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## The Future of Socialist Feminism

*Abstract:* This essay describes three new versions of socialist feminism, briefly traces their genealogies, and shows how they address the economic and social crises we face today. Antiwork theory proposes basing individual and societal value on support for life rather than on production and suggests certain nonreformist reforms—a universal basic income and thirty-hour workweek—to advance the struggle to reach such a world. Care theorists share the central value of supporting life and its reproduction and propose ways toward these goals, including abolition of the family. The third approach puts forth new concepts of labor and class and deepens our understanding of the crises faced by global finance capitalism by injecting perspectives from struggles in the global South. All are concerned with how to produce changes in subjectivity adequate to support these struggles and to build a new society based on socialist principles.

*Keywords:* socialist feminism, antiwork theory, care, feminist strike, feminist assembly, legal scholarship, legal education

### I. Introduction

What is the relevance of socialist feminism to our historical moment? We live in a time described by many as one of crisis. In this essay, I argue that socialist feminism provides a powerful guide to both how we got here and what is to be done. My vision is of a world organized around the goals of socialism: a society structured so as to serve the needs of all its members rather than profit; a society democratically run and egalitarian with respect to gender, race, and the many other characteristics that have been used to divide us. I argue that a socialism redefined by feminism—socialist feminism—is the path toward these goals because socialism unmodified, both in the past and the present, has disregarded the central importance of care. Inserting care as a necessary part of socialism makes reproduction issues key to the struggle against capitalism and women a potentially revolutionary force—because capitalism *cannot* fulfill all these needs and remain profitable (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser 2019, 66).

In Part II, I present a brief history of socialist feminism, culminating in the socialist feminism of the 1970s and 1980s, during what is often referred to as “second-wave” feminism (the first wave having supposedly been the fight for suffrage). In Part III, I describe the world in which we now find ourselves and the ways in which earlier socialist feminism is inadequate both to analyze and to address it. In Part IV, I introduce newly developing forms of socialist feminism that provide an accurate analysis of the situation in which we find ourselves, as well as strategies of resistance. I focus on three

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main approaches: (1) the antiwork approach of Kathi Weeks; (2) widespread theorizing based on care and the renewed family abolitionism that accompanies it; and (3) the “Feminist International” approach explicated by Verónica Gago and drawn in large part from experiences in the global South. I explain first the theory developed by each of these approaches and, in Part V, the practices of resistance advocated by each. In Part VI, I make some suggestions about contributions this new socialist feminism can make to the study of Law and Political Economy.

## II. A Genealogy of Socialist Feminism

The story of socialist feminism begins with the so-called Utopian Socialists, groups of theorists and activists in the UK and France in the early nineteenth century (Loubere 1974). These groups believed in both the abolition of private property and the equality of women; most also believed that abolition of the private family was necessary to achieve their goals (Taylor 1983, 38–48; Beecher 1986, 204–07). Some, such as the Owenites, established short-lived model communities based on these principles in the UK and US, relying on moral education to transform individuals’ subjectivity and harmonize the needs of the community (Gray [1946] 1968, 204–06). Marx and Engels dubbed these theories “utopian” because they did not rest on cooperation with scientific laws of history and economics but rather on individuals’ choices and changes in their moral character (Engels [1880] 1972, 605–16).

Marx and Engels made the working out of these scientific laws their life project. Neither focused on women, although Engels tried to explain the genesis of gender inequality in his 1884 *Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State*. Marx’s theory of labor value, and specifically of surplus value, is essential to understanding socialist feminism in the twentieth century, however. Marx argued that the value of a commodity was to be measured by the socially necessary labor embedded in it; surplus value is the difference between the amount paid by the capitalist to the workers and the profit made from sale of their product (Marx [1867] 1957, 179–93, 208–29). Socialist feminists did not make use of this theory until the twentieth century.

Theorists in the German Social Democratic Party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed and publicized socialist feminism as a superior alternative to the liberal feminist movements active in Germany at the time (Evans 1976; Lopes and Roth 2000; Honeycutt 1975). Liberal—“formal equality”—feminism can be defined as seeking equality for women on the same terms as men in the public sphere within the current economic and social structure. Thus, liberal feminists sought equal access to politics (at that time, suffrage), education, and employment (Lopes and Roth 2000, 95; Quataert 1979, 25–26). Socialist feminists characterized such strategies as “bourgeois” and vigorously opposed them (Boxer 2007, 131–34, 136–37). They argued that liberal reforms primarily benefited middle-class women and, if achieved, would simply ensure women the slavery men suffered under the current economic system (Zetkin [1889] 1984, 47). August Bebel argued that the genuine liberation of women was impossible without socialism, and that socialism could not be fully realized without sex equality (Bebel [1879] 1910, 17).

Clara Zetkin, the preeminent socialist feminist theorist and organizer in the Social Democratic Party, argued that women should achieve economic independence by joining the paid workforce, that their interests were identical to those of proletarian men, and that their liberation must await transformation of the society and economy as a whole (Zetkin [1889] 1984, 45–50). She thought the necessary preconditions for socializing housework and reorganizing family life would not exist until after the

revolution (Quataert 1979, 122). More pragmatically, socialist feminists in Germany did not emphasize changes in the nuclear family for fear of alienating other socialists (Honeycutt 1979, 37).

The initial years of the new Bolshevik state in Russia offered a major opportunity for socialist feminism to be embodied in societal institutions. Lenin and his wife, Krupskaya, both paid attention to sex equality in their speeches and writings, but believed that women's interests were identical to those of the working class and that their liberation would come with engagement in large-scale industry (Zetkin [1920] 1934, 14–15; Krupskaya [1901] 2017). But one powerful Bolshevik feminist theorist and activist, Alexandra Kollontai, worked to establish publicly funded childcare, communal kitchens, and dining facilities in the early years of the Revolution (Clements 1979, 151–58). She wrote and spoke repeatedly about the need to reorganize household and family life and to substitute the state for the family in the care and education of the young (Kolontay [1919] n.d., 12–16). She also repeatedly attacked the institution of marriage and advocated major changes in moral and sexual norms (Kollontai [1909] 1977, 64–69; [1921] 1977, 237–49; [1923] 1977, 276–92).

