[48] Kramer, "Military-Sexual Complex."

[49] Perez, "Guam and Archipelagic American Studies," 98.

[50] Quoted in Vine, *Base Nation*, 75. All four branches of the US military—Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Army—have bases in Okinawa. See Ames, "Crossfire Couples," 178.

[51] Sturdevant, "Okinawa Then and Now," 251.

[52] Ginoza, "Space of 'Militourism'"; Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 45. The "intimacies of U.S. and Japanese empires" is part of the subtitle of Ginoza's article. The full subtitle is "Intimacies of U.S. and Japanese Empires and Indigenous Sovereignty in Okinawa."

[53] McCormack and Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands*. McCormack and Norimatsu make three important points. First, the *reversion* was less a "handing back" as the term reversion implies and more of an actual "purchase." Second, the "return," moreover, was a "nonreturn" since the US military's occupation of Okinawa, monopoly over the most fertile agricultural lands, and control of the sea and skies continued uninterrupted. Third, "following this strange transaction in which roles of buyer and seller were

reversed, Japan adopted as national policy the retention of a substantial US military presence in Okinawa. To prevent any significant reduction of US forces ever taking place, it began to pay a sum that steadily increased over the years. The price that Japan paid to *avoid* reversion thus rose steadily" (7, emphasis in original). For the "garbage dump" question, see Nashiro, "What's Going on Behind Those Blue Eyes?," 57. For an analysis of the broad multiracial and transnational coalition that formed in Okinawa against reversion to Japan (because it would merely be a continuation of Okinawa's colonized status), see Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism*.

[54] Takazato, quoted in Chibana, "Striving for Land, Sea, and Life," 142.

[55] See Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally*.

[56] Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 45.

[57] McCormack and Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands*, 67, emphasis in original.

[58] McCormack and Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands*, 8.

[59] Tokuyama, "Collective Traumatic Memory in a Jointly-Colonized Okinawa," 192.

[60] Tokuyama, "Collective Traumatic Memory in a Jointly-Colonized Okinawa," 194, emphasis in original.

[61] See, for example, Chibana, "Artful Way of Making Indigenous Space" and "Striving for Land, Sea, and Life." See also Ginoza, "Disarticulation of Ethnic Minority and Indigeneity" and "Space of 'Militourism.'" Chibana problematizes generalized uses of the term Indigenous, noting that there are gaps between global and local contexts. Connections and attachment to the land are strong at the intensively local village level of the microcommunity, and the Okinawan understanding of community (shima) is different from racialized or affiliation-based organizing found in Western settler colonial societies. Rather, since Okinawan Indigeneity is intensively local in scale, it might thus be termed "micro-indigeneity." See "Artful Way of Making Indigenous Space," 143–44.

[62] Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 46.

[63] Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 52.

[64] In the Preface, Steve Rabson explains that in addition to the seizure of large tracts of cultivated farmland, the US Command seized control of Okinawa's infrastructure and utilities as well as the sphere of activity of Okinawans. The US military retained ultimate civil and criminal jurisdiction over everyone on the island, which "resulted in horrendous miscarriages of justice involving crimes committed by US military personnel against Okinawa residents" (xi). See Preface, *Okinawa*, ix–xiv.

[65] Davinder L. Bhowmik argues that neither the rubrics of regional literature nor of minority literature provide an adequate framework for understanding prose fiction from Okinawa. See *Writing Okinawa*, 10.

[66] As Annmaria M. Shimabuku writes, Koza City (previously known as Goyeku Village, then later as Okinawa City), was "encircled by the U.S. military" and "became a site of widespread sexual violence as well as an active hotbed for prostitution." See Shimabuku, *Alegal*, 55.

[67] The "weird landscape" described in "Dark Flowers" is also the result of the US military's notorious "one-mile limit" policy, issued in June 1949 in response to rising rates of venereal disease. Because this policy "prohibited native structures within one mile of any dependent housing or military billet of a hundred or more soldiers in the Goyeku Village [Koza City], farmers and small businesses were cut off from their livelihood." See Shimabuku, *Alegal*, 55.

