

AFRICAN RESPONSE TO GERMAN COLONIALISM IN EAST AFRICA: THE CASE OF USUKUMA, 1890 - 1918

Buluda Itandala

Introduction

In a period which has witnessed the downfall of European empires in almost every part of the colonial world, historians have realized that what happened during the colonial period in Africa was not the result of European action alone. It is also necessary to study the developments which took place in the African societies and to analyze their changing responses to European colonial policies. In other words, colonialism should be placed in an indigenous setting and perspective if the interplay between the European colonial rulers and their African subjects is to be properly understood. This, however, is not an easy thing to do because in the case of German East Africa, for example, there were numerous small-scale societies whose responses to the imposition of colonial rule differed a great deal. The historian is, therefore, compelled to either restrict his or her study to a single society or group of societies, or to the responses of the total population in the colony using broad generalizations which can be illustrated only by a few local examples.

This article uses Usukuma as a case study and serves as a contribution to the reappraisal of African reactions to European colonial occupation between the partition of East Africa and the First World War. By focusing on a parochial geographical and historical setting, the article seeks to show on a small-scale what was happening between the German colonizers and their colonial subjects in the colony as a whole. Its chief concern is to demonstrate that Africans were not passive objects of colonial rule but people who were able to respond rationally to new situations.

Imposition of German Colonial Rule in 1890

German colonial rule was gradually imposed in what is now mainland Tanzania after the creation of the British and German spheres of influence in East Africa by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1866.¹ This Agreement, however, made no provision for the boundary between the two spheres in the north, that is, in the Victoria Nyanza region.

Consequently, British and German agents of colonialism started competing vigorously for occupation of this region in the late 1880s, apparently because of its large human and natural resources and its strategic location on the head-waters of the Nile.

This "race for the lake," as Ralph Austen has termed it,² was initiated by representatives of the chartered companies of the two imperial nations, namely the German East Africa Company (GEAC) and the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), which had been given authority to administer the two respective spheres in 1866 and 1888 respectively. In other words, this competition for the Victoria Nyanza region, to which Usukuma belonged, was part of the extension of colonial control by the two companies (and shortly later by the two respective colonial governments) from the coast to the interior in their respective spheres. This rivalry was only halted by the intervention of diplomats of the two nations who agreed in July 1890 that altitude one degree south should be the boundary between their respective spheres in the Victoria Nyanza region.³ Thus by virtue of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 (commonly known as "the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty"), Usukuma fell under German rule.

Unlike the coastal traders and European explorers and missionaries, who had earlier entered Usukuma peacefully, the German colonizers entered it militarily. A military expedition was despatched in April 1890 by the newly appointed *Reichskommissar* (Imperial Commissioner) for German East Africa, Major Hermann von Wissmann, under the leadership of Emin Pasha. The latter assumed this duty following his recuperation at Bagamoyo after his rescue by Stanley from the Mahdist revolutionaries in the southern Sudan in 1889.⁴ He was instructed by von Wissmann

to secure on behalf of Germany the territories situated south of and along the Victoria Nyanza Lake, from Kavirondo Bay and the countries between Victoria Nyanza and Tanganyika up to the Muta Nzige and Albert Nyanza, so as to frustrate England's attempts at gaining an influence in those territories. . . .⁵

This meant establishing effective control within the German sphere in the region and taking whatever advantage possible of the British in the northwest.

While on his way to the Victoria Nyanza, Emin Pasha met Carl Peters at Mpwapwa returning to the coast from Buganda. Peters advised Emin Pasha to establish a station first at Tabora, the key center to the three Great East African lakes, and then one at Bukoba on the western shore of the Victoria Nyanza. From here, it was hoped, he might gain effective occupation of the entire lake region, including

Buganda, an accomplishment which would compromise the hinterland rights of the British.⁶ His assistants in the expedition were Lieutenant Wilhelm Langheld, Dr. Franz Stuhlmann, and the one-time Church Missionary Society (CMS) missionary-turned-ivory-trader, Charles Stokes. Because of his experience and influence in the South Lake Region, Stokes was recruited by von Wissmann as a German Government agent to assist the expedition in persuading the Arab traders resident there to submit to German rule peacefully and to give up the slave trade and engage entirely in legitimate commerce. He was also ordered to establish a government station at Tabora, to make treaties with the *batemi* (rulers, sing., *ntemi*) of Unyamwezi and Usukuma and to set up a government post on the southern shore of the lake.⁷

Judging from the contents of the instructions given to the two men, it would appear that von Wissmann wanted Emin to go straight to the western shore of the Victoria Nyanza and concentrate his efforts on occupying areas there while Stokes, assisted by a number of German non-commissioned officers, was supposed to establish control in Unyamwezi and Usukuma, where he had a lot of influence among the *batemi* and commoners alike. However, with co-ordination between them apparently lacking, Emin, after his encounter with Carl Peters at Mpwapwa, went first to Tabora, which he forcefully occupied on July 29, 1890, and reinstated the Zanzibari, Seif Bin Sad, as *Liwali* (governor or mayor). From there he marched north towards the Lake, while Langheld went to fight the raiding Watuta in Urambo and other nearby places in the northwest. On his way from Tabora to the Victoria Nyanza, Emin passed through Buyubi, where he made a treaty with the *ntemi* and then continued to Busongo, where he did the same with Ntemi Ntinginya. While still at Busongo, he received a letter from Stokes who was on his way from the coast, informing him that he would be arriving there soon, and that he should not take any steps whatever in Unyamwezi until his arrival. Since he had not yet received any instructions regarding their collaboration from his superiors, Emin Pasha did not feel bound to wait for Stokes or to heed his request not to do anything in Unyamwezi and Usukuma before his arrival. Instead, he immediately pushed on to the Lake, where he had heard that the Arabs of Masanza were threatening to attack the European missionaries at Bukumbi, leaving Langheld behind to wait for Stokes at Busongo after dealing with Watuta marauders in Urambo.

Upon his arrival at the Lake on September 27, Emin Pasha learned that the boundary issue between the British and German spheres in the Victoria Nyanza region had already been settled by diplomats in Europe. Without waiting for Langheld and Stokes to arrive, he hurriedly left Bukoba hoping that he could still forestall the British agents in Buganda from there and secure the whole Interlacustrine

Region for Germany. His hopes of achieving this were dashed by the arrival of Frederick Lugard in Buganda two months later.

Before leaving the southern shore of the lake for Bukoba in October 1890, Emin Pasha had sent Stuhlmann to deal with the Arab traders at Masanza who were trafficking in slaves and firearms and threatening to kill European missionaries in the area. The Europeans had offered support to Kabaka (King) Mwangwa of Buganda in his struggle to regain his position from Baganda Muslims and their Arab associates who had previously overthrown him. Furthermore, it was alleged that the Arabs were planning to sell their goods to Gedge, a representative of the IBEAC in the Victoria Nyanza region, who was at that time at Busambiro CMS mission station, which Emin interpreted as an attempt by the former to draw the southern region of the Lake into the British commercial sphere. For these reasons, Stuhlmann was dispatched to Masanza to solve the problem militarily. The Arab traders were routed by his troops and some of their slaves and trade goods were confiscated.⁸ Several were captured by the German troops and later killed by vengeful Baganda, and the rest, including their leader, Said bin Seif, fled southward into Meyadu. Independent Arab trading in Usukuma was thus effectively brought to an end. Henceforth, all commercial activity which developed in the region was regulated by the German authorities.

