

THE GREENING OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA

By

R. Ayo Dunmoye

Nigeria is presently facing a food crisis, which is compounded by the oil glut in the international market reducing in effect the country's economic capacity to finance further food imports and the capital intensive agricultural projects. The consequence of this debacle can only be an application for more loans from international lending agencies, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, thereby reinforcing economic dependence. Agricultural production in Nigeria has been declining in the past decade due to a variety of reasons, amongst which are structural impediments like inadequate marketing systems, myopic and paternalistic official policies and the short-fall in oil revenue. The Sahelian drought of the early 1970s also affected agricultural production in the northern part of the country. The official response of the government has been to embark on high technology and capital intensive agriculture in a predominantly peasant society. The Government has also turned to the World Bank to supply loans for agricultural projects which will soon cover all the nineteen states of the country. However, rather than increase food production in the country and thereby improve the standard of living of the poverty-stricken peasants, these projects are gradually incorporating the agricultural sector into the international capitalist system. The shortage of food persists as President Shagari recently acknowledged:

As of now, Nigeria does not experience intolerable and severe food shortages, but already there is ample evidence of food supply deficit which has grown at an alarming rate over the last couple of years.¹

Over sixty percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, which still supplies a greater percentage of food consumed in the country, although these farmers still remain the most impoverished class.² Since 1970, urban food prices have been rising steadily, often at a disproportionate ratio to income³, and this has often resulted in strikes and work shut-downs by workers to back up demands for better wages. But due to the exotic nature of the urban food consumption pattern, demands for cheaper food cannot be fully met by the farmers, hence the importation of food by the government which sells it to the workers through distribution agencies at heavily subsidised prices.

The policy of importing food rather than growing it at home is proving to be a costly one. For example, in 1960, the coun-

try's food bill amounted to £23.9, rising steadily to £28.8 (million pounds) in 1970. The trend has since then galloped into billions of naira (one naira equals 1.6 US\$).⁴

There are seven inter-related factors responsible for the current low agricultural production and the concomitant food shortage. These are:

1. The colonial agricultural policy which laid greater emphasis on export crops at the expense of subsistence crops.
2. The 1954 Constitution which divided the country into three regions, thereby creating a tripolar economy within the country. This tripolarity was reflected in the consolidation of regional mono-culturalism in cash crops, i.e., groundnuts (peanuts) in the north, palm produce in the east, and cocoa in the west.
3. Since agriculture was regarded as a regional responsibility, there was no centrally controlled policy, each region was left to pursue its own policy. The north opted for irrigation projects, while the west, mid-west and east preferred plantation agriculture and settlement schemes. But since the regions depended heavily on export crops to generate internal revenue and meet the costs of political promises (i.e., free education in the West), there was virtual negligence of food crops. Farmers were encouraged to produce export crops and the surpluses were expropriated by the regions through their Marketing Boards. When export earnings started its nosedive in the late 1960s, food crops suffered even more, because of the benign neglect of the regional governments.
4. The Civil War that raged in the country from July 1967 to January 1970 meant in effect that the country virtually lost the rich source of food crops in the east which had become a theatre of war.
5. The drought that occurred in the northern states between 1971 and 1973 seriously reduced the production capacity of the subsistence farmers. Many peasants abandoned farming altogether and drifted to the urban sector in search of a more 'viable' means of livelihood.
6. Oil boom which actually started in 1973 led further to neglect of agriculture, and the beginning of a greater and dangerous reliance on food imports. The windfall from oil revenue consolidated the dependency position of the country, and created all the major features of

the economy of a rentier-state which include rural-urban migration, construction boom, neglect of agriculture, or a preference for capital intensive agricultural projects, aggravation of class divisions, wanton corruption, food shortages, labour unrest, food importation, and a craving for 'white-elephant' projects.

7. The agricultural policy of the Federal Government, as exemplified by a preference for capitalist agriculture. The best examples are the World Bank Sponsored Projects and the River Basin Development Authorities. These projects have tended to favor rich 'Kulak' farmers, and the production of export or cash crops. These projects are now leading to the displacement of peasant farmers from the farms, land alienation and the creation of landless peasants. But the most disturbing aspect is that by its very capital intensive nature, this type of agricultural policy will make Nigeria more dependent on the West for agricultural inputs, technology, and services.

As we shall see later on, the conditions contributing to the food crisis in Nigeria find their explanation from three sources: a) the policies of the former colonial government, b) the uncritical acceptance and continuation of these policies by the post-independence regimes and c) the specific needs of modern agribusiness. Meanwhile, let us look more closely at the current state of affairs.

The Current Situation

In a synthesis of the views expressed by various scholars on the problems facing Nigeria's agriculture, Gavin Williams writes that the sector is characterised by:

...very small producing units. The most prominent feature is one of small holders cultivating two or three acres each. Techniques of production are not advanced. There is little mechanization. The seeds are low yielding. The use of fertilizers and pesticides is not widespread. Prices are low and this reduces incentives to modernize. The land tenure system encourages fragmentation. Storage and marketing facilities are not well organised. Credit facilities are not adequate. Finally, social amenities are generally at a low level when compared with the urban areas of the country.⁵

The optimism that was evidenced in the writings on Nigerian agriculture in the mid 1960s,⁶ has now been replaced with pessimism.⁷ A comparison between Appendix A and Appendix B is a

convincing testimony for this pessimism. Even taking into account the inflationary element characteristic of Western economies, it is clear from Appendix A that revenue from agricultural exports declined rapidly between 1974 and 1979 corresponding to a decline in the export of agricultural products. Appendix B reveals the exact opposite, during the same time-span, i.e., a rise in imports of agricultural products and accessory implements, reflecting the degree to which monopoly capitalist agriculture has penetrated into Nigeria.

Agriculture, which includes livestock, forestry and fishing, contributed about 61.2 percent of the Gross National Product at current factor cost in 1962, by 1978/79, its contribution had dwindled to an all time low of 18.4 percent. Despite this decline, agriculture still remains the most central sector of the economy. Agricultural products contributed 80.3 percent of the total value of exports in 1960, (see Appendix D) by 1978-79, its contribution had dropped to 6.64 percent of the total. Although this relative decline can be attributed to the spectacular growth in crude petroleum exports, some crops have also recorded absolute decline in production. This is the case with cereals and fruit and vegetables (Appendix A); cotton seed, cocoa and natural rubber (Table I), to take but a few dramatic examples. (See Appendix C for further data.)

