

## PERSONALITY AND CULTURE

### THE CASE OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM

by

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African socialism is the ideology of Africa. The purposes of this essay are to examine the meanings attached to African socialism by Africans and Africanists so as to analyze and compare perceptual differences existing among their competing viewpoints and, finally, indicate their areas of consensus or agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Ideology is an important aspect of any political culture. Political culture is part of a general cultural system and, according to Parsons, the individual is involved in three possible ways: through personal interest, participation and political beliefs.<sup>2</sup> Verba observes that a political culture

*consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics.*<sup>3</sup>

At a general level of analysis, ideologies embody issues of importance to individuals or groups. As a working definition of political ideology, Dion has suggested that it may be regarded as a "more or less integrated system of values and norms noted in society, which individuals and groups project on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations they have come to value in social life."<sup>4</sup>

As political currencies, ideologies perform important functions for any polity. They lend meaning to political acts, elevate social conflicts and tensions to a more sophisticated plane of political dialogue and they contribute to the process of consensus formation and, thus, to the normative integration of the polity in general. To the common man, an ideology helps to make the world more coherent, understandable and secure. To African leaders, ideologies represent available instruments in their efforts to inculcate values of modern political culture upon the populace.<sup>5</sup>

Although differing interpretations and definitions of African socialism are legion in the daily rhetoric of African leaders and elites, no attempt has been made to empirically

probe the various perceptions of the ideology. From the outset it is important for the reader to appreciate that it is not the theoretical rigor or the orthodoxy of African socialism which we evaluate here. Rather, we assume that people operate on the basis of their beliefs and that whatever African socialism is, it is best evaluated in terms of what Africans themselves believe it to be at any give point in time.

### African Socialism

African socialism means different things to different people: it has been defined as a collective will for development;<sup>6</sup> a social synthesis for the reconciliation of modern technology and human values;<sup>7</sup> a defense of communalism in a modern setting,<sup>8</sup> a sense of security and universal hospitality;<sup>9</sup> the nation state when viewed as an extended family system;<sup>10</sup> and economic development leading to the eventual physical, intellectual and spiritual integration of free men.<sup>11</sup> Even at a colloquium in Dakar, Senegal (December, 1962) in which representatives from eighteen African states and a group of European economists participated, the *Africa Report* states that

*No single definition of African socialism emerged from the conference, but there was general agreement that it was that form of social, political and economic organization based on a humanistic conception of man, which could provide the maximum economic progress and reassert the traditional collectivist values of African life.*<sup>12</sup>

It will be observed that the above definitions and interpretations of African socialism are synthetic in nature, i.e., they are based on subjective interpretations by individuals, and are, therefore, subject to dispute and controversy. As such, these statements are neither true nor false in an objective sense but, rather, are statements of opinion. In contrast, a statement such as "Julius Nyerere is the President of Tanzania," is a matter of fact -- a truism. It is subject to verification and stirs no controversy. Statements of an ideological character are synthetic in that people assign meaning to them on the basis of their own experiences, beliefs and values. In so doing, people will relate to such statements as though they are analytic: as matters of truth or falsehood, as congruent or incongruent with their own understanding of the ideology. For example, the statement "What we learn of socialism in the Soviet Union and China warns us of the terrible dangers of socialism without democracy"<sup>13</sup> is a synthetic statement since "what we learn" of socialism in these countries could be almost anything, and if what we learn warns us of dangers, it is because

we have made value judgments about what we have learned, perhaps conditioned by democratic preferences. People, however, are free to project into such a statement their own interpretations and values which may lead them to treat such a statement as a matter of fact rather than opinion. On subjects as controversial as African socialism, the projection of different values may produce different perceptions of the same phenomenon.

Despite the inadequacies of existing literature pertinent to ideological perceptions, the contributions of several scholars have served in organizing and guiding the present investigation of African socialism. The combined works of Lasswell and Kaplan, Brockway, and Friedland and Rosberg contribute a synthesis of insights useful for an exploratory study of attitudes about African socialism. Each work posits broad organizing categories which permit a systematic exploration of African socialism.

### Values

Values are important to an understanding of African affairs, and few national leaders fail to mention the traditional values of their people. Such values can be organized and examined systematically in a theoretical framework. The dichotomy used in the course of this study is that offered by Lasswell and Kaplan. In their discussion of influence, Lasswell and Kaplan dichotomize values as follows:

*By influence is meant the value position and potential of a person or group. Values may be grouped under "welfare" and "deference," and positions described in regard to each value (or set of values). Value positions are important because classes and social structures are defined in relation to the shaping and distribution of values.*<sup>14</sup>

In the Lasswell-Kaplan scheme, welfare values relate to the maintenance of the physical activity of an organism: well-being (health and safety), wealth (income), skill (proficiency in arts, crafts, trade, profession, etc.) and enlightenment (knowledge, insight and information). Deference values are those taken into consideration "in the acts of others and of the self".<sup>15</sup> Deference values include power, respect (status, honor, recognition, prestige, glory, or reputation), rectitude (virtue, goodness and righteousness), and affection (love and friendship).

Examples of welfare and deference statements made by Africans are common place in the literature of African politics.

The following statement by J. E. Casely Hayford is illustrative of a welfare (enlightenment) value orientation:

*The African's way to proper recognition lies not at present so much in the exhibition of material force and power, as in the gentler art of persuasion by the logic of facts and of achievements before which all reasonable men must bow.*<sup>16</sup>

The following excerpt from Frantz Fanon's famed *The Wretched of the Earth* is an example of a deference (power and respect) viewpoint:

*At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.*<sup>17</sup>

The Lasswell-Kaplan dichotomy is helpful in organizing the recurrent values of African politics.