Meanwhile, having failed to catch up with Emin at the southern end of the Lake, Stokes wrote a letter of protest to von Wissmann. He complained that Emin had fought his way through Unyamwezi and Usukuma, thereby making it difficult for him and other officials to gain the confidence of the people and achieve a peaceful occupation of the region. Apparently, Emin's troops, which consisted of Sudanese, Zulu, and Swahili *askaris* (soldiers), were an undisciplined lot who looted property and raped women in the areas through which they passed. No doubt Stokes witnessed some of their devastation on his way to the Lake, for in his letter of protest to von Wissmann he said,

There is no use rushing through the country leaving behind our flags to dishonour and everything in chaos from Mpwapwa to Karagwe. . . . Fighting natives is neither honourable nor just and I am quite sure that "*ruga-ruga*" work [looting and pillaging] is not the policy of Germany.⁹

His complaints were confirmed three years later by a Frenchman named Lionel Declé who travelled from Tabora to what is now Mwanza town. Mistaking him for a German officer, people in northern Unyamwezi were either hiding from him or running away whenever he approached their villages, and in the *butemi* (political unit, pl., *mabutemi*) of Nindo,

in western Shinyanga, he was told by Ntemi Nhangilwa how Emin's soldiers had pillaged and terrorized the area when they passed through there.¹⁰ Although Stokes and Langheld were able to get treaties of submission signed by the *batemi* of Urambo, Bukine, Busule, Shinyanga (Kizumbi), and Nsalala, people in the areas through which Emin had passed were perplexed by the behavior of his men. For the first time, brute force, accompanied by looting and violation of women, was used by a foreign caravan to pass through their territories. It did not occur to them that Emin's large expedition, consisting of several hundred men, was not an ordinary caravan but an invading army which had come there to conquer them. Its actions were just the beginning of the brutalities which were to characterize the German colonial period in the years to come.

With the hope of acquiring Buganda and other areas north of latitude one degree south virtually ended by the arrival of Lugard at Mengo in December 1890, the Emin Pasha Expedition embarked on the "pacification" of the lake region of their newly acquired colony from two military stations, Bukoba and Mwanza. Bukoba was established by Emin soon after his arrival there at the end of 1890 while Mwanza was established by one of his non-commissioned officers, Sergeant Hoffmann. The latter was assigned the duty of establishing Mwanza by his immediate superior, Lieutenant Langheld, who followed Emin to Bukoba where he took command of the station after the death of the former in October 1892.¹¹ Although Bukoba served as the main regional administrative center for the German lake region as a whole from 1890 to 1894, strictly speaking it served mainly as the administrative center for the west lake region because the officers who headed it spent most of their time there while Mwanza was the seat of the government for the south and east lake region under the control of non-commissioned officers.

For trade and transportation purposes, Mwanza was ideally located in the region, but it was not a suitable administrative center for either Usukuma or the east lake region because it was too remote from the main political units and large centers of population which, in the case of Usukuma, were located inland to the south and east, particularly the Babinza and Basiya states. In fact, the Basiya, Babinza and Bakamba states in what is now Shinyanga District were so remote from it that they were placed under the jurisdiction of Tabora *Bezirk* (District) to the South.

Developments During the Military Phase: 1890-1906

Compared to the west lake area, Usukuma received very little attention from the German colonizers during the period of military rule which lasted from 1890 to 1905. Initially its administration, if it can be called that, was left in the hands of non-commissioned officers who showed very little capacity for dealing politically with the Wasukuma. There are several factors which made the Germans neglect this part of the lake region during the initial years of colonization. To begin with, they chose Bukoba as the main station in the lake region as a whole because they wanted to use it as a stepping stone for entering Buganda as has already been indicated. Secondly, the Bahaya rulers, the *bakama* (sing., *mukama*) proved far easier to come to terms with than the *batemi* of Usukuma because they were used to dealing with overlords, the Baganda, even before the German overlords arrived, while the latter had never been subject to any kind of foreign rule before. Thirdly, a lucrative caravan trade between Tabora and Uganda and north eastern Zaire continued to flow through the west lake region, while Usukuma showed very little commercial prospects, a factor which led the German colonial government to even consider closing down their military station at Mwanza in mid-1895.¹² It was felt that the station should be moved to Ujiji, on the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika, in order to recapture the rich ivory trade of central and southern Zaire and that Usukuma should be administered from Bukoba. Another reason why the German colonial administration entertained the idea of closing down the military station at Mwanza in 1895 was the general belief which they had gained that people in the lake region, unlike those of Uhehe and Unyamwezi who were still resisting colonial domination actively, were peaceful and appeared to have accepted German domination. Therefore, it was felt that they could easily be controlled from one center by a single officer with a handful of troops.

But a few months after the government had announced its intention to close down the Mwanza military station and shift it to Ujiji, a series of acts of defiance occurred simultaneously throughout the lake region which alarmed the German authorities and made them give up the idea. In the first place, the diplomatic policy of playing off one *mukama* against another, which had been used by Langheld and his successors in the west lake area, seemed to have failed by the end of 1895 when uprisings erupted in Kiziba and Kyamtwara which, in the case of the latter, had to be ended by using a combined military force from both Bukoba and Mwanza. An even more serious act of defiance was the burning down of the White Fathers' mission station in Ukerewe by Mukama Lukonge, an act which had been precipitated by the establishment of the German Antislavery Committee military station on

the island. There were also several sporadic attacks on German and missionary caravans which took place in Ng'ung'hu, Sengelema, and Nela in Usukuma and Rwoma's long-standing defiance to the government in Uzinza. The fact that these outbreaks occurred simultaneously in different places alarmed the Germans and made them reverse their earlier decision. Instead, they decided to establish two separate lake districts.¹³

Given the policies which the Germans had pursued since their arrival at the Lake, it is not difficult to see why they faced a series of violent outbreaks at the end of 1895. As events in Usukuma clearly illustrate, they imposed themselves in the area without clearly defining the relationship between them and the *batemi*. The main task which the first German officer at Mwanza was concerned with in the first year or two was the construction of the military fortification or *boma*, as it became known locally. To do this, he demanded free labor and monthly tribute in the form of ivory, livestock, or foodstuffs from the nearby *batemi*. Since the Wasukuma had no experience dealing with foreign overlords before, they did not easily accept this German imposition of domination. Initially they expressed their opposition to German domination by refusing to meet the military station's demand for labor and local products and by ambushing government and missionary caravans passing through their territories and taking away their property. The German administration responded to such acts by sending punitive military expeditions to the areas concerned. These repressive measures became so common and extensive during the administration of Hartmann, that is between 1892 and 1893, that they alienated the people completely from their new overlords. In addition, the arrival of representatives of the German Antislavery Committee, who established a large military station in Ukerewe, but whose members such as Oscar Baumann and C. W. Werther travelled through Usukuma as well, surveying the area for bases of operation and for evidence of slavery, must have contributed to the unrest which erupted at the end of 1895.¹⁴ Since the Bakwimba and the Babinza were not yet fully integrated into German control because of their distant location from the *boma* at Mwanza, their *batemi* were still hoping that the Germans could still be expelled from the country in a concerted effort.

