

THE UGANDA MILITARY COUP OF 1971:

A Study of Protest

by

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*I am, perhaps, the only African leader not afraid
of a military coup.**

A.M. Obote, 1970

"We have done this for God and for our country."¹ This assertion is the Ugandan variation of the justification of the new role that the military has decided to play in African politics. The sense of mission found in this statement might have surprised many Africanists if it had happened a few years ago, when in December 1965 and January 1966, the wave of military coup d'etats began. Optimism about new institutions created after independence and the social and logistic weakness of the African armies had led many students of military affairs to minimize the political possibilities of the African armed forces and caused many leaders to exhibit an overly optimistic view of the passivity of their armies.² Julius Nyerere echoed the confidence of Obote quoted above when he declared: "There is not the slightest chance that the forces of law and order in Tanganyika will mutiny."³ But now, it is no longer surprising that a Chief of Staff of any army in tropical Africa should take advantage of the absence of a head of state to usurp his position.

At the present time, the study of military behavior commands an inordinate amount of the energy of social scientists and has given birth to a great number of case studies and theories. Beyond the details which characterize the events in each separate country, it is possible to discern some common features which could possibly be generalized into a theory. The almost "agreed-upon-theoretical proposition" has been structured along two lines.⁴

First, one explanation is based on the structure of African social systems. In this approach, three factors would seem critical: ethno-cultural disruptions, political upheavals such as the breakdown of institutional procedures, and economic fluctuations caused by the lack of real economic

* From a pamphlet circulated among Party members in 1970.
See also New York Times - January 26th, 1971.

alternatives. These different features constitute what might be called the ecological causes behind the dysfunctioning of modern African systems.

The second explanation focuses on specific elements within the military establishment such as ethnic distribution in the officer corps, internal strains, the formation of peer groups, and problems of salaries and equipment. If we agree that such explanatory approaches have contributed to the growth of knowledge about the field of military affairs, there is no reason outside informative purposes to present the Ugandan military coup as an immediate and crucial issue since it could be understood by the application of these explanations. However, most previous discussions of military coups have focused on the ecological factors, but not enough evidence has been produced to substantiate the theory of internal stress within the military establishment. For, in Uganda, the latter theory sheds light and gives to the coup d'etat and its aftermath a very important colouring.

The assertions that tribalism, for example, was the primary cause of the coup is not a wholly convincing explanation. If the question of tribalism was central to the relations between the army and the government, it could be asserted that the problem was at least partially resolved in 1966, the year in which the "northernization" of the army took place. On the contrary, what is of particular interest about this coup is the paradox of an army largely composed of Northerners presumably reinforcing a northern-oriented government which nevertheless took over power from that government. Instead, we would suggest that the military coup could be explained by looking carefully at the structure of the military organization itself. Since looking within the military establishment involves the study of more than one variable, it is not a question here of not utilizing a multi-factor approach, but of concentrating our evidence on one variable purporting to explain the coup. For these reasons the emphasis will be made on some pivotal characteristics of the Ugandan military establishment and the dynamics of its evolution. Accordingly, our discussion will focus on three developments within the Ugandan military.

- the northernization of the Ugandan army as a politically integrating device for gaining support.
- the rise of frustration sequences within the military establishment and the resulting protest.

- the process of military and political deterioration:
the logic of the coup.

It is via a short description of Ugandan society and politics that we begin this study.

The Social and Political Background

The contemporary political evolution of Uganda has been closely linked to the struggle against the centrifugal tendencies of ethno-political allegiances which has led to a delicately balanced integration. This nation inherited little which was favourable for the building of an integrated political system.⁵ Although it would be difficult to describe accurately the cultural diversity and the richness of this part of Africa, one might identify two main groups which have performed an important role in the realization of present day Uganda. These two groups are delimited along an east-west geographical line. The first group, the Northerners, is popularly known as the Nilotes. Nilotes are divided into a number of clusters: (1) the Luo (Achoi, Alur, Labwor, Lango, and Jopadhola); (2) the Karamojong (Bateso, Iteso, and Turkana; (3) and the Nandi (Sabei, Sapei). Lugbara and Madi, who are very often confused with Nilotes because of their acculturation with the Nilotes, belong to the central Sudanic peoples.⁶ We shall see that such an acculturative phenomenon may perform a very important role in determining political loyalties.

The second group, the Southerners or Bantu-speaking peoples, are located in numerous areas as a result of their migrations in the past. The precarious stability of those areas was subject to strong cleavages based upon either religious affiliations (Anchole) or tribal oppositions (Bugisu and Sabei). Most of them are constituted in kingdoms: Buganda, Bunyoro, Anchole, and Toro. The other areas were ruled as chiefdoms or principedoms: Bugisu, Busoga, and Kigezi.⁷ One of these kingdoms, Buganda, by its historical background (and/or perhaps by the scholarly attention which has been brought upon it) was considered as the main component of the acute conflict in Uganda politics and

**While it is not the custom to justify the structure of any study, we hope that by looking at the phenomenon of "deprivation" within the military class, we can compile enough evidence to show that the coup might be analyzed as the device of the military for protesting and for defending its status; in other words, the coup is a corporate means of defending army interests just as the strike is the device for defending the workers' interests.*

so considered as the scapegoat of Uganda pluralism. Very small at its origin (barely extending from Entebbe to Kampala) and subject to the mercy of the powerful kingdom of Bunyoro, Buganda succeeded in growing during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at the expense of Bunyoro and Busoga (most of the principalities of Busoga were absorbed). As it was pointed out:

This strong position was attained by the creation of a strong bodyguard, the strengthening of the royal power through centralization and the appointing of district and subdistrict chiefs, and the virtual suppression of the original clans and traditional heads. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, seven of the ten county chiefs were appointed and only three were still hereditary. ⁸

Attempting to sketch in detail the story of Buganda would take more time and space than available.⁹ Suffice it to say that Buganda, presently situated around the north-west corner of Lake Victoria, showed a high degree of institutionalization. The Buganda system, developed through five centuries, was retained by the British. Yet, the British also put a stop to the expansionist tendencies of the Baganda. The ethos of the Baganda has favoured the extension of British rule through other parts of Uganda. As a result Buganda benefitted considerably from the British presence. The Uganda Agreement of 1900 was considered as the institutionalization of Buganda as a political entity. With this recognition Buganda's cultural identity could continue to develop according to its individual dynamic.

Largely favoured by a comfortable geographical situation and including *circa* twenty per cent of the whole population of Uganda, Buganda is the centre of coffee and cotton growing and the site of a large hydro-electric complex located near Jinja. In addition, Buganda is a very interesting example of acculturation, if not a successful one. As Ali A. Mazrui has pointed out:

.....There was respect for Kiganda culture as moral force, combined with a keenness on the acquisition of Western education and the adoption of certain British modes of behaviour.....The capacity of the Baganda to imbibe the new Western civilization without straining their indigenous cultural attachments has been one of the most remarkable feats of acculturation in the history of Africa. ¹⁰

In order to maintain its identity and autonomy, Buganda brought some separatist demands which placed the Kabaka in difficulty. The British policy, expressed in the 'Lyttelton Plan', was to constitute a federation of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. Either because of the fear of Kenyan domination or of the loss of Bugandan identity, the Kabaka supported his council, the Lukiiko, which was pressing for Buganda's independence. Because of this, Sir Andrew Cohen exiled the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, to England for two years (1953-55) under the pretext that he had violated the terms of the 1900 Agreement. If the exile of the Kabaka did not weaken the fairly strong tendencies towards regionalism and growing Bugandan nationalism, nevertheless, it stripped him of his leadership position. During this period, as a result of British policies and anti-Buganda nationalism, a new political consciousness was developing among the northern groups.

Outside Buganda, this anti-Kiganda nationalism began to play a larger role in the political programmes. Politicians from outside Buganda began to unite and to advocate outright challenges to so-called Kiganda domination and leadership.... This kind of political disenchantment on the part of the non-Buganda politicians began to manifest itself in a variety of ways, and it was not unconnected with the squabbles which were now tearing the once dynamic UNC. Splits and counter splits, expulsions and counter expulsions became the order of the day in the ranks of the UNC. These splits therefore can be accurately described as important guidelines for the politics of the future. One of the splinter groups which emerged became the Uganda People's Congress.¹¹

Uganda achieved its independence in 1962 without widely recognized nationalist leaders. An interesting example of the lack of leadership was in the pre-independence elections. Crawford Young has written:

In the pre-independent elections, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) ran no candidates in Buganda and won 37 of the 61 directly elected seats in the rest of the country. The Democratic Party (DP) won 24, and the 21 Buganda seats all went to Kabaka Yekka (KY).¹²

In other words, the DP, whose leader, B. Kiwanuka, was supported by the Catholic vote, won a temporary majority. In order to defeat him, the UPC and the KY entered into a tenuous coalition and shared the nine seats coopted by Parliament itself, allotting six to the UPC and three to the KY. In May 1962, 44 of the 92 seats were allotted to the UPC. In 1964, the UPC gained an absolute majority and ended the coalition

with the KY. In August, ten members of the KY (they would be followed in July, 1965 by six others) switched to the UPC, and in December, they were imitated by Kiwanuka.