There was also a lively socialist feminist community in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century that had close ties to international socialism. Many US socialists were immigrants from Germany and Russia, and there were also hardy homegrown socialist groups that embraced feminism (Buhle 1981, 104–44). The Communist Party USA (CPUSA) flourished during the 1920s and 1930s and produced powerful socialist feminist theorists, such as Mary Inman, and leaders, such as Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (Inman 1940; Vapnek 2015, 103–78). But the CPUSA religiously followed the direction of the Soviet-dominated Communist International and did not prioritize women's issues. Stalinism, World War II, and the repression of the McCarthy period effectively neutralized the American Communist Party as a political force (Ottanelli 1991, 213–16; Howe and Coser [1957] 1962, 387–498).

Socialist feminism was revived during the second wave of the women's movement in the 1970s and 1980s as an alternative to the liberal feminism that dominated the movement. Theorists associated with socialist feminism, such as Sheila Rowbotham and Juliet Mitchell in the UK and Heidi Hartmann and Zillah Eisenstein in the US, made an essential theoretical breakthrough (Rowbotham 1973; Mitchell 1966; Hartmann 1976; 1981; Eisenstein [1977] 1999; 1981). While socialist feminists in the past had repeatedly pointed to the immense amount of labor in the home performed by women, second-wave socialist feminists returned directly to Marx's theory of surplus value and articulated the ways in which women's work in the home was also a form of surplus labor essential to capitalism, by feeding, clothing, and caring for the workforce without pay and producing, caring for, and educating the workers of the future (Mitchell 1966; Eisenstein [1977] 1999). These and other functions of women's work, such as providing a surplus army of labor and an ideal consumption unit, were set forth in a theory of capitalist patriarchy as a system in which capitalism and patriarchy were interdependent, thus making women a potentially revolutionary force (Eisenstein [1977] 1999).

The Wages for Housework movement, begun in Italy and active in both the UK and the US, developed the notion of demanding pay for domestic labor performed in the home as a way to make this interdependence visible (Federici 2012). There was also a strain of family-abolitionist thought in second-wave feminism, most evident in the work of Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh ([1982] 1991) in the UK and Shulamith Firestone (1970) in the US. These writers offered trenchant critiques of the family as oppressive to women and concluded that it must be abolished.

Second-wave socialist feminists were criticized by women of color for their failure to recognize that Black women had worked throughout history (Davis [1981] 1983, 229, 237). For many Black women, the family was a haven rather than a source of oppression. An important group of Black socialist feminist theorists was the Combahee River Collective, whose 1977 Statement put forth an antiracist, antisexist perspective (Combahee River Collective ([1977] 1979). The National Welfare Rights Organization, composed almost entirely of African American welfare recipients, mounted a campaign for a universal basic income not reliant on gender, parenthood, or family status and without any requirement for work (Sherwin 2020).

Socialist feminism virtually disappeared in the US by the late 1980s, due in part to sectarianism fomented by the FBI's COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program), although it remained alive in women's studies programs (Gardiner 2008, 572; Rosen 2000, 239–52).

### III. Socialist Feminism of the Past and the World Today

The world has changed drastically since the time of second-wave socialist feminism. The family of today is not the one to which previous socialist feminist critiques were addressed. The previous ideal, enshrined in law, was a two-parent nuclear family in which the husband worked and the wife stayed at home. Some doubt that this ideal family ever existed (Coontz [1992] 2016). Yet the model family was supported in the US by an ideology of domesticity and legal provisions, including, among others, social security, tax law, zoning laws, and laws regarding pensions (Chafe 1991, 186–88; O'Brien 2023, 28, 45). Full-time housewives are now rare, replaced by the “dual-earner couple”; families rely on the income of all their adult members to survive (Fraser 2016, 112). Moreover, almost half of the people in the United States no longer live in married-couple families (Cohn et al. 2011). Yet our legal system still favors that bygone family ideal.

We have also moved far from the economy touted by liberal democrats. Nancy Fraser (2016) describes how capitalism has mutated since the beginning of the industrial age as it attempts to balance the requirements of production and reproduction until a crisis forces it to change into a new form. In the early factories, capitalists strove to wring every inch of value out of workers, but this left no one to care for workers and their children (and either killed or destroyed the health of many women and children). The state therefore stepped in to pass legislation banning child (and sometimes female) labor and to legislate maximum hours. Capitalism during this period also relied heavily on imperialism and its extraction of superprofits in other parts of the world. The delicate balance of this era ended with “inter-imperialist wars, economic depressions and international financial chaos—giving way in the mid-twentieth century to a new regime, that of state-managed capitalism” (Fraser 2016, 108).

State-managed capitalism was the welfare state that emerged in most of the industrialized world during the Great Depression and after World War II. The United States enacted social security laws that eventually extended from pensions to medical care for the elderly and health insurance for those unable to afford private insurance (Fishkin and Forbath 2022, 293–306, 384–86). Nations in Western Europe went much further, with the postwar National Health Service in the UK and more extensive social supports in other European countries. This combination, which Fraser calls marketization and social protection, stabilized the economy but at the cost of women, people of color, and immigrants. As another author says, the postwar Keynesian welfare state “was routed through . . . the . . . nuclear family” (Dowling 2021, 41). That is, the postwar synthesis presupposed a family wage and a wife at home, backstopped by a large supply of poor people to do unskilled, nonunionized work. It thus

externalized the costs of reproduction from those who directly benefited from it onto families and the state. This version of capitalism could not handle the entry of women into the waged workplace *en masse* and the economic crises that began in the 1970s (Fraser 2016, 112).

In the US today, a full-time waged position is increasingly hard to find, except in low-paid service jobs that do not provide a subsistence wage. Instead, many people are either unemployed or precariously attached to the economy. Corporations have consciously transferred employment to smaller business entities, decreasing wages and benefits and increasing the likelihood that basic labor standards will be violated; they have done so both to reduce labor costs and to avoid mandatory social payments and liability for accidents (Weil 2014, 4–10, 78; Bernhardt et al. 2008, 2–18). Employers contract out work and then evade employment and labor law obligations by claiming that the worker is an independent contractor (Zatz 2008, 43–44). They hire temporary or part-time workers without paying benefits or being subjected to labor and employment law obligations (Weil 2014, 24). Many workers engage in informal or illegal economies to survive. Finally, corporations in the global North have sent jobs overseas to take advantage of lower-cost labor, while engaging in aggressive union-busting activities at home (Fishkin and Forbath 2022, 409). With the decline in unions, workers' real wages have fallen (Minchin 2022, 137). Meanwhile, corporate CEOs and finance specialists earn profits and salaries that exceed the income of the average worker by absurd multiples, and societies are characterized by vast inequality that reproduces itself (Minchin 2022, 137; Piketty 2014). In short, capital has succeeded in capturing the vast share of labor productivity.