### Types of African Socialism

A. Fenner Brockway has made an important contribution by attempting to organize African regimes in a typological framework. Differences in background tradition and social circumstances among the African states, together with a history of differing colonial philosophies, combine to produce differing styles or types of African socialism. Brockway observes that

*There has been a clash in Africa between the European intellectual sources of socialism and the influences of Africa's social evolution. The result has been four trends in socialist theory which can be summed up as communism or Marxist-Leninism, African Marxism, African Pragmatic Socialism, and African Democratic Socialism.*<sup>18</sup>

This typology of socialisms is based on observation, and Brockway differentiates between the various types of the basis of state policies and regime styles which he associates with particular types. He claims that the communists or Marxist-Leninists are active in various trade union movements, but they have not consolidated their power in any African regime. Some unions claim Marxist-Leninist allegiance due to their belief that "scientific socialism" is authoritative under all circumstances.<sup>19</sup> This belief runs counter to other varieties of socialism in Africa, as the remaining three types insist on a socialism that is grounded in African traditions

and realities and are anathema to doctrinaire postulates of orthodox socialism.<sup>20</sup>

African Marxist-oriented regimes, according to Brockway, show sympathy for a politically organized social structure, and are more prone to use authoritarian methods than the pragmatic or democratic socialists. They are *African* Marxist regimes as they are not allied either with more established communist organizations based in Moscow or Peking. African Marxists differ from the communists in their flexibility--international neutralism, acceptance of aid from any nation without political encumbrances, retention of privately-owned industries within carefully circumscribed limits, and religious tolerance--and in their recognition that "the traditional African social structure must not be destroyed but encouraged to evolve into socialism."<sup>21</sup>

The African Pragmatic Socialists, according to Brockway, reject Marxism: the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and "are ready to concede more to the private sector than the African Marxists, though they would subordinate it to a cooperative and collective economy."<sup>22</sup> The pragmatists also allow wider political liberties, typically within the context of a one-party state, and advocate Pan-Africanism through the functional integration of states. The programmatic aspects of socialism for pragmatic regimes are more apt to involve rural development and community action schemes.<sup>23</sup>

The African Democratic Socialists, according to Brockway, hold power in Kenya, and, with two exceptions, are similar to the pragmatists. While most African states emphasize the duties and obligations of the citizen to his community and state, the African Democratic Socialists assert the importance of individual liberties and freedoms. Moreover, the democratic socialists assert equal rights for women, more so than do other types of African socialist regimes.

The approach of the democratic socialist is essentially pragmatic. The state directs the process of development, but within a pluralistic social and economic order. While public services are expanded to improve general living standards, there is no desire for a total mobilization of society for the purposes of change. For leaders like Kenyatta and Mboya, socialist doctrine represents an opportunity for flexible action alternatives in contrast to a method of narrowing social complexity through rigid programs.<sup>24</sup>

To date, no scholar has dealt with the matter of empirically operationalizing these ideological types among individual Africans to determine their suitability at an attitudinal, as opposed to a regime, level of analysis. There is no reason to assume that because Nyerere's Tanzania exemplifies a pragmatic socialist, or communitarian, regime that all Tanzanians are pragmatists or communitarians.<sup>25</sup> It is at least as plausible to assume that the viewpoints of Tanzanians are distributed across a wide assortment of possible orientations. It may be possible to find communists, African Marxists, pragmatists and democrats in a regime generally characterized by its policies and the actions of its leadership as pragmatically socialist. From the political literature of Africa, it is an easy task to extrapolate statements made by Africans which are supportive of the types outlined above. For example, Fanon's writings are replete with passages indicative of a communist or Marxist-Leninist viewpoint.

*The people come to understand that wealth is not the fruit of labour but the result of organised, protected robbery. Rich people are no longer respectable people; they are nothing more than flesh-eating animals, jackals and vultures which wallow in the people's blood.*<sup>26</sup>

### Themes of African Socialism

African socialism appears to represent a wide spectrum of orientations towards African politics. To be sure, the ideology lacks a rigorous orthodoxy which allows African leaders safely to project almost any notion of what their African socialist utopia should be like. Friedland and Rosberg have made a significant contribution to the study of African Socialism. Three over-arching themes they suggest are (1) The problem of continental identity; (2) the crisis of economic development; and (3) the dilemmas of control and class formation.<sup>27</sup> These themes are integrating components of the ideology; they are, therefore, worthy of closer inspection.

Most African socialists contend that, historically, Africa has been indigenously socialistic, and that the elements of this socialism lend a unique identity to that continent. Communal ownership of property, the egalitarian nature of African society, emphasis on cooperation and the social obligation to work are all part of a network of traditional socialistic roots. The rejection of European culture during the struggle for independence has led most African states to re-investigate their histories for institutions, traditions and elements of doctrine which they consider unique to the African way of life, and appropriate for the modern culture.<sup>28</sup>

In the ferment of the struggle for independence, two similar motifs emerged to emphasize the African identity. Senghor's philosophy of *Negritude* underscores cultural and spiritual linkages which provide black people everywhere with an affinity to Africa.<sup>28</sup> Nkrumah's assertion of the "African Personality," argues for customs, conventions and social institutions that are uniquely African. To a significant degree, the theme of continental identity illustrates a concern for cultural and social independence in the colonial and "neo-colonial" periods.

Evidence of a concern for some of the unique dimensions of African identity are not difficult to locate in African literature. As Taiwo observes, the African genius is essentially different from his counterpart in the Western world, and this has led to different results. "The greatest achievement of *Negritude* is that it has made people of African descent all over the world accept the fact that they have a right to be different from other races."<sup>30</sup> Senghor, the leading exponent of *Negritude*, claims that in the development of African socialism, the problem is not "how to satisfy spiritual, that is, cultural, needs, but how to keep the fervour of the black soul alive."<sup>31</sup> Kaunda implies that there is a wisdom in the common African which reflects the African Personality:

*Our African personality contains elements of simplicity and wisdom that are to be found more easily in the common man than in those of us who have tried to learn the complicated new language of the modern world--and this is why we do not and must not lose touch with the common man.*<sup>32</sup>

Nkrumah's approach to the matter of continental identity was less spiritual. His concerns involved schemes of political organization and unity, culminating in a vision of Pan-African unity something on the order of a United States of Africa.

