

LAND ISSUE IN KENYA POLITICS: PRE- AND POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT

By

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Introduction

Land has played a crucial role in Kenya politics since the turn of the century; the overriding factor being the alienation of large tracts of the most fertile land for European occupation; i.e., the "White Highlands". Since portions of this land had belonged to the most populous African groups, increase in population pressure and land shortage emerged immediately. The agitation over land alienation and colonial policies designed to depress the economy in African areas and force labor into European farms became the primary focus of African political protest. This oppressive nature of colonial rule gave rise to the *Mau Mau* Revolt which further led to the Africanization of the "White Highlands" and independence. The counterrevolutionary measures against *Mau Mau* and subsequent decolonization were characterized by the promotion of an African bourgeoisie. This African bourgeoisie has not only acquired post-independence political leadership but has continued colonial policies, especially the land reform measures initiated during *Mau Mau*. Thus, land shortage and population pressure in certain areas of Kenya remain an acute problem and the most sensitive political issue.

This paper seeks to examine the rise of nationalism in Kenya as a manifestation of the conflict over land during the colonial period centered mainly among the Kikuyu.¹ The post-colonial land policies of the Kenya government are also briefly analyzed to illustrate continuity of previous policies and the emergent ideological position of the Kenya ruling elite

Pre-Independence Factors Concerning Land

Unless the systems of land and land use held by the two main parties concerned are understood, it is very difficult to grasp the core of their initial conflict - a conflict which quickly expressed itself in a government catering to a European minority while exploiting an African majority.

The Kikuyu, who were the most adversely affected by land alienation, traditionally held no form of tribal land tenure.² Prior to the need for additional lands due to population growth, land was acquired through the process of first

clearing as opposed to outright purchases from other ethnic groups.³ With the emergence of outright purchases came a system of social grouping referred to as a *mbari*, which later developed into an extended family. The buyer had complete jurisdiction over his *githaka* (estate), and upon his death the rights over the land passed to his descendants, although cultivation was done on an individual household basis. Within this social system, succession was passed to a single heir, the eldest son. It was his duty to re-allocate the land within the estate, to choose new tenants⁴ and to decide what lands would be alienated to strangers.

For the Kikuyu, land was the means to life. It served not only as an agricultural community investment and the principal emotional and psychological link with the ancestors⁵ but constituted the socio-cultural livelihood of the whole people. Thus, without an adequate supply of land these functions were nearly impossible.

The European concept of land, land ownership and land usage were similar to the Kikuyu only in the sense that land was involved. In the eyes of the European, land was purely an economic and agricultural investment, and thus held no spiritual or cultural attachments. Consequently, they purchased land simply because it was the economic step to make. However, the Kikuyu were under the impression that the Europeans were paying for cultivation and occupation rights and not title rights. These conflicts of land and ownership perception and their subsequent manifestations have been the essence of Kenya politics since the arrival of the initial European settlers.

The first string of Europeans to appear in Kenya was motivated by one goal: to remedy Britain's serious economic problems by expanding her capitalist investments through the establishment of outside markets for her products as well as obtaining raw materials.⁶

According to official and documentary records, the question of land policy began in 1886 with the international agreement between Germany and the Sultan of Zanzibar which gave Britain possession of the Kenya lands. The British government moved immediately to consolidate the land. For this purpose, the Imperial British East African Company was granted a Royal Charter in 1888. Under this Charter, the future settlers were able to stake territorial claims and a few years later allowed to settle on so-called vacant lands.⁷ Regulative rules governing European settlement were established by the Imperial British East African Company.

In theory, the government was not permitted to alienate land cultivated by Africans or regularly in their use.⁸

However, as more settlers arrived, the administration found it necessary to alienate even those areas under cultivation and use by the Africans. To make the alienation of such areas legal the East Africa Order in Council of 1902 was executed, supply the Commissioner with full authority to alienate "Crown lands which included "all public lands" subject to the control of or acquired by the British government.⁹ On September 27 of the same year, the Crown Land Ordinance was also passed. Section of this particular Ordinance clearly stated the government's official land alienation regulations:

*"The Commissioner may grant leases of areas of land containing native villages or settlements without specifically excluding such villages or settlements, but land in the actual occupation of natives at the date of the lease shall, so long as it is actually occupied by them, be deemed to be excluded from the lease."*¹⁰

The operational failure of this Ordinance was evident as land alienation continued in unsurveyed areas. In response to the worsening situation, Sir Charles Eliot posed as the solution to the settler land grievances an agricultural settlement in the Highlands (16,696 square miles) for Europeans only. This included 20 percent of Kenya's best agricultural land and being more than 4,500 feet above sea level, it was considered ideal for European habitation. (These alienated areas are shown on Map I.) This, of course, meant that the African populations would have to be removed from the Highlands to less agriculturally productive areas. Sir Eliot, refusing to establish Kikuyu reserves, expressed a desire to interpenetrate the Kikuyu country and other areas in the Highlands and therefore settle on land in the gaps between Kikuyu cultivations.¹¹ However, very few settlers shared Eliot's view and as early as December, 1903, John Ainsworth, the chief Native Commissioner requested Eliot's permission to "bunch-up" the Kikuyu into reserves at intervals along the Uganda railway in order to free additional land for European settlement. Immediately following Eliot's departure in 1904, a reserves policy was gradually instituted.¹²

Regardless of the types of policies enacted to govern alienation, between 1903 and 1904, 220,000 acres of African land was alienated and leased to 342 European settlers, the bulk of whom were South African. Thousands of acres were also granted to commercial concerns and private individuals.¹³ Furthermore by 1905, 60,000 acres of Kikuyu land in the Kiambu-Limuru area alone were further alienated. (This particular area was extremely fertile and in close proximity to Kenya's capital, Nairobi.) In the process of accommodating the settlers into this area, some 11,000 Kikuyu were displaced.