Liberal democratic states appear helpless in the face of the resulting social problems, with their legislatures, executives, and even courts captured by the rich; wealth determines the policies adopted by the government (Gilens 2012, 81–85). Many citizens have turned to authoritarian and faux populist politicians, like Trump and various right-wing or fascist leaders in Europe, who present them with easy answers and rely on appeals to racism and nationalism. Such leaders also invent internal gender scapegoats, such as gay and trans people, and fault the abandonment of so-called “family values” for current problems (Cooper 2017; Gago 2020, 211–21, 32). Attacks on women are common, including femicide and deprivation of the right to abortion (Gago 2023, 56, 78, 231–32; *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022)).

While social welfare programs proliferated to shore up capitalism in the wake of the Great Depression and World War II, the conservative governments of the present have been cutting back on these programs, passing austerity budgets and regressive taxes in the global North and imposing them by means of “structural adjustment” in the global South. Our current system is characterized by a highly unstable combination of two-earner households and disinvestment from social welfare, “recruiting women into the paid workforce—externalizing carework onto families and communities while diminishing their capacity to perform it” (Fraser 2016, 112). Along with the precaritization of labor and wages below the costs of reproduction, the system forces people to rely heavily on debt, both to live and to consume the products produced. Fraser calls this historical moment “progressive neoliberalism,” marked by an emphasis on both diversity and meritocracy while re-externalizing reproduction (113). This synthesis is not sustainable.

Two news articles that appeared on the same day in early 2023 powerfully illustrate the current capitalist dilemma. One described how South Korea, a major industrial nation, had recently proposed raising the maximum working hours per week to 69 from the current 52, already one of the longest workweeks in the world. This proposal, which arose out of “pressure from business groups seeking a boost in productivity,” was intended to address a labor shortage caused by low fertility rates (Chen,

Seo, and Raine 2023). The other article pointed out that South Korea had the world's lowest fertility rate, much below the replacement rate (Ahn 2023). Attempting to address this problem, the Korean government increased paid parental leave from one year to a year and a half and the stipend for a child under the age of one from \$230 per month to \$765 per month, to no avail. Due to long working hours, the high cost of housing, and an entrenched patriarchy, young women simply do not want to have children despite generous incentives. As one commentator proclaimed, South Korea had "successfully achieved some of the fastest economic growth in human history and the price has been that there isn't a next generation to inherit it" (Ahn 2023). And, one might add, to continue to produce the wealth.

#### IV. Three Strands of Contemporary Socialist Feminist Analysis

We need new approaches to address the threats posed by the failure of liberal democracy. Today's theorists and activists have been developing a new socialist feminism to take account of the changed conditions described above and to outline the way forward, building to some extent on the socialist feminist theory of the past but also on new practices of resistance in the present. The new feminist approaches based on socialism are many and varied, but I focus here on three: the antiwork approach, the care/family-abolition approach, and the Feminist International approach.<sup>1</sup>

While I have divided these contemporary socialist feminists into three categories for purposes of analysis and presentation, they are similar with respect to certain basic issues. All see the reproduction of life as the primary source of value, and thus care as a central focus of socialist feminist theory. They share a concern for the lack of resources in our current political and economic regimes to meet the unavoidable care needs of human beings, and the conviction that those needs will not be met without substantial transformation of those regimes. Although they differ in the tactics they suggest, each encourages forms of political action designed to appeal to large numbers of people as alternatives to authoritarianism and racism. They share the goal of constructing a society that meets human needs, is run on a democratic and egalitarian basis, and has care networks that extend beyond the nuclear family, unbroken by differences of race, national boundaries, sexual identity, class, and other identities.

##### A. *Kathi Weeks and Antiwork Theory*

In *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries*, Kathi Weeks explicitly draws on the socialist feminist thinking of the 1970s and 1980s, and particularly on the Wages for Housework movement. She describes this reliance as an attempt to recapture the power of "forgotten ideas and stifled ambitions," not just as an exercise in history or the dialectic (Weeks 2011, 116). In another book, she seeks to recover and adapt feminist standpoint theory, such as that developed by Nancy Hartsock in the 1980s (Weeks 1998). Hartsock theorized that the standpoint, or perspective, of women was formed by their unique life activity, much of which was spent in the production of use value (for example, mothering and other care work) rather than of commodities for exchange (Hartsock 1983, 292). Women's standpoint, Hartsock proposed, should form the basis for the socialist society of the future (Hartsock [1983] 1985, 247). Weeks describes this as the subversive potential contained in women's practices of work (Weeks 1998, 7).

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<sup>1</sup> Had I more space, I would include discussion of other works such as Nancy Folbre's *The Rise and Decline of Patriarchal Systems: An Intersectional Political Economy* (2020), and *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, edited by Tithi Bhattacharya (2017).

The problem with the Marxist tradition, according to Weeks, is its productivism—its emphasis on labor as the source of all value. Emphasizing work as the source of both individual and societal value resonates especially in the United States, with its traditional Protestant work ethic described by Max Weber ([1905] 1958). Work is thus seen not just as an economic necessity but as a moral imperative (Weeks 2011, 38–59). This mentality was instrumental to industrial capitalism and shared by its Marxist opponents. Weeks’s premise is that this mentality must be resisted. Her goal is to effect a shift in focus from production to reproduction and to “move from value to life as its primary product, build[ing] on an antiproduktivist logic of intervention” (230).

To challenge the present organization of work requires confronting not only its normativity and moralization, but also its reification and depoliticization (Weeks 2011, 11). By contrast, second-wave liberal feminism simply seeks to gain equal access for women to the paid labor market and to revalue unpaid labor in the home (12–13). It is necessary instead to demask work, showing the hierarchy, inequality, subordination, and exploitation that accompanies it for men as well as women, and the ways in which it produces hierarchies of gender, race, and class.

Weeks calls for substituting an antiwork politics for the class struggle of orthodox Marxism (Weeks 2011, 19). This demands insubordination to the prevalent work ethic and opposition to self-discipline for the sake of capital accumulation—“a refusal to subordinate all of life to work” (77). Just socializing production will not effect the changes she advocates. The imperative is to come up with “new ways of organizing work and production [and reproduction] and new models of subjectivity,” to pave the route from antiwork to postwork (92).

