Is Development Sustainable without Modernization?[1]

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Dunstan M. Wai was born out of the womb of a troubled country and struggled to calm a troubled world.

I was introduced to Dunstan Wai when we both lived in Uganda. I was a professor at Makerere University and Dunstan was already a casualty of a troubled country. He was a young refugee on the run from a nation at war. His political predicament illustrated the uglier side of post-colonial Africa; his immense intellectual potential illustrated what was best about post-colonial Africa. His body sought survival from day to day; his mind sought fulfillment in the years ahead.

Dunstan Wai was educated in three of the most distinguished universities of the 20th century. Although his stay at Makerere University in Uganda was only brief, Makerere's impact on that young Sudanese was incalculable. One measure of that impact was that he and I remained friends for decades — long after he had left for greener pastures.

Dunstan Wai's years at Oxford in England also were formative. Some have argued that while Harvard is a major producer of *scholars*, Oxford is a major producer of *thinkers*. Dunstan's educational background encompassed both. In Dunstan Wai's own words, "As an undergraduate in Oxford, I was introduced to the rigours of critical and logical thinking; and as a graduate student at Harvard, I was

introduced to the world of knowledge and scholarship" (Wai 1981: xi).

Modernization and Westernization Revisited

Long before the concept of "sustainable development"[2] entered international economic discourse, many social scientists debated the issue of how to *modernize* African economies and systems of government. Dunstan Wai and I entered this debate from time to time. Our early writings reflected this preoccupation.

On the other hand, left-of-center political economists developed a rival body of literature on what was called *dependency*.[3] In his writings Dunstan Wai was never part of this latter discourse, but within the oral tradition of postcolonial Africa he could not avoid it in conversations and verbal debates. He became particularly vulnerable to attacks from the dependency school of political economy when Dunstan Wai became an employee of the World Bank. The term "modernization" became discredited when it became excessively equated with "Westernization" (Latham 2000).[4] In political science literature, "political modernization" in Africa increasingly was defined as the high road toward a Western style pluralistic democracy. In technology and science, the West did enter the modern era earlier than almost any other society in the world. It therefore may be impossible for Africa to avoid some degree of Westernization in the process of modernization.

But there were two countries in the world that illustrated the distinction between modernization and Westernization in their own separate histories. Although Dunstan Wai did not always agree with me, I have argued that while Northern Sudan was on the whole more modernized than the South,

the South was more Westernized than the North. I will return to this distinction shortly. The other country that I used to cite in my World Bank discussions in the 1980s was Japan. After the Meiji restoration of 1868, the Japanese asked themselves "Can we economically modernize without culturally Westernizing?" The Japanese answer at that time was, "Yes indeed. We can economically modernize without culturally Westernizing." And on the whole that is what Japan did from the last quarter of the 19th century until the American occupation. The Japanese succeeded in spectacular modernization without succumbing too much to cultural Westernization. The Japanese motto in that period was "Western technique, Japanese spirit."[5] In the Sudanese context the concept of "modernization" was of course very relative. What I was suggesting was that Sudan illustrated the clearest African distinction between "Westernization" and "Modernization" within the same country.

In what ways and by what methods did British policy in the Sudan push modernization in the North as a higher priority than in the South? Dunstan Wai reminded us of the disproportionate resources devoted by the British to develop the North between the two World Wars, and the promotion of modern political participation in the North in the course of World War II. The British established the Advisory Council in Governance in 1943, initially exclusively for the North. It was a precursor to a Legislative Council. In Dunstan Wai's words:

> ...the magnitude of the resources devoted to development in the North ... financed social service projects, such as the establishment of schools and hospitals throughout the 1930s, and created the

> Advisory Council in 1943 in response to the upsurge of nationalism...evident in the Northern Sudan (Wai 1981: 37).

