

DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: AFTER THE COLD WAR

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Democratic forms of governance, as viewed by their proponents, have developed into ideological instruments devised to counter the ill effects of the past three decades of economic and political mismanagement in independent Africa. Recognition of these failures is manifest in the persistent "underdeveloped" human and material conditions experienced by many across the continent. Thus, democratic reform throughout Africa is an explicit declaration that government is believed to be at the heart of the continent's social and economic malaise and is a more logical means towards the achievement of future development goals.¹

To this extent, the democratic reform of inefficient political frameworks in the pursuit of the economic transformation of society has been given primacy in the current literature concerning development in Africa. However, in the haste to implement these democratic reforms some of the essential conditions thought necessary to construct a social and political framework capable of sustaining a democratic system are sometimes overlooked. Such haste can lead to a mere transformation of the political facade, without substantial alteration of the actual effectiveness of government in designing and implementing development goals and formulating public policy. The challenge, and the focus of this essay, is to ascertain some of the necessary preconditions for democracy, to identify the presence of those conditions in Africa today, and assess the potential for sustained development and democracy in Africa. In so doing it becomes necessary to differentiate between the use of democratic rhetoric which perpetuates systemic inefficiencies, presumably to the benefit of those in power, and genuine attempts to overcome such debilitating legacies in the course of charting a new future for Africa. By briefly comparing recent attempts to enact and consolidate democratic reform currently underway in Uganda and Zambia, one is able to examine fundamental obstacles and diverging approaches to overcoming those obstacles in the course of attaining the common goal of political democracy and economic development in Africa today.

Recent pressure for democratic reform emanating from within the African continent has been supported by the dynamic change in the global political order since the late 1980s. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the 'Cold War' between the East and the West

¹ Claude Ake, "As Africa Democratizes," *Africa Forum* 11.1 (1991): 44-47.

signalled the beginning of what former United States President George Bush termed the 'New World Order'. The most relevant impact that arises from this new global alignment for Africa in particular, and the 'Third World' in general, is the removal of a powerful ideological force which previously served as a "counterweight to US hegemony".² Thus, in this new environment, the United States and its European allies are firmly situated in a position to influence the course of political developments throughout the world.

In the post Cold War era, the United States and Europe, as well as international lending agencies aligned with those nations, have begun to express a clear preference for democratic political administration as the most efficient means to address the problems of development. By way of attaching political conditions to loans and development assistance, lenders confront African states which lack the financial and technical resources necessary to implement their development strategies, and require receiving states to conform to said conditions in order to qualify for assistance.

Historically, political conditions for economic aid generally take the form of fiscal and monetary policy requirements aimed to facilitate economic adjustment.³ Increasingly, however, lending institutions have attempted to intervene in the social affairs of African governments. Such was the case in Kenya in 1991 when the Consultative Group on Kenya, which is responsible for evaluating the level of the states adherence to policy requirements necessary to receive aid from international donors, insisted that the Kenyan ruling party "liberalize" its politics and develop itself into a multiparty state in order to receive continued economic assistance.⁴ Thus, such powers seek to influence both the policy formulating apparatus as well the structural composition of the ruling government. Kenya's compliance, albeit temporary, signals the emergence of a new form of leverage available to international donors and lenders to influence political transformation in developing countries. Further significance is given to this point by means of Kenya's reliance on foreign aid given its relatively strong financial position among African states. Countries less viable economically than Kenya will

² James G. Blight & Thomas G. Weiss, "Must the Grass Still Suffer? Some Thoughts on Third World Conflicts After the Cold War," *Third World Quarterly* 13.2 (1992): 229-253.

³ See, for example The World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁴ Michael Chege, "The Return of Multiparty Politics" in Joel D. Barkin, ed., *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya & Tanzania* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

theoretically be further compelled to carry out reforms. As such a scenario takes form, groups operating within the African continent seeking democratic political reform now receive implicit support for the international community.