### B. *Care Theory*

Those I describe here as care theorists, such as Emma Dowling, Alva Gotby, Sophie Lewis, and the Care Collective, detail the vast unmet needs for care and the lack of social provision, in order to address them. Turning away from the previous focus on housework, they focus their analysis on the more general contradictions posed to capitalism by the reproduction of life, or care. Care is defined as the “social capacity and activity involving the nurturing of all that is necessary for the welfare and flourishing of life” (Care Collective 2020, 5). This includes what one author calls “emotional reproduction,” which has largely been the role of women, although it is also sometimes commodified (performed, for example, by paid therapists) (Gotby 2023, 25). The gendering of these skills has been constructed by repetition of the tasks involved; “men have deskilled themselves in order to avoid responsibility for domestic work” (69).

One recent study found that working-age women in the United Kingdom provided 23.2 billion hours of unpaid childcare each year, worth an estimated 382 billion British pounds (more than \$490 billion US) (Topping 2022). Yet childcare is not even considered an element of basic needs when calculating welfare payments in the US (Zatz 2011). Feminist economists have been pointing out the failure to include women’s unpaid work in the GDP for a very long time (Waring 1988; Folbre 2001). COVID-19 brought this home to the public.

A major pandemic at a time when social supports had been drastically cut led to a crisis of care. Parents were required to work at home during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, where their children were also cooped up and studying online. Parents unable to work at home—those in the majority of working-class jobs and in the much-needed and overworked health professions—faced a choice

between their jobs and their children. Many women quit work to care for and help educate them. Thus COVID-19 made care work, the impact of the absence of care services on women, and the differential impact on women of color all starkly visible (Dinner 2022). In fact, COVID-19 only made the care crisis obvious to the middle class and professionals (O'Brien 2023, 18); poorer families were already well aware of it.

The family serves capitalism as a privatized system of social reproduction, naturalizing childrearing as nonwork, an individual choice and a private investment. Children are seen as one's private property, giving "ideological cover for the state and capital's abdication of responsibility" to care for them (Weeks 2021, 6–9, 14). Care of children may take place in the home or outside of it. It may be paid or unpaid. But it is virtually always exploitative, expensive, and at the same time inadequate. If one parent is at home, supported by another worker, care work is performed for free, almost always by women; but this is an increasingly uncommon family structure. When a family must resort to the market for childcare, this work is not only gendered but also raced. Working women who can afford to do so hire women of color and immigrants to care for their children in the home (Banks 1999).

High-quality childcare is labor intensive and thus very costly, yet the government is unwilling to pay parents directly to provide it and employers are unwilling to do so. Where both parents work or a child has only one parent, unless they are very wealthy the parents must seek care outside the home, either from relatives or daycare centers. This care varies greatly in quality. For-profit companies that provide childcare charge very high rates and may in fact rely on state subsidies to make a profit (Gotby 2023, 32).

Care for the elderly shares these characteristics. If there is no one at home able or willing to provide it, one must turn to the market. The same groups—women of color and immigrants—provide the low-paid women who care for the elderly, either at home or in nursing homes and assisted living facilities. Unless older individuals have the resources to pay for this exceedingly expensive long-term care, payment for these services falls on their families.<sup>2</sup> Eldercare is also often of poor quality. Eldercare services are increasingly controlled by national corporations that manage for-profit nursing homes by skimping on staffing and imposing speedups that do not allow time for individualized and sensitive care (Gotby 2023, 24–25). As a result, such care is often inadequate and even abusive.

In short, the costs of caring for children and the elderly (as well as the mentally ill and the severely disabled) are privatized, and they fall on women. In many countries, the need to make use of feminized labor in this way has led to a kind of convergence between neoliberals and religious conservatives, who praise "family values" to support private family responsibility for care work (Cooper 2017; Gago 2020, 227). The family thus serves capitalism by relieving businesses of the cost of caring for their workers and future workers. And at the expense, in some cases, of returning women to the confines of the traditional family.

### C. *The Feminist International Approach*

The third approach I discuss is what I call "Feminist International" after the title of Verónica Gago's book (a reference to the Socialist Internationals of the past). Like all the theorists discussed so far, Gago draws on socialist feminist work from the 1970s and 1980s, such as that of Silvia Federici and

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<sup>2</sup> In the United States, after spending down their assets, many elderly receive nursing home care funded by Medicaid; but Medicaid reimbursements are so low that facilities are reluctant to accept Medicaid patients.

Angela Davis, and seeks to adapt it to the world we face today, drawing in particular on the struggles of women in Latin America (Gago 2020, 28–33, 117–21). She agrees that socialist theories of value should be rewritten so as to understand the production of value as the production of existence. Indeed, “struggles for justice,” Gago says, “[should be] understood as an extension of the work of collective care” (79). Although social reproduction makes possible the accumulation of capital, hiding this fact is essential to capitalist theories of value. So one task of socialist feminists today remains to make visible how unwaged labor is the condition of waged labor (123–24).

Gago proposes a new feminist critique of political economy based on contemporary capitalism, updating definitions of labor and of class. The concept of labor must be expanded far beyond the waged working class of old, to “broaden[] recognition of the sites of value production and . . . highlight[] the reproductive dimension as key to a reconceptualization of what is historically considered work” (Gago 2020, 192). This should include paid and unpaid labor, contract, temporary, precarious, and migrant labor, as well as work in the informal and even illegal economies. This necessitates a reimagining of the socialist concept of class, expanding the proletariat beyond traditional waged laborers to those in “nonpaid, badly paid, non-recognized and hyper-exploited work” and even to those who are unemployed (157–58, 43). This new proletariat does not confront the capitalists in their factories, but rather confronts abstract international finance capital (247). This new class struggle combines many and varied groups, thereby calling forth a whole new feminism as well, based on alliances and involvement in social conflicts that would not heretofore have been envisaged. Feminists find themselves building a movement allied with unions and those laid off from factories, with Indigenous women evicted from their land, with migrant collectives, with supporters of disappeared activists, and with others who begin to see the common origins of their precarity but with whom feminists might not have predicted alliances (39, 45, 175).

