

Democratizing in Excess: A Marxist Interpretation of the Revolutions in North Africa

Joseph N. Agbo & Jonathan O. Chimakonam

Abstract

Whether the revolutions in North Africa are Marxist or democratic, they sure have Marxist touch in that they grew out of people's frustration with unemployment, elitist corruption, high cost of food, human right abuses, lack of freedom of speech and general poor living conditions. Although they are inspired by democratic desires and supported by democratic influences, which are curiously excessive, they nonetheless exhibit elements of Marxism. This paper aims at three things: to provide a Marxist interpretation to the revolutions in North Africa, to point out the influence which democracy or the democratic ideals had on them, and to extrapolate on the unintended consequences of excessive democratic influence.

Introduction

According to the *Indian Times*,¹ the Jasmine Revolution refers to the December-January mass uprising in Tunisia that overthrew president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 15, 2011. It was sparked off by the self-immolation of vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi when he was humiliated by a female constable on December 17, 2011. The Tunisian Revolution was christened the Jasmine Revolution by the media in keeping with its shared features to colour revolutions in Eastern Europe. According to Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese:

The term 'colour revolutions' is used to describe as a single phenomenon a number of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This has involved thousands of people, wearing coloured symbols, taking to the streets and showing their discontent with the current regime while the opposition, legitimated by such crowds, have been able to negotiate political

change with the authorities. Geographically the term has tended to encompass only post- communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, though there is evidence that similar movements for change have been initiated in the Middle East (Lebanon, 2005) and Asia (Myanmar, 2007).²

It is also in keeping with this trend that the revolutions in Tunisia and by extension the North Africa are described as colour revolutions. In Tunisia where it all began, the movement grew over the issues of unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of freedom of speech, neglect of human rights and poor living conditions.³ These pertinent democratic ideals which inspired the uprising in Tunisia show that the ideals of democracy and the problems that make societies seek it somehow motivated the revolutions in North Africa. Democracy as a system may be demanded in some places like in the totalitarian settings in parts of North Africa where there is lack of political will to install it. The question that arises in such situations is should democracy be forcibly installed?

Sometimes, it is inevitable to wonder in this unipolar, new world order whether there is an ideologically permitted limit to which leaders of the new world order or democratic institutions could go in order to propagate the gospel and install the practice of democracy to the remnants of the political gentiles in the world. In his book *The End of History and the Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama suggests that with the collapse of socialism, capitalism emerges as an undisputed economic system with democracy as its political expression.⁴ Clearly, the emergence of American-styled democracy as a dominant political system in our days should not imply, permit, or justify democratizing every nation by any means necessary. Is the 21st century driven like the Greek and Roman epochs by the mentality of culture-superiority, which saw each civilization seek to impose her ways on the conquered? And is violent revolution admissible in any process geared toward the socio-political formation called democracy? If answers to these three questions are in the negative, then the so-called thirst for democratic fervor, which spurred the uprisings, and the dedicated help from the democratic nations and their media are attempts at *excessive democratizing*. Excessive democratizing involves employment of extreme and highhanded measures in order to

institutionalize democracy in an undemocratic setting. The question is: are such extreme measures worth the goal? This question is worth considering when we call to mind the present conditions of Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan where democracy was forcibly installed to replace perceivably totalitarian regimes. And of course, we can see what Libya and Egypt at least, have turned into since after the revolutions. The problem here is not essentially the necessity or inevitability of these revolutions in North Africa, it is the roles which democratic nations had to play in the process. It seems correct to suggest that by interfering with mass uprisings in North Africa the revolutions were high-jacked by the democratic nations thus breeding new tensions and creating a sort of warped consciousness that would eventually destabilize the post revolution political order in those countries. Besides this, the revolutions were clearly inevitable. In fact, in his deeply predictive paper “The ‘End of History’ and the Crisis in Marxism: What Future for Ideology and Revolution?” Joseph Agbo in 2001 accurately predicted these type of revolutions in Africa. In his words:

[V]iolent revolution—not strictly for socialism or capitalism—can, and in fact should, occur in the developing countries, especially in Africa, where the masses are continually getting tired of decades of economic deprivation and wealth siphoning by their so-called political leaders, nay rulers. . . . The most possible (and even significant) revolution that can occur in the world today is the one that would change the CLASS (not as conceptualized in Marxism) that holds political power. It can be done through an uprising (as in the Philippines by Corazon Aquino and the masses in 1986) or through a democratic election. In both cases, revolution would not be to change the fundamental economic-political arrangement in a state; rather, it would be to change a government that is not performing within that state.⁵

When we bring to view what has happened in North Africa, one cannot help but think about the accuracy of the above prediction.

