

STATE POLICY, MILITARIZATION, AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

By

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Introduction

In the limited space of this paper I can only hope to emphasize those aspects of state policy, militarization, and the struggle for liberation in South Africa that have emerged as pivotal determinants of the current and probable future course of class struggle waged in that country.¹ More specifically, in making observations on as broad a field as this I will emphasize both the transformation that is occurring in the South African economic structure, and equally important, the various forms of struggle being waged by the oppressed, disenfranchised masses against the South African state. As Marx said, "Men [rather he should have said people²] make their own history, but not of their free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted."³ I thus hope to examine the current Botha regime's policies and the ancillary developments in the fortification of White South Africa as conscious policy decisions occurring in the confines of the economic changes being experienced in virtually every sector of the economy, and the renewed and increasingly militant struggles waged against the state by Black South Africans.

The Economy

The South African economy can generally be described as reflecting a stage of the dominance of monopoly capitalist relations.⁴ That is, the concentration of capital, centralization of planning, and consequent large-scale production units--typical almost exclusively of the gold mining industry in the earlier period of capitalist development in South Africa--have been replicated and reproduced on an expanded scale in virtually all sectors of the economy.⁵ Not only has this concentration reflected itself in the expansion of various capitals within specific sectors of the economy,⁶ but it has produced extensive interpenetration of "fractions of capital" which formerly were associated with specific areas of the economy or what have been occasionally identified as "English," "Afrikaner," "Local," or "Foreign" capitals. The rise to dominance of monopoly capital in South Africa over the past ten to fifteen years has occasioned profound structural changes in terms of the labour force

(both Black and White). More recently it has expressed itself in major modifications of state policy to serve these and other interests of monopoly capital in general; i.e., "a dominant capitalist interest [has been] formed, that of monopoly capital."⁷

The deskilling of the labour process, which is synonymous with the growth of monopoly capital, produced some of the most militant struggles by skilled White wage earners in the first quarter of the century. The ensuing "political solution" to these upheavals allowed this process of deskilling to proceed and significantly affected the class formation among White wage earners in subsequent periods of capitalist development in South Africa. The devaluation of the skilled White miners' labour power paved the way for the "elevation" of these same Whites to perform almost exclusively "supervisory functions"--what Carchedi refers to as performing the "global function of capital."⁸ This structural segregation from the African labour force allowed for a strong political and ideological unity with the emerging "White labour aristocracy" (which arose from the state's "civilized labour policy" towards the "poor White problem"), vis-à-vis Blacks. This coalition allowed White wage earners in general to obtain various concessions, primarily at the expense of the largely unskilled African workers.⁹

The massive increase in sophisticated technology introduced into the labour process of the modern day monopoly capitalism has, however, demanded a significant restructuring of the predominantly unskilled African labour force employed in earlier periods of South African capitalism. That is, it increasingly relied on "semi-skilled" labour for the technologically sophisticated, "deskilled" labour process. The use of ever-more sophisticated and complex technology is basic to the productive needs of monopoly capitalist production, particularly when it is tied into a world capitalist system of production, as South Africa is.¹⁰

The recent pilot study conducted at the Rossing Uranium Mine provides a classical example of this process that has accompanied--indeed been the consequence of--the development of monopoly capitalism from its earliest stages. In this training program the labour force was restructured from 17 qualified (White) fitters and 25 unskilled Black labourers to 4 fitters and 27 semi-skilled Black workers, "with a wage bill saving to the company of around R160,000 a year" (R1=approx. \$1.15) (*Rand Daily Mail*, 14 March 1980). [Hereafter cited *RDM*] The report also claims that this restructuring "upgrades the status of the qualified artisans by putting them into supervisory roles where their technical skills are more effectively employed." This study and similar deskilling procedures have met with bitter criticism from some of the White unions. Mr. Ben Nicholson, general secretary of the South African Electrical Workers,

retorts, in response to the findings of the Rossing study:

We will resist this with every means at our disposal. This fragmentation of jobs is exploitation of labour in its most blatant form. . . . It's just a way to get artisans' work done for less than half the price.