What is particularly distinctive about Gago’s work is that she derives much of her understanding from women’s actual struggles in Latin America, especially strikes, and the activities of extractive and finance industries there.<sup>3</sup> Large corporations have been responsible for exploitation of the land—through mineral extraction, deforestation, large-scale agriculture, and other noxious and environmentally harmful uses of the land—dispossessing many poor and Indigenous people and depriving them of the ability to be self-sufficient. It is no accident that women in the global South often mount demonstrations against these practices that deprive them of their lives and livelihoods. Together with disinvestment in social services and the concomitant privatization of care, the burdens fall heavily on women.

Gago expands the notion of extraction to include mass indebtedness, with its returns to finance capital. Debt becomes for many the only means to purchase what they need in order to survive. While consumption by the masses is essential to capital, the consumption necessary to survival exceeds their wages. Because a large portion of the population in some Latin American countries lives on state subsidies, citizens borrow against their state benefits, which are paid directly and are accessible through credit accounts on people’s cell phones. The resultant indebtedness becomes a demand for future labor from which it is impossible to flee (Gago 2020, 140–41). This mass indebtedness allows finance organizations to extract value directly from consumption, not from labor or production. In this way, “[f]inance ‘weaves’ together a ‘literal’ type of extractivism, on one hand, referring to raw materials . . . and on the other, an extractivism in an *expanded* sense: extraction that operates upon popular vitality

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<sup>3</sup> Although Gago does not explicitly rely on her work, Chandra Talpade Mohanty was a pioneer in this type of internationalization of socialist feminism (Mohanty 1984, 2003).

through mass indebtedness. . .” (97, emphasis in original). Thus, one of the demands arising from the 2017 Women’s Strike in Latin America was “We Want to Be Debt-Free!” (133).

A final contribution Gago makes to socialist feminist theory is to connect violence against women with the forms of exploitation described above. It is relatively easy to see how domestic violence may follow from destabilizing a male breadwinner in a precarious economy. Domestic violence, according to one author, can be seen as a kind of “workplace injury” (Gotby 2023, 59). But homes have also been destabilized by women’s insistence on equality, which has led them not only to enter the paid workforce and compete with men there, but also to resist the older hierarchy of obedience within the home, resulting in more violence (Gago 2020, 61).

Gago argues that aggression against women’s bodies is linked to other types of violence produced by a neo-extractivist political regime tied to the domination of finance capital (Gago 2020, 95). As dispossession of common lands and resources has deprived people of the means to survive, they resort to illegal activities to sustain bare life, with violence as a natural consequence. Gago insists that we recognize a “[p]luralization of the meaning of sexist violence . . . [to] connect[] imploded homes with lands razed by agribusinesses, with the wage gap and invisibilized domestic work; . . . the violence of austerity . . . and financial exploitation through public and private debt” (57). She does not mean these linkages simply as metaphors. There is, she asserts, an organic relationship between violence against women, other forms of violence, and the current form of capital accumulation (236).

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In sum, these three types of socialist feminist critique have emerged in the twenty-first century in response to the new and precarious conditions brought about by global neoliberal capitalism. Antiwork theory attacks the notion, shared by capitalism and socialism alike, that work is the source of all value and the concomitant productivist ethic that prevails. Kathi Weeks seeks to expose the functions this ethic serves for capitalism and challenges us to resist it. Care theorists focus on the reproductive labor performed, primarily by women, and its recent commodification and point out how the privatization of this care has served the interests of capitalism. The current combination of multi-earner households and disinvestment in social welfare constitutes an inherent contradiction in neoliberal capitalism. Feminist International theory draws on grassroots struggles in Latin America against the activities of extractive and finance industries and connects violence against women with these forms of exploitation. Verónica Gago argues that these new circumstances require new and much broader definitions of work, class, and feminism.

Each of these theoretical approaches suggests a practice of resistance, which is the subject of the next section.

## V. Practices of Resistance

Theory can be difficult to separate from practice. The theorists on whom I focus here draw their analyses to a large extent from practice, and theoretical analysis evokes practice. They are intertwined (“praxis”). Nonetheless, in this discussion I will focus on the practices of resistance that arise from each of the three approaches described above. While the three overlap in some respects, I focus on what is most salient or novel about each approach.

### A. *Weeks's "Utopian Demands"*

Kathi Weeks returns to the Wages for Housework movement to begin her analysis of the practice of demanding. With the intervening insights of Judith Butler and other scholars, she sees this practice as both provocative and performative—a declaration of revolutionary antagonism and a demand for power that is nonnegotiable. When the earlier theorists demanded wages, they were in fact announcing a refusal to continue to do all the care work for the human race. The very process of making such a demand, according to Weeks, brings forth a desiring subject and expands their needs (Weeks 2011, 131–35).

Although the ultimate goal is an end to capitalist wage relationships, Weeks argues in favor of proceeding by making what she calls “utopian demands”—demands for reforms that are difficult but not impossible, that require substantial transformation but represent “a predictable evolution from the present” (Weeks 2011, 176, 197). Weeks refuses to present a description of what the desired future would look like; her goal instead is to enlist participants in the project and to form a broad coalition (222–24). So these demands should be designed to attract a wide group of different people around a set of common interests.

Weeks has a particular set of demands in mind: universal basic income and a 30-hour workweek. The guaranteed income should provide for everyone’s basic life needs, so that waged work becomes a choice rather than a necessity (Weeks 2011, 138–39). Universal basic income is an idea that surfaces from time to time and has been the subject of experiments in the global North, although such experiments have been limited to only some groups within the population and have involved amounts not adequate for subsistence (Greenwell 2022). The demand for a basic income goes far beyond the wages demanded for housework. It includes a group much larger than housewives and mothers; it is gender neutral; it does not depend on membership in a family; and it has no work requirement. As a result, the demand for a basic income should bring together a large group of supporters.<sup>4</sup>

Weeks’s second proposed demand is for shorter working hours. She points out that the eight-hour workday and five-day workweek have remained the norm since World War II in the United States. This is a uniquely masculine norm in that it assumes a wife in the home to perform all the unpaid labor on which individual workers and the economic system depend. Weeks astutely notes that if it had been assumed that a *male* worker would perform the labor in the home, “it is difficult to imagine that he could credibly have been expected to work a minimum of eight hours a day” (Weeks 2011, 163). Reduction in maximum hours must thus be accompanied by re-funding and expanding supportive services from the state. This would in itself amount to a massive reorganization of the relationship between production and reproduction, prioritizing lives over profit (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser 2019, 80).