The unfolding revolutionary outbursts in North Africa must challenge Africans to take another look at how they have lived decades after the challenge of decolonization was confronted and (seemingly) won. We do not think these revolutionary overthrowings of regimes are just because of the perpetuation in power of the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. These mass uprisings

strike at the heart of human freedom, which in our time is more of a democratic factor. Kevin Arua, while paraphrasing the 18th century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, says that “freedom is just a character of the will as weight is of bodies.”⁶ And for those of us who philosophize on the African condition, the events in North Africa are of much concern.

For a continent (Africa) that has been trapped in-between two world-bifurcating ideologies (Capitalism and Socialism), these events present us with an opportunity to reflect on our social-political and economic destiny. In the last 150 years, Marxist ideas/ideals have gone through stages of hype, eulogy, waning, and resurgence. Revolution has been the catchword of the Marxist movement. It is the motor that drives all that Marxists want to achieve, especially as it relates to the critique (and overthrow) of the capitalist mode of production. It is this belief that whenever one mentions the word *revolution*, it conjures (simultaneously) the word *Marxism* in one’s mind that makes us want to look at the events in North Africa against the backdrop of the Marxist position.

In this essay, we shall argue that the events in North Africa are both Marxist and non-Marxist at the same time. A classical Marxist would probably regard these events as bourgeois revolution in result, but as proletarian revolution in operation. It was the rising of the masses that sparked the revolutions in these countries Marx and Engels had written that the proletarian movement would be carried out by the majority in the interest of the immense majority.⁷ However, the result of these revolutionary outbursts may not be as Marxist as their operations. This is because the possibility of creating a strictly socialist economy out of the efforts is doubtful and the post revolution Libya, Tunisia and Egypt have confirmed this point. The inability of the events in North Africa to lead to strict socialist economy should not be a minus to what has happened. There is no economy anywhere in the world that is either strictly capitalist or strictly socialist. In fact, the current global economic meltdown is an avowal of the fact that the world needs a certain dose of socialism to survive.

After explaining some Marxist jargon that will facilitate the reader’s understanding of our discussion, we shall look at classical Marxists’ understanding of revolution, before we then examine the events in North Africa. We shall take a look at the unintended

consequences of these revolutions. After all, was it not Merle Fainsod, in the book *How Russia is Ruled* who opined that “the most-ironical chapters of revolutionary history are its unintended consequences”?⁸

Conceptualizing Revolution

When Polish monk Nicolai Copernicus wrote his 1543 book *On the Revolution of Celestial Bodies*, he was said to have provided a model for scientific revolution. But how do we understand the word *revolution* within the socio-political realm? This question is important because although we are not going to capture the diverse nexus of discussions on the nature, types, issues, methods, durations of revolutions, it is at least important for us to note at the onset that the word has a Latin origin: *revolutio*, which means “a turn around.”

We do not want to go into the types and classifications of revolutions because they are very many, beginning from Aristotle’s early musings on the topic to Alexis de Tocqueville. Even the Marxist version that is the focus of this essay has many typologies. But we like the distinctions made by Charles Tilly. In his book, *European Revolutions: 1492-1992*, he differentiated between a coup d’état, a seizure of power from the top down, a civil war, a revolt, and what he calls “a great revolution”—a revolution that totally transforms the social, economic, and political structure and institutions of the society.⁹ Irving E. Fang also discusses what he sees as “social revolutions” that have no “political” connections.¹⁰ These are revolutions that transform the culture, philosophy, and technological base of society to its depth. A mere mention of these distinctions suffices in giving background to the discussions here but we shall not dwell on their explanations for want of space.

Let us capture some of the definitions and conceptions of *revolution*. In Leon Trotsky’s very popular book, *The Revolution Betrayed*, a critical and courageous reflection on the developments in the Soviet Union under Stalin, Trotsky says that “revolutions are mad inspirations of history.”¹¹ This conception looks Hegelian because revolution appears to be the attempt by history to use humans to actualize itself. This implies the designation of humans as object rather than the subject of history. And again, it does appear to be true that there is a certain degree of madness

in the revolutionary outbursts in history. In his book, *Resistance and Revolution*, Martin Seymour says that “revolution refers to a sudden reversal of fate, the disorderly process by which former rulers are displaced by a new group within the state.”¹² So it is a form of lawlessness or anti-status quo.

