

PORTUGAL AND HER COLONIES JOIN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CAUSES AND INITIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY COUP

by

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When Marcello Caetano assumed power in September 1968, he offered Portugal the hope that he, and the new faces he brought with him, could solve the major social, economic, and political ills--including the colonial problems--which plagued the tiny country. Newspapers heralded "the end of the dictatorship," and during his first year as Prime Minister, Caetano looked and sounded like a radical in comparison with his predecessor. He promised to carry out a major overhaul of the educational system, to end the censorship of the mass media, to severely curb the abuses of the secret police (PIDE), to modernize the economy, to stem the flow of Portuguese emigration which was depopulating sections of the country, to permit and encourage political opposition, and to initiate reforms in the African policy which would lead toward a gradual autonomy for Portugal's African colonies. Although the opposition withdrew just before the October 1969 election which confirmed Marcello Caetano as Prime Minister, there is little doubt that he would have won a popular mandate even if he had allowed a free and open election.

What happened, then, between 26 October 1969, when Caetano was at the apex of his popularity and 25 April 1974, when barely a single soldier or citizen raised a hand to prevent the Armed Forces Movement from toppling his regime? Is this phenomenon summed up merely in the opening paragraph of the Armed Forces Movement's "Proclamation"?

*Considering that after thirteen years of fighting overseas the present political system has been unable to define an overseas policy leading to peace among*

*Portuguese of all races and creeds. . .*

Or should we look at the multitude of broken promises, disappointed hopes, and deepening despair of a people whose autocratic ruler (of hardly six years) had become as isolated, intolerant, repressive and incapable of reform as Salazar at his worst? The frustrations over three stalemated colonial wars can be seen as the proverbial "last straw" for a people who had not experienced political freedoms in nearly half a century, whose level of literacy was the lowest in Europe, whose activities--be they political or economic--were increasingly restricted, and whose general standard of living barely exceeded subsistence.

How fitting it is that this little European country, which for so long had pretentiously assumed the determination of the destinies of other larger and distant countries, should suddenly find itself freed of its own oppressors and at the same time consider ceasing being an oppressor. While the Caetano regime's inability to resolve the "colonial problem" proved to be its Achilles' heel, the Military Junta and the Provisional Government have also quickly discovered the complexity and divisiveness of the problem as it has come to dominate much of their time since April 25. Each of the African colonies presents a unique set of issues, thereby precluding a single plan for immediate decolonization. The granting of immediate independence to Guinea-Bissau, for example, would satisfy most of the competing interest groups there and leave the Africans in control of their own destinies; the same action in Angola--and to a lesser extent in Mozambique--could precipitate an attempt to establish a minority regime run by reactionary white settlers. Before examining the problems and prospects of decolonization, let us analyze the downfall of the dictatorship in Portugal.

The Portuguese Economy

The conventional wisdom concerning the link between the Portuguese economy and the continuance of the colonial wars has been that the former was so dependent on the latter that Portugal's large capitalists would push the regime to fight until final victory. However, the annual expenditure of about fifty percent of the national budget for the prosecution of the wars in Africa has unquestionably been the major factor in Portugal's economic stagnation. With the most underdeveloped economy and the lowest standard of living in Europe, Portugal could simply not fight three wars in Africa and at the same time economically develop both the metropole and colonies. The impact the

wars have had on Portuguese development can be seen clearly by examining the percentage of the gross national product spent on defense and development between 1956 and 1970.

Table 1  
Percent of GNP Spent on Defense  
and Development (1956-1970)<sup>1</sup>

Years	Average % of GNP Spent on Defense	Average % of GNP Spent on Development
1956-1960	3.7%	3.3%
1961-1965	6.6%	3.1%
1966-1970	7.1%	2.4%

The agrarian sector has been the most stagnant in the Portuguese economy. Over the last quarter of a century, agricultural production has increased at approximately one percent per year--the lowest increase in Europe. The relative absence of government investments in agriculture, the uneven distribution of land (one percent of the total number of farm holdings encompass one-half of all the arable land),<sup>2</sup> the inflationary rise in agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, and labor) along with a veritable price freeze on agricultural products were all factors which caused more than a million rural Portuguese to abandon their lands during the sixties and seek employment outside Portugal. In the late sixties, skilled and professional workers, also unable to tolerate the economic, political, and social conditions, joined their compatriots in the abandonment of their country. Many of the emigrants were able to earn five to ten times more money abroad than it was possible to earn in Portugal.

At first the "emigration problem" was viewed as temporary, for it was believed that most of the emigrants would return after a couple of years or so abroad. However, almost 1.5 million Portuguese emigrated legally and clandestinely between 1960 and 1972; nearly three-quarters of a million went to France alone and Paris became the second largest Portuguese city (after Lisbon). Obviously the "emigration problem" was far more permanent than temporary for only 1.4 percent of the emigrants returned. The result of this exodus was a two percent drop in the Portuguese population (of about 8.5 million), clearly

unprecedented for any modern nation, especially a Catholic one). In some districts of Portugal, as many as a third of the population left during the 1960s. Included in the ranks of those who fled the country were approximately 100,000 boys of draft age, seeking to avoid military service.

The initial concern which the Caetano regime showed toward the "emigration problem" began to wane in the 1970s when the Portuguese economy became increasingly dependent on the remittances sent back to Portugal by the emigrants. Whereas these remittances accounted for less than two percent of the GNP in 1956, by 1970 they had reached eight percent. In 1972, over \$750 million dollars entered Portugal through emigrants' remittances, a decisive contribution toward making up the deficit in Portugal's balance of payments--a problem Portugal had been experiencing due to her growing negative balance of trade. (In the same year the negative balance of trade rose to approximately \$857 million.) Another important factor in reducing the balance of payments problem was the dramatic increase in tourism. While tourists spent only \$2.4 million dollars in Portugal in 1960, the more than four million tourists who visited Portugal in 1972 spent approximately \$225 million. Although the money derived from tourism and the emigrants' remittances helped to offset trade deficits and balance the Portuguese budget, it also stimulated a runaway inflation which, exacerbated by international inflation, reached almost twenty-five percent in 1973--the highest in Europe--and rose as much as six percent in February of this year.

Portugal was caught in a truly vicious cycle: wages to workers and prices paid for agricultural products remained rather stable while the cost of living kept increasing to the point that it was no longer possible for growing numbers of Portuguese to subsist. As noted above, this trend first attacked rural farmers and workers, but by the late 1960s the urban middle class was equally affected. Since under the totalitarian regime it was not possible to protest by voting, demonstrating or even striking, most Portuguese manifested their unhappiness by leaving the country. With the rest of Europe enjoying a standard of living approximately four times that of Portugal, these individuals needed little encouragement to seek a better life outside their homeland.

Important Changes in the Portuguese Economy

Despite this apparent economic stagnation, some major, almost revolutionary changes did take place after the early 1960s and, it could be said, helped to lay at least the economic groundwork for the military coup. Since the onset of the African wars, the Portuguese government had been able to count on the unflinching support of the country's major capitalists who were heavily dependent on the protected colonial markets for their products and who likewise made large profits on the raw materials which they imported from the colonies--a pattern of trade which stunted the growth of the metropolitan and colonial economies alike.

During the sixties, however, both the Government and the large capitalists began to invest heavily in industry, with the assistance of foreign capital and companies who began to invest in Portugal and the colonies after 1965. The result was a radical shift in Portuguese exports as can be seen in table 2.

Table 2  
Composition of Portuguese Exports: 1960-1973<sup>3</sup>

Exports	Value of Exports (1,000 contos) <sup>a</sup>		Percent of Total Exports	
	1960	1973	1960	1973
Group A New Exports <sup>b</sup>	1,300	12,437	14.0%	29.5%
Group B Traditional Ex- ports of Raw Materials <sup>c</sup>	5,076	10,704	54.0%	25.5%
Group C Textiles	1,979	12,895	21.0%	30.5%
Group D Others	1,043	6,186	11.0%	14.5%
Totals (excluding precious metals)	9,400	42,222	100.0%	100.0%

<sup>a</sup>In 1960 one conto was equal to about (U.S.)\$35.00 while in 1973 it rose to approximately \$42.00.

<sup>b</sup>Includes: machinery, instruments, electronic products, products manufactured from rubber, plastic and chemicals, surgical and optical instruments, etc.

<sup>c</sup>Includes: wood, cork, fish, wines, and minerals.

The fundamental importance of this shift in the substance of Portuguese exports was that Portuguese companies began to greatly expand manufacturing and processing industries which were better suited for exporting to developed countries, rather than underdeveloped countries like the African colonies.

This trend of exports to developed countries was further accelerated during the 1970s when the government devised new legislation designed to reduce the growing trade deficit between the colonies and the metropole. One high official in the Economic and Finance Ministry stated in early 1972 that the Angolan and Mozambican deficit to the metropole exceeded one billion dollars! While most of this deficit can be attributed to Lisbon's exploitative economic arrangements with the colonies, businessmen there and in Portugal began to show great concern over the growing balance of payments problem. In 1970, in an attempt to curb deficit spending, it was suggested that Angola and Mozambique only be allowed to import goods which they could pay for. Whites in Angola and Mozambique protested that this was unfair unless they be allowed to export and import to other countries which offered more favorable prices. A compromise was attempted in a decree issued in November 1970, whose effect was to curb metropolitan exports of certain products (e.g., wine) to the colonies.<sup>4</sup> The consequences of this decree were mixed. On the one hand, the colonies were no longer obligated to buy exclusively from the metropole those products which were often inferior in quality but higher in price than comparable products which could be obtained elsewhere. (Angola in 1973, for example, exported 25,000 tons of maize outside the escudo zone for a price forty percent higher than maize exported to Portugal the same year.) Furthermore, the restrictions on the export of selected products, such as textiles and alcoholic beverages, were partially lifted allowing the colonies to compete with metropolitan industries. On the other hand, the restriction on imports purchased on credit caused a dramatic drop in the colonies' standard of living and a growing number of whites began to leave Angola and Mozambique. In March of this year the censor cut an article in Expresso which indicated that approximately 22,000 people in Angola and Mozambique were on the waiting list for ships returning to Portugal; most of them had one-way reservations.<sup>5</sup>

The wine industry is an interesting illustration of the consequences of the new economic measures. The colonies had been the major market for Portuguese wine exports: between 1934 and 1969 more than two-thirds of all Portuguese wine went to Angola and Mozambique.<sup>6</sup> However, in 1971

exports of wine to the colonies dropped twenty-five percent, prompting spokesmen from the wine industry to describe the situation as catastrophic!<sup>7</sup> Although the wine industry complained to the government, it also began to develop new markets abroad, especially in the United States.