With the continual alienation of African lands, the European settlers lost all respect for African legal rights to Kenya lands. An early indication of this tendency was made by the Delamere Land Board in 1905, when it stated that:

"It did not believe that the government should recognize any native rights in the land inasmuch as the agricultural natives lay 'claim to no more than a right of occupation.' The government was the owner of all land not held under title, whether occupied or not...." ¹⁴

This official policy was given further legality with the enactment of the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915. This new Ordinance, in addition to prohibiting the transference or sale of land between whites and Africans without the consent of the Governor of Kenya, completely nullified all Kikuyu legal rights to the land. For instance, by defining Crown lands as including all lands occupied by native tribes, almost every inch of land in Kenya was placed under the legal authority of the Crown.¹⁵ However, land set aside and occupied by Africans remained designated as the Native Reserves. In 1925, these reserves comprised some 47,000 square miles. The significance of this is that "some 2,000 European owners of farm lands (counting both residents and absentees) were allotted as much land by the government as (on the average) 400,000 natives."¹⁶ The Native Reserves did not receive any sort of legal status which tended to limit further European land acquisitions until 1926, when the boundaries of the African reserves were officially recognized and gazetted. However, the local government continued (after receiving the Secretary of State's consent) to alienate land declared as part of the African reserves.¹⁷

In order to fully grasp the colonial forces operating in the establishment of a settler agricultural economy in Kenya, the relationships existing among the various European communities must be understood. During the initial years of imperial rule the settler groups were totally interdependent. On one level the settlers¹⁸ relied on the colonial administrators for economic support: the redistribution of peasantry taxation, the development of a suitable infrastructure for settler farms, and support against metropolitan influence. On another level, the colonial administrators depended on the settlers for the provision of export crops which were to finance Kenya's economy, help Britain overcome her economic problems, and to finance the construction of the Uganda railway. Both the settlers and administrators were dependent on the African population for their labor. To obtain this valuable product, the settler community and administrators were willing to use almost any means except wage increases and improved working conditions.

The underlying factor which led to the exploitation of wage labor was, above all, the economic situation of the settlers. They were plagued by chronic indebtedness, by heavy insolvency, by a gross lack of farming knowledge and by the failure to gain sufficient backing from the banks. Thus, the Europeans needed and depended on surplus labor to utilize all of their acquired land - between 1919 and 1939 only 10 percent of European reserved lands were under arable farming.¹⁹ To worsen matters, a large number of Europeans were obtaining loans not on the basis of their crops but on the value of their holdings. Many were also using government money to pay for more land and were, thus, forced to rely on other loans for daily expenses or on the monetary returns from their commodities. In light of these economic drawbacks, the development of European estates could only be achieved over a long period through the creation of under-development of production in the African areas. It can be further concluded that the economic development of production in the European communities was directly correlated with their ability to control, dominate, and distribute the economic and political resources on the local levels.

Due to considerable economic developments in certain sections of the African reserves, the Europeans failed to obtain absolute dominance. The inhabitants of these particular sections held a very limited access to suitable fertile land, to commodity markets to sell their goods, and to transport facilities. However, the majority of the Africans remained barred from participation in the commercial market. Four factors worked to prohibit full African participation: the low prices offered for African products; the African majority's inaccessibility to the markets; the restriction of reserve boundaries and quarantine regulations which prohibited the bringing of local stock to the markets; and the lack of technically innovated opportunities.

A number of ethnic groups - Kikuyu, Kamba, Kipsigis, Nandi, Abaluyhia and Luo - were given permission to develop crops like copra, wattle, and Irish potatoes. However, due to their shortage of land, the economic development of these groups was limited. In order to survive, many of the members of these ethnic divisions, as well as numerous other groups, became migrant wage workers. At that time, it coincided with European aims.²⁰

Cheap labor, labor shortages and various alternative forms of production to obtain cash, and the level of wages, were the major determinants in the level of labor supply. It is necessary to understand that the exchange value of crops was directly related to the exchange value of labor. For example, when prices were rising in 1920, the wage labor was too low to

create the labor force required. Then, on the other hand, when prices on the international market fell (1920-1921 and 1930-1936), the prices of produce fell relatively further than the return on wage labor. Consequently, the chronic shortage of labor in the rural areas suddenly turned into an oversupply. (Chart I illustrates these rises and decreases in African 30-day wages from 1919-1939.)

Until 1939, the colonial government in an attempt to institute a South African form of development - without the aid of the mineral resources which made the South African developments so fruitful for its white population - sought to utilize artificial methods to equalize the labor supply with the demands. Among these measures were direct taxation, forced labor and registration certificates (the *kipande*), all of which received governmental sanction.

Taxation constituted one of the major political weapons used to create a wage labor force. For example, to pay tax one needed cash, which could be obtained by the sale of livestock, sale of surplus crops or labor migration. In the prevailing circumstances, labor migration was the economic choice available to the majority of the people. Direct taxation was first imposed on the local Africans in 1901 in the form of hut tax²¹ and in 1910 in the form of poll tax. Within the new taxing system, every African over the age of sixteen was compelled to pay tax, as opposed to the European tax-paying age of twenty-one years. Various penalties were also levied on those who failed to comply.²² By 1923, taxes comprised nearly one-third of the total revenue and in 1930, one-sixth of all taxes were paid by the Africans.²³ Furthermore, as the revenue for the administration increased, so did the African tax. Van Zwanenberg estimates that between 85 and 95 percent of Kenya's revenue from 1910-1930 was acquired through African hut, poll and indirect taxation, which was redirected towards the development of the European sector.²⁴ In fact, only 30 percent of the Local Native Council's total annual budget in these 20 years was used for African capital and educational development.

The second most important legalized labor recruiting institution was the system of compulsory labor, which was first organized on March 23, 1906. By 1917, the administration, in response to increased labor shortages due to famine, war deaths, and various forms of repatriation immediately following World War I, had resolved to use excessive coercion in recruitments. On October 23, 1919, Governor-General Northey of Kenya issued a circular, *Northey Circular*, announcing that the "British government's labor policy would seek to induce the African to leave his reserve and take up work in European farms."²⁵ Ainsworth further elaborated on this policy in his *Labour Circular Notice* of October 23, 1919, which received legal backing

Chart I*

30-Days Work Period

1919/20	8-10 shillings**
1921	5-7 shillings
1922/23	6-8 shillings
1924/29	12-16 shillings
1930/31	6-10 shillings
1931/39	10-12 shillings

*This chart does not include squatter wages.

**One shilling equals \$.14 in U.S. currency.

Source: Zwanenberg, Roger van. *Primitive Colonial Accumulation in Kenya 1919-1939*. Nairobi, 1971.

in 1920 through an Amendment to the Native Authority Ordinance of 1912.

On one hand, this particular Amendment provided provisions for paid porters; for government servants, tours, and transport; and wages for workers engaged in public projects like the construction and the maintenance of roads. However, on the other hand, it gave no benefits or protection for the African workers. Consequently, they could be co-opted any time by the government-appointed chiefs and forced to devote 60 days of free labor to such mentioned public constructions unless fully engaged in another occupation.