What the White unions are reluctant to accept is that these changes do not necessarily jeopardize the privileged position of White wage earners. As Paul Davison, manager of the consulting firm that designed the Rossing study, replied:

What these people [the White trade unions] do not seem to realize is that a demand is growing for an entirely new type of worker--the semi-skilled. There are just not enough artisans to do these jobs where their skills are wasted. Besides, they are more badly needed for higher levels (Financial Mail, 14 March 1980). [Hereafter cited FM]

It has been widely--though not convincingly¹¹--argued that the restructured labour process *in itself* requires a "small, semi-skilled, (geographically) stable work force rather than the large, cheap, migrant labour force."¹² While the turnover in the work force--due to a regulated migration system--need not necessarily jeopardize¹³ the training of a semi-skilled Black work force, political considerations, such as the urban/rural fragmentation of the Black work force, probably carry more weight in monopoly capital/state's preference for a small geographically stable "semi-skilled" Black labour force. These considerations become more apparent when we find that the concentration of capital and the reliance on such semi-skilled labour correspondingly produce a situation of "permanent structural unemployment" for increasing numbers of Blacks in the reserves or "homelands." That is, the increase in the proportion of constant capital employed in the production process not only increases the proportion of "dead labour" to "living labour" in each commodity produced in this process, but produces also a relative decline in the total labour force. For example, in 1960 1.24 million people were estimated to be unemployed. By 1977, Simkins estimated that the number of unemployed would be 2.3 million, and that the economy would have to sustain a growth rate of 5.3 percent to keep this rate of unemployment constant and 6.7 percent to keep the number of unemployed constant. The South African economy has not even equalled the 5.3 percent growth rate over the past two years.¹⁴ The growth of unemployment in the rural areas has persisted in the wake of the Rieckert Commission's policy proposals. In fact, a paper delivered at the recent Black Sash conference alleged that the Rieckert Commission's proposals "were likely to result in substantially increased unemployment in the

homelands and so-called independent black states" (FM, 14 March 1980).

The abject conditions to which the growing reserve army of labour is reduced in these rural areas are frightfully apparent to the most casual observer touring these regions. The efforts of the "homeland administrations" in providing even the most rudimentary "social services" for these unemployed are at best ineffective, when we consider the often corrupt, self-serving, and repressive practices of the emerging Black bourgeoisie in these administrations.¹⁵ This situation can only exacerbate the multiple and complex contradictions within the entire South African social formation. As one homeland leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, remarked, "unemployment frightens (me) more than anything else as a threat to peace in South Africa . . . unemployment not only caused by economic factors but also political factors." (Post, 7 March 1980). Matanzima similarly cautioned the Transkei Nationalist Assembly that "the . . . Transkei had to contend with serious and persistent financial instability reflected in . . . high rates of unemployment." (Daily Dispatch, 20 March 1980).

The rapid expansion of monopoly capital has also placed demands for new types of skilled labour (e.g., in the petrochemical and nuclear industries) and has increased the demand for other categories of labour (e.g., semi-skilled labour). Hence, in opening the National Conference of South African Association of Municipal Employees, the minister of Manpower Utilization, Mr. Fannie Botha, warned that there was a grave shortage of "skilled"¹⁶ labour. He estimated that by 1990 there would be a shortage of 1.4 million office workers, 180,000 technical and professional personnel, and 758,000 skilled and semi-skilled workers. He also indicated that the current practice of recruiting expatriates to fill these positions was not an "ideal" long-term solution and that "members of other race groups would urgently have to be trained and utilized in order to alleviate the ever increasing shortage" (cited in Citizen, 4 March 1980).

The current transformation in production relations have also meshed in with the urgent need to expand the domestic consumer market. Earlier this year, NAFCO estimated that Blacks, who constitute slightly less than 80 percent of the population, will only be responsible for 40 percent of the purchases on the South African consumer market. Faced with the political obstacles to extensive penetration of African countries to the north¹⁷ many sectors (e.g., the motor industry) have saturated the moderate to high income "White market" and desperately need to cut into the relatively untapped "Black market." The creation of a stratum of Black workers with increased "buying power" thus offers some hope to these beleaguered industries.

State Policy

The additional complexity of the contradictions which this nationwide restructuring of production relations has produced has also prompted the state to assume a central role in transforming the economic, political, and ideological relations. This change in the state's policy and some of its apparatus has been largely formulated under the rubric of P. W. Botha's "Total Strategy."¹⁸ In very general terms, the Total Strategy (TS) policy can be viewed as a concerted, highly coordinated effort by the state, monopoly capital, and to a lesser extent other related groups, to orchestrate an intense economic, political, and ideological campaign in order to allow for the successful restructuring and further reproduction of monopoly capital production relations in South Africa. That is, while the state has assumed a pivotal role in delineating, coordinating, and executing elements of the TS policy, it has very explicitly relied on a vast range of non-governmental institutions (from monopoly capital to other voluntary associations) to "spread the gospel and carry out the ministry" of the new order.

