

# U F A H A M U

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## CONTRIBUTIONS

UFAHAMU will accept contributions from anyone interested in Africa and related subject areas. Contributions may include scholarly articles, political-economic analyses, commentaries, film and book reviews, freelance prose, and poetry.

Manuscripts must be between 20-30 pages. All manuscripts must be clearly typed, double-spaced originals with footnotes compiled at the end. Contributors should keep copies of all their manuscripts. The Editorial Board reserves the right to edit any manuscript to meet the objectives of the journal.

Authors should send two copies of their article and a brief biographical note, indicating position, academic affiliation and recent publications, etc.

All correspondence -- manuscripts, subscriptions, books for review, inquires, etc., -- should be addressed to the Editor-in-Chief at the above address.

## Review Article

Revolutionary Pan-Africanism.....P. Geoffrey Bush 207

## Book Reviews

In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.  
South African Relations.....Samir Amin 209

Winnie Mandela: Part of My Soul  
and My Mind.....Margaret M. Ross 211

The Struggle for South Africa:  
A Reference Guide to Movements,  
Organizations and Institutions.....Liba Wilson 215

Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance:  
The Culture and History of a  
South African People.....Robert Shankell 219

The Lagos Plan of Action for  
The "Ary" World.....Peter H. Ngau 223

Migration to Slushland:  
Ethnicity, Gender and Occupation  
in Urban Ethiopia.....Patricia Ameen 227

Double Impact: France and Africa  
in the Age of Imperialism.....P.S.O. 229

African Orléans Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy.....P.S.O. 236

## Poetry

Out of Love.....Don 231

Freedom Fighter.....Steve Jo Moko 233

Prime Minister.....Steve Jo Moko 234

Anti-Apartheid War Situation.....Steve Jo Moko 235

U F A H A M U

Volume XV, Numbers 1-2, 1986

Contents

Contributors.....	3
Editor's Quill.....	5
Issues.....	6
Letter to the Editor.....	8

Articles

South Africa: On the Verge of Revolution .....	Bernard Magubane 22
Popular Alliance in South Africa.....	Horace Campbell 58
African States and the South African Problem.....	Boniface Obichere 84
The Third International and the Struggle for National Liberation in South Africa.....	Robin D.G. Kelley 99
Finding Some Space: South African Women Writers.....	Carole Boyce Davies 121
SADCC, Liberation Movements and Regional Development in Southern Africa.....	Ackson M. Kanduzo 137
Public Enterprise and Industrialization: The Case of Zambia Breweries Limited.....	Chisepo J.J. Mphaisha 152
Universal Education and Social Class Formation.....	Daniel Sifuna 164

Forum

Independence on a Silver-Platter: The Emerging Liberal Mythology.....	Tiyambe Zeleza 182
--	--------------------

## Review Article

- Revolutionary Pan-Africanism.....P. Godfrey Okoth 202

## Book Reviews

- In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S.  
South African Relations.....Sandra Jackson 209

- Winnie Mandela: Part of My Soul  
Went With Him.....Margaret M. Ngau 211

- The Struggle for South Africa:  
A Reference Guide to Movements,  
Organizations and Institutions.....Ziba Jiyane 214

- Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance:  
The Culture and History of a  
South African People.....Robert Shanafelt 218

- The Lagos Plan of Action Vs.  
The Berg Report.....Peter M. Ngau 219

- Migration to Shashemene:  
Ethnicity, Gender and Occupation  
in Urban Ethiopia.....Patricia Apenyo 223

- Double Impact: France and Africa  
in the Age of Imperialism.....P.G.O. 225

- African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy.....P.G.O. 228

## Poetry

- Out of Love.....Dee 231

- Freedom Fighter.....Simon Zu Mbako 233

- Prime Minister.....Simon Zu Mbako 234

- Anti-Apartheid War Situation.....Odumu Onche Amali 235

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## EDITOR'S QUILL

Although unannounced in advance, this is a double issue. Two reasons make this edition of Ufahamu a double-decker: the quality of the articles and the urgency of the South African issue.