The development of the Northern infrastructure at a much faster rate than anything in the South, right up to the establishment of the first institutions of higher education, laid the foundations of faster modernization in the North. On the other hand, did British policy consciously promote Westernization faster in the South? Three instruments of Westernization were utilized in the South — religion, language and missionary education. Again Dunstan Wai helps us trace the origins of this Westernizing colonial policy. Wai argued as follows:

> The basic flaw underlying the [British] Southern policy was the encouragement and implementation of Western institutions, Christianity in particular ... but also European cultural habits ... The educational policy, whereby English was actively encouraged to the exclusion of Arabic as the *lingua franca* of the South and the missionaries were entrusted, although not exclusively, with the education of the Southern people, prevailed (ibid: 36-38).

While the Japanese after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 purposefully pursued economic modernization without cultural Westernization, British policy in Southern Sudan reversed the order. British colonial policy in Southern Sudan pursued cultural Westernization without economic modernization. Dunstan Wai did not himself formulate the

issues in such stark terms, yet Dunstan provides us with some of the evidence. The two-pronged policy of the so-called Anglo-Egyptian Sudan helped Northerners to modernize faster than Southerners, and yet helped Southerners to Westernize faster than Northerners. British officers used the vocabulary of "developing" the North and "civilizing" the South! But how do these issues of "modernization" and "Westernization" relate to the substance of development?

One of the few occasions when I have clashed with Robert McNamara face to face was when we were both guests of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi at a select conference of world thinkers in New Delhi in 1997. I had argued at the conference that European colonial policies in Black Africa had been so busy subjecting Africans to soft-Westernization (language, Christian values, consumption patterns, Scotch whiskey and dress culture) that we were left behind in hard-Westernization (economic discipline, numeracy, the discipline of the clock and the work-ethic). Although technology and science were essentially part of modernization, I argued that aspects of technology should also be included as part of hard-Westernization.

Robert McNamara retorted that cultural differences had nothing to do with Africa's problems. Africa was suffering from the consequences of wrong policies and bad leadership. I made the standard comparison between Ghana and South Korea.[6] When Ghana attained independence in 1957, its per capita income was reportedly at the same level as that of South Korea. Since then, South Korea evolved into the 12th largest industrial power in the world, while Ghana stagnated. And yet Ghanaians spoke better English and were Christianized in larger numbers than South Koreans. The English language and Christian values were a case of soft-

Westernization. The South Koreans had embraced the harder Westernization of production techniques, the discipline of the clock and a sense of organization.

Robert McNamara insisted that Africa could not wait for a cultural revolution. Africa needed more sensible policies and wiser leadership. McNamara was prepared to concede the possibility that European colonialism has been more destructive of indigenous traditional restraints in Africa than it had been in the Asian dependencies; that more of indigenous culture had been destroyed under the imperial onslaught in Africa than had been the case in the Asian colonies. But he was convinced that these historic issues were secondary to the need for more enlightened leadership and more sensible policies in the postcolonial era.

Dunstan Wai's position was somewhere between Robert McNamara and myself. Dunstan Wai saw the relevance of cultural variables. He helped the World Bank move toward recognizing culture as both a possible constraint and a potential facilitator of development (World Bank 2002; see also Elyachar 2002). But Dunstan also shared McNamara's emphasis on the paramountcy of policy and the imperative of leadership. Dunstan helped the World Bank struggle with a policy of capacity-building for Africa; he helped the Bank agonize about how best to define "capacity" and how best to help Africa build it for itself.[7] But what about that old dialectic between theorists of modernization and theorists of dependency? Is there room for a re-validation of the concept of both "modernization" and "dependency"? A quarter of a century ago I coined a definition of development in the following terms: Development equals modernization minus dependency. The question now arises whether the definition would still hold if we added the word

"sustainable" to characterize "development." Is the following definition defensible: Sustainable development equals modernization minus dependency?