Weeks’s proposals are undergirded by her work on the construction of subjectivity. Collective subjects, she argues, are constituted by the practices they enact and the desires they cultivate, which results in ever-changing modes of subjectivity (Weeks 1998, 9, 122). Thus the experience of demanding and the change in the place of paid work in one’s life open up space in which to imagine—and desire—an existence not dominated by work; the ongoing process of denaturalizing and problematizing gender

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<sup>4</sup> This approach contrasts with a proposal for a legally enforceable job guarantee, “which ensures that no *working* person . . . would go without a basic living wage and benefits” (Tcherneva 2022, 91, emphasis added).

norms will also open space to imagine alternative futures (143). In short, the subjects necessary to effect such big changes in our economy and society will be produced in the process of a long struggle.

One can see indications that work refusal has already become attractive to many. A book called *How to Do Nothing* was popular in the US and UK (Odell 2019). The “lying flat” movement, rejecting overwork in China, was seen as so dangerous to productivity that it was suppressed by the government (Bandurski 2021). French citizens mounted huge daily demonstrations in 2023 to resist the extension of their work lives from age 62 to age 64. This is currently unthinkable in the United States, but one can hope. (This is not meant to be facetious. Weeks relies heavily on the philosophy of hope, and especially on the ontology of the “not yet” set forth in Ernst Bloch’s *The Principle of Hope* (Weeks 2011, 186–98; Bloch [1954, 1955, 1959] 1995)).

## B. *Care Support and Resistance*

The care theorists on whom I focus also present agendas for change. Almost all favor public reinvestment in essential care services. Some also advocate experimentation with alternative forms of providing support services. I first discuss these approaches and then turn to the revival of the family-abolition movement that has become prominent among care theorists. Both strands share a desire to undo the privatization and commodification of care.

### 1. Public and Cooperative Support Services

One obvious way to make reproduction central to our politics is to reverse neoliberal austerity measures and to revive and expand the welfare state by engaging in electoral politics, union organizing, and more popular forms of resistance, such as the Fight for 15 and Bargaining for the Common Good (Rolf 2016; McCartin 2016). Working for universal guarantees of free health care, paid maternity leave, sick pay, childcare, eldercare, and low-cost housing would all fall into this category (Dowling 2021, 193–96). This strategy would involve forming alliances among diverse groups and supporting, for example, public sector workers and others who fight for improved state services, such as the teachers’ strikes in the US and UK and the National Health Service and public transport strikes in the UK (Ferguson 2020, 137). Care recipients and consumers, such as working women who employ other women to care for their children and/or aging parents, should join caregivers in making demands for higher pay and benefits.

The goal is to resist by refusing private responsibility for reproduction and care. Although each of these issues may individually seem reformist, capital *cannot* fully internalize all the costs of reproductive labor and remain profitable (Gotby 2023, 53). Because workers are collectively indispensable (if individually fungible), the struggle to demand that these costs—the true costs of labor—be borne by capital rather than by individuals and families makes reproduction issues a central locus of anticapitalist struggle.

Another approach, often endorsed in tandem with public provision of support, is to develop alternate modes of care not based on profit—types of mutual support and resource sharing that connect caregivers and care receivers—in essence, the demarketization of care. Cooperatives and other types of collective organizations that operate on a grassroots, not-for-profit, nonbureaucratized basis are proposed by several theorists; municipalism is also offered as a solution, with nationalization the last resort (Care Collective 2020, 45–58; Dowling 2021, 197–98, 202–05). *The Care Manifesto* speaks of

“promiscuous care”—caring across lines of family, nation, and difference—and points to the voluntary assistance extended to migrants by individuals and groups in Europe and the United States and mutual aid during AIDS and COVID-19 as examples of our inherent capacity to offer such care (Care Collective 2020, 36–44). But this voluntary labor and the groups that provide it should be supported by the public fisc rather than by private charity.

## 2. Family Abolitionism

Another common theme of current socialist feminist theorists addressing the care crisis is that the nuclear family should be abolished. Weeks joins care theorists in this analysis. She, along with Alva Gotby and Sophie Lewis, draw their inspiration from second-wave socialist feminists, such as Shulamith Firestone, Michèle Barrett, and Mary McIntosh. Weeks also refers to the Wages for Housework movement as contesting the institution of the family and showing it to be a site of coercion rather than a free and voluntary association (Weeks 2011, 124–29). She accurately describes second-wave feminism as having retreated from a family-abolitionist position to a more modest position advocating gender-equitable division of domestic labor and a more inclusive definition of family—to include, for example, gay and lesbian unions (183–84).

In a 2021 article on family abolition, Weeks returns to her earlier critique of the nuclear family, arguing that it is a particular historical, and thus contingent, model: a “white, settler, bourgeois, heterosexual and patriarchal institution” that was imposed on freed slaves, Indigenous people, and immigrants (Weeks 2021, 4). The current family form imposes hierarchy and dependence while also narrowing the bounds of solidarity and community to those who are perceived to be “the same” as oneself (14–15). Gotby also criticizes the family as an exclusionary social form based on private property and scarcity (Gotby 2023, 122).

M.E. O’Brien presents a particularly thorough discussion of family abolition in their 2023 book of that name. They specify that the family to be abolished is the “private household, a unit of privatized care” (O’Brien 2023, 21). Family abolition “is a commitment to making the care necessary for human flourishing freely available throughout society” (6). It is inherently linked to gender freedom because such freedom requires that the means of survival and reproduction not depend on family, wage labor, or the state (200).

Most of today’s socialist feminist theorists are reticent about what should replace the family. Sophie Lewis simply makes vague suggestions about “establish[ing] consensus-based modes of transgenerational cohabitation, and large-scale methods for distributing and minimizing the burdens of life’s work” (Lewis 2022, 18). Although she cites Alexandra Kollontai, she does not propose the communal kitchens, laundries, and nurseries that Kollontai tried to establish in the Soviet Union (49). Virtually every author cites African American traditions of multiple mothers and non-nuclear-family parenting, as well as the diversity of Black relationship structures, without mentioning the violence and intergenerational trauma that may also pervade these families (Lewis 2022, 24–29, 43–45; Gotby 2023, 135–37). Gotby speaks of “queering emotional reproduction,” by which she means developing “forms of sociality that move away from individualism, privacy, and property,” which need to be worked out in future practice (Gotby 2023, 129). This will require major structural changes to provide the necessary material conditions—changes in city planning, housing, health care, education, and care of both children and the elderly (132).