Within the present scheme of reasoning, there exists a distinct relationship between democracy, governance and economic development. While apparent consensus has emerged as to the absolute need for the creation of political structures throughout the continent which incorporate the most positive aspects of these three notions, the relative importance of each remains less than certain. Consensus regarding the necessity of an inclusive framework has been seen as a result of the "authoritarian politics [that] have dominated [Africa's] domestic political scene" since independence.⁵ According to this logic, power, in the immediate post-colonial state, was concentrated in order to overcome the structural inequalities inherent in the colonial export oriented economies.⁶ Rather than achieving the stated goals of reducing poverty and reviving the state's human and structural capacity, John Mukum Mbaku argues that the preponderance of "statism has instead encouraged or facilitated corruption in public office, political mismanagement of national resources, graft in government, and the promotion of unworkable or perverse economic policies."⁷

By examining this argument in the context of prevailing systems of governance as well as the social and material conditions which they have produced, the relationship of these factors becomes increasingly evident. For instance, in 1989 "38 of the 45 countries of Africa were under autocratic, military or one party rule."⁸ Indicators, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), devised to measure the performance of governments as related to economic and social development, reveal that "[o]f the 50 countries with the lowest levels of human development in the world, 38 of them are located in Africa" and "among the 10 least developed in the world, 9 of them are in sub-Saharan Africa."⁹ Given the fact that HDI is determined by life expectancy, adult literacy, and income, it is implied that reintegrating an extremely neglected human

⁵ Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988): 7

⁶ John Mukum Mbaku, "Political Democracy and the Prospects of Development in Post-Cold War Africa," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 17.3-4 (1992): 345-371.

⁷ *Ibid.* 350.

⁸ Ake, *As Africa Democratizes*, 45.

⁹ Mbaku, *Political Democracy*, 348-349.

population into popular society comprises the starting point for a movement towards either democracy or development. These social and political realities are further exacerbated by the persistent civil unrest as well as the current external debt which is estimated to be US \$150 billion, a remarkable 122% of sub-Saharan Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹⁰

Having made reference to a few of the economic, political and social conditions which, in differing aspects, have come to characterize the post-colonial African state, it would be prudent at this juncture to qualify the three terms — democracy, 'good' governance and development — before proceeding with an attempt to identify their forms and existence in post-colonial Africa.

Perhaps the most straight-forward of the three terms to identify is development. In its crudest form development refers to the undertaking of activities that will lead to sustained economic growth in both industry and agriculture. The result of such growth being the creation of structural components designed to ease the social pressures created by poverty, lack of educational opportunities and under-utilization of the state's productive capacities.¹¹ Development can thus be viewed as an ideological construct aimed towards re-organizing a state's productive capacities and transforming economic potential into material improvement and social opportunity for those residing within the state's boundaries.

Conceptually speaking the notion of "democracy" is a coveted ideal for which people worldwide are prepared to risk life and limb in order to secure as the means of governance under which they aspire to live. In the African experience, sustainable democratic structures have proven to be quite elusive. Yet the aspirations for an improved quality of life under such a framework persists. Given the fleeting nature of democratic practice in Africa, any discourse centering on its meaning must examine its many factors and relationships. As defined by Seymour Martin Lipset in his 1959 paper, "*Some Social Requisites of Democracy*," democracy in the political realm is a "system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials," which is itself the "social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these

¹⁰ Editorial, "What Chance for Democracy," *Index on Censorship* 21, (1992): 1-8.

¹¹ See, for example, Meddi Mugenyi, "Development First Democracy Second," in Walter O. Oyugi et. al., eds., *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa* (London: James Curry Press, 1988).

decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office."¹²

Thus, according to Lipset, democracy is a dynamic system that is participatory insofar as it is representative, and is designed to resolve, via compromise, inevitably competing interests within a given society. However, if one delves deeper into this definition it can be argued that, in their varying applications, democratic systems are presumed to serve as the structural component which binds the government to the people. They are designed to guarantee citizens equal access to the resources of the state as well as equal treatment and equal protection under the law, which is a significant step towards legitimizing the governmental structure and creating a stable political and social environment in which economic development can take place. In this instance, legitimacy refers to the systemic process of transparent decision making and accountability by leaders to the citizenry, and is enhanced by the ensured participation of the masses in the political future of the state. A general lack of perceived legitimacy inherent in many regimes in Africa over the past two decades has been argued to be a major deterrent to economic development effort, as fiscal and monetary policies reflect efforts by leaders to manufacture consent and quell opposition by controlling the state's economy.¹³

Regardless of the immediate implementation of various constitutional reforms within a given system under the guise of democratic transformation, there must be a sustained effort to legitimize the political institutions, mechanisms and policies of a particular government in order for both democratic systems and development efforts to evolve. Governance as defined by Goran Hyden is "the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhance the legitimacy of the public realm."¹⁴ Hyden's understanding of the concept 'management of regime structures' is clearly distinct from, yet related to, the making of public policy. Thus, governance deals with the ability of those in power to adhere to the prescribed procedural rules of the particular political system. The inevitable result of such adherence in a democratic structure is the successive orderly transfers of power

12 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 71.