The present editorial board is a new one, having been chosen in a general election by the African Activist Association, the parent body of Ufahamu, in February 1986. Our directive is unambiguous; it is to improve the journal's scholarly quality as well as to cover and highlight current African concerns, be they of social, cultural, economic or revolutionary nature. For the latter, Ufahamu wishes to register its displeasure about the U.S. raids on Libya in April 1986 and South African raids on Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in May 1986.

We shall aim at publishing top-quality works in all areas of African Studies and Studies on Africa's Diaspora. No journal on Africa, particularly, Ufahamu, can afford to overlook the Africans in the Western world. Their fate and that of Africa's have always been intertwined. Conforming with the double reach of its objective, this issue is therefore composed of two components: Part one carries articles on the most pressing issue of South Africa. Part two carries case-studies of some of the burning aspects of post-colonial conditions in Africa, namely, regional integration and development; public enterprise and industrialization; education and social class formation; some theories of African independence and a reiteration of the concept of revolutionary Pan-Africanism. The rest are book reviews and poems.

Let me also take this opportunity to thank our former Production Editor, Doris 'Owanda' Johnson-Ivanga for her great service she rendered to the journal. Doris has been elevated to the rank of Assistant Graduate Adviser, African Studies Program, UCLA. In the same vein, I would like to welcome the new Production Editor, Stephanie Ingram to the Ufahamu family. We extend our congratulations to Peter Amuka for his energy and service to both Ufahamu's editorial board as well as AAA. After earning his Ph.D. in Comparative Literature, Peter has joined the African Studies Institute at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. Congratulations Dr. Amuka! Similar congratulations go to Darlene Daniel and Stephanie Campbell upon their successful completion of their M.A. in African History. We wish all of them plenty of happiness and success. Their energy and commitment to Ufahamu will be missed.

P.G.O.

## DR. CHEIKH ANTA DIOP

Ufahamu acknowledges with a deep sense of loss the death of a distinguished African historian, Professor Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal. Dr. Cheikh Anta Diop died on February 8, 1986 in Dakar.

Born in Diourbel, about 150 km east of Dakar, on December 29, 1923, he earned a Docteur es Letters from the University of Paris in 1960. His area of specialization was the History of Ancient Africa.

Professor Cheikh Anta Diop's major contribution to the professional study of African history manifested itself in the re-interpretation and rewriting of the history of ancient Africa. More critical in his scholarly contribution, was his device of a new methodology that led him to an overwhelming evidence that had for a long time been either minimized or deliberately suppressed by Euro-centric historians. Of special significance was Dr. Diop's pioneer work in the scientific study and analysis of the impact of ancient 'Black' Africa on the development of classical and ancient Egyptian civilization. In corollary to this was Dr. Diop's intellectual struggle to 'reclaim' Egypt to Africa.

Apart from being the pre-eminent scholar he was, Dr. Diop also served his country as a politician, having served as the secretary-general of the new opposition party (R.N.D.) formed after President Leopold Sedar Senghor lifted the ban on political parties in Senegal in 1976. Until his death, Professor Diop was the secretary-general of the R.N.D.

Ufahamu laments the untimely death of this illustrious son of Africa whose immense contributions to African studies will for a long time be remembered. We extend our sympathies to his wife, children and other members of his family and urge Africanists the world-over to establish a fund for a "CHEIKH ANTA DIOP INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES" in Dakar.

## VICTIMS OF THE CAMEROON DISASTER

Ufahamu learned with shock, the death of thousands of Cameroonians on August 22, 1986. Poisonous gas erupted from the bottom of Lake Nios, enveloping neighboring farm settlements in a cloud of toxic fumes, claiming the lives of our brothers and sisters.

Natural disasters are beyond human prediction. Ufahamu joins President Paul Biya and the entire Cameroonian nation in mourning the victims of this tragedy. May their souls rest in peace.

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\* CALL FOR PAPERS \*  
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The Editors of Ufahamu will publish a special issue on "The POST-COLONIAL STATE IN UGANDA." This issue will appear in Winter 1986/87.

We are now soliciting manuscripts from Ugandan scholars and Ugandanists on aspects of the country's history, politics, economics, international relations, education, literature, and other topics on Uganda that fall within the realm of the Arts and Social Sciences.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced, between 20-30 pages, with footnotes compiled at the end. Papers should be submitted no later than November 30, 1986.