Table I - Principal Crops (1,000 metric tons)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Rice	534	579	580
Maize	1,300	1,400	1,450
Millet	2,865	2,950	3,100
Sorghum	3,680	3,700	3,800
Sweet Potatoes	200	200	202
Cassava	10,800	10,600	10,844
Other tubers	17,200	16,900	17,389
Groundnuts	500	300	700
Cotton Seed	122	162	74
Palm Kernels	350	375	375
Palm Oil	655	660	680
Sugar Cane	740	765	770
Plantains	1,900	2,000	2,036
Cocoa	165	202	160
Tobacco	14	10	10
Natural Rubber	85	90	90

Source: *Africa South of the Sahara 1980-1981*, p. 771.

With the increase of food production remaining at its 1971⁸ rate of 2.1 percent per annum, and the country's population growth rate advancing at the estimated three percent per annum (U.N.) to

a projected 160 million, double the current population, it is impossible to imagine how the agricultural sector can keep up with the difficult task of feeding the people. From 1968 to 1973, the average annual rate of growth of the agricultural sector was 1.3 percent, but due to the relatively higher levels of population growth, per capita agricultural production registered a negative average annual growth of 1.8 percent between 1968 and 1973 and 0.8 percent between 1973 and 1979.⁹ Although the food sector has displayed a more disturbing trend, the output of agricultural export crops fared better within the same period, a clear indication that production of export and cash crops is becoming a constant constraint on food production, whose demand has been growing at 3.5 percent per annum. A short term solution of the problem has been the massive importation of food items. Food import bills rose steeply from 88 million in 1971 to ₦ (naira) 1.56 billion in 1980. Food imports from France alone rose from \$87 million in 1976 to \$104 million in 1977.¹⁰

A breakdown of some of the country's basic food needs will show how dependent the country has become on other countries for the survival of its citizens at a time when the United States, our major supplier of wheat and agricultural machinery, has openly declared that food is now recognised as a means of putting pressure on recipient countries to toe the U.S. political line.

Wheat and flour: In 1981, wheat imports were over 1.3 million tonnes and by 1985 will reach 2.1 million tonnes -- mostly from the U.S. On the other hand, domestic production is disappointing: 15,000 tonnes was grown in 1980; in any case few areas in the country are suitable for wheat production except under irrigation. Furthermore, the wheat produced within the country is a soft variety, but Nigerians prefer the hard variety which is used to make bread.

Rice: The country needs between 40,000 and 50,000 tonnes of rice monthly, and it is expected that demand will rise to between 67,000 and 83,000 tonnes a month in 1985. It is a remote possibility for the country to be able to meet these demands without heavy importation.

Vegetable Oil: Domestic demand has increased drastically while palm-oil production has stagnated. Imports this year may reach 300,000 tonnes.

Sugar: Raw sugar production in 1980 was 32,000 tonnes, heavily supported by imported sugar.

Nigerian Agriculture during the Colonial Era and Early Period of Independence

The British colonial administration partially incorporated

the Nigerian agricultural sector into the world capitalist economy. Between 1900 and 1960, the colonial government intervened in the peasant mode of production and used state power to influence the peasants' allocation of production factors (labour and land) in order to ensure that labour was readily available for the production of export crops, or the construction of the necessary infrastructures such as roads, railways and the maintenance of law and order which would facilitate an easy processing of raw materials.¹¹ The official colonial policy was to discourage white settler plantations and prevent foreign investors in agricultural production, instead British firms were encouraged to invest in the commercial sectors and procure agricultural crops from the peasant farmers.¹² The peasant agriculture was induced to produce export crops, which it was able to do simultaneously and often on the same plots with food crops. This deliberate policy of sustaining the traditional method of organising production with its low level of technology and the lack of official encouragement for mechanised farming, even as modest as a plough, blocked the emergence of a buoyant agricultural sector and the creation of large plantation (*latifundia*) owning class in Nigeria. Economically, the prevention of the emergence of a plantation owning class was beneficial to the British. There was no direct threat to the source of their export crop supply since the peasant producers were atomized and could not organise themselves effectively to demand better prices for their export commodities. The policy of indirect rule not only nurtured the feudal relations of production and exploitation, especially in the northern part of the country, it also introduced the colonial requirement of monetary taxation. The peasant producer now had to serve two masters instead of one and produce enough surplus to be expropriated by both.

Between 1900 and 1945 the surplus accruing from agriculture was not being reinvested to expand agricultural production, instead it was used essentially for the maintenance of the colonial administrative apparatus, and the sustenance of industrial growth in Britain. In 1940, marketing boards were established and the government began to pursue research into export crops like groundnuts, cotton, palm oil and cocoa. These marketing boards still constitute the most important device for appropriating surplus from the agricultural sector. Although ostensibly designed to stabilize the prices of all export commodities, except rubber, they gradually assumed the role of taxing agriculture.¹³ For many years, the revenue derived from commodity exports was the major source for financing economic growth in Nigeria after independence. The farmers were exploited by the government through these boards, which paid the farmers producer prices which were always below the world market prices. Furthermore, the government extracted export duties and sales tax from the farmers.¹⁴ By prescribing producers prices that were substantially below world prices, the government unwittingly discouraged

any noteworthy expansions of commodity production. The expansion of export crops in the country that occurred between 1900 and 1940 was as a result of bringing more land under cultivation coupled with additional labour, and was not due to the introduction of any new technology. Small farmers cultivating between three and six acres usually produced almost simultaneously both export and food crops.

After independence, the petty-bourgeoisie that assumed political power continued the agricultural policy of the colonial regime, which as an essential aspect of the neo-colonial and dependency relations between Nigeria and the international capitalist system. The governments (both federal and regional) introduced new produce taxation systems while still retaining others like the cattle tax (*jangali*) and poll tax and continued the adverse pricing systems for commodities. In order to generate more surplus from agriculture, the regional governments became directly involved in the planning and execution of agricultural projects like plantations and farm settlements with less than desirable results.¹⁵ The governments also continued with the development of infrastructural facilities necessary for the extraction and transportation of commodities to the urban centres and seaports. The First National Development Plan 1962-1968 allocated 13.5 percent of the funds to agriculture. Within this plan period, about a third of the federal and regional budgets were allocated to the major projects mentioned above.¹⁶ The governing class of the post-colonial state never utilized the surplus accumulated from the Regional Marketing Boards productively, instead this was distributed among them as largesse, used to finance the political parties in power and maintain their hegemony over the country generally.¹⁷ Thus the downward trend of the agricultural sector in Nigeria, although it has its roots in the colonial policy, was aggravated by the policies of the civilian rulers in the first republic.