But what is modernization? I have from time to time suggested the following sub-processes of modernization:

1. A quest for practical effectiveness compatible with social equity.
2. A quest for technical proficiency — a shifting balance in technique from custom and intuition to innovation and measurement.
3. A quest for secular knowledge — a shifting balance in the science of explanation from the supernatural to the temporal.
4. Planning for the future: A shifting balance between preoccupation with ancestry and tradition to a concern for anticipation and planning.

And so the four elements for modernization are effective pragmatism, which is compatible with social equity and social justice. Second, proficiencies that are measurable and innovative must be achieved in technical and technological pursuits. To paraphrase the Bard, "The answer, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in our minds that we are underlings ...." Fourth — to paraphrase Descartes: "We are what we think" — modernization has to include a capacity for secular anticipation and a readiness to plan for an alternative future.

Modernization in African History

Where would a technical institute or polytechnic in Southern Sudan fit in? If sustainable development equals modernization minus dependency, and modernization includes technical and technological proficiency, such a polytechnic in Juba could be part of the vanguard of the modernization of Southern Sudan. The new Southern Sudan needs to shape a new paradigm to meet its new mission. Pre-eminent among the elements is precisely a culture of innovation and invention long neglected since the days when British rulers and Christian missionaries decided that the South needed more soft-Westernization and less modernity. If "modernization" also includes a quest for practical effectiveness, the South would need monitoring mechanisms. Government policy could introduce such monitoring mechanisms as Performance Contracts for government subsidized institutions like the proposed Polytechnic for Juba.

A culture that seeks to encourage innovation and invention also should construct a system of inducements and rewards for success in producing new products of intrinsic or potential value. The awards could range from being nominated for an honor from the Head of State to financial compensation. At the Juba Polytechnic the rewards could range from an academic promotion to extra sabbatical leave with full pay. Brilliant students who concretely contribute to success in innovation could also reap their own kind of harvest — ranging from a scholarship to a financial bonus.

If modernization includes a culture of planning and anticipation, Southern Sudan would need to identify goals and the strategies for realizing them; Southerners need to

match ends with means. Eventually a technological institution like the proposed Juba Polytechnic needs to raise the level of commitment toward research, publication and development. Agricultural and technological know-how have newer and newer frontiers of expertise. In due course, the South should fully encourage the pursuit of those new horizons. Interdisciplinary research and product development has historically yielded quicker results than isolated individual scholarship. But we must not be dogmatic about this. In science there is always room for individual brilliance; there is always room for the solitary genius on the verge of crying out "Eureka!" to a new discovery.

In most societies, education initially was linked to religion. Dunstan Wai was a product of both Oxford and Harvard. Oxford University in England had insisted well into the 19th century that academic appointments be based on affiliation with the Church of England. Long before Dunstan was a student in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard passed through different stages of Protestant preoccupation, including a phase of prejudice against the Jews.[8] The Sudan was once Anglo-Egyptian. Al-Azhar University in Cairo is over a thousand years old, and continues to be partly Islamic. The modernization of these institutions has included at least partial replacement of religious criteria with secular ones.

In Southern Sudan and in much of Black Africa, Christian missionaries often took the lead in establishing Western-style schools. Education and the quest for spiritual salvation were allied closely.[9] One of the consequences of this alliance was that education in Africa was disproportionately "literary" rather than directly practical. It was soft-Westernization. There was also a distrust of secular pursuits.

Who broke the logjam? Among the actors in most of Black Africa were transnational corporations. The impact of transnationals on colonial schools was in the direction of both increasing educational interest in practical skills (practicalization) and reducing the colonial educational focus on religion (secularization). In Sudan transnationals had an earlier impact on the North than on the South.

Industry in neighboring Kenya is still partly transnational. But industry and commerce in Kenya also have become increasingly local and national. Selective partnership between universities and industry can pursue goals of mutual interest regarding human power needs. Staff attachment to industry, student internships and research funding are among potential areas of collaboration. The Kenyan model is more relevant than the Sudanese. Much of future research will have to be market-driven, but this should be moderated by a social driven agenda in terms of the needs of society. A proper balance should constantly be maintained between response to market forces and response to social needs.