A second theme of African socialism suggested by Friedland and Rosberg is that of economic progress and development. Although it is true that most African economies can to some degree be labeled as "mixed", economic development will be largely a function of decisions and advances made in the public or governmental sector. Issues of government planning, capital formation, exports and imports, economic regulation, foreign involvement in the domestic economy or neo-colonial economics are all subsumed under this theme.

This mixture of private and public, and domestic and foreign, capital is a subject of much controversy among African leaders. In 1962, President Philibert Tsiranana of Madagascar

argued that "we must encourage private businesses or individuals, Malagasy or foreign, to industrialize our country. In order to do this, we must give them guarantees."<sup>33</sup> Not all Africans are as eager to extend guarantees to foreign investors. For example, the program of the *Parti Africain de l'Independence* (PAI) in Senegal argued that "this socialism which safeguards the interests of both the local and foreign bourgeoisie is no more nor less than the African form of capitalism in the neo-colonial era."<sup>34</sup>

Dilemmas of control and class formation provide the focus of a third theme of African socialism. As Friedland and Rosberg suggest,

*The drive for independence and for economic development following independence has created serious problems of control for the leaders of Africa's new countries. These problems are centered upon the imperative of obtaining the enthusiastic cooperation of the populace for sustained economic activities that will aid the accumulation of capital without creating new imbalances in the distributions of national income.*<sup>35</sup>

The struggle for independence has not been a totally integrating experience for most Africans. In some quarters, there is the belief that independence simply permitted Africans to assume the political, military and bureaucratic positions of privilege once held by Europeans. In this connection, African socialism has been interpreted as a facade behind which the elite promote their own interests,<sup>36</sup> or socialism for the poor, and a form of protected bourgeois capitalism for the elite. In more candid terms, one Nigerian scholar writes, "I honestly believe that advocating socialism in Nigeria now is a clever device to arouse people's emotions for selfish ends."<sup>37</sup> Anyone who appreciates Lasswell's general formula for the developmental history of the political man (private motives displaced on public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest) will observe that the African sentiments suggested above fit into this level of understanding.<sup>38</sup>

This literature survey serves to illustrate the complexities and possibilities of ideological research.

#### Experimental Design: The Q Technique

To illuminate the political orientations of individuals towards African socialism, Lasswell and Kaplan's value scheme,

Brockway's types, and Friedland and Rosberg's themes were reduced to a completely randomized design with three main effects in factorial arrangement.<sup>39</sup>

In this study, we employ the Q technique which was described by Stephenson, and more recently summarized by Block, Zanovich, and Kerlinger.<sup>40</sup> The technique has been usefully applied in the fields of psychology and political science, and Stephenson, in a study similar to this one, applied the technique in his study of the meaning of democracy in the United States.<sup>41</sup>

The application of the Q technique involves the distribution of statements along an opinion-continuum. The statements, in this case, were selected according to their conformance to the theoretical design of the study. For purposes of this study, the statements contain important theoretical properties, the design of which is not apparent to the respondent. The design facilitates a representative stimulus situation insofar as the values, types, and themes of African socialism are presented to respondents.<sup>42</sup> The statements were randomly numbered, reproduced on individual slips of paper and presented to respondents. Respondents were asked to arrange the statements along an opinion continuum from +6 (most agree) to -6 (most disagree) with 0 (neutral, ambiguous, unclear, etc.) in the center.

### Data Analysis

Each one of the N=53 respondents in the study provided his ranking of the n=75 statements (from "most agree" to "most disagree") and all 53 Q-sorts were intercorrelated using Spearman rank order correlations, providing a 53 x 53 matrix. This correlation matrix was factor analyzed and three principal axis factors emerged.<sup>43</sup> This means that of the 53 separate Q-sorts provided by the respondents, the statements were distributed in essentially three different ways. At this point it was possible to classify those individuals who clustered together (i.e., those who organized the statements similarly) and construct one Q-sort from a weighted average of all their separate but similar Q-sorts. This procedure further reduced the data to three Q-sorts, representing three different points of view about African socialism--pragmatic, scientific and international.

### The Pragmatic Culture

The first factor is composed of 31 respondents who can be described as pragmatists in terms of their view of African

socialism. By way of identification, the pragmatic socialists exhibit several unique characteristics which serve to distinguish this group from other types of socialists. These characteristics include: (1) a belief in the spirit of hard work and self-sacrifice typically associated with communalistic endeavors; (2) a predisposition towards economic adaptability in the developing context including a preference for a mixed economy which allows some role for private enterprise within a collective scheme; (3) a cultural assertiveness of indigenous African values and institutions; and (4) a skepticism towards African politicians and a concomitant preference for decentralized political institutions with effective checks on those who rule.

With respect to a communal spirit of hard work and self-sacrifice, the pragmatic socialists stipulate that there should be an equality of sacrifice by all the classes in the population and, if necessary, the state should intervene to assure their participation in efforts towards development. This orientation serves to accent the forces of integration and retards differences which may exist between the masses and various elite groups.<sup>44</sup>

A second element of the pragmatic culture is the willingness to adapt to varying circumstances. There is no support for rigid, orthodox socialist programs. Rather, the pragmatic culture is sensitive to programs and policies that are successful in the African context.<sup>45</sup> This willingness to adapt to varying circumstances is a receptivity to innovative foreign ideas so long as they are applicable in an African context. This is not to suggest that all Western political or economic models can be transplanted to Africa. As Keita argues, "We have never blindly accepted any ready-made idea, whoever it came from."<sup>46</sup> The pragmatic attitude accepts foreign innovations which could contribute to the welfare of Africans.