The end of the UPC's tenuous alliance with KY, precipitated by the government's decision to proceed with the referendum in the two 'lost counties' of Bunyoro, until then administered by Buganda, made the undeclared hostility of the Kabaka's government open and official. 13

It should be recalled that during the colonial period these two provinces, Buyaga and Bugangazzi, were turned over to Buganda as a reward for the Kabaka's behaviour vis-a-vis the British. Just after independence the people of these provinces were not reconciled to this separation and demanded the return of the regions to the Bunyoro kingdom. After the referendum was held in June, 1964, a majority voted for joining Bunyoro (in spite of the presence of the Kawonawo group which was not authorized to vote) and the decision was approved by Parliament. Thus the UPC, whose strength lay in its majority (67 out of the 92 seats) and the KY, who decided to regain at all costs its political influence and to preserve its identity, engaged themselves in a merciless struggle which ended in the crisis of May 1966 to the detriment of Buganda.

It might also be said that the ethnic composition of both parties was far from homogeneous. The Baganda, we have seen, were more or less members of the UPC and a strong personality like Daudi Ocheng, although Acholi, was the secretary general of the KY. Another example of this political heterogeneity was the unhidden sympathy of the Lumu group for the KY.

Taking advantage of Obote's trip to northern Uganda in early 1966 the traditional elements and their henchmen tried to strike a blow from within the UPC. The general secretary of the congress was ousted from office and the so-called right wing of the UPC succeeded in capturing the leadership. Subsequently, after unclear parliamentary maneuvers, 'Ocheng's bomb', to use Crawford Young's expression, exploded. Ocheng levelled charges of malfeasance against the prime minister and some other members of the Cabinet. While it is impossible to produce any evidence of malfeasance on the part of Obote, such allegations were taken very seriously by many members of the UPC. 14

Obote, therefore, had had to move very carefully in order to retrieve his political position. A kind of *18th of Brumaire*, if we may use this analogy, was the fatal blow

to the opposition. On February 22, 1966, Obote announced:

We are introducing a new era and new issues in Uganda's politics. It would be unfortunate to go back to a government at Mengo controlled by the Kabaka. ¹⁵

The constitution was suspended, the Kabaka was ousted from the Presidency, and five Bantu ministers, Grace Ibingira, Emmanuel Lumu, George Magezi, Balaki Kirya, and Mathias Ngobi, were put under arrest. Finally, on the 15th of April, a temporary constitution established the basis for a unitary form of rule. The offices of Prime Minister, President, and Vice-President were abolished and replaced by an Executive Presidency. In addition the constitution minutely dismantled the semi-federal structure and the numerous constitutional and juridical privileges of Buganda.

The rise of resistance in Buganda, the motion of May 20th calling for the central government to move outside Kampala, and the escalation of violence were the desperate attempts of the Baganda to save their autonomy. On the 23rd of May, after half a day of combat, the General Service Unit clashed with the troops of the Kabaka at the royal palace on Mengo Hill. It is worthwhile to note that the Ugandan army unit which was initially sent was unsuccessful, an important element in understanding the resentment of the army towards the GSU after its frustrating failure.

In June, 1967, President Obote announced that he would abolish all four Ugandan kingdoms and turn Uganda into a republic. Thirteen days later, the National Assembly was converted into a Constituent Assembly to discuss a new constitution. In spite of a comfortable majority, the new project was debated for three months. The project was even exposed to the criticisms of the Press. For example, the UPC's newspaper, *The People*, published certain criticisms concerning the fact that the elections would have to be delayed for five years. However, this liberty of expression was not a widespread phenomenon. *Transition*, a magazine published in Kampala, but widely distributed and read throughout Uganda, printed a letter emanating from a member of Parliament, Abu Mayanja, a Bantu-speaker allied to the UPC. This critical letter, which urged the government to hold new elections and to liberalize the Detention Laws, was censored severely. Abu Mayanja was arrested along with the editor of the journal, Sir Rajat Neogy. Later, one of the editors of *The People*, D. Nelson, was put under arrest for similar reasons. ¹⁶ This atmosphere of insecurity and censorship and these arrests provoked many criticisms abroad and many disappointments about the Obote political regime. ¹⁷

In conclusion, we should focus on two characteristics which place the coup d'etat in its historical-political perspective. First, we might suggest that if one considers Uganda's small size and that it followed in the wake of its more powerful neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania, Ugandan politics could be interpreted as an attempt to compensate for poor 'ecological' givens by the advocacy of a very strong cultural role. This remark would continue to be true later and would justify Obote's politics as, for instance, the 'move to the left'. Obote's policy, in spite of what might be regarded as his opposition to Buganda, was in fact the continuation of the Kabaka's leadership-oriented policy but through the new structures of an independent Uganda. We might suggest further that the coup d'etat might be a significant reaction of Ugandan culture attempting to contest the leading role performed by Kenya and Tanzania.

The flight of the Kabaka was the symbol of the success of this shift. This shift is often called the Obote revolution because beyond the Buganda issue and Kiganda nationalism, it was conducted against what might be regarded as a colonial *residu*. The maintenance of the privileges of Buganda - privileges which had been previously protected by the British - appeared both in the eyes of Obote and in the confrontation of the "African search for nationality and identity" as a *corps étranger* produced by colonialism. Consequently, it represented the cultural transmission of Uganda from the hands of the traditional leader, the Kabaka, to the new social leader, Obote. At the same time, this passage was made in terms of colonial to non-colonial ideological leadership.

The second characteristic can be stated from a sociological point of view. The abortive attempt of the Baganda to retain their autonomy was nothing more than the manifestation of the vitality and the strength of a wealthy peripheral sector of the society vis-a-vis the new political centre.¹⁸ It is one among many examples (Katanga, for instance) of a dysfunctional relationship in modern Africa. It also reveals the distribution of authoritative power and values between new political centres born after and as a result of decolonisation and the traditional sectors which continued to shape the political dynamic of these societies. Moreover, this partial integration of ethnic, cultural, and political groups emerged on the political scene through the agency of the political party. In other words, the political party is in Uganda a microcosm of societal disintegration. Numerous tendencies among the factions indicate the frailty of the UPC. Schisms appeared among Obote's own kinsmen and among the powerful and wealthy Muslim community.

It is quite understandable that any sort of regime, in order to maintain its structures and policies, needs a minimum level of cohesion within its boundaries and a legitimate acceptance by the political community through authority and persuasion. In Africa, the Parsonian differentiation between power and force is not yet well defined and well delimited.¹⁹ Consequently, in order to function, a government has to rely on a strong political device able to implement the politics of the regime and to propagate its ideology. Very often it is the political party which is in charge of performing this role. The part appeared for African leaders as the perfect political weapon. But one condition is then necessary: a high degree of internal integration. In spite of its reshuffling, the UPC could not (and Obote was aware of this) perform this function. At this point a regime is able to survive either through a strong bureaucratic network or, at a lower level, through an integrated police force which might play the role of a militia.

In Uganda, neither the bureaucracy nor the police was able to implement the policies of the regime. The apolitical tradition of the bureaucracy largely made up of Bantu and Baganda worked against any unconditional support for the government on the part of the civil service.²⁰ On the other hand, the police had originally been multi-tribal in its composition and had remained absolutely apolitical. Moreover, the Uganda police force is very poorly equipped and so diffuse that it is practically ineffective. In comparison with the powerful Kenyan organization, the Ugandan police force lacks advanced techniques of criminology (we shall see later what the consequences of this are for the army). The Special Branch of the Kenyan police force is the pivotal instrument on which Jomo Kenyatta relies to maintain the functioning of the political system.²¹ Between 1964 and 1968, the size of the Uganda police force only increased from 5,692 to 7,400 men, an annual growth rate of 0.54. At any rate, there are few chances, if any at all, that the police force would be able to perform any political functions even in terms of coercive support. In effect, the police cannot become the expression of the goals of the society.

In fact it might be argued that, in absence of an army as a counterforce, the police would tend to expand their political power in new nations with weak political institutions, and their intervention might be unstable and fragmentary. Thus, while it might have been an important political experiment to develop some nations without armies, there is no guarantee that such arrangements would be uniformly superior. ²²

Considering his lack of valid alternatives, it is not difficult to understand why President Obote was obliged to depend heavily on the army's support to run the country. However, considering the present structure of the Uganda military organization, some accommodations were necessary in order to reinforce the political affiliation of the soldiers. This was the purpose of the Northernization of the Uganda army.

