

THE ZIONIST AND THE APOSTOLIC PROPHETIC CHURCHES
IN ZIMBABWE:
A CRITICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CULTURAL NATIONALISM

by

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The African Independent Church Movement has existed in Southern Africa since the beginning of the twentieth century. It entered Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) around 1918. It consists of two major and similar, but composite, segments: The Zionists, who claim an ideological inspiration from old Jerusalem, the Zion City of God; and the Apostolics, who consider themselves the authentic successors of the twelve disciples of Jesus and derive their spiritual mandate directly from the Master's own injunctions at Pentecost. This Independent or Prophetic Church movement should be distinguished from African Separatist Church movements, comparatively older movements that arose from secessions from European Missionary denominations. Except for the Chilentwe rebellion (1915) in Malawi, the Bullhoek incident (1921) of the "Israelite" colony in South Africa, and the Alice Lenschina catastrophe (1964) in Zambia, independency has maintained a comparatively low profile in Southern Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular.¹

The Independent Church movement has suffered much more from scholarly neglect than from analysis. In fact, in spite of its huge membership, much less is known about it, (at least by Europeans and certain segments of the African population in Southern Africa) than about some of the most insignificant functionaries of the Christian missions. As recently as the late sixties an African clergyman in Zimbabwe could still confess his indifference about the movement:

I do not know the vaPostora, and I do not know what the differences are between the Zionists and the Apostles. I have only heard of the Chibarirwe and Topia Churches, but I have not had the time or means to meet them... I have not yet seen a prophet being possessed by the Spirit, but I think that they possibly resort to the traditional practices. Occasionally I have met individual members of these Churches, but I have not yet met one who could give the proper facts about his Church.²

But what is more disturbing than the scarcity of systematic information on the Prophetic movement is the apparent inadequacy of the little literature on it. Much of it is factual and descriptive rather than interpretive, and where an interpretation has occasionally been attempted, it has frequently not conformed to the facts of the situation. The present critique will attempt to bridge this gap. But before going into a critique of the Prophetic movement, it is necessary to make a brief survey of the Zimbabwe African political and religious scene of which the Zionists and the Apostolics are an integral part.

On the political, economic and social scene, Afro-European rivalry has been the dominant feature since the country's colonization by the British in 1890.³ But among the Africans themselves there is also the question of ethnic rivalries which predated the European colonization of the country but have been exacerbated in certain respects by the latter. However, ethnic identification has also been considerably neutralized by many other equally potent factors that cut across it such as modern education, urban migration, wage employment, trans-ethnic political parties, and nation-wide religious and social institutions. Political rivalries among the Africans also manifest themselves on a class basis. The African bourgeoisie are in a state of more or less latent competition among themselves, depending on whether they are a business or a service bourgeoisie. Yet as a group they are also in sharp competition with the traditionalist elements that continue to wield feudal powers over rural African populations. While the Europeans are threatened by the African bourgeoisie, and the latter by the feudal traditionalists, all the three groups are also threatened, even if not equally, by the radical left consisting of the exploited and land-hungry African peasantry in the Reserves and the emerging African proletariat in the urban centers and on the European-owned latifundia.⁴

This situation becomes more complicated when religious persuasion and the resulting rivalries are taken into account. While the traditional religions have been considerably undermined by a number of factors since 1890, they still retain considerable vitality not only among their professed followers, but even among the supposedly Christianized Africans.⁵ The prospects of Christianity are much brighter than those of the traditional beliefs. For centuries Portuguese Catholicism failed to make any headway into the Mwanamutapa Empire in spite of the martyrdom of Father Silveira in the process. And yet as a part of the colonial bandwagon Christianity has made an astounding impact on Zimbabwe since 1890. With the traditional religions on the retreat and with Islam among the alien migrant farm and mine workers, Christianity has been winning converts by leaps and bounds. But when applied to Zimbabwe the term "Christianity" is something of a misnomer, for here the faith is represented by numerous European and American sects in hot competition among themselves. In the crusade for African souls Catholicism competes uncompromisingly with Protestantism. Within the latter camp the fundamentalists and other "purist" sects gang against one another as well as collectively against non-fundamentalists and latitudinarians.⁶

In spite of their numerical inferiority, the white members of the Christian missions in Zimbabwe have retained total administrative, financial, and doctrinal control of their respective denominations at the expense of the majority African membership much as their white counterparts have also monopolized a corresponding control of the secular realm of the country.⁷ This has led to Euro-African rivalry within each missionary denomination—a feature that is regularly reflected in the allocation of positions of responsibility within each Church. This rivalry also manifests itself in disciplinary actions against African church functionaries and ordinary church members. But the reality of this Euro-African rivalry does not necessarily minimize rivalries among the respective African communicants themselves within each denomination and particular congregation, leading to more or less similar disciplinary measures. Furthermore, the persistence of traditional religious beliefs among many Christianized Africans often punctuates these rivalries with the connotation of the struggle between the Europeans and the Westernized Africans on the one hand, and the traditionally-oriented Africans on the other. In that case the rivalry also assumes overtones of orthodoxy *versus* heterodoxy respectively corresponding to Christian *versus* pagan. In this context it has not been unusual for many African Christian communicants—ministers, school teachers, chiefs, village heads, widows and widowers—to challenge the Church's attempt to circumscribe their social, marital and other prospects within the traditional hierarchy on theological grounds.⁸

It is due to these rivalries and many other reasons that nearly every missionary denomination in Zimbabwe has been intermittently hit by African religious secessions that have led to the formation of more or less similar congregations under African ecclesiastical control. And if order has been maintained on the surface, this has been largely due to the fact that the colonial regime is the guarantor of the missions.

Regardless of the cause of the primary secessions the resulting Separatist Churches have rarely achieved commendable success. A number of reasons account for this. First and foremost, the quarrels which propel them out of the mission churches are in reality frequently more nationalistic than theological, even though this becomes apparent to the concerned protagonists only after the secession. Thus once the latter is attained, the supposedly theological momentum which brought it about quickly recedes and the new sect's membership either trickles back to the parent church or proceeds to a nationalistic organization, which has no role for religious preferences. Secondly, the secessions are frequently a result of the conflict of personalities and do not usually outlive their founders.¹⁰ Lastly, the very *raison d'être* of the primary secessions is a potential for further secessions from each new sect. These schismatic tendencies cripple the Separatist Church movement more than any other factor.

Because of their doctrinal and structural affinity to mission churches, the Separatist sects tend to remain within the scope of missionary Christianity. They are frequently called "Ethiopian" Churches on the assumption that their desire for autonomy derived its initial inspiration from the Ethiopian Church.¹¹ The Separatist Churches are not the subject of the present analysis which is centered on the Independent or Prophetic Churches.

While the missionary and secessionist denominations in Zimbabwe have been fighting among and within themselves, the Prophetic movements were outflanking them on the left. In South Africa each of these two movements is represented by about half a thousand autonomous sects; in Zimbabwe by a comparatively smaller number.¹² In spite of the many differences they accentuate between themselves, the Zionists and the Apostolics are much closer to each other than they are to the missionary and Separatist Churches. Reverend Bengt G.M. Sundkler has gone so far as to classify them all under the "Zionist" label on the grounds that theologically, they are "a syncretic Bantu movement with healing, speaking with tongues, purification rites, and taboos as the main expressions of their faith."¹³ Martin L. Daneel has instead described them as "Spirit-type" Churches on the grounds that possession by Spirit is one of their common features.¹⁴ In this critique they will be referred to as the Prophetic Churches inasmuch as the ability to prophesy is the crucial tenet of their formal "theology".