During the initial period of military rule, very few Wasukuma had direct contact with their German masters. This means that the general impression of the Germans which the majority of them had was based mainly on reports from those who had been in direct contact with them. Up to 1895, German officers spent most of their time at their stations in Mwanza and Tabora and only went out to conduct punitive expeditions against recalcitrant groups or to punish groups which threatened to destroy peace and order. This gave most of the

Wasukuma little opportunity to get to know their new overlords. For those who had the opportunity, a two-phase reaction developed. First, they tried to defy the German intruders who presumed that they could pass through their territories without securing permission and paying the necessary passage tolls known locally as *mahongo* (sing. *ihongo*) and further supposed that they had the right to take food, water, and livestock by force and even violate local women. This reaction manifested itself in attacks on German and missionary caravans in Ng'ung'hu and Sengelema.¹⁵ After bloody confrontations with the German *Schutztruppen* (German colonial troops or soldiers), however, the attitude of defiance gave way to fear of repression and personal harm. Apparently, the Germans were quick to punish harshly by shooting people, flogging them, burning their villages and confiscating huge numbers of livestock. These kinds of punishment became so much the standard response of the Germans in the early 1890s that almost all Wasukuma would flee into hiding for safety whenever they saw a white man's column approaching.¹⁶ Occasionally, this infuriated the Germans, who would order the destruction of these villages. Thus there was almost a complete breakdown of communication. But to the Wasukuma who were living far from the military stations at Mwanza or the caravan routes, and these were the vast majority, this type of encounter was quite rare. They continued to live their normal lives almost completely unaffected by the German presence in the vicinity. No doubt they dreaded the Germans too, and occasionally paid the necessary dues and provided the required labor services to their agents; but it was the dread of an enemy about whom they had no firsthand knowledge.

The basis for this fear of the Germans by the Wasukuma who were living in remote areas from the military station and caravan routes was the nature of the German administration which up to 1895 depended entirely on the use of military force. No effort was made by the non-commissioned officers who headed the military station at Mwanza to understand or make use of the social and political system of the Wasukuma. Given the inexperience in administration and political affairs, Sergeant Hoffmann, the first commander of Mwanza military station, believed that the only way he could establish submission and obedience to German authority in Usukuma was through the use of guns. It was a method of governing which was based on fear of the numbers of the colonized and which German officers used in Usukuma throughout the period of military rule. Hoffmann was the man who set the pattern of sending punitive expeditions to the *Schutztruppen* whenever he felt it was necessary. His military campaigns, which were many, took him as far as Busumbau, Nela, and Sengelema (see map). He was prompted into action in this direction by the report of an attack

in Sengelema, in November 1891, on a caravan transporting supplies for the White Fathers missionaries at Bukumbi.¹⁷

It appears that Hoffmann saw the incident as an opportunity to demonstrate German military power in this populous area of central Usukuma which hitherto had not experienced it. When he arrived in Sengelema after marching through Busumabu and Nela at the beginning of December, he found Ntemi Kumba and his men prepared for war. They refused to have any discussion with him concerning the stolen goods. But he did not engage them in battle possibly because his force, consisting of twenty regular soldiers and three hundred *balugaluga* (armed auxiliaries), was too small to face them. Instead, he captured two hundred goats, burned several villages in the area where the incident was supposed to have taken place, and, before leaving, he warned the people of Sengelema that unless they returned the things which had been stolen from the caravan, he would come back and destroy the whole *butemi*.¹⁸ This was one of the few occasions when a German officer acted with restraint in a punitive expedition. Nevertheless, because of his cruelty and uncompromising behavior in general, Hoffmann, who was originally nick-named "*Madako*," apparently because he had big buttocks, acquired the additional name "*Bwana Mkali*," meaning "the fierce one," of which he seems to have been very proud.¹⁹

Like its neighboring *butemi* of Nela, which had acquired a bad name among Europeans for resisting Stanley's passage in 1889, Sengelema acquired the reputation of being an obstructionist *butemi* from this time on. In fact, Hoffmann was criticized by some of his colleagues for not having punished it sufficiently for the attack on the White Fathers' caravan. A year later it was verbally threatened by his successor, Hartmann, for not paying its share of the submission tribute. As a result of this unfavorable reputation, it became the target of several punitive raids in subsequent years. One such raid took place in 1895 when Lieutenant Langheld went to punish some villages in eastern Nela whose people were reported to have robbed a German mail caravan. While he was dealing with the people in the villages concerned, some people from Sengelema are said to have gone there to help their Bana-Nela neighbors. This provided him with an excuse to cross the border into Sengelema and settle the long-standing grudge which he had against the Bana-Sengelema for their earlier obstruction of caravan traffic and stubbornness. During this raid, many people were killed in both Nela and Sengelema, several villages were destroyed, and hundreds of livestock were taken away as booty.²⁰ It seems paradoxical that a raid of this magnitude should have been carried out by a man who had earned the reputation of being "*Bwana Mzuri*," that is, "the Good Master." It is possible that he launched it in order to remind people in

this area that the Germans were still a force to reckon with despite the defeat they had suffered at the hands of the Wahehe in Iringa, the news of which, it was feared, was spreading and encouraging some anti-German elements in the lake region to resort to physical confrontation. In other words, his demonstration of force in this "rebellious" area of Usukuma was probably intended to make people so afraid of the Germans that they would not dare to put up a challenge or consider the possibility of emulating the Wahehe and stage an uprising.

By the end of 1895, it became clear that the policy of conducting occasional punitive raids on the various *mabutemi* had failed to crush anti-German resistance among the Wasukuma or to win their allegiance to the administration. Therefore, having accepted the recommendation of Colonel von Trotha, the commander of the *Schutztruppen*, to retain the Mwanza military station, the colonial government decided to review its administrative policy in the lake region. It also accepted his recommendation that a larger force should be stationed at Mwanza, that missionary efforts should be encouraged and spread to other parts of Usukuma and that all Europeans should refrain from tribal intrigues as much as possible.²¹ As a result of these efforts, a new administrative policy emerged from about 1896 which tried to create a new political order in the region. As Austen has argued:

If the characteristic figure of the first years of German administration at the Lake Victoria was the *Schutztruppen* officer, ultimately dependent upon the deployment of military forces for the assertion of his authority, the next period would see the emergence of a new breed of opportunist African chiefs, relying upon a combination of traditional authority and newly acquired skills to maintain their position between the European authorities and the body of their people. Although such men were forced to abandon direct resistance to the colonial regime, they learned to work the system to their own advantages, preventing absolute encroachment by a variation on the previous German "diplomacy"—playing off the military administration against the missionaries.²²

Apparently, it was realized that the best way to eliminate resistance and dominate the people was to mix force with diplomacy, exploit the missionary presence—all far-sighted officials knew of its effectiveness in changing cultures²³—and to strengthen the position of the *batemi* by giving them more power than they had traditionally enjoyed. This would make them more dependent on the German colonial administration than on traditional norms. Hence, the various commanders of Mwanza made a concerted effort to strengthen the

position of the *batemi* and *banangwa* (village or regional heads) in the hope that they would become good allies or collaborators. First, they required every *butemi* to be represented at the *boma* by a "*katikiro*" (*gadigilu* in Kisukuma), a system which had evolved earlier in the west lake region.²⁴ This representative was somebody who knew Kiswahili well and acted as a messenger between the *boma* and the *butemi* and vice versa. Second, all legitimate *batemi* and *banangwa* were officially registered and recognized, and assisted in every way possible to assert their new authority, thereby reducing their dependence on traditional bonds such as the authority of the *banang'oma* (state elders) and *bafumu* (diviners, sing., *nfumu*).

Another method used by the commanders during this period to establish firm control among the Wasukuma was the making of frequent tours in the region. By visiting different parts of what became known as Mwanza *Bezirk* after separation from Bukoba, it was hoped that the commanders would get to know the people and their customs better, and, in so doing, would make them know that the Germans were not sojourners but were there to stay as colonizers.