The Northernization of the Uganda Army: Obote's Search for Political Support

The fourth unit of the King's African Rifles (KAR) was the nucleus around which the modern Ugandan army was built.²³ It might be recalled that the KAR was divided into separate military units for the regions of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia. These KAR units were placed under the control of the Colonial Office at least during peacetime, since in case of war the War Office took control of them. Unlike the case of the famous Royal West African Frontier Force, the military capabilities and coordination of the KAR could not be developed because of the peculiar structure of colonisation in East Africa. As James Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr. have indicated, each of the separate colonial governments tended to press vigorously and continuously for greater economy of military expenditure.

This parsimonious and parochial attitude is largely explained by the fact that each colonial government had substantial budgetary autonomy and that tax-conscious European settlers have had a strong influence upon territorial budgets.²⁴

At its inception, the Ugandan army was essentially made up of members of Northern tribes. The predominance of Northerners was due to the traditional policy of British recruitment of soldiers from warrior tribes, at least those considered as such. The Acholi, the dominant group in the Ugandan army, were heavily recruited because they were regarded by the other Northerners as arrogant and haughty, and so considered good soldiers. It should be noted that experience demonstrated that they were good soldiers. There is also another factor which must be taken into account in order to understand the recruitment of Northerners. There existed one of those ludicrous requirements which are often found in military regulations stipulating a minimum height of 5 feet 8 inches for KAR personnel. Northerners could have access to the army because most of them could meet the height requirement.

From a strategic and a financial point of view, the choice of Northerners appeared fruitful. Since they were considered as warriors already, there was no need for basic and intensive military training and no need for instilling a 'fighting spirit.' Thus the necessary costs could be reduced to equipment and the imposition of a hierarchical and disciplinary network. It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with British policy vis-a-vis their military units in Africa, but we might add that because of the roots of colonial politics, the strong influence of White settlers, and the lack of educational opportunities in the armies, the Africanisation of the officer corps began very late.

Africanisation began theoretically in 1959 when East Africans were eligible for training at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. But actually only one East African received such training. While this low cadence of Africanisation was justified by politico-economic reasons, it is easy to understand that it gave birth to a certain number of practical problems for the different military staffs of East African armies. Taking into account colonial politics, these difficulties were handled by the creation in 1956 of a special rank of Warrant Officer often called *effendi*. This was an African duplication of the system used by the British in India. A Warrant Officer fulfilled the function of an officer. He was sometimes considered as such, but he did not retain the legal status of an officer. Idi Amin, for example, a sergeant at that time, was among the first to be nominated as an *effendi* in 1959. Two years later he was commissioned.

This technique allowed the British Command to avoid military difficulties by promoting experienced African soldiers while still being in charge of the staff. But if this situation was an easy path during the transitional colonial period, the acquisition of independence sharpened the real problems of this ambiguous situation. Just after independence many of the younger, better educated individuals who had been planning a military career through the British academies had to compete with the newly promoted NCO's and Warrant Officers who had been the key element in the Ugandan KAR. Thus, as soon as the Ugandan army had been formed, its homogeneity was already infected by educational and generational strains.

It seems plausible to assume that this conflict was at the foundation of the mutinies in Uganda in 1964. However, many explanations which appear in the literature dealing

with East African mutinies are not completely satisfactory as far as Uganda is concerned. While they are right in stressing the importance of poor equipment, low salaries, and the lack of respect for the Africanisation schedule, behind these strictly material problems appeared some other dimensions such as the question of loyalty to the government²⁵ and the internal conflicts within the military organisation. This last point is interesting because it shows the relation of the fact that the January mutiny took place in Uganda less than six weeks after the return of eight cadets from Mons Officer Cadet School in Aldershot.²⁶ The mutiny seems to have been the expression of the frustrations or jealousy felt by the promoted NCO's for their younger and better educated colleagues.

Jealousy is one element which strongly influences the parametric equilibrium of the military organisation. It has been emphasised that the idiosyncrasy of the structural norms such as authority and discipline, obedience and hierarchy of this bureaucratic organization which is the army (barely comparable to the Weberian model) are justified by its goals (the inevitability of hostilities) and are strongly influenced by elements such as prestige and expertise which might reinforce cohesion. A lower rank who behaved well under fire might have more prestige and consequently more influence than an untested upper rank.²⁷ In Uganda, the young officers trained in Britain did not have any charisma or prestige in the eyes of the older NCO's or WO's especially when the latter were very proud of their military experience acquired during the second World War in the Far East. It was consequently extremely difficult for the younger officers to be obeyed and to justify the ex officio leadership form in the hierarchy.

A second problem reinforced these difficulties. Hierarchical obedience, displayed in respecting orders given by high ranking officers, has taken a particular arrangement precisely because of the structures of ethnic communication. During the colonial period, British officers, in order to control the soldiers (mainly Northerners), adopted within the military communication network the tribal pattern of communication. Accordingly the British officers communicated with an intermediary (an NCO, for instance) according to a complicated system deriving from traditional palavers (*barazas*).²⁸ The orders after that were dispatched to the troops through the intermediaries. After independence, the young cadets, who were replacing

British officers and trained according to a purely Western military system, could not communicate with and would not be obeyed by the NCO and others. No admiration and respect based on military heroism could fill in this gap. This behavior among up-rank officers is still an important factor. For example, General Amin has always shown a great deal of suspicion towards young cadets and has refused to agree to promotions so that the better educated men receive reduced pay and status. The first Ugandan cadet, Lt. Karugaba, just back from the RMA at Sandhurst, was dismissed from the army.²⁹

What is important to emphasize is that this conflict between generations coincided with an ethnic conflict. In order to apply for training at British military academies, a primary and secondary education is required. Thus most of the young cadets come from the south because these groups came into contact first with European institutions and received more opportunities for formal education and instruction than people from the North.

What were the consequences for a government facing national difficulties of having an army riddled by internal dissension? Certainly it could not count on strong and unified support. In order to cope with a lack of support from the policy force and within the bureaucracy, Obote's strategy was directed towards a strong northernization of the army. Northernization became a twofold operation. The government could hope to find reliable support for the implementation of its policies and at the same time to resolve the inherent tensions inside the army at the expense of the southerners. In its policy of northernization the government's task was greatly facilitated when links between officers from the south and suspicious politicians were evident. For instance, Lts. R. Katarwa and D.C. Ndhura were dismissed because of their familial relationships with two of the five arrested Bantu ministers (Ibingira and Magezi).³⁰ Many other southern officers were arrested when the proof was made that the Kabaka, in order to solve his precarious political situation, had made contact with Bantu officers. A number of captains and junior officers were court-martialled on charges related to mysterious connections in an abortive military coup.

The northernization of the army went so far as to bring about the arrest of Brigadier-General Sabama Opolot. He was a long-time service professional and had received a degree after being trained at Sandhurst.

Brigadier Opolot is not properly speaking a southerner, but he belongs to the Teso group who are related to the Nilotes, but are culturally closer to the Bantu-speaking group and called for that reason a 'swing tribe.' He was assimilated by his colleagues more like a southerner than a northerner and could not have had any authority over northerners within the councils of government. Because of these delicate relationships with his colleagues, Opolot was de facto replaced by the government as chief of staff. His impatient colleague, Idi Amin, was appointed in his place and later arrested him for unclear reasons. This occurred at the same time that a motion was submitted accusing the Prime Minister and Idi Amin of smuggling ivory and gold.³¹

As a result, the politics of northernization reached the high command of the army. Colonel Amin was promoted to Chief of Staff and military advisor to the Cabinet and to Defense Minister. New appointments for the post of army commander were given to two northerner officers: Brigadiers Pierino Yere Okoya and Suleiman Hussein.

The dynamic of the northernization of the army allows us to articulate two important features. Firstly, we can see why the Ugandan army showed the highest level of officer dismissal and the reluctance of men to apply for appointment to British military academies. The following table (see table no. 1) indicates the low number of Ugandan cadets both at Mons and Sandhurst in comparison with other East African cadets and their army's size in the period discussed above. Secondly, it allows us to understand the continuous recruitment of civilians in the army. The great number of dismissals and desertions especially after May 1966 (when many Baganda officers deserted the army for fear of repression) might have favored the functional goal of northernization for gaining support for the government's policies, but it also weakened the numerical strength of the army. Thus the Obote regime did not hesitate to call up individuals who were not necessarily planning a military career. In 1965, for example, among the 30 officers sent to Ghana by the Minister of Defense, there were several former primary school teachers, an engineering assistant from the Public Work Department, and a clerk from the Ministry of Regional Administration.³² Thus the Ugandan army, through massive changes, became northernized. Consequently the Ugandan army was able to have at its disposal a coherent base or support in the army.

The Obote revolution in 1966 eliminated southern particularisms. At the institutional level, the new constitution was a departure for radical politics and at the military level, northernization was designed both to provide

a reliable support for the civilian government and to eliminate the internal tensions within the military class.