The overall trend of developing markets outside the colonies dramatically shifting the pattern of Portuguese exports can be seen in table 3. The Portuguese economy moved away from its dependence on colonial markets as trade with Europe expanded.

Table 3  
Metropolitan Commerce by Commercial Trading Blocs<sup>8</sup>

Blocs	1959	1967	1972	1973*
<u>Exports</u>				
EFTA	17.6%	34.3%	40.8%	13.9%
EEC	22.7%	16.6%	20.5%	48.6%
Colonies	29.8%	24.4%	14.7%	14.8%
Other	29.9%	24.7%	24.0%	22.7%
EEC & EFTA	40.3%	50.9%	61.3%	60.5%
<u>Imports</u>				
EFTA	20.6%	22.9%	24.4%	11.7%
EEC	31.1%	33.5%	31.4%	45.2%
Colonies	14.2%	14.3%	11.6%	10.1%
Other	34.1%	29.3%	32.6%	33.0%
EEC & EFTA	51.7%	56.4%	55.8%	56.9%

\*The 1973 data reflect the enlargement of the European Economic Community and therefore are not really comparable with the earlier years.

While this trend was officially promoted by the 1970 restriction on trade, Portuguese capitalists were further encouraged to seek markets outside the escudo zone by the bleak economic prospects developing in the colonies themselves, such as Guinea-Bissau. The colony of Guinea has long been considered an almost exclusive monopoly of Portugal's largest conglomerate, CUF (Companhia União Fabril).<sup>9</sup> In recent years the war in Guinea has caused an economic decline, prompting CUF to import groundnuts from Senegal, then re-ship them to the metropole through Guinea in order to help justify Portugal's presence. In spite of these financial manipulations, however, Guinea's exports remained stationary while her imports increased, as shown in table 4.

Table 4  
Balance of Trade in Guinea-Bissau  
(1966-1970)<sup>10</sup>

	1966	1970	1966-1970
Exports	\$2,914,450	\$ 3,051,300	+\$ 136,850
Imports	\$8,382,500	\$12,306,000	+\$3,923,500
Balance	-\$5,468,050	-\$ 9,254,700	-\$3,766,650

The small amount of Guinea's exports along with the growing deficit in her balance of trade may have been enough to convince any rational businessman that he should look elsewhere for his profits. When one adds the skyrocketing costs of fighting the war in Guinea--which reached hundreds of millions of dollars per year by the 1970s--even Portugal's most prominent capitalists such as José Manuel de Mello, to a lesser extent his brother Jorge (the principal owners of CUF), and António Champalimaud realized that it no longer made economic sense to continue their support of the Caetano regime. Once these men and others in the large business sector adopted the position that their best interests were served by expanding trade abroad rather than with the colonies, the wars became liabilities rather than assets. And once these business oligarchs got off the Caetano bandwagon, the regime was in very serious trouble.

When Caetano came to power, he appeared to favor the "Europeanists" in the endemic debate over whether Portugal should orient its economy toward Europe or toward Africa.

He brought in a number of young and competent technocrats (e.g., João Salgueiro, Rogério Martins, Xavier Pintado, Manuel Belchior, Carlos Horta, and many others) who were unabashedly pro-European in their orientation. However, one by one they were either fired or forced to leave the government as Caetano came under increasing pressure from the conservative forces led by the President, Américo Tomás, and the former Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira. By 1972 practically all of the so-called technocrats were out of government and most of them became associated with a group established two years earlier called SEDES (Association for Social and Economic Development). In 1972 SEDES published a book entitled *Portugal que somos, Portugal que queremos ser* (The Portugal That We Are, The Portugal We Want to Become) which was a strong criticism of Américo Tomás. Last year they published critical pamphlets on Portuguese emigration and an important little book called *Portugal para onde vais* (Portugal Where Are You Going) which presented four scenarios for the economy in 1985: (a) western European capitalism; (b) elite capitalism (e.g., the Caetano regime); (c) western socialism (e.g., the USSR and Sweden); and (d) another socialism (e.g., decentralization along the lines of China and Tanzania). SEDES favored the fourth option and they clearly had considerable influence on the opposition forces, including the Armed Forces Movement and General Spínola himself. Today, a number of the SEDES members hold prominent positions in the provisional government.

In sum, Caetano's policies engendered the deep resentment and alienation of such diverse groups as rural and urban workers, farmers, conservative middle class businessmen, large-scale capitalists, socialist-oriented technocrats, and practically all the businessmen in the colonies. Caetano desperately tried to win these people back to his camp with impassioned speeches in which he blamed most of the country's economic problems on outside forces; but his refusal to recognize any connection between the detrimental effects of the African wars on the Portuguese economy served as a clear sign that the Prime Minister had lost all touch with reality and was merely whistling in the dark.<sup>11</sup>

### University and Underground Agitation

When Caetano took over the reins of government, many university students and faculty anticipated a new era of liberalization largely because he had clashed with Salazar in the early 1960s over the very issue of university freedom and autonomy--the outcome of which was his resignation as

rector of Lisbon University. Caetano's actions as Prime Minister, however, more closely approximated his former nemesis, Salazar, than the liberal image his earlier actions had suggested.

Initially the students' protests were centered on parochial university issues such as examination procedures, the rising price of food in the cafeterias, and free election of student association officers. As the Caetano regime became more repressive toward the students, however, they began to shift the focus of their protests from the university to the "system," which to most students meant the colonial system. The government continued to use brutality in the name of preserving order and the morale of a country "beleaguered" by three African wars as its justification for suppressing student demonstrations--which resulted in escalating the protest against the wars. In the early 1970s the students began to publish clandestinely speeches of Amílcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto as well as translations of articles by nationalist supporters such as Basil Davidson and Gérard Chaliand. The enlarged scope of student protest fed the government's paranoia that "fifth columns" were growing among the university population, were undermining the war effort, and therefore must be crushed at all costs. The result was more government intervention in university affairs than had ever occurred under Salazar; in fact, in recent years some universities and professional schools seemed to be closed more often than they were open.

Far more dangerous than the students as a threat to the regime were the underground opposition groups which became increasingly effective in their use of sabotage against the government and the military. They attacked banks, NATO installations (including a new NATO Headquarters), military bases, troop and supply ships destined for Africa, air bases--destroying planes and helicopters--and any other target whose destruction could create fear, if not chaos, among the regime's supporters. Most of the initial publicity attributed the sabotage to LUAR (League of Union and Revolutionary Action), led by Hermínio da Palma Inácio, the aged and often arrested revolutionary, whose activities as a saboteur began in 1947. As time passed, however, it became apparent that many groups were involved in the increasing acts of sabotage, including ARA (Armed Revolutionary Action--a subsidiary of the Portuguese Communist Party--students, Maoists, Trotskyites, a small number of commissioned and non-commissioned military officers, and a few anarchists. With rare exceptions, the ostensible goal of the underground movements was to

convince the government to grant immediate independence to the African colonies.

As the military stalemate in Africa persisted into the 1970s, dissent on practically every issue in the metropole was tied to the wars. The government was largely responsible for the growing popular belief that the ills of the nation were caused by the African wars since nearly all suppression of every type of protest was justified in terms of maintaining the country's resolve to win. Nevertheless, the government did not consider the African wars or the future of Portugal's African colonies to be a proper subject for debate--whether in the streets or in the parliament. The number one issue facing the nation was arrogated to a small inner circle in the government while most of the country was expected to ignore the matter.

Caetano's hardening line was apparent immediately preceding the October 1973 general election when he not only purged most of the liberals from the National Action Party's (A.N.P.) list of candidates but refused to allow any election debate on the colonial question. His position was that since the voters had "endorsed" his African policy in the 1969 election, there was no need to put the country through unnecessary strains by debating that policy in 1973. (What would have happened had Lyndon Johnson, in the face of the Vietnam protests, announced his candidacy--instead of withdrawing it in March of 1968--and had accompanied his announcement with the threat that anyone raising the issue of Vietnam during the campaign would immediately be imprisoned--and for an undetermined length of time!)? Following the election last fall, Caetano proceeded to replace moderate cabinet members with reactionaries and to move more liberal military officers to relatively powerless positions. These actions effectively destroyed any remaining hopes that peaceful opposition could ever modify the government's African policy.

#### Dissent Finally Touches the Military

The various ideological segments within the Portuguese military had serious grievances against the government, grievances which not only varied widely, but were often mutually exclusive. Each group sought redress in a different way. The result was that no one, especially Caetano, seemed willing or able to satisfy any one segment.

Three broad ideological divisions could be identified within the military before the coup. On the far left were a few officers (but no generals) and a significant number of draftees who believed Portugal should stop the wars and grant immediate independence to the African colonies. This was too extreme a position for most upper echelon officers who generally held a more conservative view on the future of the colonies. Two outspoken generals epitomized the positions of the moderate and the ultra right segments of the military: António de Spínola and Kaúlza de Arriaga, whose military styles, ideologies, and activities prior to the April coup illustrate the basic split within the military over the colonial question.