The study of the history, structure, and practises of the Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa has been done elsewhere and will therefore not be duplicated in this brief critique.¹⁵ The present critique will instead attempt to make a critical interpretation of these movements rather than a schematic description of them. The critique is designed to present a conceptual perspective of the Prophetic movement in Zimbabwe in respect to the social situation of the country as a whole, and to compare and contrast the phenomenon with other social forces on the national scene. Such an interpretative survey will first take into account the existing literature on the subject and assess its relevance.

Nearly all the literature on the African Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe is by non-Africans and is primarily written for the latter. It tends to put emphasis on minute factual and descriptive details while ignoring the overall philosophy of the movements it studies. As will be shown below, the critics have put emphasis on the biography of the personalities leading the movements, the theological dogmas of the various sects, their respective ceremonies and procedures, the church constitutions and government, and, among others, the schismatic history of those movements.

However informative and meritorious such approaches to the subject may be, they should be treated only as the beginning of the study, and not as the study itself. Many of these critics have labored under the mistaken assumption that the whole necessarily and automatically emerges from the sum of its parts. For example, the extensive and impressive histories of the Prophetic movements written by Sundkler and Daniel leave something to be desired since they fail to show exactly why the movements and their component sects invariably developed in a particular direction, and not in any other. It is well to investigate the relationship of the Prophetic movements to the colonialist and apartheid white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa; but, there is the even more pressing need to explain why they attained such a relationship when other African-sponsored organizations were proscribed.

Furthermore, the Prophetic movements have no significant written literature of their own and express themselves entirely in highly tonal and idiomatic African languages and dialects. To understand them in their own cultural context requires much more familiarity with their social *milieu* than many non-Africans have been able to attain. Some of the critics have frequently supplemented this deficiency by interviewing the respective leaders of the movements. But, just as an individual does not necessarily correspond to what he claims or sincerely believes himself to be, the same is also the case with respect to social movements and institutions. Nearly all Christian denominations and sects in the world today consider themselves a replica of the teachings of Jesus, yet few scholarly critics would agree. But when it comes to the study of the Prophetic movements in Southern Africa, the extravagant claims of the Zionists and the Apostolics have almost invariably been accepted at face value even by distinguished scholars.

What is equally disturbing is that the tools of social analysis which have been long accepted in Western scholarship have not been utilized to an appreciable extent in the study of the Prophetic movements in Southern Africa. For example, nearly all social scientists would agree that very little objective knowledge of Catholicism as a movement could be derived from a literal reading of its catechisms as the latter would hardly reflect its actual political and social dimensions. It has been long since Western historiography stripped the Protestant Reformation of the theological and doctrinal pretensions with which men like Luther, Calvin, Zwingli and Knox had clothed it. The doctrinal aspect of the Reformation has been relegated to the ephemeral, while the underlying political and economic dimensions have been brought into the foreground. Nineteenth-century European imperialism in Africa has also been stripped of its "white man's burden" pretensions and studied in other contexts. Even the missionary crusade to "save" the "Dark Continent" has been emancipated from its own self-perception and re-interpreted as a cover for imperialism and ethnocentrism.¹⁶

Yet, when it comes to the study of the Zionist and the Apostolic movements, the same scholars seem to rally to the assumption that the phenomenon cannot represent much more than actually meets the eye or hits the ear. It is the thesis of this paper that such ill-conceived studies need to be liberated from their narrow perspective. After critically analyzing some selections from such literature, this critique will propose an alternative interpretation of the Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe that transcends the inadequacies of the existing views on the subject. The literature singled out for analysis consists of selections from the following: Reverend Bengt Sundkler, which represents a theological approach to the subject; Marshall W. Murphree, which represents an anthropological perspective; Martin L. Daneel, which is a historical and descriptive approach; and Vittorio Lanternari, which represents a socio-political approach.¹⁷

In his extremely detailed and pioneer critique on the Prophetic and the Separatist movements in South Africa, Sundkler abolishes the distinction between Zionism and Apostolicism by labelling both movements Zionist.¹⁸ This means that in many cases one should add "Apostolics" wherever Sundkler uses "Zionist". The interpretive aspects of his thesis are almost entirely confined to doctrinal and theological issues and perspectives. His study led him to the conclusion that the Prophetic movement represents "new wine in old wineskins" by which he means a new assertion of the doctrines of African traditional religions. He sees them as representing a situation in which the Westernized, spiritualized religion is overcome by the spiritism of African traditional theology, and not the other way round. He maintains that they are an outcome of a long syncretic process in which African religions, which resisted Christianity from the outset, have revitalized themselves by substituting, doctrine for doctrine, the African view for the Christian but under a seemingly Christian umbrella. Hence, for Sundkler it is essential to go back to African traditional religions in order to comprehend the syncretic dimensions of the Prophetic phenomenon.¹⁹

Sundkler gives some striking examples of the absorption of Christianity into the African religion. He observes that whereas spirit-possession was characteristic of the Zulu traditional religion, "the fundamental concept of Zionist ideology is *uMoya*, the Spirit, by them understood to be the Holy Spirit of whom the Book has spoken." Thus in accepting the Christian Holy Ghost the Prophetic movement retains the original African spirit beliefs in a new framework that is Christian, and therefore modern and respectable, in appearance. Speaking with tongues had similarly existed among the Africans "long before the first Zulu had ever heard of Christ."²⁰ The same applies to the angels the equivalent of which the Zulus had had long before. Sundkler also treats the prophesying that is characteristic of these movements as a correlate of African magic and divining. His chart illustrates the syncretistically substitutive sequence of pagan tenets for Christian ones as follows:

African traditional belief in and fear of witchcraft; then the colonial legislation against diviners, that did not take into account the fact that the role of the latter is to stamp out witchcraft; then came ill-health and dissatisfaction with the legislation; then the rise of the diviner in the Zionist Church who acts as a witchfinder under a religious umbrella, for "prophesying it divining, in a supposedly Christian form." Hence Sundkler's contention that "the basic pattern from which Zulu Zionism is copied is that of diviner and witchfinder activities rather than that of the historic Christian Church."²¹

As a theologian, Sundkler did a remarkable job in analyzing the Zionist movement. The weakness of his critique is not so much in its errors as in the inadequacy of his framework for analysis. Because it is confined to matters of religious doctrine, his critique's framework is too narrow and uncritically accepts what could be a social movement at the level of its own theological pretensions. And yet as he himself admits, Prophetism is a major social force: *a tertium genus*, a third race, over against both the heathen and the Christian community."²² If this is indeed the case, then it is doubtful that its strength lies in merely revivifying African traditional beliefs with the occasional apprehension of witches and the speaking in meaningless jargon. Furthermore, Sundkler recognizes the latent antagonism between the Westernized Africans and the movement, but he does not try to account for it, even though he at the same time elaborately accounts for the potential rivalry and reconciliation between the Prophetic movement and the traditional society.