13 See World Bank, "Adjustment in Africa," Chapter 1.

14 Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Study of Politics," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) 7.

through free and fair elections, as well as the evolution of the other principles of legitimacy prescribed above.

The notion that a democratic system must be grounded upon certain fundamental conditions or factors has been developed by scholars throughout history. Theorizing with respect to the development and sustainability of democratic systems can be traced as far back as Aristotle with distinct and consistent reformulation from those with such diverging political philosophies as Karl Marx and Adam Smith.¹⁵ However, in the latter half of this century the debates which centered on the necessary conditions for democracy to flourish appear to have become relatively consolidated and consistent. For instance, one can examine the 1958 work of Lipset in which he sets forth "economic development and political legitimacy" as the two most fundamental prerequisites for the development of a democratic system.¹⁶ Lipset's argument promotes ideas set forth by Aristotle whereby development leads directly to wealth, which leads to industrialization and urbanization, which ultimately leads to a more "intelligent" population capable of making better informed political decisions.¹⁷ Legitimacy in this scheme is thought to also be derived from the notion that leaders trying secure the state's wealth will inevitably maintain, at the very least, an economic interest aligned with that of the whole of society and thus manufacture and maintain the trust and consent of the people.

The problem with Lipset's argument however lies in his assumption that economic development within the state is derived necessarily through a complex of activities performed by a diversity of citizens throughout the state. Furthermore, he assumes that those assets will automatically be duly reinvested within the state, and therefore lead to industrialization, urbanization and subsequently serve to legitimize the ruling system. Wealth without knowledge and a comprehensive framework to deal with pre-existing conflicts in a given society cannot itself produce a democratic system. This point is proven by the current political and economic malaise in Nigeria. Although Nigeria has experienced tremendous boom periods and maintains significant economic potential because of its prominent oil reserves, democratic reform of its political system has been repeatedly compromised by the inability of ruling elites to devise a system capable of reconciling the conflicts of the many competing interest groups within its borders.

¹⁵ See, for example Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Volume Two* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988) ix-xxvii.

¹⁶ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 71.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 75.

Consistent with Lipset's analysis, Afrifa K. Gitonga offers that a "healthy and prosperous economy, simple and open electoral rules and procedures and a political culture based on the values of equality, liberty and human dignity" are essential for a sustained democratic experiment.¹⁸ Similar to Lipset, Gitonga asserts that the economic basis of the democracy is essential. Yet, diverging from Lipset, he argues for a moral basis for legitimizing the structure rather than an intellectual approach as his study is concerned with addressing the particular social problems facing the African continent. Despite the difference in means utilized by Lipset and Gitonga respectively, the main thrust of both arguments does however rest on notions of economic viability of the state and legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the public in order for the system to become self sustaining. It is this notion of the legitimacy of rulers and their actions in the eyes of the citizens and, as of late, the international community which proves to be fundamental for the development of a democratic and potentially self-sustaining democratic framework.

If, however, one attempts to set into motion an earnest attempt to effect a democratic transformation of a state characterized by decades of centralized political power and economic stagnation according to one of the previously mentioned strategies, two distinct challenges emerge. The first is to ascertain to what degree the goals of democratic politics and economic development are compatible in the primary stages of societal transformation; and, second, how best to achieve a synthesis of these goals while maintaining stability and order throughout said transformation.

In response to these challenges and in conjunction with the apparent opportunities for self-determination made available in the absence of Cold War conflict, there has emerged a movement within Africa to regain control of its leadership and reharvest its economic potential. The basic framework for this movement is cooperation among international agencies (primarily appendages of the United Nations), African governmental and civil leaders, with the common goal of introducing popular forms of democracy for the development of Africa as a region. The two most prominent manifestations of these efforts are the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, which produced the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation* (Arusha 1990), and the Africa Leadership Forum, which produced the *Kampala*

¹⁸ Afrifa K. Gitonga, "The Meaning and Foundations of Democracy," in Walter O. Oyugi et. al., eds., *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa* (London: James Curry Press, 1988) 3.