Initially, the concept of Total Strategy was propounded by part of the military leadership in the midst of the political upheavals of 1976. Later, the need for a broader based strategy involving more segments of the ruling classes brought about the rapid incorporation of the representatives of monopoly capital¹⁹ and, with the rise of P. W. Botha (Minister of Defense) to the position of leader of state, of the entire state apparatus. As Moss indicates:

The chronological development of total strategy shows the manner in which it was initially formulated as a para-military notion (total war); how this notion was extended to all state apparatuses with the emergence of a military dominance within the state; and the logical extension of total strategy incorporating a more than eager monopoly capitalist interest.²⁰

In a sense, the cooperation between the military and monopoly capital was structurally reflected as early as 1973 in the formation of the Defense Advisory Council to "give advice specifically to the Minister of Defense. Its membership includes the chief of the SADF [South Africa Defense Force], retired senior officers of the SADF and heads of private industry" (RDM, 23 March 1978, cited in *International Defense and Aid Fund*, p. 5 [hereafter cited *ID&AF*]). However, the foundation of this process lies in the steady development of the military-industrial complex which accompanied monopoly capital's expansion in South Africa. For example, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) was set up in 1964. This agency's turnover in arms production increased from R32M in 1968 to R979M in

1978. More importantly:

It controls 9 nationalized manufacturing subsidiaries and distributes work to over 1,200 private industry contractors and sub-contractors. Its policy is to give as many of the SADF contracts as possible to the private sector. . . e.g. about 25,000 contracts were handed out to private sector manufactures in 1976 (ID&AF, p. 14).

By 1977, seventy-five percent of the defense budget was spent in South Africa, of which two-fifths was given directly to the private sector and "the balance went to ARMSCOR subsidiaries which in turn spent up to 80% of that amount on sub-contracts with private industry" (ID&AF, p. 14). In fact, the South African government's 1979 defense white paper reported that there were some 800 private companies involved in such sub-contracts (involving some 100,000 employees, excluding the 19,000 employed in ARMSCOR).

Thus, this military-private industry cooperation has developed as both a vital means of overcoming the effects of the United Nations arms boycott of South Africa, as well as assuming paramount importance in sectors of the South African economy. As some observers noted:

Over 400 companies [in S.A.] now rely to a significant extent on defense contracts. Indeed private industry and finance, facing recession in other areas, are eager to gain a share of the weapons market. . . . In 1978, ARMSCOR was allowed to enter the capital market for the first time, thus linking the finance sector directly to military affairs (ID&AF, p. 15).

Another classical reflection of this process was the appointment in 1979 of the executive director of the Barlow Rand Corporation, John Maree, to a chief executive position in ARMSCOR for three years.

Furthermore, the indigenous arms manufacturing industry (a valuable source of foreign currency) has also been able to enter the export market. This not only allows for lucrative arms sales to numerous repressive regimes, such as the former Rhodesian government, Latin American dictatorships, South Korea, and Indonesia, etc., but also provides important channels for circumventing the United Nations arms embargo on arms and military technology to South Africa. Hence the ID&AF pamphlet concludes that these developments are "pushing South Africa into the international arena as a middle-power arms producer and

supplier--with potentially serious consequences for peace [and the course of class struggle] elsewhere in the world" (p. 18).

Ideologically, TS is propagated as a policy adopted by the state which is purportedly confronted with a communist-inspired "total onslaught" from "without and within," and hence requires a coordinated, united national effort by all South Africans to preserve the "bastion of Western democracy."

The other (and probably more important short-term) strategic target of this policy is, however, easily visible beneath the thin veneer of the "war psychosis." TS is quite explicitly directed at winning the hearts and minds of Black South Africans, so as to provide some elements of the disenfranchised masses with a stake in the defense of the South African state. More specifically, the thrust of this aspect of the TS policy is directed at urban Blacks in general and the creation of an urban Black middle class in particular. Thus, in his crucial address to the National party's Cape Provincial Convention in Port Elizabeth in September 1977 (a year after the Soweto uprisings), P. W. Botha called for a concerted national effort to develop a Black middle class as a means of satisfying the demands of urban Blacks and disrupting the unprecedented (in recent times) unity among the disenfranchised people of South Africa. Also, more recently, Mr. Bill Sutton, M.P., was reported in the *Argus* (7 March 1980) to have said in Parliament that "The concept of the middle class had to be propagated to the black people to facilitate their involvement in the free enterprise system." The report also mentioned that "surveys showed a very strong antipathy among Blacks to the concept of the middle class, because it affected the idea of solidarity among Blacks." Harry Schwartz, a Progressive Federal Party (PFP) M.P. expressed the intent of this strategy even more explicitly in his address: "The distinction between old style capitalism and 20th century free enterprise was not understood. The new concept of free enterprise could give effective answers to Marxist appeals to the workers and masses of Africans" (*RDM*, 7 March 1980).