Both Spínola and Arriaga shared a profound belief in the necessity of a continuing Portuguese presence in Africa, however much they disagreed about the nature of that presence. Both achieved national fame during their tenures as Governor Generals from 1968 to 1973 in Guinea (Spínola) and Mozambique (Arriaga)--the colonies where the fighting was the most intensive. Each man considered himself a logical successor to President Américo Tomás when it was (erroneously) believed that Tomás would not run in the October 1973 elections. Finally, each was unexpectedly recalled to the metropole in 1973, Arriaga in July and Spínola in September, and each was given a hero's welcome by the metropolitan Portuguese. Here the similarity ends!

General Kaúlza de Arriaga revealed his ideas about the role and importance of Africans in the colonies before assuming his command in Mozambique. In an article published in 1967 (in *Lessons of Strategy in the Course of High Command* vol. 12), Arriaga stated that "blacks are not highly intelligent, on the contrary, of all peoples in the world they are the least intelligent." He feared the rise of "assimilated Africans," arguing that if they became more numerous than the whites, one of two undesirable situations would be inevitable: the establishment of an apartheid system, or "we'll have black governments with all the consequences that that would entail." Not surprisingly he did very little to encourage the development of "assimilated blacks" during his tenure as Mozambique's Governor General.

Militarily, Arriaga's strategy was essentially based on the belief that Portugal not only could win militarily but was winning. Frequently claiming to have "total victory" within his grasp, he did at least succeed in carrying out the largest military campaign in the history of Portugal's African wars; operation "Gordian Knot" took place in the

Mueda plateau of northern Mozambique during the summer and fall of 1970. However, by the time of his departure in mid-1973, the FRELIMO soldiers were not only far from being defeated, they had actually expanded the war significantly southward nearer the white population centers.

In direct contrast to Arriaga's low opinion of Africans (and to Portugal's African policy in general), General António de Spínola manifested considerable respect for traditional African cultures, encouraging Africans in Guinea to resolve their major social and economic problems within their traditional ethnic structures. He organized "congresses of the people" which provided a forum for Africans to express themselves as Africans and not as Portuguese with black faces.<sup>12</sup> His experience in Guinea also engendered his respect for the ability of the African soldiers--both those under his own command and his opponents, the PAIGC--and he concluded that a military victory was impossible for the Portuguese to attain. Significantly, Spínola came to this realization in spite of having had considerably more success in slowing down the nationalists' advances than his counterpart, Arriaga, had in Mozambique.

By 1973 Caetano was caught between two increasingly vocal and divisive military forces. On the one side he was being pressured by President Américo Tomás, Admiral Tenreiro, and General Arriaga to show more resolve in the military prosecution of the African wars and in the suppression of dissent at home. The ultra right demonstrated its power in early June 1973, when 11,000 veterans met in Porto to vociferously implore Caetano and other members of the government not to back down one inch from the orthodox positions they endorsed.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, Caetano could not afford to ignore his two top soldiers, General Costa Gomes, the Chief of Staff and General Spínola, the Deputy Chief of Staff, who continued to argue that since the wars could not be won militarily the government had to show more flexibility in finding a political solution. On various occasions Caetano attempted to appease both sides, the result of which was that he satisfied neither and worse, each came to view him as a serious obstacle.

The Tomás/Tenreiro/Arriaga position was more popular among the upper echelon of the military, which gave rise to much speculation that if there were a coup at all in Portugal it would come from the right. In a country where the political and ideological predispositions of the elite are practically the only ones ever considered or implemented, it seemed futile to most people to consider the possibility that

junior officers who disagreed with their generals could ever preempt their superiors and manage a successful coup d'état. Speculation about the activities of the right wing generals was further encouraged in December of 1973 when reports circulated in Lisbon that an attempted coup, supposedly led by Arriaga, had been stifled at the last moment by General Costa Gomes and others.<sup>14</sup> (It was immediately following these rumors that General Spínola was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff-- a position created especially for him.)

### The Armed Forces Movement

The mistake of the Caetano regime and of most outside observers who envisioned Portugal's next government being further to the right was to ignore the growing dissatisfaction among the junior military officers. In mid-1973 approximately 1300 captains and majors sent a petition to the government, setting forth a number of professional grievances which focused on internal military matters such as pay and conditions of military service. On July 13, 1973, the government issued a decree (no. 353/73) designed to fill the growing number of vacancies in the officer corps; it stated that university graduates who served as officers during their four years of obligatory military service could remain in the military as career officers. Previously, all career officers had to be graduates of the military academy but the growing unpopularity of the wars had so depleted the academy's rolls that less than ten percent of its openings were being filled. The decree outraged most of the military officers, including members of the Armed Forces Movement who called a meeting in October of a core group numbering less than two hundred.

This meeting in Évora of these captains and majors was intended to be a forum for a discussion of the decree and of the non-response by the government to their earlier grievance petition. It soon became apparent to all in attendance, however, that they were less concerned about their professional and personal grievances than they were about the state of their country. There was considerable agreement among them on basic economic, social and political questions, as well as a concurrence that the African wars should be ended through political negotiation rather than military victory. Some discussion of attempting to overthrow the regime did occur at this meeting but the issue was left unresolved.

On January 30, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement issued a manifesto holding the Caetano regime responsible for the crises plaguing the country. The manifesto stated that the

African wars could not be resolved militarily and that unless the regime instituted major democratic reforms, none of the country's problems could be solved. Through the manifesto, the junior officers warned the regime and the country not to believe in "the myth that the Armed Forces is always apolitical and merely executes orders handed down from above."<sup>15</sup>

#### An African Enters the Debate

Just prior to the appearance of the Armed Forces Movement's manifesto, a singular event underscored the often ignored African dimension of the colonial problem. Generally, most information transmitted to the Portuguese people concerning the positions and activities of the Africans in the Portuguese colonies had come from self-interested officials, not from the Africans themselves. In part this accounts for the shockwaves set off by a press conference held in Lisbon by Joana Simião, an African from Mozambique who had once belonged to the central committee of COREMO (a Mozambican nationalist group) but who had returned to her country to teach French in a Lourenço Marques high school.<sup>16</sup>

At her press conference, Joana Simião stressed the urgency to "Mozambicanize Mozambique," arguing that blacks, mestiços, and Asians had to assume more responsible positions, to participate more actively in the administration of Mozambique. She attacked Caetano's 1971 Overseas Reforms--theoretically intended to implement that participation--as empty words since non-whites in responsible positions were still rare.<sup>17</sup> The impact of her remarks was heightened by the vicious attack of an old, reactionary white Mozambican deputy to the National Assembly, Gonçalo Mesquitela. Assuring his fellow deputies that Joana Simião's accusations of racial discrimination and assertions of racial tension were completely false, he declared that her press conference had made him nauseous.

The unique (indirect) debate between two Mozambicans--one black, the other white--was given full coverage in the Portuguese and Mozambican press, laying bare the issues and perceptions which divide the races in Mozambique. The more liberal newspapers, such as *República* (edited by Raul Rego, Minister of Social Communication in the provisional government) and *Expresso* (edited and owned by Francisco Pinto Balsemão, a leading member of SEDES and former Deputy), openly applauded Joana Simião, *Expresso* calling Gonçalo Mesquitela's intervention in the National Assembly "lamentable."

Within the National Assembly, where preoccupation with colonial questions had heretofore taken up minutes and hours but seldom if ever days and weeks, the issues raised by the debate could no longer be ignored. A courageous young Deputy from the Azores, João Mota Amaral, implicitly endorsed Joana Simião's position and evoked the wrath of many conservative Deputies who attacked him for not making a clear distinction between progressive autonomy and actual independence. His response that he saw nothing wrong with the creation of new independent countries if that was what the future held in store stimulated heated controversy in the press and among the public in general.

At the same time that the colonial issue was suddenly firing public debate within the metropole and underground acts of sabotage were on the increase, nationalist activity in both Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau stepped up considerably. In Mozambique FRELIMO was experiencing its greatest success since the war had begun a decade ago. In early 1974 they made a number of crippling attacks on rail traffic between Malawi, Rhodesia, and the Mozambican port of Beira. Their rapid southward advance toward the white population centers confirmed the worst fears of the Portuguese that FRELIMO was receiving growing support from the civilian African populations. As the hostilities drew uncomfortably close to the cities of Beira, Vila Pery and Manica, the whites, fearing the military was no longer capable of protecting them, panicked and physically expelled Catholic priests and nuns whom they suspected of sympathizing with FRELIMO. In the meantime thousands of whites were demonstrating in the streets, demanding the dismissal of Generals Costa Gomes and Spínola. In Guinea-Bissau, Portuguese military authorities confirmed reports that the PAIGC was successfully shooting down Portuguese planes with their new surface-to-air missiles; rumors abounded that the PAIGC had trained jet pilots who were about to initiate combat missions.<sup>18</sup>

With the metropolitan economy at its nadir, political repression at its apex and the initiative in the "stale-mated" African wars clearly passing back to the nationalists, Caetano's monotonous assurances that the worst was over and everything under control sounded vacuous and demagogic. His insistence on pursuing military victories and refusal to consider political solutions now sorely tested the patience of many Portuguese and of Portugal's few remaining allies. There seemed to be no way out of the impasse, no "light at the end of the tunnel," no successful challenge to the rigid institutions and orthodoxies which were dragging the nation down. The appearance of General Spínola's now celebrated

book, *Portugal and the Future*, couldn't have been more opportune.