[68] The Battle of Okinawa also resulted in the deaths of almost a third of the island's population, exceeding the atomic bomb casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See Bhowmik and Rabson, Introduction, *Islands of Protest*, 3.

[69] Vine, *Base Nation*, 75.

[70] Gillem, *America Town*, 38.

[71] McCormack and Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands*, 78. See also Akibayashi and Takazato, "Okinawa."

[72] Shimabuku, *Alegal*, 68. The "land confiscations were dramatic. With 'bulldozers and bayonets,' they often tricked farmers into signing documents they did not understand and burned down their houses at gunpoint."

[73] Gillem, *America Town*, 238. The Japanese Diet passed the law in 1972 as part of "reversion" and secretly agreed to pay $4 million for outstanding claims against land seized for US bases. When Okinawan landowners demanded the return of their appropriated land, Japan used its Land Acquisition Law to maintain control of the land. However, in contrast to "eminent domain laws in the United States that require one-time compensation for the forced sale of private land for public use, the Japanese law allowed for continued private ownership but forced lease" (238).

[74] In response to growing public sympathy for the Isahama women farmers resisting the prohibition on farming, which was announced in the summer of 1954, the Ryūkyū Legislature's special land committee, which in late 1954 had excused itself from official negotiations, "convened two sessions that were open to the public on February 5 and 8 [of 1955] to discuss their official position. Approximately sixty men and women from Isahama attended these sessions and submitted two documents for consideration: a petition signed by all residents of Isahama and a document titled the 'Women's

Appeal' that articulated the position of women whose livelihoods depended on having access to farmlands." See Matsumura, "'Isahama Women Farmers' against Enclosure," 557–58.

[75] Matsumura, "'Isahama Women Farmers' against Enclosure," 567.

[76] Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*.

[77] Gillem, *America Town*, 26.

[78] Hatcher, quoted in Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 35.

[79] 2018 Base Structure Report of the Department of Defense, 8, https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/BSI/BEI_Library.html.

[80] Gillem, *America Town*, 26, 38.

[81] Gillem describes it as "a low-density suburb, exported from the homeland, replete with auto dependency, isolated uses, and low net densities." See *America Town*, xv.

[82] Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 23.

[83] Gillem, *America Town*, 88.

[84] Gillem, *America Town*, 92.

[85] Raheja, *Reservation Reelism*, 13, 21.

[86] Carter, "Nappy Routes and Tangled Tales," 13, 8.

[87] Kajihiro, "Moananuiākea or 'American Lake'?," 132.

[88] Wesley Iwao Ueunten provides these statistics: "According to 1969 statistics, 7,400 Okinawan women, or about one in every 40 to 50 women in Okinawa aged 10 to 60, were involved in prostitution. Koza, where the uprising took place, was the major site for the bar and sex industry that catered to American troops" (93). See "Rising Up from a Sea of Discontent." By the mid-1980s, predominantly Filipinas provided entertainment and sexual labor for the US military in Okinawa.

[89] On the debt bondage system in Okinawa, see Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, "Disparate Threads of the Whole"; and Shimabuku, *Alegal*, 91.

[90] Rabson, Introduction, *Okinawa*, 17. Akibayashi and Takazato reveal that 4,790 criminal charges were brought against US military personnel between 1972 and 1995, including twelve cases of murder, 355 of robbery, and 111 of rape. These do not include the many more unreported cases, nor do they include reported and unreported cases before reversion, for which there are no official statistics. See "Okinawa," 252. For a partial list of these crimes, see http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm.

[91] Keyso, *Women of Okinawa*, 86.

[92] Linda Isako Angst analyzes how the 1995 rape evoked a powerful symbolic theme of "Okinawa as sacrificed schoolgirl daughter," inciting powerful responses from Okinawan women's groups, landowners, the then governor Ota Masahide, and even the international community calling for the removal of US bases. See "Rape of a Schoolgirl," 135, 138, 140.

[93] Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, ix.

[94] For a discussion of the author as a public intellectual, see Molasky, "Writer as Public Intellectual in Okinawa Today."

[95] Bhowmik and Rabson, Introduction, *Islands of Protest*, 2.