The development of a Black bourgeoisie is, however, inhibited by the very nature of the dominant monopoly capital social relations.²¹ For example, most aspiring Black capitalists are precluded entry into the economy by virtue of the existence of large-scale enterprises²² and corresponding vast amounts of capital required to compete effectively with the monopoly enterprises. However, the political appeals for the creation of a Black middle class as a buffer stratum have been pursued eagerly by many elements of monopoly capital. Monopoly capital, due in part to the shortage of certain kinds of labour and in part to the imperatives of this policy, has thus come to draw increasing numbers of Black South Africans into managerial, supervisory, and to a lesser extent technical and professional positions.

TS policy has also taken the more general form of "urban (ghetto) renewal programs," propagated principally by the monopoly-financed²³ Urban Foundation. The various programs aimed at improving the "quality of life" of urban Blacks, conducted in conjunction with state and capitalist efforts at restructuring the labour force, have contributed to a significant change in the "conditions" of the urban Black labour force and created the "material conditions for the emergence of a relatively privileged stable urban working class at the expense of the unemployed."²⁴ For example, the Benoni Working Committee set up by the Urban Foundation in the offices of the South African General Electric Company in Benoni will be responsible for projects such as "housing, transport, telephone service, road works, storm water drainage, electricity and water supply in the two [Daveyton and Wattville] black townships" (*Post*, 5 March 1980). Similarly, the "Soweto Clinic," a private hospital being built for those Blacks who can "afford to pay from their private income without medical insurance assistance" (*FM*, 7 March 1989), will also be partially funded by the Urban Foundation.

State intervention in this arena has included substantial efforts to assume the costs of training Black workers as well as making important modifications of some "racial elements" in labour related statutes. For example: "Three hundred special institutions are to be established for Blacks, according to a brochure released (on 31 March 1980) at the launching of the government's manpower 2000 project" (*RDM*, 1 April 1980). The minister of Manpower Utilization, Mr. Fannie Botha, also announced that "Blacks could in the future also be engaged in skilled building work outside black areas" (*Argus*, 10 April 1980). This annoyed the White building workers' union which threatened that these measures "would endanger the peace in the industry . . . [being] convinced that the only motive for the demands for Blacks is cheap labour" (*Cape Times*, 11 April 1989). However, Mr. Lew Davis, director of the Building Industries Federation of South Africa, assured the White wage earners that "employers would consult the (White) unions--which strongly opposed the exemptions--before introducing changes" (*RDM*, 12 April 1980).

The much hailed changes that followed the Wiehahn and Rieckert Commissions have also resulted in significant (albeit reformist) changes for Black trade unions. They represent important initiatives aimed at smashing the growing Black Labour militancy and co-opting a "privileged" stratum of Black workers under the regulated conditions of the registered trade unions. These developments have also been accompanied by a spate of initiatives to cripple the more militant "unregistered" Black unions, predominantly affiliated with the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). These attempts have ranged from "smear pamphlet" campaigns to discredit the White trade union

officials in FOSATU (see *Post*, 3 March 1980) to the efforts of the director of the Steel and Engineering Industry Federation of South Africa, Dr. E. Drummond (who served as a member of the Wiehahn Commission), recommending that "employer organizations disregard unregistered unions" (*Citizen*, 5 March 1980). Also, the state National Manpower Study Group distributed pamphlets that described the activities of the unregistered unions as "a danger to the white worker and the country," that Black unions "send their leadership in certain ways behind the Iron Curtain," and that they are also "free to engage in politics and join strange international bodies" (cited in *RDM*, 11 March 1980).

Furthermore, migrant workers are only allowed to join registered unions and in terms of the Rieckert Commission's recommendations, would only be able to enter the urban areas if there were no unemployed urban dwellers. Hence, a Black trade union organizer asked: "How can a trade union follow a consistent policy when some of its workers, the permanent urban dwellers, are given better opportunities for employment than those members who are migrant?" (*RDM*, 19 March 1980). More recently, the government has indicated that it intends taking "strong measures" to "combat the foreign influences in black trade unions." Notably, the Wiehahn Commission's criticism that the educational material offered to Black workers is "of uncertain origins and dubious ideological motivation" has prompted the government to propose joint public/private financed training programs for Black trade union officials (*RDM*, 9 April 1980).