The Second National Development Plan 1970-1974, introduced after the civil war, was primarily concerned with the rehabilitation of the economic activities that were adversely affected by the war. However, it was during this period that the agricultural sector first entered a crisis stage with the Sahelian drought that affected the northern part of the country causing chronic food shortages in the rural areas. Oil revenue was increasing with the concomitant social problems, especially rural-urban migration which reduced the number of agricultural producers, while increasing the number of urban food consumers. The introduction of free primary education also affected the labour input into agriculture and prevented school age pupils from giving helping hands to their parents during the planting and harvesting seasons. While the introduction of free primary education surely has its advantages in terms of manpower development, many parents (and children alike) perceive access to educa-

tion as a way of escaping the drudgery and poverty characterised by the farming life. The government's response to this crisis is enunciated in the Third National Development Plan 1975-1980.

Prior to the crisis two surveys of the agricultural potential of the country was carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and a U.S. consortium.¹⁸ These two surveys show that while the Nigerian economy was undergoing rapid growth and sectoral expansions, the agricultural sector was lagging behind. Another report, by the World Bank [formerly International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)] states that while the agricultural sector has considerable potential for growth due to the expansion of both foreign and domestic markets, there are major problems. The diagnosis offered by the World Bank is revealing:

*...low producer incentives, transport and distribution bottlenecks, inadequate machinery for planning coordinating and implementing a coherent national policy for rural agricultural development, ...and shortages of improved seeds, fertilizers, chemicals credit and other farm inputs.*¹⁹ (emphasis added)

This diagnosis determines the type of prescription offered for recovery! The purpose of this historic resurrection is to show the linkage between the agricultural policies of both the colonial and post-colonial states, and to explain how the agricultural sector is located within the international division of labour.

The Green Revolution Strategy

Uma Lele has identified two broad strategies of rural development administration in Africa: autonomous and nationally planned projects.²⁰ Autonomous projects are prevalent in countries that are less endowed with resources and the institutional infrastructure necessary to undertake large scale multi-sectoral programs. These projects are perceived by aid donors and foreign planners as a way of making noticeable impact and "thus, of exercising a demonstration effect on policy makers, administrators, and of course, on the rural people"²¹. The nationally planned programs are embarked upon in countries where there are adequate resources, and the official desire to introduce a comprehensive agricultural and rural development plan for the country. More relevant however is the official policy of using these rural development programs as a vehicle to broaden political participation, garner popular support for the state ideology or reinforce political patronage. A classic example of a nationally planned rural development program is the Ujamaa in Tanzania which evidently has not been altogether successful despite the wide interest it generated.²²

By mid-1970s, the military regime became eager to embark on capital intensive projects both in construction and agriculture. For the latter, the plan was to tackle the issue of food shortage by encouraging the production of import-substitution crops, the construction of big dams for irrigation purposes and the introduction of Integrated Rural Agricultural Development Programs. The food shortage was becoming alarming, resulting in a significant outflow of foreign exchange earned from oil as Table II shows:

Table II - Imports of Grains to Nigeria

Commodity	<u>1974-1977 (Value naira)</u>			
	1974	1975	1976	1977 (Jan-Aug)
Wheat	50,744,534	54,956,770	97,836,367	68,520,861
Rice	1,497,534	2,376,879	20,136,490	94,054,463
Maize	608,289	429,999	1,422,338	3,490,112

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.

Note: The drain of foreign exchange earnings as a logical outcome of the failure of food production is commented upon in this table (Ed. K.M.).

The significance of oil in Nigeria's economy is borne out by the steep rise of public expenditure as shown in the Development Plans. During the 1962-1968 plan period, 2.2 billion naira was spent, this rose to 3.2 billion naira in the 1970-1974 period and 30 billion naira during the 1975-1980 plan period. The government's annual budget also increased correspondingly from 108 million naira in 1962-1963 to over 13 billion naira in 1979-1980.²³ The 1975-1980 plan allocated 43.79 percent of the estimated capital investments to agriculture.²⁴ The Third Plan draws up what the government perceived as the ailments of the agricultural sector which include:

*...shortage of qualified manpower in key areas; inadequate supplies of agricultural inputs and extension services; poor conditions of feeder roads and other transport facilities; poor supporting services such as farm credit and marketing facilities; problem of a complex land tenure system, labour shortage in the rural areas; diseases and pests; and lack of appropriate or complete packages of technology.*²⁵ (emphasis added)

The similarity between this diagnosis and that of the World Bank is striking but not accidental.

An array of programs was then initiated to make Nigeria self-sufficient in food production, but with an eye also on export crops. These programs include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN); the National Accelerated Food Production Program (NAFPP) which is aimed at stimulating the production of six main crops -- maize, rice, millet, sorghum, wheat and cassava -- and involves 400,000 farmers; the River Basin Development Authorities which is charged with the responsibility for constructing big dams for irrigation purposes; and the Integrated Rural/Agricultural Development (IADP) which is sponsored by the World Bank. Our analysis will however be based substantially on the last two projects. There are other supportive policies like the Land Use Decree of 1978, which vested land rights exclusively on the Federal/State governments, the establishment of the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank and the Rural Bank Scheme. All these programs are now coordinated by a 'Green Revolution' Committee under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.

The River Basin Development Authorities - Big Dam Projects:

The history of the River Basin Development Authorities dates back to 1963, when the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) began the study of the land and water resources of the Sokoto-Rima River Basin and later recommended the construction of a series of dams to irrigate about 300,000 acres of land in the Basin. By 1976, the Federal government had divided the whole country up into eleven river basins. These are: Sokoto Rima, Hadejia-Jama'are, Chad, Upper Benue River, Lower Benue River, Cross River, Anambra-Imo, Niger River, Ogun-Oshun River, Benin and Niger Delta Basin Development Authorities; all except one are being financed by the Federal government. The Hadejia-Jama'are was inaugurated in 1969, and was initially jointly financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Kano State government. The RBDAs are charged with the responsibility of providing water for irrigation through the construction of dams, canals, barrages, boreholes and wells. They are also expected to introduce new agricultural methods and technology to the farmers in their areas of jurisdiction as well as provide agricultural inputs like fertilizers, new seedlings and insecticides. They also have the responsibility of resettling farmers who might be displaced by the construction of the big dams and canals, and for paying them adequate compensation for their land and economic trees. In the eastern states, the Authorities will have the control of soil erosion as one of their principal tasks. Only three of these RBDAs have started to operate fully as of 1982, while others are still at the planning stage or under construction. Each of the three that are operating has a big dam and has to contend with resettlement schemes, and payment of compensation to displaced farmers, issues that have not been easily resolved to date.

A major phenomenon of these irrigation projects is their high cost. The construction of the Bakolori Dam in the Sokoto-Rima Basin, for instance, will cost the Federal government over 400 million Naira. Another dam, Goronyo, in the project area will cost an additional 150 million Naira and is expected to be completed in May 1983. These projects, although centrally coordinated by the Federal government may be categorized as autonomous programs. Each has a board of directors who are political appointees, a general manager who is the overall administrative and technical head of the Authority, and an array of technical, agricultural and extension workers.