[96] Calder observes that despite strong antimilitarism among Okinawans as a collective identity as well as among media and local government, and continuous demonstrations against the overwhelming concentration of US bases on the island, "there is remarkably little transformation in the basing structure, even when political leaders agree to undertake it" (167). It is important to note that local landowners who enjoy increasing base-rental fees, which are higher than market rates, have a growing stake in the continued presence of US military bases. Moreover, given that the land has been radically transformed by the bases, these landowners realistically have few alternative uses for the land. Base landowners thus constitute a powerful interest group, well organized at the grassroots level, with local associations represented at the prefectural and national levels. Base workers as well as unions also have a vested interest in the continuing presence of the bases. See *Embattled Garrisons*, 167, 172–73.

[97] The campaign was initiated in 1982 by Okinawan intellectual and activist Arasaki Moriteru and others. By the late-1980s, there were about two thousand antimilitary landlords, including "one-tsubo" landlords. See Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military, 36.

[98] Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMW), a women's peace, human rights, and demilitarization advocacy movement, emerged. It established the first private rape crisis center in Okinawa in October 1995. Okinawan high school and college students established DOVE (De-activating Our Violent Establishment). In 1997, an international solidarity network called East-Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network Against Militarism was established by feminist peace activists in San Francisco. Composed of women from Okinawa, mainland Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, the United States, Puerto Rico, and Hawaiʻi, the network held its first meeting in Naha, Okinawa, in 1997. Together with other feminist peace activists in different parts of the world, the women in this network have formed an analytic framework of "authentic security" that guarantees the following: an environment that sustains human and natural life; the provision of people's basic survival needs in terms of food, clothing,

shelter, health, and education; respect for fundamental human dignity and cultural identities; and the protection of the human and the natural environment from avoidable harm. See Akibayashi and Takazato, "Okinawa." For a history of OWAAMW on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, see Akibayashi, "Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence."

[99] Akibayashi, "Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence," 39, emphasis in original.

[100] Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 173.

[101] For a classic account, see Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*.

[102] Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," 388.

[103] Atwood, *Payback*, 150.

[104] Atwood, *Payback*, 125.

[105] Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 58.

[106] Bhowmik and Rabson, Introduction, *Islands of Protest*, 5. See also Ginoza, "R&R at the Intersection of US and Japanese Dual Empire," 584; Jin, "'All Okinawa' Movement."

[107] Kyodo, "Okinawa Files Fresh Lawsuit to Halt U.S. Futenma Base Relocation," *Japan Times*, July 24, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/24/national/crime-legal/okinawa-files-fresh-lawsuit-halt-u-s-futenma-base-relocation/#.WlBGGEtG1p8.

[108] Derrida, "Force of Law."

[109] Matthew M. Burke and Aya Ichihashi, "Landfill Work Begins on Controversial Futenma Relocation Facility in Okinawa," *Stars and Stripes*, December 14, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/landfill-work-begins-on-controversial-futenma-relocation-facility-in-okinawa-1.560610.

[110] Eric Johnston, "More than 70% in Okinawa Vote No to Relocation of U.S. Futenma Base to Henoko," *Japan Times*, February 24, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/24/national/politics-diplomacy/okinawa-residents-head-polls-referendum-relocation-u-s-futenma-base-henoko/#.XRF6SXt7m00. For an analysis of the ambivalent and contradictory feelings held among Okinawans with regard to US military bases, in particular how many oppose the presence of the bases in principle but recognize the economic opportunities they provide in a stagnant local economy, see Nishiyama, "Geopolitics of Disregard."

[111] Justin McCurry, "Soil to Build New US Airbase on Okinawa 'Contains Remains of War Dead,'" *Guardian*, March 22, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/22/okinawa-us-airbase-soil-war-dead-soldiers-japan.

[112] Mei-Singh, "Geographies of Desecration."

[113] Chibana, "Striving for Land, Sea, and Life," 148.

