

Kevin, Danaher. In Whose Interest?: A Guide to U.S. South Africa Relation. (Washington, Washington D. C. Institute for Policy Studies, 1984). pp. 279. \$11.95.

In this book, Danaher critically examines the premises upon which U.S. policy toward South Africa is built. The book consists of four chapters. Chapter one debunks the myth about alleged reform through existing political institutions, chapter two exposes the sham of U.S. business involvement in South Africa as an impetus to the abolition of apartheid, chapter three traces U.S. policy toward Africa since the Kissinger Doctrine, and looks at the hypocrisy of 'constructive engagement,' and chapter four demonstrates that under the Carter and Reagan Administrations the linkage of anti-communism with the question of strategic minerals has meant U.S. support of the status quo.

Danaher's major point in his book is that U.S. relations with South Africa are hypocritical and antidemocratic. He debunks the myths about alleged U.S. inability to be a powerful catalyst in effecting real change in South Africa. He reveals that what is lacking is a genuine commitment and a lack of will regarding the struggle to dismantle apartheid. Tacitly, the true democratic rights of Africans in South Africa have been consciously and systematically subordinated to the interests of multinational corporations and a repressive white minority regime. The Reagan administration remains unconcerned about the on-going genocide of the Black people in South Africa under the white minority regime. The grim realities of the recently declared state of emergency in South Africa, the accompanying state violence perpetrated against Africans--mass arrests, indeterminate detentions, military oppression and cold-blooded murder of men, women and children have been tacitly removed from the media.

The first premise on which the U.S. policy of 'constructive engagement' towards South Africa is built is that fundamental change can come about through existing political institutions. Danaher reveals the patent falsehood of this premise. First, no real change is possible through existing political institutions because of the very exclusive and prohibitive structure inherent in apartheid. Africans have historically been denied the franchise, they have no representation in the parliament, and they also lack constitutional guarantees of protection regarding civil liberties, human rights and entitlements to due process. Furthermore, with Botha at the helm, the National Party continues to commit genocide under the banner of Christian Nationalism, an ally of Nazism. The apartheid minority regime in South Africa has forcefully and arbitrarily divided the Africans into ten "ethnic nations" and confined them into reserves called

bantustans to serve as sources of cheap labor. It is this labor in bondage that U.S. firms with investments from U.S. institutions use to extract super profits.

The second premise of the 'constructive engagement' policy is that U.S. corporations can be a force for democratic change. Danaher's analysis reveals the contrary. Despite nearly \$3 billion in direct investment in South Africa, U.S. companies employ less than 1% of all African workers (p.52). In addition, because American investment in South Africa is concentrated in capital-intensive sectors such as petrochemicals, computers, nuclear power, and transportation equipment, they tend therefore to contribute to structural unemployment. Add to this the fact that of the more than 300 U.S. subsidiaries there, more than half have refused to sign the voluntary Sullivan Principles. The Africans who stand to benefit from employment in U.S. corporations will objectively become a part of the white government's strategy to cultivate a small, relatively well-off African elite as a buffer in the struggle.

The third premise of the U.S. policy of 'constructive engagement' is similarly untenable. It is deceitful and hypocritical for the U.S. to claim that it recognizes only groups which rely upon peaceful means. The U.S. government has a long tradition of opposing independence movements that threaten the international status-quo, even when the country in question has marginal economic or strategic assets, and even when the Soviet Union is in no way involved (p.95). Yet, the U.S. government demonstrates no reluctance to supporting right-wing dictatorships such as Iran during the rule of the Shah, Chile under Pinochet, Nicaragua under Somoza, Cuba under Batista and the Phillipines under Marcos. There is a pernicious double standard at work here. Without hesitation, the U.S. government has given support to groups in opposition to progressive and socialist governments in the developing world; the contras in Nicaragua, UNITA in Angola, insurgents in Mozambique. True to the double-think machinations of the U.S. government and its western allies, these groups have been called "freedom fighters" whereas groups struggling against oppressive capitalist regimes are labeled "terrorists." Both also exhibits a similar hypocrisy: though the South African government has refused to bargain in good faith with "moderate" Africans who still conduct nonviolent demonstrations and protests, it steadfastly refuses to recognize the legitimate leaders--Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and others. Those who advocate armed struggle, like the African National Congress (ANC), are labeled 'terrorists' and 'agents of communism.'

Reagan and Thatcher nod in solid collaborative agreement.

Mystification again pervades a fourth premise, the argument that the U.S. is dependent upon South Africa's Cape

Sea Route and strategic minerals. The argument is that, should Africans attain control of their country, a leftist regime would assume power ipso facto collaborate with the Soviet Union in restricting western shipping around the Cape. Danaher argues that no empirical evidence in the history of past and present African liberation struggle supports this speculation. Furthermore, strategic minerals which are imported in substantial quantities from South Africa, though essential, can be acquired from other sources. Four minerals (chromium, manganese, platinum-group metals, and vanadium) which head the list can be imported from other sources, for example Zimbabwe, has the highest grade of chrome followed by Turkey, Albania, the Phillipines, New Caledonia, Madagascar, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Regarding manganese, Gabon, Australia, India, and Brazil are viable alternatives. For platinum, there are Zimbabwe and Canada, the latter which also has a ready reserve of vanadium. Yet, in Danaher's view, U.S. policy makers deliberately focus upon the specious argument of mineral dependence and questions of physical supply, to divert attention from the central reason U.S. mineral corporations are in South Africa: high profits (p.89).

Where does Danaher's conclusion lead us? Implicit in Danaher's analysis is a strongly sanctioned, pro-divestment imperative rooted in an international condemnation of South Africa. Cut off from U.S. and Western ally political and economical support-South Africa would be obliged to dismantle apartheid. Ultimately, according to Danaher, this would be in the U.S. long term interests. Contending with South Africa's arrogant recalcitrance, and the continued repression and exploitation of Africans is an area in which the U.S. should take the initiative and exercise leadership. South Africa cannot go it alone, they know it, we know it and the world knows it.

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Benjamin, Anne (ed.): Winnie Mandela: Part of My Soul Went With Him, New York: W.W. Norton and company, 1984. pp. 163 paperback, \$5.95.

The book is a biography of Winnie Mandela. It is a vivid account of Winnie's personal involvement in the African liberation struggle in South Africa. It is based on direct interviews with Winnie Mandela, letters of correspondence of