The Integrated Rural/Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs):

These projects have been rightly tagged as World Bank projects because of the Bank's heavy financial and technical commitments to them. There are nine IADPs operating now: Funtua (Kaduna State), Grusay (Kokoto), Gombe (Bauchi), Ayangba (Benue), Lafia (Plateau), Bida (Niger), Ilorin (Kwara), Oyo North (Oyo) and Ikiti-Akoko (Ondo). Three others being planned are: Anambra North East (Anambra), Sardauna (Gongola) and Ogoja (Cross-River).

Table III - Integrated Rural/Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs)

<u>Project</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Area (Km²)</u>	<u>Estimated No. of Farming Families</u>
Funtua	Kaduna	7,500	88,000
Gusau	Sokoto	4,000	62,000
Gombe	Bauchi	6,450	65,000
Ayangba	Benue	13,150	125,000
Lafia	Plateau	9,400	48,000
Bida	Niger	16,500	124,500
Ilorin	Kwara	11,775	120,000
Oyo North	Oyo	12,300	79,000
Ekiti-Akoko	Ondo	4,950	100,000

Source: Department of Rural Development, Federal Ministry of Agriculture. *Agriculture and Rural Development, Nigeria:1980. Five Years Progress*, p. 4.

These projects are jointly being managed centrally by the Department of Rural Development of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, the State government where the project is located, and the World Bank which supplies the top technical personnel. The Federal Department of Rural Development and the World Bank liaises with the projects through the Agricultural Projects Monitoring Evaluation and Planning Unit (APMEPU) based in Kaduna with a branch in Benin to handle the affairs of the southern projects. The APMEPU, of course, is headed by a World Bank official.

The funds for the projects come from three sources: the World Bank, the Federal government and the State governments. The World Bank makes available loans which cover between 38 percent and 58 percent of the projects' costs. These funds are used for overseas' payments for goods, services and reimbursement of agreed categories of local expenditure, this indicates that most of the funds given by the Bank are not spent within the country but in Western Europe and the U.S., where most of the heavy machinery and agricultural inputs are purchased, as well as to pay the salaries of its employees.

Table IV - World Bank's Contribution to
Seven IADPs (millions of naira)

ADP	Total Planned Cost	World Bank Loan
Funtua	39	23.4
Gusau	30.6	11.4
Gombe	30.7	12.6
Ayangba	64.0	21.0
Lafia	52.6	16.2
Bida	61.8	13.8
Ilorin	36.6	16.2

Source: Culled from *Agriculture and Rural Development in Nigeria 1980. Five Years Progress*. Lagos Department of Rural Development, p. 6.

One naira equals \$0.6 U.S.

Note: The neo-colonial rule of finance capital is represented here by the World Bank's involvement in agricultural projects in Nigeria (Ed. K.M.).

The Federal government contributes about 25 percent of the costs while the state where the project is located provides the rest. The principal responsibilities of these IADPs include the construction of farm service centres, where farmers can obtain farm inputs, credit and effective extension services, provision of seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and mechanical implements; training of staff and farmers in modern farming techniques, construction of small earth dams for irrigation and the provision of marketing facilities for cash crops. The technicalities of the loans are complex; negotiations are usually between the State governments and the World Bank with the Federal government serving as the guarantor for debtors -- a role which often leaves the Federal authorities caught in the middle when the creditor and debtor haggle over the correct interpretation of the loan agreement.

The World Bank's involvement in Nigeria dates back to 1952 when the British colonial administration commissioned it to prepare a general economic survey of the country. Most of its recommendations, like increase in taxes, creation of an independent currency and a Central Bank were accepted by both the colonial regime and the emerging petty-bourgeois political 'heirs'. In 1958, the Bank made an investment in the form of a loan amounting to \$28 million U.S. for the extension of Nigeria's railway. Other loans were given for the construction of a hydro electric dam project and for the expansion of Lagos' port facilities. By the middle of the 1970s, the Bank had become deeply interested in Nigeria which it saw as credit worthy due to the oil revenue. The Bank's involvement in agriculture started in 1974, and by 1978 it had given thirteen agriculture-related loans to the tune of \$292.2 million out of a total loan of \$947.9 million which covers other sectors, such as education, transport and electricity.²⁶ Nigeria is now by far the largest recipient of the World Bank's loans in sub-Saharan Africa.

Most of these projects, especially those in the northern states (three-quarters of them), being prone to drought, have irrigation as a major program. Irrigation as a method of efficient and prudent management of water for agricultural purposes is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The colonial administration started irrigation pilot projects in Nigeria in 1925, although with limited success.²⁷ Irrigation schemes have always been in response to the problem of flood control in the rainy seasons and paradoxically the inadequacy of water supplies in the dry seasons. Despite massive investment in these irrigation projects, less than 10 percent of the projected irrigable area has been developed. The major crops grown on these projects are rice, wheat and sugar cane. These are mostly the exported food items whose production is expected to conserve Nigeria's foreign exchange.

Rice is being extensively produced due to its high productivity on irrigation and the ever-increasing domestic demand for it. Nigerian rice production has almost tripled from 500,000 tonnes in 1978 to 1.2 million tonnes in 1981 making the country the second largest producer in Africa after Madagascar. However, demand grows at an annual rate of 20 percent, and rice accounts for about seven percent of food consumption. Prices for rice within the country reached \$2,000 per tonne in 1981 while the world market price was \$500 per tonne.²⁸ Rice is a 'prestige food' consumed mostly by urbanites and industrial workers.

Wheat is also an important consumer item which is mostly imported. Currently export figures have exceeded one million tonnes per annum, while domestic production in 1980 was less than 10,000 tonnes, that is less than one percent of total consumption. Almost all the wheat grains come from the U.S. Bread is the

'breakfast' meal for millions of Nigerians, and wheat occupies a key position in Nigerian industrialization. There are six flour mills in Nigeria, which supply flour for bread baking. Baking is done by a wide range of technological methods and is one of the largest small scale industries in Nigeria. The petty-commodity producers (bakers) spearhead the expansion of bread consumption in Nigeria both in rural and urban sectors. This wheat-bread economy illustrates the fragility of Nigeria's industrial structure and the dependency of the economy. In order to sustain this consumption pattern, the government is now encouraging domestic production of wheat on the northern irrigation schemes especially in the Chad and Hadejia-Juma'are river basins.

A Critical Assessment of the Projects

The success of these projects can be measured on two planes, each of them complementary. The first method will be to correlate the performance of the projects since inception with the stated objectives; that is determine whether these projects, despite their enormous costs have been able or can be able to meet Nigeria's food requirements. The second method will be to assess critically the socio-economic implications of these projects, especially its effect on rural transformation. We will try to argue here that on both counts, the projects' performances have not been salutary. However, it will be pertinent at this juncture to state that both the World Bank and the Federal government believe that the programs are succeeding. The government's view is expressed in the *Outline of the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985*.