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\* CALL FOR PAPERS \*  
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TO: THE EDITORS OF UFAHAMU

RE: SANCTIONS FACT SHEET: LESSONS FROM RHODESIA

In the recent debates concerning the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, reference frequently has been made to the case of Rhodesia. Concerned that the Rhodesian example was being misused by antagonists of sanctions against South Africa, many opponents of apartheid urged me to investigate the Rhodesian case.

This Fact Sheet was prepared on the basis of extensive research conducted at the National Archives of Zimbabwe and the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre in Harare. The evidence compiled from these sources has been supplemented by that obtained from numerous interviews with businessmen associated with the public and private sectors of the Rhodesian economy during Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). A select bibliography and list of interviewees is attached.

In regard to my own background, I have written extensively on U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa and the Sullivan Principles. In particular, as a staff member of the Institute for Policy Studies, I wrote Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980). More recently I wrote One Step in the Wrong Direction: An Analysis of the Sullivan Principles as a Strategy for Opposing Apartheid (New York: Episcopal Church People for a Free Southern Africa, 1985). I have also written documents for the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid.

In 1981 I spent three months in South Africa as a correspondent for Maryknoll Magazine. I am currently a doctoral candidate in African History at the University of Wisconsin and have been conducting research in Zimbabwe since April 1985.

#### Thatcher and Reagan Policies

In their attempts to forestall economic sanctions against South Africa, Reagan and Thatcher have claimed that sanctions "don't work." To justify their position, they have frequently pointed to the case of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, asserting that sanctions actually strengthened the Smith regime.

As the following evidence illustrates, the Thatcher-Reagan argument is demonstrably false. Sanctions, in

conjunction with other factors, most notably the armed struggle, were instrumental in the demise of the Smith regime.

Those who distort the Rhodesian case do so on the basis of three erroneous assumptions:

(1) They consider only the short term effects of economic sanctions, rather than studying their impact over the long term.

(2) They consider sanctions in a vacuum, whereas proponents of sanctions speak of their effectiveness in conjunction with other forces.

(3) They fail to consider the crucial differences between the political and economic situations of Rhodesia in 1965 (when sanctions were imposed) and South Africa in 1986. Many experts contend that these differences make South Africa even more vulnerable to sanctions than was Rhodesia.

### The Case of Rhodesia

Ian Smith announced UDI on 11 November 1965, entrenching white minority rule in defiance of the colonial power, Britain.

Between November 1965 and May 1968, a series of sanctions were imposed by the United Nations Security Council on the illegal regime. Sanctions escalated from being selective and voluntary to comprehensive and mandatory.

### Sanctions Loopholes

Oil was Rhodesia's Achilles heel. It had no oil supplies of its own, and yet oil was absolutely vital to keep the economy, and later the war machine, running. This life-line was never severed. British, American, and French oil companies, as well as the South African, Portuguese, and British governments, collaborated to ensure for Rhodesia a continuous supply of oil and other petroleum products.

If the flow of oil had been halted, Rhodesia could not have survived for more than a few months. The blame for this wide gap in sanctions enforcement lies squarely with the West. The very countries that had called for the imposition of sanctions lacked the political will to enforce them. (According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, sanctions can be imposed on any member state that refuses to comply with mandatory sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council. Western members

of the Security Council refused to pressure major sanctions violators, in particular, South Africa and Portugal, by applying sanctions against them.)

### Rhodesia's Vulnerability to Sanctions

Rhodesia in 1965 had an extremely open economy. For decades before UDI, international trade and investment was the major source of its economic growth. In 1964, exports earned 40% of Rhodesia's national income (compared to 5% for the U.S. and 20% for Britain). Thirty four of Rhodesia's national income was in turn spent on imports.

At UDI, the bulk of Rhodesian exports were primary products. Tobacco alone constituted 33% of the total value of Rhodesian exports at that time. Half of the tobacco exports went to one country--the United Kingdom. Mineral exports constituted another 22% of the total value of Rhodesian exports.