The first commander to implement this new policy fully was Hauptmann Gaston Schlobach or "Suluba," as he became known to the Wasukuma. During his period in the Mwanza *Bezirk* from 1897 to 1899, the German administration began to make itself felt in many parts of Usukuma. Paul Kollmann, his predecessor, had required labor from the nearby *mabutemi*. Schlobach continued these projects and extended the labor requirements of recruits for the army to replace the hated Sudanese, Zulu, and Swahili *askaris* who had caused so much trouble and resentment among the people in the past. He also introduced taxation in kind for each *butemi* according to estimated population size and began to survey and to do preliminary work on the major roads with which he wanted to link Mwanza to the other parts of the District in the south and east.

Politically, Schlobach tried to meet as many *batemi* as he could and sought their submission to the administration. He made his longest tour of the District between June and September 1898 when he visited not only most of Usukuma but also the east lake region. Having succeeded in settling political conflicts in Nela and Busumabu at the beginning of his tour, he marched on to Sengelema, Badi, Ng'ung'hu, Ng'wagala, and Ntuzu, all of which had remained outside effective German control during the first phase of military rule.²⁵ During this trip, he succeeded in getting the cooperation of all important *batemi* in eastern Usukuma, namely Kumba of Sengelema, Luhaga of Badi, Kabuta of Ng'ung'hu, Masanja of Ng'wagala, and Kichimanzala of Ntuzu.

But about a year after Schlobach's visit to this part of Usukuma an uprising erupted in Ng'wagala which threatened to undo what he had achieved during his 1898 tour. Its root cause was apparently a dream by one *mfumu* that all Europeans were soon going to leave the country, a prediction which incited his followers to seize property belonging to all *banangwa* who were known to have supported the imposition of German rule as a punishment for their complicity.²⁶ This uprising spread rapidly to Ng'ung'hu, Sengelema, and Nela where one of the *banangwa* reported it to Schlobach who quickly dispatched a military expedition which ended it in Nela and Sengelema but not in Ng'wagala where anti-European sentiment remained strong for quite some time. This was no doubt a reaction of the people to the loss of freedom of action, harassment, forced labor, corporal punishment, and loss of property through plunder. In other words, these acts of oppression, to which they were so much subjected by the German administration made them turn to the *bafumu*. The *bafumu* suggested the same kind of solution to the problem at hand as they had always done in the past which was elimination of the source of danger, be it a *nogi* (witch), a foreign intruder, or an agent of external forces.

In Ng'wagala, the situation was made worse by the weak position in which Ntemi Masanja found himself. His right to rule was being challenged by one of his powerful *banangwa*, named Mashala, who wanted to become *nsemi* himself. Having been restored to his position some years back following an earlier deposition in 1888 on account of a famine, Masanja did not apparently have the support of all his *banangwa* and *banang'oma*. Those who supported him were ready to collaborate with Germans as he was, while those who opposed him were not. The Germans realized also that he was not strong enough to assert his control in the *bahoja* (affiliate) divisions situated north of the Simiyu or Shimiyyu river in Itilima, Ndudumo, Zagayu, Nyasambe, and Ndagalu. They appointed his half-brother and *Katikiro* at the *boma* in Mwanza, Ng'winula "Ng'wanilanga," to establish effective control there for him. Moreover, before ending his tour of duty in Mwanza in 1899, Schlobach sent a soldier with a group of *balugaluga* to go and help Masanja to strengthen his position but these were killed while still in transit in Ng'ung'hu. A European-led punitive expedition was then immediately dispatched which devastated a large part of central Ng'ung'hu and northern Ng'wagala where the Bana-Ng'ung'hu (people of Ng'ung'hu) from the affected areas, including Ntemi Kabuta, were reported to have sought refuge.²⁷ Even after this expedition, the situation in Ng'wagala remained turbulent. Mashala continued to defy Ntemi Masanja and had virtually become the ruler of southern Ng'wagala, where his *igunguli* (area controlled by a Ng'wanagwa) of Ng'wamushingi was situated. It was only in 1903, when he interfered

with tax collection, that Masanja was able to remove him with German military assistance. Active resistance to German rule in Ng'wagala could be said to have ended at this time.

The situation in some of the neighboring areas was equally turbulent in the last years of German military rule in the region, that is, between 1898 and 1906. Ng'ung'hu, as we have just seen, was involved in the killing of government *askaris* in 1899, for which it suffered a devastating punitive raid shortly after the incident. Its aging *ntemi*, Kabuta, caused no more trouble to his German overlords from then til his death in 1910. Meanwhile, fighting broke out between Ntemi Luhaga of Badi and Kumba of Sengelema in 1900 during which time the latter was killed and Schlobach's successor as Mwanza station commander, Constantin Cramer, known to the Wasukuma as "Kama," had to station a group of *askaris* to keep peace in the area for sometime.²⁸ Kumba was succeeded by his brother Ng'henagula in Sengelema. While stationed in Badi and Sengelema, the government *askaris* extended their pacification campaign into Kigoku where they burned several villages during Ntemi Izengo Ng'wan-Sayi's time.

Farther north in Ntuzu Kichimanzala had died at the end of 1898 and had been succeeded by Balele. Balele's rule was soon marred by a rebellion which was partly caused by his own excesses and partly by opposition led by one member of the ruling family, Basindike, who had been aspiring to become *ntemi*. In 1901, the area suffered from a famine which became known as "Nzala ya Balinhakano," during which Ntemi Balele allowed the *banikulu* (members of the royal family and his hangers-on) to go from house to house taking away whatever foodstuff they could find from people's stores, even inner stores in the ceiling of the houses (*kano*), a move which infuriated a lot of people because they regarded it as an infringement on their personal property and privacy.²⁹ Basindike exploited this widespread resentment of the people against Balele, campaigned for his deposition and won the support of many *banangwa* who were willing to get rid of him. When he and his supporters were about to carry out their plan, however, Balele informed Cramer in Mwanza of the plan. Cramer sent the then *katikiro* of Ntuzu, Masunga Ng'wanibelenge, with a large group of balugaluga to go and deal with them. The latter went and ravaged almost the whole of Ntuzu from Bulila to Wenya in typical German style by killing people, burning their houses, and confiscating their livestock. They captured Basindike and the *banangwa* who were supporting him and sent them to Mwanza for imprisonment. The destruction of human life and property was apparently so great that people throughout Usukuma still remember the notorious Ng'wanibelenge through the following song which almost became a "national anthem" soon after the event:

Nani Wapemba Numba Yane?

- Chorus: *Nani wapemba numba yane?* (x2)
Ng'wanibelenge (x2)
Ng'wanibelenge bagosha (x2)
- Chorus: *Hu, Ng'wanibelenge*
ukantule machimu abili (x2)

Who Set My House on Fire?

- Chorus: Who set my house on fire?
 It is Ng'wanibelenge.
 Men, this Ng'wanibelenge.
- Chorus: Ah, let us go and spear
 two-fold this Ng'wanibelenge.³⁰

After Ng'wanibelenge's War, Ntuzu was subjected to two more German raids: one took place in the village of Gabu, where people had refused to pay tax, and the other in the village of Nyamhimbi, near the capital village of Somanda, where it was alleged that a German settler's servant had been assaulted and his master's estate destroyed by some of Ntemi Balele's *balugaluga* during the owner's absence.³¹ These raids however, were minor and less destructive than earlier ones. They all took place during the term of Cramer's successor, Hauptmann Egor Seyfried, between 1902 and 1904. No other punitive expedition appear to have been carried out in Ntuzu and other neighboring areas after Seyfried's term, which seems to suggest that when Baumstark took over the administration of Mwanza District from him in 1905, the resistance of the Wasukuma to German intervention, had ended. Yet subsequent developments within the rest of the year and the next do not support such a conclusion.