### The General Sets the Battlelines

General António de Spínola was no stranger to controversy nor limited to military concerns when he published *Portugal and the Future* on February 22, 1974. In the early sixties, volunteering for duty in Angola almost immediately after the war broke out there, he not only quickly distinguished himself as one of the few upper echelon Portuguese officers who would lead his troops into battle, he also became known for taking strong stands against the white settlers who attempted to illegally expropriate African lands; he even threatened to arrest one of the most powerful white settler leaders in Angola.

Named Governor General in Guinea in May 1968, Spínola quickly undertook drastic reforms in an attempt to correct the centuries of Portuguese neglect of the African population. Within a year he was expressing his conviction throughout the Portuguese media that the war would never be won on the battlefield.<sup>19</sup> Although he repeated this theme throughout his five years in Guinea, few members of the cabinet ever understood his reasoning. Convinced that he could triumph if Portugal would support his "counter social revolution" in Guinea, he told a South African journalist in 1971 that the war has "moved from the field of arms to the sphere of ideas, to the ideology of the mobilization of the masses. . . ." <sup>20</sup> As his thinking on guerrilla warfare approached that of his brilliant counterpart in the PAIGC, the late Amílcar Cabral, his speeches in Guinea began to sound as though Cabral himself had written them. (One member of the PAIGC jokingly observed that the only difference between Cabral's and Spínola's speeches was that the latter added "under the Portuguese flag" at the end.) Although Spínola had been more successful than any other Portuguese general in Africa since the wars began, he was suddenly (and unexpectedly, at least to the general public) relieved of command in 1973. He reportedly remarked to a friend, "they didn't even let me say goodbye to the people."

Upon his return to Portugal in September, Spínola immediately attempted to engender metropolitan support for his political and military ideas. Within two months he had published a book entitled *Por una Portugalidade renovada* (Toward a Renewed Portuguese Civilization) in which he more or less flirted with the themes which were to make his next book the biggest seller in Portuguese history (over

200,000 copies were sold in a month). The liberal press praised the book vociferously, and called for Spínola to push harder: "Many people hope that the General will further advance" his ideas.<sup>21</sup> *Portugal and the Future* was his answer.

Other individuals had tried over the years to bring the colonial question into the public sphere but none had sufficient prestige and strength nor were the objective conditions suitable for an individual to make such a major impact and survive the inevitable governmental retribution. But by February 1974, António de Spínola was the most highly decorated general in Portugal and the most charismatic "political" figure in Lisbon; as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Portuguese military he had the position and power required to bring his disagreement with the government directly to the people. Furthermore, he knew his book would not be suppressed easily since the publishing house, Arcádia, was owned by none other than the giant conglomerate CUF!

Caetano dismissed Spínola as Deputy Chief of Staff (and the Chief of Staff, Costa Gomes, who supported Spínola) less than a month after the book was published. The action merely served to increase national and international interest in Spínola's ideas and consequently enhanced his prestige. It became obvious that the government could not continue its condemnation of his solutions for Portugal's future without the risk of tearing Portuguese society apart.

The ideas expressed in *Portugal and the Future* are neither revolutionary nor unique but they did have a cataclysmic effect on the country. The book begins with a detailed analysis of how the African wars paralyzed Portugal's economy, contributed to a catastrophic exodus of over fifteen percent of the population, stifled desperately needed political and social reforms, and perpetuated in office those individuals who were "guided by a thirst for glory and honor."<sup>22</sup> Lashing out at the officials who continued to advance sterile explanations of the wars which blamed everyone but themselves, Spínola remonstrated,

*We do not deny the authenticity of the past, but we support the evidence of an error in understanding the African phenomenon [of nationalism] . . . the very national survival will be put to a test if we persist in the idea that it is world public opinion that is wrong and that all our problems result merely from the faulty vision and avarice of others. . . . the fact is that the origin*

*of the situation is very diverse and basically resides in an ignorance of the basis of the problem which was not confronted in time. And, upon further analysis of the fundamentals, we must recognize that again we did not do what we should have, when we should have.*<sup>23</sup>

Spínola tried to fill the enormous void in the Portuguese political spectrum between those who "feared evolutionary formulas" and those whose revolutionary principles "could lead to the disintegration of the country." His criticism of the past ultimately captured the support of all but a handful of extremists on the left and the right. There was far less unanimity over his proposed solutions for decolonization, however. In essence he was prepared to grant self-determination to the colonies but not total independence; the colonies could manage their own affairs according to their own patterns but within a greater Portuguese Federation in which Lisbon would continue to exercise control over defense, foreign relations and financial matters. At least at the time he published his book, Spínola felt Portugal could not survive if totally severed from her African colonies, arguing that a Portuguese presence in Africa was "a requisite for our survival as a free and independent nation. Without the African territories, the country would be reduced to a small corner in a growing Europe with no potential trump to play in its favor in the concert of nations."<sup>24</sup> Not surprisingly, all of the major nationalist parties immediately rejected Spínola's plan for decolonization; within the metropole, it was also attacked from all sides of the spectrum--from Caetano and Tomás to the Portuguese Socialist Party, all groups left of that party and the Armed Forces Movement.

Unable to ignore the furor stirred up by the General's book, Caetano opted to make his stand from the far right and on March 5, 1974, he used the National Assembly as the forum where he would take the hardest position he had yet manifested against the opposition in Portugal.<sup>25</sup> In his speech he not only rejected Spínola's political solution to the African wars, he declared mere discussion of the colonial question illegal, arguing that the country had indicated its support of his policies by electing him in 1969 and there was therefore no possible reason for debate of the policy after its implementation. Directly responding to Spínola's notion of encouraging self-determination in the colonies, Caetano admonished that it made no sense because "the majority of these people have not gone beyond the state of tribal organization" and that "it makes even less sense to rely on the popular will according to an individualistic formula--

one man (or one woman), one vote." He went on to completely disassociate the war from Portugal's economic and social problems, blaming the inflation on Europe and the United States, and claiming that the defense of the colonies had actually been a stimulus to national development. In his March 5th speech and in the others which followed, Caetano made it patently clear that there was simply no hope for evolutionary change within his regime--he made this clear to the press, to the students, and to the military, beginning a series of military purges, dismissing Generals Costa Gomes and António de Spínola on March 14, 1974, and proceeding to the arrest of some of their colleagues.

### The Coup and the Junta of National Salvation

Américo Tomás, the 79-year-old President who had never been more than a figurehead only appearing in public on ceremonial occasions, took time off from his ribbon-cutting duties to become actively involved in the political machinations of the country.<sup>26</sup> Already concerned about the deepening divisions in the military, he grew even more alarmed over the growing defections of big business to the Spínola camp. Newspapers began to report (until cut by the censors in late March) frequent meetings between Tomás, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, and Admiral Tenreiro. These activities signalled the junior military officers that the time was right for carrying out the plans drafted before the appearance of *Portugal and the Future*.

In early March the captains and majors circulated an underground document, *The Armed Forces and the Nation*, in which their analysis of the country's problems is similar to Spínola's and in which they call for an immediate political end to the African wars. Scorning Spínola's idea of a Federation as an unacceptable "Gaullist" solution, they demanded immediate independence for the colonies. Although they disagreed with the General in this regard, they were pragmatic enough to recognize his plans as being infinitely preferable to those of Caetano or Arriaga and decided that if Spínola did come to power the dynamics of the colonial situation would obviate any possibility of ending the wars through a federal solution.

After a false start on March 16, the captains and majors met again on April 4 to make certain their next attempt would be better coordinated and executed and to set the date. The precision with which they carried out the coup on April 25 erased any doubts as to their ability at organization and planning. At appointed hours soldiers appeared

with machine guns atop key buildings in Lisbon while armored columns from regiments in and around Lisbon and Porto arrived at preselected spots. Within hours it was over; Prime Minister Marcello Caetano formally relinquished control of the Portuguese Government to General António de Spínola, the man who had set the battlelines yet had not been involved in either the planning or execution of the actual coup.

Not a great deal is known about the backgrounds and ideology of the dozen or so captains and majors who formed the Armed Forces Movement's Coordinating Committee. All are career officers between the ages of thirty and forty with one or more tours of duty in Africa. Some were involved in the infamous "Goan debacle" which left a cloud over their heads for not having properly defended the "fatherland" during India's lightning seizure of Goa in December 1961. Some are also said to be Freemasons, a membership which Salazar had outlawed in 1934 because of its association with liberal causes before and after the establishment of the *Estado Novo*.<sup>27</sup>

The day of the coup, the Coordinating Committee named a seven-man Junta (the Junta of National Salvation) to lead the country until a provisional government could be selected.<sup>28</sup> Although generally remaining in the background, the Coordinating Committee did not yield full control to the Junta. During the first week in May one of the captains on the Committee stressed that power rested with the Armed Forces Movement; their establishment of offices in the Defense Ministry's Operations Room as well as next door to Spínola's executive suite in the official Belém residence appears to confirm their claim. They also emphasized that while they chose the Junta's members for their honesty and independence from the previous regime, any member (e.g., Spínola) who offered solutions for the end of the wars did so not in any official capacity but as an individual; the final resolution of the colonial problem would come from the people in free and open elections.<sup>29</sup>

Shortly after being installed, the Junta of National Salvation abolished censorship, released political prisoners, allowed the formation of independent labor unions, invited exiled communist and socialist leaders to return to Portugal, retired a number of upper echelon right wing military officers, encouraged the formation of political parties, fired the Governor Generals in the colonies, announced the intention to hold free elections within a year, exiled Caetano and Tomás along with a handful of other reactionary politicians, and--in their most popular act of all--abolished

the hated secret police (PIDE or DGS), putting over a thousand former PIDE/DGS agents in prison. Finally, on May 15, the Junta announced the members of the Provisional Government which is to exist until next year's open elections.