There were also groups of Europeans and Asians that set themselves up as professional labor recruiters. Regardless of the oppressive measures utilized by these professionals and the government, all were considered justified in light of the quantity of laborers they produced. This same set of values applied to the enforcement of work registration certificates.

The South African *Kipande* registration certificate was instituted in Kenya by 1920. This certificate was to fulfill three services: control the movement of Africans in non-African areas, eliminate desertions, and insure a sufficient labor force. This certificate was carried in a small metal container and bore a worker's fingerprints, name, address, name of last employer, date he began work, date job ended, and the wage rate.²⁶ The *Kipande* system referred not only to rural laborers but to all urban African workers as well. For example, in Nairobi from 1927 onwards all domestic servants had to possess a special certificate before being eligible for such employment. Furthermore, in order to stay within the limits of Nairobi, a special 24-hour pass was necessary.

In the final analysis, registration certificates, forced labor and high taxation proved to be only short-term solutions to the labor problems and none were ever fully successful. However, in regard to these various recruiting methods, one factor should not be overlooked: the rise of African government-appointed chiefs as the early representatives of an African bourgeoisie or loyalist group who functioned as extensions and instruments of the administration. For instance, the government placed arbitrary powers in their hands and as early as 1924, each chief was given two and one-half percent of all taxes he collected. Many chiefs thus resorted to the burning of African huts for refusal to pay tax.

Before discussing the African responses to these legal coercions by the government, one other section of the colonial Kenya community needs further explanation. The squatter arrangement, like the *Kipande* system, was of South African origin.

Under this arrangement, the African worker was allowed to reside on a European farm in return for his work.²⁷ However, with the alteration in the capital needs of the plantation economy, the government advised the settlers to discourage squatting unless a man had a proper contract of service. Emphasis was then to be placed on more profitable businesses, such as large-scale cattle farming. Thus all the land occupied by the squatters was needed. In spite of this shift in policy, by 1934 there were some 28,939 squatters in the Highlands and even though the numbers dropped to 24,872 in 1936, by 1945 there were more than 202,764 squatters. Charts II and III illustrate this situation. Chart III also shows that by 1945 the Kikuyu comprised approximately 51 percent of the total squatter populations.²⁸ This can be attributed to the fact that the Kikuyu, being the most populous ethnic group, was faced with extremely overcrowded reserves. Therefore, in order to survive and pay tax, they were forced to become squatters. (This fact was very instrumental in intensifying resistance among the Kikuyu ranks in the 1950

The first indigenous political response to the colonial policies after the suppression of wars of resistance was the *East African Association* (1919). This particular mission and governmentally influenced organization consisted of a moderate body of trans-tribal members; the majority, however, being Kikuyu. The following year, the *Young Kikuyu Association*, headed by the Senior Kikuyu Chief Koinage, was formed. Its membership consisted mainly of chiefs and headmen, who not only spoke in defense of the Kikuyu land and its alienation, but accepted the colony's basic political structure for they themselves had achieved great power and status within it. The first real nationalist-inspired movement began (in 1922) with Harry Thuku assuming leadership of the *Young Kikuyu Association*. Thuku and his colleagues held protest meetings throughout the reserves in the north, since the southern part was under the influence of the missionary-led *South Kikuyu Association*.²⁹ By presenting the political issues in a somewhat semi-religious framework, the YKA was successful in gaining support also from various Christian populations.³⁰ Due to Thuku's successful campaigns and mass organizing in the northern region, the government arrested and deported Thuku on March 15, 1922. On March 16, 1922, a general strike was called by YKA, and the Kikuyu laborers, among others, joined in the protest.³¹ The government further reacted by outlawing YKA and imprisoning many of its members. A more militant association was formed in 1923 called the *Kikuyu Central Association*. KCA also concerned itself with obtaining title deeds, removal of African planting restrictions, compulsory primary education for African children, abolition of the *Kipande* system, the training and employment of Africans as agricultural instructors, African elected representation in legislative councils and governing bodies, as well as a promise of ultimate African dominance.³²

Chart II

Distribution of Squatters in the White Highlands:
No. of Male Squatters

Elgon	1,026	
Cherangi	409	
Kitale	427	
Kiminini	833	
Hoey's Bridge	688	
Soy-Sergoit	387	
Plateau	1,683	
Kipkarren	704	
Nandi-Kaimosi	1,075	
Lake	1,679	
Lumbwa	628	
Kericho	643	
Sotik	1,221	
Muo	495	
Rongai Solai	1,542	
Nyora	635	
Rift Valley	1,210	
Aberdare	1,533	
Laikipia	629	
Nanyuki	227	
Nyeri	401	
Maraguo	9	
Makuyu-Ithanga	1,748	
Thika	451	
Upper Kiambu	696	
Ruiru	231	
Donyo Sabuk	1,025	
Kiambu	430	
Ngong-Dagoretti	363	
Matchakos	1,812	
Coast	32	
1934	<u>28,939</u>	total (inc. women 104,373)
1936	24,872	total (inc. women 93,112)

Source: Zwanenberg, Roger van. *Primitive Colonial Accumulation in Kenya 1919-1939*. Nairobi, 1971, p. 443.

Chart III

Ethnic Origins of Squatters - Applicable to
Seven District Council Areas for 1945

	Kavirondo*	Lumbwa	Nandi	Kikuyu	Kamba	Other
Nairobi	252	-	-	11,675	18,620	
Naivasha	24	166	50	22,136	79	2
Nakuru	687	929	106	36,388	87	3
Aberdares	24	392	5	19,622	11	2
Uasin Gishu	3,843	898	16,723	3,709	4	4,9
Trans Nzoia	8,946	431	1,800	754	-	5,8
Nyansa	822	9,582	4,295	6,754	-	
Forest Dept.	66	52	-	21,143	8	1
Totals	14,658	12,450	22,979	122,181	18,809	11,6

Grand Total - 202,764

* includes Luo, Kisii and Maragoli.

Source: Zwanenberg, Roger van. *Primitive Colonial Accumulation in Kenya 1919-1939*. Nairobi, 1971.

The government responded in 1929 by appointing a committee to look into the nature of Kikuyu land tenure for clues to help solve the land situation. Convinced that the answer lay in the already overcrowded reserves, the Kenya Land Commission sought to buy time by supplying the Africans with additional plots of land inferior to those of the Highlands.³³ Sensing an increased political dissatisfaction among the populations, the colonial government attempted further to hinder the Kikuyu's political participation in three ways: by regulating the collection of money among the Kikuyu in the reserves; by prohibiting certain Kikuyu songs and dances which expressed political discontent of Kenya's situation; and by arresting KCA's president, Joseph Kangethe, in the summer of 1930. Prior to its being outlawed and its leadership jailed in 1940, KCA's membership had risen from 2,000 to 7,000. This large support placed it as the major nationalist movement during the inter-war period.