The disparity between the developed and developing countries in terms of computers can be seen in the figures released by the World Bank in the years when Dunstan Wai was still based in Washington in the 1990s. High-income states or developed countries possessed about 201 computers for every 1,000 people. The figure for low- and middle-income countries (or developing countries) dropped to approximately six computers for every 1,000 people. In African countries it was much lower than that.[10]

Although the speed of computerization in Africa is modest in absolute terms, and countries such as Tanzania have even attempted 'decomputerization,' the new culture that is coming to Africa with computers cannot but deepen

or aggravate technological dependency. The science of anticipation still has its most elaborate expertise outside Africa. The initial phases of the computerization of Africa carry the risk of a new form of colonialism. Africa could be duly "programmed." The "machine man's burden" looms ominously on the horizon as a new technological crusade to modernize Africa unfolds. The arrival of the computer may indeed be a contribution to modernization, but it also is adding dependence. The computer probably is helping to make planning more efficient, but simultaneously is making development more difficult. The science of anticipation is, for the time being, caught up in the contradictions of premature technological change.

Toward Decolonizing Modernity

If sustainable development in the Third World equals modernization, minus dependency, how can the contradictions of premature technological change be resolved? How can technology be decolonized? Decolonization is a process of reducing dependency involving five sub-processes: 1) indigenization, 2) domestication, 3) diversification, 4) horizontal inter-penetration and 5) vertical counter-penetration. The strategy of indigenization involves increasing the use of indigenous resources, ranging from employing native personnel to utilizing aspects of traditional local technology. We need to study indigenous traditional technology. While *indigenization* means using local resources and making them relevant to the modern age, *domestication* involves making imported versions of modernity more relevant to the local society. For example, the English language in the Horn of Africa is an alien medium. To domesticate it is to make it respond to

local imagery, figures of speech, sound patterns and to the general cultural milieu of African know-how written in English. The promotion of Amharic in Ethiopia and Kiswahili in Tanzania are examples of indigenization.[11] It involves promoting a local linguistic resource, rather than making an alien resource more locally relevant. Julius Nyerere's translation of Shakespeare into Kiswahili (Nyerere Swahilized *Julius Caesar* and *Merchant of Venice*) both domesticated Shakespeare and enhanced indigenous literary skills.

With regard to Western institutions in Africa, *domestication* is the process by which they are, in part, Africanized or traditionalized in local terms. But with local institutions, the task is partly to modernize them. Thus English in East Africa needs to be Africanized, while Swahili needs to be modernized in the sense of enabling it to cope with modern life and modern knowledge.

Clearly the two strategies of domestication and indigenization are closely related and are sometimes impossible to disentangle. This is particularly so when we apply these strategies of decolonization to African universities. African universities started off as alien bodies in need of cultural domestication.[12] The proposed Polytechnic in Southern Sudan would be in a similar predicament. The computer is a piece of alien culture. Can it be domesticated?

We believe it can, but the introduction or expansion of this piece of technology in an African country must be much more carefully planned than it has been so far. The domestication of the computer would first and foremost require a substantial indigenization of personnel. In the larger context of Africa's needs, this would require, first, greater commitment by African governments generally to

promote relevant training at different levels for Africans; second, readiness on the part of both governments and employers to create a structure of incentives that attract Africans of the right caliber; third, greater political pressure on computer suppliers to facilitate training and to cooperate in related tasks; and fourth, stricter control by African governments of the foreign exchange allowed for the importation of computers.

The indigenization of high-level personnel in the local computer industry should in time help to indigenize the uses to which the computer is put and the tasks that are assigned to it. When the most skilled roles in the computer industry in an African country are in the hands of Africans themselves, new types of problems will in turn be put to computers. The cultural and political milieu of the new personnel should affect and perhaps modify problem-definition. This Africanization of computer personnel should also facilitate, over time, the further Africanization of the users of computer services. What should be borne in mind is that the efficient indigenization and domestication of the computer requires a gradual and planned approach.