These actions thus assume an amazingly coordinated campaign at restructuring the African labour force and in the process, creating a "buffer stratum" of wage earners, whose position of relative privilege vis-à-vis the unemployed and migrant workers would provide a substantial basis for an allegiance to the status quo and the fractionalization from the rest of the oppressed South African Blacks. The ideological onslaught used to obtain this commitment to "free enterprise" has been vigorously pursued from the highest levels of state power to the more insidious programs of some White dominated voluntary associations; e.g., the White women's organization, "Organic Soil Association," which has promoted a "grow campaign" to encourage "every black family --so that they--will eventually be able to supplement their diet from backyard vegetable patches." Although the campaign has met with only limited success so far, one of its organizers, Ms. Marie Roux, claimed that "things were not exactly coming up in roses in the townships, but at least there appears to be a 'growing feeling' about" (*Star*, 6 March 1980). The president of the South African Foundation was more specific in his annual address to the foundation, when he appealed that "all barriers preventing Blacks from enjoying the benefits of the South African 'free enterprise' system should be removed" (*Argus*, 12 March 1980). Similarly, as the article in the *Sunday Post* (16 March

1980) titled, "I Just Can't Tolerate These Bourgeois Clubs Says Ma-Vesta," reported: "Industry is making concerted efforts to create a black women's middle class by drawing [Black] women into organizations that were exclusively White in the past." Their limited success to date is probably due to the view of Ma Vesta, which other Black women share; i.e., "as much as I would like to see racial discrimination come to an end, in this country, what I cannot stand is to allow myself to be seen as a different kind of person who qualifies for what other Blacks do not."

Equally important, the state has initiated a thoroughgoing restructuring of its own apparatus and a similar modification is evident in the makeup of the ruling Nationalist party. That is, the changes in the state policy to more accurately reflect the interest of the dominant monopoly capital have been mirrored to some extent in the Nationalist party's slow change from a White "populist" party to one more closely identifiable with monopoly capital. I do not wish to insinuate that the party has completely lost its links to and totally forsaken its White wage earner base. However, the party's shift from serving the interests of the small-scale farmers and other non-monopoly capitalists has probably been reflected in the recent rifts in the National Party; e.g., the HNP split in the early 1970s and the more recent Connie Mulder-Conservative National party split. Also, the 1980/81 budget was described by the director of the South African Agricultural Union, Mr. Chris Cilliers, as "hitting the farmers with the introduction of higher rail tariffs." He added that "farmers in the remote areas who had to rely on roads and rail would be hardest hit" (*Daily Dispatch*, 6 March 1980). The gloomy future these measures spell for the small White farmer is indicative of the changing nature of the Nationalist party.

Most White wage earners have been removed from positions requiring manual labour, or in cases where they are still required to do so, they are also usually required to perform some "supervisory" duties over "semi-skilled" or unskilled Black workers. The development of monopoly capitalism in South Africa has in no manner substantially challenged the racial hierarchy in the division of labour. Rather, the incorporation of Africans into "semi-skilled" positions in the restructured labour process has been predicated by the "elevation" of Whites, who formerly performed such tasks, into "supervisory positions"; i.e., to perform the "global function of capital." Hence the restructuring of production relations has generally coincided with the racial division of labour in South Africa. This process has, however, had important repercussions for the class formation among most White wage earners: their loyalty to the state has been structurally shifted from one predominately based on the privileged position they enjoyed vis-à-vis the Blacks as a

result of state interventions to one favouring their performing the global function of capital. This shift allows them to politically ally with the interests of monopoly capital (and hence the state) vis-à-vis the majority of Black workers.

However, in some cases this process of transformation has produced situations in which the strata of White wage earners have not been incorporated into the "supervisory levels" ahead of the vanguard of the "semi-skilled" Black workers. This situation has reinforced the persistence of ideological and political tendencies among these White wage earners who in their history of hostility towards Black labour fear the "advances" allowed sectors of the Black labour force and have adamantly criticized the government for relinquishing some of its protective role towards White wage earners. The Paulus Report, prepared by the right-wing leader of the Mine Workers Union, called for the reversal of the recent government labour "reforms" for Blacks and subsequently caused the split in and ultimate demise of the all-White South African Confederation of Labour over this issue. The present government has deployed all its available means to marginalize such fracturing of its electoral base; e.g., the "envoy squads of roving ambassadors," proposed by M.P. Jan Marais, to tour the country to motivate "more of our own people to go along with the Prime Minister's new initiative" (Citizen, 16 April 1980). The present regime has simultaneously been explicit in indicating that it does not propose and will not endorse the complete annihilation of the White wage earners position of privilege vis-à-vis the Black worker. Thus the minister of Manpower Utilization, Mr. Fannie Botha, told the Congress of Mine Surface Officials: "We will not allow these arrangements to be abused or to threaten [the White miners'] job security" (RDM, 7 March 1980). Instead the regime has emphasized and gone to tremendous lengths to guarantee that these changes would occur within the context of the racial division of labour and appealed for White support for the TS policy in order to collectively face the "total onslaught" confronting the nation.

