

## HOMeward BOUND?

### A SURVEY STUDY OF THE LIMITS OF WHITE

### RHODESIAN NATIONALISM AND PERMANENCE\*

by

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#### Introduction

This study proposes to inquire into the limits of the white Rhodesian commitment to remain in Zimbabwe. With the experience of various other European settler societies in mind, e.g. at one end the United States, Canada and Australia; at the other such short-lived entities as French Algeria and British Kenya; I organized an interview approach in an attempt to find out where the white Rhodesian has come from; what has happened to him (or her) in the process; and to where he is going. This final question looms largest in the face of rapid change in Southern Africa in general and in Rhodesia in particular. Although these questions were asked in the relatively quiescent period of 1968-69, their relevance in early 1975 is clear. If the Republic of South Africa relaxes its steadfast support of the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, will Smith's relatively little band of followers pack it in? The data presented here ought to go far in suggesting the possible directions which will be pursued by white Rhodesians when faced with "going it alone".

I have done a comparative survey with one sample derived from Rhodesian Front "middle-level" leadership and the other sample taken from white urban-dwellers in Salisbury municipality. The R.F. group was selected as the core of the ruling participant/elite while the Salisbury urban-dwellers were chosen for reasons of electoral representativeness and population density. The R.F. activist group comprised 113 divisional, constituency, and branch chairmen (out of a possible 166). Thirty-eight were given long interviews while 75 returned mail questionnaires. The 38 interviewees represented each of the six divisional areas --Salisbury East; Salisbury West; Matabeleland; Mashonaland

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Rural; and Manicaland, and Midlands. This type of population was not sufficiently large for random selection procedures and so I strove instead for maximal respondent distribution in the six divisions.

The 100 Salisbury urban-dwellers were a sub-sample selected from a previous sample of households (with household heads listed) compiled by the Rhodesian Central Statistics Office. With 1200 names on the original sample, every sixth name was selected (providing 200 total respondents--100 designated as primary subjects and 100 as secondary--alternate--ones). The household heads tended to be males although questionnaires were submitted to the adult person answering the door if possible. The Central Statistics Office sample included household heads from the following areas inside Salisbury: Mabelreign, Central Salisbury, Eastlea, Southerton, Hatfield, Waterfall, and Hillside/Queensdale.

Previous surveys of white Rhodesians have not explicitly delved into their own sense of cultural separateness and "national" commitment. Rogers and Frantz,<sup>1</sup> and McEwan,<sup>2</sup> did inquire into the question perhaps indirectly from the perspective of ethnicity. Rogers and Frantz in 1958 found that while 61% of their white Rhodesian sample identified themselves as "English", only 1% declared themselves Rhodesian. But McEwan discovered, about eighteen months later, that only 38% "felt British", while precisely the same percentage now "felt Rhodesian." These percentages in themselves might not be regarded as significant and indeed, there are possible problems of validity. But we can begin to sense in these responses the relevance of national commitment in a social group whose size and length of residency would not seem to raise this question.

These two studies, however, preceded the emergence of the Rhodesian Front to power in the General Election of 1962. By 1965 the RF were consolidating their position and swept all fifty Ordinary Roll seats in that election. Stephen Hintz carried out a survey of over 300 white Rhodesians during that year and ascertained the widespread support for the RF from every sector of the white population.<sup>3</sup> His study further reveals the political ascendancy of race as the salient issue amongst the white electorate. His inference from this datum is that it was solely this issue of race which has characterized the ostensible transformation of Rhodesian politics.

The problem with this conclusion is that it tends to ignore the concomitant emergence of the "national" issue in the RF

ascendancy to, and consolidation of, power. The elements of race and nation are inseparable in many societies which have developed along specific lines. These traits are particularly apparent in societies which have developed from British colonialism. Hence, it might be hypothesized that in these kinds of societies, the concept of nationhood will be culturally defined, and that therefore national consciousness by the colonizing population will be correlated with the emergence of the "race" issue. However, the race issue did not play so great a role in the long reign (1932-62) of the centrist-paternalist United Party mainly because the UP leadership had communicated to the white electorate early on its own commitment to the issue. This is evinced in Prime Minister Huggins' explicit promise to preserve the "white island in a sea of black."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, I prefer to hold the racial issue constant in developing an inquiry into the issues of commitment to nation and permanency of residence by the white Rhodesian population.

#### The Fragment Concept

One recent formulation has been addressed directly to the settlement experience of which Rhodesia might be considered an empirical case. Louis Hartz' notion of the "fragment society" embraces those contemporary social/political entities which were settled by "fragments" of other, for the most part European, societies of national existence. Those settlements remained mere colonial extensions of the European homeland, i.e. they never quite "made it" as separate and independent nation-states, but have nevertheless possessed some of the characteristics of the "true" fragment societies. These imperial settlements have, within this schema, been labelled quasi-fragments in reference to their apparent inability to develop the basis of independent national existence. Of course, there are evident social variables which help to explain this status of societal insufficiency. In nearly every case the fundamental impediment refers to those indigenous peoples who are inhabiting the land at the time of the settlers' occupation or indeed may even include other peoples who may have arrived after the first European residents. From this historical angle, Kenya and Algeria perhaps come closest to fulfilling a quasi-fragment definition, although several other European colonial settlements in Africa and Asia may be included in this category.<sup>8</sup>

The difficulty with this format, as with so many others in social sciences, is that it lacks an empirical base. The criteria and data used to develop this theoretical framework are borrowed rather selectively from existing historical works. No attempt has been made, or even suggested, to apply more

systematic and empirical methods in testing some of the assumptions of this conceptual inference. Hence, Rhodesia invites inquiry from this perspective. It might be hypothesized at this point that white Rhodesians claim "fragment status" in their proclamation of UDI, while their small number and recency in settlement would only suggest the outline of an imperial quasi-fragment.

With no specific guidelines for empirical inquiry into the fragment hypotheses, one is compelled to derive inferences from the framework and then manufacture specific questions to put to "members of the fragment" in quantitative or qualitative form.<sup>9</sup> The responses from these questions have allowed us to generate eleven primary inferences which should be stated as firm hypotheses open to further inquiry and testing. These findings and hypotheses are presented here with the idea of fragment "source" and residential "permanence" in mind.

