

COLONIALISM: AN EPOCHAL ERA A REVEIW OF PETER P. EKEH'S WRITINGS

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Introduction

This paper presents the ideas of and issues raised by Peter P. Ekeh on colonialism in general and its Nigerian manifestations in particular. Four of Ekeh's written works form the primary sources for understanding his political thought, on the effects and consequences of colonialism on contemporary Nigeria. Ekeh uses Nigeria as an ethnographic case example but raises issues applicable to all parts of Africa that were colonized.

Four main ideas provide the foundation for a synthesis of Ekeh's political thought on the character of colonialism in Africa. Stated briefly, the following premises are indicative of Ekeh's political thought:

- (1) Colonialism must be accepted as a reality, *sui generis*, as a phenomenon in its own right. This phenomenon is to be perceived as a social movement of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance surpasses the life-span of colonialism into the post-independence period. Furthermore, social formations of supra-individual entities and constructs evolved (Ekeh 1983:5).
- (2) The African bourgeois class emerged from European colonial rule in Africa, thus their legitimacy is neither "homegrown" nor traditional (Ekeh 1978:302).
- (3) African colonial experiences have led to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in modern post-colonial Africa (Ekeh 1975:97).
- (4) Any political conflict belongs to a class of

human political behaviors, and the type of ethnic group to which one belongs is central to one's definition and relations to political conflicts in Nigeria (Ekeh 1972:76-77).

This paper is divided into six parts including the summary and conclusion. The separation of Ekeh's ideas is an attempt at highlighting clarity rather than an indicies of substantive discontinuity. Appropriate references are made to other political thinkers who hold views on the significance of African colonialism.

Part I. The Nature of African Colonialism

Peter Ekeh's fundamental thesis upon which he elaborates is the pervasive nature and continued effects of colonialism on contemporary Africa. Colonialism, a *sui generis*, social reality, made for unique social formations (i.e., institutional structures) that could not be terminated by legal declaration (Ekeh 1983:5-6). The use of such terms as neo-colonialism and decolonialization become misrepresentations with this line of thought. Additionally, the colonial experience provided the framework for the unique nature of present-day African politics (Ekeh 1975:93). The political actors have changed, but the post-colonial period is an extension of the colonial era (Ekeh 1978:308).

In the historical context, 17th century colonization represented the "classic form" whereby Europeans rendered surplus and/or undesirable by local socio-political and economic conditions migrated or were banished by their home countries. In this way, the Americas and Australia were conquered and settled. The next major wave of colonization, "neo-classic", took place in the 19th and 20th centuries. At this time, Asia and Africa were made to accommodate surplus capital, "by creating new economic structures and opportunities receptive to European capitalist expansion" (Ekeh 1983:2). For Ekeh (1983:17), the distinction between the export of persons associated with organizational values has to do with a positive or negative correlation to morality. To extend Ekeh's argument with respect to morality, "classic" colonialization led to cultural and economic transformation. A relationship of investment was established. In contrast, neo-colonization designed to

create and alter institutions to respond to established foreign structures, was exploitative.

On the character of colonialism in Africa, Ekeh (1983:6-7) asserts: "it represented an epochal era, similar to the British Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution." The similarity rests in the overall longterm significance of colonialism in Africa on all that was African in character. And like other epochal eras, qualitative changes in the central value systems, a differentiation of the future from the past, and an alteration of basic assumptions and norms took place. "The African colonial experience represented a crisis in human experience on both the micro and macro levels of social reality" (Ekeh 1983:7-8). Similar views are held by Nursey-Bray (1983:98), who characterized the colonial era as a change from *Gemeinschaft* to the world of *Gesellschaft*. In a somewhat different context, Fanon (1962:24) refers to "the legacies of imperialism where the structural partitioning of Africa into small competing units led to destructive petty national rivalries resulting in a 'colonial neuroses'." These views of colonialism as espoused by Ekeh, Nursey-Bray, and Fanon, are diametrically opposed to some other characterizations. In particular, some others believe that the colonial era represents, "not a complete departure from the African past, but rather an episode in the continuous flow of African history" (Ajayi 1965:194). Still other sources of literature emanating from the ahistorism of social anthropology reduced the analysis of colonialism to a "clash of cultures" (Ekeh 1983:9).