Baumstark had briefly served as Mwanza commander in 1902/03 and during that time he had distinguished himself as a very harsh man, as the man who had imposed the hated one-rupee personal tax instead of the general *butemi* tax, and as the man who had imprisoned Igulu Ng'wana-Malundi, the famous *ningi* (dance leader) of Nela. Naturally, his return for a second tour of duty in Mwanza created anxiety and unrest among the *batemi*. He himself was aware of this unrest and in fact appears to have feared that an uprising was about to erupt in the District when he discovered a plot against the government allegedly being planned by the *ntemi* of Ng'wanza. Consequently, as soon as he heard about the outbreak of the Maji Maji uprising in south eastern Tanzania in July 1905, he informed Dar-es-Salaam about the precarious situation in his own District, particularly concerning the

doubtful loyalty of certain *batemi* and some of their officials as well as his own *askaris*, most of whom were Wasukuma. This was immediately followed by the transfer of the local garrison and its replacement by German marines and non-Wasukuma *askaris* and by the deportation of twelve suspected conspirators to the coast the following year, including Ntemi Balele of Ntuzu, Ntemi Ng'hoja Ng'wizamholya of Itilima, ex-Ng'wanangwa Mashala of Ng'wagala, Ntemi Makongolo of Ng'wanza, Katikiro Mphandashalo of Ng'wanza, and Igulu Ng'wana-Malundi, the famous *ningi* of Nela.³² Balele was deported for allegedly conniving with Ntemi Kapongo of Nasa and the CMS missionaries of Nasa to support a British invasion of the country and on account of a quarrel with a German settler over cattle. These deportations marked the terminal point of the resistance of the Wasukuma to German colonial rule and of German military rule in the region, for Baumstar, whose term ended in 1906, was replaced by a civilian administrator.

Among the changes which resulted from the deportations by Baumstark in eastern Usukuma was the replacement of Balele as *ntemi* of Ntuzu by his son, Mvanga, which thus ended matrilineal succession and marked the beginning of patrilineal succession in the *butemi*. This shows the extent to which the Germans had succeeded in pacifying the people, who accepted the change without protest. Meanwhile, Ng'wanilanga, Masanja's assistant in the *bahoja* division of Ng'wagala in the Simiyu valley, was made an independent *ntemi* of Itilima division after the deportation of its Ntemi Ng'hoja, Ng'wizamholya, to the coast in 1906. The Germans were apparently so impressed by his work in tax collection, labor supply, and in keeping the government informed about what was going on in the area that they decided to reward him for it by making him *ntemi* of Itilima to which the other *bahoja* divisions of Ndudumo, Zagayu, Nyasambe, and Ndagalu were soon added as their *bahoja* were deposed one after the other. Being literate and a fluent speaker of Kiswahili, and on the basis of his good record as a former government agent and *Katikiro* of Ng'wagala, Ng'wanilanga was able to convince the Germans that the rest of the *bahoja* divisions of Ng'wagala in the Simiyu valley could best be administered under his authority because their *batemi bahoja* were inefficient, backward-looking traditionalists. This of course meant the dismemberment of Ng'wagala, but apparently Masanja, for whom the Germans had done so much to retain him in his position, did not object to this move. He acquiesced and Ng'wanilanga, with the approval of his German mentors, created a new *butemi* under the name of Itilima in the area lying between Ng'wagala, Ng'ung'hu, and Sengelema in the south and west and Ntuzu in the north and east.

The southern Babinza *mabutemi* of Buchunga, Buduhe, Mondo and Ng'wadubi and Seke, as well as the Basiya and Bakamba *mabutemi* were placed under the jurisdiction of the Tabora military station, as has already been noted.³³ Although remoteness from Mwanza appears to have been the main reason for their inclusion in the Tabora District, they actually found themselves equally remote from the *boma* of the latter. This worked to their advantage because they remained almost undisturbed by German interference during most of the period of military rule. Unlike other areas of Usukuma to the north, which tried to resist German intervention by refusing to pay tribute in labor services and goods and by attacking caravans taking mail and supplies to the government and mission station in Mwanza, the southern Sukuma areas appear to have offered no such resistance. One of the reasons for accepting German rule comparatively more easily was probably the example set by the larger and leading *mabutemi* in the area. Ntemi Ng'wandu of Busiya, for example, is said to have been relatively free to collaborate with the Germans if he so wished because he had consolidated his position well before their arrival by establishing a fairly large *balugaluga* army on which he was more dependent than on traditional bonds.³⁴ So were many of the *batemi* of the other Basiya states in the area. Furthermore, the latter had learnt how to cope with other external forces during their dealings with coastal traders in the pre-colonial period. Hence, having seen their more powerful neighbors accepting German rule readily, the smaller political units reluctantly acquiesced as well.

However, because they were remote from these areas, and because they were initially preoccupied with the pacification of Bunyanyembe and other parts of Unyamwezi, the Germans did not harass people too much in this part of Usukuma during the military phase. Nevertheless, they did bring about some changes of leadership whenever and wherever they felt it to be necessary. When Buduhe was visited by a German officer for the first time, for instance, Ntemi Mafunda refused to see him and ran away. The German officer, concerned, asked the *banang'oma* and *banangwa* to choose someone who was prepared to deal with the Germans. They chose Nyangindu, and Mafunda was considered to have abdicated.³⁵ Similarly, when the Germans reached Seke for the first time, they discovered that Ntemi Shimba was too old to work with them, for he could not even walk. Therefore, they pressured the electors to choose someone younger, and Sakwa was elected.³⁶ No changes in leadership were made in the initial stages in Mondo, where Ntemi Kumalija proved to be agreeable, and in Ng'wadubi, Buchunga, Busiya, Si-yinyanga (Kizumbi), Lubumbo, Nindo, Ng'wanhini, Busanda, and Tinde, whose leaders agreed to be their allies. In fact, no changes to speak of occurred in this area before

the German administration established a substation near the *ikulu* of the *butemi* of Siyinyanga (Shinyanga) in 1910 at what is now Old Shinyanga town.