Consequently, a question remains to be asked. Why in spite of its political consistency did this situation generate a military coup? Having reinforced his political position, having given Uganda a national identity, being theoretically able to rely on the army, how was Obote supplanted by the army? There is something paradoxical that the functions of the President were taken over by the Chief of Staff who had been placed at the head of the army by the ousted President. For this reason we might suggest that beyond the consistency discussed above, a mechanism of rising frustrations had developed in the army—frustrations generated by the fact that the army was used as the main political support. Obote, in utilizing the army, exposed himself to the demands of it as the result of this utilization. But the level of satisfaction received by the army was always lower than the level of demands (based on the increasing utilization). Therefore, one might assume that the coup is the device for the army to implement its demands.

Table No. 1
East African cadets trained in Britain between
1964 - 1965 and 1966 - 1967

	1964 - 1965			1966 - 1967		
	R.M.A. Sandhurst	Eaton Hall and OGS Mons	Army Size	R.M.A. Sandhurst	Eaton Hall and OGS Mons	Army Size
Uganda	4	12	2,000	8	12	5,960
Kenya	14	75	2,500	13	36	5,000
Malawi	4	20	750	-	9	1,086
Tanzania	13	46	2,000	14	7	5,280
Zambia	10	30	2,200	10	50	3,440

Sources: Figures adapted from J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*, London, 1969, p. 126 and from D. Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 15, April, 1966

The Rise of Frustration in the Uganda Military Organisation:
The Dynamic of Protest

We have presented the process of northernisation of the Uganda army in terms of a search for political support emanating from the government. In reality, however, this process has to be understood as one of interaction. It belongs to the complex of military-governmental tensions. If it appeared to be a political device for the government, the politics of northernisation was also a response to a certain number of demands emanating from the army--demands mainly brought for the solution of the internal strains. The dynamic of such a process generally acted to strengthen one of the partners. But in this case, the tension between the army and the civilians had a greater chance to be advantageous to the army because the army controlled the instruments of violence unless there were a strong cultural belief in civilian institutions or a civilian control over the military either by 'subjective control' or by 'objective control.'³³ In Uganda, Huntington's notion of the permeation of the military by civilian values and interests was reversed in the sense that military interests penetrated civilian values.

For example, at the time of the army mutinies in January 1964, Obote put himself in a considerably weakened position vis-a-vis the mutineers by giving in to all their demands. There were large scale promotions to the rank of officer, the formation of a new battalion of infantry, and a general increase of salaries. Only three mutineers were condemned, and all those who were suspected were allowed to rejoin the ranks some months later. Obote could not have repressed this mutiny as could his East African neighbors who imposed important sanctions on their mutineers and who reconstituted their armies on new bases according to the non-political western formula in Kenya and in rebuilding through the party system in Tanzania. Tanzania would be an example of the permeation of the military by civilian values. The Defense Minister, F.K. Onama, who had been taken as hostage and ridiculed by the mutineers, was not even replaced in his functions.

From a political point of view, the mutiny had a very important significance in terms of military influence. By definition, a mutiny is a protestive device functioning outside the political-social set of means legitimized by the system. One might consider the mutiny comparable to a revolt.³⁴ It is a kind of anomic behavior directed towards 'something' which plays the role of a frustrative object. There is no political goal, it is entirely negative. Generally the authors of a mutiny or a revolt, if they succeed in their action, become very embarrassed by their success. Even though mutinies are seen mainly as non-political actions,³⁵ in Africa and particularly in East Africa they are a means

for the army to express its demands by bringing them to a political level.

Consequently, the word mutiny expresses another meaning. We might assume that it corresponds to the process of *greve sur le tas*. To compare a mutiny with a strike appears as an operational concept in understanding the 1964 events. The army organization, because of its particular structure and its goals and functions, has no expressive devices for its demands. In any institutional framework (bureaucratic or not), the strike is the institutionally legitimized channel through which the members are able to express their grievances. Not having such an opportunity, the mutiny might be regarded as the non-institutionalized device that the military organization utilizes for expressing its demands. Ali Mazrui and Donald Rothchild have concluded: *"The 'strike' by soldiers is very nearly an insurrection and is fraught with enormous risks for life, property, and stability. It cannot be treated as just another problem for the Labour Department."* 36

The aim of this brief insight into the ambiguous significance of the mutiny in African armies is to show that we might legitimately assume the coup d'etat can be placed in the same perspective. The coup d'etat appears as the temporary termination of a long sequence of frustrations within the Uganda military establishment. It is the result of what is called sociologically a relative deprivation process.

The study of the concept of relative deprivation has given birth to a considerable amount of work and definitions. Defined by S.A. Stouffer and others, this notion might be formulized in the following way: relative deprivation is the actor's perception of discrepancies between his value aspirations (by reference to other individual or group standards and status) and his capability to implement these values according to his personal and social possibilities. 37.

As far as the Uganda army is concerned, the frustrations could be summarized in two categories, each of them having a direct or indirect impact on the civilian-military balance. But they have to be analysed according to the dimensions and perspectives in which any military organisation is embedded; that is, the inevitability of hostility.38. The *raison d'etre* of any army is combat and therefore the military is trained and equipped with this

in mind. As far as the armies of developing areas are concerned (except for those leading liberation wars) the 'war of deprivation' might be regarded as the basic frustrative mechanism. In tropical Africa, there are two specific reasons which corroborate this assertion. Firstly, as a result of the colonial heritage, Africa was usually isolated from the major conflicts during the colonial era.³⁹ It seems that the former colonial powers tried to limit the possibilities of African armies operating outside their own borders. Secondly, from a logistic point of view African armies were normally unable to face any kind of war commitment and to support the burden of more than a few days of battle.⁴⁰ Thus African armies were not utilized in external conflicts. For example, in Africa, each soldier is required to defend 130 sq. km. The fire power is very weak because of the lack of heavy artillery and operational air forces.⁴¹

The basic frustration, then, could be indicated as follows: a military man is trained to uphold the principles of discipline and the hierarchical structure, to believe in combat, and to be psychologically conditioned in the importance of his role vis-a-vis the nation. Besides his military education, the army man receives elementary instruction which, when exposed to the communication media, makes him more aware of the impracticability of the occurrence of war in such a way that he might question the usefulness of his organization. This overall deprivation is fortunately either sublimated or transposed through heavy military exercises, training, or war-gaming.⁴²

In Uganda, this basic frustration was heightened by the utilization of the army in civil functions and police tasks. This shift towards civilian oriented performance had important consequences in the dynamic of deprivation. In terms of military behavior, one knows that the military 'spirit' is incompatible with police oriented activities. Many officers, for instance, believe that police activities are not noble functions. Therefore, to modify the military role to a police oriented role increases the frustrations among the military establishment. From a political point of view, these kind of domestic tasks have contributed in a way to the politicization of the army. The internal operations in which the army is involved makes clear that officers believe the survival of the political system depends heavily upon them. Further, it has been argued that if a government in order to maintain political order

is obliged to appeal to its military rather than its police force, its legitimacy is weakened.⁴³ How these domestic activities are implemented and how they increase the level of deprivation in the Ugandan military establishment are questions we are going to consider by looking at two elements of Uganda politics: the problem of maintaining order internally and at the borders.

The Problem of Border Security

Since most of these operations dealt with border conflicts, one might suggest that the military was able to absorb its basic frustrations by involving its military leaders in external operations. In Uganda this took another form because the army could never succeed in these type of operations because of the lack of equipment, the lack of appropriate strategy, and the consequences of political involvement. Uganda is located between Zaire, Sudan, and Rwanda, countries in which strong minorities are constantly struggling against the central authority. Depending upon their military and political situation, these groups are either rebelling (consequently fighting) or becoming refugees seeking political asylum. Therefore the politics of the Ugandan government were organized to match the exigencies of the international agreements on political asylum and those of the African bilateral treaties. The former and the latter were sometimes in contradiction. Thus the Ugandan army had to obey the sudden shifts in policies which caused bitter dissatisfaction among its members.

Zaire

The problem of what attitude to adopt vis-avis the Congolese rebellion was a major issue of Ugandan foreign policy and caused a strong reaction from the Uganda army. There are several reasons for that which were summarized in Africa Report:

Financial inducement as well as a shared anti-establishment bias drew Uganda's up rank officers and the self-styled Congolese rebels together, and Obote's own position on the Congolese rebellion was sufficiently ambivalent to allow a great deal of operational cooperation which was evidently not cleared with the army commander...⁴⁴

Furthermore, Obote's ambiguous attitude towards this rebellion was clarified when he publicly declared that the government under the pressure of the majority party (and

after an East African meeting where Christophe Gbenye was heard) decided to appoint Colonel Idi Amin to organize assistance to the Congolese rebels.

However, after the Nairobi Conference (March 31 to April 2, 1966) which espoused the 'good neighborly feelings' it was decided that member states should control the activities of refugees within their borders, avoid propaganda campaigns against neighboring states and cooperate closely in eliminating border incidents. Thus this conference ended the military aid to the Congolese rebellion. At the same time, President Mobutu was gaining more and more legitimacy in East Africa. After further talks the two governments of Uganda and the Congo agreed upon a new policy towards the refugees. Those who wished to stay in Uganda (although urged to return home) were placed in a camp far from the border. The Uganda army was therefore gradually deprived of its 'external involvement.' Furthermore it was obliged to arrest refugees and rebels who tried to cross the frontier to attack Congolese military units. It is understandable why many 'good' soldiers might feel uneasy in fighting peoples they were assisting previously.