The restructuring of the state apparatus has also had important repercussions in the emergence of the state as one that more accurately represents monopoly capital. One of the initial changes that followed the recommendations of the Public Service Commission (staffed by both state officials and representatives of monopoly capital), resulted in the move to "streamline" the number of state departments from forty to eighteen. Not only did this maneuver allow the relocation of agents more favourable to Botha's TS, but it effectively reduced agencies responsible for catering to the interests of certain White wage earners and non-monopoly capitalists. For example, the advancement of the Department of Military Intelligence and what appears to be the reduction in the duties of the former Bureau of State

Security. Both intelligence units are now responsible to the prime minister, General M. Malan (head of the SADF), and the deputy minister of defense.

Other agencies, such as the Human Sciences Research Council, have been mandated to coordinate programs of research in the social sciences, while the Steyn Commission has been told of the need for greater centralization of information gathering and propaganda dissemination. For example, Mr. A. J. Engelbrecht, the director general of the Information Service, suggested to the Steyn Commission that a national information center "could collect information from such sources as universities and the Department of National Security and engage in research and analysis on attitudes of different groups in South Africa." He added that it was "vital that people had a valid frame of reference in which to view the realities of the South African situation . . . if we had a system to analyze how these people see the world and how they view the future, and how a person can increase his resistance to Marxist influences, the [outcome in Zimbabwe could have been] averted" (cited in RDM, 6 March 1980). More important, the summit of state power, the State Security Council (SSC), has been reconstituted into a highly centralized (distinctly militaristic) power group with the "executive wing of the state wielding enormous power to re-structure and direct events and dynamics."²⁵ Similarly, the ID&AF pamphlet asserts that the SSC "clearly appears to have taken over from the cabinet as the key decision making body" (p. 7).

The Steyn Commission (on defense, police, and security reporting), other governmental commissions, and a host of non-governmental agencies have become integral components of the multifaceted "Total Strategy," directing and facilitating the transformation of the economy as directed by the imperatives of monopoly capital while simultaneously attempting to deal with the rising militancy of the broad stratum of disenfranchised people in South Africa. This campaign has not only been directed at the political instability within the country, but Botha's proposed "constellation of states" can be viewed as a means of reinforcing and expanding economic links with neighbouring states and to curtail their support for the South African liberation movement. As a cabinet minister, Piet Koornhof, described his (and probably the government's) vision of the "constellation of states," he saw that:

More than a mere common market or trading block was envisaged. A full package of trade links, technological links, transport links, sociological links, the exchange of know-how, capital and credit, assistance in utilizing the human resources of the region, improvement of lifestyles throughout

the region and mutual support of each other's security was needed (reported in Cape Times, 25 March 1980; my emphasis).

Militarization

The repressive nature of the South African state and the general fortification of White South Africa has increased unabated, despite the supposedly "verligte" posture of the Botha regime. For example, the Riotous Assembly Act, banning open-air gatherings, has been recently reimposed on a nationwide level for another year from 30 March 1980. (It has been in effect since 1976.) As a former editor of a South African newspaper commented in London:

Botha is not going to allow anyone to set the pace of reform for him. This means the grip of the security police will be tightened, not relaxed; there will be fewer not more civil liberties; people will be co-opted and coerced into the "total strategy"; and compliance will be demanded of everybody--on the right, center and left (Africa News, vol. 14, no. 12, 24 March 1980).

As the ID&AF pamphlet accurately analysed, while the "security of the state" in the earlier periods of Black resistance, "was largely left in the hands of the legislative, the judiciary and the South African police, ... military force and control is now at the center of the strategy to preserve apartheid, rather than being one aspect among several" (pp. 2-3).