At UDI, Rhodesian imports were predominantly capital and intermediate goods, including machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, petroleum products, spare parts, and industrial raw materials. Machinery and transport equipment constituted 32% of the value of total imports in 1964. In spite of its heavy dependence on foreign trade, Rhodesia in 1965 had a healthy economy and was in the midst of a vigorous economic expansion, largely financed by exports.

### The Immediate Impact of Sanctions

Between 1965 and 1966, exports declined 38%. By 1968, exports were only slightly more than half the value of 1965 exports. As a result of this decline, not enough foreign exchange was earned to finance necessary imports. Between 1965 and 1966, imports declined 30%, affecting agricultural and industrial inputs, new machinery, and spare parts. Consequently the terms of trade deteriorated more than 18%.

In order to get goods in and out of the country, Rhodesia had to sell cheap and buy dear (i.e., the "sanctions discount" and the "sanctions premium"). The extremely low price for Rhodesian exports was necessary to keep them competitive. Trading partners weren't willing to take the risk of buying Rhodesia's contraband products unless they could strike a good bargain. Moreover, sanctions-induced costs were added to the basic price. Rhodesia had to pay the extra expenses incurred by re-routing, handling by numerous middlemen, paper shuffling to disguise the products' origin, etc. Over the 14 years of UDI, the sanctions discount alone was estimated to have cost Rhodesia about R\$1.1 billion.

### Limits to Import Substitution

Because Rhodesia could no longer obtain many products, it began a massive drive to manufacture them inside the country. Most import substitution industries that began during UDI made consumer goods. Because of the limited domestic market and Rhodesia's inability to export many of its manufactured products at competitive prices, the new industries were frequently not economical. They could not produce and dispose of large enough quantities to achieve economies of scale. Some of the Rhodesian-made goods were more expensive than the products they substituted--and often of inferior quality.

Raw materials continued to be imported at great expense. A serious lack of foreign exchange, necessary for the import of raw materials and capital goods, stunted the growth of the import substitution industries.

By 1975, most of the consumer goods that could be made within the constraints of the Rhodesian economy were produced. Ten years after UDI, the shallow phase of import substitution was completed. However, the deeper phase, the manufacture of the majority of capital goods, was seriously constrained by the lack of foreign currency. Throughout the UDI period, Rhodesia remained heavily dependent on the outside world for many of its industrial and agricultural inputs and capital goods.

### Lack of Foreign Investment

Rhodesia needed external capital loans and direct investment for large scale development. Sanctions denied Rhodesia access to both sources of finance. Lack of capital meant lack of investment in new industries, in exploration for new minerals, in irrigation schemes, in research, etc. As a result, growth suffered. In the past, Rhodesia's economic growth was founded on expanding exports and the inflow of capital and skills. The imposition of sanctions severely hindered Rhodesia's access to these necessary inputs. The economy reached a plateau, and by 1974/75 it was no longer moving forward.

### World Economic Recession

Oil prices increased dramatically worldwide in 1974. Between 1973 and 1976, Rhodesia's oil import costs trebled. To finance vital oil supplies the Smith regime sharply cut all non-petroleum imports, reducing them by 40%. The cut-back severely damaged all sectors of the economy. Although oil prices increased around the world, Rhodesia was particularly affected because it paid the sanctions premium on top of the OPEC price increase.

The oil price increase sparked a world economic recession. As an exporter of primary products, Rhodesia was especially hard hit. Prices for food, minerals, and other primary products declined most drastically. Rhodesian copper earnings, for instance, were cut by one-half. Rhodesia was actually earning less foreign currency for its exports at a time when it needed currency more than ever.

The result of rising import prices and declining export prices was a serious deterioration in Rhodesia's terms of trade. By 1979, Rhodesia's terms of trade were 40% worse than in 1965. Between 1973 and 1979, Rhodesia's import capacity fell by 42%. This decline was largely the result of an import bill that was 192% higher than in 1973.

### Sanctions in Conjunction With Other Factors

The effects of the world economic recession, and the oil price increase were deepened by the cost of sanctions. Simultaneous with these debilitating factors was the escalation of the liberation war. In December 1972, a new front was opened in Mozambique. With Mozambican independence in 1975, the war escalated even further and the Rhodesian economy suffered severely. Economic activities were disrupted. The search for new minerals was virtually abandoned. White commercial farmers in remote areas began to abandon their farms.