*The pilot Agricultural/Rural Development Projects have proved quite successful resulting in Substantial Improvements in incomes and living standard of the small holder farmers in the project areas. This has attracted a considerable nationwide interest. Efforts will therefore be made during the next plan period to extend this approach to rural development progressively over the whole country.*²⁹
(Emphasis added)

But this official assessment tends to underplay the social consequences of these projects, their effect on rural social differentiation, impoverishment and deprivation of the small-holder producers and the monetary aspects of such capital intensive projects.

The Agricultural Project Monitoring Evaluation and Planning Unit (APMEPU) uses such indices as the number of durable consumer items like bicycles, radios, and motorcycles that the farmers have been able to purchase to measure the performance

of the Agricultural Development Projects (ADP) and concludes that increased ability of the farmers to purchase such items are clear indications of success. The following table (V) is an example of how this is done.

Table V - Capital Inventories for
Funtua ADP 1976-1979

<u>Item</u>	<u>Base Index 1976</u>	<u>Index of Opening Inventory (1979)</u>
Bicycles	100	252
Clocks	100	179
Donkeys	100	125
Hurricane lamps	100	140
Motorcycles	100	516
Radios	100	277
Sewing Machines	100	288
Watches	100	349

Source: *Agriculture and Rural Development in Nigeria 1980. Five Years Progress*, Lagos Department of Rural Development, p.10.

The random selection of 250 progressive farmers per project by APMEPU, farmers who had an average of four plots, made the result of the survey a farce. The monitoring units in another survey of outputs reached the conclusion that changes in output have been achieved by farmers who adopted the new technology, including ability to extend farmland, apply fertilizers, buy new seedlings, rent tractors, apply insecticides and secure credits. The survey of the monitoring unit is therefore limited to the 'progressive farmers'.

The Big Dams

In the big irrigation projects the cost is so high that it will be difficult to have an extensive irrigated area. It was recently estimated that 274,000 hectares would be ready by 1991 at a cost of 2.2 billion naira; that is 8,000 naira per hectare. It is very doubtful whether the government can achieve that target at such a high cost. The irrigation schemes have become the most costly undertaking in the whole program. Wheat is the principal product emphasised by these projects, but the documents preparing for these schemes did not pay much attention to the economic viability of irrigated wheat production. The high cost of irrigation tends to restrict the choice of crops to those which cannot be grown under normal weather conditions. Production is heavily subsidised, especially in the Chad River Basin. Prices paid to farmers are still less than those offered for traditional crops, but higher than the prices of imported

wheat! The projects could not find suitable alternatives because of the desire to justify the heavy investment on the projects. It will be financially self-defeating to plant sorghum which can do well under normal weather conditions on an irrigated land that costs 8,000 naira per hectare! Irrigation levies collected from the farmers do not always cover the current maintenance costs. The whole idea is an investment without a chance of success.

The Sokoto-Rima Basin is under the management of Impresit Bakolori, an Italian company with another foreign (Canadian) firm, MRT, serving as the engineering consultants. The heavy machinery, tractors, the buses for the workers, canal pipes and equipment for air-conditioned and prefabricated houses and offices (including food -- spaghetti) have to be imported from Italy. That is part of the formal agreement between the company and the Federal government.

A major problem encountered in Bakolori is the resettlement scheme for displaced farmers. The homes of 60,000 farmers in the Talata Mafara area were inundated by the Lake. They were displaced in 1977, but no adequate provision was made for their resettlement until 1980.³⁰ The people of Maradun, a flooded village, are now to be resettled in hastily constructed shanty houses, where they have to walk three kilometres to fetch water. In the new place allocated to them, there was no *fadama* (dry season land), neither is the authority interested in providing them with suitable farmland. Many of the displaced peasants left the area and drifted to the cities like Sokoto and Gusau, while the 'lucky' ones are employed on the construction sites as labourers. Many, while waiting for compensation and resettlement, sold their livestock to buy grains in order to feed their families. When the farmers became impatient with official benign neglect, there were serious riots: they barricaded the main entrance to the big dam and occupied the construction site. The Federal government drafted in the police and the rioters were brutally suppressed, many were killed.³¹ When compensation finally came, it was too little and too late. The number of the peasants had been decimated, many of them got the meagre payment and migrated, yet others abandoned farming altogether.

In the Madejia-Juma'are River Basin, those whose lands were affected by the construction of the main canals were offered 80 naira per acre as compensation, the rest were reallocated new rectangular farms minus 10 percent to allow for the canals. Those who received compensation were expected to purchase land near the canals, but the little land that was available for sale was far more expensive than the 80 naira per acre paid to them, hence they were forced to operate on far smaller plots than hitherto. Those who received irrigated land were required to plant wheat at the expense of traditional food crops. The peasants did

not like this idea since they believed that one of the principal attributes of a successful farmer was the ability to feed one's own family without having any recourse to purchase food from the market -- a farmer should be a supplier of food, not a buyer.

The plight of the villages that are located downstream of the dams is more serious, they no longer have enough *fadama* (dry season) land on which to farm, and there is little water left for local irrigation. The paradox in this is that those located downstream outnumber the beneficiaries upstream.

Integrated Rural/Agricultural Development Programs (IADPs)

The World Bank's preference for the Integrated Rural Development Program is in consonant with the policy speech McNamara gave to the Board of Governors in 1973 in which he unveiled the Bank's plan to reorientate its development policy by 'pumping' larger funds into the agricultural sector of the Third World countries in order to combat rural poverty.³³ McNamara proposed also that about 70 percent of the Bank's agricultural loans will contain a component for the small-holder; the percentage of this component was not specified. The essence of this policy is to allow recipient governments to meet the basic needs of the rural population, thereby stifling rural discontent and 'leftist' tendencies.³⁴ However, this 'Green Revolution' package is capital intensive and operates in the form of the application of inputs like fertilizers, new seeds, feeds, tractors and pesticides. Many small holders cannot afford the finance required for this package. Rather than ameliorate the problem of rural poverty, the projects are aggravating social stratification in the rural areas and nurturing the development of middle farmers.