[114] Chibana, "Artful Way of Making Indigenous Space," 137–38. Chibana explains that "the conceptual structure of indigeneity in Okinawa cannot be understood solely in terms of nativity versus settler colonialism. Nor is Okinawan indigeneity commensurate with 'minority minzu (nationality)' or 'heritage residents' ideas of indigenous peoples, as articulated by other Asian states. Rather, Okinawan indigeneity hybridizes both models on an intensively local scale that might be termed *micro-indigeneity*" (142–43, emphases in original).

[115] Yokota, "Okinawan (Uchinānchu) Indigenous Movement and Its Implications for Intentional/International Action," 59–60.

[116] *Bloodless* was shot with eight GoPro cameras, and the images were stitched together in a costly and technologically advanced transnational postproduction process in the United States and South Korea. Quite different from a traditional film screening, VR films such as *Bloodless* are seen by donning a VR headset. As such, even if a VR film is seen in a large theater with many other viewers, it is decidedly not a collective experience in the way that a traditional filmgoing experience is. Indeed, immersion via the donning of the headset creates an individualized and isolating experience. *Bloodless* has garnered multiple awards, including the award for Best Virtual Reality Story at the 2017 Venice International Film Festival. This was the first film festival globally to create a competition category for virtual reality films, with an entire island dedicated to its newly constructed, state-of-the-art VR theaters. Soon after Venice, the Busan International Film Festival in South Korea also offered VR screenings. Other awards include Best VR Film at the 2017 Thessaloniki International Film Festival and Best VR Story at the 2017 Dubai International Film Festival. The film was also an "Official Selection" at numerous film festivals around the world, including Brazil, Australia, and Taiwan. See Doo, "Empathy without Exploitation"; Chang, "VR Trooper."

[117] *Bloodless* was funded by Venta VR (a south Korean producer of VR video content), the Dankook University Graduate School of Cinematic Content in South Korea, and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Although the camptown area called "Special Tourism Zone for Foreigners" itself is not restricted to South Korean nationals, only foreign passport holders can get into the clubs and bars. Kim and her crew shot the film "guerilla style," without permits, but it was not "scandalous" insofar as they were not singling out any particular bar or store. See Chang, "VR Trooper."

[118] Gina Kim, quoted in Chang, "VR Trooper."

[119] Depending on the romanization, Yun's first name is variously spelled Keum Yi, Kum-i, and Geom-i.

[120] Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora*, 113, 118–19.

[121] See Gina Kim's website: http://www.ginakimfilms.com/filmography#/bloodless-2017/.

[122] See Lele, "Virtual Reality and Its Military Utility"; Rizzo et al., "Virtual Reality Goes to War."

[123] Buckmaster and Yecies, "Docu-reality and Empathy in Bloodless (2017)."

[124] Doo, "Empathy without Exploitation."

[125] Tan, "Filming from a New Perspective."

[126] See Chang, "VRTrooper"; Tan, "Filming from a New Perspective."

[127] Wissot, "Sex Crimes and Virtual Reality."

[128] The film's soundtrack was created by MarcoCo. Studios. For a detailed discussion of the film's soundscape and other elements of its form, see Buckmaster and Yecies, "Docu-reality and Empathy in Bloodless (2017)."

[129] Gina Kim's Director's Statement, http://www.ginakimfilms.com/filmography#/bloodless-2017/ (emphasis added).

[130] For a useful analysis that trace's the development of South Korea's regulated system of camptown sex work back to the World War II system instituted by the Japanese, see Lee, N. Y., "Construction of Military Prostitution."

[131] Moon, S., Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea.

[132] For an excellent history of US military camptown sex work in South Korea, see Moon, S., "Regulating Desire, Managing the Empire."

[133] Moon, K. H. S., *Sex Among Allies*, 1. Moon relates that this ongoing structure of militarized sexual labor has involved over one million Korean women employed as sex workers serving a US military clientele.

[134] Lee, J-k., *Service Economies*, 127.

[135] In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea's Park Chung Hee regime, almost immediately following his coup, passed two major legal provisions actively supporting camptown sex work. The Prostitution Prevention Law excluded camptown sex work from the general state crackdown on sex work, and the Tourism Promotion Law designated camptowns as "special tourism districts." See Lee, J-k., *Service Economies*, 126.