### The Provisional Leaders and Political Parties

The Junta named a left of center cabinet which includes two members of the Portuguese Communist Party, Avelino Gonçalves as Minister of Labor and Álvaro Cunhal as Minister without Portfolio; and three members of the Portuguese Socialist Party, Mário Soares as Foreign Minister, Raul Rego as Minister of Social Communication, and Francisco Salgado Zenha as Minister of Justice--during the last decade all five of these men spent time in Portuguese prisons. The brilliant economist, Francisco Pereira de Moura, who had been fired from Lisbon University and imprisoned for his attendance at a church service where the priest attacked the colonial wars, was also named Minister without Portfolio. A number of the cabinet members are active in SEDES, whose economic proposals for Portugal's future clearly favor socialist solutions. Also closely allied with the socialists is the new Minister of Interterritorial Communications (formerly the Colonial Ministry), António de Almeida Santos, a lawyer from Mozambique long associated with the opposition and respected for his past defense of many FRELIMO members and sympathizers. The new Prime Minister Adelino da Palma Carlos, and six other cabinet members can be considered independents; and one member, Gonçalo Ribeiro Telles, belongs to the Monarchist Convergence (Convergência Monárquica), the furthest left of the various monarchist parties.<sup>30</sup>

Since the coup more than fifty political parties have emerged or re-emerged throughout Portugal, nearly all of them located somewhere between center and left on the political spectrum.<sup>31</sup> In spite of the fact that fifty distinct political positions do not truly exist among the fifty parties, even more parties are appearing as splinter groups are born from intra-party divisions over personality and/or ideology. For example, thus far there are at least five socialist parties, yet a large number of socialists belong to parties that are not among those five.

During the first month following the coup no parties on the ultra right had as yet appeared, although General Kaulza de Arriaga was considering the "hypothesis" of founding a right of center party.<sup>32</sup> A number of the positions of the Portuguese Federalist Movement (MFP), under the leadership of the political maverick Pacheco de Amorim,

could place it right of center.

One of the interesting myths widely embraced by the international press proclaims "the communists" as the strongest party in Portugal. However, since its founding in 1921, the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) has suffered innumerable splits, most of which have paralleled the international divisions in communist movements but some also caused by the exiling of various members throughout the party's history. In 1962 some exiled members of the PCP joined in a loose coalition with socialists, liberals, progressive monarchists, and Christian-Democrats to form the FPLN (Patriotic Front of National Liberation) in Algiers. Within Portugal the first major schism since the colonial wars began occurred in 1964 when, following the pattern of most of the world's communist parties, a pro-Chinese wing broke away to form the CMLP (Portuguese Marxist-Leninist Committee). That same year the FPLN communists also split over the Sino-Soviet dispute, which led to the creation of the FAP (Front of Popular Action), oriented toward China and dedicated to armed action against the Salazar regime. In 1970 two new parties were born: dissident PCP members, accusing the Party of "dogmatism" and "revisionism," split away to create the MRPP (Movement to Reorganize the Party of the Proletariat); and CMLP members living outside Portugal broke from their party to form the Communist Party of Portugal (M.L.). In 1971 another split occurred among the communists who had remained in the FPLN and the Revolutionary Brigades was formed. Again in 1973 two more parties emerged: the OCMLP (Marxist-Leninist Organization of Portugal) largely resulted from the 1970 CMLP schism; and the PRP (Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat) was born from still another split among the FPLN communists.

After the coup the PRP was one of the only parties on the extreme left which did not immediately support the Junta of National Salvation.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the PCP--which remains oriented toward Moscow--has cooperated closely with the new regime since its inception and has been severely attacked by most of the radical parties for its appeals to workers to halt the rash of wildcat strikes which have hampered the government's early efforts to stabilize the economy. The animosities surrounding the divisions among the parties on the extreme left are deep and, if they persist, may dilute their strength in the national election scheduled for the spring of 1975. Not unexpectedly, most of the Portuguese newspapers have been appealing for an amalgamation of parties so that the voters will eventually be able to make coherent choices.

Self-Determination, Independence, or More Bloodshed  
in the Colonies?

In the turbulent months preceding the coup, most discussion of decolonization centered around the "Spínola Plan" for extending self-determination to a multiracial "third force" within each colony. Cognizant of the practical non-existence of such third forces, the General called for massive infusions of aid to initiate the major reforms required in the political, economic and administrative sectors for the advancement of the Africans. Without this immediate and dramatic aid for advancing the Africans, it would be impossible to create the multiracial parties which Spínola believed to be the best mediators between two existing extremes--the white settlers who were considering a Rhodesian style independence and the African nationalists who were fighting the Portuguese. He hoped that an unequivocal manifestation of Portugal's moral and material commitments to the rapid advancement of the African populations would cause the nationalists to lay down their arms and return home as participants in the building of new countries. And if this didn't work, he believed then that the nationalists would eventually have to fight the multiracial third forces--whom he was sure would want to protect their new stake in their countries--rather than metropolitan military forces.

A careful analysis of this plan, however, brings one to the conclusion that it would be yet another example of Portugal's trying to do too little too late. It would take decades, if not generations, to eradicate the profound educational and economic disparities extant between whites and blacks in the colonies. Moreover, present-day race relations in the Portuguese African colonies are the product of five centuries of unmitigated racial exploitation. In spite of the romantic image --held both within Portugal and in a part of the outside world--of the Portuguese as non-racists, the greatest obstacle to the formation of representative multiracial parties actually rests with the white settlers. The nationalists on the other hand have always been committed to multiracial solutions, giving practical demonstrations of their commitment through the racial composition of their own movements (e.g., MPLA and FRELIMO).

Within days of the coup it was apparent that nearly all of the Portuguese and a large number of Angolans and Mozambicans considered Spínola's plan too restrictive to lead to a permanent (and satisfactory) settlement of the wars. FRELIMO's response to the Junta--which basically summed up the reaction of all of the nationalists and a growing number of Africans,

mestiços, and whites in the colonies--was to deny the existence of "liberal fascism" or "democratic colonialism." With few exceptions all of the metropolitan political parties either endorsed "total independence" or demanded that at least it be included among the options presented to the voters. On May 12, three days before his appointment as Minister of Interterritorial Coordination, Dr. António de Almeida Santos published an article in the Mozambican magazine *Tempo* in which he stated that he saw no reason why a plebiscite should exclude the option of independence or even why it was necessary to pass through a transitional stage of self-determination. The Provisional Government immediately adopted his position.

The effect of this rapid evolution of political solutions to the African wars transformed the "Spínola Plan" from a radical to a conservative alternative. In the colonies, with the exception of a few thousand reactionary whites who hoped to maintain white hegemony by emulating their Rhodesian racist counterparts, most of the conservative whites warmly embraced Spínola's multiracial third force as the best solution. For example, the conservative white journalist, Reis Ventura, whose columns in the Luanda newspaper *A Província de Angola* defending the "legitimate interests" of white settlers have infuriated Angolan blacks and mestiços for over a decade, rushed to jump on the Spínola bandwagon: "Given the present state of affairs in Angola, I do not think that any other alternative better defends the legitimate interests of the large mass of its population."<sup>34</sup>

By the end of May, however, the visits from General Costa Gomes (once again Chief of Staff) and Minister Almeida Santos and the start of the London Talks between Foreign Minister Soares and PAIGC representatives convinced increasing numbers of whites in the colonies that Portugal was going to sell them down the drain.<sup>35</sup> More enlightened colonial whites, recognizing the impending reality of independence, decided to join front organizations which were openly running interference for the nationalists--such as the pressure group "Mozambican Democrats" which is campaigning vociferously for FRELIMO's becoming the next government of Mozambique.

Because of the vast differences among Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, the Lisbon regime will not be able to devise a single solution for decolonization. It is useful, therefore, to discuss the decolonization of each colony separately and in the light of three important variables: (1) number and role of whites; (2) effectiveness

of the nationalists' military threat; (3) number and position of the Africans in the modern sector.

### Guinea-Bissau

For the past eleven years, Guinea has been Portugal's albatross. Since the first day of the war in 1963--when the Portuguese Defense Minister announced that the nationalists controlled fifteen percent of the territory--the PAIGC has expanded its influence until they have effectively denied control to the Portuguese today over most of Guinea's rural areas. Since Guinea has never attracted white settlers, most of the two thousand whites presently living there (excluding the military) are administrators and small shopkeepers, few of whom consider Guinea their homeland. For decades Africans have occupied middle-range positions in the administration and army, in part because of the relative absence of whites and, more recently, because of Spínola's reforms during his tenure as Governor General. CUF, one of the only major Portuguese companies with economic interests in Guinea, has made very little money there and now favors self-determination.

The *only* reason for Portugal's sacrificing thousands of lives and spending hundreds of millions of dollars to stay in Guinea has been her fear that a withdrawal would undermine her ideological justification for remaining in Africa; the Portuguese version of the domino theory held that once Guinea went, so would Angola and Mozambique. Within the new context of decolonization set in motion by the Junta and the Provisional Government, that justification is no longer relevant.

Mario Soares' first act as Portugal's Foreign Minister was to make a series of trips--including to Senegal at President Senghor's invitation--preparatory to entering negotiations with the PAIGC as quickly as possible. Within ten days after the establishment of the Provisional Government, Soares attended the first negotiating session with the PAIGC in London; by the end of the first week of talks the Portuguese press was speculating that the successful conclusion of those negotiations was in sight. With all the major interested parties (possibly excluding the Fula people who have collaborated so closely with the colonial regime and its armed forces) desirous of a speedy Portuguese withdrawal, Guinea-Bissau should be independent within the coming months.