The pragmatic culture demonstrates a marked concern for economic issues. Issues of growth and development are of high priority, and there is a preference for state dominance in a mixed economic arrangement where activities of private investors are permissible. The meaning of socialism in the pragmatic context is closely associated with concerns of actual physical and material conditions. This concern for development, however, must not be jeopardized by political agreements with or concessions to foreign nations.<sup>47</sup>

Although the public sector will be most influential in terms of the overall progress of the economy, the pragmatic culture acknowledges that private investors and entrepreneurs should have some part to play in the socialist state. There is much agreement with Kenyatta's position that

*--we shall continue to play our part in accelerating capital accumulation. We are determined to accelerate economic growth within the context of African socialism, meaning that both the government and private enterprise will have a contribution to make.*<sup>48</sup>

The pragmatist views African socialism as an opportunity to create a new form of economic life. In this new economy, human needs are harmoniously reconciled with the aspirations of technical advancement. Socialism in Africa, according to this view, represents a complex of social and economic purpose, and an opportunity to engage in productive social engineering.<sup>49</sup> The first priority must be the development of a strong economic structure compatible with humanitarian aspirations.<sup>50</sup> In pursuit of economic development, political leadership must blunt the tendency of some groups (such as civil servants, businessmen, etc.) to seek out a life style of ease and comfort. (This tendency is associated with a colonial mentality which is counterproductive to the goals and purposes of the modern African culture.<sup>51</sup>)

Another belief of the pragmatists is that colonial institutions and values should be replaced by indigenous ones. This Africanization process is important for asserting an identity which is not only independent of European influences, but also integrative in Africa. References to Africa in neo-colonial terms (e.g. French West Africa, British East Africa, Portuguese Africa, etc.) are partially offensive at a time when Africans seek to reaffirm their identity and divorce it from European cultural influences. The pragmatic socialists emphasize the importance of a unique African heritage for the welfare of all. Such concepts as Negritude and the "African Personality" have a part to play in this reaffirmation process.<sup>52</sup>

The concern for the rejuvenation of indigenous African values and traditions is not caught up in a nexus of orthodox socialism, communism or Marxist-Leninism as a reaction to the capitalist West. Rather, it is a candid acknowledgement that the African experience has a unique culture and heritage not encompassed by radical ideologues. Consistent with Friedland and Rosberg's analysis of continental identity it is quite easy to discern that references to such an identity in orthodox Marxist-Leninist terms are quite offensive to the pragmatic socialist. Moreover, the pragmatic culture is non-violent to the extent that social issues will not be resolved through revolutionary tactics, nor would it advance the welfare of Africans for them to be resolved violently.<sup>53</sup>

The pragmatist is not morbid in his distaste for wealthy people. They would argue that Fanon was too macabre in his characterization of the wealthy as "flesh-eating animals."<sup>54</sup> It is probably true that, according to the pragmatists, the bulk of the people have not come to understand the relationship between wealth, capitalism, greed and corruption. Capitalism and the potentiality of acquiring massive amounts of wealth are antithetical to the goals of the pragmatic culture. The public sector is regarded as the storehouse of wealth, and the just allocation of regime resources is a function of the state, not of the whims of a competitive marketplace. Nyerere suggests that the very desire to accumulate wealth must be regarded as a vote of "no confidence" in the social system.<sup>55</sup>

The policy of austerity for future economic welfare has not totally penetrated the consciousness of the whole society. The pragmatist is quick in appreciating that the colonial experience left a legacy of selfishness and exploitiveness in some groups, making it difficult to promote measures of self-sacrifice in the general public. The pragmatist knows that the accumulation of capital is necessary for purposes of nation-building; but he hopes that the regime can accumulate capital without fostering a class of capitalists.

In order to foster the proper socialist attitude, the socialization of future generations is important to the endurance of the pragmatic culture. It is also important to the integration of the state if the cleavages based on income differentials are to be overcome. Citizen education must therefore be geared to producing a citizen who appreciates his history and culture. The citizen must be aware of his role and his obligations in the socialist state. The ideas, mental outlook and social habits of the new citizen demand redefinition if the modern culture is to endure:

*Many prejudices and social attitudes will have to be abandoned, wasteful expenditures on funerals and weddings, and the giving and taking of "dash". The youth will have to be taught the dignity of labor. Older people will have to be taught thrift--idleness will have to be condemned as a social evil. The spirit of self-help and cooperation will have to be encouraged. Bribery and corruption must be harshly punished and examples made of the most important transgressors by long terms of imprisonment and the confiscation of their property, especially in cases involving theft of state funds and property. For these are crimes against society as a whole and not just an individual.*<sup>56</sup>

Fostering the proper "attitude of mind"<sup>57</sup> in a socialist society requires planning, patience and foresight. Progress will be made incrementally, and perhaps over the span of several generations. This scenario requires prudent leadership if the African socialist utopia is to be realized. Here again the pragmatists have no misgivings and express a fourth concern--that of the quality of their leadership. It would be an understatement to suggest that politicians in Africa do not enjoy an honorable reputation. The calling to public service, in some cases, has been tantamount to an invitation to partake of the spoils of the system. Under these conditions, the temptations of tyranny or of unresponsive government are always incipient possibilities. Against these potential hazards, the pragmatist seeks political refuge in decentralized institutions.<sup>58</sup>

To the pragmatist, socialism is something more than a way of organizing economic and political relations. It is, in part, a crusade in favor of equality, humanitarianism and a sense of community, and against social dishonesty and injustice.<sup>59</sup>

### The Scientific Culture

The second factor is composed of seven respondents who hold a scientific view of African socialism. These respondents possess several attitudinal characteristics which serve to distinguish them from other types of socialists. These characteristics are: (1) a more dogmatic adherence to principles of orthodox (or scientific) Marxism-Leninism; (2) an acknowledgement that the existence of various classes will serve to perpetuate division among various groups, and will ultimately lead to class warfare and a subsequent form of socialism which is more perfect; (3) the belief that, ultimately, simple administration will replace governmental decision-making; and (4) private investment activities (as provided in a mixed economic arrangement where the state and private sectors each have some role to play) are neo-colonialistic and should play no part in the future development of African economic life. These scientific socialist respondents tend to give high scores to statements which conform to a more orthodox, or Marxist, view of socialist development as defined by Brockway.<sup>60</sup>

Like orthodox Marxists, there is the candid acknowledgement of different classes and, therefore, revolution appears inevitable.<sup>61</sup> Equality of sacrifice for the economic progress of all is important to the scientific socialist. This view suggests a corporate interdependence of all individuals and groups in a society. As society has responsibilities towards

its citizens, and these involve the assurance that no man is good enough to be another man's master.<sup>62</sup>

The scientific socialist's utopia is quite similar to that of the pragmatist's with one exception. Whereas the pragmatist does not believe that a classless society will ever eliminate the need for governments, the scientific socialist is more visionary in the sense that he believes simple administration will eventually supplant government.<sup>63</sup>

The scientific socialist is emphatically anti-capitalist with respect to economic institutions. Within the scientific culture there is hardly any role that private investment, industry or ownership can play. The state alone is responsible for capital accumulation, industrial management and sustained economic growth. The scientific socialist would, in theory, probably agree with the complete nationalization of industry within his state. Anti-capitalism for scientific socialists operates in tandem with an anti-colonial (or anti-neocolonial) mind-set. The colonial legacy is regarded as an insult to Africa, and bourgeois tendencies which have carried over in the post-independence period must be eradicated. This position demonstrates, in part, an effective reaction against the colonial experience.