Unlike Sundkler's essentially theological critique, Marshall W. Murphree purports to be anthropological as well as more interpretive than descriptive.²³ Whereas Sundkler covers the whole of South Africa, and Daneel covers much of Zimbabwe, Murphree's study is confined to the evaluation of the evolution of religion among the Budjga of northeastern Zimbabwe since 1890.

Murphree's schematic approach to the subject rejects a "categorical" approach in which two or more religions are seen as competing for a society's loyalty. He also rejects the "layer" or "vener" approach which would imply that the earlier (traditional) religion is still the basic substratum on which the later ones (Christianity *et al.*) merely add by quantitative accretion. He instead chooses the "synthetic" approach which he says "sees a dialectical interchange between the traditional, local religious organization and the immigrant religion (or religions) and focuses in particular on such independent religious groups as may arise as being the synthetic end of this process."²⁴

As far as Murphree is concerned, the Prophetic movement represents the widening of the scope of Budjga society that has come under the radius of religion since the beginning of the colonial regime, for "the changing conditions of Budjga society have greatly enlarged the range of situations calling for religious solution" with the result

of "a high degree of religious mobility and heterodoxy."²⁵ Like Sundkler, Murphree sees Prophetism as a religious syncretism between traditional religion and Christianity inasmuch as the affinity of the concepts of the former to those of the latter "makes them [the former religions] at the same time vulnerable to Christianity and viable in the face of it. Because of this, the juxtaposition of the two religious systems has not resulted in, nor necessitated, a categorical rejection of either in its totality."²⁶

But once Murphree accepts Prophetism as mere syncretic religiosity, he has very little left to interpret. His critique therefore quickly descends to the level of description so as to establish religious parallels between Prophetism on the one hand and traditional beliefs and Christianity on the other. His study recounts the petty details of the new movement's ceremonies, procedures, and doctrines to the point of making all sorts of remote comparisons between it and Catholicism and Protestantism. Ultimately, his analysis is reducible to an anthropological version of Sundkler's, but without many of the merits of the latter.

The most extensive study of the Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe to date is that of Martin L. Daneel, which has some significant merits over other critiques.²⁷ In the first place, Daneel concentrates exclusively, even if too narrowly, on the movements in Zimbabwe. Second, he writes from a considerable personal familiarity with some of the movements and their respective leaders, a task that is facilitated by his knowledge of Shona (though not of the appropriate dialectic distinctions).

But Daneel largely approaches the subject from a historical and descriptive, rather than a conceptual and interpretive, point of view. Occasionally the latter is attempted, but poorly and unsystematically. For example, he rightly recognizes that the elimination of the first four Biblical commandments from the catechisms of many Prophetic movements is due to the latter's focus on man and society rather than on God. Yet he proceeds to attach some religious connotations to this fact:

This [the elimination from the Decalogue of the first four commandments] is no mere coincidence nor the subjective preference of an individual Church leader, for it shows the African's concern with the horizontal relation in society, man's religiously defined obligations to his fellowman, starting with his nearest kith and kin. The vertical relationship between man and God is not really excluded or of secondary importance. It is a presupposed reality, a basis for the horizontal relations between man and man. As such, it encompasses all Church laws which, in the African setting, start off with the interrelations of the most vital social unit, the elementary family.²⁸

But how can one affirm the primacy of God by eliminating and displacing him with a humanistic philosophy? This is a rather superficial view on Daneel's part, especially in the light of the fact that he is also aware of many other departures of the movement from crucial Biblical doctrines. For an example, Johane Maranke, the founder of the largest Apostolic movement in Zimbabwe—a movement that claims to derive its authority from Jesus and the Apostles—had sixteen wives at the time of his death, and his brother Anrod, who became the spiritual counselor of Johane's successors, inherited thirteen of them in addition to his own collection. Daneel thus skips over the crucial and original aspects of Prophetism in favor of a rather simplistic interpretation of the phenomenon.

To the extent that he conceptually interprets Prophetism at all, Daneel, like Murphree, sees it as a basically Christian movement arising from a theological syncretism in which the internal or African criticism of the old traditional religious beliefs is more successful than external missionary criticism which has a deprecating tone:

The frequent failure of Missions to cope with the real issues in the lives of traditionalists or of their African converts left a vacuum which the Independent Church leaders were well equipped to fill. In this respect the latter have a distinct advantage over the former. Familiarity with existing practices and beliefs facilitates their task of presenting the tenets of Christianity to the African mind, if not at a deeper level, then at least in a more appropriate idiom.²⁹

Daneels' preceding assertion to the effect that Prophetism represents the process of Christianization through African mediation is in fact the exact opposite of Sundkler's observation that there is a sociological parallel between the heathen diviner and the Zionist prophet and that "the basic pattern from which Zulu Zionism is copied is that of the diviner and witchfinder activities rather than that of the historic Christian Church."³⁰ Long before Daneel's thesis, Sundkler had pointed out the de-Christianizing impact of Prophetism:

The behaviour and activities of the Zionist prophet and his church reveal that, in certain cases, the deepest cause of the emergence of Independent churches is a nativistic syncretistic interpretation of the Christian religion... *The syncretistic sect becomes the bridge over which Africans are brought back to heathensim--* a viewpoint which stresses the seriousness of the whole situation. It can be shown how individuals and groups have passed step by step from a Mission church to an Ethiopian [i.e., Separatist and secessionist] church, and from the Ethiopians to the Zionists, and how at last via the bridge of nativistic Zionism they have returned to the African animism from where they once started.³¹

Thus in spite of their subscription to syncretism, the interpretations of Murphree and Daneel on the one hand and that of Sundkler on the other are in fact diametrically opposed. Whereas the former sees Prophetism as a process of Christianization through the use of a pagan African idiom, the latter maintains that it is a process of paganization through the use of a Christian idiom. For Daneel the result is the rooting of Christianity in the traditionalist mind; for Sundkler the routing of Christianity from the African mind and its displacement with revived pagan doctrines, for the "two pillars" of pagan religion—"ancestor-cult and magic—still stand in the very chancel of the Zionist [and Apostolic] Church. The ancestor-cult and its corollary, sacrifices, form the pattern on which Zionist [and Apostolic] Spirit-religion, cult of angels and sacrifices, is built." Ultimately, therefore, the Prophetic movement represents a process in which "Western spiritualized religion was [is] eventually changed and overcome by African spiritism," for in this case "the more things change, the more they remain as they were before."32

Although the present critique does not endorse Sundkler's interpretation of Prophetism in entirely theological terms, and maintains that the latter is only the means by which the movement formally conceptualizes itself in confronting the external world, it nevertheless considers Sundkler's thesis as a long step in the right direction. Those of Murphree and Daneel are, in spite of their apparent similarity to Sundkler's, an unfortunate step backwards.