Sudan

There are 160,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda. They are southern Sudanese people, therefore Nilotes and of the same origin as the Northerners in Uganda. For this reason, they were sympathetically received by the government. In spite of an official rapprochement with the Sudanese government, they were equipped, trained and supplied with arms by Uganda. The southern Sudanese Liberation Army, the *Anya-nya*, is reported to have received intense military training and some equipment in a camp near the frontier. This was for the Ugandan army an indirect 'war involvement.' As a result, the Sudanese military administration decided to pursue *Anya-nya* rebels into Ugandan territory if Uganda persisted in allowing them sanctuary. It is not necessary to recall that the Sudanese army is one of the most powerful military structures in Africa.⁴⁵ Consequently the role of the Ugandan army was to prevent, though not to fight, southern Sudanese in their search for protection among their ethnic neighbors. The rapprochement made the Ugandan army admit its weakness and impotence in the face of the Sudanese threat. It was announced that in August 190,000 refugees had returned to their country and at the beginning of 1971 mercenary Rolf Steiger was caught in Ugandan territory and handed over to the Sudan government where his trial was carried on. Similar difficulties were occurring with the Tutsi refugees who have not lost hope of restoring the Monarchy in Rwanda.

The Problem of Maintaining Order Within Uganda

The utilisation of the army for purposes of internal security is another element which had two main effects. Firstly, it added to the sequence of frustrations which the army was suffering and secondly, it brought the military to become aware of the government's inability to maintain order and to understand that the survival of the political system depended upon them.

The structural weakness of the police force did not allow the government to face the high level of crime in Uganda.⁴⁶ Uganda, like other developing nations going through rapid social change had to face a certain number of dysfunctions arising from the discrepancies between economic and social status and the changes in the value system of the people. As Musa Mushanga has pointed out:

The most unfortunate thing is that the educated, the politician, the businessman or farmer, and the poor unemployed or the underpaid and very often the over-taxed have the same culturally prescribed aspirations but do not have the same socially structured avenues for the realisation of these aspirations.⁴⁷

Thus people who are exposed to changing values and who cannot find any means of handling the new opportunities decide to supply their needs through anti-social activities. The same author has shown that youth are most prone to succumb to criminal behavior. In Uganda, this civil violence developed along ethno-cultural lines. Having lost their power on the political and economic scene, the Baganda were induced to protest through an underground network. At the same time, the Northern peoples, who were exposed to the new value systems generated by the government (and by the inherent northernization of the regime), but who did not yet see their expectations satisfied and who knew that the South remained more privileged (at least in the economic distribution of the wealth) decided to gain more wealth through violence. People organized themselves in opposing groups if not in opposed gangs (*kondo*) either fighting each other or carrying out *razzia* in stores or houses. Some of the more powerful organisations built along lines of mafia-type social banditry fought for underground leadership based upon *reglement de comptes* and vengeance.⁴⁸ This civil violence and the impotence of the police caused the re-appearance of the ancient form of private or personal justice. Suspicious persons and thieves were killed with-

out any kind of trial. This form of non-institutional justice and of de facto militia became very common throughout Uganda.

The government, in order to deal with this increasing violence, decided to appeal to the army. It was, however, evident that the army could not solve this type of problem. Many years ago in Africa, the army could have been utilized as a police device (in Nigeria, for example, to fight strikes or in Sierra Leone to struggle against diamond smuggling). But now a functional division between the tasks of the army and those of the police appears necessary. To take the Ugandan example, in 1953, a period when the Ugandan Rifles (a division of the KAR) was being used outside the territory, the British decided to establish a police force. In other words, the social changes such as urbanization, migration and the rise of internal conflicts necessitated the creation of a police force. The army at this time appeared unprepared to handle these types of conflicts and domestic strains. Criminal investigation is a new complex science and it requires a great knowledge of the society and of its customs and languages. It has naturally led to very elaborate professional specialization. On the other hand, the traditional reluctance of the military for police tasks was not helpful. The solution to these difficulties outside of reforming the values of the society and satisfying the peoples' aspirations would have been the creation of a police force based upon the constabulary model. Morris Janowitz has suggested a solution to this problem of violence in the United States which could be applied to Uganda:

The constabulary function as applied to urban violence emphasized a fully alert force committed to a minimum resort to force and concerned with the development and maintenance for viable democratic political institutions. The constabulary approach implies a continuing review of the division of responsibility between local and federal authorities, as well as of the social prestige and professional self-concept of the police.⁴⁹

The utilization of the army had no effect on the reduction of violence in Ugandan society, but it increased the level of the frustration among military personnel whose role was now considered to be law enforcement. Moreover, the army was also utilized to maintain order between the traditional fighting groups. For instance, the army had to intervene constantly without any real success against the Bankon and the Bwamba who are entrenched in the

mountains and who are the traditional enemies of the Batoro. These groups were fighting mainly to create the independent state of Rwenzori. Similarly the army had to try to calm the warring tradition of the Turkana and Karamojong. But the army did not succeed in this type of military operation. Both the struggle against rising violence and the maintenance of order in the North caused the army to increase its demands upon the government which were made in increases of men and equipment. One must not be astonished by the high growth ratio of the size of the Ugandan army. Since 1962, the number of soldiers has increased from 1,000 to 7,500 in 1970, to 8550 in 1972, the growth rate reaching circa 48% annually (see table no. 2).

We wish to restate the importance of frustration as an antecedent of coup d'etats. The Uganda army, 8,550 strong and relatively well equipped, became the only political support for Obote.⁵⁰ It has been said that this relationship was reciprocal so that if the army faced any difficulties in fulfilling its mission, it was obvious that it was going to make some demands upon the government. In Uganda this 'exchange' of demands was an escalative one. Aware of this dynamic, Obote, in order to weaken the rising flow of demands emanating from his own demands upon the army, decided to create a second military unit, the General Service Unit (GSU).*

This type of paramilitary group is found everywhere in Africa under different labels: militia, bodyguards, President's guard. Not quite a military force these units have been either used to protect the head of state or to influence the population through a propaganda network. Some of these groups have disappeared or have been transformed into propaganda devices (like the Red Guard in China). Such was the case in Mali until 1966, when the militia began developing into a strong military-political weapon. In other states, these organizations succeeded in assuming a very important role in the functioning of the political system, performing at the same time a political, military and police role. One of them was the famous President's Own Guard Regiment in Ghana, another the General Service Unit in Uganda. However, their development was a function only of the relationship between the military and the government.

* *It should be noted that the GSU does not belong juridically to the army. There was, however, another group within the army, the Special Force, on which Obote relied before the creation of the GSU. But we emphasize the GSU because it was regarded by the military as their personal opposition.*

Table No. 2
Comparative Growth Rates of
East African Armies

	1962			1964			1967			1970			1972		
	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy
Uganda	1000	2000	5700	200	60	7150	450	80	8550	450	100				
Kenya	—	2500	4475	450	150	4700	450	250	6300	620	250				
Malawi	—	750	1086	—	—	1200	—	—	1300	—	—				
Tanzania	—	2000	5000	200	80	5700	250	100	10000	500	600				
Zambia	—	2200	3200	240	—	4000	400	—	4500	1000	—				

Sources: The inconsistency among the different sources is such that it is difficult to give any precise figures. For example, the size of the Uganda army in 1970 was an average of 7000 men, but some data indicates 9000 men (without including the GSU). The mean size of the Tanzania army would be 5500 men, but other sources report upwards to 10000 men. However, the figures shown above are drawn from the computation of several surveys and controlled by one consistent source published by the Institute of Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), pp. 34-39. The Almanac of World Military Power (Harrisburg, Stackpois Books, 1970).

In Uganda, it is needless to say that integration seems to have been the main issue on the political level. The government, attempting to deal with the fragmentation of society and seeking political legitimacy, had to establish its power on an efficiently authoritative device. Neither the police nor the bureaucracy could fulfill this demand whereas the army could. To northernize the army was the objective of Obote. It is unclear whether in fact he even thought he would succeed. In case of a political emergency, Obote would rather have fallen back on a more reliable device. It was for that reason that the GSU saw its status increase from year to year.

Although it is difficult to gather any reliable data about the GSU, we can surmise that it had increased from 200 men at its inception to 900 or 1,000 men when the coup occurred. One source has estimated that the size of the GSU at this time was 2,000 men.⁵¹ In order to perform its political role efficiently, the GSU was exclusively composed of Lango (Obote's tribe). The budget allocation was secret, but it seems that a large amount of money was invested in it, especially in terms of military equipment. (Russian and Chinese weapons, very modern in comparison with those used by the army, were found after the coup; incidentally some of them were found in Obote's private residence.) It is noteworthy that an increase of the GSU's budget was accepted without discussion during a period of proclaimed austerity. Divided into small units and dispersed along strategical positions in the country such as the Sudanese borders, the *raison d'etre* of the GSU was to prevent foreign involvement in Ugandan affairs. This is an important feature because even more than the regular army, the GSU had access not only to political documents, but also to military information.