#### Birth Patterns: The South African Bias in the Rhodesian Front

Table 1 reveals that nearly 60% of the RF sample were of southern African birth while only 26.5% were British-born. Of this 60%, nearly 33% were South African-born. Only 27.4% of these activists were born in Southern Rhodesia, while the 1969 Rhodesian Census shows that 39.5% of the total settler population were Rhodesian-born. However, this latter percentage includes Rhodesian-born children who, of course, were not included in either of the sample groups under analysis. Nevertheless, it would appear that South African birth patterns amongst the RF activists is discernibly higher than that of the white population as a whole, even when taking into account the natural increase factor.

The Salisbury urban-dweller sample, in contrast, consists of higher proportion of British-born residents indicating perhaps the influx of British immigrants into Salisbury and other Rhodesian towns after World War II. Comparative percentages of birth in other countries (other than Rhodesia, South Africa and Great Britain) appear about equal in the two groups.

The South African bias amongst currently mobilized activists in the dominant white sector suggests that this fragment is linked to another contiguous fragment rather than to a European sourceland (in this case the United Kingdom),<sup>10</sup> Rhodesia is still no more than three generations old and the persistence of South African white settler leadership is characteristic.<sup>11</sup>

### The South African Matriline Hypothesis

A fragment society is more vividly shaped by its cultural lines than the traditionally established societies (e.g. the European "homelands"). In Rhodesia these lines can be perceived fairly readily since the settler society itself does not extend beyond three generations. Indeed in this case, with such extensive recent settlement, it is sufficient to descend merely one generation. Thus the fathers' and mothers' countries of origin are appropriate indicators of cultural descent. Table 2 portrays predominantly British birth amongst a slight majority of the fathers of the RF middle-level chairmen. Nevertheless, nearly one-third of this group's fathers were born in South Africa. The Salisbury urban-dweller sample reveals similar patterns in fathers' countries of birth, except for the 7.5% increase amongst those born outside of Great Britain or Southern Africa.

More significant though, are the mothers of the RF activists. While over half of the RF chairmen's fathers were UK-born, only 39.8% of their mothers were born there. On the other hand, an identical percentage (39.8%) of RF activist mothers were born in South Africa (as opposed to 30.1% of the fathers being South African-born).

This ostensibly solid connexion to the South African fragments configuration is thrown into even greater relief when broken down into respondents' and mothers' countries of birth and then cross-tabulated as in Table 3. While 61.3% of the mothers of those RF activists born in Southern Rhodesia are of South African birth, only 48.4% of the activists' fathers were so born. These same respondents indicate the opposite propensity regarding the British birth of their parents. While 35.5% of the Rhodesian-born activists fathers were born in the U.K., only 12.9% of their mothers were. This same pattern persists with the South African-born RF activists: 70.3% of their mothers were also born in South Africa, while 51.4% of their fathers were so born, with the bulk of the remainder born in Great Britain. Since the Southern Rhodesian and South African-born respondents comprise 60.1% of the RF chairment surveyed, it can be inferred that these are meaningful data. There is a definite propensity for the RF activists to have been sired by British-born fathers but South African-born mothers.<sup>12</sup> Thus there is a tendency toward South African-rootedness in the matriline. RF activists tended to be the offspring of British immigrants and British South African or even, in a few cases, Afrikaner women.

### The Secular Religion Hypothesis

Lack of religious commitment can sometimes be construed in terms of preferred commitment to secular values. One of the cited dimensions of twentieth-century nationalism has been the emergence of a "political/secular religion."<sup>13</sup> If this tendency can be empirically verified, then an inference might be drawn that an aspect of nationalism would be a diminution of religious commitment, rather than religious identity so stated.

Table 4 does not reveal any significant difference in religious preference between the Salisbury urban-dwellers and RF activists except that the former contains a higher proportion of Roman Catholics and a lower proportion of South African Dutch Reform. But the overwhelming lack of commitment in both groups, expressed in such phrases as "I'm Anglican (or Catholic or whatever) but...", is salient and indicative of the preference for other values--perhaps secular/political amongst the activists while secular/materialist amongst the urban-dweller (see Table 5). Although there are no cross-tabulation between religious preference and intensity, it might be safe to assume qualitatively, that South African Dutch Reform and Greek Orthodox were most committed to their religious preferences. In any event we might infer that RF defense of "Christian values" is secular and political commitment relating to the white settler ethos rather than being a religious proclamation.

### Emigration Motives

More British-born RF activists emigrated to Rhodesia because of "intolerable or unacceptable conditions" in their home country than was the case with the South African-born activists (obviously Rhodesian-born respondents were not relevant here.) On the other hand, the reverse ratio is in evidence regarding the reason "knowing it was a place where a European could thrive." Implicit in this latter statement is an awareness of favourable conditions for whites vis-avis Africans--something that South Africans were in a better position to know. Also implicit in this response is an awareness of increased economic advantage when they responded to the word "thrive." The sophistication of South African-born immigrants would seem to fit into the Rhodesian tradition of relying upon British South African social, political, and environmental expertise for continuity in culture and leadership.

### The "Birds of Passage" Hypothesis

Not only might this type of data portray high mobility patterns, but critical experiences such as those in the British

colonies of southern, eastern, and central Africa could lend credence to assumed linkages with the fragment pattern.

Table 7 demonstrates that both RF activists and the urban-dweller sample have had extensive intermediate experience in "other African" territories or even Britain, though the random sample from Salisbury indicates a greater tendency to have lived and worked in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>15</sup> These data would suggest an inter-colonial white settler residential pattern amongst the surveyed groups. This syndrome of mobility would indicate that there is a linkage amongst white settlers in Africa based on the British imperial presence there and the South African colonial (fragment) keystone. These propensities toward mobility further suggest a tendency to move on to "greener pastures" when conditions become unacceptable in the one setting or appear more attractive in another. This pattern reflects the pervasiveness of the imperial "quasi-fragment" socialization pattern.<sup>16</sup>

#### The "Power and Privilege" Hypothesis

Our data reveal a tendency amongst the RF activists toward the "managerial and executive" level while the urban-dwellers show a clustering in the "skilled manual" grade.<sup>17</sup> Nearly 70% of the RF chairmen presently claim occupational roles in the two highest categories. The urban-dweller sample, on the other hand, demonstrated no increase in the two highest grades when compared with their earliest occupational level. A dynamic analysis reveals a stunning rise in occupational level by the RF activists. Whether this was a cause or consequence of their political activism is not clear by inference. But there is no question of correlation in that nearly 27% of the activists were in the two highest levels in their earliest occupational roles in Rhodesia, while over 70% were at these levels during the period of political ascendancy. The Salisbury urban sample did not display such a leap, but they also tended to have not been Rhodesian-born nor to have immigrated quite as early. Although it is only correlational, it would appear that RF cadres have achieved occupational mobility along with political ascendancy and that this might induce them to greater intensity of commitment to the existing power structure. Since their economic interests are more clearly internal to Rhodesia, then that commitment might more clearly resemble that of other fragment structures.