With the release of banned KCA leaders and the appointment of Kenya's first African to the Legislative Council following World War II, the Africans came together to form the *Kenya African Union*. Even though its members did nothing more than reiterate the demands of KCA, it was the first "united front or Congress-type nationalist association comprised of persons and leaders with a fairly wide range of interests and political views."³⁴

In an attempt to pacify these members, Kenya's Governor, Sir Phillip Mitchell, issued a circular in 1946 informing all Province Committees that the government intended to revise the power of control traditionally exercised by the elders. This idea of revising "community control" rather than individual tenure, which first appeared prior to World War II, was to serve one main purpose: to ensure the community heads enough power to deal with land rights, disputes, and development. In order to establish backing from various sections of the African community, it was necessary to give special titles to certain groups or individuals. Although the circular was prepared by two other European officials, H. E. Lambert and Wyn Harris, it was, to some degree, an extension of Mitchell's earlier policy of multi-racialism.³⁵ This multi-racial doctrine argued that if a limited number of qualified Africans were allowed to gradually accumulate wealth alongside the Europeans, then these Africans would identify and ally themselves with their fellow social members. Once socially and economically established, they would be given places in the government and on the Legislative Council to act and vote on behalf of the colonial status quo. Thus, a new society would emerge based on class rather than racial values which would in the final analysis aid and sustain the economic interest of the Europeans. (By 1952 such a loyalist group had clearly evolved.)

Such plans, however, did not eradicate the resentments of the majority and as a result strikes broke out in 1947.³⁶ The administration, instead of correlating these disturbances with the critical weaknesses in the government's economic and political policies, sought to place the blame elsewhere. It advocated that such agitation was the result of irresponsible and self-seeking leaders. The Africans finally retaliated by staging a militant and revolutionary political movement, *Mau Mau*.

Two incidents occurred on March 26, 1952, which finalized in a government-declared state of emergency: 1) the *Mau Mau* raid on the Naivasha Police Station, 2) the assassination by the movement of one of the administration's most dedicated loyalists, Senior Chief Waruhi.³⁷ Under the emergency, curfews were instituted, military forces were strengthened and all those known to have been associated with *Mau Mau* were placed in detention. In response to the oppressive nature of the emergency and the continual harassment by the colonial government, Rosberg and Nottingham in their book, *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya*, report that by 1953 approximately 15,000 Africans had taken to the forest areas of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares.

All initial responses piloted by the Europeans sought to mythically undermine the nationalistic aspects of this movement. Their voiced conceptions of *Mau Mau* ranged from a "terrorist" movement to a "dangerous hypnotic obsession based on primitive emotions."³⁸ In order to remove this menace and threat to European stability and to re-establish law and order, the settlers contended that *Mau Mau* would have to be militarily eradicated and its members rehabilitated.³⁹ By 1956, the *Mau Mau* fighters had undergone both disintegration and defeat. In the process of eliminating these fighters, a large number of non-*Mau Mau* participants also experienced great losses,⁴⁰ especially those in the Central Province where the fighting was concentrated.

The European government took advantage of the emergency period to push through land reform measures which would stabilize their own position and reward the loyalists, thereby strengthening their commitment to the administration. The appropriate reform was provided by R. J. M. Swynnerton in 1954 and was referred to as the *Swynnerton Plan*. As a legal land reform, Swynnerton's program of consolidation and registration was to serve three functions:

1. To end uncertainty of customary tenure;
2. To provide the basis for an agricultural revolution;
3. To create a 'stable middle class' built around the Kikuyu loyalists."⁴¹

In the process of creating a landed middle class that would accumulate relatively larger holdings and provide employment on these, a landless class was also to be created that would not make good use of their own holdings and instead would be useful in providing the labor needed on the more successful holdings.⁴² By replacing communal control of land tenure with consolidated individual land tenure, the *Swynnerton Plan* gave freehold titles to the farmers. Theoretically, such titles were equivalent to exclusive rights of proprietorship under customary law. Once legal titles were issued, each farmer was entitled to government loans, and technical assistance in planning and developing their farms.

As a political and social reform, the *Swynnerton Plan* sought to shift the African emphasis from politics and the Africanization of the White Highlands to agricultural development of cash crops within the African reserves. Swynnerton argued his position in light of two factors. First, the majority of the high-potential land (80 percent) was in the possession of the Africans. Second, he contended that there were no unused lands of high agricultural potential in the Highlands which could be employed to resettle Africans from overcrowded districts.

Naturally, most nationalist Africans refused to see any relevant links between consolidation and their problem. According to this group of Africans, the *Swynnerton Plan* sought to retain the political status quo in two ways: by emphasizing economic growth as opposed to a total redistribution of the lands, and by creating a group of politically-contented rural "lords" immune to the cries of the insurgent nationalists. In 1955, a number of these protestors formed a secret organization, the *Kiama Kia Muingi* (Assembly of the People).⁴³ A second party was formed in the latter part of 1955, the *Kenya Independent Movement* (KIM) with Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya playing leadership roles in it. KIM was followed in May, 1959 by Michael Blundell's multi-racial *New Kenya Party*. In August, 1959, Odinga's party issued a five-demand policy⁴⁴ to the administration. The request was denied in the same manner as the party's registration petition one month later. In October, the government finally issued a Sessional Paper stating that all racial barriers would be removed from the Highlands and elsewhere in Kenya. It was further announced in January, 1960, that Kenya would move rapidly to independence under an African government.⁴⁵

A few months after these promises were made, members of KIM, the *Land Freedom Army*, and a large number of peasant farmers (who failed to benefit from the *Swynnerton Plan*) joined forces and demanded free land on which to settle. When the government failed to comply immediately to their demand, violence broke out once again. A number of settlers were killed and their homes raided. These violent actions struck fear in

borrow money from the settlers' mother country to buy the land. They were also aware that by being the lenders, the African purchasers would be further bound to them and in the long run European influence would be increased. Thus, the British government informed the African community that it would provide the capital in the form of grants and loans. (Other funds were made available by the World Bank and the Federal Republic of Germany.)