Developments During the Civilian Phase: 1907-1918

It has been argued that the years of the Maji Maji uprising, that is 1905-7, was a turning point in German colonial history, presumably because Germany, which faced another serious uprising in Namibia (Southwest Africa) at that very time, was forced to change her colonial policy.³⁷ The new policy which emerged from this crisis aimed at correcting the mistakes of the past by introducing a more just administration and meaningful economic development programs. Germany's colonial task since then, as her new Colonial Secretary explained, was

to render useful the land, its resources, the flora, the fauna, and, above all, for the benefit of the colonizing nation, which is itself thus obligated to give in return its high civilization, its ethical concepts and its methods.³⁸

This meant the abolition of military rule and the establishment of a civilian colonial administration. The man who was appointed to implement this new policy in Usukuma was Theodor Gunzert, a man who took up his duties as *Bezirksamtmann* (District Commissioner) in 1907 and remained there till 1916. One of the main problems he faced was how to gain the confidence and cooperation of the *batemi* who had been so much alienated from the administration by the rough treatment they had received from the military commander during the Maji Maji War. This was extremely important because he wanted to use them as agents for the implementation of his economic programs. Among the steps he took to achieve this goal were refraining from the use of military force as much as possible, keeping in close contact with the people through frequent tours of the District, dealing with them fairly and justly, and refraining from interfering in the choice of the *batemi* as much as possible. He also tells us that he was able to win the confidence and cooperation of the *batemi* by making them

the exclusive agents between their followers and the White administration and to this end I backed up their authority as much as possible, investing it with official prestige, and thus finally gave the district's negro population its won legal-political status.³⁹

Considerable power was delegated to the *batemi*, but the District commissioner reserved to himself the right to intervene in local affairs whenever he felt it necessary. Thus the system of local government which Gunzert devised for Usukuma resembled, in some ways, the British system of indirect rule, and it differed from it in others because, as he himself elaborated, "it left the white administrator much more scope for direct intervention." His reason for reserving the District Commissioner the right of intervention was his belief that Africans still "needed the 'enlightened' ruthlessly effective harsh Absolutism of 17th and 18th century Europe."⁴⁰ In other words, Africans were, according to him, still like children and needed close European supervision in order to accomplish anything. He also justified the continuation of corporal punishment and the maintenance of strict discipline for the same reason.

Gunzert's attitude towards Africa made him look like his military predecessors in one sense and different in another. Soon after taking over from Baumstark in 1907, he sanctioned not only the political changes made by the latter in Usukuma during the Maji Maji uprising, but also made similar changes of his own. In Sengelema and Kigoku, for example, he deposed Ng'henagula and Izengo Ng'wana-Sayi respectively for dubious reasons and then made the electors in both cases choose successors from among the sons of the deposed *batemi*, thus changing the system of succession to the *butemi* from matrilineal to patrilineal,⁴¹ which was quite a departure from the traditional system which he was claiming to uphold. Secondly, following the deportation of Ntemi Balele to the coast in 1906, Ntemi Ngokolo of Kanadi seized the opportunity to extend his territory by claiming the villages of Bulolambesi, Sembelya, and Ng'wayayi from Ntuzu, a claim which was tentatively accepted by Baumstark before he left. When Gunzert took over, he sanctioned not only the annexation of those villages but also of Ntagwasa, Malusugi, and Ng'wahongowa, presumably because Ngokolo, who had been a *katikiro* prior to becoming *ntemi*, had a good record at the *boma*, while the new *ntemi* of Ntuzu did not.⁴² Moreover, Balele's successor in Ntuzu, Mvanga, committed a number of crimes for which he was imprisoned in Mwanza for six months in 1911. During his imprisonment, Ng'wanilanga of Itilima seized the opportunity to expand his territory at Ntuzu's expense by annexing thirteen of its villages in the south, including Nkoma, Gasili, Inalo, the Lugulu Ginery area, Ng'wandu, and Nhobola, with Gunzert's approval.⁴³ In fact, it was also during Gunzert's time that Ng'wanilanga was able to annex the Ng'wagala *bahoja* divisions in the Simiyu valley. Like Ngokolo in Kanadi, he was handsomely rewarded with territory from Ntuzu for his cooperation and good work, a reward

which meant more prestige and more pay for him because the *batemi* were then being paid according to the number of tax-payers under their jurisdiction.

That the *batemi* were now competing for government attention and favors is indicative of the success which had already been achieved in turning them into clients of the colonial state. They were no longer the "natural" leaders of their people but rather servants of the colonial administration and remained in power as long as they were able to satisfy their masters. Gunzert augmented their authority and supplemented it with trained paid assistants such as clerks, agricultural instructors, road-building supervisors, and uniformed local police known as *balugaluga*. The closest link between the *ntemi* and the District Office was still the *katikiro* whose main duty was to keep the former and his advisors informed of government intentions and decisions as soon as they were made. These men resided in Mwanza but they often travelled between the *boma* and their *mabutemi* carrying messages. Their actual influence in the new administrative set-up is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, being people who acted as the only regular communication link between the colonial government and the local authorities, they must have exerted a good deal of influence. As a matter of fact, some of them took advantage of their special positions to acquire *batemi* positions to which they were not traditionally entitled. Examples are Ng'wanilanga of Itilima, Ngokolo of Kanadi, and Tungu of Bugalama.⁴⁴ What gave them advantage was their constant contact with the German colonial officials whose intentions and ways of doing things they came to know fairly well. Another advantage they had was their knowledge of Kiswahili, which was used as the second language of administration.

Taxation had been one of the main causes of discontent during Baumstark's tenure. Naturally, when Gunzert took over, not only did he lower the rate from one and a half to one rupee per house per annum as was required by the Governor, but he also changed it from a poll to house tax and made the methods of collection more orderly and less painful.⁴⁵ To accomplish the latter, he instructed the *batemi* and their clerical staff and the *banangwa* to count all taxable houses carefully and register the would-be tax-payers. After the revenue was handed over to the *Bezirksamtmann*, about one quarter of it was to be returned to the *ntemi*, who would keep half of it for himself and his clerk and divide the remainder among the *banangwa*. This means that the *ntemi* and his assistants had a vested interest in the collection of taxes. The more they collected, the more pay they received.

The administration of justice is another area in which Gunzert made some significant changes. Unlike his military predecessors who had established only the district court and had deprived the *batemi* of

any judicial role, he created a two-tier court system consisting of the district court at the top and the *batemi* courts at the bottom.⁴⁶ To the *batemi* courts, he handed over the jurisdiction of all cases dealing with property disputes and crimes which did not involve murder, breach of the peace, or witchcraft. These courts were permitted to impose fines in livestock, as was customary, and could collect court dues in small stock, but could not give prison sentences. All cases handled and judgements made had to be recorded by court clerks in ledgers which the *Bezirksamtmann* inspected during his tours of the District, and appeals could be submitted to him then. To assist in the maintenance of law and order, Gunzert also created a new district police force made up of local personnel which replaced the old force which had developed out of the earlier colonial force.

Apart from administrative issues, what concerned Gunzert most during his ten year stay in Mwanza was the implementation of his economic program. According to government policy of the day, he was supposed to introduce the development of a peasant cash crop economy in Usukuma by persuasion and encouragement of voluntary efforts. Instead, he ignored this directive and instructed the *batemi* and the assistants assigned to them to force each household to grow a cash crop on an annually increasing acreage. The peasants could at first choose between groundnuts and rice if they were living in moist areas like those of the lake littoral and islands, and from about 1912, they could choose cotton as well. Such a choice did not exist for most of the people in eastern Usukuma because only groundnuts could thrive there. Rice could be grown in Sengelema, Nela, and Bukumbi, but cotton production was not introduced in eastern Usukuma until about the outbreak of the First World War. Gunzert's resort to the use of force rather than persuasion in this endeavor was prompted by the desire to get quick results and by his preconceived idea that Africans could only work under orders and European supervision. He charged the *batemi* and their assistants with the responsibility of supervising the peasant producers, and he periodically checked what was being done. He also used a few German settlers who had established themselves in various parts of western Usukuma shortly before his arrival as agricultural instructors to local producers in modern methods of farming. These were encouraged to combine the cultivation of their own holdings with promotion of cash crop production among the adjacent African population.