Document: A Conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (Kampala 1991).

These two forums have taken on monumental significance in two respects. First, they represent a genuine effort to formulate a strategic approach to address the many lingering social, economic and political crises which have been exasperated by structural inconsistencies and poor governance, and thus impede economic development. Important also is the emphasis on 'popular participation', which is viewed as the logical countervailing force to failed systems of authority:

We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human economic condition be improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people.¹⁹

Thus, one can locate the presence of traditional democratic principles within the framework of emerging leadership in the continent. Representative government legitimized by the consent of the masses as well as through the moral approval of the people as it is implied in the term 'popular enthusiasm.' The International Conference on Popular Participation, addressing social and economic problems by reorganizing and legitimizing the political structures in the minds of the masses, seeks a more synthesized approach.

Secondly, these two forums represent an important international effort to address security issues throughout the continent. Both conferences were sanctioned by the international community in conjunction with African leaders and attempted to lay a solid and comprehensive foundation on which new systems of government based on democratic principles and economic development could be erected. Without internal security, a stable environment conducive to political transformation, social and economic development cannot exist. As stated in the Kampala document:

The security of the African people, their land and property and their states as a whole is an absolute necessity for stability, development and cooperation in

¹⁹ International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, *Africa Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation*, (Arusha 1990) 17.

Africa. It must be sacred and a primary responsibility of all Africans and all African governments individually and collectively, exercised within the basic freedoms and rights of the African People.²⁰

The significance of the security issue cannot be overlooked, as the manifestations of such crisis exerts a debilitating effect on the state as well as on regions. War causes death, induces famine, displaces persons, disturbs agricultural and industrial production, prevents children from attending school and forces the educated to flee. The plethora of negative results of war are incapable of being confined within a given state's borders or of being qualified within a particular time frame. Such insecure environments have created missed opportunities for Africa's potential to be realized. The ability to contain and prevent such situations will greatly impact Africa's future. Recognition of this serves to motivate efforts to create and implement new systems.

Simply outlining the necessary prerequisites for democratic transformation and economic development within the context of a democratic structure constitutes only the initial phase of an otherwise arduous task of creating and institutionalizing an operable democratic framework. Regardless of the internally generated desire, potential economic incentives, or externally motivated pressures for reform, democratic practices cannot be implemented and adhered to without the complete abolition of distinctly undemocratic practices. Democratic tools such as constitutions can be subject to manipulations when power is able to remain centralized through the use of coercion. Thus, the case of Zambia illustrates a situation whereby the democratizing process is allowed to evolve to the stage of implementing political pluralism without however a successful depoliticization of the military. Nor has there been total separation of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government and its members in the pursuit of balanced power within a representational system. All these elements have proven to be critical elements to sustained democratic systems.

Twenty-five years of authoritarian rule dominated by an imposed state of emergency by former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda came to an official end in 1991. By way of constitutional amendment, Zambia officially became a multi-party state, paving the way for the 1991 elections. Approximately eighty percent of Zambian voters pledged their support for Frederick Chiluba and his Party, The Movement for Multi-

²⁰ Africa Leadership Forum, *The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, (May 1991) 10.

Party Democracy (MMD), and their platform for democracy and development.²¹ Chiluba's rise to power was predicated on a breakdown of order, culminating in a coup attempt which was a result of the persistence of dismal social and economic conditions faced by the country in light of Kaunda's failed socialist experiment. Although Chiluba's program for economic and political liberalization garnered mass appeal, he was forced to begin the implementation of his program for economic development under the constraints of an extremely inefficient state controlled economic system and a \$7 billion debt burden.²²

Zambia, with its 35 official political parties and peaceful succession of power, had been perceived as the model of hope for the future of Africa's democratic future.²³ The emergence and official sanctioning of such a great number of parties symbolized an apparent liberalizing of the political system and a significant move towards pluralistic and human centered, competitive politics. However, a rising gap between public expectation and political accountability and the inability of Chiluba's government to deliver tangible economic improvements to the Zambian people during the first 18 months of his tenure, raised issues as to the integrity of the Zambian system. In response to a perceived lack of concern on the part of the government and a rising fear of continued corruption and cronyism, there arose what Chiluba described as a danger to national security. In a nationwide address delivered to the Zambian people, Chiluba stated:

Zambia is threatened. Our young democracy is at stake. The danger is real and the consequences if not attended to are grave. The political climate is being systematically spoiled by a few of our citizens who are bent on plunging this nation into chaos".²⁴

The statement was made in reference to a report of a "Zero Option" program put forth by a group of dissatisfied political opponents working within the government. The program reportedly sought unordered

²¹ Margaret A. Novicki, "Champion of Zambia's Democracy," *Africa Report* 38.1 (1992): 36

²² *Ibid.* 37.