Once Kenyatta, who assumed leadership of KANU upon his return from detention, had given his approval in the middle of 1962 for the program outlined by the administration, the colonial government wasted no time in rewarding him and his cabinet supporters. Large plots of 100 acres, in addition to former European residences, were given to each African social and political elite even though each party member participated in the regular resettlement program.⁴⁸ Kenyatta's acceptance of such a policy and the whole European land resettlement program agitated and widened the division among the African populations. Several African political advocates like Oginga Odinga and Bildard Kaggia verbally protested against this decision. They said the Europeans had no rights to the land and, therefore, no right to dictate land reforms. Kaggia not only attacked Kenyatta's aim but went as far as to suggest that perhaps Kenyatta had been a traitor to African nationalism for all of the forty years he had been idolized. Why else, according to Kaggia, would he suddenly accept such European dictation.

One can conclude three possible reasons as to why Kenyatta, in fact, accepted such a bargain.⁴⁹ The first is that Kenyatta believed that the British officialdom was the sole authoritative power; second, the Europeans had a right to the land; third, it would provide land for the landless and jobs for the unemployed thereby preventing a possible uprising by this group. However, at the 1963 Lancaster House Conference, Kenyatta's submission to European interest was evident. At this conference, Kenyatta, under pressure from the remaining settler officials, agreed to enter into the independent government without Odinga (an unacceptable candidate due to his views on land and the proposed land policy concerning the White Highlands). Thus, on December 12, 1963, Kenya became the 34th independent African state with Kenyatta as its president, and one year later KANU and KADU merged to form a single national party, KANU.

Post-Independence Concerns on Land

Independent Kenya inherited a very lopsided system, guided by a Constitution and land reforms designed to satisfy the interests of a privileged minority. In many respects, "independence was granted on the basis of the continuation of the colonial system and not on its destruction."⁵⁰ This

will be vividly illustrated by Kenya's post-independence policies and its present internal situations.

The first two years of independence, for the most part, were devoted to the implementation of the Million Acres Scheme and the consolidation of the positions of the African elites through their acquisition of land and political offices. In 1965, an official publication, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, announced Kenya's future political and economic nation-building policies. This *Sessional Paper No. 10*, prepared by various members of the President's cabinet, pledged Kenya to a development program based on what Kenyatta referred to as "Democratic African Socialism."⁵¹ It entailed the Africanization of the economy and the civil service, while at the same time fulfilling six social objectives felt to be universal:

- " (i) political equality;
- (ii) social justice;
- (iii) human dignity including freedom of conscience;
- (iv) freedom from want, disease, and exploitation;
- (v) equal opportunities;
- (vi) high and growing per capital incomes equitably distributed."⁵²

Within this socialist program two basic African traditions were to be utilized - political democracy and mutual social responsibility - in such a fashion as to adapt to any changing situations. Under this program, there was to be no elite vanguard, economic inequality, or any satellite-type relationships with countries or groups. (Unfortunately, all of these, due to the continued implementation of colonial policies, remain characteristics of Kenya.)

Kenya's land policy was to be one of the prime illustrations of African socialism in operation. However, it was very clear in 1965 that the land resettlement program was a poor example since it offended the fundamental principle of Kenyatta's new philosophy. For example, the Kenyatta government stated in the *Sessional Paper* that no land problems were to be settled on terms decided in the United Kingdom.⁵³ Yet, the land reforms were inherited from the European administration and thus oriented to aid the Europeans leaving Kenya and not those Africans receiving land. In fact, the same document which gave support to the resettlement schemes also condemned them. The *Sessional Paper* concluded that the schemes, due to their uneconomic use of scarce resources, were to be de-emphasized, whereas Swynnerton's plans of land consolidation and registration, in light of their previous high economic returns, were to be

the hearts of the settlers, fear not only of another *Mau Mau* uprising but widescale grabbing of their lands by these Africans. While many of the settlers decided to leave Kenya, others appealed to the government for help and protection. In light of these facts and the fear of a possible alliance between these African forces and the returning of 6,000 hardcore African detainees who were also demanding free land, the administration realized in 1961 the urgent need to reconsider the previous request. Thus, in an attempt to diffuse the growing insurgency and to dampen the agitation, the government engaged itself in emergency resettlement schemes which came to be known as "jet schemes."

Even though these schemes were designed in such a way as to sustain European dominance, a large number of the settlers, wishing to preserve their agricultural assets and fearing the possible consequences of an African government, pushed for full buy-out schemes. For this and other reasons a Lancaster House Conference was called in 1962 to write a Constitution for independent Kenya, which eventually provided extra security for its European population. The Constitution which emerged not only proposed an enlarged resettlement scheme but attempted to limit the power of the majority party, KANU (*Kenya African National Union*), formed in 1960 under the leadership of James Gichuru, by giving the multi-racialist dominated party, KADU (*Kenya African Democratic Union*), also formed in 1960, broad powers over the execution of land policies.⁴⁶ In this way the administration hoped that the regional KADU and the settlers would combine forces and undermine the incoming KANU central government. The written Constitution listed two prerequisites for the attainment of Kenya's independence: first, the land in the Highlands was to be purchased by the Africans and not confiscated from the Europeans; second, extensive land resettlement was to take place prior to independence in order to minimize the exposure time of European landowners to an African government.

This settlement of the Africans in the Kenya Highlands initially involved a total area of 1.2 million acres and became popularly known as the Million Acres Scheme. It aimed at resettling about 6,000 peasant families on holdings designed to produce net incomes ranging from 25-100 pounds per year in High and Low Density schemes, and 1,800 "yeomen" on larger holdings producing net incomes of about 250 pounds per year. In those areas where ecological conditions discouraged fragmentation of land or where it was more advisable to preserve the existing farming system, cooperative settlement schemes were to be initiated.⁴⁷ The colonial administration argued that the Million Acres Scheme, through the intensive cultivation, extension and adoption of new crop varieties, would help to ameliorate unemployment and landlessness in the former African reserves. Of course, the Europeans knew that the Africans would have to

re-emphasized. According to Kenya's new development policies, consolidation and registration would ensure efficient use of resources, proper use of loans, and punctual collection of loan payments. Thus, the *Sessional Paper* clearly illustrated that the new African government had no intentions of sacrificing the economy, in the short run, while implementing thoroughly African innovation.

So, in the final analysis, Democratic African Socialism proved to be no more than another strategy of the elite to retain the colonial political and economic status quo. To accomplish this it was again necessary to divert the attention of the African masses from political participation and resettlement in the Highlands to solely economic development. In an attempt to strengthen this division and to fulfill its economic aspirations, the new African government assumed three functions emphasized in the *Swynnerton Plan*: 1) to defend private property, 2) to assist farmers in their contributions to Kenya's economic development, and 3) to persuade the African populations to develop their own reserves as opposed to the Highlands, since it would be less expensive, and since the Highlands were now populated by a large number of African elites. In light of these stresses, the administration found it more advantageous and profitable to identify and align itself with those members holding individual titles and skills at the expense of the unemployed and landless.