#### Concept of the "True Rhodesian"

This variable helps generate inferences regarding the respondents' own conception of a "Rhodesian" as distinct from other nationalities, and also tries to determine whether the

qualities assessed to this ideal type are political or social, positive or negative. The respondents were asked to answer in rank order.

Both sample groups place highest consideration on the political trait of "putting Rhodesia first." It is interesting to note that this characteristic is an action rather than a cultural tendency. It is as though the commitment to White Rhodesia, above all other allegiances, is the maximal national quality. About 40% of the RF activists and 34% of the Salisbury urban-dwellers placed this quality first. The RF group tended to rate fair-mindedness and anti-Communism as second choices, while the urban-dwellers also placed anti-Communism second. Both groups ranked the relatively (politically) neutral characteristic of "loving the outdoors" as a third choice.

The transformational aspects of the European political consciousness are inferred from these data. "Putting Rhodesia first" virtually acclaims the "coming of age" of a Rhodesian fragment vis-avis perceived British authority over a tentative imperial quasi-fragment. This little band of settlers tend to believe that a unified national proclamation is the necessary condition for their own independent existence and privileged control of the predominantly African population. The respondents' second and third choices reflect the virtual absence of any identifiable unique cultural traits. Indeed there are clearly tautological elements in defining a "true Rhodesian" as one who "puts Rhodesia first." It is at this point that the proclaimed Rhodesian fragment begins to expose its own contradictions.<sup>18</sup>

#### The UDI Equals Nationhood

Although the preponderance of respondents in both groups surveyed viewed 1965 and/or the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as the "moment of nationhood", there was, nevertheless sufficient diversity in responses to warrant more elaborate analysis. While a much greater proportion of the RF activists than urban-dwellers regard the UDI as the moment in which Rhodesia achieved nationhood, there was a more sizeable inclination among the urban-dwellers than amongst the RF chairmen to regard Self-Government in 1923 as the critical point in the history of Rhodesia. Perhaps the activists were more involved in their own propaganda, thus, they felt greater compulsion to link their own proclamation to that of "the nation". Indeed this would indicate a propensity on the part of the RF respondents to identify nationhood with their own rule.

It would appear significant, though, that 18 respondents from each group, which in percentage terms (25.7%) is sizeable for the Salisbury urban-dwellers, do not yet see Rhodesia as a nation.

Here is a list of some of the more frequent conditions which each group sets for the future attainment of such nationhood.

RF Activists:

- 1) Achievement of republican status--3
- 2) When a majority of Europeans are Rhodesian born or when most civil service positions are held by those Rhodesian-born--3
- 3) With national recognition--3
- 4) When independent of Britain and other countries--2
- 5) When settlement with Britain is reached and/or sanctions are lifted--2

Salisbury Sample

- 1) Achievement of republican status--3
- 2) When all inhabitants regard themselves as Rhodesians--2
- 3) When settlement is reached and/or sanctions are lifted--2
- 4) With international recognition--2

There is basic agreement between those in each survey group who did not yet (at least in 1969) believe that Rhodesia was a nation. For some of them--three in each group--the achievement of republican status, officially achieved in June, 1969, should have been sufficient for them to acknowledge Rhodesian nationhood. Others look to a settlement with Britain, the lifting of sanctions, or international recognition as crucial to the attainment of nationhood. These people take a more externalized view of Rhodesia as a nation-state in an international system of states. Finally, there are those who see either the achievement of political/economic domination by Rhodesian-born Europeans<sup>19</sup> or an almost opposite perception, the acknowledgement of all Rhodesians, Black and White, that they are Rhodesians. In the end, though, approximately 83% of the RF activists and 74% of the Salisbury sample regard Rhodesia as a nation, however difficult that concept may be perceived or defined by them. But the sizeable minority of dissenters reflects self-conscious doubt regarding overall white Rhodesian acceptance of that perception.

Preferred Political Form

This variable is significant in that it indicates the conception that the respondent has of Rhodesia as a political unit and in its relationship with other states. Preference for an independent republic would be expected of an RF activist, but the South African heritage and experience could furnish another alternative for those who cannot see white settler Rhodesia as

capable of political independence.

There is an apparent diversity of choices amongst the Salisbury urban-dwellers while the RF activists show an overwhelming inclination to opt for an independent republic. It is interesting to note, though, that nearly one-fourth of the activists would prefer a formal confederation with South Africa, although this might reflect the specific orientation of Afrikaner RF activists. Over one-third of the urban-dwellers would prefer continuation of the British connexion through Dominion status, thus indicating some possible popular pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate a settlement with Britain (in maximizing internal legitimacy for that regime amongst the white population). Since the RF middle-level personnel do not display such enthusiasm, the Rhodesian leaders might be under even more pronounced counter-pressure to not pursue such a settlement with undue zeal, especially under conditions which might enfeeble the activists' perceived national independence.

By cross-tabulating with country of birth other interesting patterns emerge. The Rhodesian-born RF activists predominantly support an independent republic but with over one-fourth opting for confederation with South Africa. But the Rhodesian-born amongst the urban-dwellers show diversified views with less than half advocating an independent republic. The South African-born respondents in each group were closer together in their support of an independent republic. Of the views of the British-born, the RF activists supported an independent republic (like the southern African-born respondents). But the British-born in the Salisbury random sample group preferred dominion status to an independent republic by a margin of 8.1% (and this same tendency was evinced by the urban-dwellers born in other countries than Great Britain, South Africa, or Rhodesia). Hence, the general inclination of the activists was to support independent republic status. Their express nationalism stimulates a seemingly less anxious, though willing, white public; and their moderate affinity for confederation with the Republic of South Africa leaves this a possibility to consider.

#### Limits of Commitment to a "Rhodesian Nation"

National survival depends fundamentally on the commitment of citizens to the existence and perpetuity of the nation. Relative size and strength are not the sole factors in differentiating between a fragment and a quasi-fragment: the national commitment of the members of a fragment is a basic foundation for its survival, especially when confronted by the vast numerical superiority of the indigenous population.