A close scrutiny will reveal some more fundamental deficiencies in Daneel's critique. If, as he says, Prophetism is a Christianization process, then it necessarily follows that the movement runs counter to African traditional beliefs in one way or another—as does Christianity itself—and that its success in an area would somehow correspond to the relative breakdown of the traditional religions. Daneel recognizes the persistence of the latter in the African rural areas of Zimbabwe:

Traditional beliefs and practices among the Southern Shona have a remarkable resilience, whether in overt or [sic] camouflaged form. In a rural area where Christianity has exerted its influence for at least 70 years through medical and educational institutions, and where the majority of the people claim affiliation to a Mission or Independent Church, the old beliefs still continue to exist. Many ...still regard the God of Matonjeni as the rain-giving God, the *midsimu* are still believed to threaten their well-being if neglected, the *shavi* spirits are still inspiring agents of contemporary *nganga* practices, and the *varoyi* are still believed to cause the ailments or deaths of their victims. Even the old network of interrelated rituals, despite changes and minor breakdowns, continues to exist with surprising tenacity.33

And yet he admits that in spite of this prevalence of traditional beliefs, "the rural environment proved to be an ideal setting for the recruitment of Independent Church membership... Here one finds the largest concentrations of IC adherents and the heartbeat of large-scale religious activities."³⁴ Sundkler had already made a similar observation with respect to Prophetism in South Africa:

To them the Reserve is the Canaan with Bethesdas and Jordans, the pools and the rivers where the sick are healed, and Hills of Zion, the holy hilltops where prayers and sacrifices are presented to Jehovah... The Zulu prophet looks to the Zululand reserve as the only place where the essential business of the Church--healing--can be successfully performed."³⁵

Because he associates Prophetism with the Christianization process and the consequent breakdown of the traditional matrix, Daneel cannot explain this apparent correlation between the survival of the traditional and the success of the movement. Murphree similarly recognizes, but fails to explain, the correlation between Separatism and the urban centers, and Prophetism and the rural areas.³⁶ As mentioned earlier, Daneel's theory implies that Prophetism would be more successful in the urban centers where "a different set of social values and forces is emerging" and where the situation "furthers a breakdown of traditional sanctions." And yet this is not the case. Prophetism has been much less successful in the urban centers than in traditional rural areas, a point which Daneel recognizes, albeit grudgingly, stating "Nevertheless, the urban environment has not (yet) ... become the seedbed of religious separatism [Prophetism] as one might have expected."³⁷

But why this clear delineation of geographical spheres of influence between Prophetism and secessionist Separatism when both movements are led by Africans? It cannot be answered by Daneel's tautological contention that the rural areas "are" and the urban areas "are not (yet)" the sphere of Prophetism. The question is not whether the one area is and the other is not the sphere of Prophetism--that is an apparent fact of Zimbabwe and South African history--but why such is the case. Hence our contention, which will be elaborated upon later, that this division of spheres between Prophetism and Separatism such that the former is rural and the latter is urban reflects the corresponding indigenization and Westernization of the Africans in the respective areas. Our argument will show that the issue between Prophetism on the one hand and Separatist and Missionary on the other is not merely that of religious preferences, but that it represents the conflict between the indigenous African culture and Western culture.

It is Daneel's failure to comprehend this point that leads to his inability to explain the acceptance of the Prophetic movements by the Rhodesian settler regime and the African traditional authorities and their complete rejection by the missionaries and the Westernized Africans. Instead of accounting for it, he merely notes that in their relationship with the colonial government and the traditional authorities, the Prophetic movements have gone from "conflict" with to "recognition" by them:

conflict made way for recognition. Chiefs, ward headmen and scores of kraalheads not only recognized the Independent Church movement but they joined these Churches and were themselves promoted to positions of honorary or active leadership within the various hierarchies.³⁸

In their relationship with the missionaries, however, the movement went from "conflict" with to "negation" by them, as one missionary clearly emphasizes: "We see the Zionists as non-Christians. They are only more difficult to convince... I do not see the use of visiting the Zionists. You simply cannot convince them of a different viewpoint."³⁹ Such dissimilar developments on the part of the Prophetic movement as its enthusiastic acceptance by one group and its complete rejection by another deserve far more attention than Daneel's statement on their chronological facticity.

The final thesis for analysis is that of Vittorio Lanternari's: *Religions of the Oppressed*.⁴⁰ Lanternari is familiar with Sundkler's critique and uses it as his background source on African Prophetism. However, he differs with Sundkler only on interpretation. Insofar as its thesis goes beyond matters of religious doctrine in search of the motive force of Prophetism, Lanternari's critique is an improvement on Sundkler's. In reality, however, it contains some serious errors. The author shows more devotion to his preconceived formula than to historical facts. He maintains that the African anti-colonial rebellions since the Second World War were "the inevitable... manifestations of a religious ferment... causing profound disturbances in the patterns of traditional culture."⁴¹ As far as he is concerned, Prophetism is, among other things, a politically revolutionary movement: "A tenet common to Zionist churches expresses the need for revolt from within against the present status of native society in order to make way for the new Jerusalem."⁴² The rest of his thesis is a further assertion of the same theme, with relevant examples to support it.

Lanternari's thesis is open to challenge from a number of directions. That the Prophetic movements have considerably helped to keep the flame of liberty burning through the difficult colonial era is readily admissible; but so did the Christian Church, even if indirectly and against its own intents and purposes. Nearly all of Africa's anti-colonial revolutionaries received a Christian education, if not a somewhat Christian upbringing as well. And yet it would be ridiculous to call the Christian Church in Africa a revolutionary movement when its reactionary tendencies are so apparent.

But if, as he claims, Prophetism is a revolutionary movement against the colonial establishment, how does it come about that the movement has never been represented in the inner leadership circles in Africa during the struggle against and since the fall of colonialism? The leaders of these movements have not headed a single government or a major political party. It is doubtful they have even attained party membership.

Lanternari's thesis is not even as Marxian as he tries to make it sound, for the Marxist thesis would in this case run in the opposite direction to the effect that Prophetism provides a retreat from revolutionary reality and is therefore the ruling class's opium for the oppressed African masses.⁴⁴ This is in fact the implication, though not the gist, of the alternative explanation which this paper will present on the movement. As early as 1905 a South African Commission of inquiry actually advised that "so long as it [Prophetism] remains unassociated with mischievous political tendencies, members unite in advising that any... persecution be avoided." This is in fact the policy that has been pursued by the white minority regimes of Southern Africa since the emergence of the movement.⁴⁵

Lanternari unfortunately over-simplifies a phenomenon that requires an appreciation of its complexity. If Prophetism is as revolutionary as he claims, it surely would have been proscribed in Zimbabwe and South Africa long before such African political parties as the ANC, the PANC, the NDP, the ZAPU, ZANU, etc. Hence Sundkler's incisive observation that

Claims that 'political' reasons are behind the Separatist Church movement miss the mark. The few instances of radical party affiliations of certain Ethiopian or Zionist groups do not offer a sufficient proof of any definite political trend; and even admitting the existence of much outspoken anti-white propaganda in most Independent Churches, one should not forget that the attitude of the leaders and masses of these Ethiopians and Zionists has on the whole been loyal, not least during the trying experiences of war.⁴⁶

But, even while he maintains that the movement is not political, Sundkler nevertheless points out that it is "often nationalistic" and has "definite nationalistic connotations."⁴⁷ Yet he misses the fact that a nationalistic but apolitical movement in a multi-racial situation almost invariably espouses cultural nationalism.

What both Lanternari and Sundkler fail to bring out is that in both South Africa and Zimbabwe Prophetism and the white political establishment are only potential and not operational rivals. In Zimbabwe their long relationship has been characterized by a policy of live-and-let-live, a situation not to be found in the relationship of the African political movements with the same regimes. The few clashes that occurred between Prophetism and the white minority governments have been an exception to their *modus vivendi*.⁴⁸ Furthermore

and as has been the case in its dealings with the traditionalist chiefs, the white minority regime in Zimbabwe has accorded these movements increasing recognition and tolerance since 1945, even as it correspondingly proscribed the African national liberation movements. Lanternari's attempt to put Prophetism at the forefront of the African revolutionary movement is therefore discredited.