This shift of emphasis and continuing alliance among the elite had further repercussions upon the Kenya community. To begin with, the change of stress operated under the assumption that the land resettlement thus far was sufficient. However, in reality, most of the land in the Million Acres Scheme had been either purchased by large-scale African farmers or by members of Kenyatta's own ethnic group, the Kikuyu. For example, by 1964 the Kikuyu of the Central Province had purchased 58 percent of the farms sold in the Highlands (which comprised nearly 91 percent of the acres bought up to this time). And, by 1965, the Kikuyus had received approximately 56 percent of the total land settled. Charts IV and V clearly illustrate these points. Furthermore, the statistics on loans from the (public) Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation up to April, 1966, show that Kikuyus, who formed 20 percent of the male population, received 64 percent of the industrial and 44 percent of the commercial loans.⁵⁴

It is also important to mention that those destitute Africans who did buy land were burdened with high interest loans. Even though the majority of these poor farmers barely earned enough for subsistence, the government made a habit of withholding individual freehold titles until full repayment of loans was obtained. In place of freehold titles, letters of allotment

Chart IV

Distribution of Total Settlement Acreage by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Farms Bought</u>	<u>Acres</u>
Western	68	147,977
Nyanza	71	86,035
Rift Valley	134	197,444
Central*	418	950,178
Eastern	39	162,393
Total	<u>720</u>	<u>1,043,032</u>

Source: *Kenya Central Land Board Annual Report 1963-64.*

Chart V

The State of Settlement as of June 30, 1965

<u>Province</u>	<u>Total Acreage Settled</u>	<u>Estimate Total No. of Holdings</u>
Western	102,610	4,713
Nyanza	48,272	2,381
Rift Valley	153,210	4,326
Central*	413,807	14,127
Eastern	18,536	32
Total	<u>736,435</u>	<u>25,979</u>

* Central Province is one of the most populated areas in Kenya and is the traditional home of the Kikuyu ethnic group.

Source: Department of Settlement, *Annual Report 1964-65.*

were, and continue to be, issued. Insecurity also emerged in the 1960s due to the fact that any African settler could be dismissed from his holding without the benefit of a court proceeding as in colonial times.

During 1966, great resentment developed among sections of the community as a result of government favoritism and its general abandonment of the poor and destitute Africans. One political party expressing these resentments was the *Kenya's People's Union* led by Odinga, Kaggia and Oneka. This party claimed that KANU's government had failed to provide enough people with land, education, medical facilities or regular employment due to its stress on the development of economic resources as opposed to economic redistribution. Unsurprisingly, their demands were overlooked and within a few years the members of this party were co-opted into KANU's government.

To a certain extent, Kenya's officials were correct in their assertion that the resettlement schemes in the Highlands were draining the country's economy. For example, from 1964 to 1965, the Kenya Central Land Board's Final Report recorded that it cost 45 percent of the available resettlement funds, 11,424,000 pounds, to purchase 1,174,000 acres of European farms. By 1966, the Ministry of Settlement reported that out of the 35,000 families settled, it cost the country 25 million pounds at approximately 715 pounds per family. In an overall view, prior to 1970, the Million Acres Scheme cost some 60 million dollars: one-third of which was an outright donation from the British government and two-thirds being a loan at 6.5 percent interest. A further 10 million dollars prior to 1970 was spent on other existing resettlement schemes.

Following the de-emphasis of land transfers in the Highlands, the new government embarked on a number of other transfer schemes. First, more than 45 percent of the former large European farms were transferred intact on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis to Africans who could afford them. Second, abandoned and mismanaged farms were transferred into squatter settlement schemes for as many as 1,800 families with the intention of providing little more than subsistence income for destitute and landless families⁵⁵ (referred to as Haraka Scheme). Another squatter scheme was the Ngoliba. Here, approximately 1,294 families (6,470 people in all) of various ethnic groups were settled on 8,000 acres. However, the squatters have not been able to meet even subsistence levels due to the nature of soil in their land holdings, their limited cultivations and scarce technical skills.⁵⁶

The third created scheme resulting from the government's change in policy was the Shirika settlements or state cooperatives. These cooperatives were established on the basis

that new purchases of expatriate farms by the government were no longer to be subdivided, but were to be run as single units. Thus, each family (some 6,000 up to 1975) was to be given a plot of about one hectare for its own use and was to receive a salary for working on the main farm under the direction of a manager.⁵⁷ So far the government has not only made it mandatory for all in resettlement schemes to establish cooperatives, but has tried to manipulate the cooperatives in the same fashion as the colonial rulers undermined the traditional institutions by co-opting the institutions and its leaders. All cooperative leaders, being de facto administrators for the government, have no decision-making power or control over economic allotments. The practice of discrimination and favoritism is also very evident. For example, the small-holder cooperatives, due to inefficient organization and the lack of financial stability, are not able to market their products to their own advantage and are thus subjected to governmental controls and fixed prices. However, the large-holder sector, consisting of Europeans and African elites, is served by well-established marketing organizations, private wholesalers, export brokers, and national cooperative organizations like the *Kenya Farmers's Association*, *Kenya Cooperative Creameries*, and the *Kenya Planter Cooperative Union*.⁵⁸ By 1973, large farms had received over 75 percent of short- and medium-term credits to produce some 50 percent of the total marketed output, while small-holders obtained some 25 percent of short- and medium-term credits to produce not only half of the total marketed output, but also subsistence for 90 percent of the population, which concludes that credit directly reaches less than 15 percent of the small-holder population.⁵⁹ Until now, the government has done very little to improve the condition of small-holder sector cooperatives and on occasions has refused loan applications on the grounds of management difficulties.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the question remains: What is to be done with the thousands of high-taxed, landless and jobless Africans who account for about 75 percent of the population?

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to illustrate two factors in Kenya's history: 1) the rise of Kenya nationalism, led by the Kikuyu as a direct response to colonial discriminatory land policies, and 2) the personalization and continuation of colonial policies and philosophies by the African ruling elite. In substantiating the historical precipitation of these factors, it was necessary for the writer to view each in its historical context.