Rhodesia's budget deficit increased five-fold between 1975-76 and 1979-80--from R\$95 million to R\$475 million. In 1977, income taxes increased by 10% and sales taxes by 50%. By 1979, the war was costing Rhodesia R\$1 million a day. It was consuming an increasing amount of government expenditures. In 1971, military costs were 18% of the budget. By 1979, they had almost doubled to 34%. In the long run, the government could not finance both the economy and the war. Thus sanctions assisted the guerrillas by reducing the regime's ability to finance the war against them.

### Pressure from South Africa

When sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia, it relied heavily on the good will of South Africa and Portugal to ensure its well-being. Until the newly independent government in Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in 1976, Mozambique had been Rhodesia's most important outlet to the sea. From 1976, Rhodesia became almost totally reliant on South Africa to supply it with imports, to purchase its exports, and to allow passage of goods through its territory to and from Rhodesia.

Rhodesia's almost total dependence on South Africa rendered it extremely vulnerable to South African pressures. Ten years after UDI, South Africa's prime minister, John Vorster, had come to consider the Smith regime a thorn in the side. He saw it as a destabilizing factor in the region. He feared that if the liberation war continued to escalate, it might spread its message further south. Moreover, South Africa was itself beginning to feel external pressures. U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, told Vorster that South Africa was risking sanctions by not severing its ties with the rebel Smith regime.

Vorster and Kissinger were much more interested in installing a moderate, pro-Western, black regime in Rhodesia than they were in supporting Smith's white minority rule. So, South Africa began to put pressure on Smith. Unexplained snarl-ups in the South African transport system occurred which left Rhodesian imports and exports stranded. Vital oil supplies ceased to flow. South Africa cut off loans which financed the Rhodesian war. Arms and ammunition, previously supplied by South Africa, began to dwindle.

When South Africa began to apply sanctions against Rhodesia, their effectiveness was greatly enhanced. South Africa, through its actions, was demonstrating that sanctions do work. By 1979, the combined pressures of the war, the oil price increase, the world economic recession, and the impact of economic sanctions, forced the Smith regime to accede to majority rule.

#### The Case of South Africa: Comparative Reflections

In 1986 South Africa, like Rhodesia in 1965, is an extremely open economy, heavily reliant on international trade and investment. 17% of South Africa's capital comes from abroad. Foreign trade constitutes about 55% of South Africa's gross domestic product. Writing about South Africa in November 1985, the Standard Bank Review noted that,

"As a small, relatively open economy, the country's prosperity is based to a great extent on its ability to freely sell materials and products abroad. In turn, South Africa depends on the outside world for many essential inputs."

#### Imports

Machinery and vehicles are South Africa's two most important imports--apart from petroleum products and military goods, which alone constitute an estimated one-third of the import

bill. In 1982, 50% of the transport equipment and machinery used in South Africa, and 30% of the motor vehicles were imported. Chemicals and chemical products are also crucial imports. Like that of Rhodesia during UDI, the South African manufacturing industry is heavily dependent on imported technology, and foreign expertise.

South Africa has no oil supplies of its own. Oil is an essential input in many vital sectors of the economy. The South African security forces could not function without it. To circumvent the OPEC oil embargo, South Africa pays US\$5-20 per barrel of the regular price for oil. This extra cost for purchasing on the spot market, plus the costs of middlemen, re-routing, and other forms of camouflage, cost South Africa about US\$2 billion per year.

It is estimated that South Africa spends about US\$2.1 billion per year to circumvent the UN mandatory arms embargo. (This figure excludes the cost of the weapons themselves.) Although South Africa manufactures many of its own arms, 80% of the components of those arms are foreign made. Thus, rather than increasing South Africa's strategic self-sufficiency, the apartheid arms build-up is increasing its dependence on foreign collaboration.

### Exports

Like Rhodesia during UDI, South Africa is extremely dependent upon exports to finance domestic growth. The bulk of South Africa's exports are primary products, the prices of which fluctuate heavily on the international market. More than 60% of South Africa's exports are minerals and mineral products, followed by agricultural and textile products. The South African economy is essentially gold-based. Gold contributes 45% of the value of all exports.