It would be hard to find a single African in Zimbabwe who would hope to attain political liberation by joining the Zionist and Apostolic movements. It is also an open secret that there is considerable uneasiness between Prophetism and the rest of the African community with the exception of the traditionalists. The broad African community in Zimbabwe therefore tends to see the movement as the European's opium for the masses, the colonizer's antidote for African political revolutionism. And yet they recognize its anti-European essence and orientation. It is this issue which necessitates a more systematic interpretation.

There have also been some attempts to explain Prophetism as a class movement on the grounds that its members are, materially, usually confined to the lower levels of the African society.⁴⁹ This is partly due to their lack of formal education which restricts their entry into the wage market, and partly due to their preference of rural life which, for the Africans in Zimbabwe and South Africa, is almost invariably characterized by inescapable exploitation and poverty. But when it is realized that in Zimbabwe these movements do not like formal education, that their members frequently withdraw their children out of school after only four or five years of education, that they do not want to work for wages, and that some of the rural poor choose Christianity, education and urban employment as a way out, the class hypothesis becomes problematical.

Prophetism as a Cultural Nationalism

In Zimbabwe Prophetism should be treated not as a theological or revolutionary movement, but as an African cultural movement. Perhaps in no other African state apart from South Africa has colonialism had a greater impact on African life and culture than in Zimbabwe. In the cities the impact is clearly discernible. But the rural areas have also been greatly affected. While the Christian Church and its schools were extending to the remotest corners of the country, the Land Apportionment Acts were greatly undermining the cultural foundations of the traditional society by making it dependent on urban wage labor.⁵⁰ The result is that the values of the colonizer have widely permeated the culture and outlook of the colonized even as the latter resisted the settlers.

What one sees in Zimbabwe is the equivalent of the impact of the West on nineteenth century Russia. The encroaching modernization of that country by Western capital led to an internal debate about the viability of Russia's own indigenous institutions and culture. As the Russians argued about which was preferable, the

indigenous or the foreign; the rural or the urban; Tsarism or democracy; and the commune or the open society, two ideological poles emerged: the Westernizers, who were, as circumstances later showed, a heterogeneous collection of capitalists, liberals, socialists and communists; and the Slavophiles, who consisted of traditionalists and other sentimentalists.⁵¹ In the case of Russia the Westernizers won, and of them it was the Bolsheviks who came out on top.

A similar parallel applies to Zimbabwe. As the country slides into a Westernized cultural *malaise* which traditional society is now too weak to challenge, so does it give rise to a Western orientation on the part of some of the affected Africans. But that also gives rise to the Afro-philés who challenge the acceptability of the erosion of the traditional way of life. This critique maintains that the Zionists and the Apostolics are such a group and that they represent the reaction of cultural nationalism against rampant "cosmopolitanism" which is nothing but Westernization. While the Westernizers accept readily the concept of *kukurira*, which means to attain elevation in style of life, or proudly point out that these or those people *varikuohena* (they are getting polished or cultivated), the Zionists and the Apostolics maintain that such people have been corroded (*vapepetwa*) by European evils. But if Prophetism is an antithesis of the Westernizing tendencies unleashed by the colonial establishment, then its initial tenets should themselves cover the whole broad range at which the Zimbabwe culture is being eroded. By examining the assertions and negations of the movement's tenets, the do's and don'ts, we should be able to invert them and discover if there exist some corresponding postulates by the other camp which they are challenging.

In rejecting Westernism in Zimbabwe, Prophetism uses three kinds of strategies. In the first case it may respond through outright negation, as when it shuns materialism, an issue which will be discussed later. But the movement frequently resorts to independent parallelism, by which is meant doing for and through one's own culture those very things which an alien person or culture is trying to impart, but achieving them independently of the latter. This independent parallelism manifests itself in two forms. In the first case it may take the form of reverse parallelism, which means an apparent acceptance by the one culture of the concepts of the other culture, followed by a reassertion of them by the former in the converse sense so as to put the latter into a position of directional absurdity. As will be pointed out later, this is especially the case when Prophetism appears to accept Christianity and yet proceeds to so define it as to make the West look anti-Christian. In the second case Prophetism combats Westernism with pre-emptive parallelism, which means the former's acceptance of the concepts of the latter's culture but in order to effect them in a manner that appears so "advanced" as to dwarf and denigrate the latter. This is the case with respect to medicine inasmuch as Prophetism accepts the concept of healing but derides at the Western practice of the art which utilizes medicines

instead of the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit. The Zionist and Apostolic application of these three strategies—outright negation, reverse parallelism and pre-emptive parallelism—in combating Western culture in Zimbabwe will become apparent in the topical analyses which follow.

Prophecy: the Ultimate of a Superior Epistemology

The ability to prophesy whenever and wherever the need arises is the foundation of the country's Prophetic movements. But prophecy is not just divination, as Sundkler implies. It is a pre-emptive parallelism designed to undercut the prestige of Westernism. Its target is the epistemological foundations of Western culture as attained through formal education and experimental science. The leaders of the movement know that the prestige of the European in the African's eyes considerably rests on what could be called individual certitude as contrasted with the African's cumulative communal knowledge. The latter amounts to a collective rather than individual consciousness, as is the case with the former. They see the European's type of knowledge gradually displacing the African's through the filtering of formal education into traditional society. The Apostolics and the Zionists try to undercut this Westernization of the African's process of knowledge by accepting and asserting the value of individual (as opposed to collective) knowledge. And yet they proceed to pre-empt the Western concept of its attainment by substituting prophecy—instant individual enlightenment for the long and arduous process of education and experimental science that is the foundation of Western epistemology. Thus in its perception of the African's transition from collective to individual knowledge, Prophetism sees prophecy as the ultimate instrument for by-passing Western intervention in the African's quest for the autonomous certitude, the hallmark of the educated Westerner. In this instance Prophetism resorts to the strategy of pre-emptive parallelism by accepting the ideality of individual consciousness but attaining it through a method supposedly superior to that of the European. Hence the indispensability of prophecy in the struggle against Western ideas that is characteristic of the cultural nationalism of the Independent Church movement in Zimbabwe.