The land problem remains very much a part of Kenya's present politics; the most important reason being the persistence

of the political, social and economic policies and ideologies which first gave it its dominance. Today, in the Kenya rural areas, which house 90 percent of the population, land ownership is highly concentrated. At one end of the ladder less than five percent of all farms account for almost 50 percent of all farm land. At the other end of the ladder, more than 30 percent of all farms account for less than two percent of all farm land. Moreover, approximately 18 percent of this total (300,000 rural households) own no land at all. Such extremes can also be found within the incomes of the small-farm sector as well. At the top of this sector, there is a group of commercial farmers who sell a wide-range of cash crops, hire labor on a permanent basis and often work regularly on more profitable pursuits off the farm. Even though these top small-holders comprise only one-fifth of the total, they are generally the beneficiaries of public settlement or irrigation schemes and have managed to increase their incomes rapidly over the last 10 years. At the bottom of this sector, for there is no middle, lies a majority of small-holders who earn less than 60 pounds a year, including the value of food crops. They possess only a very slight chance of obtaining access to credit or investments for commercial farming due to governmental priorities and because of their insufficient economic backing.⁶¹

The government has made no concrete attempts to rectify this situation due to the advantageous posture this situation affords. Thus, the Kenya government prefers to operate according to the guidelines of the *Swynnerton Plan*, which stresses consolidation and registration of present holdings. Presently, it is highly doubtful whether the *Swynnerton Plan* can be replicated in most of the country, which for the greater part is marginal land suitable for dry-land farming techniques which have not yet been developed. Consequently, the promise of faster agricultural growth has not been forthcoming. To the majority of Kenya's population, it does not matter that Kenya's economy has grown at an annual rate of 6.8 percent per year since independence, or that the bulk of the land is in African hands, or that the central government is now African. They continue to live in despair; i.e., unemployed, squatters, living in overcrowded areas since the majority of the best lands remain in the hands of a minority elite. For example, the old African reserves still house the majority of the Africans, whereas the areas which were designated for European settlement, such as Laikipia, Nakuru, Nyandarua, Trans Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, are still characterized by a lower population density in relation to the available land.

Thus, even though Kenyanization has radically changed the racial composition in the centre of power, the mechanisms which maintain its dominance have remained undisturbed: pattern of government income and expenditure, freedom of foreign firms to locate their offices and plants in Nairobi, and the narrow

stratum of expenditure by a high-income elite superimposed on a base of limited mass consumption. In fact, the power of the center over the periphery is greater since there is now a closer correlation of interest between the urban elite, the owners of large farms and the larger foreign-owned companies. By aligning themselves with these foreign, economic-interest groups, by creating a strong entrepreneur class, by making the majority dependent on government handouts, and by suppressing all oppositional forces,⁶² the African-ruled Kenya, like the European-ruled Kenya, has retained its powerful and oppressive position.

Footnotes

1. Kilson, Jr., M. L. "Land and the Kikuyu," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XL, No. 2 (April, 1955), p. 117. The Maasai, proportionately, may have lost more land than the Kikuyu. There is, in fact, no longer a debate on this issue. A census count put 1,500,000 Kikuyus in colonial Kenya as opposed to approximately 55,000 Maasai. This would seem to highly suggest that even a little land lost by the agricultural Kikuyu could have detrimental effects on population density while the largely nomadic Maasai possessed no population problem, or at least not to a comparable degree.
2. Sorrenson, M. P. K. *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country*. London, 1967, p. 8.
3. *Ibid.* In the southernmost section of Kikuyu land, Kiambu, the Kikuyu have confessed to purchasing irredeemable land from the original Dorobo inhabitants.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 11. The Kikuyu recognized various tenant relationships based on either a form of unwritten contract or on status ties; all of which were issued on a temporary basis.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 9. Sorrenson contends that it was the depth of this emotional and psychological link which caused the land issue to rival political independence as the prime focus of African nationalism.
6. Wolff, R. D. *Britain and Kenya 1870-1930: The Economics of Colonialism*. New Haven, Connecticut, 1974, pp. 5-24.
7. Kilson, p. 109. In footnote 18 on this page, Kilson debates whether there was such a thing as 'vacant lands'.

8. Kilson, pp. 110-11. The regulations of 1897 stated that:

"a certificate will not be granted in respect of any land which at the time of the commencement of these regulations is cultivated or regularly used by any native or native tribe, but may be granted if the Commission, after such inquiry as he may think fit, is satisfied that such land is no longer so cultivated or regularly used, and that the granting of a certificate would not be prejudicial to native interests." (Ross, W. M. *Kenya From Within*. London, 1927, p. 49.)

9. Buell, R. L. *The Native Problem in Africa: Volume I*. New York, 1928, p. 299.
10. Kilson, pp. 111-12.
11. Sorrenson, p. 19.
12. *Ibid.* In May and July, 1906, the boundaries of two Kenya reserves, Nyeri and Fort Hall portions of the Kikuyu reserves and Kiambu were published in the Official Gazette.
13. Kilson, p. 113.
14. Buell, p. 317.
15. Kilson, p. 114.
16. Ross, W. M. *Kenya From Within*. London, 1927, p. 440.
17. Ross, p. 48; Buell, p. 321.
- 18.* There were clearly four groups of Europeans who could be distinguished either by their origins or their economic resources:
- 1) a small group of wealthy farmers with considerable private incomes outside of Kenya, like Grogga and Lord Delamere;
 - 2) company farms which often formed joint stock companies, like Brook Bonds Tea in the Kericho District;
 - 3) small groups of farmers who were always short of cash and cultivated only small quantities of land - less than 269 acres;
 - 4) the administration itself which was dependent on taxes and loans from the London money market for revenue.
19. Zwanenberg, Roger van. *The Agricultural History of Kenya to 1939*. Kenya, 1972, p. 8.