## Mozambique

The impact of the coup has perhaps been the most startling in Mozambique, where pre-1974 prospects for a majority ruled independent country seemed the most pessimistic in spite of FRELIMO's more recent gains on the battlefield. Almost immediately after the reactionary civilian and military authorities were replaced, Africans began to hold large demonstrations in Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique, calling for independence. Seizing on their new right to organize labor unions, they instituted a number of strikes for higher wages, those who had been earning barely \$1.25/day demanding up to a ten-fold increase in their salaries. The release over a period of weeks of approximately 4,000 political prisoners from Mozambican jails injected a good number of FRELIMO members and sympathizers into the political arena. In almost a symbolic action within the new liberal atmosphere, the Africans marched through white neighborhoods in Lourenço Marques and in Mozambique's second largest city, Beira, carrying signs and shouting slogans to indicate their desire for independence.

The reaction of the nearly 220,000 whites in Mozambique has been varied. Although some whites, panicked by the sudden displays of confidence and strength among the Africans, held counter-demonstrations, their manifestations were in support of retaining ties with the metropole. The rapid transition of events appeared to have pulled the rug out from under the white separatists who had been assumed for so long to favor a UDI along Rhodesian lines. A variety of factors have made the position of the white separatists rather tenuous. Besides lacking any pre- or post-coup official support from Lisbon, the backing they expected from Rhodesia and South Africa, which have contiguous borders with Mozambique, has thus far not materialized; these two white racist regimes appear to be avoiding alienating Lisbon and are remaining nervously silent while watching events unfold. The Africanization of the Portuguese army in Mozambique, believed to have included nearly sixty percent of the pre-coup army, precludes the use of that army by the white separatists. They were also nearly immediately deprived of the forceful assistance they might have received from the secret police when the new regime quickly dismantled the PIDE/DGS. Their main political party is FICO (Front for Independence and Continuity with the West, whose acronym in Portuguese means "I am staying") which, although holding several demonstrations including one in Lourenço Marques on May 5 which attracted approximately 5,000 whites, has not developed a strong organization. Another smaller white

settler party, the Union of Mozambique, was ideologically indistinguishable from FICO and finally merged with it. By mid-May front page newspaper headlines declared that white independence efforts were no longer a threat to Mozambique.<sup>36</sup> While it may be premature to rule out a white attempt to seize power, the objective conditions do not favor their success without massive outside aid.

The majority of whites in Mozambique appear to favor a multiracial third force, which would retain links with Lisbon, rather than either a FRELIMO-controlled government or a white separatist regime. Initially they manifested their support for the multiracial party GUMO (United Group of Mozambique), recognized by Caetano this past February as a legitimate lobby--an event which has been a source of both strength and weakness for the party. Led by Máximo Dias--a mestiço lawyer--as President, Joana Simião as Vice-President, and Jorge Abreu--a wealthy white settler--as Secretary, GUMO was the most organized party, excepting FRELIMO, in Mozambique at the time of the coup. Their first meeting in Lourenço Marques which attracted over 30,000 people, nearly all Africans, erupted in violence; the repetition of this pattern in most of the meetings held since then throughout the country has frightened away many of the more moderate whites. GUMO's detractors have seized upon its earlier recognition by Caetano to brand it and its members as "collaborators with the fascists." Because of its support for progressive autonomy rather than immediate independence, it has also been labeled a "neo-colonial vehicle" desirous of perpetuating the economic groups which colonized the country. While these accusations are undoubtedly exaggerated, especially in view of Joana Simião's repeated affirmations of seeing no major differences between her goals and those of FRELIMO, once Spínola's plan lost its currency and total independence became a legitimate option, GUMO was overtaken by events, seemingly out of touch with the times. Presently, it appears to be in a competitive situation with FRELIMO and those groups which support FRELIMO, which may well be GUMO's downfall.

Another multiracial force, the Mozambican Democrats, began as a party but quickly changed to a pressure group. Led by liberal lawyers and other professionals, and in collaboration with a large number of students in the "Academic Association" at the University of Lourenço Marques, they announced that their complete identification with FRELIMO's program for Mozambique precluded their being a political party. In late May one of their leaders, Adrião Rodrigues (a white socialist lawyer), declared that since FRELIMO's

political program is supported by a majority of the Mozambican people, it offers the best hope for creating a progressive multiracial government; he further asserted that the Mozambique Democrats would not collaborate with the present regime, preferring to await the arrival of "those who will form the future cabinet" of an independent Mozambican government. The work of Sansão Mutembe, a militant FRELIMO supporter who was appointed the new director of Mozambique's national radio station, Voz de Mozambique (the Voice of Mozambique), exemplifies the desire of the Mozambique Democrats to facilitate FRELIMO's return through pressure group activities.<sup>37</sup>

Of the numerous parties which emerged in Mozambique, two others should be mentioned. One is MIMO (Movement for the Independence of Mozambique), created initially as a response to FICO and whose young technocrat membership is demanding direct negotiations with the nationalists and immediate independence. The other party, the "Commercial, Agricultural, and Industrial Association of Niassa," is apparently trying to take advantage of traditional ethnic rivalries between the Makondes, who are heavily represented in FRELIMO, and the Macuas, the largest ethnic group in Mozambique with an estimated population of three million in 1970. They have called themselves "the only ethnic group profoundly rooted in Mozambique," and have declared that no solution can be reached without the Macua, "the traditional enemies of the Makonde." They have also asked that the capital be moved from Lourenço Marques to Nampula, the heart of Macua country.<sup>38</sup>

Although FRELIMO is not the only nationalist organization fighting for Mozambique independence, neither COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique) nor MOLIMO (Movement for the Liberation of Mozambique) has ever constituted a serious military threat to the Portuguese forces nor established meaningful roots among the Africans. On the other hand, since it began fighting in 1964, FRELIMO has not only expanded its zones of military operations, it has also made spectacular gains in politicizing civilian Africans and has attracted numerous white sympathizers. Politically and militarily FRELIMO has created a situation in which no resolution of the war can be contemplated without its concurrence. The existence, therefore, of one major force with whom the Portuguese government will have to deal and with whom most black and some white Mozambicans can identify, greatly facilitates the decolonization process for Mozambique.

Near the end of May, the Minister of Interterritorial Coordination, Almeida Santos, constituted a one-man "Pearce Commission" (the Commission sent by Great Britain in 1972 to determine African opinion in Rhodesia), visiting Mozambique and Angola to sound out local opinion on the future of the two colonies. Over two hundred groups asked to meet with the Minister during his seventy-two hours in Mozambique and although he made no attempt to summarize his findings before leaving, he did tell a group of Africans shortly before his departure not to worry because "your own brothers are coming to govern you." Other reports indicate that he expects Mozambique to be independent within a year.<sup>39</sup> If and when this is realized, there is little doubt in Lisbon or Lourenço Marques that FRELIMO will form the core of an independent Mozambique.

### Angola

Of Portugal's three African wars, the first broke out in Angola in 1961, yet Angola may be the last of the three colonies to taste the fruits of independence. The largest of Portugal's colonies and the richest in natural resources, it is not surprising that Angola has the largest white population, most of whom are poor, conservative, and racist.<sup>40</sup> The nationalists' military threat is the weakest and most fragmented within the three colonial wars and the combined forces of more than 60,000 Portuguese troops, 30,000 Angolan militia, over 1,000 full-time agents of the secret police, and tens of thousands of part-time paid police informers have greatly assisted the ultra conservative administration to keep the lid on in Angola. In fact, General Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future*, was not available in Angolan bookstores until *after* the coup.<sup>41</sup>

Initially, Angola's top civilian and military authorities defied the Junta's order to relinquish power, leading to fears that Governor General Santos Castro might yet try to challenge Lisbon. However, on April 27 he issued a communiqué announcing his suspension, then surrendered to the army. Censorship of the media was slow to exit and many of the institutions (e.g., the Legislative Assembly) which were blatant symbols of the old regime continued to function almost as though nothing had happened. Less than a week after the coup the return to Angola of São José Lopes, the hated former chief of the Angolan secret police, heightened the already discernible tension within the country.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, by the end of the first week in May, less than half of Angola's estimated 20,000 political prisoners had been released.

On May 5 when an estimated 30,000 Africans attended a multiracial party meeting in Lourenço Marques, only a handful of Africans could be found among the 5,000 participants in a similar "multiracial" party meeting in Luanda, Angola's capital. Enlightened whites, anxious about the absence of meaningful black participation in Angola's pseudo-multiracial parties, publicly despaired that the Africans were too frightened to even appear on the streets, let alone participate. Not only did Africans not attend political rallies, they were largely absent from union meetings--called to discuss their future wages and working conditions--although they numerically dominated those unions.<sup>43</sup>

The heavy pall of terror, reminiscent of March 1961 when blacks and whites slaughtered each other by the thousands, seemed to be hovering over Angola once again. Both "sides" began to arm themselves and the newspapers daily reported armed assaults. The notorious OPVDCA militia, long considered a potential military arm for the white settlers should they attempt to seize power, was not disbanded as Africans and enlightened whites were asking; instead it held ceremonies and parades in the central highland district of Bié, further exacerbating the Africans' fears. On May 14 a white radio commentator, either anxious to precipitate a bloodbath or callously insensitive to the tension around him, announced that the Africans had bought up all of the available machetes and would attack whites as soon as instructions were received from Radio Brazzaville. This rumor spread quickly until it was widely believed that the Africans were planning to slaughter white school children the following day.<sup>44</sup> Whites rushed out to buy more arms and everyone braced for the attack.