There is a need for us to comment on the ideas of “suddenness” and “disorderliness” in Seymour’s quotation above. It is not in the scope of this essay to begin to examine the objective and subjective factors that merge to ensure that revolutions occur, but the “suddenness” is referring to the fact that real revolutions do not have to be fixed for a particular day. One can fix a day in which a revolt or a demonstration can begin, but no one fixes such dates to begin a revolution. A revolution is not an *event*, it is a *process*. A revolution is “disorderly” because it is not an occasion, programmed with a Master of Ceremony (M.C.) moderating what is happening—it is an outburst of anger and stored emotions.

Jeff Godwin gives us a narrow and a broad conception of the term *revolution* within the socio-political environment. For the narrow one he says, “Revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.”¹³ He gives the broad conception of socio-political revolutions as “any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extra-constitutional and/or violent fashion.”¹⁴ A revolution has to be by popular choice otherwise it will fail, for it is the people that wage the revolutionary battles. Revolutions—socio-political revolutions—set aside the status-quo and change or transform society in a fundamental way—in an ontological way.

As humanity evolved and conflicts across states differed from state to state, and as the character of the decision-making process changed across the globe, a need arose to reconsider the traditional conception of revolution as a violent mass uprising which meets with the state crushing (or attempting to crush) the people’s resistance. The demand here is whether just any mass uprising at all qualifies as a revolution? Obviously, this cannot be the case. Although scholars may not regard certain rebellions, uprisings, etc., as revolutions, that judgment may wait till the eventual outcome of such rebellions. No one knows just how far a little

uprising could go, nor whether it would develop into a full blown revolution whose outcome is regime change until such becomes the eventual result. And when eventually a revolution leads to a regime change, another problem quickly comes to the fore to wit; which set of leaders takes over from the old one and will they fare better?

There is the possible scenario in which the political systems that succeed the toppled regimes in North Africa would turn out worse or incapable of delivering the democratic good they claimed to motivate the uprising. This is because men could hide their real motive as they seek to exploit a yearning advantage just to acquire political power. If such turns out to be the situation in the three North African countries, then the goal of the revolutions which is to usher in an era of human rights might as well have failed. Already, the post-revolutionary era in Egypt that saw the return of protesters to Cairo's Tahir square following Mubarak's successor allotting dictatorial powers to himself provides a sign as to what could happen in the aftermath of the revolutions. The general distress in Tunisia one year after the change in political structure which saw the protesters beginning to re-converge; and the deepening crisis in Libya involving some dissident armed groups and the persisting vendetta in the leadership class, all point to the ill faith that might trail the events of power change in North Africa. As a matter of fact, the situation in Libya became so chaotic that it would not be out of place to imagine that perhaps many Libyans may begin to develop a sense of nostalgia, at least for the order that existed in the Ghadaffian years.

Understanding some Marxist Terminologies

We have decided to explain some of the expressions/phrases that are constantly used by Marxists in order to understand what the Marxists mean when they say that revolutions occur when there is disequilibrium between the relations of production and the character and level of development of the productive forces. This explanation will help those who are not very conversant with Marxism to grasp the arguments in this essay. Marxist philosophy does not trivialize discussions concerning labour. Labour is man's conscious activity. It is what defines man as man. In his labour,

man transforms himself from subject to object. In his popular book *Anti-Duhring*, Fredrick Engel writes:

The whole development of human society beyond the stage of brute savagery begins from the day when the labour of the family created more products than were necessary for its subsistence, from the day when a portion of labour could be developed to the production no longer of the mere means of subsistence, but of means of production.¹⁵

This shows the significance of labour in Marxist philosophy. In a way, labour could be said to be the trigger controlling economic movements. This is why in “The Part played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man” Engels wrote that labour “is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.”¹⁶

Having said that, let us build the structure of this jargon. Marxists speak of *objects of labour* (OL), which refer to the lands, houses, water (oceans, rivers, seas), etc., mostly grounded things on which man applies his labour power. There are also the *instruments of labour* (IL), which are the fashioned equipment with which man confronts the OL in order to put labour activities into action. The IL can be hoes, machetes, mattocks, hammer, nails, saws, pens, and/or computers—anything that man can use to facilitate his labour.

A combination of OL and IL gives rise to what the Marxists call the *means of production* (MeP). The MeP is the crux of the matter in Marxism, for it is its control that breeds the class struggle that is so dominant in Marxist analysis. In fact, it is where one belongs in reference to the MeP that determines which class one belongs. If you are the owner of the MeP, then you belong to the dominant, controlling class, but if you only apply your labour via the MeP, then you belong to the dominated, controlled class. In *The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* by F.V. Konstantinov, he states that “the social division of labour and exchange brings in its train private ownership of the means of production, which supersedes the previous communal form of property ownership and gives rise to social groups that have unequal standing in social production classes.”¹⁷ The place of labour in the process (and even, possibility) of production cannot be over-emphasized.