The introduction of this technological package also means that Nigeria will become increasingly dependent on the West for agricultural inputs. There is only one fertilizer industry in the country which depends on imported phosphates, and cannot even meet the requirements of the whole country. What these projects have succeeded in doing is to open the agricultural sector to the penetration of the multinational corporations and agribusiness.³⁵ It must be stated, however, that the Bank is now meeting some measure of resistance for its projects in the country. For instance in 1980, the government of Kaduna State, under a 'socialist-populist' party (which controls the governorship but does not control a majority in the Legislature, openly disagreed with both the Federal government and the World Bank on the terms of agreement on the loan to finance the state's IADP, and published parts of the agreements concerning the recruitment of staff. The Bank was expected to provide 40 percent of the total cost while the State and Federal governments were to contribute the other 60 percent. The State government charged that since

the World Bank was giving a loan which must be repaid, it had no right to control the staff of the project, neither did it have the right to stipulate the remuneration of foreign staff. According to a statement issued by the State government, the Bank wanted to control the staff appointments of forty-five of the key staff of the project, and ensure that they are expatriates to be paid exorbitant salaries, fringe benefits and allowances as follows:

1. The salary of each will be about 40,000 naira per annum, tax free, and paid in foreign currency, in foreign banks.
2. They shall each receive in addition 7.8 percent of the gross salary as cost of living allowance.
3. Seven hundred seventy-three naira per annum per dependant as dependant allowance.
4. Twenty-five percent of the gross salary as "post allowance".
5. Seventy-five percent of their children's school fees to be paid abroad in foreign currency.
6. Free air-conditioned and chauffeur-driven vehicle.
7. Free air-conditioned and furnished housing.
8. Free electricity and water supply.
9. Free trip return air ticket to anywhere in the World for annual vacation.
10. Forty working days' leave per annum.³⁶

This remuneration for only forty-five of the expatriate staff would cost about 12 million naira -- about a third of the cost of the project! The Federal government which had negotiated similar agreements on behalf of other State governments on similar terms was caught in the middle, but made no official statement. The Kaduna state government also attacked the project through the setting up of a Land Panel which has as one of its points of reference the investigation of the encroachment on the peasants' land by the progressive farmers in the project area. In the process, the socialist governor threatened the interest of the bourgeoisie, the feudal landlords and top bureaucrats who were obviously benefiting from the projects, consequently, he was impeached by the State Legislature where the President's party has majority control.³⁷

Within the project areas, there is a systematic elimination of small-holders whose lands are being bought by richer 'progressive' farmers. These peasants are often employed as labourers in their previous farms by the new owners. There is no legal provision to prevent land alienation of this form, and the Land Use Decree of 1978 invests control of land exclusively on the government. Land owners are expected to have legal documents of ownership, an aspect that is being exploited by feudal rulers, bureaucrats, and the petty-bourgeoisie who can procure title claims to land supported by official documents and push the peasant holders out. The communal land ownership in the country has now been neutralized by this Land Use Act which was strongly resisted by traditional rulers and other interests in the country, but the government insisted that the Land Act was meant to make land available for development.

Another problem facing the IADPs is that of marketing. The pricing policy of the Commodity Boards is erratic and varies with the vagaries of international market prices. Sometimes the Commodity Boards cannot ensure that the crops they ask the farmers to produce will be bought, since imported food items are often cheaper than locally produced ones. Despite the chaotic marketing system, the government wants the farmers to produce mainly for the market, but evidence around the world has shown that this type of policy has desultory effects.³⁸ Credit facilities are inadequate, and only the 'progressive farmers' have good chances of obtaining them. The credit facilities offered by the projects are only for a two-year period, farmers are expected to take care of themselves after that. Tractors break down often, and spare parts have to be imported. The tractor-hiring services of the projects are poorly organised, and tractor service has to be paid for in advance, in cash.

In order to facilitate credit for the 'progressive farmers', the Federal government established the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB), and also passed an edict that directed all commercial banks to establish branch offices in the rural areas for rural credit schemes. These Banks have not benefited the small-holders. The requirement of the NACB is indicative of who the beneficiary will be. Clients are to go through the State governments and submit the following documents: (a) two copies of the feasibility study of proposed farm projects, (b) tax clearance certificate for the last three years, (c) survey plans signed by a licensed surveyor or registered certificate of occupancy covering the farm project land and (d) detailed curriculum vitae of the proposed farm/project manager or supervisor.³⁸ This clearly indicates that the policy of the government is to encourage capitalist farmers who plan for big farm projects. The commercial banks who were asked to set up rural banking schemes lack the qualified personnel, and granting loans to small-holders is considered as a bad financial risk.

Because they are not always able to provide adequate collateral for required loans, many of them (small-holders) do not even try to ask for loans as they consider it an exercise in futility.

Conclusion

The food crisis in Nigeria has demonstrated the inability of the post-colonial capitalist state to manage rationally immense export revenue derived from oil. The food crisis is not only a manifestation of the neglect of the agricultural sector, but also the skewed development policies pursued by the government which have tended to place priority on import-substitution industries, prestige projects, satisfying the exotic and conspicuous consumption patterns of the governing class and urbanites, disproportionate sectoral development -- neglecting the rural sector which has led to rural/urban migration. Our analysis has tried to show that rather than benefit the small-holders (peasants) agricultural policy in Nigeria is responding to and serving the interest of agribusiness which is owned by international corporations. While one commends the desire of the government to increase food production, capital intensive agriculture is hardly the correct instrument to achieve this goal in a predominantly peasant economy. This policy has drastically altered the mode of production in the countryside while failing to provide a corresponding framework for an equitable distribution of material needs, in this case, food. What is needed is first and foremost the production of local food items that are easy to cultivate under normal rainfall conditions, such as cassava, yams, sorghum, millet and maize for the satisfaction of immediate wants. One fundamental flaw of the government's policy is the belief that the 'primitivity' of techniques and smallness of the holdings of peasant agriculture are the reasons for the low productivity. But we have demonstrated above that during the colonial era, the peasant farmer, despite his 'primitive' system of cultivation was able to produce both export crops and domestic food items.

The average Nigerian farmer, bewildered by the new requirements of capitalist agriculture, is faced with the option of either withdrawing from the system (which is increasingly becoming impossible), or abandoning farming altogether to join the labour market (a growing trend). The Federal government meanwhile is determined to pursue this capital intensive agriculture. In fact the government has signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. to form a Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC) in order to "benefit from the wealth of experience and the technology of large-scale agricultural production and processing for which the United States is famous."⁴⁰

Of course there is nothing wrong with introducing high technology into farming, but any technological innovation has to

take cognizance of the socio-economic reality of the country. Mechanization in Africa cannot be equated with mechanical and heavy fertilizer input, it should connote low level technology that is both practical, inexpensive and well within the means of the average peasant producer. Lastly, the peasant should be consulted and be directly involved in any policy that may affect his means of livelihood.