The "epic" school of thought also brings into question the practicality of those who would infer that Africans can "go back" to traditional pre-colonial forms of social organization (Nyerere 1977). Furthermore, Ekeh (1983:7-8) maintains that social change became pre-determined, thereby affecting everyone in Africa. The epochal character of colonialism also changed Africa's relations with the outside world.

Part II. Post-Colonial Leadership: Dilemma of Dialectics

According to Ekeh (1983), the present socio-political structure operative in Africa is not only unique but a direct

consequence of the colonial experience.

Concerning the nature of post-colonial African socio-political organization, Ekeh systematically examines the European and African bourgeoisie, social structures that have evolved, and the response of the African masses to these ideologies and structures.

Highly critical of the African bourgeoisie, Ekeh (1975:93-94) summarily dismisses them as, "a new privileged class which may wield much power, but have little authority; which may have a lot of economic influence, but enjoy little political acceptance. Coming out of the colonial experience, they lack legitimacy of the local stratification system." Furthermore, "the bourgeoisie do not represent elites, as they lack autonomy from the external influences in taking decisive action." Similarly, Franz Fanon questions the legitimacy of a viable African bourgeoisie class developing when national independence is not accompanied by social-economic transformation. Where the bourgeoisie lacks the ability and/or motivation to transform the social order, it is a bourgeoisie "in spirit only" (Geismar 1962:37). In a more definitive view, Chabal (1981:42) asserts, "there is no economically viable bourgeoisie because imperialism prevented it being created. What there is, is a stratum of people in the service of imperialism who have learned how to manipulate the apparatus of the state -- the African petite bourgeoisie."

In the following, we consider briefly Ekeh's views on the ideological orientations of both the European and African bourgeois classes. According to Ekeh (1978:302-308), not only did each bourgeois class have the need to formulate ideologies of legitimacy but the post-colonial era represents a continuation of the colonial era in the need for legitimacy.

Ekeh (1975:94) defines ideologies as "unconscious distortions or perversions of truth by intellectuals in advancing points of view that favor or benefit the interests of particular groups for which the intellectuals act as spokesmen." Ideologies are interest-begotten theories. However, ideologies are necessary, since according to Hodgkin (1957:169), "all political movements find a need to justify themselves, to construct ideologies."

The primary emphasis of European bourgeois

ideologies of legitimacy was two-dimensional. On the one hand, "imperial ideologies" directed at fellow European countrymen provided justification and/or rationalization for expansionist tendencies and continued presence in foreign lands. The complimentary "colonial ideologies" directed at Africans stressed the beneficial merits of the European presence as evidence of the "right to rule" (Ekeh 1975:95-96; 1978:309). It is the "colonial ideologies" designed to persuade Africans of European benevolence that in their many forms continue to shape Africa. One ideological strategy was to draw attention to the "enlightened colonial" period and compare this to the "backward" or "ahistorical" African past. For Africans who accepted this line of reasoning, there was the tendency to differentiate between "Western educated" Africans and "backward" natives. In this form, colonial ideologies were more likely to be directed at and accepted by intellectual and upwardly mobile Africans.

Another colonial ideology emphasized the role of the colonizers in building Africa, thus supporting the "right to rule" and maintain peace by intervening in "inter-tribal" conflicts. Lastly, colonial ideology stressed the financial and administrative costs to the colonizing countries for the selfless service extended to African colonies (Ekeh 1975:95-99). This form epitomizes the "white man's burden syndrome."

Ekeh (1975:95-99) considers the merit of each of the colonial ideological forms and concludes that, first the defamation of Africa's past allowed for the exaggeration of colonial achievements. Second, the "benevolent ruler syndrome" was a means of rationalization as was the reported restoration of peace. Interestingly enough, the preoccupation with "inter-tribal" conflicts rather than "intra-tribal" conflicts negates the issue of sovereignty. Finally, Ekeh maintains that the cost-benefit line of reasoning falls outside the realm of ideologies, reflecting more of an outright lie. Africa was neither advantaged nor did it reach a level of equitable exchange in the market system monopolized by European bourgeoisie.