The difficulty of this task is compounded, particularly in recent years, as Africa braces for it second partition by transnational corporations and their respective governments. Christian missionaries are now succeeded by corporate power-brokers. The move to conquer the world's last, great untapped consumer market in Africa has brought concerted efforts to modernize Africa. One such effort was illustrated by the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Leland Initiative. The goal of the initiative was to bring full Internet connectivity to approximately 20 African countries over a five-year period in order to promote sustainable development.[13]

The trend toward greater computer technological sophistication in the underdeveloped countries of Africa carries the risk of a commercial colonization of the continent. The evolution of the computer industry has led to increasingly rapid change in computer technology. As these changes occur, the chance to domesticate and indigenize the new technology may dissipate, given that many African countries will find it difficult to keep pace technologically and economically. The rapid pace of technological change will make a gradualist and planned approach to domestication and indigenization of the computer in Africa a difficult task. The resources needed to sustain these new technologies may promote additional problems. As technology levels increase in these countries, the dependence of these countries on transnational corporations may likewise increase in order to maintain them. But institutions like the proposed Polytechnic in Juba can accelerate the production of local and indigenous experts.

Development as Diversity

Diversification, at the broader level of society, means the diversification of production, sources of expertise, techniques of analysis, types of goods produced, markets for these products, general trading partners, aid-donors and other benefactors. This approach — though often inefficient — should help an African country to diversify with respect to its dependence on other countries. Excessive reliance on only one country is more dangerous for a weak state than reliance on half a dozen countries. The Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya started with a partnership with Japan and has been involved in

collaborating with both the West and fellow African countries. Such diversification helps to reduce dependency.

The computer is under-utilized in Africa, not merely in terms of capacity or in terms of hours per day, but also in terms of the range of tasks assigned to it. Even in economic planning, the computer in Africa is still greatly under-utilized. We have argued elsewhere that the computer can help planning, while simultaneously harming development. If the computers already have been purchased, and are being used in ways that already harm development, should they not at least be made to perform their more positive functions in planning as well? Once again, diversification of usage — if handled with care — could extract certain benefits from the computer, while sustaining its development costs.

The next strategy of decolonization of technology is *horizontal interpenetration* among the Third World countries. In the field of trade this could mean promoting greater exchange among African countries themselves. In the field of investment it could, for example, mean allowing Arab or Malaysian money to compete with Western and Japanese money in establishing new industries or promoting new projects in Africa. Dunstan Wai recommended a partnership between Africa, the Arabs and the OECD countries. In the field of aid it also must mean that oil-rich Arab countries should increase their contribution toward the economic and social development of their resource-poor sister countries in Black Africa. In the field of technical assistance, it might mean that Third World countries with an apparent excess of skilled human power in relation to their absorption capacity not only should be prepared, but also be encouraged, to facilitate temporary or permanent migration to other Third World countries. This last process is what might be called the horizontal brain drain — the transfer

of skilled human power from, say, Egypt to Abu Dhabi or from the Indian sub-continent to Nigeria, or from Kenya to Southern Africa.

This horizontal interpenetration also may require our readiness to train foreign students especially from other African countries. Students from Japan and the Western world should also be encouraged to come to the Juba Polytechnic one day. As part of horizontal interpenetration, Third World countries must learn to poach on each other's skilled human power, at least as a short-term strategy. President Idi Amin of Uganda learned after a while to distinguish between Indians with strong economic and historic roots in Uganda and Indians on contract for a specified period. He expelled almost all of those who had strong local roots — and then went to the Indian sub-continent to recruit skilled professional teachers, engineers and doctors on contract terms. The wholesale expulsion of Asians with roots was basically an irrational act.[14] But the recruitment of skilled Indians on contract was sound. Today, African nations should turn increasingly to the Indian sub-continent instead of Western Europe for some of its temporary needs for skilled personnel, including the need for computer personnel, pending adequate indigenization.