By 1910-11, Gunzert extended his cash crop drive to the cultivation of cotton in areas along the lake. His efforts to increase cash crop production included the opening up of markets for the crops involved, setting up guaranteed minimum prices for them and encouraging private investors to establish oil mills, a rice mill, and a

cotton gin in Mwanza. The construction of the Mwanza-Old Maswa Road, the Mwanza-Ngasamo Road, and other minor roads was speeded up in order to facilitate the transportation of these crops by motor lorries and wagons from various parts of Usukuma to Mwanza for export via the Kenya-Uganda Railway. His efforts paid off, and by the outbreak of the First World War, Mwanza had become the greatest exporter of rice, groundnuts, and cotton in the colony.⁴⁷ This success was partly due to his use of force and partly due to the need for money by the Wasukuma with which to meet a number of obligations, including the payment of taxes. It was also due to the fact that rice and groundnuts were food crops and, therefore, resistance to grow them on a slightly larger scale was minimal.

However, the success of cash crop production in the Gunzert years can only be properly understood if one takes into account the economic changes which had taken place earlier in the region as a result of German intervention. Large-scale caravan trade with the coast persisted among the Wasukuma until about 1895, when Stokes, the famous European ivory trader, was hanged by the Belgians in Zaire allegedly for trafficking in firearms and when Ndekeja, the great caravan leader of Busiya, died. Consequently, the leadership of smaller but still diverse independent groups was assumed by men like Nkande of Ng'wagala who had been closely associated with Ndekeja and Luheka of Shinyanga.⁴⁸ More people from Ng'wagala, Buduhe, Buchunga, Mondo, Seke, Nindo, Lubumbo, Busule, Tinde, Busanda, and other parts of Usukuma were participating in portage and trading with the coast at this time than ever before, and continued to do so until 1900 when the Germans introduced controls over caravans by requiring leaders to obtain permits specifying the number of people and animals involved in each caravan. These measures were followed by the banning of elephant hunting by individuals between 1905 and 1908.⁴⁹ These restrictions made people in Usukuma lose interest in trading with the coast.

In the meantime, new traders from the coast invaded Usukuma and started establishing trading posts in different areas. This commercial invasion of Usukuma was stimulated by two inter-related events. The most important was the completion of the Kenya-Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Kisumu in 1901, and more specifically, the introduction of steamers on the Victoria Nyanza in 1904.⁵⁰ The second was the introduction of taxation in money in 1905, which forced the Wasukuma either to sell some of their agricultural or animal products or to seek employment in settler farms or in portage. With ivory production and caravan trade with the coast being restricted by the German administration, they turned to the exploitation of local resources. Coastal traders, Indian, Arab, as well as Swahili, moved in

as middlemen. By 1905, for example, three Indian shops were established at Lunele in Nela, where even people from Sengelema, Badi, Seke, and Buhungukila could sell their groundnuts and animal products in exchange for money or cloth. A few years later, Swahili and Arab traders established shops in Buchunga, Buduhe, Seke, Lalago in Ng'wagala, Nyakabindi in Ntuzu, Nisungwi in Bulima, Busagala in Bukumbi, where they brought not only groundnuts but also ghee, hides and skins, and sometimes, cattle. Once in a while, these traders offered employment to local people as porters to transport merchandise to Mwanza for sale. Thus by the time Gunzert introduced his cash crop production drive, the Wasukuma were already turning away from caravan trade with the coast and were looking for alternative economic activities at home. This was probably one of the main reasons why they did not offer much resistance to the introduction of cash crop production.

Conclusion

Looked at generally, the imposition of German colonial rule marked a turning point in the history of the Wasukuma, a people who had previously succeeded in preserving their independence and way of life from destruction by foreign intruders. By first resisting the Germans and then coming to terms with them, they were able to preserve a good deal of their traditional way of life throughout the German colonial period. Among the significant changes which occurred in their region as a result of German intervention were the imposition of an authoritarian regime, the modification of their political system by the regime and the introduction of a peasant cash-crop economy. These changes, as we have already seen, manifested themselves in various forms of oppression and exploitation such as taxation, forced labor, imprisonment, corporal punishment, confiscation of property, and meager wages and prices. In addition, the introduction of patrilineal succession to kingship or government appointment of the *batemi* deprived the *banang'oma* of their political power and made the *batemi* more dependent on their colonial masters than on traditional norms of authority.

In spite of the changes introduced by the German colonizers, most Kisukuma social and political institutions remained intact up to the end of German colonial rule in 1918. One aspect of colonialism which the Wasukuma managed to resist effectively throughout the German colonial period was Christianity. Up to 1909, missionary activity in Usukuma was still confined to the White Fathers stations at Bukumbi, Nyegezi, and Mwanza town and the CMS station at Bulima, in Nasa, where converts to Christianity were still very few, possibly because the

new religion was too contrary to Kisukuma social and religious practices such as polygamy, ancestor worship, and *bufumu*. The rest of Usukuma remained outside missionary influence of any sort. Starting from about 1910, however, efforts were made by the American fundamentalist African Inland Mission (AIM), which had expanded from western Kenya and taken over the CMS station of Bulima in Nasa to spread its activities inland to Kijima in Nela and Nkolandoto in Busiya, a step which prompted the White Fathers to open a station at Sumve, in Busumabu, in 1911.⁵¹ Meanwhile, the mixed German-American Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) missionary society spread its activities from the east lake region and opened up a station at Bupandagila in Ntuzu in 1912.⁵² Despite their increase in number, the only influence which these missionary bodies had during this period was the introduction and spread of literacy in the region. But even in this field, their achievement was still negligible because they failed to satisfy even the modest needs of the administration for local manpower. For this reason, the German administration decided to establish its own elementary school in Mwanza in 1907, where sons of the *batemi* and those of their officials were sent for training in elementary skills such as reading, writing, and arithmetic in order to make them better servants of the German colonial administration.

It is, therefore, clear that foreign intrusion by both coastal traders and Europeans was able to introduce a number of significant changes politically and economically in Kisukuma society from the beginning of the 1890s to 1918. However, despite the full integration of their region in the capitalist system as a result of these changes, the Wasukuma managed to assimilate them without losing their basic social and cultural institutions. In other words, they were able to retain a great deal of their material culture and institutions up to 1918 despite the onslaught of German colonialism.

Thus it would appear that superficial though the changes introduced by the German colonizers in Usukuma in the cultural sphere might have been, there is no doubt that the experience which the Kisukuma ruling elite gained under German colonial rule prepared them for the indirect rule administrative system which the British introduced in Tanganyika in the 1920s after taking over the colony from the Germans at the end of the First World War. This paper has attempted to show how the new men with both traditional and Western skills emerged, and how anxious they were to reorganize their communities to face alien rule more effectively in the post-war period.