Having considered briefly European bourgeois ideologies, the way is now clear to consider the African bourgeois ideologies that, according to Ekeh (1978), had

their origins in the colonial period. With the advent of independence African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation come into their own. However, these ideologies are similar to those of the colonists accepting the same implicit principles, but advocating African leadership. These ideologies expounded by Western-educated Africans were directed at the African masses. In substantive terms, Ekeh (1975:100-3) stresses that the African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation are neither original (i.e., tradition bound) nor a rejection of colonial ideologies with regard to the perceived ideals and principles of Western institutions. African bourgeois ideologies can be categorized into two types: anti-colonial and post-colonial.

African bourgeois anti-colonial ideologies mimic colonial ideologies in perpetuating the "right to rule" of those who have acquired the "high standards" in Western education and administration. For many, the colonizers' behavior became the measuring rod for what was good. Unfortunately, these ideologies are struck by two internal inconsistencies that prohibit the African bourgeois class from being able to assume the role played by the colonial bourgeois class. First, there was no socio-cultural link between Britain and its colonies. Thus British colonial authority was based on charisma, rather than tradition. Ultimately, charisma became routinized for all whites, as a group,¹ protected by the attribution of supernatural powers, ignorance, and isolation from external communication for the African majority (Ekeh 1978:316-328). Charismatic rule represents a specifically extraordinary and purely personal relationship epitomized by the 'leader - disciple syndrome', or as Louis Dumont (1967) poignantly uses the terms: *homo hierarchicus* vs. *homo aequalis*. The primary goal of African bourgeois anti-colonial ideology was to attack colonial "right-to-rule" and gain acceptance for African rule. However, the strategic difficulties became quite formidable. First, there was the need to discredit the colonial personnel while stressing the right of Africans to rule. And second, there was the desire to assume the charismatic authority previously attributed to whites (Ekeh 1978:317-329). Even if these initial difficulties had been overcome, many among the new African bourgeois failed to

appreciate that the benefits enjoyed by the 'charismatic' whites was in direct proportion to the political domination and economic exploitation of Africans.

Many African bourgeois post-colonial ideologies were equally contradictory. For example, in some instances the criteria for success was expressed in the idiom of the acquisition of Western education. In other instances, the African bourgeois perpetuated ethnic domain-partition ideologies to consolidate their spheres of influence (Ekeh 1975:103-104).

Part III. Social Structure in Transition.

With regard to social structural formation, Ekeh (1983:11-13) presents a three part typology. The determining criteria for classification are origin and association to African tradition. Ekeh does not state explicitly whether his social structural classification represents an evolutionary scheme. However, there does appear to be some multi-evolutionary² tendency implied in how the three social structures are distinguished. The first social structural types identified are "those social structures that are the transformations of pre-colonial indigenous institutions" (Ekeh 1983:11). Colonialism presented important consequences for institutions based on tradition, either by encouraging growth, recession, or obsolescence. However, more crucial to understanding the impact of colonialism or traditional institutions was the conscious perversion of inherent discriminating factors. In particular, Ekeh (1983:15) asserts, "The generalization of symbols of colonialism consisted of making the elements of traditional high culture available to popular or general culture." Evidence of this generalization is expressed in the institution of chieftancy and emirships. Not only were warrant chiefs imposed without regard for the indigenous standards of succession, but with total disregard for traditional checks and balances. In the Northern Nigeria emirates, emirs with colonial backing became despotic in their rule.

The second type of social formation which Ekeh (1983:17) distinguishes is "migrated social structures and constructs." These social structures and constructs

developed around Western models of social organization which were transferred to Africa by the colonial administration. "Migrated social structures," formal in character, differ from pre-colonial social structures in evolving through a process of diffusion "of forms and practices from the metropole to the colony" (Sklar 1983:4). The primary weakness in and criticism of these structures was the rigid compliance to organizational forms to the extent that there was no room for accommodation to local traditions or social conditions. Prominent examples of "migrated social structure and constructs" included democracy, law, and bureaucracy.