The scientific socialists appear to be willing, in theory, to endure self-denial for the sake of equality. This group grasps the idea that special privileges for peasants, workers or bureaucrats is a form of inequality and potential exploitation, and therefore rejects the idea that they are deserving of special privileges. This is interesting in light of the data offered by Lloyd on the institutionalization of bureaucratic and military elites in Africa who are willing to accord themselves special amenities in spite of socialist rhetoric to the contrary.<sup>64</sup>

Finally, if the policies advocated by the scientific socialists are to succeed, leadership groups must be the masters, not the servants, of an efficient bureaucratic apparatus. This requires a perspective of leadership attuned to the needs and demands of the socialist state. Persons with political authority must develop an attitude toward their mission which is congruent with the efforts of workers and farmers in the developing state.

### The International Culture

This factor is dealt with cursorially since only one respondent rendered the international viewpoint in its pure form;

six other respondents are associated with this factor, but they are also significantly associated with the pragmatic or scientific viewpoints. It is nevertheless justifiable to report this factor on the basis of the non-statistical principle of "where there's smoke, there's fire"--i.e., the fact that the factor appears at all suggests the possible viability of a third point of view (no matter how limited its present dispersion is within the population), and the possibility that with more extensive sampling, others might be found who would embrace this view as well.<sup>65</sup> Since the viewpoint represented by international socialists is in its incipient form, the interpretation of it, is tempered by a need for more elaborate research.

The international socialists are distinguished from other socialists on the basis of four criteria. These are: (1) recognition that the future economic development of Africa requires assistance from non-African sources; (2) an envy of European socialist cooperation in their national development activities; (3) a rejection of the popular mythology supportive of indigenous African culture; and (4) a belief that current African socialist leaders are actually neo-colonialists who keep the masses of Africans incarcerated in traditional lifestyles, and intentionally deprive them of the benefits of modernity.

The international socialist rejects the implication that there is a unique quality associated with African thought and culture. Moreover, his economic orientation allows for the intercontinental exchange of aid and trade for the benefit of Africans.

Secondly, the internationalist also demonstrates an envy of European cooperation and social institutions. The internationalist views poverty as a common denominator of African life, and this factor binds Africans together in a struggle for Pan-African unity. The international socialist view point is also intolerant of leadership generally. Persons in politically strategic positions are seen as self-serving individuals exploiting the government.<sup>66</sup>

The internationalist also exhibits a third characteristic which distinguishes him from the pragmatic and scientific socialist types, namely, that he stands opposed to some of the myths supportive of popular African culture. Whereas pragmatic and scientific types view African socialism as modern day communalism and a new form of economy where technology is reconciled with human values, the international view of African socialism is that it is a fraudulent disguise used to promote

the interests of a privileged group.<sup>67</sup> The internationalist does not view socialism as a sense of community, a return to Africanism or a struggle against the forces of evil as do his pragmatic and scientific counterparts.

The internationalist denies the indigenous nature of democracy and socialism in the African context, and sees no functional reference for the "African Personality." He rejects the notion that there is anything like a unique African socialism. Moreover, the international socialist believes that those in current positions of leadership in Africa are, for the most part, selfish and exploitive. They accuse the present leaders of being the true neo-colonialists, and of protecting the interests of the local and foreign bourgeoisie. The masses, it is claimed, are prevented from participating in efforts to modernize African culture.

In his observation of Afro-Americans in Africa, J. K. Obatala relates his view of the African political culture in a manner that is consistent with the international orientation:

*Close observation of the Afro-American in Africa will show that, if indeed he is interested in "preserving" traditional African culture it is mainly for the illiterate and backward Africans who are still encapsuled in it: and not for himself.*<sup>68</sup>

Obatala goes on to suggest that most Afro-Americans fail to realize that the slogan "preserve Africa's traditional culture" is used for reactionary purposes, and is a disguise for anti-socialism. According to this view, most Afro-Americans are led to believe that there is a political difference between the traditional leaders and the modern, westernized African. In reality, "the cultural differences are only superficial and ... the traditional rulers and the westernized Africans are, for the most part, one political entity."<sup>69</sup>

Obatala relates what he sees to be the role of the chief in African political culture:

*their job is rather easy: preside over the affairs of the backward and ignorant bush dwellers and villagers who have been deliberately kept outside the sphere of modern learning by their elitist "brothers" in the city; keep the oppressed masses worshipping their traditional Gods and performing their ancient rituals so that they will not begin to trouble themselves (and others) over things such as a higher standard of living, education*

*for their children, a modern home, paved roads, a more nutritious diet, more and better medical and dental care, a modern transportation system and...a more equitable distribution of the national income!*

*The mind of the masses must forever be bound by ignorance, religion and superstition! They must forever be loyal to the elders, chiefs, linguists and herbalists who are, in turn, the political pawns of the reactionary and corrupt neo-colonial states that have emerged in Africa following "independence".<sup>70</sup>*

Finally, the internationalist denies that principles of socialism or democracy are rooted, historically, in African culture. And such concepts as Negritude and the African Personality are dismissed as useless sources of confusion.<sup>71</sup>

### Consensus

In contrast to the unique aspects of the viewpoints presented above there are aspects of African socialism which are treated similarly by respondents from all three factors, and represent a basis for consensus among them. With respect to problems of control and class formation, all three viewpoints acknowledge that wealth is responsible for class differences, and this fact is morally incompatible with African socialism as they variously define it. This disdain for wealth is reinforced by a unity of suspicion concerning politicians and their corrupt practices. Political corruption and elitist privileges are regarded as obstacles which must be overcome if socialism is to work in Africa.