* * *



Harvest Time

Appendix A

AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 1974-1979 (\$1000)

Items	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Live Animals	75	43	29	29	10	10
Cereals	54	-	625	227	336	-
Fruit and Vegetable	4595	162	5	103	187	87
Sugar	130	-	-	-	-	-
Coffee/Tea/Cocoa	295,724	336,770	389,925	585,416	689,252	434,800
Hides and Skins	16,737	11,038	10,877	8,909	4,135	4,759
Oil Seeds	88,425	43,169	48,875	55,990	35,505	33,550
Natural Rubber	51,367	17,707	18,500	16,068	19,850	20,000
Textile Fibres/Cotton	106	77	35	15,675	8,092	37,000
Fish & Fishery Products	4,211	4,087	1,946	382	387	408
Forest Products	24,437	8,850	2,188	707	707	707

Source: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) Trade Year Book 1980.

Editorial Note: A declining curve in this table depicts falling agricultural revenue corresponding to a fall in agricultural exports. K.M.

Appendix B

AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 1974-1979 (\$1000)

Items	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Live Animals	37,282	28,771	37,074	58,781	86,882	105,390
Meat	1,260	9,189	25,020	42,083	93,661	76,220
Dairy Products	46,665	92,430	105,217	156,914	236,880	230,780
Cereals	115,955	141,860	242,669	504,048	638,888	417,058
Fruit & Vegetables	8,093	14,423	22,048	30,512	47,238	66,839
Sugar & Honey	44,179	122,953	128,644	197,238	275,340	245,230
Coffee/Tea/Cocoa	4,362	7,618	9,286	13,211	24,669	17,930
Feeding Stuffs	1,550	1,750	2,734	6,533	19,231	18,800
Miscellaneous Food	15,171	30,825	47,041	71,117	79,463	78,300
Beverages & Tobacco	14,383	78,020	101,930	206,834	53,954	53,390
Textile Fibres	32,678	29,461	11,443	8,364	13,274	3,000
Crude Materials	3,400	5,750	4,491	6,789	6,782	6,800
Animal Vegetable Oil	5,677	14,497	39,409	73,512	97,089	169,200
Animal Fats	2,874	9,313	17,431	19,185	25,229	29,000
Fixed Vegetable Oils	1,283	3,844	21,060	51,278	66,919	135,300
Processed Oils	1,520	1,340	918	3,049	4,941	4,900
Fish & Fishery Products	11,615	62,660	122,846	114,402	116,173	122,368
Forest Products	87,094	122,573	176,321	197,763	225,088	229,895
Crude Fertilizers	4,769	5,823	13,078	1,000	100	900
Manufactured Fertilizers	9,827	19,930	32,549	20,817	8,911	32,300
Pesticides	16,609	34,322	34,509	36,487	77,817	80,000
Agricultural Machines	17,055	95,803	97,867	114,627	115,269	117,800

Source: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) Trade Year Book 1980, vol. 34.

Editorial Note: A rise in agricultural imports and, consequently, a drain on the country's foreign exchange, measures the extent to which agribusiness has been active in Nigeria. K.M.

Appendix C

INDICES OF FOOD PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS AND CONSUMER PRICES

Year	Production of Major Food Crops	Volume of Food Imports	Consumer Price Index - Food Only	Consumer Price Index - All Items
	1964-5 - 100	1965 - 100	1960 - 100	1960 - 100
1968	80	74	123	131
1969	90	115	143	140
1970	94	150	164	151
1971	87	214	211	175
1972	63	204	217	180
1973	72	234	224	189
1974	82	199	261	214
1975	--	271	368	285
			1975 - 100	1975 - 100
1976	--	--	123	122
1977	--	--	143	146
1978	--	--	167	172

Source: Anthony Kirk Greere and Douglas Rimmer, *Nigeria Since 1970, A Political and Economic Outline*, Africana Publishing Co., New York, 1981, p. 72.

Editorial Note: The negative trend in food production is emphasized by an ever-growing volume of food imports. K.M.

Appendix D

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS FROM NIGERIA DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Year	Cocoa		Palm Kernels		Palm Oil		Peanuts	
	long tons	pounds*	long tons	pounds	long tons	pounds	long tons	pounds
1900	202	9	85,624	834	45,508	681	599	4
1905	470	17	108,822	1,090	50,562	858	790	7
1910	2,932	101	172,907	2,451	76,851	1,742	995	9
1915	9,105	314	153,319	1,693	72,994	1,462	8,910	72
1920	17,155	1,238	207,010	5,718	84,865	4,677	45,409	1,120
1925	44,705	1,484	272,925	4,937	128,113	4,166	127,226	2,394
1930	52,331	1,756	260,022	3,679	135,801	3,250	146,371	2,196
1935	88,143	1,584	312,746	2,245	142,628	1,656	183,993	2,093
1940	89,737	1,583	235,521	1,500	132,723	1,099	169,480	1,476
1945	77,004	2,150	292,588	3,496	114,199	1,894	176,242	2,696
1950	99,949	18,984	415,906	16,694	173,010	12,072	311,221	15,237
1955	88,413	26,187	433,234	19,196	182,143	13,151	396,904	23,134
1960	154,176	36,772	418,176	26,062	183,360	13,982	332,916	22,878

Source: Nigeria, Trade Reports.

- Adapted from C.K. Eicher, "The Dynamics of Long-Term Agricultural Development in Niger Nigeria," in C. K. Eicher and C. Liedholm (eds), *Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy*, Michigan State University, 1970, p. 11.

*One Nigerian pound equals two naira.

Editorial Note: The colonial character of agricultural production, which emphasized cash crop cultivation, is graphically reflected. Food crop production suffered as a consequence, leading eventually to the present food crisis. K.M.

NOTES

¹ President Shehu Shagari at the first Nigerian Agricultural show held in Kaduna, April 7, 1981. See the *New Nigerian*, 8 April 1981.

The beneficiaries of this agricultural show were foreign companies engaged in agribusiness. The occasion was used by Federal and State government officials to sign contracts worth millions of dollars for the supply of agricultural equipments, such as tractors and storage facilities that are best suited to temperate climates.

² See Dupe Olatunbosun, *Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority*, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1975; and *Poverty In Nigeria*, Proceedings of the 1975 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan, 1976.

³ See Paul M. Lubeck, "Labour in Kano Since the Petroleum Boom," *RAPE*, No. 13 (May-August), 1978, pp. 37-46.

⁴ See *Rural Development in Nigeria*, Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan, 1973, p. 26; Bill Freund, "Oil and Crisis in Contemporary Nigeria," *RAPE*, No. 13 (May-August), 1978; and *West Africa*, 13 July 1981, p. 1569.

⁵ Gavin Williams, *State and Society in Nigeria*, Afrografika, Idanre, 1980, p. 135.