The third and final social formation discussed by Ekeh (1983:19) were "emergent social structures." Without recourse to tradition and informal in character, "emergent social structures" represented new, unique, and innovative responses to the colonial milieu. Operating with a logic all their own, Africa's "emergent social structures" such as urbanism, ethnicity, the civic public and primordial public are indicative of a dynamic and rational response to colonialism.

Part IV. Concept of Citizenship: Africa's Two Publics.

The consequences of colonial, anti-colonial and post-colonial ideologies, and the social structures that evolved during colonialism are to be seen in the orientation towards citizenship by Africans. One also notes, as Sahlins (1965) has so skillfully reminded us, ideology and composition of social structures are not necessarily (or perhaps even usually) congruent. The very nature of a political ideology requires depending on the circumstances, that it be both rigid and flexible, representing the beliefs of those in power as a sort of visionary theorizing.

To establish a frame of reference, Ekeh, following Marshall (1978:306) provides a working definition of citizenship. "Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what rights and duties shall be, but societies in

which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed" (T.H. Marshall 1959:92).

The use of Marshall's definition is significant for Ekeh's analysis in its emphasis on rights and duties, as well as in citizenship. According to Ekeh (1975:106-107), in the West there is a positive correlation between rights and duties. This orientation towards citizenship came about by what Bendix calls the "Great Transformations" in Western Europe (Ekeh 1972:81). Here again is evidence of the epochal nature of colonialism in Africa. A gradual transformation whereby "duties come to be defined centrally and concomitant rights are sought in the idiom of national consciousness" never occurred in Nigeria. Nigerians were made to believe that citizenship was given with independence in the 1960s (Ekeh 1972:81-82). The doctrines of colonialism and the struggle for independence both proved counter-productive in the long-run for a positive association for rights with duties to develop (Ekeh 1972:82-83). With independence there existed no mechanisms for a smooth transition of the locus of citizenship from the primordial order in localized areas to the national civil order (Ekeh 1972:83-84).

Ekeh's analysis (1983:21-22) focuses on the issue of morality vis-a-vis behavioral expectations. Unlike the West, where behavior is either moral or immoral, colonialism bred a duality of moral perceptions. Consequently, in Africa, morality is determined by one's focal point (Ekeh 1975:92-106).

Evidence of the dynamism of "emergent social structures" is abundantly clear in Ekeh's (1978:318; 1983:23) explanation of and distinction between the "amoral civic public" and the "moral primordial public." The "two publics" operate in African political life in a particular way fashioned by the colonial experience. In "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," Ekeh (1975:107-108) makes the following distinction between the character of the primordial and civic publics:

[P]ublic realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individuals' public

behavior. This is called the primordial public which is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm" (Ekeh 1975:92).

Public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. Based on civil structures, the military, civil service, and the police have no moral linkages with the private realm. This is called civic public in Africa, it is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public (Ekeh 1975:92).

The distinctions existing between the moral primordial public and the amoral civic public are, in scope, similar to Durkheim's sacred and profane and Tonnies' *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, and other such classic typologies. It is not only the distinctive character of the "two publics" but also the implications for citizenship duties and rights that Ekeh (1975: 106-110) pointedly stresses.

Notably, typologies often represent ideal types, but in this instance, Ekeh (1975:106-110) works from the premise that the distinction made between the "two publics" determines the African conception of citizenship. Africans feel a duty to give materially to sustain the "moral primordial public" and receive non-material sanctions of psychological security inherent in primary and in-group association (Ekeh 1975:107). There is in a real sense a generalized reciprocity. In contrast, in the "amoral civic public," the African orientation is towards rights in economic gain. Unfortunately, not even the principles of balanced reciprocity are operative, due to the disassociation with moral content. This bifurcated notion of citizenship becomes increasingly important as educated Africans play an active role in the "two publics" in their respective societies (Ekeh 1975:108). Ekeh (1978:78) states categorically: "civil and primordial ties are centrifugal forces pulling the same persons in different directions at the same time."

Nigeria provides a good ethnographic example of the dialectical nature of these "two publics" operating in the normative social order. In Nigeria, the issue of tribalism, which arose out of ethnicity (emergent social structure) has become an important feature of public life. "Tribalism arises where there is conflict between segments of the African bourgeois regarding the proportionate share of the resources of the civic public to differentiated primordial publics" (Ekeh 1975:109). With this, the highest expression of the dialectics is in Nigerian corruption vis-a-vis the civic public by embezzlement, bribery, and partiality to nepotism (Ekeh 1975:108-109).