There is also agreement among all the groups of respondents that the implementation of African socialism requires concomitant socialization towards work, and the individual's responsibility to his community. The desire for the "easy life" is a phenomenon related to colonial example and, thus, inappropriate for the modern African culture.

A further element of consensus emerging from this study relates to the ideal African socialist leader. Thirty-six of the fifty-three respondents indicated that Julius Nyerere was their ideal leader. This sentiment was expressed by persons aligned with each of the three factors.<sup>72</sup>

The attraction of Nyerere as an ideal leader for the pragmatic socialists described here is understandable. The attraction of Nyerere as an ideal leader for the scientific and

internationalist type socialists may have something to do with issue salience, but more likely with Nyerere's political style and charisma. Among other leadership virtues Nyerere projects a life-style of austerity much in line with his own socialist philosophy. Nyerere is a person who attempts to live by the norms he preaches. He seems to represent something vital about African life, and personifies a new order to the scheme of post-independence African affairs. This charismatic quality pervades African culture and helps to maintain a sense of orderliness in the African setting. Nyerere is a shrewd politician and has demonstrated bold leadership on issues which have changed over time. In doing so, he has become a symbol of the modern African culture.

The routinization of the new order involves the transmission of cultural myths over time. The myths of a communal and democratic heritage, for example, are important for cultural maintenance. The reconciliation of human values to modern technological forms is also a popular conception. This mythology to any given situation is not as important as the African belief that the society is equalitarian or anti-colonial, and contains certain implicit rules circumscribing individual wealth and exploitation. In the end, the maintenance of cultural order is more dependent on these rules and distinguishing features than on bicycle plants and railroads. While political regimes must provide the latter (as evidence of improved conditions), they must engage in the transmission of the cultural norms and myths through continuing processes of socialization.

The most frequently repeated components of myths are regarded as key symbols, the presence of which serve as cues for those whose perspectives are similar.<sup>73</sup> The pragmatic socialists, for instance, are under the influence of, or (in the case of Western Africanists) sympathetic to, an environment stressing equality, hard work, self-sacrifice and anti-colonialism. Consequently, Nyerere becomes a key symbol for them since what he stands for is common to their shared experiences or sympathies.

Nyerere's symbolic appeal is sufficiently strong for him to serve as a key symbol for persons with differing ideological preferences. The situation becomes a bit muddled as persons with differing perspectives regard Nyerere as an ideal leader, perhaps for different reasons supported by different experiences. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon may be that the absence of dogma in Nyerere's thought provides a socialism that is sufficiently vague to accommodate everyone. The requirements for acceptance of his socialist principles are minimal:

*For socialism the basic purpose is the well-being of the people, and the basic assumption is an acceptance of human equality. For socialism there must be a belief that every individual man and woman, whatever colour, shape, race, creed, religion, or sex, is an equal member of society with equal rights in the society and equal duties to it.*

*A person who does not accept this may accept many policies pursued by socialists; but he cannot be a socialist.<sup>74</sup>*

It is important to recall that for Nyerere socialism is an attitude of mind. As such one need not pledge to support a specific program of economic or political activities. Under these circumstances, references to socialism itself become a necessary symbol in the African context. Any leader or group of like-minded persons may invoke the term socialism to describe their policies. Although the definition of the term may be obscured in discussion within and between various groups, few would reject the opportunity to legitimize their activities through its use.

Bienen notes that those who would prefer a style of socialism different from Nyerere's also recognize the appeals of *Ujamaa*:

*Not all who desire a socialism more "militant" than Nyerere's embrace scientific socialism so heartily. Some middle-level leaders differ with *Ujamaa*'s formulations more in political style than in content. And middle-level leaders who speak in a Marxist jargon never used by Nyerere also recognize a "Tanzanian way".<sup>75</sup>*

Commenting further on the "Tanzanian way", Bienen suggests that

*the way in which problems are presented now is peculiarly important....The frames of reference for looking at the problems have a tendency to pre-empt the very political programs themselves.<sup>76</sup>*

All of this suggests that Nyerere serves as a condensation symbol for people with pragmatic orientations as well as those whose orientation is not so pragmatic. As such his political style reflects a concern for past humiliations, present unity, and future greatness for Africans.<sup>77</sup>

### Summary

To recapitulate, the data presented in this paper reveal three distinct patterns of orientations towards African socialism: pragmatic, scientific and internationalist. There is no evidence to suggest that citizenship, race, sex or the immediate testing environment are salient variables of association with these viewpoints.

The pragmatic and scientific (marxist) types parallel to some degree, Brockway's description, but the internationalist view is apparently unaccounted for in the literature of African Socialism. There is no evidence to suggest the viability of the democratic socialist type posited by Brockway.

Persons (Africans and Africanists alike) aligned with all three viewpoints mention Nyerere as their ideal type of African socialist leader. The inference which emerges is that Nyerere serves as a condensation symbol for persons of differing ideological persuasions. This symbolic appeal is supported by a charismatic political style, an absence of ideological dogma and orthodoxy, and assertive leadership on issues of importance to Africans.

These data represent empirical evidence for ideological differentiation where none had existed before. Their emergence under experimental conditions serves as a point of departure for further investigation of questions of political importance in African affairs. Such questions would include: Under what conditions are orientations of African socialism altered? With what frequency are the orientations posited above held in African countries, or any given African country? What are the policy implications for African decision-makers as these orientations relate to processes of socialization and regime maintenance? These questions, and others, invite our attention to a more focused inquiry of ideology in Africa.<sup>78</sup>

### Footnotes

1. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professors Steven Brown, Murray Fishel, Rodger Yeager and Patrick McGowan for their advice, comments and encouragement during the course of this study. All errors of this study, either technical or substantive, are the responsibility of the author.
2. Talcott Parson, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 57-58.

3. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 513.
4. Leon Dion, "Political Ideology as a Tool of Functional Analysis in Socio-Political Dynamics: An Hypothesis," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXV (February, 1959), 49.
5. Nyerere, for example, states that TANU members should "get thorough teaching on party ideology so that they may understand it, and they should always be reminded of the importance of living up to its principles." Nyerere further argues that for socialism, "There must be a belief that every individual man and woman, whatever colour, shape, race, creed, religion, or sex is an equal member of society with equal rights in the society and equal duties to it." For Nkrumah, the socialist revolution could not fulfill itself without "a strong and well organized political party...and decisive leadership...to guide and lead it." The function of an ideologically elite party, for Nkrumah, was to serve as an educative and disciplinary vehicle for government policy. See Julius K. Nyerere, *Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 250 and 303; and *Some Essential Features of Nkrumahism* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 87, and Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), pp. 50 and 128.
6. Mamdou Dia, p. 17 as quoted in "Dakar Colloquim: Search for a Definition," *Africa Report*, VII, 4 (April, 1963), 15-18.
7. Kwame Nkrumah, "African Socialism Revisited," in *The African Reader: Independent Africa*, ed. by W. Cartey and M. Kilson, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 201.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
9. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 164-165.
10. K.E. de Graft Johnson, p. 20, as quoted in "African Roundtable," *Africa Report*, VII, 5 (May, 1963), pp. 19-31.
11. Leopold Senghor as cited in Irving L. Markovitz, *Leopold Senghor and the Politics of Negritude* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), p. 157.

12. "African Socialism Discussed at Dakar," *Africa Report*, VIII, 2 (February, 1963), p. 14.
13. This is similar to a statement made by K. A. Busia, *Africa in Search of Democracy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 90.
14. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 55.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
16. J. E. Caseley Hayford, "Race Emancipation and African Nationality," in *The Political Awakening of Africa*, ed. by R. Emerson and M. Kilson, Spectrum Books (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 30.
17. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p. 73.
18. A. Fenner Brockway, *African Socialism* (London: The Bodley Head, 1963), p. 19.
19. For differences of philosophy among trade unions, see Robin Cohen, "Why Trade Union Disunity?" *Nigerian Opinion*, IV, 4-6 (April-June, 1968), pp. 333-336. See also Ioan Davies, *African Trade Unions* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966).
20. Anderson, von der Mehden and Young suggest that "The Soviet citizen, with his more rigorous conception of 'scientific socialism,' is apt to be totally baffled by the free-wheeling unorthodoxy of the socialists of the emerging nations.... Rather, the socialists of the developing nations endorse a bewildering variety of beliefs, theories, and action programs. For the foreign observer to assume that he can anticipate the doctrines, intentions, alliances, and programs of a leader once he has declared himself a 'socialist' is a very serious mistake." See Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 176.
21. Brockway, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
22. *Ibid.*
23. At the time of his writing, Brockway contended that Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic were

examples of pragmatic socialist regimes. Whether or not Brockway would still consider all of these regimes as pragmatic is open to speculation. For our purposes, the significance of Brockway's contribution is that he attempted to develop a profile of characteristics associated with a particular type of regime. In contrast, Anderson, *et. al.* more recently have discussed the Tunisian regime within the context of Destourian socialism, and the Egyptian regime within the context of military socialism. Senegal and Tanzania, they suggest, are examples of a "communitarian" type of socialism, very similar to Brockway's "pragmatic" socialism. See Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-182.

24. See Brockway, *op. cit.*, p. 22, and the discussion of "moderate, welfare socialism" in Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
25. Tordoff and Mazrui argue that the ideological left in Tanzania covers a broad spectrum of viewpoints, and that Nyerere's own viewpoint is in a state of flux. See William Tordoff and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Left and the Supre-Left in Tanzania," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, X, 3 (October, 1972), 427-445.
26. Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 153. For an example of an African Marxist viewpoint, see Kwame Nkrumah as contained in Cartey and Kilson, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 202. For an example of pragmatic socialist sentiments see the remarks of then President David Dacko of the Central African Republic in an address to the party congress of the governing *Mouvement d'Emancipation Sociale de l'Afrique Noire* (MESAN) at Bambari, July 26, 1962. David Dacko, p. 20, as quoted in "African Roundtable," *Africa Report*, VIII, No. 5 (May, 1963), pp. 19-31. African democratic socialism finds expression in the writings of K. A. Busia, *Africa in Search of Democracy*, esp. p. 90 where he discusses the need for decentralized socialist power, safeguards for individual citizens, and institutions and laws to protect individuals from tyranny.
27. William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 3-4.
28. It is a truism of life that each generation reinterprets history for its own purposes. With respect to ideological purposes, reinterpretations are particularly facile and

serve to justify Voltaire's dictum that "history is a pack of tricks we play on the dead."

29. Aime Cesaire first used the term *Negritude* in 1939 in a poem entitled "Cashier d' un Retour au Pays Natale." The term gained currency as an acceptance and an affirmation of the quality of "blackness." It represents a black culture synthesis of art, religion, history, social convention and culture in general.
30. Oladele Taiwo, *An Introduction to West African Literature* (London: Nelson, 1967), p. 46.
31. Leopold Senghor, p. 76, as cited in Busia, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
32. Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia: Independence and Beyond* (London: Nelson, 1966), p. 148.
33. Philibert Tsiranana, p. 31, as quoted in "African Roundtable," *Africa Report*, VIII, No. 5 (May, 1963), pp. 19-31.
34. Program of the *Parti Africain de l'Indepence* (PAI), banned Senegalese opposition party, as reported in *France Nouvelle*, Weekly newspaper of the French Communist Party, August 29-September 4, 1962; and, subsequently quoted in "African Roundtable," *Africa Report*, VIII (May, 1963), p. 23.
35. Friedland and Rosberg, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
36. Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII, 3 (October, 1969), p. 160.
37. Dupe Olatunbosun, "Premature Socialism?" *Nigerian Opinion*, V, Nos. 1-2 (February, 1969), p. 383. The author goes on to remark that socialism in Nigeria would "create a group of a class with a vested interest in perpetuating its privileges. If the adoption of socialism is going to be a way of legitimizing the corrupt practices of the privileged few by concentrating greater power, more wealth and the major means of production in their hands, then we should not have it."
38. Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), pp. 75-76.
39. Roger E. Kirk, *Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences* (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 171-229; see also Steven R. Brown, "On

the Use of Variance Designs in Q Methodology," *The Psychological Record*, XX, (Spring, 1970), pp. 179-189.