The movement recognizes all too clearly the apparent imbecility of the traditional diviner's epistemological methodology for affirming his certitude: the casting of worn-out bones, the rubbing together of stones, and the donning of awesome but archaic costumes in order to attain maximum credibility. They are aware that such demeaning practices on the part of the diviner alienate the African in the direction of the Western processes of formal education and experimental science. Prophetism therefore rejects the diviner outright. But, by instituting prophecy, it not only supersedes the diviner, but also effectively outflanks the West—at least in the eyes of its traditional constituency. It should be noticed that to the extent that the Westerners impress the traditional mind with their having an epistemology that can solve

problems (e.g. detection of criminals, health problems, agricultural issues, weather predictions, etc.) to that extent does the African prophet pattern himself after the European experts. There is nothing he cannot ascertain if he is given a chance to prophesy. He prophesies about everything on which the Westerner frequently counsels the African traditionalist: crop prospects, as do agricultural experts; cattle ills, as do veterinary officers; perpetrators of crimes, as do the police; causes and cures of ill health, as do health officers and physicians; reasons for the breakdown of mechanical equipment such as tractors, buses and automobiles, as do the mechanics; marriage prospects, as do marriage counselors; child-bearing potential, as do physicians; social justice, as do the lawyers and judges; and, among many others, weather prospects, as do the meteorologists. There is nothing that is relevant to their constituency that these prophetic sages cannot explain upon with instant certitude. As the experts *emeriti* of Africa, these sages not only supplant the discredited diviner, but also singly outdo the whole range of Western experts combined, through the superiority of the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit to formally acquired knowledge. Hence where Prophetism is prevalent, the need for educated experts correspondingly declines; and where the latter are prevalent, the progress of Prophetism is considerably retarded.⁵²

The preceding analysis has demonstrated the pre-emptive parallelism of Prophetism in its struggle to outflank the epistemological foundations of Westernism. It now remains to deal with other more specific areas of competition between Prophetism and Western culture in Zimbabwe. The analysis that follows will show that the movement's essence is not religion, but culture, and that its target is not African traditional society, but the Westernism that has widely proliferated in the country.

Prophetism and Christian Missionism: the Theological Conceptualization of a National Culture

With its colorful sectarian uniforms and other appertunances, Prophetism is among the most active social movements in Zimbabwe today. Whatever the movement undertakes it clothes it with a religious umbrella, thereby making its followers look like the most dedicated of all the Christians in the country. They ostentatiously carry their Bibles almost everywhere they go and recite from Scripture even on the most irrelevant issues and occasions. They have many "religious" taboos, numerous prayer and fasting days, and they frown upon any non-religiosity. Singly or collectively, they sing and pray at busy crossroads, visible hilltops, and other conspicuous sites. They conduct their worship services with great elan but reserve their sharp acumen for theological attacks on the heretics, by which they mean any people who subscribe to Christianity as transmitted by the missionaries.⁵³

It is largely because of this apparent religiosity that they have been classified by many analysts as a Christian Church movement with the revivalist connotations approximating those of the storefront churches in the United States and elsewhere. In reality, however, such a view is rather simplistic and does serious injustice to an extremely sophisticated movement. Prophetism considers itself a crusade not so much against African paganism, as Sundkler implies, as against the Western corruption of the African. Hence its refusal to admit Caucasians to church membership. The movement's socio-cultural dimensions cannot be properly understood unless its professional religiosity is seen as a deliberately constructed antithesis to the Missionary activities in Zimbabwe. The religiosity is a reverse parallelism defined earlier in this critique in that Prophetism seemingly accepts Christianity, but interprets and affects it in a manner that is diametrically opposed to that of the missionaries. This puts the latter in a position of directional absurdity. Hence the contention of its members that they are the only true Christians and the missionaries are the anti-Christ.

In the realm of religion Prophetism challenges missionism at two levels: that of theoretical conceptualization, and that of practical culture. The movement's religiosity is so designed as to antithetically relate to Missionary Christianity at all the levels and aspects on which the latter operates as to effect reverse parallelism. For example, its church organization tolerates no universal inter-racial fellowship; rejects the Western types of church governance; has no buildings for worship, no tithes and offerings, no paid ministry, no theological seminaries, no books in non-African languages, no fine clothes or groomed postures as a requisite for attending church services, and no rigid doctrine.⁵⁴

Because it suspects him of using doctrinal authenticity to augment his own authority over the African, Prophetism pre-empts the missionary by claiming exclusive doctrinal orthodoxy.⁵⁵ And yet, just as in his everyday life the missionary frequently disregarded the Bible even as he preached from it, Prophetism similarly emancipates itself, socially and culturally, from the straight-jacket of the Scriptures even while it formally upholds them against pagan laxity and Missionary heresy. It does this through the series of eclectic strategies described below.

The first of these is *kurefura kairi*, which literally means "to reference twice" in addition to the initial source of the Biblical injunction one is asserting. This triple referencing, which is the first pre-condition for the movement's acceptance of any Biblical injunction, means that one must not only show that the Bible actually requires or prohibits a particular practice, but that one must also show two other conclusive references from the Bible, but not from the same book or prophet, which maintain the same point. Should one eventually achieve that—which is very doubtful—they will still reject the texts on the grounds that the original contexts of the references are different or on the basis that

they may be texts with which the white man has tampered. They however easily emancipate themselves from the triple reference requirement by means of two other eclectic strategies. In the first case, they claim to know the "lost" portions of Scriptures and therefore refer to them as a supplement to the Biblical sources that have survived European distortions. Secondly, they assert that inasmuch as Scriptures came out of Prophecy in ancient times, they can be supplemented by modern prophesying, a science over which they alone currently hold an exclusive monopoly. It is because of these Scriptural circumventions that no Christian theologian can cross theological swords with them. Reverend Brand is in fact correct in observing that "You simply cannot convince them of a different viewpoint," whereas Daneel is quite naive when he advises the missionaries to bridge the gap between them and the movement.⁵⁶

From the preceding it is apparent that the Prophetic sages of the Independent Churches merely want to discredit the missionary and his followers. They resort to Biblical theology only because that is the level at which the missionary conceptualizes his own mission in Africa. This makes it the level at which they can knock down the metaphysical foundations of his cultural imperialism. Prophetism has thus been able to condemn or justify just about anything it chooses to under cover of an eclectic interpretation of the Scriptures just as the missionary used to do as an ally of Western imperialism. More than any other movement, Prophetism appreciates the reality of a "civilizing" ingredient in missionary enterprises in Africa the end product of which is the black European.⁵⁷ But by showing that there is no contradiction between African traditional culture and the Word of God, Prophetism effectively blunts the Missionary's cultural imperialism while at the same time affirming the validity of the African way of life. That is why an African's conversion to Prophetism in Zimbabwe leads to self-pride and cultural arrogance even among the uneducated.⁵⁸

Prophetism and Formal Education

In Zimbabwe the opposition of Prophetism to formal education has been misconstrued by the movement's critics as a preference for ignorance to enlightenment when in fact the opposite is the case. Throughout the period of colonialism, African formal education has been largely an exclusive preserve of the missionaries who have benefited from government subsidies for the purpose.⁵⁹ Prophetism recognizes the affinity between Western sponsored education and the corresponding acculturation process. But far from being opposed to education, the Zionists and the Apostolics encourage functional literacy, but only in the vernaculars. But because they resent the alien cultural tinge, they frequently withdraw their children from school after the completion of the elementary grades and proceed to teach them a traditional trade instead. In this instance cultural nationalism is apparent in their outright rejection of formal education.

Spiritual Healing and the Struggle Against an Alien Wedge

Perhaps on no other issue has Prophetism been more frowned upon by both outsiders and the Westernized Africans than on its stand on medicine. The movement rejects all medicines, Western or African traditional, and relies on spiritual healing for the restoration of the health of its sick members. But what the critics fail to appreciate is that the ministry of healing, as the medical profession is often called in missionary circles, has greatly facilitated the Christianizing campaigns of most denominations as the indispensable "entering wage." It is therefore not surprising that Prophetism meets this challenge by rejecting all medical services. The African medicine men and diviners are also rejected because it is their inefficacy that draws attention to the missionary doctor as a better alternative.