NOTES

- ¹E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty* (London: Harrison, 1909, Vol III, No. 264), pp. 882-88. See also F. O. 403/93/5400: Points of Agreement Between British and German Governments Respecting Zanzibar, October 26, 1886.
- ²R. A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 24.
- ³See Agreement Between British and German Governments Respecting Africa and Heligoland, in Hertslet, *Op. Cit.*, No. 270, pp. 899-908.
- ⁴G. Schweitzer, *Emin Pasha: His Life and Work* (Westminster: A. Constable and Co., 1898, Vol. II), pp. 23-47; F. Stuhlmann, *Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika* (Berlin, 1894, Vol. I), pp. 1-12.
- ⁵Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 41. See also J. M. Gray, "Anglo-German Relations in Uganda," *Journal of African History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1960, p. 218. Further reference to this journal shall be indicated by *JAH*.
- ⁶C. Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa*. Translated by H. W. Dulcken (London: Ward and Co., 1891), pp. 538-43, 45; Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 67-8.
- ⁷A. Luck, *Charles Stokes in Africa* (Nairobi: EAPH, 1972), pp. 86-7; Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 62; N. Harman, *Bwana Stokesi and His African Conquests* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp. 118-19.
- ⁸Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 105-7; Stuhlmann, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 111-13; C. F. Holmes, "Zanzibari Influence at the Southern End of Lake Victoria: The Lake Route," *African Historical Studies*, XIV, 3, 1971, pp. 499-500. Further reference to this journal shall be indicated by *AHS*.
- ⁹Quoted in Luck, *Op. Cit.*, p. 94.
- ¹⁰L. Declé, *Three Years in Savage Africa* (London: Methuen and Co., 1898), pp. 360-62, 370-71.
- ¹¹Emin was murdered by Arab traders at Kinena, in what is now Zaire, while on his way back from his former camp near Lake Albert and heading towards Lake Tanganyika and, eventually, the coast, in October 1892. See Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 271-304; Harman, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 157-58.
- ¹²W. Langheld, *Zwanzig Jahre in deutschen Kolonien* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 217-18; P. Kollmann, *Auf Deutschem Boden in Afrika* (Berlin, n.d.), p. 125; Austen, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 34-35.
- ¹³Austen, *Ibid.* p. 42.
- ¹⁴O. Baumann, *Durch Massailand Zur Nilquelle* (Berlin: Reimer, 1894), pp. 42-67; Werther, *Zum Victoria Nyanza* (Berlin, 1894), pp. 100-120.
- ¹⁵D. C. MacGillivray, "A History of European Settlement and Government from its Advent Until the Great War as seen through the Eyes of Kiyumbi. . .," *Mwanza Provincial Book* (hereinafter *MPB*); Langheld, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 218-220; Kollmann, *Op. Cit.*, p. 315; Mpanduji, "Luganda Iwa Batemi ba Ng'ung'hu," *Lumuli*, No 8, 1949, pp. 1-3.
- ¹⁶Declé, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 316-62, 371, 380-84; Langheld, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 218-220; Werther, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 114-15; Feldwebel Hartmann, "Bericht über Ereignisse auf

der Station Muansa Während des Monates September durch Januar," *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, [DKB] IV, 1893, p. 433; Kollmann, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 255 and 314.

¹⁷This incident appears to have actually taken place in the border area between Ng'ung'hu and Sengelema and most of the things belonging to the caravan were taken by Bana-Ng'ung'hu, but the report which reached the German commander mentioned only the Bana-Sengelema as being responsible. See Mpanduji, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-3; MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸Hoffmann, "Bestattung des Sultan Sengelemas in Usukuma," *DKB*, III, 1892, p. 330; MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁹Hoffmann, "Bericht von der Station Muansa," *DKB*, III, 1892, p. 237.

²⁰Langheld, *Op. Cit.*, p. 117; MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*

²¹O. von Trotha, *Meine Bereisung von Deutschostafrika* (Berlin, 1897), pp. 9-10; Austen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 42.

²²Austin, *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²³Schweitzer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 109; Peters, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 480-84 and 488-89.

²⁴Austen, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 39 and 92. See also "Memoirs of a German District Commissioner in Mwanza, 1907-1916" [hereinafter "Gunzerts Memoirs"], *Tanzania Notes and Records* [hereinafter *TNR*], No. 66, 1966, p. 178.

²⁵Hauptmann Schlobach, "Über eine Expedition nach Magalla, Ntussu, Nassa, Uschaschi zum I. Grad südlicher Breite," *DKB*, X, 1899, pp. 124-26.

²⁶C. F. Holmes, "A History of the Bakwimba of Usukuma, Tanzania, from the Earliest Times to 1945," Ph. D. thesis, Boston University, 1969. Microfilm, University Microfilms, 1979, pp. 196-97.

²⁷MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; Mpanduji, *Op. Cit.*

²⁸Testimony of Ntemi Machibya Luhaga and six of his *banang'oma* and *banangwa* at Gumali, Badi, 20 June, 1971; MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*

²⁹van der Schaans, "Histoire legendaire de Ntuzu," typescript (n. d.), p. 6; testimonies of Ntemi Ndatulu Masanja Ngiwinula and three other elders at Somanda, Ntuzu, 21 March, 1971; Ntemi Majebele Masanja and four of his elders at Lalago, Ng'wataga, 26 April 1971; Salumu Ng'hulyungu of Malampaka, Sengelema, 10 July 1971.

³⁰van der Schaans, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 6-7; "Igunguli Iya Kilulu," *Lumuli*, No. 26, 1952, p. 3.

³¹MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*

³²van der Schaans, *Op. Cit.*, p. 7; MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; testimonies of Ntemi Ndatulu Masanja and Salumu Ng'hulyungu.

³³This separation of the Wasukuma into two different districts did not worry the German military commanders because they were not interested in them as a people but simply saw them as a bunch of natives to be ruled by the German colonial administration as it saw fit.

³⁴Austen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 52; C. F. Holmes and R. A. Austen, "The Pre-colonial Sukuma," *Cahier d'histoire Mondiale*, XIV, 2, 1972, p. 402.

³⁵Testimony of Ndekeja Gambishi and five other prominent elders at Ng'wataga, Buduhe, 25 August 1971.

³⁶Testimony of Sita Kishosha of Butunga, Seke, 30 June 1971.

³⁷J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 2-8; M. E. Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918* (New York: Howard, 1966), pp. 225-55.

³⁸Austen, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 76-77; Dernburg, Speech of January 8, 1907, *Zielpunkt des deutschen Kolonialwesens*, Berlin, 1907.

³⁹*Gunzert's Memoirs*, p. 176.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; testimonies of Pagi Nkuba Mbusa of Ng'wangelula, Logoku, 7 November 1971; Yakobo Jigwa of Hinduki, Sengelema, 27 September 1972.

⁴²MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; testimony of Mboyi Muchunga of Lagangabilili, Kanadi, 24 May 1971.

⁴³MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; A. M. Turnbull, Senior Commissioner, Mwanza, to the Chief Secretary Dar-es-Salaam, 16 June 1922, ACC. No. 215/3/33, NAT; testimonies of Ng'wana-mbiti of Mahembe, Itilima, 28 May 1971; Yidoma Gwihenda of Kimali, Itilima, 3 June 1971.

⁴⁴MacGillivray, *Op. Cit.*; Native Administration: Chief Mwanilanga of Itilima, 20 April 1940, ACC. No. 215/3/108, NAT; testimonies of Mboyi Muchunga, Ng'wana-Mbiti and Yidoma Gwihenda.

⁴⁵*Gunzert's Memoirs*, p. 179.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

⁴⁸P. Stigger, "The Late 19th Century German Trade and Some of its Modern Implications: The Shinyanga Example." Paper presented to the Canadian Association of African Studies 4th Annual Conference, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, March 1974, p. 18.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 22; testimony of Petro Kiganga Mukima of Butunga, Ng'wadubi, 19 July 1972.

⁵⁰M. F. Hill, *The Permanent Way—The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway* (Nairobi, 1961), p. 237.

⁵¹E. Sywulka, "Early History of Mission Work Among the Basukuma." Typescript, Mwanza Inland Mission, 1926; Bukumbi Mission Diary, 15 November 1910 and 2 January 1911; anonymous, "Aproximate Dates in the History of Sukumaland," Sumve 1953.

⁵²Communication with Seventh Day Adventist Pastor K. B. Elineema, Dar-es-Salaam, 24 April 1983.