The consideration to leave Rhodesia and go elsewhere at any given time looms as a critical indicator for the nature of the political commitment. In gross terms, 54% of the RF said that they had never considered leaving Rhodesia (before 1969), while 42.5% admitted that they had. Consideration to leave was not so high amongst the urban-dwellers.

Fear of a white, perceived-as-liberal, "sellout" government motivated over one-third of the RF activists to consider leaving Rhodesia at some time. An extension of this fear, the development of conditions for an "African takeover," stimulated another 30%. Political considerations thus influenced nearly three-fourths of the RF activists who had pondered departure from Rhodesia.

In terms of the year in which departure might be considered, there was overwhelming selection of the years 1961 and 1962 when the Whitehead Constitution was approved and his United Federal Party appeared certain of obtaining a majority of seats (in the 1962 General Elections). Whitehead appeared to arouse as much enmity as Todd amongst the activists with Welensky running slightly behind them. At any rate, 31 of the 48 activists (64.7%) who have considered emigration from Rhodesia entertained such notions during this period.

One of the problems with the preceding variable is that it does not indicate what might effect departure amongst those who have heretofore not actually considered leaving. The preceding questions refers to changes which have, or might have, taken place in the past. But the foregoing variable raises the question of altered conditions in the future, perhaps even more relevant for assessing the level of commitment.

The disparity between the responses of the two survey groups (as seen in Table 15) would appear significant. While a vast majority of the activists (70.4%) would leave Rhodesia with the eventuality of threat of African majority government, only 44.8% of the Salisbury urban-dwellers feel similarly, although it cannot be inferred that this group are necessarily more tolerant. Also rather interesting is the fact that over one-fourth of the Salisbury sample indicated that they would remain in Rhodesia under *any conditions* in contrast to the 8.3% of the RF activists who were so committed. Those responding in this way usually identified their commitment in terms of "staying and fighting."

By country of birth, there is a propensity for South African-born activists to be somewhat more prepared to leave Rhodesia with the appearance of even a "white, liberal" government (18.9%). At the same time, the South African-born RF chairmen also show

greater inclination to stick it out at all costs (13.5%) than those born elsewhere (including Southern Rhodesia). It would seem then that the opinions of the South African-born activists tend to characterize the RF group as a whole, inasmuch as they see Rhodesia in the context of greater South Africa. The next variable under analysis further develops this inference.

#### Country of Choice (For Residence) if Leaving Rhodesia

If any doubt still exists regarding the links of the Rhodesian white population to South Africa, the responses to this question should dispel them. With 87 responses amongst the RF activists, 86.2% stated preference for South Africa as their destination of choice if they were to leave Rhodesia. Sixty-nine of the Salisbury urban-dwellers expressed relevant responses here, and 60.9% of them identified the Republic of South Africa as their country of choice, given a decision to emigrate from Rhodesia. 13.0% of these urban-dwellers would return to the United Kingdom, while 9.1% of the activists stated as their choice for emigration another fragment, e.g. Australia, Canada U.S.A., New Zealand.

In light of the distinction which I made earlier between fragments and quasi-fragments, the quasi-fragment character of white Rhodesian society begins to form. Although the Rhodesian whites are not the least inclined to return to Britain (indeed because so many are only culturally, and not natively, related British political and social traditions), they do see the Republic of South Africa as a homeland. Perhaps this might be due to the similarity of social conditions and the perceived effectiveness of the policies used by South African whites (particularly Afrikaners) to maintain that social structure. Like the British (i.e. English speaking) South Africans, Rhodesian whites (almost totally English speaking) appear ready to subordinate their own cultural traditions to another European fragment which has effectively maintained its domination over an increasingly threatened indigenous population.

#### Theoretical Conclusions: the Concept of a Rhodesian Fragment

There can be little doubt that Rhodesian whites do see themselves as a distinct community. There is also every indication that the current political leadership (i.e. the RF activists) regard this community as "naturally dominant" and therefore impatiently disposed to the establishment of a Rhodesian "nation" under such dominant conditions. The white urban-dwellers of Salisbury overall do not reflect any aversion to this orientation. However, when confronted with the task of identifying the characteristic

of their own nationhood (the qualities of the "true Rhodesian", and the year and/or event marking attainment), ambiguity and tautology tend to cloud their perceptions. Thus a "true Rhodesian" is "one who puts Rhodesia first" and Rhodesia became a nation when it declared itself a nation (UDI).

These ambiguities and contradictions tend to trigger a shift in focus. If in fact the white Rhodesians cannot identify their own cultural traits, then to whom can they turn? We did not expect any great stirring of British patriotism, particularly amongst the RF activists, but there was a glimmering of sentiment toward the Republic of South Africa. While not expressing outright the advocacy to power of the Afrikaner fragment in South Africa (except perhaps amongst Rhodesian Afrikaners), there was the sense of dependency upon a "friendly giant" to the south who indubitably shared the same conditions and problems as Rhodesian Europeans. Further, the evident bias in birth patterns--especially in parentage--toward South Africa, suggests a closer examination of an hypothesis positing South Africa, rather than Britain, as the cultural/political (fragment) homeland.

The British involvement, of course, is indirect at best and our survey exposes this datum. Recent writings, though, have revealed the paucity of British authority over and constraints upon white Rhodesians from the inception of colonization.<sup>21</sup> There have been continual expectations by the settlers that they would be the heirs to a tradition whereby the British imperial authorities devolved power upon their loyal kith and kin. That this policy was already operative in the Union of South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War only served to heighten this anticipation. Thus the South African experience (and contiguity) pervasively distinguishes the Rhodesian experience from the Kenyan one. In any event, the British position, though legally authoritative, has not been clear-cut, and the white Rhodesians have subsequently acquired a British cultural consciousness without an accompanying sense of political subordination. Today the British impact is primarily catalytic and her actual role in Rhodesian affairs appears mainly symbolic to all other actors involved. Few white Rhodesians today envisage any sort of future Rhodesian connexion to Britain. The survey indicates that most are no longer considering seriously the prospect of a Rhodesian dominion status.

Nevertheless, Rhodesian fragment options for independence and sovereignty are severely limited. The elements of recency of settlement and unfavourable relative size would appear as meaningful obstacles to the sort of autonomy enjoyed by other British colonial off-shoot, e.g. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. With a population ration of one European to 23 Africans

the whites are far from even the Algerian configuration of one colon to approximately ten "natives". Given the outcome of the latter colonial situation, Rhodesian whites cannot rest comfortably for the long run. Their propensity to have considered leaving Rhodesia in the past and to continue to speculate about departing in the future would appear to furnish evidence that they are in fact quite well aware of their own problematic prospects. Their further proclivity to look to the south puts their uncertainty into a cultural framework which suggests a real dependency upon the Afrikaner fragment--who it might be assumed would "stay on and fight" much longer than our Rhodesian respondents.