On May 10 the African National League (LNA) held its first open meeting since 1957 in Luanda when the government had taken over this more than fifty year old African association. At the meeting, the Government appointed LNA leaders were removed.<sup>45</sup> With the exception of this meeting, none of the more than thirty political parties which sprang up in Angola appeared to attract any sizeable African following. While nearly all of these parties proclaimed themselves the best guarantor of African interests, most of them clearly represented little more than the egos or narrow ethnic interests of their founders.<sup>46</sup>

The first disturbing sign in the formation of the Angolan parties was the reappearance of a number of disreputable (Bakongo)politicians--such as Angelino Alberto, Jean Pierre M'Bala, and Francisco Lele--who had broken away from

Holden Roberto's UPA in 1960-61 and had established narrow, divisive parties whose later infamous collaboration with the Portuguese army and secret police will always remain a source of embarrassment and shame to the cause of Angolan nationalism.<sup>47</sup> Some of these leaders had been arrested in the mid-1960s by their former Portuguese allies and sent to the São Nicolau prison; this may have been fortuitous, however, since it now provides them with a "prison degree" which has been interpreted in some circles as bona fide nationalist credentials. The prison degree may not be enough for M'Bala, however, since his leadership of MDIA has been challenged by João Paulo in widely reported (in Angolan newspapers) accusations and counter-accusations of collaboration with the fascists--this time the São Nicolau prison officials.

Some parties emerged under the leadership of mestiços whose prior collaboration with the Portuguese in the publication of Portuguese versions of Angolan history gave them dubious credentials for their claims to be Angolan "nationalists." It hardly seemed possible, for example, that Carlos Alberto Lopes Cardoso, president of the newly formed Workers Party of Angolan Salvation, could be the same individual who, in 1968 Angolan newspapers, accused the mid-nineteenth century assimilated Bakongo prince, Dom Nicolau, of "treason" for the latter's affirmations of loyalty to his own (Bakongo) people rather than to the Portuguese (whom Dom Nicolau attacked for having undermined and corrupted Bakongo culture and the dignity of Africans in general).<sup>48</sup>

In early May, it was announced that the "people of Cabinda" (Cabinda is an oil rich enclave in Zaire) had formed the Democratic Party of Cabinda Peoples, unabashedly created to keep any non-Cabindan out of Cabinda's affairs. In a telegram sent to the Junta on May 6, they argued that:

*The People of Cabinda can not allow the direct or indirect intervention of any of the political parties into issues which rest solely with Cabindans, [and any] intervention will be considered illicit and, as such, repudiated by all of the sons of Makongo, Mangoyo and Malungo.*<sup>49</sup>

UAPAM (African Union of Angolan and Mozambican Peoples), one of the avowedly pro-white settler parties, has claimed that it "represents the only buffers of European civilization to impede Communist domination" and has also announced that they intend to make an "intransigent defense of what we built and that which belongs to us."<sup>50</sup> The "Monarchy Cause," another party whose appeal is largely to whites, has asked the Junta

to give preference in Angola to those who have "graduated from our high schools and universities," which would effectively eliminate many of the nationalists who were trained abroad. In an interesting twist, this party is appealing for the immediate return of legitimate African lands illegally conceded to whites while also advocating the passage of a law which would legally recognize the validity of land concessions made before the abolition of slavery. Such a law would conveniently cover the period when the Monarchy controlled the affairs of Angola. The Monarchy Cause has also registered a strong protest against "certain parties which call for immediate independence of the Overseas Territories which are stupidly given the name of colonies."<sup>51</sup>

The Popular Movement for Angolan Unity is one of the only multiracial parties which claims to have branches in all of Angola's districts and which is asking for immediate negotiations and collaboration with the three major African nationalist movements fighting in Angola.<sup>52</sup> Partially because of the plethora of political parties and the lack of widespread support for any one of them, increasing numbers of Angolans are looking to the nationalist movements, especially the MPLA, to fill the need for meaningfully progressive, multiracial representation to lead the country to independence.

The internal divisions within the MPLA (especially during the summer of 1973), partially responsible for reducing MPLA-initiated military actions against the Portuguese in 1973 to approximately one-third of the previous year, had caused its supporters to become more critical of the party. However, the MPLA has emerged with new strength and a strong internal appeal; its multiracial composition and the cosmopolitan orientation of its leadership have proved to be an important trump card in post-coup Angola. The more appealing image of the MPLA must be largely attributed to the many speeches and interviews given after April 25 by its highly competent and articulate leader, Dr. Agostinho Neto.<sup>53</sup> His and the party's emphasis on a multiracial orientation is exemplified in an unprecedented interview of Neto in the Lisbon weekly, *Expresso*, which appeared on the front page of the May 4th edition. When asked what he meant by the term "our people," Neto responded:

*Obviously when I say "our people," they are all those who were born in Angola and who consider themselves Angolans. That is: the blacks . . . who are traditionally considered Africans and Angolans and the whites who have been on our continent and in our country for five centuries. Therefore, these are our people.*

He later added that:

*For the MPLA, the existence of a large white community in Angola never constituted a problem in itself since our movement is in essence antiracist. Proof of this is the fact that a good number of whites fight in the MPLA. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is ready to give every guarantee for the continuity of a white population in Angola, provided that all the country's inhabitants submit to the laws and supreme interests of the independent Angolan State.*

Both UNITA and GRAE, the MPLA's major rivals among the nationalist movements, would appear to be at a great disadvantage at this juncture given their almost exclusive appeal to Africans. On May 7, UNITA announced the conditions under which it would negotiate with Portugal. It appears that only the condition of Portugal's immediate military withdrawal could hamper talks. Holden Roberto announced days after the coup that his movement, GRAE, would continue the armed struggle "until their right to self-determination was victorious"; in a later interview with *Jeune Afrique* (11 May) he declared that armed struggle was not the only way for Angola, adding that he did not exclude the possibility of negotiating with Portugal under the condition that Portugal recognized the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence.<sup>54</sup>

One month after the coup, Minister Almeida Santos, visiting Angola as part of his fact finding tour of the colonies, asked all Angolans to appear in front of the Governor's Palace on May 26 to show him how they felt about the future of Angola. To the great surprise of many, thousands of Africans appeared at their first major public gathering in Angola in decades. Many carried signs which favored the MPLA; and all of their shouts left no doubt in Almeida Santos' mind that they favored independence. He told the crowd that "If the majority of the Angolan population wants independence for Angola, Angola shall have its independence." A number of the whites formed a counter-demonstration after the Africans had dispersed, verbally attacking his (and the Provisional Government's) position at the airport when the Minister departed for Lisbon, shouting slogans such as "Viva Caetano" and "Viva PIDE."<sup>55</sup> Once again, the capital was filled with racial tension, but this time the Africans appeared to be confident and the ultra-conservative whites seemed almost desperate. One member of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed

Forces Movement, assigned as the Movement's official representative on the staff of the Commanding General, Franco Pinheiro, argued after the demonstrations that he thought the danger from white extremists was greater than that from the black militants.<sup>56</sup>

### Conclusion

Within a matter of weeks, political events in Lisbon have completely transformed the prospects for the future of Portugal's three African colonies: from the last gasps of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, vowing that Lisbon would never consider extending self-determination to the colonies, to General Spínola's declarations that he favored self-determination but not total independence, and finally to Almeida Santos' and the Provisional Government's acceptance of the legitimacy (and right) of total independence for the colonies. Whether or not the colonies are to be independent will be an issue decided by the people within a year; but it has still not been determined who "the people" are. While the present political parties in Angola, and to a lesser extent in Mozambique, do not appear representative of the majority of the inhabitants, the debate which has already begun over who will have the right to vote should provide a clear picture of the strength of the various forces. The reactionary white settlers will continue to argue that only those who are "qualified" should be allowed to vote. In the last election, October 1973, the "qualifications" (which included literacy requirements for voter registration) meant that only two percent of the Mozambicans and eleven percent of the Angolans were allowed to register.<sup>57</sup> Africans will also continue to argue strongly that a vote on the vital question of the future status of the colonies would be meaningless unless *all of the people* are allowed to participate. The struggle over this issue will be extremely difficult, but it is hard to envision the Provisional Government, which has demonstrated such wisdom, foresight and exemplary behavior during its first month in office, opting for any solution which does not have the full support of the majority of the people in the colonies.

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### Footnotes

1. This table is adapted from Banco Nacional Ultramarino, *Boletim Trimestral*, no. 19 (July/September 1972), chart 7, p. 34.
2. In Greece, on the other hand, the one percent of the total number of farm holdings encompass less than 20% of the arable land. If one looks at the converse--what percent of the land is held by 95% of all farmholdings--the comparative percentages in Portugal and Greece are respectively 32% and 80%! These figures compiled by the OCED can be found in *Expresso*, 25 May 1974. According to a study of Portuguese agriculture for the OCED by Henrique de Barros, 82.5% of all agricultural holdings in Portugal are less than twelve acres. Cited in *Comércio do Funchal* (Madeira), 23 November 1972.
3. For a complete breakdown of the differences in value and percentage of major products exported between 1960 and 1973, see *Expresso* (Lisbon), 13 April 1974.
4. For discussions of the impact of this decree, see *Vida Mundial* (Lisbon), no. 1679 (13 August 1971) and *Notícias de Portugal* (Lisbon), vol. 25, no. 1267 (14 August 1971). Some indications of the benefits of this decree for Angolan exporters can be found in Michael Chapman's article, "Development Projects to Help the Farmer," *Financial Times* (London), 6 May 1974.
5. See *Expresso*, 4 May 1974, p. 24.
6. Francisco Pereira da Fonseca, "A evolução e perspectivas das exportações de vinhos para as províncias ultramarinas," speech reported in *Diário de Notícias* (Lisbon), 13 June 1969.
7. See *A Capital* (Lisbon), 4 April 1972 and *Financial Times* (London), 13 April 1972.
8. *Expresso*, 20 April 1974.
9. For example, see Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 26.