The TS concept originated in the military command and has continued to be an explicitly militaristic policy and important component of the broader TS policy. The victory of MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, the failure of the Angolan invasion, the resounding defeat of Muzorewa with ZANU's victory in Zimbabwe, and a resurgence of sophisticated guerilla attacks by ANC in South Africa, have all contributed to fuelling the immensely expanded defense budget for 1980/81 (R2,074M with an additional R272M set aside for increased defense spending if necessary).

These considerations were clearly reflected in the 1977 defense white paper, that stated: "Developments in Africa and elsewhere have today thrust the R.S.A. into the foreground where the attainment of National Security aims is directly affected by the occurrences and trends of thought beyond our borders" (cited in ID&AF, p. 3). The following table reflects the extent of the growth of defense spending in South Africa over the past two decades:

TABLE 1

Defence Budget (cash votes) 1958-1979

	Rm	
1958/9	36.0	
1959/60	40.0	
1960/1	44.0	
1961/2	72.0	
1962/3	129.0	
1963/4	157.0	
1964/5	210.0	
1965/6	229.0	
1966/7	255.0	
1967/8	256.0	
1968/9	252.7	
1969/70	271.6	
1970/1	257.1	
1971/2	321.5	
1972/3	335.0	
1973/4	472.0	
1974/5	692.0	(707.0)
1975/6	970.7	(1,043.5)
1976/7	1,350.0	(1,407.6)
1977/8	1,654.0	(1,940.4)
1978/9	1,899.2	(1,976.3)
1979/80	1,972.4	(2,189.0)

Source: ID&AF, p. 10.

Note: These figures reflect cash votes as indicated in the Annual Estimates. The figures in brackets are an indication of total defence expenditure from all government departments as published in the biennial White Paper on Defence.

Even these figures do not accurately reflect the extent of South African defense expenditure since numerous military related expenditures, such as base construction, are financed by the Department of Public Works, housing for SADF personnel by the Department of Community Development and intelligence gathering is partially borne by the Treasury Vote. There has also been an extensive drive to glamorize the armed forces among all sectors of the South African population. For example, the increased use of SADF personnel in rendering social services to rural Blacks to "improve the living conditions of the population and raise its cultural level. . . contributes to the winning of the hearts and minds of the population" (SADF, *Guide to Psychological Action Handbook*, cited in ID&AF, p. 51). Also, there have been explicit attempts by the SADF to have SATV produce

"sabre rattling films which glamorize" the defense force (see *Argus*, 24 March 1980).

Recently, the Botha regime was mildly rocked when certain newspapers uncovered a plan by the military to "neutralize the opposition" around the SADF budget debate. Nonetheless, the defense forces still obtained a massive budget increase that included R812,400 (up from R360,600 last year) for training personnel overseas, and an overwhelming preoccupation with expanding its "anti-terrorist" potential (R1,032M for "landward defences"--see Appendix C for statistics). The increased militarization has also been reflected in drives to expand the manpower of the SADF. For example, the extension of the compulsory conscription period (first introduced in 1967) for White males, from nine to twelve months in 1972 to twenty-four months in 1977. However, the drain of key personnel and the interruptions in training programs in private industry created by these tours of military service have placed a severe burden on the South African economy. By 1978, these efforts at expanding the SADF were reported to have produced a thirty percent expansion in the permanent forces. The SADF has also been expanded by the recent drive to include some Blacks into the armed forces: "Between 1974 and 1979 a total of approximately 12,000 troops were trained and deployed, most of them on a permanent basis" (ID&AF, p. 40). Moreover, the paramilitary nature of the South African Police (SAP) makes it almost indistinguishable from the SADF. All members of the SAP receive the same basic "anti-terrorist" training as the SADF, it was the SAP which was initially deployed in Zimbabwe and Namibia in the guerilla war from 1964-1974, and their recent military-styled operations in the streets of South Africa in 1976/77 and 1980. Hence the ID&AF pamphlet states that, "in fact, a realistic definition of the SAP in it's present form is that it is a wing of the SADF with additional training in crime prevention" (p. 47; also see Appendixes for structural analysis of SAP).

Within the state structure itself, the preponderance of the military's influence is graphically reflected in the highly centralized and extremely powerful State Security Council, which includes Prime Minister Botha, who has retained the defense portfolio, General Magnus Malan, head of the SADF, as well as the secretary, General Van Deventer, who serves together with the prime minister's secretary on all the other cabinet "working groups":

The SADF is today no longer seen as a necessary tool of government, but is instead an increasingly powerful force within the government itself. Senior officers of the SADF are clearly playing an increasing role in the politics and general administration of the South African government,

and the same trend can be discerned in the number of markedly political speeches that have been made by the SADF generals in public appearances (ID&AF, pp. 4, 6).