[136] Seungsook Moon observes that US military bases and camptowns in South Korea resemble Puerto Rico, a US colony. See "In the U.S. Army but Not Quite of It," 234.

[137] Johnson, *Sorrows of Empire*, 35.

[138] Lee, J-k., *Service Economies*, 2.

[139] Lee, J-k., *Service Economies*, 6, 7.

[140] Kim, E-S., "Itaewon as an Alien Space within the Nation-State and a Place in the Globalization Era," 53.

[141] See Cho, "Diaspora of Camptown." For an important study of Korean military brides in the United States, see Yuh, *Beyond the Shadow of Camptown*.

[142] Doolan, "Transpacific Camptowns," 33.

[143] As Kang points out, the producers and directors of *Camp Arirang*, Diana Lee and Grace Lee, are both Korean American. In terms of *The Women Outside*, Hye Jung Park is Korean American, whereas J. T. Takaji is Japanese American. So when Kang references "Korean American," she means mainly the three Korean American documentarians. See *Compositional Subjects*, 260.

[144] Kang, *Compositional Subjects*, 260. Kang quotes Marx's famous line in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, "They must be represented."

[145] Kang, Compositional Subjects, 269.

[146] The plaintiffs in the case encouraged the comparison between themselves (sex workers who had been "comfort women for the US military") and "comfort women," Japan's euphemism for women conscripted in Korea and other parts of Asia into a system of forced sexual servitude for the Japanese army during World War II. See Choe, "South Korea Illegally Held Prostitutes Who Catered to G.I.s Decades Ago, Court Says."

[147] Katharine H. S. Moon writes in *Sex Among Allies*,

> The "debt bondage system" is the most prominent manifestation of exploitation. A woman's debt increases each time she borrows money from the owner—to get medical treatment, to send money to her family, to cover an emergency, to bribe police officers and VD clinic workers. Most women also begin their work at a new club with large amounts of debt, which usually results from the "agency fee" and advance pay. Typically, (illegal) job placement agencies which specialize in bar and brothel prostitution place women in a club and charge the club owner a fee. The owner transfers the fee onto the new employee's "account" at usurious rates; Ms. Pak mentions one club owner charging 10%. Often, women ask the owners for an advance in order to pay off her existing debts to another club, and the cycle of debt continues.

Owners also set up a new employee with furniture, stereo equipment, clothing, and cosmetics—items deemed necessary for attracting GI customers. These costs get added to the woman's account with interest.... For this reason, women try to pick up as many GIs as possible night after night, and for this reason, women cannot leave prostitution at will. Nanhee sums up the debt-ridden plight: "In some American [camptown] clubs, *if you have no debt, they see to it that you incur some*. If you had no debt, you would have the choice of going to another club, a better club. But if the woman has debts, she can't leave before she pays up. Escaping from a club isn't easy to do. The women with a conscience stay and work [to pay off the debt]." (21–22, brackets in original, emphasis added)

[148] Yuh, "Moved by War"; Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Hart-Celler Act), replaced immigration based on strict national origins quotas with broader hemispheric quotas. This made it possible for Koreans in the United States to sponsor multiple family members and changed anti-Asian immigration exclusion that had been in place beginning with the 1875 Page Act barring Chinese women.

[149] An important example of such a social service agency for camptown sex workers is Du Rae Bang (My Sister's Place). An outreach project of the Korean Presbyterian Church, it opened two centers in 1986, one near Camp Stanley Army Base in Uijongbu and the other north of Seoul. Services included shelter, educational and counseling services for women, education and childcare for their children, an alternative means of making a living by opening its own bakery, and pooling money so the women could pay off their debts to club owners. See Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, "Women Opposing U.S. Militarism in East Asia." For an analysis of how the Christian faith of Yun Ja Kim and that of other former camptown sex workers informs a "spiritual activism" that can be an alternative to war and militarism, see Pae, "Prostituted Body of War."

[150] For an important analysis, see Okazawa-Rey, "Amerasian Children in GI Town."

[151] Lee, J-k., *Service Economies*, 173–74.

[152] See Kim, J., *Ends of Empire*; Kim, J., "Militarization."

[153] Davis, *Empire's Edge*, 130.