10. Adapted from *Província da Guiné, Prospectiva do desenvolvimento económico e social da Guiné* (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1972), charts 3 and 4, pp. 36-37.
11. See, for example, Caetano's speech to the National Assembly, 5 March 1974.
12. For a review of these congresses see Manuel Belchior, *Os Congressos do Povo da Guiné* (Lisbon: Editora Arcádia, 1973), pp. 11-118.
13. See *Notícias de Portugal*, vol. 27, no. 1362 (9 June 1973), pp. 11 and 15.
14. UN Document A/AC/109/L.921 (28 February 1974), pp. 9-10; also see *Financial Times* (London), 3 January 1974.
15. Quoted in *Expresso*, 4 May 1974, p. 3.
16. In a recent interview Joana Simião explained that her association with COREMO was more of an accident than a commitment to that nationalist organization. *Seara Nova* (Lisbon), no. 1542 (April 1974), pp. 12-16. A number of interesting aspects of her background are brought out in this interview.
17. When asked why she held her press conference, she responded:

"People have to be informed, don't they? I gave one in Lourenço Marques before leaving for Europe and I thought that it would be good to also inform people here. It's important, and besides there is a diplomatic corps here and it is necessary for them to know that there are people in Mozambique who know how to solve the problems, because they have ideas" (*ibid.*, p. 16).

For more on the debate between Joana Simião and Gonçalo Mesquitela as well as the reaction by the Portuguese and Mozambique press, see *Comércio do Funchal*, 14 February 1974, p. 2.

18. The Portuguese apparently believed that the PAIGC would be capable of jet attacks, given the large number of anti-aircraft batteries they moved into Guinea in late 1973 and early 1974.

19. For his comments over Portuguese radio and television on 17 September 1969, and an interview with the news agency ANI 21 October 1969, see António de Spínola, *Por uma Guiné melhor* (Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1970), pp. 127-129 and pp. 197-199.
20. Quoted in Al J. Venter, *Portugal's War in Guinea-Bissau* (Pasadena: Munger Africana Library, 1973), p. 186. Also see António de Spínola, *Linha de Acção* (Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1971), pp. 415-428 and *passim*.
21. *Expresso*, 3 November 1973. Also see Raul Rego's comments in *República*, 6 November 1973.
22. António de Spínola, *Portugal e o futuro* (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1974), pp. 19-24 and *passim*.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
25. Marcello Caetano, "Linha do rumo para o Ultramar," *Notícias de Portugal*, no. 140? (9 March 1974), supplement.
26. The Portuguese, who may have no match in the field of political humor, are currently circulating the story that the only way the Junta could convince Tomas to enter the plane (used to send him and Caetano to exile in Madeira) was to give him a pair of scissors and place a ribbon at the door of the plane.
27. Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 48-49.
28. The Junta, in addition to General Spínola, is composed of General Francisco Costa Gomes, General Jaime Silvério Marques, General Carlos Galvão de Melo, Vice-Admiral José Batista Pinheiro de Azevedo, Vice-Admiral António Alva-Rosa Coutinho and Air Force General Manuel Diogo Neto.
29. See *New York Times* and *Washington Post* of 5 May 1974.
30. The names of the members of the cabinet can be found in *Expresso*, 18 May 1974.

31. The May 4 and May 11 issues of *Expresso* contain the background and positions of many of the major parties.
32. The *Expresso* interview with Kaulza de Arriaga was published on 11 May 1974. Three days later under the headline, "A Racist Serves the 'Center-Right'," *República* (14 May 1974) published extracts of Arriaga's "colonial thinking," taken from "O problema estratégico português," *Lições de estratégia do curso de altos comandos-1966/67*, vol. 12, which I referred to earlier in the text. Two of the seven extracts published are:

"We shall only be able to maintain white control in Angola and Mozambique, which is a national objective, if the (white) population grows at a rate which at least accompanies and slightly overpasses the production of assimilated blacks . . ."

"Clearly this brings up another problem: that is that we shall also not be too efficient in the advancement of the blacks; of course we should advance them, but let's not exaggerate."

*República* ended on the following thought:

"It seems to us unnecessary and beyond our competence to comment on such a doctrine. Let the Junta of National Salvation and the Armed Forces Movement comment!"

Two days later the Junta "commented" by firing Kaulza de Arriaga along with 41 other generals.

33. A brief history of the Portuguese Communist Party as well as an extensive interview with Carlos Antunes, one of the leaders of the PRP, can be found in *Expresso*, 11 May 1974. Also see Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 28, 40-41, 208, and 585-586.
34. *A Província de Angola*, 11 May 1974. Other reactionary whites were more skeptical of Spínola's federal solution. Marques Palmeirim, who was the President of the Luanda City Council before the coup, observed that he didn't agree with the Junta's plan to solve the "overseas problem," since he opposed self-determination, let alone independence. Quoted in *O Comércio* (Luanda),

19 May 1974. (*O Comércio*, owned by the Champalimaud banking interests, began publication following the coup and immediately became Angola's most conservative newspaper.)

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Domingos Coelho for having provided scores of Angolan newspapers which were extensively utilized in the preparation of this article.

35. *A Província de Angola* published a letter from one of its readers which vividly expresses this attitude:

"Don't forget that practically all people in the metropole today are against us. . . . Metropolitan political groups, out of ignorance or pure treason, prefer to ignore our truth and are therefore hostile, collaborating with those terrorist groups operating against us" (12 May 1974).

36. See *Expresso*, 18 May 1974.
37. For an extensive interview with Adrião Rodrigues, see *Expresso*, 25 May 1974.
38. Cited in *Expresso*, 18 May 1974.
39. See *New York Times*, 26 May 1974, and *Newsweek*, 3 June 1974, p. 47.
40. The section on Angola is based on a thorough reading of the following Angolan newspapers: *A Província de Angola*, *O Comércio*, and *Diário de Luanda* as well as various issues of several metropolitan newspapers covering the period from April 25 through May 27, 1974.
41. The "official" explanation for *Portugal and the Future* not appearing in Angola was that there were simply no extra copies available in Lisbon. This, however, would not explain how hundreds of copies of the book were sold abroad while none was available to ship to Angola. See *A Província de Angola*, 17 May 1974.
42. São José Lopes was sent to Timor on May 14 on orders from the Junta of National Salvation. *Diário de Luanda*, 15 May 1974.

43. An account of the union meeting of the Commercial and Industrial Employees of Luanda can be found in *A Província de Angola*, 13 May 1974.
44. The commentator, João Aguiar, was imprisoned the following day and the Chief of the Angolan Armed Forces warned that any one who broadcast, published, or spread rumors inciting violence would be arrested. *Diário de Luanda*, 16 May 1974.
45. For further background on the African National League see Douglas L. Wheeler, "Origins of African Nationalism in Angola: Assimilado Protest Writings, 1859-1929," in *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil*, ed. Ronald H. Chilcote (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 67-87; and "A Liga Nacional Africana e os seus empreendimentos: trinta e seis anos de actividade fecunda," *Angola*, vol. 34, no. 172 (January-June 1966), pp. 3-5.
46. Some of these parties are: Associação Cívica Pro-Angola, Frente Democrática da Huíla, Movimento Democrático de Angola, União Nacionalista de Angola, Partido Cristão Democrático de Angola, and Movimento Popular de Unidade Angolana. A few parties seemed to represent absolutely no one other than their founder-- John Bungo's Movimento Popular Africano de Angola.
47. For the most comprehensive and insightful account of the early formation of these parties in 1960 and their collaboration with the Portuguese, see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 90-98, 139, 169-170, 233-235, 286-290 and *passim*.
48. See Carlos Alberto Lopes Cardoso, "A Traição de D. Nicolau de Agua Rosada e Sardonia," in *Tribuna dos Musseques* (Luanda), no. 63, 8 August 1968; also see Lopes Cardoso's "A expansão portuguesa no mundo," *Diário de Luanda*, 28 May 1968. For a penetrating interpretation of D. Nicolau, see Douglas L. Wheeler, "Nineteenth-Century African Protests in Angola: Prince Nicolas of Dongo (1830?-1860)," *African Historical Studies*, vol. 1 (1968), pp. 40-59.
49. The entire text of the telegram can be found in *A Província de Angola*, 11 May 1974 (emphasis in the original).

50. See *A Província de Angola*, 12 May 1974.
51. A text of the telegram sent by the "Causa Monárquica" to General Spínola can be found in *A Província de Angola*, 11 May 1974.
52. On May 18 it was announced that MDIA, NTO/Bako/Angola and the PRPA (Parti de Ressemblément du Peuple Angolais) merged with the Christian Democratic Party (PCDA) in an attempt to legitimize the latter's claim to be multiracial. *Diário de Luanda*, 19 May 1974.
53. See, for example, his speech to the Portuguese Democratic Movement in Montreal (Canada) three days after the fall of the Caetano regime. It would be difficult to accuse him of opportunism or pandering to an almost exclusively white Portuguese audience since many of his multiracial themes were contained in a speech he delivered in Dar es Salaam in February 1974, which is reprinted in this issue of *Ufahamu*. Excerpts of his Montreal speech can be found in *A Província de Angola*, 9 May 1974.
54. See *Summary of World Broadcasts*, 4 May 1974 and *Jewne Afrique*, 11 May 1974.
55. Newspaper reports of this meeting can be found in all of the major Angolan newspapers of 27 May 1974. Also appearing at the meeting as a speaker was Diógenes Boavida, the brother of the late Dr. Américo Boavida, the popular former head of the MPLA medical corps who was slain in a Portuguese bombing attack in eastern Angola in the fall of 1968. In an earlier interview for the newspaper *O Comércio* (21 May 1974) Diógenes' articulate and forceful analysis of past Portuguese denial of African dignity and the necessity to build Angola's future with the immediate aid of the personnel and parties of the liberation movements projected him as one of, if not the most important African spokesmen inside Angola today. It is difficult to imagine his not playing a vital role in the formation of any independent government in Angola.
56. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 2 June 1974.
57. UN DOC. A/AC.109/L.921 (28 February 1974), p. 6, table 1.