Part V. Perception of Citizenship: Potential for Conflict

One of the tragic consequences of the dual perception of citizenship, according to Ekeh (1972) is the potential for differing attitudes to lead to political conflict. It is Ekeh's thesis (1972:77) that "the type of ethnic group (primordial attachment) to which one belongs is central to one's definition of and relations to political conflicts in Nigeria." If indeed the "hallmark of a modern nation-state is citizenship" (Ekeh 1972:80-81) grounded in a positive association of loyalties to the civil nation-state, the epochal nature of colonialism is self-evident. Colonialism ensured the diversification of citizenship loyalties in Africa.

While political conflicts may result from either the civil or primordial order, "the balance between the rights and duties of citizens are important determinants of the nature and type of political conflicts that develop in that society" (Ekeh 1972:84). Political conflicts involve an admixture of civil commitments to rights and primordial commitments to duties" (Ekeh 1972 1972:85-86). After due consideration of several primordial principles--race, territory, religion, language, and ethnicity--Ekeh (1972:87-90) determined that ethnicity is the principle of primordialism in Nigeria.

The Nigerian political orientation that has evolved emphasizes ethnic group membership as the *raison d'être* of political power. More important, with respect to potential conflicts, is the demarcation of boundaries between different ethnic groups. This is a consequence of "civil

politics being introduced into Nigeria at a time when individuals had no attachment or had no reason in fact for any commitment to civil goals" (Ekeh 1972:91). Thus ethnic boundaries have become the determinants of power relations between Nigeria's different ethnic groups. From 1954, with the creation of a federal government, the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa emerged as those ethnic groups holding majority power. Unfortunately, the power held was neither uniform nor did it take into account those Nigerians who belonged to other ethnic groups outside the Igbo-Yoruba-Hausa triad (Ekeh 1972:94-96). This leads Ekeh to an analysis of differing citizenship expectations among majority, minority, and marginal Nigerians. Any illusion of equality is dismissed in this analysis.

Nigerians' self identification has determined their reactions to regional and national politics. In seeking political power, only majority groups could become politically meaningful in a national context.³ This led to internal tensions among non-majority Nigerians. Minority Nigerians with no ethnic affiliations with majority groups had no access to political power. In other instances, marginal Nigerians who held ethnic ties with majority ethnic groups lived in different regions from that which they had ties. These two developments led to negative reactions to majority groups and to regions (Ekeh 1972:95-98). Not surprisingly, successionist tendencies have only appealed to majority Nigerians with broad primordial bases. Indeed, Ekeh (1972:113) sums up the reason for the Nigerian civil war; "It represented a conflict between those who were fighting for equal citizenship expectations and opportunities and the direct relationship of the citizen to the civil center, and those who were fighting for the supremacy of majority ethnic groups."

Part VI. Summary and Conclusions

In at least four written works from 1972 to 1983, Peter P. Ekeh systematically elaborated upon the thesis that, "Colonialism in Africa represented an epochal era." This characterization is in reaction to views hitherto held on colonialism in Africa. In particular, Ekeh's view can be contrasted with the "episode" view of social history and the

"clash of cultures" view held in social anthropology. Also held in contrast to Ekeh's epochal era thesis, is the work of Balandier, "*la situation coloniale*". La situation coloniale, a concept from Balandier's "*Sociologie Actuelle de L'Afrique Noire*" presents the colonial situation as a particular conjuncture imposing a certain orientation to agents and processes of transformation. It is further suggested that this transformation as a whole leads to a new and autonomous society. Balandier suggests that each colonial situation is somehow a unique experience and must be studied as a function of this diversity. There is the illusion that new and old relationships can coexist and lead to innovations devised by the dependent society in a mixed character of traditionalism and modernism. However, Ekeh (1983:5-6) does acknowledge the merit of Balandier's efforts in providing a sociological conceptualization of colonialism. But Ekeh (1983:6) believes that "individuals count for little in the intellectual arena of colonialism." One must examine distinguishable social institutions.