For Prophetism spiritual healing is a weapon for effecting preemptive parallelism in competition with the West. Far from denying the need for efficient healing, the movement accepts the principle but substitutes a technique that appears superior to that of the West and at the same time enables the African to evade alien cultural imperialism. Sundkler maintains this spiritual healing represents a return to the traditional diviner, and yet the preceding shows that it is an outcome of cultural nationalism.⁶⁰ Hence its indisparability to all the Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe.

Prophetism and Materialism

Members of Prophetic movements in Zimbabwe have also been criticized for lacking an economic initiative especially as they are scarcely represented in the ranks of professional careers.⁶¹ But their actual position is quite consistent. They are opposed to wage labor under non-African employers, though they accept contract jobs from any source provided they can do them under their own supervision. Hence their prevalence in small contract jobs in the rural areas and in other independent trades in the cities. They resent the fact that materialism makes the African more dependent on the European who proceeds to exploit and humiliate him with wage drudgery.

Prophetism rejects Western materialism outright. Its members refuse to enter the modern economy except as independent buyers and sellers; they shun capitalism, individualism, and acquisitiveness. Their very definition of success and a good life precludes materialism. They work to sustain life but not to embellish it. If they are often criticized it is because their cultural nationalism is rarely appreciated by their detractors.

The Ideal Person: An Approach to Individual and Social Being

The cultural nationalism of Prophetism is also manifested in

the latter's concept of the ideal individual and social existence. On close examination this looks identical with the traditional version but far removed from the Western model. It is in this movement that the cult of the ordinary man still retains great vitality. Prophetism also holds to the traditional concept of beauty that is centered on character and personality (*tsika ne unhu*) rather than on physical appearance. They therefore frown upon self beautification, ornamentations, bodily exposure, artificial poise, and emphasis on gaudy clothing. Whereas the women usually wear long inexpensive uniforms that go down to the ankles, the men derive a rugged appearance from unshaven faces, shaven scalps, and the occasional wearing of *mwongoro* (cloths) instead of trousers. They encourage early marriages and rarely frown on polygamy. Far from being eccentric, they are in fact recreating the authentic traditional African that has been eroded by alien values.

Prophetism and its Prospects in Zimbabwe

The preceding analysis has conceptualized the socio-cultural nationalistic implications of Prophetism in Zimbabwe. It has accounted for the philosophical ideals that actuate the movement's dynamic relationships with other social forces. The analysis has also outlined the various strategies by which the movement asserts itself in its struggle for cultural supremacy. It now remains to assess its future and prospects in the context of the decline of colonialism and the rise of the nationalist state.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that colonialism is not so much afraid of cultural nationalism as it is of political nationalism. Colonialism is cultural nationalism *par excellence* and a response to it on that plane only reinforces its basic premise. A cultural nationalist creates a counter-culture as an alternative to overthrowing the oppressor culture, and in spite of his radicalism he tends to remain basically apolitical so long as he is allowed to function in his own make-believe separatist niche. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that cultural nationalism has at times been a precursor to political nationalism. On the other hand, a political nationalist seeks to abolish or take over the existing state machinery, depending on whether he is a radical or a moderate revolutionary. This explains the more than fifty years of *detente* between the oppressive colonial regime in Zimbabwe and Prophetism, a situation which Daneel erroneously attributes to the former's respect for religious freedom.⁶² Other instances of such seemingly incongruous alliances between colonial regimes and traditionalist elements against the Westernized elites are apparent in the history of South Africa, West Africa, Egypt, and India.

But as far as the Westernized African is concerned, Prophetism is as much a hindrance to his country's progress as is traditionalism. The Westernized African in Zimbabwe does not see himself as such, let alone as the Zionists, the Apostolics and the other traditionalists see him. He sees himself instead as progressing. He accepts many

Western ideas but tries to utilize them for his own advancement rather than exploitation, as is the case under the colonial regime. His conflict with the European therefore largely emanates from a conflict of interests. The possibility, if not the inevitability, of conflict therefore exists not so much between colonialism and Prophetism as between the latter and African political nationalism in the liberated Zimbabwe nationalist state. Whereas the colonial regime was willing to tolerate certain non-progressive tendencies of the cultural nationalism of Prophetism, such as rejection of formal education, refusal to enter the urban labor market, etc., the nationalist state with its "modernization" program is likely to be less tolerant. Hence the probability of conflict between a "backward-looking" cultural nationalism and a "forward-looking" political nationalism.⁶⁴ As happened to the Slavophiles in Russia, the former will lose out primarily because of their underestimation of the potential of political power for redefining the national culture. And yet, with its large numbers of followers the movement could also generate political instability by refusing to bridge the gap between "modernity" and traditionalism and thereby becoming an *imperium in imperio*.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

1. On the origins of Independent Church movement in South Africa, see Reverend Bengt, G.M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, 2nd ed. (London: O.U.P., 1961), pp. 38-64. All references on Sundkler, unless otherwise indicated, will be to this text. For the movement in Zimbabwe see Martin L. Daneel, *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*, I (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1971), pp. 285-385. References to Daneel, unless otherwise indicated, will be to this text. By "low profile" is here meant that the movements have stood outside the major conflicts of the region.
2. Father Urayai, an African Roman Catholic Church priest at Mutero, as quoted by Daneel, I, p. 443.
3. On the Afro-European political rivalry in Zimbabwe since 1890, see Terence O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967); Stanlake Samkange, *Origins of Rhodesia* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1969); Eshamel Mlambo, *Rhodesia, the Struggle for a Birthright* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1972); and Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, 1965).
4. Although the class thesis of Rhodesia has been considerably neglected, it has in fact been implied in most of the literature that deals with the land question, racial discrimination and the chiefs. Examples of some of this literature are Mlambo, *Rhodesia Struggle for Birthright*; G. Arrighi, *Political Economy of Rhodesia*

- A.K.H. Weinrich, *Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia*. For a considerably abstract approach, see William J. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa: Economic Development in a Dualistic Society* (London: O.U.P., 1961).
5. On the persistence of traditional religious beliefs see Daneel, I, pp. 17-184; Michael Gelfand *Shona Religion* (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1962), and his *Shona Ritual* (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1959); also Marshall Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona* (N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 15-59. All further reference on Murphree will be to this text.
 6. Studies of the activities of each denomination show the great concern about competition between missions for both converts and schools. See Daneel, I, pp. 210-230.
 7. Sundkler's analysis (*Bantu Prophets*, pp. 25-37) of relations between African and European Christian communicants in South Africa is excellent and also applies to Zimbabwe; and Reverend N. Sithole, *African Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: O.U.P., 1970), pp. 84-94. All references in Sithole will be to this text unless otherwise indicated.
 8. Conflict between Christian standards and African obligations arise on such issues as eligibility to chieftancy, an institution that often requires office holder to participate in pagan ceremonies; similarly, *kugarwa* or *kugarwa nhaka* may imply need to inherit a deceased relation's wife, or, in the case of a widow, to marry a deceased husband's kin.
 9. Daneel, I, pp. 233-43; Sithole, pp. 84-94; Sundkler, pp. 32-37.
 10. Daneel, I, p. 309.
 11. On Separatist or Ethiopian Churches, see Sundkler, pp. 38-64; Daneel, I, pp. 350-385.
 12. *Ibid.* Sundkler, pp. 354-374 for a list of about one thousand such churches in South Africa.
 13. Sundkler, pp. 53-5.
 14. Daneel, I, 285.
 15. T.O. Ranger, *African Voice in Southern Rhodesia* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 194-222; Daneel, *Zionism and Faith-Healing in Rhodesia: Aspects of African Independent Churches* (The Hague: Mouton, 1970). See also footnote 17 below.