Now, following the creation of a system wherein production takes place, certain relationships are entered in the production

process, and this is what is called the relations of production (RP). The RP is characterized by or expressed in the forms of the ownership of the MeP, and how the product of labour is appropriated within that society. P.I. Nikitin corroborates when he says that in Marxist terminology “the relations between people in the process of production, exchange, distribution and the consumption of material wealth are called relations of production or economic relation.”¹⁸] The MeP and RP create a gigantic interplay of interaction that propels and makes production and all that relate to it. This is called productive force (PF). There must be a correspondence between the PR and the character and level of development of the PF. This appears to be an objective law that has existed throughout history. In primitive communalism (which for the Marxists is the first stage of history), the strength of the commune or collective was the main productive force. The appearance of stone, bronze, and iron tools raised the productive force under feudalism. Under capitalism, the productive force manifests a private character that corresponds with the private property production relation of the capitalist mode of production. This shift is orchestrated by humankind’s growing civilization in the 19th century which makes economic change inevitable. Nikitin captures it succinctly:

A specific level of development of productive forces requires corresponding relations of production. This is the economic law, discovered by Marx, of the correspondence of the relations of production to the character and level of development of the productive forces. This law reveals the economic basis of social revolution. When relations of production fall behind and hamper the development of the productive forces, they are inevitably replaced by new ones.¹⁹

Thus from the above excerpt we realize that the mode of production (MoP) is another bit of Marxist jargon which we need to understand. The MoP is simply a distinctive way of producing, exchanging or distributing goods. The mode of production refers to the organization, the implements and tools, the technologies, etc., that produce a social system. As Nikitin puts it, “together, the productive forces and the relations of production constitute the mode of production.”²⁰

The mode of production within a society gives rise to what is usually called the *socio-economic formation* (SEF), a condition wherein a kind of tranquility exists between the RP and the PF. It is when this tranquility is disturbed that change would occur, and this change, according to Marxists, is brought about by revolution.²¹ In the Marxist classification, there have been five socio-economic formations: primitive communalism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism/communism.

Classical Marxist Conception of Revolution

Orthodox Marxism regards the overthrow and abolition/destruction of the capitalist mode of production as the historical mission of the modern proletariat. The purpose and the need for this class to carry out revolutions are very clear in Marxism. What has been in dispute among Marxists is the method of achieving this capitalist overthrow as a prolegomena to the emancipation of the entire society. Marx had written this often quoted thought: “No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed; new, higher relations of production never appears before they mature in the womb of the old society.”²²

What Marx calls a *social order* is what we tried to explain earlier as *socio-economic formation*. The idea is that historical evolution of mankind is in stages. In Marxist historical materialism, in at least the last three stages (Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism/Communism), we have a certain level of development of the productive forces. In 1917, when the Bolshevik revolution occurred in Russia, many orthodox or classical Marxists argued that Russia was not ripe for a socialist revolution. They argued that Tzarist Russia was a feudalist society with an emerging capitalist class. However, the great polemist, Vladimir Lenin, through his *law of uneven development*, which states that capitalism breaks down at its weakest link, justified why he would use his revolutionary vanguard to force-march Russia into an uncertain Socialist future.²³ The founders of Russian Marxism, Georgii Plekhanov, Karl Kaustsky (whom Lenin calls a renegade), Leon Trotsky, and other social-democrats all wondered why a socialist revolution should occur in Russia. Lenin’s defense above was offered in one of his last few pamphlets, “On Revolution.”²⁴ He mockingly says,

“Russia has not attained the level of development of productive forces that makes socialism possible . . . they keep harping on this incontrovertible proposition in a thousand different keys. . . .”²⁵ Trotsky had, while re-echoing Plekhanov, said that Russia, like all “profane nations” would “have to pass through the purgatory of capitalism, and that precisely along this path she would acquire political freedom indispensable for the further struggle for the proletariat for socialism.”²⁶

The point at issue here is not to debate about the necessity of the 1917 Russian socialist revolution. It is not even to wonder if the revolutions in North Africa are socialist Revolutions, for they do not have to be. What Lenin did has two significances for the events in North Africa: (1) it negatively affected the perception of socialist revolutions; (2) it positively showed that revolutions do not have to be dressed in the toga of theoretical /classical Marxism before they can be given a hearing. But the classical Marxist concept of revolution is very precise: it is defined in terms of Karl Marx’s conception of social development in terms of class struggle within a society, structured by a particular mode of production. In his very popular response to Karl Popper’s critique of Marxism, Maurice Cornforth, in his book *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society*, writes:

A revolution, then, is a change in the political system of such an order, that another class comes to power and deprives the former ruling class of its opportunities to maintain itself by its former methods of exploitation. A revolution thus effects a change in the relations of production. And, it is a phenomenon peculiar to and typical of class-divided society where there are exploiting and exploited classes.²⁷

The Marxist concept of revolution, therefore, involves two occurrences. First, it involves the coming into place of a new socio-economic formation; that is to say, a radical change occurs in the way production and exchange of goods as well as in the appropriation of the gains of labour. However, the mode of production (or socio-economic formation) does not change on its own. It is brought about by a change in the *class* that wields and manages political power, the second occurrence. In Marxism, a *class* is defined by the relationship its members have to the means of

production. Under Feudalism, for example, the serfs are defined by the virtue of the fact that they are the ones that till the lands owned by their antithetical class—the feudal lords—for the purpose of subsistence. In other words, in Marxism, classes are defined economically not socially. As Karl Marx writes in *The German Ideology*, “revolution is necessary not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way; but also because only in a revolution can the class which overthrows it rid itself of the accumulated rubbish of the past and become capable of reconstructing society.”²⁸

This capacity of reconstructing society is built by people with different vision and mission. In Marx’s famous *Theses on Feuerbach*, he wrote that “philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”²⁹ and this desire to change the world is at the root of all the theories embedded in his philosophy. In 1989, when the former Soviet Union in which Socialism as an economic system had been practiced for over 70 years, broke up into 15 Republics, which all reverted back to the capitalist mode of production, new interests appeared on Marx across the globe, especially with Francis Fukuyama’s stirring book, *The End of History and the Last Man?* The question as to whether the Soviet Union was socialist indeed generated further and fresh reactions. However, we will not dwell on these issues here. Rather, we must pause to examine the revolutionary outbursts in North Africa, and examine them against the backdrop of the Marxist position before we conclude our reflections.

The March on the Maghreb

When on January 14, 2011, the 23-year old regime of Tunisia’s maximum, sit-tight ruler, Zine Abidine Ben Ali, came to an abrupt end following his departure to Saudi Arabia, the world stood in shock. This was the culmination of weeks of protests led by the masses (jobless youths, students, petty traders, academics, shop owners, etc.) and which later became popularly known as the Jasmine Revolution. Layers of youths demanding jobs, food, human rights and to be treated with some dignity by the semi-monarchical regime, set up an uprising that became too sweeping to be contained by the police and the military as it spread from Sidi Bouzid in central Tunisia.

As the events unfolded in Tunisia, Tahir Square in central Cairo, Egypt, was ignited by youths demanding the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, who himself had been in office for over 25 years. Again, before one could say “Mubarak,” he was raked out of Cairo. Once again, the people’s power prevailed. At the heart of the Maghreb in Algeria, the masses also protested against the 74-year-old ailing ruler, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who came to power in 1999, who was on his third term and had changed the constitution in 2009 to stay on.

However, what was to be the mother of all protests for the season of revolt was to begin in Libya on February 15, 2011. A peaceful protest against the 42-year-old regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was met with repressive reaction by the government. Gaddafi, who came to power in 1969 after toppling King Idris, did not expect that such could come from six million Libyan citizens. The situation moved from a protest to an uprising and from there to a full-scale civil war. By August, the National Transitional Council (NTC) had moved into Tripoli, Gaddafi had escaped, and by September 16, the United Nations had recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. The war continued on a mop-up level until October 20, 2011 when Gaddafi was killed ingloriously at Sirte, and on October 23, the NTC declared a day of liberation for the Libyan people.