- 20.* Due to the low wages received, the migrant workers had to rely on the use of their land in the reserves - if they held such land - in order to provide subsistence. All of the migrant workers needed housing, medical facilities, and food supplies. This was recognized in Section 24-34 of the 1910 Master and Servant Ordinance, but prior to 1938, the bill was not enforced. Under the 1919 Amendment to the Ordinance, labour inspectors and medical officers were given power under Sections 3 and 4 to enforce the law in regard to the care of servants. In 1926, rules concerning medical treatment included paragraphs on medicines and free examination appropriations. Even after 1938, only minor improvements occurred. It also became somewhat a rule to cut the worker's monthly pay for the collection of minor fines designated by the European employers. I.O.U. chits were sometimes issued to the workers.
- 21.* Hut tax was in reality a wife tax - which constituted a tax on property - even though the European wives were not taxed.
- 22.* The penalty in 1912 for the refusal to pay tax included three months imprisonment. However, from 1920 onwards, depending on the need for labor, the penalty fluctuated from 3 rupees to 15 rupees.
23. Zwanenberg, Roger van. *Colonial Primitive Accumulation in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1971, pp. 77-78. In 1930, Africans earned approximately 750,000 francs, out of which 600,000 francs were paid in taxes.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
25. Kilson, p. 130.
- 26.* At times, the employer would write in red which made it hard for the employee to find another job. This method was made illegal in 1936 under clause 3 of the draft of Native Registration Bill. Blue and black ink were to be used.
- * Sources for the information in quotes 18, 20, 21, 22, and 26 include Zwanenberg's *The Agricultural History of Kenya*, Werlin's *Nairobi City Council*, and Parker's Ph.D. thesis. All are listed in the reference sections of this paper.
27. Sorrenson, p. 33. Some of the European settlers in the Kiambu district even introduced the South African system of *Kaffir* farming, whereby Africans were encouraged to rent land and required to sell produce to the farmer at below market rates. However, the general squatting

situation was very similar to the sharecropping system which became widespread in the Southern part of the U.S.A. in the early 20th century - where Black families or poor white families resided on farms and worked the owner's land in return for their occupancy.

28. Zwanenberg, Roger van. *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919 to 1939*. Nairobi, 1975, p. 217.
29. Kilson, p. 140.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 141. Christian populations among the Kikuyu were urged to pray for Thuku and his supporters in order that God might guide and protect them in their roles as leaders.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 142. Twenty-one people were killed in front of the Nairobi Police Station where the demonstration took place. (For details, please read Kilson, pp. 141-42.)
32. Barnett, Donald and Njama, Karari. *Mau Mau From Within*. New York, 1966, p. 37.
33. Sorrenson, p. 43. For example, 350 square miles of the North Yatta was given. This was to be a Native Leasehold Area where individual Kikuyu could lease land. However, this particular area was too hot and dry to be productive, least of all capable of providing good husbandry conditions.
34. Barnett and Njama, p. 41.
35. Sorrenson, pp. 54-56. Mitchell felt that the Europeans' presence in Kenya must be as trustees and the Africans, 'wards' in trust. The aim of the trustees was to create conditions in which the Africans could advance in 'civilization' and knowledge.
36. Barnett and Njama, p. 42. On February 1, 1947, 250 Rift Valley squatters plunged, in protest, on the lawn of the Government House. Six protestors were arrested. Then, on September 5, 1947, there was a strike at the Uplands Bacon Factory near Lare where three people were killed and six wounded.
37. Rosberg, Carl G. and Nottingham, John. *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1966, p. 286. In the Naivasha Police raid, Mau Mau members took a truck load of ammunition, rifles and automatic weapons. It is also important to note that Mau Mau fighters viewed the inhabitants of Lari as part of the loyalist group and therefore against the movement.

38. Kilson, p. 150.
39. Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 334-347.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 303. (27,000 Kikuyus were placed in detention, 11,503 were killed, 1,035 were captured wounded and 1,550 were captured unwounded. Among the government forces, 95 Europeans were killed, 127 were wounded, 1,920 loyal Africans were killed, 2,385 loyal Africans were wounded, and 29 Asians were killed.)
41. Sorrenson, p. 102.
42. Heyer, Judith. "The Origins of Regional Inequalities in Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya, 1920-73." Kampala, 1975, p. 156.
43. Omsule, Monone. "*Kiama Kia Muingi: Kikuyu Reaction to the Land Consolidation Policy in Kenya 1955-59.*" *Mono 591*. UCLA, pp. 2, 25. KKM felt land consolidation to be in direct conflict with the Kikuyu lifestyle. It also held the opinion that the whole scheme was improperly carried out.
44. Wood, Susan. *Kenya*. London, 1962, p. 53. The five demands were as follows:
- "common roll on a universal franchise, with reserved seats for minorities*
- a date for Kenya's independence*
- a degree of responsible government with the majority party forming the Government-side of the Legislature*
- that the White Highlands must be opened up immediately*
- and a programme of African resettlement in the area undertaken at once."*
45. This was in all respects, another political maneuver by the administration to undermine and manipulate the nationalist sentiments of the Africans. For example, by being the initiator in promising independence, opening up the White Highlands to Africans and then issuing a land resettlement program, the administration managed to snatch those elements which sought to mobilize the African population. Being the initiator, the government also held direct control over who obtained loans and land for agricultural development.

46. Gertzel, Cherry. *The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-68*. London, 1970, p. 10.
47. Ruthenberg, Hans. *African Agricultural Production-Development Policy in Kenya*. Berlin, 1966, p. 79.
48. Hertz, Barbara. "Land Reform in Kenya." Washington, June, 1970, p. 29. It is also important to mention that the actual siting of the Million Acres Scheme was such that it presented an extension of the former African reserves, and the selection of settlers was carried out with this in mind.
49. Wasserman, Gary. "The Independence Bargain: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue 1960-62," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 99-100.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
51. Kenya, Republic of. "Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya." Kenya, 1965, pp. i-ii.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
54. Amsden, Alice H. "A Review of Kenya's Political Economy Since Independence." *Journal of African Studies*, 1975, p. 425.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
56. Mbiti, Philip and Barnes, Carolyn. *Spontaneous Settlement Problems in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1975.
57. Amsden, p. 420.
58. These three country-wide agricultural cooperative unions were established by European farmers prior to independence to serve the interests of the large-scale farmers in the White Highlands. (DeWilde, J. C. *Experience with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa*. Maryland, 1964, pp. 1-241.)
59. Amsden, p. 431.
60. Mbiti and Barnes. Here reference is being made to the Muka Mukuu Cooperative Society. This is a large estate containing both former labor tenants and new squatters. However, even now, only a small portion of the land is under permanent cultivation and due to its difficulties, no other

land is being used by the Cooperative; e.g., for other crops or livestock.

61. Amsden, p. 423.
62. To cite two recent examples - the government planned and brutally murdered Mr. James Kariuki less than a year ago. Kariuki was one of the few emerging opponents of the President and the KANU government. Similarly, throughout the 1974-75 school year at the University of Nairobi, there were numerous student disturbances (concerning certain actions and policies of the government) which were put down by the military after several raids on the campus and dormitories. A large number of students were also beaten. In the final analysis, the supposed student leaders were expelled. In an attempt to escape possible danger, some of these overt political speakers left the country for nearby countries, like Tanzania, for example.

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