More generally, the widespread purchase of arms by many Whites and the war psychosis instilled in White youth, have further increased the fortification of White South Africa. The army's Easter camp for White schoolboys was part of the nationwide campaign designed by the defense forces to "revive the dwindling interest in the cadet movement" (*Citizen*, 11 April 1980). Also, a host of "Leadership Courses" have been convened, such as the one held at Hobhouse recently where pupils were taught to sing, "We hate Mugabe, we hate terrorists, kill them all" to the tune of "I'm singing in the rain"--part of the aim of the Orange Free State's director of education to give "positive indoctrination to prepare the youth to withstand the onslaught of communism and the total onslaught against South Africa" (cited in *RDM* 21 March 1980). Another campaign proposes to use White schoolboys over the age of sixteen in volunteer positions in the South African Police during their mid-year vacation, "to help regular policemen with 'normal' crime prevention in both urban and rural areas" (*Sunday Times*, 19 March 1980).

The war psychosis has also been extensively promoted by business interests who have installed a variety of "anti-terrorist" security measures at their plants, or as in the case of General Motors, even drawn up "contingency plans" to assist the state in times of "civil disorder." Further examples of the generalized nature of this war psychosis are clearly evident by the fact that in 1978 "the sale of war games in toy shops increased by 500% over the previous year" (*Financial Times*, 5 July 1978, cited in ID&AF, p. 48). Also, the advertising industry in South Africa provides numerous examples of this pervasive mentality. One of IBM's advertisements reads: "The future is a moving target . . . improve your aim with new IBM processors"; a light truck is referred to as "a little tank"; a lawnmower as something "to fight the battle of the lawn"; and video cameras under the banner, "Shoot the workers. It's the only way they'll learn." Similarly, a magazine is advertised in the following manner: "With the battle cry of 'Saddle up the enemy is coming' and the motto 'Unity is strength,' our country's sons have answered the call. Read South African Man, the vital magazine for men and how these two slogans became our prescription for 'national survival'" (ID&AF, p. 48). A more vivid illustration of this ideological war was the recent depiction of the 'terrorists' in a photo magazine, with the caption, "MARK THE VICTOR," in which the "terrorists" appear as unarmed Blacks in ordinary work clothes.

The Botha regime has also not relented in its armed

aggression against some of its African neighbours who are known to support the liberation struggle, for example the numerous murderous raids into Angola (ostensibly aimed at SWAPO guerilla bases), the assistance South Africa rendered to the former Rhodesian regime in its destructive raids into Mozambique, and the more recent discovery of 572 kg. of wired explosives (that originated in South Africa) outside the Polana Hotel in Maputo (see *Sunday Post*, 25 May 1980). There have also been numerous instances of kidnappings and assassinations of South African refugees and militants residing in neighbouring African states. For example: "Two houses were destroyed and two persons killed by bombs last week in the Swaziland town of Manzinzi in what may have been the retaliatory action against the ANC of South Africa [for the attack on the oil installations]" (*Africa News*, vol. 14, no. 23).

The Liberation Movement

The decapitation and the repression suffered by the Black nationalist organizations in the early 1960s produced a noticeable decline in the "public presence" of Black resistance organizations in South Africa for almost a decade. The rise of what can be referred to generically as the "Black Consciousness Movement" in the early 1970s and the Durban strikes of 1973 signalled a resurgence of organized (albeit minimally structured for security reasons) resistance to capital and the state. As mentioned above, the events in Mozambique and Angola lent increasing momentum to the Black South Africans' struggle partly because the defeat of the SADF in the Angolan invasion did much to eradicate the myth of the invincibility of the SADF might.

The 1976/77 uprising, more than anything else, signalled the entry of a new generation into the struggle and new ingenious methods of organization were born in the face of harsh military repression. Not only did the struggle during this period produce an increased unity among the disenfranchised South African, but the student initiated revolt enjoyed substantial community support among Blacks. In fact, this uprising also produced the remarkable three day national strike which shook the very foundations of the South African economy to the extent that it required an urgent \$100 million loan from a New York banking consortium to bale it out of this crisis. The age of these students, who formerly had largely been denied or had restricted access to the history of struggle in South Africa, and the daily confrontations with the sheer physical brutality of the armed forces, contributed immensely to the persistence of militant Black resistance and led to the swelling of the militant ranks of the ANC. The renewed vigour with which the liberation movement is currently pursuing the armed struggle in South Africa is followed closely by many Blacks who have increasingly come to identify with and support the armed struggle