The final strategy of decolonization is that of *vertical counter penetration.* It is not enough to facilitate greater interpenetration among Third World countries. It is not enough to contain or reduce penetration by Northern industrialized states into Southern underdeveloped economies. An additional strategy is needed, one which increasingly would enable Southern countries to counter-penetrate the citadels of power in the North. Dunstan Wai in the World Bank was himself an embodiment of counter penetration into a citadel of power.

The Middle Eastern oil producers already have started the process of counter penetrating Western Europe and North America. This vertical counter penetration by the Middle East ranges from manipulating the money market in Western Europe to buying shares in West German industry, from purchasing banks and real estate in the United States to obtaining shares in other transnational corporations.[15] Even the Southern capacity to impose clear political conditions on Western firms is a case of vertical counter penetration. The Arabs' success in forcing many Western firms to minimize trading with Israel if they wish to retain their Arab markets was a clear illustration of a Southern market dictating certain conditions to Northern transnational corporations instead of the older reverse flow of power.[16]

Another question is how far the African computer market, as it expands and acquires greater sophistication, would be able to exert greater counter-influence on the computer industry. This would depend at least in part upon the extent to which each domestic African market is internally organized and how far African countries using computers consult with each other and possibly with other Third World users on the application of the computer and related issues. Obudho and Taylor told us in the 1970s that there was greater awareness and organization on computer-related matters in Francophone Africa than in Anglophone Africa. Gabon, Madagascar, Cóte d'Ivoire, Morocco and Algeria were experimenting with domestic institutions to coordinate Francophone informatics. Such consultations on computer applications should still be encouraged as part of horizontal interpenetration among African systems of informatics. But the greater sophistication that will be

acquired in time should increase the influence of the African market on the computer industry itself.

Yet another element in the strategy of *counter penetration* is the Northward brain drain itself. Third World countries generally cannot afford to lose their skilled human power. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Northward brain drain is completely disadvantageous to the South. Indian doctors in British hospitals indeed are recruited to some extent at the expense of the sick in India. But those emigrant Indian doctors are becoming an important sub-lobby in British society to increase British responsiveness to the health and nutritional needs of India itself.[17] Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya recognizes that brain drain can be brain gain.

The American Jews that are not prepared to go to settle in Israel are not merely a case of depriving Israel of skills and possessions which they would have taken there. Jewish-Americans also constitute counter-influence on the American system to balance the influence of the United States on the Israeli system. The presence of Irish-Americans in the United States is indeed partly a case of agonizing economic disadvantage for the Irish Republic. But Irish-Americans are also, conversely, an existing economic and political resource for the benefit of the Irish Republic and Catholics in Northern Ireland (Shain 1999, Ambrosio 2002). This is also true of Greek-Americans, Polish-Canadians, and Algerians in France. Migration from one country to another is never purely a blessing nor purely a curse to either the donor country or the receiving country. As Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya becomes more and more successful in producing first-class experts, it may cause more brain drain than any other public university in Kenya. Excellent graduates of

Kenya may be tempted to serve other lands. They may serve at the Juba Polytechnic in an oil rich Southern Sudan.

As more and more Africans become highly skilled in computer technology and usage, some of them will migrate to developed states. As matters now stand, the costs of this kind of brain drain are greater than the benefits for African countries.[18] It is essential to understand that the intellectual penetration of the South by Northern industrial states one day must be balanced with reverse intellectual penetration by the South into the think tanks of the North. Given the realities of an increasingly interdependent world, decolonization never will be complete unless penetration is reciprocal and more balanced.

Dunstan Wai was a Sudanese who counter penetrated the Bretton Woods fortress. But Bretton Woods sent him back to Africa as a reverse flow of skill and expertise. Dunstan Wai helped to lay the foundations of sustainable development. Perhaps he also enhanced modernization while trying to reduce future dependency. The struggle continues as part of his legacy.