Our concern as philosophers is not really to chronicle these events. We would leave that for historians. But for us, when something like a revolution happens, we subject it to critical scrutiny. Our concern would even go beyond observing or analyzing the causes of these events. Our major concern is on the interpretations, permutations, projections, predictions, and hypotheses that have been thrown up since these revolutions. Also, we want to see in what way(s) they are (or are not) Marxist and the consequences of the revolutions in the affected countries. This suggestion of consequences is because these revolutions coming at a time when capitalism is in crisis renews fresh interest in the Marxist interpretation of the revolutions. It is very clear that the global financial crisis that hit the world was a crisis of capital. According to *Fiakpa Lucy and Osunkeye Olusegun*, it was the crisis that hit the United States’s subprime mortgage lending practices that brought about the meltdown.³⁰ Subprime mortgages were usually granted to those who could not afford or qualify for either of the other two

types of mortgages—conventional and interest-only. All one requires to get a subprime mortgage is to make some down payment and present a history of previous loan repayment. For these analysts, the capitalistic tendency came to the fore when mortgage brokers, enticed by the lure of big commission, talked people into subprime mortgages, and since the assumption was that they have a history of loan repayment, many people got in and there was a mass default. It is apt to see in these events a process that confronts imperialism in a way as to set in motion a global process that goes beyond North Africa or even the Arab world. While the events in January were unfolding in Tunisia, a conference took place in Paris under the theme “Dynamics of the Revolutionary Wave in North Africa,” organized by the French section of the IVth International, on January 29, 2011. In a contribution titled “The Revolution in Tunisia and the Situation at World Level,” Lucien Gauthier rejects the Arab and Jasmine perception given to the Tunisian Revolution, averring sweepingly that it is a full-fledged, proletarian revolution. In his words:

There lies the fundamental significance of the process under way. That is the reason this idea of “an Arab Spring” or an “Arab Revolution” must be fought, because, let’s say it again, in Tunisia it’s proletarian revolution movement. Defining it to-day in terms of “Arab spring time,” means that the Tunisian revolution would be a “Jasmine” revolution as the press calls it. “Jasmine” revolution, like when one spoke at the “Orange” revolution in the Ukraine, where one saw the manipulation of the masses by different factions of the Nomenklatura swapping power. It is not a new Orange revolution, it is not a Jasmine revolution, it is not a “democratic” revolution. It is a revolution with a social content.³¹

Now, taking Tunisia as an example, if the North African revolution is not a democratic revolution, but rather a proletarian revolution, does that imply that it is a socialist revolution? Is this socialism Marxist? Is it the dictatorship of the proletariat? Are the North African nations about to nationalize the big transnational corporations in Cairo, Benghazi, Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, Alexandria, and other cities? That the North African revolutions are Marxist (proletarian) in operation, there seems to be little doubt. But

to say that the result we are expecting is the liquidation of the capitalist class on the one hand, and the emergence of a strictly socialist mode of production on the other, is already being falsified by the events in these countries. Above all, it is incorrect to declare these revolutions Marxist because the aftermath does not portend the dictatorship of the proletariat but a change in the bourgeoisie ruling class. Another unusual result of the revolution is a movement towards capitalism and democracy instead of socialism and communism.

As a matter of fact, the unfolding disarray in Libya could lead (if it has not already led) to a feeling of nostalgia at least for the relative order that prevailed during the Gaddafian era. No one would like to live in the almost anarchical situation that has prevailed in Libya. Fukuyama, in *The Origins of Political Order*, observes that “one of the peculiar features of European state building was its heavy early dependence on law as both the motive and the process by which state institutions grew.”³² He shows that even from prehistoric (pre-human) times order has been a principal need by man. This appears to be a scarce commodity in the Libya of today.

In fact, everything does point to Libya tilting more heavily towards capitalism in the coming months and years. In 1986 after the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi by the United States, Gaddafi came out to triumphantly name his country, The Great Socialist Libyan Arab Jarmahiriya. As far as we are concerned, the little socialism remaining in Libya will disappear as the European Union and the United States swoop on the country with business strategies and the now popular Foreign Direct Investments (FDIS) or aid, in an attempt to rebuild Libya from the ruins of war. No wonder Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described his countries posture toward the NATO invasion of Libya as unenthusiastic.³³

What we see in North Africa is a response by the people, to internal stimuli—hunger, joblessness, hikes in prices of goods—producing emotional states of hopelessness, helplessness, anger, and despondency that had to be externally expressed via these operations.

Some analysts are even of the opinion, and we agree, that Ben Ali and Mubarak had to be eased out of office with the support of the United States so that the ruling class in both countries

would remain. We have said that these revolutions, by virtue of being led by the mass of people in an unprogrammed manner, are Marxist. But that's where it ends. The relations of production and systems of government in these countries would become capitalist and aristocratic even if not so in the onset.. In the opinion of Charles Rachlis, each country involved in these revolutionary thrusts has its own opposing classes: one trying to perpetuate imperialist domination, the other "burdened with the historic task of defeating it."³⁴ For him, however, the contradiction cannot be resolved by the emergence of the "constitution of democracy": The aspiration of the mass base that ignited the revolution cannot be successfully met if the revolution limits itself to the fight for "freedom and democracy" as defined by western imperialism and embraced by the petty western bourgeoisies; the academics and Wannabe imperialists Hackeys like El Barradei in Egypt and the TNC in Libya.³⁵