Weeks agrees that abolishing the family will be a very long process, impossible without establishing a universal basic income as well as public support for the forms of care now meted out according to family status (for example, health insurance and social security benefits) or provided directly by family members. To answer the question of what should replace the family, both Weeks and Gotby cite with approval Barrett and McIntosh's 1982 conclusion: *nothing* (Weeks 2021, 16; Gotby 2023, 132). What is needed instead is "to make the family less necessary, by building up all sorts of other ways of meeting people's needs" (Barrett and McIntosh [1982] 1991, 159).

O'Brien, by contrast, argues that visions of a possible future are important to establishing a movement's values and practices, as Marx provided in describing the Paris Commune (O'Brien 2023, 95–96, 189; Marx [1871] 1972). O'Brien would build their model of the future on two premises. First are the qualities (or perhaps preconditions) of communist social reproduction, including a classless society; abolition of private property, wage labor, the state, the family, borders, prisons, and police; unconditional access to the means of survival; and collectivization of goods (O'Brien 2023, 194–96). Second, O'Brien's vision is derived from the practices of mass protest encampments, where functions provided by private families are replaced "without constituting a new state form separated from the collective social body" (220–21).

O'Brien proposes that the future society be made up of communes of two hundred to five hundred individuals, each centered on a large building containing dining rooms, laundries, nurseries, and childcare, that would replace the functions of the family. These communes, resembling Fourier's phalanxes, would be run by direct democracy (O'Brien 2023, 222–23, 225–29). Kinship ties could continue but within a broader interdependent community, including family-like arrangements such as coparenting by unrelated adults (230).

### C. *Gago: The Feminist Strike and the Assembly*

In *Feminist International*, Verónica Gago advocates for the revolutionary potential of two feminist institutions: the strike and the assembly. The feminist strike reframes the strike weapon of union politics and its goals, while forms of feminist assembly serve a variety of functions, including the construction of a new consciousness.

#### 1. The Feminist Strike

On March 8, 2017, an international feminist strike took place—fittingly on International Women's Day, the holiday established by socialist women in the early twentieth century. The strike movement began in Poland, with marches and walkouts to protest the criminalization of abortion, and it spread quickly, especially to Argentina and other Latin American countries to protest the increase in femicide (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser 2019, 6–7).

These strikes made visible the role of gendered work by its absence. They also explicitly called for democratic collective control over production and reproduction, that is, for alternatives to capitalism, and forged avenues to reach them (Ferguson 2020, 133). Gago announces her intention to develop a "political theory of the feminist strike" (Gago 2020, 9). Such a strike, she says, evinces a radical critique of neoliberalism by reconfiguring both class and work. The strikers, marchers, and organizers present what she calls "a diverse collective imaginary of what is called work" (143). They show by their persons and banners the many different types of labor and of persons who perform it. The strike thus enlarges

what are traditionally considered sites of value production, including and highlighting reproduction. By its ubiquity, moreover, it demonstrates a concrete internationalism, defying borders both between and within nation-states (182–84).

Consequently, the first of Gago’s “theses on the feminist revolution” is about the feminist strike:

The feminist strike is a tool that maps new forms of the exploitation of bodies and territories, with the aim of making such an exploitation visible and insubordination to it formidable. The strike reveals the diverse composition of labor in a feminist register, by recognizing historically disregarded tasks, by showing its current imbrication with generalized precarious conditions, and by appropriating a traditional tool of struggle to reinvent what it means to strike. (Gago 2020, 234)

## 2. The Feminist Assembly

The institution of the feminist assembly typically precedes and/or follows a strike or other protest. Gago describes the assembly as a “situated apparatus of collective intelligence”—a democratically organized gathering where participants together evaluate a crisis situation, make political decisions about how to proceed, and put those decisions into practice; she analogizes these gatherings to kitchens, where a feminist diagnosis of a crisis is elaborated (Gago 2020, 155–57). Listening is central to the assembly’s process of political decision-making (164).

The assembly consists of many different groups, with different struggles, both political and economic. Their diversity and democratic mode of operation lead participants to understand how their oppressions reinforce one another and to unite based on those mutually reinforcing effects, avoiding splits based on identity politics (Gago 2020, 173–76):

By weaving together this multiplicity of different conflicts, each rooted in particular relationships of domination and exploitation, the meaning of mass politics is redefined. Now, it is based on practices and struggles that have historically been defined as “minoritarian,” and therefore as anathema to mass politics. . . . Therefore, it challenges the neoliberal machinery of minority recognition (as an isolated identity politics) and the pacification of difference (in the register of multicultural neoliberalism). (239)

Thus, Gago denounces both identity politics and multiculturalism as tools of neoliberal capitalism, in favor of a gradual recognition of the ways in which multiple oppressions have the same source. Moreover, unlike the conventional wisdom that a movement’s aims must be moderate in order to attract large numbers, this approach includes more people through radicalization (Gago 2020, 173). Similarly, the assembly allows work within existing conditions rather than waiting for perfectly liberated subjects; it acts out reform and revolution simultaneously (170–72). Revolutionary subjects will be produced by the process.

It is important to note that these assemblies are not just some sort of convention called at a particular time for a particular cause. “Assembly” encompasses all kinds of gatherings and confrontations—for example, women’s encampments and occupations by Indigenous people to defeat extractive projects. In the course of these struggles, noncapitalist spaces are created (Gago 2020, 85–88). Gago gives as an example the response of Argentine women to the 2001 economic crisis, during which

neighborhoods “buil[t] the infrastructure necessary to maintain a series of roadblocks, providing meals, security details, and physical materials for the encampments on major routes . . . initiat[ing] a radical problematization of work and the meaning of a dignified life, understood as decoupled from the wage regime” (125). O’Brien’s thick description of the 2006 Oaxaca Commune similarly shows it as “a moment of family abolition,” in which women challenged their social roles and transformed “the care labor of their private homes into a mass insurrectionary movement for the transformation of society as a whole” (O’Brien 2023, 2). In the United States, a good example of an assembly is the 2016–2017 encampment at Standing Rock in North Dakota to protest the building of an oil pipeline threatening the water supply to Indigenous lands (205). All who joined the occupation were fed and cared for, and they left it changed (Erdrich 2016).