40. See William Stephenson, *The Study of Behavior: Q Technique and its Methodology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953); Jack Block, *The Q Sort Method In Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1961); M. George Zaninovich, "Measuring the Intensity of Attitudes and Behavior," in Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich and Dina A. Zinnes, *Content Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 55-77; Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 581-599; and *idem*, "Q Methodology in Behavioral Research," in *Science, Psychology, and Communication*, ed. by Steven R. Brown and Donald J. Brenner (New York: Teachers College Press, 1972), pp. 3-38.
41. William Stephenson, *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).
42. Egon Brunswik, *Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), and, more appropriately, Steven R. Brown and Thomas D. Ungs, "Representativeness and the Study of Political Behavior: An Application of Q Technique to Reactions to the Kent State Incident," *Social Science Quarterly*, LI, 3 (December, 1970), 514-526.
43. Various rotation solutions were applied to these data in order to place them in simple structure. The results of these procedures produced factor structures virtually identical to those of the unrotated factors and, thus, the unrotated factors were judged to be in simple structure. Moreover, when the rankings of Africans and Africanists were correlated independently, three factors emerged which were similar in structure to the three factors embracing all of the respondents.
44. The reader will observe that African leaders have been sensitive to this issue of "atmospheric conditioning". Kenyatta, for example, has articulated this concern in the form of a verbal symbol--*Haramb ee!* (Let's all pull together!) Nyerere often times ends his speeches with exhortations to his audience of *Uhuru na Kazi!* (Freedom and Work!)
45. This is very similar to the view expressed by David Dacko, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

46. Modibo Keita, p. 84, as quoted in Francis G. Snyder, "The Political Thought of Modibo Keita," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, V, 1 (May, 1967), pp. 79-106.
47. This overriding concern for actual material growth as well as the cautionary note about foreign aid is a key feature in Nkrumah's works. With respect to the former, see his *Conciencism*, (London: Heinemann, 1964), esp. p. 114. With respect to the latter, see his *Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism*, (New York: International Publishers, 1965).
48. Jomo Kenyatta, *Hararibee!: The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963-1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 76.
49. See Kwame Nkrumah, "African Socialism Revisited," in Cartey and Kilson, *op. cit.*, p. 201. Nkrumah proclaims that "Those African leaders who believe these principles are the socialists in Africa."
50. These concerns expressed in statement 20 are much in line with those articulated by Leopold Senghor, as cited in Markovitz, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
51. Modibo Keita as cited in Snyder, *Op. cit.*, p. 88.
52. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), p. 165.
53. The statements are similar to those made by Frantz Fanon, *op. cit.*, pp. 73 and 117.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
55. Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism," in Friedland and Rosberg, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
56. George Padmore, "A Guide to Pan-African Socialism," *Ibid.*, p. 234.
57. The term represents Nyerere's caricature of African socialism. Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism," *Ibid.*, p. 239.
58. K. A. Busia, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
59. Leopold Senghor, p. 15, as quoted in "Dakar Colloquium: Search for a Definition," *Africa Report*, VIII, 4 (April, 1963), pp. 15-18.

60. See Nkrumah's *Conscienism*, *op. cit.*, 74, and Padmore, *op. cit.*, p. 230. Padmore later writes: "It cannot be firmly stressed that socialism is more than an economic system. It is a social arrangement...the socialist system demands the maximum cooperation alone which will bring that abundance which will make the good life available for all in Ghana."
61. This is similar to a passage found in *The Spark* of April 19, 1963, as quoted in Busia, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
62. Tom Mboya, "African Socialism," in Friedland and Rosberg, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
63. Maurice Adoum, p. 17, as quoted in "Dakar Colloquium: Search for a Definition," *op. cit.* Adoum points out that "the scientific socialization of our institutions will inevitably be *progressive* and *peaceful* [his emphasis]; the now classical notion of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' must be interpreted in Africa with a great deal of flexibility."
64. Peter Lloyd, *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). In passing it is interesting to observe how culture responds to privileged individuals. In Tanzania the Swahili vernacular contains a word "Wabenzi" used to identify a group of high status individuals who own Mercedes Benzes.
65. It is important to emphasize that the method used in this study serves to uncover audience segmentation--i.e., it provides access to the varieties of attitudes that exist rather than information as to the proportion that hold a particular attitude. This research strategy is therefore more conducive to uncovering *how* different types of respondents think (qualitative) rather than *how many* of them think such-and-such a way (quantitative).
66. Kaunda, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
67. Program of the *Parti Africain de l'Independence*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
68. J. K. Obatala, "Black Americans in Africa: A Critical View," *The African Communist*, 52 (First Quarter, 1973), p. 93. (original emphasis.)
69. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

70. *Ibid.*, (original emphasis.)
71. Other skeptics of such concepts include John S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), esp. p. 352; and Charles Frantz, "The African Personality: Myth and Reality," *Journal of Human Relations*, VIII, 3-4 (Spring and Summer, 1960), pp. 455-464, esp. pp. 461-462.
72. Others mentioned were Diiori, Houphet-Boigny, Awolowo, Solarin, Nkrumah, Cabral, Tshombe and Nasser.
73. Harold D. Lasswell, "Key Symbols, Signs and Icons," in *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study*, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver, and R. McKeon (New York: Harper Brothers, 1954), p. 200.
74. Nyerere, *Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism, op. cit.*, p. 303.
75. Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 217.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
77. Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1967), p. 6.
78. The original data for this study are available from the author upon request.

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