We have chosen to downplay the question of democracy in this paper because it is usually the chorus we repeat when the West sings the songs of freedom, liberty, and equality, concepts that are sometimes used for the purpose of capitalist exploitation. We have wondered whether the events in North Africa and the Middle East are the beginning of the "fourth wave" of democratization (another step after Samuel P. Huntington's Third Wave³⁶). But in as much as the masses in North Africa want to breathe some fresh air from decades of near monarchical regimes characterized by repression and corruption, must that fresh air be provided by a new, ubiquitous, God-playing, liberal, capitalist democracy? Or didn't the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* declare with prognostic insight that the bourgeoisie "creates a world after its own image"?³⁷ And has it not transformed from just creating 'a' world of its own image to creating 'the' world in its image?

The bourgeoisie have passed through different levels of transformation, both in Europe and in the Third World and every scholar knows that it would continue to appropriate socialist principles to perpetuate its hold on society. In "The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeoisie in the Third World," Ali Tariq, observes that the bourgeoisie in Europe had basically passed through 3 stages: an adolescent stage that ended in 1789 with the French Revolution, a revolutionary stage that came to an end in 1871 with the defeat of the Paris Commune, and a conservative

stage that began around 1872 till about 1904. He, however, argues that two things differentiated the bourgeoisie in Europe and the bourgeoisie in the Third World: one, while the former emerged from a Feudal root, the latter had to struggle from a colonial foundation; two, “the conflict between the bourgeoisie in the Third World and their former colonial rulers occurred in the context of the rivalry between the capitalist and socialist camps.”³⁸ This colonial connection has not left the Third World and there is no reason for it to leave now with the global march of capital.

What the events in North Africa have shown is that people can still respond to the contradictions they feel between their hearts and the environment. The question of these events being initially sponsored from outside does not arise because it can be argued that the puppet leaders in North Africa served imperialist interests pretty well, the way the Fadhs protect imperial interests in Saudi Arabia. That was why when the uprising began, the West continued to talk about “orderly transition.” Are these revolutions expressions of anger? Are they agitations for democracy? Are they agitations for socialist economy? Or will they lead to the emergence of other subtly repressive regimes that would be lured by the petrol dollars? We think the revolutions were inspired by democratic ideals, given a fillip by democratic powers but the outcome is more likely going to be an emergence of another set of bourgeoisie leadership. This is because the influence of the democratic powers who are more interested in political control, stability, and economic benefits will subvert the natural turn of post-revolution events in these countries.

The Influence of Karl Marx in the North African Revolutions

Concerning the global thrust of capitalism, especially with regard to the events in North Africa, Marx’s position on the capitalist motive to dominate and exploit comes up strong. About 50 years ago, Maurice Cornforth penned down the following thoughts:

In order to preserve the condition in which the capitalist mode of production continues to function, it is necessary that not only wage workers but capitalists too should be subjected to various kinds of direction and constrain. It is this which is provided by “the economic interference of the state.” But the fact that “organized political power has begun performing far-reaching economic

functions” does not mean that capitalism has disappeared but that, on the contrary, it is being preserved. And is preserved, for so long as the “interventionist” state remains essentially a capitalist machine.³⁹

In no other period in history has this interventionist, preserving character of the state been displayed more than in the past four to five years. It is natural, therefore, for Marxists, anytime they hear of a masses-led liberating uprising to just wish it were a proletarian revolution. But if it is a revolution by the workers as a result of anger at the way the state is being run, isn't there something anti-capitalist in it? But does that ipso facto lead to a socialist revolution a la Marxism? Very few theorists in history, if any, have been attacked more than Karl Marx. The attacks come in various ways and on various issues. One of them is by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. In his book, *Marxism Unmasked*, von Mises addressed the central question of the “workable-ness” of socialism.⁴⁰ That is to say, would a system of central, collectivist, planned economy be ever possible on a large scale? Will a system that has to intervene in the daily lives of individuals not be the greatest of tyranny? These criticisms are pungent and could explain why no economy in the world today is capitalist or socialist, exclusively.