²³ See, for example, Melinda Ham, "An Outspoken Opposition: Opposition to Ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia is Strengthening," *Africa Report* 38.6 (1993): 31.

²⁴ Melinda Ham, "History Repeats Itself: Zambian President Frederick Chiluba Declares State of Emergency," *Africa Report* 38.3 (1993): 14.

procurement of nation political power "in order to form a government responsive to the people's needs."²⁵ Chiluba responded to this apparent threat by imposing a state of emergency over the entire country thus enabling him to detain without charges those suspected of collaborating to produce the declaration. Of those held under the act, most belonged to the nation's largest opposition group, United National Independence Party (UNIP).

Under the Zambian constitution, imposition of a state of emergency could not have been made independently by the President. A majority in the state's Parliament was also necessary to implement the state of emergency. Considering the level of support Chiluba received in his bid for the Presidency, it is no surprise that 125 of a possible 150 Parliamentary positions were captured by his MMD party during the 1991 elections. However, the 114 to 23 vote recorded in support of the proposed state of emergency implies that either the perceived threat to national security was qualified, or that party politics in Zambia had run afoul.²⁶

Chiluba's cabinet however, was unable to produce either for Parliament, or the public, substantial evidence to support his beliefs that democracy in Zambia was under direct siege by disaffected members of government. The fact that he could command such a decision from Parliament without evidencing a true threat does not bode well for the institutional and ideological independence of the Zambian political system and, therefore, its legitimacy in the eyes of internal government opposition. It must be noted that the structural aspect of the Zambian constitution which accounted for the consent of both the legislative and the executive branches to impose such measures is of great significance. However, the ease by which a single party could obtain such a disproportionately large share of state power, and the ability of the executive officer to command such legislative solidarity, in the absence of a preponderance of evidence, should be of concern to all seeking to develop a democratic apparatus. On the one hand, there arises the perception that conditions which produced the current government were such that the level of true electoral competition was diminished so that the people's options were severely limited. On the other hand, there is the implication that, as constructed, the state's Parliament as an institution is subject to allegiance based on patronage and thus able to be manipulated as a means for social mobility. When this is the case, it ceases to be representative of the nation and diminishes its perceived legitimacy while jeopardizing the potential for democratic evolution as

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.* 16.

well as the integrity of efforts to develop the economy through prudently conceived policy.

The contemporary Ugandan experience, much like the Zambian experience, began with a stagnant economy and the initial promise of democratic reform. But that is precisely where the similarities end. After a 10 year dictatorship by Idi Amin, which had an almost unprecedented devastating effect on Uganda's human population and development capacity, the people of Uganda found themselves weary of conflict and receptive to change.²⁷ In 1986 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni ascended to power as leader of an armed movement. As the head of a revolutionary movement, the National Resistance Army (NRA), Museveni seized power and attempted to transform his guerilla unit into a political movement and promised to "restore peace and democracy" to the war torn and exhausted state.²⁸ As refreshing a pledge as this was to the citizens of Uganda, the process is proving to be a closely scrutinized and difficult experiment.

Like much of Africa, Uganda's colonial borders were drawn with blatant disregard for cultural and ethnic divisions. Those divisions were worsened by the colonial administration's preference for people of Ganda descent to serve in colonial administrative positions. Where colonialists were able to smother animosity between groups, the weakness of the political arrangement at independence exacerbated these feuds. Reconciliation of many of these historic disputes were never resolved only suppressed by military rule, and the threat of those divisions re-emerging and interfering with the Museveni government allegedly inspired him to redirect the thrust of his political campaign:

In Africa we do not have the social structures that make party politics viable. We do not have broad economic classes, we do not have workers on the one hand and owners of land on the other; we have peasant farmers.... Given these conditions, on what are you going to form your parties?... (T)hey will (form parties) in the only form familiar to themselves and create ethnically based parties.²⁹

²⁷ For a detailed political history of Uganda, see, for example, Kenneth Ingham, *Politics in Modern Africa: The Uneven Tribal Dimension* (London: Routledge, 1990).