Participation in assemblies like these bring a new kind of subject into being, with new capacities and desires. People experience community economics, “which . . . both open up and decolonize the economic imagination of . . . anti-capitalist alternatives, as well as deconstruct the hegemony of capital based on spaces that exist in the here and now” (Gago 2020, 119). In short, desires and subjectivities are changed by a period of living in these noncapitalist spaces. This transformation is particularly common where there is a local confrontation in defense of land, water, and life, which results in new modes of organization, sociability, exchanges, and points of view (88).

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Each of the three approaches suggests a practice of resistance that complements its theory. Kathi Weeks argues for demanding a universal livable basic income in tandem with a 30-hour workweek as what she calls utopian demands. Although accomplishing these goals would not yield the ideal world of the future, it would provoke a different attitude toward the place of work in an individual’s life and the time to imagine—and work toward—an alternative world. The impact of this process on subjectivity is key.

Care theorists argue that socialist feminists should, at a minimum, campaign for public provision of basic care functions, allying themselves with other groups fighting for these goals. Some argue also for developing alternative forms of care, such as cooperatives, to demarketize care. Care theorists who are family abolitionists take a more radical approach, arguing to replace the bourgeois patriarchal family, which functions so well for capitalism, with forms of extended community that would better serve human flourishing and relieve women of the burden of care work by more equitably distributing it.

Finally, Verónica Gago argues for using two specific weapons of resistance: the feminist strike and assembly. The strike not only shows the importance of women’s work by refusing to perform it, but also serves to bring together women involved in many different struggles, thus enlarging the definition of labor and building ongoing alliances. The assembly also brings together diverse groups and interests and encourages them, through democratically organized discussions, to see the common source of their problems in neoliberal finance capitalism. Participation in these strikes and assemblies and in the provisioning of their participants serves to create a new form of subjectivity and imagination that can fuel the continuing struggle for a new future.

## VI. Lessons for Our Scholarship and Teaching

The new scholarship described in this essay provides important insights that should inform LPE scholarship and teaching. With a few small exceptions (Harris, Kapczynski, and Zatz 2021; Gonzalez and Mutua 2022, 154–55), the themes emphasized here have been absent from the literature of Law and Political Economy, although they are present to some extent in feminist legal theory, most notably in the work of Martha Fineman and her Vulnerability and the Human Condition project at Emory. We should remedy this lack.

I am a US law professor working in the fields of family law and feminist theory, so I will focus on these areas to make specific suggestions for incorporating the insights of socialist feminism into our scholarship and teaching. We need to teach our students how law and other forms of coercion have pushed people into prescribed family forms. Jim Crow laws required marriage as a precondition of renting land in the post–Civil War South. Traditional family structures of Native American tribes were assaulted by the removal of children to assimilationist boarding schools and the allocation of tribal lands as private property (O’Brien 2023, 77–93). Dorothy Roberts has described how current child protection services function to police families of color (Roberts 2022).

We also need to show our students the many ways in which the traditional nuclear family is still assumed by a host of our laws, even where this no longer fits the ways people today live: zoning laws that regulate what size and type of group or family formation can live together and public assistance laws that regulate the units that can receive assistance and whether mothers must work or can stay home to care for their own children, for example. Our tax laws reward certain family formations and not others. Cohabitants and people who live apart together are not only deprived of the protections of family law, but are also punished in various ways (Bowman 2010, 2020).

I and others have tried to include these insights in our teaching. But what have been omitted are the many critical functions that the traditional family provides for capitalism. Socialist feminism would bring a highly developed analysis of the economic functions of the household and their relationship to the greater economy. Rather than discussing “work/life issues,” the focus would be on the fundamental incompatibility between the way the household and market economies are currently structured and the assumptions on which they are based. Attention would be directed to the dependence of American women on the labor of immigrant women for the care of both the very young and the very old at exploitative rates of pay. A sensitivity to the underlying interests at stake in the renewed struggle over reproductive autonomy for women would emerge from understanding how capital is fighting back by attacking the gains women attained in the second wave. The connection between the disruption of communities by economic crisis and violence against women would be explored. These critical insights need to make their way into our classrooms, to challenge basic notions with which our students both come to and depart from law school.

What is true of family law and feminist theory applies to other fields as well. The injection of socialist feminism into the field of employment law, for example, would yield a better understanding of the tenacity of discrimination against women in employment, given its centrality to both patriarchy and capitalism. It would also offer an analysis of the sexual division of labor that would deepen our understanding of what is necessary in order to change it and an understanding of the gender division of labor as international. I encourage law professors in all fields to attend to the issues raised by the new socialist feminism.

We work to produce lawyers. We should encourage them to think not only about law reform but also about the impact of any reforms on goals they seek. We or our students might draft and advocate

legislation for a universal basic income or 30-hour workweek, as Kathi Weeks suggests, while understanding that these are not final goals but only important steps along the way. Our roles as lawyers, scholars, and law professors are bound to be limited in changing the world, but we can make an impact on the consciousness of our graduates as they go on to positions of power within our society.

## VII. Conclusion

A primary object of this essay has been to describe three exciting new versions of socialist feminism—approaches that confront the economic, social, and political crises of the present—and to show how they can fruitfully inform legal and economic analysis. Antiwork theory shows us the focus on productivism instead of life in society as it is and proposes nonreformist reforms to advance the struggle toward a postwork world. Care theory emphasizes the gaps in our systems of support for reproduction, describes them in detail, and proposes reforms that would collectivize these responsibilities; some care theorists propose abolition of the family as the only route to this end. Feminist International thinking initiates a major reconsideration of the concepts of both labor and class, analyzes the many forms of extractivism prevalent in the global South and other Indigenous areas, including violence against women in this analysis, and proposes the instruments of the feminist strike and assembly, broadly conceived, as a way toward a different world. In the society each theorist envisages, labor would be directed toward producing for human needs, not for profit. All these theorists are committed to working toward bringing such a society into being, even though that struggle will extend beyond our lifetimes. Feminists will be key participants in this struggle because it is they who import the central importance of caring—whether performed by women in the home or by institutions supported by the state—into the very definition of socialism. The significance of the care work they perform, moreover, makes their insubordination a revolutionary act. Finally, these theorists cause us to think bigger, just as the nineteenth century socialists and socialist feminists did, rather than merely focus on narrow reforms as we have been trained to do.

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