16. On Christianity see Ram Desai, ed., *Christianity as seen by Africans* (Denver: Swallow Press, 1962), an excellent source; also Marx and Engels, *German Revolutions*; C.P. Groves, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa*, vols. I-IV (London: Lutterworth Press, 1948 and after); V.I. Lenin, *On Religion* (Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.); Ludwig Feuerbach, *Essence of Christianity*. On the reinterpretation of imperialism see, Harrison M. Wright, ed., *The "New Imperialism" -- An Analysis of Late 19th Century Expansion* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1961); Raymond F. Betts, *The "Scramble" for Africa Causes and Dimensions of Empire* (Mass: Heath, 1966); Lenin, *Imperialism, Highest Stage of Capitalism*; Robert O. Collins, ed., *Problems in the History of Colonial Africa, 1860-1960* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
17. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*; Murphres, *Christianity and the Shona*; Daneel, *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*; and Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed* (N.Y.: A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 3-62.
18. Sundkler, pp. 53-55.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 238-294. Other references on the theology of African religions are: John S. Mbiti, *Concepts of God in Africa* (London: S.P.C.K., 1970), and his *African Religions and Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1970); E. Bolaji Idowu, *African Traditional Religions* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973).
20. Sundkler, pp. 242-245 and 249. On spirits in African religions see also J. Beattie and John Middleton, ed., *Spirit Mediumship and Society in Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); W.C. Willoughby, *Soul of the Bantu* (Westport, Conn.: Negro University Press, 1970); and Charles Bullock, *The Mashona* (Negro University Press, 1970).
21. Sundkler, pp. 253-59 and 262-63. For a similar phenomenon in Zimbabwe see Michael Gelfand, *The African Witch* (E. & S. Livinstone, Edinburgh, 1967); also his *Medicine and Magic of the Mashona* (Cape Town, Juta and Co., 1956).
22. Sundkler, pp. 95-97.
23. *Christianity and the Shona* (N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1969).
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3
25. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
27. Daneel, *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*, vol. I (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1971).

28. *Ibid.*
29. Daneel, I, p. 451.
30. Sundkler, p. 242.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 297. Under "Zionism" Sundkler includes all Prophetic movements. See also his "New Wine in Old Wineskins," pp. 238-294. That Christian churches lose members to Prophetic movements, and not vice-versa, is a recognized fact and strongly supports Sundkler's thesis as opposed to Daneel's.
32. Sundkler, pp. 259-260.
33. Daneel, I, p. 450.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 447.
35. Sundkler, p. 93.
36. Murphree, p. 12.
37. Daneel, I, p. 448. "Separatism" is Daneel's equivalent for Sundkler's "Ethiopianism."
38. Daneel, I, p. 437. On the history of the relationship of Prophecy to government and traditional authorities, see his "Conflict and Recognition," pp. 386-438.
39. Reverend Brand of Alheit Mission as quoted in Daneel, I, 441-42. See also comments by Reverend Shiri to the same effect, p. 441-2.
40. Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed* (N.Y.: A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 3-62.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
43. These African nationalist leaders, among others, had a Christian upbringing and/or education: K. Kaunda, J. Nkomo, B. Muzorewa, N. Sithole, H. Chitepo, K. Nkrumah, P. Lumumba, T. Mboya, J. Nyerere, etc. On role of the Christian Church in Africa see Sithole, pp. 84-94; C.G. Baeta, ed., *Christianity in Tropical Africa* (London: O.U.P., 1968); Noel King, *Christian and Muslim in Africa* (N.Y.: Harper, 1971); Ram Desai, ed., *Christianity in Africa as seen by Africans*.

44. On the Marxian thesis of religion see Marx and Engels, *On Religion*; Lenin, *On Religion*; Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (London: Heinemann, 1964).
45. Sundkler, p. 67.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
47. *Ibid.*, p.
48. On relationship of Government and Prophetism in South Africa see Sundkler, pp. 65-79; on Zimbabwe see Daneel, I, pp. 386-438. The most serious incident in South Africa involved the death of 117 people when government tried to force Enoch Mjji "Israelite" colony out of a camp site in 1921. Arrests of leaders on minor charges occurred in Rhodesia but the movements were not outlawed.
49. Monica Wilson, *Religion and the Transformation of Society: A Study in Social Change in Africa* (London: Cambridge, 1971).
50. A.K.H. Weinrich, *Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia* (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina University Press, 1971). This text deals with the transformation of Rhodesian African society from traditional to modern forms. See also Michael T. Kaufman "Rhodesia's Blacks Have No Time to Hate," *N.Y. Times*, Sunday (April 4, 1976), p. 2E.
51. On conflict between Western and indigenous ideas in 19th century Russia see Nicolas Berdyaev, *Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1964), "Slavophilism and Westernization," pp. 19-36; also Marc Ræff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia* (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), "The Impact of Western Ideas," pp. 148-171; and Leopold H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Boston: Beacon, 1955), pp. 3-25.
52. Examples of prevalence of Prophetism in less Westernized areas are Maranke, Bikita, Sinoia, and the remoter South. See also Sundkler, pp. 93-99.
53. Sundkler, pp. 60-64; and 180-237.
54. Daneel, I, 46-62; Mutendi's Zion City is a rare exception in that a permanent site with church buildings exists (See Daneel *Zionism and Faith-Healing*, pp. 27-35); Sundkler, pp. 100-179; Murphree, 92-110.
55. Sundkler points out that even the choice of each church's name reflects the claim for exclusive orthodoxy.

56. Daneel, I, pp. 442-43.
57. Ram Desai, ed., *Christianity in Africa as seen by the Africans* (Denver: Swallow Press, 1962). This is an excellent book on the proximity of Missionaries to colonialism. See 11-36, and Sithole's critique of Schweitzer, pp. 103-108 of same.
58. The fact that members of Prophetic churches consider Mission Church members as "lost" is proof of their elevated concept of themselves.
59. The exclusion of Prophetism from opening schools is discussed in Daneel, I, as is the centrality of education to Missionary campaigns, pp. 210-230.
60. On role of healing in Prophetic movements see Sundkler, pp. 180-237; Daneel, *Zionism and Faith-Healing in Southern Rhodesia*; for its role in Missionary activities see Daneel, I, pp. 230-33.
61. In 1948 Mr. Makuwaza and Mr. Chitope were deprived of their farms in the Zwiyambe African Purchase Area on the grounds that as Zionists they were not sufficiently enterprising.
62. Daneel, I, pp. 393-430.
63. See "Indirect Rule in Theory and Practice," in pp. 83-160 of Collins, ed., *Problems in the History of Colonial Africa, 1860-1960*; particularly Low and Pratt's "British Colonial Policy and Tribal Rulers," pp. 150-160 of same.

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Igbo Folk-tale: *OKUKU'S CHICK*