²⁸ *Ibid.* 34.

²⁹ Anver Versi, "Revaluing the Pearl of Africa," *Africa Business*, March (1995): 10.

With this in mind, Museveni quickly abandoned his promise of instituting democratic reforms in favor of concentrating his efforts towards developing the state's economic potential. According to Museveni, the most efficient means for developing a society capable of avoiding the pitfalls of ethnic and "tribal" politics is through the development of economic classes whose interests are aligned with the improvement of the entire nation rather than an ethnic group.³⁰ Thus, democratic transformation is regarded by Museveni as an evolving process which must be controlled and is also the product of social stability and sustained economic growth.

The basis of the state's economic recovery was the implementation of, and adherence to, adjustment policies designed by the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, the government was able to create a stable environment in which agricultural and industrial activities could function and prosper, thus attracting some private foreign investment.

Structuring political participation along non-party "movement" criteria positions Uganda without a traditional democratic framework under which to generate both national and international legitimacy as well as internal stability. Thus, the "movement" system, under Museveni, has come under attack by those who feel that the movement is little more than a cover for the perpetuation of NRM rule. At times, the regime has resorted to force to quell rising opposition to the regime rather than accede to demands for the return to state sanctioned multi-party politics. Opposition to the NRM was formed ethnically as well as by those who sought strict and timely adherence to proposed democratic reforms and, thereby, a return to multi-party politics. Physical repression of opposition voices in a given society problematizes the internal legitimacy of the ruling regime. Yet, the implicit support for the results predicated on such tactics by those benefiting from the actions confounds the perception of legitimacy from within as opposed to that bestowed by the international community. Among the beneficiaries are the international donor agencies who can point to Uganda's apparently successful economic recovery as proof of the effectiveness of their adjustment policies when properly implemented. Implicit support is revealed through the extension of financial assistance to a regime admittedly guilty of human rights violations and depriving certain citizens state sanctioned forums for the expression of their discontent with the organization of the state. The act of granting aid to the Museveni regime, in the absence of a viable framework for incorporating the views of the disenchanting and Museveni's resultant

³⁰ Ad'Obe Obe, "A Revolutionary With a Cause," *Africa Forum* 1.2, (1991): 8-12.

use of force to stymie such views suggests a kind of gross "liberalization" of the meaning of democracy and legitimacy by the international community. This new meaning then becomes predicated on the regimes ability to provide, by any means, the necessary stable environment for structural adjustment policies to take hold.

Yet, one must also examine the validity and effectiveness of the Museveni approach within the context of economic and political transformation of Ugandan society. Museveni's wealth-creating approach for the development of a class based society for which democratic evolution is to be based is consistent with Lipset's theory, yet the problematic aspect of gaining internal legitimacy remains in the absence of a competitive electoral political atmosphere. Thus, a new set of questions arise. If heavy handed economic development is able to produce the stable and self perpetuating economic environment deemed necessary to bridge historic differences amongst peoples in the pursuit of more national oriented political goals, can such an approach be deemed valid? Can the physical repression of opposition during the short term ever be reconciled in the political future of a given state in order to allow the forces of development and democracy to become a legitimate and cohesive force for the advancement of a particular state? The answers to these questions, as difficult as they may be to develop, confront both the present and future of African leadership and challenges the leadership to devise creative new ways to integrate culturally and historically diverse populations into processes of economic development and democratic transformation.

The apparent lack of integrity found in Chiluba's democratic facade and Museveni's inability to simultaneously develop and democratize further convolutes efforts to clearly ascertain Africa's preparedness for both economic and political transformation into the twenty-first century. The myriad of ideological and historical factors which have served as impediments to democratic transformation and sustained economic development must be confronted head on and attacked systematically in order for the continent to prosper as a region. In this regard, the ability of the Museveni regime to sustain current efforts to raise the standard of living throughout the state and to successfully integrate opposition into a commonly accepted representational system of governance will allow Uganda to emerge as a model for other states on the continent. The success of such an effort will allow other states to utilize the lessons of Uganda's contemporary history in order to avoid the mistakes of Museveni and clear the way for more rapid and orderly transformations.