Although other works have clearly revealed Rhodesian economic dependency upon South Africa, this survey clearly illuminates attitudinal dependency on the part of the Rhodesian European population. Elements of cultural origin, especially birth patterns, as well as similarity in socioeconomic/cultural structure help create this asymmetrical link. But it is the saliency of this link which is most significant. White Rhodesians are immersed in the Republic of South Africa: in their economic and military dependence, and, as we have seen from our data here, their political attitudes, perceptions, and conceptions. Our subjects might tend to see Rhodesia as a nation in the wake of UDI, but a glimpse toward the future reveals a sense of subordinate nation to Afrikaner actions and intentions.<sup>22</sup> White Rhodesians thus see their nation as contingent upon Afrikaner commitment to them. In the end they do accept their quasi-fragment status, with a South African orientation.<sup>23</sup> If they are "citizens," it is within a greater community of southern Africa in very much different terms than the colons of Algeria saw France.

#### Strategic Conclusions: Inferences Regarding Political Direct

Our data permit limited inferences regarding options of political action by the major actors involved in the Rhodesian conflict.

Great Britain's imperatives have inclined to a holding action since the small community of white Rhodesians opted for Responsible Government in 1923.<sup>24</sup> Currently the British attempt to slap white hands through a policy of international sanctions have not been overly successful,<sup>25</sup> while the efforts of the Conservative Government in 1972 to rid Britain of her legal obligations to the whole Rhodesian population (the Smith-Home Agreement) foundered upon the rocks of the Pearce Commission enquiry. The range of British options decreases as the existing impasse is prolonged. With so little white Rhodesian opinion oriented toward Great Britain, British officials are limited

a continued policy of attempting to discourage open hostilities between Africans and whites, mollifying the antipathy of their erstwhile "kith and kin" in Rhodesia (by now a shopworn and ineffective policy, especially when taking the fragment factor into account), and perhaps dampening the enthusiasm of any prospective British emigrants to Rhodesia (but Britain has never been a primary source of immigrants anyway). It would appear that most Rhodesians' regard for Britain is intermediary, as their ultimate concern is with the direction of the United States' policy. Since American policy heretofore has generally followed that of Great Britain (with the notable exception of the American decision to disregard sanctions with respect to purchasing Rhodesian chrome in 1972), the Rhodesians have attempted to reach some sort of settlement with the British. Britain has become increasingly aware of this new imperative in white Rhodesian calculations and recently has begun to exploit it.

The South African (Republics') involvement in Rhodesian strategic considerations is much greater, if not permanent. The South African regime is aware of the increasing degree of Rhodesian dependency upon them, and so they feel they ought to possess greater control over Rhodesian policies and actions. In fact they are often embarrassed by the Rhodesian Front decision-makers who at times try to act "more Catholic than the Pope" in their emulation of South African policy orientations. White Rhodesian militancy often stirs international opposition to the power position of the white South African regime and therefore inhibits South Africa's own policy options. Hence, Vorster and his followers are now inclined to play down at the formal level the inextricable links between the whites in both countries. At the same time, South Africa requires a quiescent Rhodesia for its own policy purposes. A successful guerrilla movement inside of Rhodesia with a hundred thousand or more Europeans scurrying across the Limpopo into South Africa is not a desirable South African policy objective. Hence, the likelihood (especially with Mozambique and Angola tabled for "full" independence by the end of 1975) is for the South Africans to place maximum pressure on Smith to arrange a mutually satisfactory formal solution to the conflict. However, Vorster must perform this delicate operation while at the same time effectively communicating to his own electorate that it is in the prime interest of white power and privilege (in South Africa) to push Rhodesian whites in this direction.

White Rhodesian options, under these conditions, are not numerous. As long as the RF regime wishes to hold on, they are compelled to provide a comfortable, privileged existence for the white population while repressing the increasing threat of African invasions (externally) and uprisings (internally). The

former goal is inhibited by the precarious Rhodesian economic condition while the latter is shackled by the gradual diminution of Rhodesian military strength vis-a-vis African guerrilla military capability. White Rhodesian morale must thus constantly be boosted by propaganda reminding them that the war is being fought on a "far-off front" and by news of "showpiece" victories i.e. mass captures, killings of guerrillas, the "pacification" of border villages, or even mass executions. The regime can be expected to maintain a fine line between studied vigilance and confident expectations. Ultimately there must be every avoidance of any significant emigration of the European population and the maximal effort to attract white immigrants. This latter task has continually posed a dilemma for Rhodesian officials as they would prefer to maintain their cultural traditions, e.g. the English language, while at the same time they must make every attempt to boost the European population in the face of a breakaway increase in the African birthrate. And then they are confronted with the task of recruiting for white troops amongst their own population. This prospect hardly attracts immigrants so that the regime has been forced to depend increasingly upon the command of South African troops on the one hand, and the deployment of Rhodesian African troops on the other.

African options must be distinguished between those external to Zimbabwe, i.e. the guerrillas, and those living inside the country. Having learned by now that the Rhodesian question was generically different from those of other "quasi-fragments", e.g. Kenya and Zambia, the Zimbabwean action units are now aware that Rhodesia has perhaps more in common with the structure of the Algerian struggle than with the Ghanaian one. And not only military action and bloodshed are required, but the mapping out of effective organization and strategy. Unlike the Algerian conflict, the Rhodesian one points to an ultimate showdown (rather than agreement) even though South Africa now pushes Rhodesia to settle with nationalists.

On the other hand, the settler commitment to Rhodesia is clearly circumscribed. They do not express any inclination to stay at all cost,<sup>26</sup> and look to a modification of their privileged existence in an eventual move to South Africa. Consequently the situation is far from hopeless for the guerrillas. Their principal problem remains one of coordination rather than unity (amongst the various groups involved) in order to expedite the entire process.