Already South Africa's export base is suffering. Between Jan. 1980 and mid-1985, the price of gold fell from US\$850 per ounce to US\$310 per ounce. South Africa's coal exports are also in jeopardy. France, once South Africa's biggest European customer, has steadily reduced its intake of coal over the past few years. Denmark, currently South Africa's largest coal customer, announced in May 1986 that it would no longer buy South African coal.

### Vulnerability to Sanctions

South Africa is highly vulnerable to sanctions, in many ways even more vulnerable than Rhodesia during UDI. South Africa is dependent on a small number of suppliers and export

markets. A few key export products make up most of the export trade.

South African technology is largely imported through subsidiaries of multinational corporations. Foreign loans financed the expansion of strategic parastatals, oil, and military expenditures. Unlike Rhodesia in 1965, South Africa has long since passed the shallow phase of import substitution--i.e. the manufacture of consumer goods. Hence, sanctions will not serve to stimulate a period of growth in the manufacturing sector as they did in the case of Rhodesia (1965-1974). Even before the imposition of sanctions, South Africa has reached the plateau that Rhodesia reached some years after sanctions were imposed. It has not yet succeeded in producing the major share of its capital goods.

Another difference between Rhodesia in 1965 and South Africa in 1986 is the health of their respective economies. Rhodesia in 1965 had a vigorous economy on the up-swing. The South African economy is currently in serious trouble. It is in the midst of its worst recession since the Great Depression:

Inflation is rampant, running at more than 20%.

Interest rates, also more than 20%, are among the highest in the world.

Terms of trade have fallen by more than 20% since 1979.

The rand has lost half its value since 1984.

Black unemployment has reached record levels--about 30% in the urban areas and more than 50% in the bantustans. In September 1985, the press reported the largest flight of capital from South Africa since the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre 25 years before.

Foreign banks are refusing to roll over South Africa's lines of credit. South Africa's foreign debt is now about US\$32 billion, which is equivalent to over 33% of its gross domestic product--and makes South Africa one of the world's top debtor nations.

Like Rhodesia in 1974, South Africa is faced with a recession, mounting military expenditures (now equivalent to 27% of the gross domestic product), and an escalating armed struggle. Pressed internally by militant trade union and community action and by the activities of the African National Congress,

South Africa is extremely vulnerable to external pressures, especially in the form of comprehensive economic sanctions.

In conclusion there is no doubt that the success of sanctions against Rhodesia can be used to support sanctions against South Africa.

Quotes from Former Rhodesian Government and Business Officials on Rhodesia:

Ian Smith, prime minister of Rhodesia, to the House of Assembly, April 5, 1973:

"The imposition of sanctions created many trading problems for us. We find that we are compelled to export at a discount and import at a premium. The result is that we lose out on both transactions. This has an effect on our balance of payments and foreign reserves. Because our foreign reserves are depleted artificially, our natural development is prejudiced."

A businessman who, during UDI, was concerned with getting Rhodesian minerals out of the country:

"Describing the rapid decline of the Rhodesian economy from the mid-1970s.... You come to the crunch line where your major industries, which in this country remain export oriented, start to suffer in their volumes and in their prices or net prices and where you begin to run out of foreign currency for the necessary inputs into your new domestic industries, and where your foreign revenue begins to fall below the level required for those things for which you cannot possibly do a domestic substitution."

A businessman who worked with the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia during UDI:

"Sanctions, by itself, would sooner or later have forced a political decision, because... (no) economy anywhere in the world can exist under a sanctions type situation for a long period of time... A small country such as ours could never have hoped to make the thing stick... Sooner or later something had to give."

A businessman concerned with exporting minerals:

The inability of the country to finance both the war and the economy "was in part attributable to sanctions." Without sanctions, the bloodshed would have been prolonged: "If we had been able to continue our economic strength the political side of the thing would have continued the war longer."

A businessman working with the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia:

"The state of war, the state of economic sanctions could not go on forever without a total collapse...It was incumbent upon the business community to try and get the message across to the politicians that sooner or later they had to grasp the nettle or else there would be nothing left to govern."