Let us conclude with a verse dedicated to Dunstan:

He was Africa's anguish, Africa's sigh;
He was Sudan's will to try;
He was a Kuku soul ascending high;
He was a pilgrim passing by;
He tilled the earth, and touched the sky;
Who was this man?
He was Dunstan Wai

Endnotes

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[2] For some guides to the issues in global sustainable development, consult Cooper and Vargas 2004; Bigg 2004; Segger and Khalfan 2004; Mira, Cameselle and Martinez 2003; Lee, Holland and McNeill 2000; and Lafferty and Langhelle 1999. In relation to Africa, consult Ukaga and Afoaku 2005 and Darkoh and Rwomire 2003.

[3] On dependency, consult Gunder Frank 1967, Larrain 1987 and Brewer 1990. One of the newer critiques of dependency and modernization theory is a feminist critique; see Scott 1995.

[4] For a review of conceptual issues in modernization, see Singh 1981. Specifically, in relation to Africa, see Leys 1996 and Apter and Rosberg 1994.

[5] On the Meiji Restoration, consult Jansen 1995 and Beasley 1972.

[6] For one such analysis, see a number of fascinating but depressing comparisons between Ghanian and South African progress; see Werlin 1994.

[7] For some examples, analyses and reports on the World Bank's efforts in the capacity-building arena, consult, for example, Howell et al 2004; Wubneh 2003; and *Africa Report* 1993.

[8] Harvard, among the Ivy League schools, was no exception in its prejudice against Jews; see Freedman 2000.

[9] There was of course resistance also to the Christian-led education movement, as for example from Muslims as described in Yahya 2001. For a general overview of comparative education policy in British and French Africa, see White 1996.

[10] A July 2002 status report about African connectivity to the Internet has pointed out the disparity: "In Africa, each computer with an Internet or email connection usually supports a range of three to five users. This puts current estimates of the total number of African Internet users at around 5-8 million, with about 1.5-2.5 million outside of North and South Africa. This is about 1 user for every 250-400 people, compared to a world average of about one user for every 15 people, and a North American and European average

of about one in every 2 people." The UNDP World Development Report figures for other developing regions in 2000 were: 1 in 30 for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1 in 250 for South Asia, 1 in 43 for East Asia, 1 in 166 for the Arab States). "The African Internet — A Status Report" at http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm, accessed July 1, 2005).

[11] An overview of the nexus between politics and language policy in education may be found in Wodak and Croson 1997. Chapters 15 and 16 deal with African countries.

[12] An overview of the historical background of higher education may be found in Ajayi 1996.

[13] For a report on the Leland Initiative, see Spangler 1999. And for a guide to the current status, consult the website at http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/leland/ (accessed Jul 1, 2005).

[14] For a contemporaneous report on the expulsion, see Meisler 1972. For a more recent appraisal of the action, see Amor 2003.

[15] One example is Saudi Arabian Prince Walid bin Talal, who has invested in several U.S. and Western companies; see "Saudi Reports $1 Billion of Investments," *New York Times* (May 17, 2000). Of course, with the decline of oil wealth, these kinds of investments are less-commonplace and instead we have the phenomenon of Indian companies buying U.S. steel companies and Chinese companies attempting to buy U.S. companies. For a report on the concerns raised in the United States about Chinese penetration of the U.S. economy, consult, for example, Porter 2005.

[16] See the report "Arabs Meet for Boycott, First Gathering Since '93," *Wall Street Journal* Eastern Edition (October 12, 2001).

[17] An intriguing suggestion also has been made by Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati (2003) who has suggested that citizens living abroad pay taxes to their home countries as part of a diaspora model of citizenship.

[18] What about African Americans who migrate to Africa and provide their skills and connections to improve life in their host country? Some even have integrated through marriage with their host country; an example is Mr. David Robinson, son of Jackie Robinson who was the first black man in baseball's major leagues. Mr. Robinson started a coffee farm in Tanzania, married a local woman, and has raised a family there (Duke 2005).

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