Perhaps the most difficult choices confront those Africans inside Zimbabwe. They must survive on a day-to-day basis with the ruling RF regime. They have already jettisoned the illusion of British support and intervention through their own massive

rejection of the Smith-Home Agreement on the visitation of the Pearce Commission. Since then, the vehicle for that expression, the African National Council, has been able to maintain a quasi-legitimate presence. Recent developments in Rhodesia do not augur well, however, for its longevity.<sup>27</sup> Perhaps above all, Africans inside Rhodesia must be aware of their own indispensability. The white Rhodesian way of life would come to a grinding halt without African labour. This is as true today as it was in the halycon days (to the Africans) of the disintegrating Central African Federation in 1959-62. At the proper moment concerted African strike action could do more to cripple white domination than any military invasion. And if such an internal action were coordinated with an external strategy, then the payoff might be increased by geometric proportions.

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Footnotes:

1. Cyril Rogers and C Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: the Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), esp.
2. P. H. M. McEwan, "The Assimilation of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1963), esp.
3. Stephen E. C. Hintz, "The Political Transformation of Rhodesia, 1868-1965," *African Studies Review*, XV, 2, (September, 1972), pp. 173-183.
4. This fundamental premise of white Rhodesian politics has been amply documented in Richard Gray, *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*, (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1960). The passage from Huggins containing this quotation is from p. 152.
5. See Hartz' fullest statement on this concept in his edited *The Founding of New Societies*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964). Professor Hartz' first section, pp. 3-65, are directly addressed to this theory of comparative history. His other expositions on this format have appeared in his *The Liberal Tradition in America*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955), and his "A Comparative Study of Fragment Cultures in Hugh D. Graham and Iod Robert Gurr, *Violence in America*, (New York: New American Library, 1959), pp. 100-118.
6. See Howard J Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-American Tradition: the Corporate Model," *World Politics*, XXV, 2, (January, 1973), pp. 206-235; or his recently edited volume, *Politics and Social Change in Latin America*, (Amherst, Mass: University

- of Massachusetts Press, 1974, especially the essays by Wiarda and Richard Morse ). The latter volume would appear to include the definitive application of the fragment model to the Latin American configuration.
7. Kenneth McRae analyses the Canadian dual-fragment and Leonard M. Thompson that of South Africa in *The Founding of New Societies, op. cit.* , for the former, and pp. 178-218 for the latter.
  8. Both the quasi-fragment and the dual-fragment are developed in classificatory form in my "The Concept of Fragment in Comparative Political Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, I,1, (October, 1968), pp. 111-125. These formulations appeared in original form in Richard N. Rosecrance, "Interrelation of Comparative and International Politics: the Concept of Fragment," a paper presented at the 1962 American Political Science Association Meeting in Washington D.C.
  9. The questions which were broached in our survey related to 1) white Rhodesian social origins, i.e. their place of birth, their parents' background; 2) social background and experience, i.e. religion and religious intensity; motive and time of departure from country of origin: experience in other countries; year arrived in Rhodesia: spouse's country of origin; 3) voting behavior; 4) political perceptions, i.e. preferred political form, idea of separate development, reasons for supporting RF; 5) concept of nationhood, i.e. concept of the "true Rhodesian", year of Rhodesian nationhood; 6) national commitment, i.e. consideration to leave Rhodesia (past or present), and country of choice if emigrating.
  10. The stress on white Rhodesia's peculiar connexion with South Africa is not novel. Colin Leys refers to it in his *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1958), esp. pp. 76-77; and Frank Clements develops this point in his *Rhodesia: Course to Collision*, (London: Pall Mall, 1969), esp. pp. 86-87. However, I am trying to not only make this argument but to fit it into the framework of the fragment, i.e. the whites are a cultural fragment of South African white society, not Great Britain.
  11. The primary population links to South Africa are abundantly clear. The Pioneer Column itself and the accompanying British South Africa Company Police were clearly attached to South Africa in residence both before and after their adventure into Mashonaland. And the critical demographic inputs from 1897 to 1921 when the cultural foundations of white Rhodesian society were laid were also primarily derived from South Africa. See my "European Population Patterns, Cultural Persistence, and Political Change in Rhodesia," *The Canadian Journal of African Studies*, VII, 1, (June, 1973), pp. 3-25. This body of evidence supports my theoretical assertion that the white Rhodesian primary source is the British South

- African quasi-fragment, i.e. the subordinate fragment in the South African dual fragment configuration.
12. This point also buttresses the British South African quasi-fragment inference introduced in the preceding footnote.
  13. See particularly David Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 82-101.
  14. This point might become clearer when recalling that post-World War II Britain was physically scarred and spiritually depressed. The coming to power of the Labour Government with its nationalizing, socializing policies further disenchanting many who were already uprooted and dispirited. See especially Julius Isaac, *British Post-War Migration*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947).
  15. In addition to residence in specified other countries (than Rhodesia or country of origin), there was inquiry into length of residence and occupational role in each of these countries. RF activists tended to have greater length of residence and higher occupational levels than the urban-dwellers in these countries.
  16. Though it ought to be remembered that South Africa tended to remain a residual basis for residence and identity for most of these "birds of passage." Of course, it was South Africa in its British cultural milieu rather than the Afrikaner fragment by which they identified themselves. The tendency to overemphasize the white Rhodesians' wayward patterns has already adversely affected African Nationalist perceptions. Rhodesian links to South Africa, buttressed as they are by contiguity, distinguish this case from that of Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, etc.
  17. The Salisbury sample was biased in terms of the areas in which the survey was conducted. They tended to be urban rather than suburban and more rather than less densely populated.
  18. It is difficult to logically conceive of the combined traits of anti-Communism and fair-mindedness. Giving everyone a fair chance ought not to exclude ideological categories. And the obvious tendency in "anti-Communism" is to be inclusive when in doubt. Perhaps these are the echoes of the faint liberal strains in the Rhodesian ethos. But they could appear essentially symbolic.
  19. This solution might be reminiscent of the Israeli dependency upon their own "sabras" (native-born) to solve the problems of their national existence.
  20. The survey was conducted before (and during the campaign of) the 1969 Constitutional Referendum in which the white electorate was also asked to express preference for the republican form of government. This they did with over 76% responding affirmatively.