Quotes on South Africa:

E.G. CROSS, economist for the official Rhodesian Agricultural Marketing Authority, 1969-80.

"Sanctions have the capacity to really damage the South African economy. In a sense they are more vulnerable than Rhodesia ever was because they are so much more sophisticated, so much more dependent on access to technology, so much more dependent upon exports of sophisticated products. It's difficult to hide a commodity which is made in South Africa--partly because they are so big."

A businessman who worked with the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia:

"What the South African whites seem reluctant to accept is that in the end, what the blacks are talking about is not some form of power-sharing, is not some form of accommodation. They are actually looking for power and one-man-one-vote. And against that you have a white community which is facing the loss of power, which in their minds is catastrophic..."

In the end, all these things boil down to people. They don't boil down to buildings and machines. It boils down to people and what people are willing to do. If a person is willing to burn his house down rather than give it to somebody who he thinks doesn't deserve it, and he feels strongly enough about it, that's what he will do. But certainly, if

sanctions can be applied successfully, then the consequences are pretty dire."

Elizabeth Schmidt  
Harare, Zimbabwe

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Interviews, conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, March-May 1986

E.G. Cross, economist for the Rhodesian government's Agricultural Marketing Authority, 1969-80. Currently, chief executive of the Zimbabwe parastatal Cold Storage Commission.

John Graylin, chair of the Tobacco Export Promotion Council, 1965-68. Subsequently chair of the National Export Council, and finally, chief executive of the Association of Rhodesian Industries.

H.W. Freeman, managing director of the Rhodesian government's Tobacco Corporation, throughout UDI.

Simon Gray, currently economist for the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries.

Anthony Hawkins, professor of economics at the University of Rhodesia. Currently Dean of Commerce at the University of Zimbabwe.

Ruth Weiss, Financial Mail (SA) correspondent in Rhodesia, 1965-68.

Sir Garfield Todd, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, 1953-58. (Placed under restriction by the Smith government during UDI).

Judith Todd Acton, author and campaigner against the Smith regime during UDI.

Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Information, Posts, and Telecommunications, Government of Zimbabwe.

Tirivafi J. Kangai, chief representative of ZANU-PF to the United Nations, the United States, and the Caribbean, 1977-80. Currently, Director General of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC).

Also interviewed were businessmen and women involved in tobacco and mineral exportation, with the Association of Rhodesian Industries and the Associated Chambers of commerce of Rhodesia, who preferred to remain anonymous.

defensive position. It is to some extent a reaction to the privileged position of the oppressor. It was not until the late 1940s to 1950s that revolutionary movements against the oppressor in the 1940s when they were arrested. It is a different situation today, when their interests are more. The ANC is strong and can defend the people against British control in the executive forces. And it is also an entirely different situation again today, when the majority of Rhodesian states enjoying the only remaining white minority and the anti-apartheid movement in the world is becoming a defining force in international relations. Finally, I deal with apartheid, which like an incurable cancer is draining South Africa of vital manpower and human resources.

The struggle for liberation of the people of South Africa has always had a global significance. Today the imperialist tentacles of South Africa cannot get along without their support for the most inhumane system of racial oppression and exploitation yet ever known, more clearly than ever before. For instance, the struggle of the black population was a mockery of the well-known plan of the white regime and its allies that would have given a free life to apartheid in order to make the apartheid regime acceptable to western public opinion. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique raised serious questions about the durability of South Africa as the heartland of imperialism. In fact, the events of 1974/75 destroyed the assumption of the late National Security Council Report (NSM 31) which urged the United States government to 'lift' its arms embargo against the regime because of the indefinite picture of stability they presented.

The Reagan administration's so-called Constructive Engagement policy had as its cardinal goal the pursuit of the aim of NSM 31 under changed circumstances, viz. the preservation of white minority rule in South Africa as a bulwark of western interests. In the meantime South Africa through armed diplomacy had been given a green light to force Mozambique to sign the so-called Beaufort West and Acacia the so-called Bismarck Agreement.

South Africa today is approaching one of those brief but decisive moments of (historic) and social contradictions, when the routines of normal life are shattered, when the possibilities of revolution against the aims of the oppressor and not the masses into motion. This has a particular significance for a country like South Africa, a country where