After considering the distinctive character of colonialism, Ekeh examines the mechanisms that affected the colonial hold on Africa. Ekeh (1983:25) states, "Africans live and function in an environment which has been impregnated and shaped by the social forces promoted by colonialism." It is important for those interested in Africa to understand this complex environment.

In an effort to explain the African socio-political environment, Ekeh (1978) critically examines in turn the ideological bias of two sets of bourgeoisie. While ideologies are characterized as interest-begotten, Ekeh (1975:94) associates the level of deception with the degree of insecurity felt by those promoting such ideologies. In turning to the social structures that have evolved in Africa, Ekeh (1983) classifies them as: pre-colonial, migrated, and emergent, depending on their origins. Clearly, the emergence of "two publics" is one of the most significant consequences of colonialism in Africa, as it affects citizenship. This leads Ekeh (1975:93) to consider two theoretical approaches to a reconceptualization of colonialism in Africa.⁴ The politico-historical approach allows one to address how "two publics" emerged in Africa.

A sociological approach forces one to examine how the operation of the "two publics" affect African politics.

Ekeh's work presents a critical examination of colonialism as representing an epochal era. This examination is focused on the role of the bourgeoisie, the social formations that evolved, the African orientation to citizenship, and the potential for conflict. Ekeh never questions that there is a role for the African bourgeoisie to play in Africa's autonomous development. He thus implores the bourgeoisie to become a responsible political class guided by ideologies that reflect socially determined thought. Among other political and socially conscious Africanist scholars commenting on the role of the African bourgeoisie, one should note the works of Rene Dumont, (1966) "False Start in Africa" and Amilcar Cabral (1973) "Return to the Source".

Dumont analyses the basic problem of new-ex-French-Africa south of the Sahara. It is a tale of failure, on the whole due to the historical framework in which liberation has taken place. Despite the rally for pan-Africanism, it is a story of fragmentation that is neither viable nor able to cope with the demands of self-supporting development. An unfortunate feature of contemporary Africa is the fact that the great opportunities given to the charismatic leaders who emerged during the process of decolonization for cooperative development based on sacrifice have not been firmly grasped.

According to Dumont, "the African who persists in holding on to his privileged status, regardless of the effects on his country's development, is following a path laid out for him. In many instances, political independence has not meant the effective evolution of the masses. Rather the masses have the impression that national sovereignty has created a privileged class which has cut itself off from them." Africa is headed towards a worse colonialism, that of class, or what Fanon (1963) refers to as an 'internal mutation'. Purely political independence is only the beginning. Real independence can only be achieved through economic development. Therefore, the importance of economic development should not be underestimated by those who simply want to sit back and enjoy their new privileges.

In a similiar vein, Cabral (1974:12) leaves us with the truth that 'the process of returning to the source is of no historical importance (and in fact may be political opportunism) unless it involves not only a contest against the foreign culture but also complete participation in the mass struggle against foreign political and economic domination."

In the transition of "freedom from" to "freedom to" (Ekeh 1978:330), Africans must "rely upon their own cultural resources and innate capacities for cultural advancement" (Cabral, 1974 and Sklar, 1985).

The reconception of colonialism that Ekeh (1983) calls for will come about with the systematic re-examination of African political ideas "with reference to the categories and traditional concerns of political theory" (Sklar 1985:1).

A possible paradigm for those who will tackle the task of providing a holistic explanation of the consequences of colonialism will include not only the political and economic repercussions, but the perpetuation of group interests, cultural constants rooted in the human psyche, and the tendency for cultures to form a relatively integrated whole.

NOTES

1. In an interesting observation, Ajayi (1968:189) states: "in the colonial period there were not really men dealing with other men, but a race of gods and heroes communing with naughty mortals; Prospero communing with Caliban; Europeans with Natives."
2. Evolutionary, as used here, does not imply progress in the sense of better or superior, but rather a transition.
3. One notes that meaningful political participation is still primarily dominated by the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria.
4. Some scholars might refer to Ekeh's approach as "structural-functional" and commend his efforts for avoiding the tendency to perceive equilibrium where conflicts exist.

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