21. See especially Larry W. Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 62-90.
22. This aspect of the regional configuration in southern Africa has been exposted by Larry Bowman in his "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, 12, (1968), 231-261.
23. Thus reinforcing the argument that the Rhodesian white community is, after all, a "fragment of a fragment" in that they are a mere extension of the subordinate British South African quasi-fragment.
24. Larry W. Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia*, *op. cit.*
25. See particularly R.B. Sutcliffe, "The Political Economy of Rhodesian Sanction," *Journal of Commonwealth Studies*, 7 (1969), pp. 113-125; and George W. Sheperd, Jr., "The Failure of Sanctions Against Rhodesia and the Effect on African States: a Growing Racial Crisis," *Africa Today*, (February-March, 1968), pp. 8-12.
26. The publication of a summary of my doctoral dissertation in the *Rhodesian Herald*, June 12, 1973, created a flurry of comment in subsequent editions from white letter-writers, including some Rhodesian Front high officials (e.g. Mr. Desmond Frost, party chairman), only verifying this disinclination.
27. Quasi-legitimate in the sense that a) the white Rhodesian regime recognizes it as a bargaining agent without affirming it as the ultimate representative of the Rhodesian African peoples, and b) ZAPU and ZANU see it as a manifestation of internal Zimbabwean opposition to the regime but not as the legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people. A similar internal/external cleavage occurred in the Algerian Revolution.

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Table 1

Country of Birth (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Country	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample		1969 Census	
	(Frequency)	(Percent)	(Frequency)	(Percent)	(Frequency)	(Percent)
Southern Rhodesia	31	27.4%	9	9.5%	90,000	39.5%
South Africa	37	32.7	24	25.3	35,000	15.4
Great Britain	30	26.5	40	42.1	34,000	14.9
Other Countries	<u>15</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>69,000</u>	<u>30.3</u>
	N = 113	100.0%	N = 95	100.0%	228,000	100.0%

Question: In what country were you born?

Table 2

Mother's and Father's Country of Birth (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Country	R.F. Activists				Salisbury Sample			
	Mother		Father		Mother		Father	
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)
Southern Rhodesia	3	2.7%	3	2.7%	4	4.5%	3	3.4%
South Africa	45	39.8	34	30.1	19	21.3	19	21.3
Great Britain	45	39.8	59	52.2	48	53.9	47	52.8
Other Countries	20	17.7	17	15.0	18	20.2	20	22.5
	113	100.0%	113	100.0%	89	100.0%	89	100.0%

Question: 1) In what country was your father born?

2) In what country was your mother born?

Table 3

Respondent's Country of Birth Cross-Tabulated With  
 Mother's and Father's Country of Birth: R.F. Activists

Country of Birth	Southern Rhodesia		South Africa		Great Britain		Other Countries		Total	
Respondent's	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Southern Rhodesia	3 9.7%	3 9.7%	19 61.3%	15 48.4%	4 12.9%	11 35.5%	5 16.1%	2 6.4%	31 100.0%	31 100.0%
South Africa	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	26 70.3%	19 51.4%	8 21.6%	15 40.5%	3 8.1%	3 8.1%	37 100.0%	37 100.0%
Great Britain	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	29 96.7%	28 93.3%	1 3.3%	2 6.7%	30 100.0%	30 100.0%
Other Countries	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	4 26.7%	5 33.3%	11 73.3%	10 66.7%	15 100.0%	15 100.0%
Total	3 2.7%	3 2.7%	45 39.8%	34 30.1%	45 39.8%	59 52.2%	20 17.7%	17 15.0%	113 100.0%	113 100.0%

Table 4

Religion (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Religious Organization	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Church of England	37	32.7%	26	33.3%
Roman Catholic	6	5.3	18	23.1
Dutch Reform: South African	17	15.0	4	5.1
Presbyterian	15	13.3	12	15.4
Methodist	5	4.4	3	3.8
Baptist or Assembly of God	3	2.7	4	5.1
Other Christian	8	7.1	4	5.1
Jewish	4	3.5	2	2.6
Greek Orthodox	3	2.7	3	3.8
None Practiced	15	13.3	2	2.6
	N = 113	100.0%	N = 78	100.0%

Question: Which religion do you practice?

Table 5  
 Religious Intensity (by Frequency):  
 R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Commitment	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Expressed Response	16	14.3%	6	7.0%
Qualified Response	<u>96</u>	<u>85.7</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>93.0</u>
	N = 112	100.0%	N = 86	100.0%

Table 6  
Country of Origin (South Africa or Great Britain)  
by Main Reason for Emigrating to Rhodesia (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists

Reason	South Africa		Great Britain	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Came with Parents	6	17.6%	4	15.4%
Intolerable or Unacceptable Conditions in Country of Origins	3	8.8	11	42.3
Relatives' or Friends' Influence	3	8.8	3	11.5
Knowledge That It Was a Place Where Europeans Could Thrive	11	32.4	2	7.7
Previous Favorable Impression	6	17.6	4	15.4
Economic Opportunity	3	8.8	2	7.7
Attractive Climate	1	2.9	0	0.0
Chance	1	2.9	0	0.0
	N = 34	100.0%	N = 26	100.0%

Question: Why did you emigrate to Rhodesia?

Table 7

Residence in Other Countries (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Country	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
South Africa	9	20.0%	7	18.9%
Great Britain	9	20.0	5	13.5
Other Africa	16	35.6	19	51.4
Other Non-Africa	<u>11</u>	<u>24.4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>16.2</u>
	N = 45	100.0%	N = 37	100.0%

Question: In what other countries besides Rhodesia and your country of origin have you resided?

Table 8

First and Present Occupational Levels (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Occupational Level	R.F. Activists				Salisbury Sample			
	First Level		Present Level		First Level		Present Level	
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)
Unskilled Manual	1	0.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Semi-Skilled Manual	18	16.1	1	0.9	13	15.7	9	10.7
Skilled-Manuel: Routine Non-Manuel	34	30.4	8	7.2	48	57.8	35	41.7
Inspectional/Supervisory; Other Lower Grades	11	9.8	10	9.0	6	7.2	18	21.4
Inspectional/Supervisory; Other Non-Manuel Higher Grades	18	16.1	14	12.6	10	12.0	16	19.0
Managerial and Executive	27	24.1	58	52.2	5	6.0	4	4.8
Professional and High Administrators	3	2.7	20	18.0	1	1.2	2	2.4
	112	100.0%	111	100.0%	83	100.0%	84	100.0%

2) What is your present occupational position?