It is easily understandable that the army, aware of these favours, became very jealous of the GSU's status. This was especially true since the army had nothing to exhibit except defeats. Less numerous than the army, the GSU was sent to Mengo Hill to depose the Kabaka after the army was unsuccessful. One understands the increasing frustration among the soldiers. From the point of view of military competitiveness, the army was theoretically stronger than the GSU, but was less able to succeed. Moreover, the heavy loss in human life suffered by the GSU at Mengo Hill reinforced the political identification of the GSU vis-a-vis Obote. After 1969, Obote relied

more and more on the GSU. Akenda Adoko, a Lango and close friend of Obote, became the commander of the unit. Finally another element which reinforced the jealousy of the army vis-a-vis the GSU was that the GSU could have been used by Obote as an apolitical instrument designed to oversee the behaviour of the army and to dominate the high command. (*Mutatis mutandis* like the Nazi secret police infiltrated the Wehrmacht during the Second World War.)

There is another factor which is very important in evaluating the coup. It might be said that this following interpretation focuses on the impact of domestic politics on the increase of frustration among the military establishment. In other words, it allows one to see a direct connection between political affairs and military affairs. One might say that the new orientation that Obote's government gave its politics---the socialization of the regime through the "move to the left"--was interpreted by the army as the end of its privileges, especially the end of its financial perquisites. Before going further with a detailed analysis, let us have a look at domestic politics during this period.

To explain the new socialist orientation of the Uganda government, two main reasons can be advanced. The first was a function of the East African environment. It is certain that the very strong personality of a Julius Nyerere or a Jomo Kenyatta had generated in Obote's mind the desire to imitate their social philosophies. The political philosophy of Zambian humanism or, more prominently, the Arusha Declaration (along Ujamaa lines) appeared not only as a possible socio-economic solution for the Ugandan future, but also might have allowed Obote to exhibit a new political ethos vis-a-vis his East African neighbours.

The second reason lies in the logic of policies that Obote had decided to initiate after independence. Because Uganda lacked cohesiveness, unity was Obote's main goal. After having weakened Bagandan influence, Obote decided to reorient the regime toward the one-party system and a more egalitarian economy free from the structures of traditionalism. In regard to the evolution of the one-party system, the way was made easy by the delicate position of the Democratic Party whose influence had considerably declined since the trial of its leader, Ben-Kiwanuka. The assassination attempt of December, 1969, allowed Obote to ban

every opposition party. The UPC was itself "repurified." Members of the party were harshly criticized for their eagerness to place their own interests at the expense of the political goals of the nation. However, the implicit opposition of the South was still strong⁵² and paradoxically, Obote was faced with rising opposition from the ranks of the most radical members of his party who were reproaching the UPC's leader for being too cautious and pragmatic. The new politics was launched at the end of 1968 with the announcement of the "move to the left" which was proclaimed in the "Common Man's Charter."⁵³ This radical policy had the advantage of reinforcing the political leadership of its promoter and of spreading economic wealth throughout the country. It was also designed to appeal directly for the peoples' support and to alienate many who had vested interests in the existing conditions.

Without a doubt, this radicalization of the regime generated a new wave of enmity against the government. Capitalist businessmen sensed a threat to their property rights. If it affected the political process and the alliances and supporting mechanisms, the move to the left also had an important impact on an army already overburdened by strong feelings of frustration: Although it is difficult to gather enough evidence, it might be said that the move to the left with all its implications of economic and financial austerity was perceived by the army as a threat to its financial privileges. As a result of the northernization process and the heavy utilization of the military in domestic affairs, the army saw its financial prerogatives increase greatly. Except for the Zambian army (and only at the highest levels), the Ugandan army offered higher salaries than any other East African army and perhaps in Africa. (See Table No. 3)

The Process of Deterioration and the Logic of the Coup

The Significance of the Northernization of the Ugandan Army

We have tried to show clearly the process of northernization; it is however necessary to evaluate its significance. It is doubtlessly easier to explain or to expose a fascinatingly paradoxical bipolarization, but such rhetorical preoccupations must not confuse the confrontation of the theory against reality. Even the best mechanism of integration is subjected to some dysfunctional conflicts and tensions. The term northernization

Table No. 3
East African Army Salaries
(in Sterling pounds)

	Uganda	Kenya	Malawi	Zambia
Commander	2900			
Brigadier	2500	2520	—	3066
Colonel	2300	2175	2440	2691
Lt. Colonel	1935	1935	2000	2217
Major	1690	1690	1271	1779
Captain	1200	1200	954	1368
Lieutenant	905	905	668	1003
S/Lieutenant	790	790	615	949
Cadet	516	312	312	638
W.O. 1	963	813	455	784
W.O. 11	648	525	383	547
Sergeant	310	316	242	370
Corporal	—	194	161	292
Private	285	129	108	180

Source: Table adapted from Lee, *African Army and Civil Order* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 94.

East African Military Expenditures, 1970-71

	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Zambia
Est. GNP (millions \$)	106	158	110	158
Defense Budget (millions \$)	16.875	24.5	26.64	17.64

Source: The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London, 1971), pp. 36-39.

is simultaneously proper and improper. It is precise because it indicates the elimination of the Bantu speaking southerners from the army. It is imprecise because it leads to confusion between northernization and ethnic integration as if the army were composed of one tribe. Even if the army had been composed of only one ethnic group, that would not prevent the occurrence of cleavage born from other sorts of conflicts such as intra-generational strains, conflicts within the peer groups based upon respect of military norms, etc. In fact, it is necessary to give to this term all the relativism possible and to understand this word for the reason for which it has been chosen, i.e. simplification along the crucial cleavage found in Uganda society.

This main division must not make us lose sight of the other tensions though they are not so acute. However, these tensions are not directly related to the coup but perform a useful function in understanding political loyalties. In fact, they are often superimposed or coincidental with other conflicts such as rivalries for prestige and influence. For example, among the Acholi, who constitute the dominant group of the Ugandan army, antagonisms arose very often based upon internal loyalties, kinship affiliations, and family influences. In order to balance the dominant presence of the Acholi, Lango were heavily and hastily recruited, contributing to an increase in the possibility of future conflicts. However, both of these groups belong to the Nilote cluster, supposedly strongly loyal to Obote. Two other northern groups, the Lugbara and Teso, were very opposed to the Acholi and the Lango (putting in a secondary effect the Acholi-Lango tensions). First the Lugbara, who supported Amin in spite of a strong acculturation to the Nilotes, had many grievances against the Acholi. The second group was the Teso (Karamajong) who, although a "swing tribe", are generally neutral vis-a-vis northern loyalties.

In northernization would have been a rewarding political calculation, its rapidity did not allow the crystallization of primary groups which perform a very important function of resisting disintegration and maintaining cohesion. Caught up in an atmosphere of frustration, the Ugandan soldiers could not rely on any structural elements capable of lessening their anxieties⁵⁴ Thus, while it is important to understand the process of northernization, we believe that the tensions discussed above would not normally assume a key role, but they

became important in the abnormal situation of frustration. We shall see that the consolidation of the military regime depended upon the degree of cohesion within the military establishment.

The Polarization of the Military-Civilian Relationship.

A strong polarization occurred very soon after the end of 1969. This polarization materialized in a personal conflict between Obote and Amin; yet, the situation before the coup was so confused in terms of relationships between the two antagonists that it is difficult to find some clear-cut guidelines. We can say that Amin entered into conflict with Obote and other members of the army loyal to Obote as the result of the frustration process explained above. For example, Idi Amin did not hide any longer his opposition to Akena Adoko, Obote's close kinsman in charge of the GSU. In order to show their opposition to Idi Amin, a certain number of officers inside the army under the responsibility of Lieutenant-Colonel D. Ojok (a Lango) succeeded in petitioning against their commander. Although such an act was a very serious breach of discipline since it questioned the hierarchial principle of obedience, Ojok was not even court-martialed. Without any doubt, he was protected by the President. Thus the army regulations were violated by the infiltration of civilian influence and whatever the position of Amin, it shows that the army seemed to have lost part of its privileges (juridical among others) and its prestige. This situation was aggravated by other events such as the unclear assassination of P.Y. Okoya on 25th of January. After the elimination of Brigadier Opolot, Major Okoya was one of the two army appointed commanders when Amin was promoted Chief of Staff and military advisor to the Cabinet and the defence minister. Okoya, though a close friend of Amin, made serious criticisms against his former friend in a secret session dealing with the future role of the army after the assassination attempt against Obote (it might be recalled that at the end of December 1969, Obote was wounded in the face by a shot). Although no clues were found, suspicion was brought upon Amin.⁵⁵

In spite of northernization the army it seemed, after 1969, was divided into two main groups, themselves not really cohesive: those in favour of the government and those in favour of Amin. Each of them hoped that the

frustrations would be solved if these personality conflicts were solved. Those in favour of Obote would blame their frustrations on Amin's faults. That Amin was a bad commander could have been the reason for the failures of the army (consequently at the origin of the frustrations). Those in favour of Amin believed that more power in the hands of the army could be the best manner to defuse these frustrations.