⁶ See, for instance, W. A. Lewis, *Reflections on Nigeria's Economic Growth*, OECD, Paris, 1967; C. K. Eicher and C. Liedholm (eds.), *Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy*, Michigan State University Press, 1970; G. K. Helleiner, *Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria*, Homewood, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966; and H. A. Oluwasanmi, *Agriculture and Nigeria's Economic Development*, Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1966.

⁷ Gavin Williams (ed.), *Nigerian Economy and Society*, London, 1976; Williams, *State and Society in Nigeria*; D. Olatunbosun, *Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority; Poverty in Nigeria*, Proceedings of the 1975 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan, 1976; *Rural Development in Nigeria*, Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan, 1973; T. Wallace, "The Challenge of Food: Nigeria's Approach to Agriculture 1975-80," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1981, pp. 239-258; and Okello Oculi, "Dependent Food Policy in Nigeria," *RAPE*, No. 15/16, 1979, pp. 63-74.

⁸ Q.B.O. Anthonio, Population Growth and Food Productivity in Nigeria, Seminar on population problems and policy in Nigeria's Ibe-Ife, (mimeo).

- ⁹ "Nigerian Focus: Challenges of Economic Development," *Africa*, No. 122 (October) 1981, pp. 59-60.
- ¹⁰ Oculi, "Dependent Food Policy in Nigeria," p. 63.
- ¹¹ Oculi, "Green Capitalism in Nigeria," paper presented at a conference on the African Bourgeoisie Sevegal, 1980, (mimeo).
- ¹² See Bob Shenton and Bill Freund, "The Incorporation of Northern Nigeria Into the World Capitalist Economy," *RAPF*, No. 13 (May-August), 1978, pp. 8-19. They view the colonial period as a period of transition to peripheral capitalism.
- ¹³ G. K. Helleiner, "The Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development 1947-61," *Economic Journal*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 295 (September), 1964, pp. 582-610.
- ¹⁴ Lewis, *Reflections on Nigeria's Economic Growth*, pp. 19-21.
- ¹⁵ S. A. Agboola, *An Agricultural Atlas of Nigeria*, OUP, OUP, 1979, pp. 191-192.
- ¹⁶ J. C. Wells, "Government Investment in Agriculture: Some Unsettled Issues," *The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March), 1966, pp. 37-48.
- ¹⁷ "The Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Board Corporations in Western Nigeria," 1962, revealed that the action group misappropriated the money of the Western Nigeria Marketing Board -- the sole buyer of cocoa in Nigeria. A similar inquiry into the operations of the Northern Nigeria Marketing Board in 1967 revealed a similar trend in the North.
- ¹⁸ *Agricultural Development in Nigeria 1965-1980*, Food and Agricultural Organisation, United Nations, Rome, 1966; and *Strategies and Recommendations for Nigerian Rural Development 1969-1985*, by the Consortium for the Study of Nigerian Rural Development (CSNRD) under the auspices of U.S.A.I.D., Michigan State University.
- ¹⁹ W. Tims, *Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, p. 77.
- ²⁰ Uma Lele, *Design of Rural Development Lessons from Africa*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975. She based her work on the study of seventeen major agricultural projects in

21 Lele, *Design of Rural Development Lessons from Africa*, pp. 127-128.

22 For an analysis of the Ujamaa policy and reasons for its failure, see J. Barker in B. Mwansasu and C. Pratt (eds.), *Towards Socialism in Tanzania*, Toronto, 1979, pp. 95-124; B. M. DeGennaro, "Ujamaa: The Aggrandizement of the State," in R. E. Galli (ed.), *The Political Economy of Rural Development*, Albany, 1981; and M. Von Freyhold, *Ujamaa Village in Tanzania - Analysis of a Social Experiment*, London Monthly Review Press, 1977.

23 P.C. Asiodu, "The Impact of Petroleum on Nigerian Economy," *New Nigerian*, November 21, 1980.

24 S.M. Essang and S.O. Olayide, "Pattern of Estimated Agricultural Expenditures in the 1975-80 Nigerian Plan: Some Implications," *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (November), 1975, pp. 245-261.

25 *Nigeria: The Third National Development Plan 1975-80*, Vol. 1, Lagos, 1975, p. 30.

26 J. P. Olinger, "The World Bank in Nigeria," *RAPE*, No. 13, 1978, pp. 101-107.

27 See J. Palmer Jones, "How Not to Learn from Pilot Irrigation Projects: The Nigerian Experience," *Water Supply and Management*, Vol. 5, 1981, pp. 81-105.

28 Vivienne Heston, "Race for Rice," *West Africa*, No. 3378, (3 May), 1982, pp. 1199-1200.

29 *Nigeria: Outline of the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85*, Federal Ministry of Planning, Lagos.

30 See J. Wallace, "Agricultural Projects and Land in Northern Nigeria," *RAPE*, No. 17, 1980; T. Wallace, "The Challenge of Food," (see note 7); and Okello Oculi, *The Political Economy of Planning the Bakolori Irrigation Project*, seminar paper, Department of Political Science, A.B.U., Zaria, 1980.

31 The government was not willing to give the accurate number of the victims, but opposition parties and the villagers charged that over eighty peasants lost their lives.

32 See Wallace, "The Challenge of Food:...", p. 246.

33 Robert McNamara, "Address to the Bank's Board of Governors," World Bank Publications, Washington, D.C., 1973.

34 For a discussion on World Bank's and IMF's lending policy, see Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap: The International Fund and the Third World*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974. For an analysis of the World Bank's involvement in Third World agriculture since McNamara's speech, see Ernest Feder, "Capitalism's Last Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agriculture: International Agribusiness, the World Bank and the Rural Poor," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1977; and Feder, "The New World Bank Programme for Self-Liquidation of the Third World Peasantry," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1976. Feder argues effectively that rather than help the peasants and small holders in the Third World, the Bank's policy has only succeeded in opening up Third World markets for international agribusiness for the sale of tractors, fertilizers, seeds, feeds, and irrigation equipment. We agree with this analysis, and the results of the Bank's activities in Nigeria has further reinforced the validity of this assumption.

A more sympathetic view to the Bank's policy is that of Richard E. Strykler, "The World Bank and Agricultural Development, Food Production and Rural Poverty," *World Development*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1979.

35 For instance, there is now an agricultural tractor assembly plant in Nigeria which imports every component of the tractor.

36 *New Nigerian*, Thursday, 30 November 1980.

37 This is not to suggest that the World Bank was directly involved in the impeachment, but one of the interests protected by the governor's removal was that of World Bank.

38 For instance, see Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1976.

39 "Role of NACB In Agricultural Development, A Rejoinder," *New Nigerian*, Tuesday, 7 July 1981.

40 Address by President Shehu Shagari to the U.S./Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee in Washington, D.C., October, 1980, *Nigerian Herald*, Tuesday, 14 October 1980.