Table 9

Concept of the "True Rhodesian" in Rank Order (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

	R.F. Activists						Salisbury Sample					
	1		2		3		1		2		3	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Positive</b>												
Fairminded	23	20.5	18	17.5	15	17.2	18	22.5	8	10.4	7	9.3
Honest	9	8.0	10	9.7	4	4.6	8	10.0	11	14.3	2	2.7
Compassionate	4	3.6	11	10.7	5	5.8	3	3.8	7	9.1	9	12.0
Intelligent	4	3.6	6	5.8	4	4.6	2	2.5	2	2.6	7	9.3
Puts Rhodesia First	45	40.2	12	11.6	10	11.5	27	33.8	9	11.7	12	16.0
Independent	9	8.0	8	7.8	13	14.9	7	8.8	12	15.6	7	9.3
Friendly or Sociable	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.7
Others	5	4.5	8	7.8	6	6.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Neutral</b>												
Anti-Communist	4	3.6	14	13.6	8	9.2	6	7.5	19	24.7	9	12.0
Loves Outdoors	1	0.9	9	8.7	15	17.2	5	6.2	6	7.8	16	21.3
Easy-going/Comfort-loving	2	1.8	1	1.0	1	1.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Others	2	1.8	4	3.9	3	3.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Negative</b>												
Politically Naive	2	1.8	2	1.9	1	1.2	3	3.8	2	2.6	2	2.7
Complacent	1	0.9	0	0.0	1	1.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Insular	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.3
No Such Thing	1	0.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.2	1	1.2	0	0.0	1	1.3
	112	100.0%	103	100.0%	87	100.0%	80	100.0%	77	100.0%	75	100.0%

Question: Which of these qualities most aptly describe a "true Rhodesian"?

Table 10

Year in Which Rhodesia Became a Nation (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Year	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1896-1923	13	12.3%	16	22.9%
1923-53	0	0.0	0	0.0
1953-61	0	0.0	3	4.3
1962 (election of R.F. Govt.)	2	1.9	1	1.4
1963-64	3	2.8	2	2.9
1965 (U.D.I.)	52	49.1	18	25.7
1965-69	6	5.7	4	5.7
Not yet a nation (subject to fulfillment conditions)	18	17.0	18	25.7
Vague answer, but affirmative	<u>12</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11.4</u>
	N = 106	100.0%	N = 70	100.0%

Table 11

Preferred Political Form (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Form	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Independent Republic	80	71.4%	36	44.4%
Confederation with South Africa	25	22.3	16	19.8
Dominion Status/British Connection	5	4.5	28	34.6
Inter-Southern African Confederation	<u>2</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.2</u>
	N = 112	100.0%	N = 81	100.0%

Question: Which political form would you prefer for Rhodesia?

Table 12

Preferred Political Form Cross-Tabulated with Country of Birth:  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Country of Birth	Dominion Status		Southern African Confederation		Independent Republic			
	R.F. Activists	Salisbury Sample	R.F. Activists	Salisbury Sample	R.F. Activists	Salisbury Sample	R.F. Activists	Salisbury Sample
Southern Rhodesia	1 3.3%	2 22.2%	8 26.7%	3 33.3%	21 70.0%	4 44.4%	N = 30 100.0%	N = 9 100.0%
Southern Africa	2 5.4%	2 10.5%	8 21.6%	4 21.0%	27 73.0%	13 68.4%	37 100.0%	19 100.0%
Great Britain	1 3.6%	16 43.2%	7 25.0%	8 21.6%	20 71.4%	13 35.1%	28 100.0%	37 100.0%
Other Countries	1 6.7%	8 53.3%	2 13.3%	1 6.7%	12 80.0%	6 40.0%	15 100.0%	15 100.0%
	5 4.5%	28 25.0%	25 22.5%	16 14.5%	80 72.7%	36 32.7%	N = 110	N = 80

Table 13

Major Reason Stimulating Consideration to Leave Rhodesia  
(by Frequency): R.F. Activists

Reason	Frequency	Percent
Return of liberal (white) government-- perceived in terms of U.F.P.	18	37.5%
Fear of conditions conducive to African political takeover	14	29.2
Other political	6	12.5
General discontent	2	4.2
Decline in economic opportunity	<u>8</u>	<u>16.7</u>
	N = 48	100.0%

Question: Since residing in Rhodesia, was there ever a time when you considered leaving?

Table 14

Year in Which Leaving Rhodesia Was Considered  
(by Frequency): R.F. Activists

Year	Frequency	Percent
1930-1939	2	4.8%
1940-1949	4	8.3
1950-1959	3	6.2
1960-1969	39	81.2
(1961-1962)	<u>(31)</u>	<u>64.6</u>
	N = 48	100.0%

Question: Was there ever a year when you specifically considered leaving Rhodesia?

Table 15

Future Change in Rhodesia Which Would Cause Departure  
(by Frequency): R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Change	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
White, liberal government and/or political instability	18	16.7%	12	13.8%
African government or the immediate threat of it	76	70.4	39	44.8
Other reasons concerning social and economic discontent	5	4.6	14	16.1
Nothing would cause departure	<u>9</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>25.3</u>
	N = 108	100.0%	N = 87	100.0%

Question: What changes in the country could cause you to leave?

Table 16

Future Change Causing Departure Cross-Tabulated with  
Country of Birth: R.F. Activists

Change Which Would Cause Departure	Southern Rhodesia	South Africa	Great Britain	Other Countries	Total
White, liberal government and/or political instability	2 6.7%	7 18.9%	2 7.7%	7 46.7%	N = 18
African government or immediate threat of it	26 86.7%	23 62.2%	21 80.8%	6 40.0%	76
Other reasons of social or economic discontent	0 0.0%	2 5.4%	2 7.7%	1 6.7%	5
Nothing would cause departure	2 6.7%	5 13.5%	1 3.8%	1 6.7%	9
	30 100.0%	37 100.0%	26 100.0%	15 100.0%	N = 108

Table 17

Choice of Country if Leaving Rhodesia (by Frequency):  
R.F. Activists and Salisbury Urban Dwellers

Country	R.F. Activists		Salisbury Sample	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
South Africa	75	86.2%	42	60.9%
England	0	0.0	9	13.0
Australia	4	4.6	3	4.3
Canada	0	0.0	3	4.3
USA	2	2.3	2	2.9
New Zealand	1	1.1	1	1.5
Portugese Africa	0	0.0	2	2.9
Portugal	1	1.1	1	1.5
France	1	1.1	0	0.0
Irish Republic	1	1.1	0	0.0
Greece	0	0.0	1	1.5
Italy	0	0.0	1	1.5
Cyprus	0	0.0	1	1.5
Europe (not specific)	1	1.1	1	1.5
Latin America	1	1.1	0	0.0
Not specific	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2.9</u>
	N = 87	100.0%	N = 69	100.0%