In order to reinforce his influence inside the army, Amin placed officers loyal to him in all the battalions and especially placed all his confidence in the Paratroop battalion. The fidelity of this battalion was based upon two elements. Firstly, the paratroop battalion was strongly jealous of the role of the GSU. This battalion, well trained by Israeli advisors, was considered a crack unit. Secondly, it was composed entirely of men chosen by Amin himself. This unit was sometimes called Amin's suicide squad. On the political level, Amin's position was strong and influential.

Due to the influential position of Onama, the defence minister, who might be considered because of his past actions during the mutinies⁵⁶ as a *homme de paille*, a straw man for the army. Obote understood, then, the danger of the dynamics of Northernization and of the frustration mechanisms produced and tried to modify his relations with the army. General Amin was sent to Nasser's funeral and was advised as a good Muslim to make his pilgrimage to Mecca. During this period, Obote decided that the post of Chief of Staff had to be divided. Amin would remain as Army Commander, but promoted Colonel Juma Musa to become Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Brigadier Suleiman (one of the former army commanders and Okoya's colleague) became Chief of Staff of the Army. All promotions were delayed until Amin's orders were rescinded. Everybody in Uganda thought that Amin's position was terminated. Sick with gout when he came back from the Middle East and obliged to stay at home, reports circulated that he was under arrest.

In order to maintain his position the only alternative for Amin was the coup d'etat. Details are still unclear, but we can assume that Amin was definitely compromised. Before Obote left Uganda for Singapore, the government under the channel of the Auditor General asked for some explanation about the expense of five million sterling pounds by the Army and Obote asked Amin to defend

himself against the allegation of being involved in Okoya's assassination. Obote ordered the GSU to help Brigadiers Hussein and Ojok to overthrow Amin by a pre-emptive coup. However, one would wonder about such a solution. In effect, whatever the dissensions within the army, the military would have more or less refused to be helped by the GSU. Also at this time, Hussein and Ojok, in spite of their loyalty to the government, would have been tempted to take over the power for themselves. In support of this argument is the idea that Obote would involve the GSU whose fidelity he trusted to overthrow Amin in order to prevent an eventual coup by the brigadiers.

After a private meeting with the President and with Basile Bataringanya, Suleiman Hussein and Ojok ordered troop movements led by the Commander of the 2nd Infantry, Colonel Mesmera Arack, the commanding officer of the School of Infantry, Colonel Langoya, and the commanding officer of the battalion stationed in Morote, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Loyira. Two other officers were reported to have participated in this operation, the military police chief, Captain Nyero, and Major Obote.

This plot, if we consider this assessment accurate, failed because the officers loyal to Amin, who infiltrated the different battalions, could alert Amin, who was consequently able to take the initiative.⁵⁷ The initiative of the coup would have been taken by Captains Ocima and Otachu, who revealed after the coup that Obote was planning to eliminate every non-Lango officer from the army. The troops loyal to Amin were sent towards Hussein and Ojok's troops. After twelve hours of combat 200 deaths (most of them by the GSU) the advantage shifted to Amin's men.

However, one might wonder if Obote had not made a mistake when he left the country. Knowing the growing opposition of Amin and realizing that a military usurpation often occurs during the absence of the head of state (Ghana, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, etc.), Obote should have been able to prevent Akena Adoko's departure from the country.

Because this article is mainly designed to explain the crisis, only the dysfunctional aspect of the system's dynamic has been shown. It is quite certain that this rhetorical condensation of the events was spread out over several months and confident of the "close watch on affairs" by the GSU, Obote left the country and let Adoko take a trip to London without having any idea that there

was something afoot.

Finally, we could see that everyone of these analyzed elements such as the problem of order maintenance and police operations, the domestic commitment of the army, the constant increase of the GSU's role in the Ugandan political system, and the evolution of the regime and its perception by the military establishment, converged to raise the flow of frustrations and bitterness within the army, provoked intense social strains among soldiers and modified the structure of the military-civilian relationship towards a very strong polarization at the expense of the government.

One might consequently suggest that the January 25th coup is inscribed in the logic of the events of 1964. That is to say that the mutiny and coup d'etat are two forms of what we might define as an homeostatic response to impossible satisfaction and can be construed as the organization's "natural way" of healing a certain level of frustration. The Coup like the mutiny might be interpreted in terms of corporate revendication or rather in terms of what we could call "*Poujadisme*".⁵⁸ The 1964 mutinies and the coup of 1971 appear as an aggression sequence following a certain level of frustrations.

The political aspect of this comparative revendication is easily explained if one bears in mind the peculiar characteristic of military organization and its physical isolation from the social community. The army acting as an integrative institution is prone to high conflicts among its members which explains the polarization between Amin's and Obote's followers, and which forced the officer corps to express its demands and its anxieties in an absolutist way placing the blame upon the government's shoulders.

The African military has a rather strong tendency to think in terms of loyalty to the Nation than in terms of fidelity to the government; if one proceeds further in the assumptions of this logic, the coup can also be viewed as the manifestation of the salvation of the nation from the politicians.⁵⁹ This last consideration could not be the main explanation of the coup d'etat and mutiny but could only be a sort of political rationalization facilitating the political role of the army and justifying it towards the social community. One consequently understands Amin's declaration:

"I am just a professional soldier with a concern of my country and her people."⁶⁰

Footnotes

1. This statement was the conclusion of the eighteen points broadcast of 26 January, 1971.
2. E. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in J.J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 54. W.F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States*. London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, pp. 143-144. H.J. Spiro, "The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in W.C. McWilliam, ed., *Garrisons and Governments*. San Francisco, 1967, p. 264.
3. *Inside East Africa*, August-september 1960, pp. 13-14.
4. We have used the expression of "almost agreed-upon theoretical proposition" because it is the common type of explanation described in the growing literature on military and politics. But it is not necessary to say that the content of these explanations is very often vague or too general and so unsatisfactory. This was denounced by the stimulating critique of Robert E. Dowse, when he talks about a "highly unsatisfactory vagueness or at least too high level of generality about theorizing". R.E. Dowse, "The Military and the Political Development," in C. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing* 1969, p. 217.
5. H. Ingrams, *Uganda: A Crisis of Nationhood*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960. British Information Service, Uganda: *The Making of Nation*, London, 1961. F.B. Welbourn, *Religion and Politics in Uganda*, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1965.
6. G.P. Murdock, *Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., pp. 226 and 328 and ff.

7. In relation to these Bantu Kingdoms and Chiefdoms, one might read: A.R. Dunbar, *A History of Bunyoro*, Nairibi, Oxford University Press, 1965. L.A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of Political Revolution Among The Basoga of Uganda*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
8. G.S. Were, "The Western Bantu Peoples from A.D. to 1300 to 1800," in B.A. Ogot, and J.A. Kieran, eds. *Zamani: A Survey of East African History*, Nairobi, E A P M, 1968, p. 186.
9. The reader might find a very stimulating analysis of Buganda in the work of David Apter. See D. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.
10. A.A. Mazrui, "The King, The King's English and I", *Transition*, vol. B, No. 38, 1971, p. 58.
11. M.S.M. Kiwanuka, "Nationality and Nationalism in Africa: The Uganda Case", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1970, p. 240.
12. C. Young, "The Obote Revolution," *Africa Report*, June 1966, p. 10.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
14. It is, in fact, extremely difficult to determine exactly the so-called involvement of Obote and Amin in the alleged smuggling. (They were called for instance "the gold dust twins", see *Newsweek* 8th of February 1971.) Briefly, during the period when the army was implicitly allowed to furnish some military assistance to Congolese rebels, Colonel Amin was reported to be at the bottom of the coffee, gold and ivory traffic. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, his half-brother Nekyon, and the minister of defence Onama, were alleged to have shared some of these indelicate benefits. Daudi Ocheng, in trying to embarrass the government, produced to the parliamentary assembly copies of Amin's bank statement. (17,000 Sterling pounds had been deposited in one day.) Obote, Nekyon, and Onama seem to have shared 350,000 Sterling pounds. In spite of their precision, these figures were not taken as sufficient evidence at the official

- inquiry. For that reason, it is necessary to treat this problem with objective detachment.
15. In C. Legum and J. Drysdale, *African Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents, 1968-1969*, London, Africa Research Limited, 1969, p. 231.
 16. See *New York Times*, October 27th, 1968.
 17. For example, Ali Mazrui, an old political jousting of Obote's, declared on October 19th: "I personally know of no two peoples who have contributed more to the intellectual liveliness of Uganda than Rajat Neogy and Abu Mayanja. I did not always see eye to eye with either of them. In fact, Abu Mayanja and myself have been on opposite sides in almost every debate in which he and I have taken part in the Main Hall of Makerere, and the differences between us were real. But Uganda's reputation as an open society was secure for so long as there was one Abu Mayanja free to speak out his mind, and one *Transition* leading the rest of Africa in sheer intellectual verve. There is a sense in which intellectual freedom is indivisible. One day like this, I feel lonely and shaken." For more details on this question, see Legum and Drysdale, *op. cit.* p. 234. About the censorship and the judgment against *Transition*, see, "A Matter of Transition", *Transition*, vol. 8, No. 38, 1971, pp. 43-46 "The Judgment", *Transition*, *ibid.*, pp. 47-49.
 18. About the notion of Center and Periphery, see E. Shils, "Ideology, Center and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, pp. 117-130.
 19. Talcott Parsons, in order to show this differentiation between Power and Force, uses a very rewarding analogue: the gold and the money in an economic system. See T. Parsons, "Some Reflexions on the Place of Force in Social Process", in H. Eckstein, *Internal War*, New York, 1964, p. 60.
 20. See P. Anyang-Nyongo, "The Civil Servant in Uganda", *East Africa Journal* Vol. 8 No. 4, April 1971, pp. 9-19.
 21. C.P. Potholm, "The Multiple Roles of the Police as Seen in the African Context," *The Journal of Develop-*

- ing Areas, Vol. 3, January 1969, p. 145.
22. M. Janowitz, *The Military and the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago, 1964, p. 101.
 23. For an interesting and complete analysis of the history of the KAR, the reader might look at H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles: A Study of the Military History of East and Central Africa*, Aldershot, 1956.
 24. J.S. Coleman, and B. Brice Jr., "The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in J.J. Johnson ed., *The Role of the Military ... op. cit.* pp. 372-373.
 25. We shall come back to this problem and perhaps propose another explanation but this mutiny phenomenon was approached clearly along political lines by Mazrui and Rothchild, "The Soldier and the State in East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 20 No. 1, March 1967, pp. 82-96.
 26. J.M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1969, p. 106.
 27. The structure of the military organization is far more complex than this single explanation we have given. Because of the goals, it generates paradoxical dynamic (initiative obedience) which gives to the organization a complex equilibrium. M. Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 1959, pp. 36-42.
 28. J.M. Lee, *African Armies ... op. cit.*, p. 106.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
 31. See *supra* note 14.
 32. *The Square*, *Ghana Military Academy Journal*, 1965, pp. 8-11, quoted in J.M. Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
 33. Concerning the theoretical problem of civilian-military relations, the literature is massive. In order to avoid a considerable review of it, one

- might look at S.P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement", in H. Elau, S.J. Eldersveld, and M. Janowitz, eds., *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*, Glencoe, 1956, pp. 380-385. S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957. S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1962. For a general view of this topic, see A.R. Luckam, "Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1971, pp. 5-35. Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1 April 1968, pp. 382-404.
34. See the provocative analysis of J. Ellul, *Autopsie de la Revolution*, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1969.
 35. William Gutteridge thinks that to regard the mutinies as the sign of a more generalized political intervention exaggerates their signification. W.F. Gutteridge, "The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The Impact of Foreign Military Assistance", *African Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 263, April 1967, pp. 98-99.
 36. A.A. Mazrui, and D. Rothchild, "The Soldier and the State...", *op. cit.* p. 87.
 37. S.A. Stouffer, E.A. Suchman, L.C. DeWinney, S.A. Star, and R.M. Williams, *The American Soldier: Adjustment in Army Life*, Vol. 1, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949.
 38. M. Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, *op. cit.* p. 22.
 39. Except for the Anglo-French and German conflicts during the battle of Ethiopia in 1930, and the allied forces struggles against the Italians during W.W. II.
 40. An example of the fighting capability of the African armies is Guinea's attempt to invade Ghana after the coup d'etat of the 24th February, 1966. See W. Foltz, "Psychanalyse des armees sud-sahariennes" in *Revue Francaise d'Etudes politiques Africaines*, No. 14, Fevrier 1967. For a more general study see, Deon

Fourie, *War Potential of the African States South of the Sahara*, Johannesburg, Jan Smuts House, 1968.

41. Concerning the African air forces see R.N. Baker, "The Air Forces of Tropical Africa", in *Air University Review*, vol, 19, No. 2, January-February 1968, pp. 76-81.
42. Very often, the psychological mechanism generated in the military structure works so well that many military men continue to believe irrationally that a war might always occur. One might look at the fascinating novel *El Deserto dei Tartari* by D. Buzzati.
43. See P. Calvocoressi, *World Order and New States*, London, Chatto and Windus, I.S.S., 1962.
44. "The Uganda Army: Nexus of Power," in *Africa Report*, December 1966, pp. 38-39.
45. The Sudanese army is composed of 26,500 men distributed in four infantry brigades, three infantry battalions, one armoured regiment, one parachute regiment, and three artillery regiments. The equipment on the ground is important since the army possess 100 heavy and semi-heavy tanks and around 100 armoured vehicles. The artillery includes 50 25-pounders, 40 105mm. guns and howitzers 20 120mm. mortars, 80 *Bofors* 40mm.
If the navy does not seem very operational, the Air Force is particularly good, since it is composed of 500 men and almost 30 jets (with 16 Mig-21s). For more details see R. Booth, *The Armed Forces of African States 1970*, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 67, May 1970, p. 7. *The Almanac of World Military Power*, Harrisburg, Dupuy Associates Stackpols Book, 1970.
46. Colin Leys, "Types of Violence", *Transition*, No. 21, pp. 17-20.
47. M.T. Mushanga, "Observations on Crime in Uganda", *Mwazo*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1970, p. 39.
48. E.J. Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels; Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, New York, Norton and Co., 1959, Chapt. 2-3.
49. M. Janowitz, *Social Control of Escalated Riots*,

Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1968, pp. 8-9.
_____, *The Professional Soldier: Political and Social Portrait*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1960, pp. 417-440.

50. The Ugandan army is composed of two brigade groups (each brigade consists of two infantry battalions), one independent infantry battalion. The Air Force is composed of 450 men, possesses 19 combat aircraft, 12 *Magister* armed trainers (French trainer planes), one squadron of seven old Mig-15s and Mig-17s, one transport squadron which includes 6 C-47s, 4 Piaggio P-149, and 5 L-29 *Delfin* trainers, and finally 70 Pipers light aircraft. The equipment on the ground consists of, outside the supporting services, of 16 *Ferret* Scout car, 20 BTR-40 and BTR-152 and 12 OT-64B (Transportation). See *The Military Balance 1970-1971*, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970, p. 53, and 1971-1972, pp. 38-39.
51. See *Africa*, Paris, Agence France Press, no. 1746, 29 janvier 1971.
52. 1969 has shown the intense restlessness of Baganda, especially after the death of Sir Edward Mutesa in London. Sir Edward was reported to have died in very mysterious conditions; some have said he was poisoned.
53. See the analysis of Gingyera-Pinyewa, A.C.G., in *East African Journal*, February 1970.
54. Many studies have been conducted on primary groups. But one might see on the functions of primary groups E. Shils, and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1948, pp. 283-286; E. Shils, "Primary Groups in the American Army" in R.K. Merton and P.F. Lazarsfeld, eds., *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of the "American Soldier"*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1950.
55. Four robbers confessed in jail that they killed Brigadier Okoya, and that the murder was paid for by a senior officer. However, they said that it was not Amin. Later on, three detained officers would have confessed that Amin was implicated in the assassination but they retracted because they pretended to have been tortured. See C. Legum, *Uganda, Africa*

Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1970-1971, London, 1971, pp. B188-B189.

56. See p. 26.
57. As far as the process of infiltration is concerned one might see E. Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, London, the Penguin Press, 1968, pp. 62-63.
58. *Poujadisme* was a form of political behavior launched by Pierre Poujade in France. It is based upon the exclusive defense of the professional interests of the artisans and traders. This movement was articulated through the *Union de Defense des Commerçants et Artisans de France* (UDCA). Demands were brought upon French government and the bureaucracy by refusing to pay taxes and to be submitted to fiscal control. One might say that mutiny and coup d'etat seem like this form of non-institutionalized protest and opposition. For further details on *poujadisme* see P. Poujade, *J'ai choisi le combat*, Saint-Cere, 1955, and S. Hoffman, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1956.
59. S.P. Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 20-32.
60. General Idi Amin was born about 1925 in Koboko (a British protectorate). He is a Muslim by faith and a member of the Kakwa tribe. He has a primary-school education.
1944 - He enlisted in the Fourth Unit of the Kings Africa Rifles and served in Burma.
1949 - He was promoted to corporal.
1953 - He fought against the Mau Mau revolt.
1957 - He was promoted to sergeant and *Effendi* in 1959.
Commissioned in 1961 he was promoted to Major in 1963 and became Colonel Amin in 1964.

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