In “Marx in the Mirror of Globalization,” Peter Hudis chronicles the continued resurgence of interest in Karl Marx following the global march of capital.⁴¹ And that, we think, is part of the reason (and need) for the upheaval in North Africa. How can people be hungry and jobless, yet they see their sit-tight leaders, family members and cronies live like lords? Hudis, commenting on Francis Wheen's book, *Karl Marx: A Life*, writes:

When approaches his subject with considerable skepticism, especially concerning Marx's goal of a classless society. A columnist for the Guardian, Wheen has never considered himself sympathetic to Marxism. Yet, he writes, “The more I studied Marx, the more astoundingly topical he seemed to be. Today's pundits and politician who fancy themselves as modern thinkers like to mention the buzzword ‘globalization’ at every opportunity without realizing that Marx was already on the case in 1848.” Two issues make Marx especially relevant in his view: one, Marx's notion that even in the most propitious economic

conditions, the laborer under capitalism is compelled to endure overwork and “the reduction to a machine, the enslavement to capital”; and two, Marx’s insistence that once capital becomes the predominant formation in any society, “what is truly human becomes congealed or crystallized into a material force, while dead objects acquire meaning, life and vigor.”⁴²

The revolutions in North Africa, once again, demand that we give the people a hearing, even as liberalism uses the concept of *individual* as canon fodder for exploitation. We must stop demanding the utopia of a classless, stateless society that will be given a spatiotemporal manifestation, because it won’t work in practice. However, we have to keep desiring this utopia as a means to keep capital in check. If we say that allowing people to live in dog-eat-dog capitalism is the best model for society, then why have we decided to rescue privately mismanaged capital with social capital? Why must we take capital on bail when it put itself in jail by its greedy activities? On the whole, the revolutions in North Africa are most likely going to herald capitalist economies and democratic institution of government in the affected states because the revolutionaries were inspired by democratic ideals and supported by democratic/capitalist powers whose post-revolution influence cannot be overlooked. But beneath these events is the delicate influence of Karl Marx whose thoughts opened the eyes of the revolutionaries to their democratic rights and the socialist means of demanding them. Granted that the influence of democracy and democratic powers to the North African revolutions is stellar; could it have been excessive by democratic standards? This shall occupy the paper in the next section.

Excessive Democratizing in the North African Revolutions

In Tunisia and Egypt, the Western democratic leaders and their media constantly threw fuel on the burning fire during the mass uprising; in Libya, these Western leaders joined the revolution by arming the rebels or maybe the mob and fighting side-by-side. So the West armed the mob to realize their (mob) democratic rights? A mob is usually a turbulent or lawless crowd or group of thugs that are usually difficult if not impossible to control. In Shakespeare’s epic play, *Julius Caesar*, recall how a mob descended on

Cinna the poet mistaking him for Cinna the conspirator.⁴³ Turbulent and lawless are perfect adjectives that qualify the horde that toppled Ghadaffi, no doubt. "Freedom fighters" was merely a baptismal name while TNC appears to be a camouflage code name for group of investors in the emerging national private limited liability company. What this points to is the inevitable assembly of capitalists who must dock under the umbrella of democracy-loving citizens to avail themselves of the opportunity of benefiting the most in the would-be capitalist economy.

Plato conceives democracy as government of the mob,⁴⁴ while Aristotle scorns it as the best form of all lawless governments and the worst form of all lawful ones.⁴⁵ Is it any wonder, then, that it is associated with the violent bloodletting revolutions in North Africa? A host of scholars may argue that the Athenian idea of democracy differs from the one in play in our time. That may be granted, but not without some concessions of relevant similarities. We understand that the American-styled democracy, which Fukuyama sees as the world's best form of government,⁴⁶ does not admit violent revolution rather it emphasizes peaceful demonstrations in its place, an ideal example being the Gandhi's non-violent resistance to autocratic rule. This is also why Martin Luther King Junior's non-violent demonstrations are approved democratic models as against Malcolm X's violent revolutionary reaction. So do we now say that the oppressed people of Tunisia under Ben Ali, Egypt under Mubarak and especially Libya under Gadhafi have the right to self assertion which the democratic world should help protect even if it means going to undemocratic lengths? Or, to rephrase; appropriating some crude elements of the ancient Athenian democratic model characterized by mob violence and lawlessness. In other words, this pattern involves going against some basic tenets of democracy as a political system so as to achieve a truly democratic setting. Such tenets as state sovereignty, respect for national sovereignty, rule of law, peaceful resolution of crisis, peaceful protest, elections, and dialogue and persuasion rather than violence in the process of changing a political system that does not provide for the human rights of its citizens. Such an adventure is what we have called excessive democratizing, i.e. employing extreme and highhanded measures to institutionalize democracy in an undemocratic setting. Could there ever be a truly democratic justification for that?

Undoubtedly, such undemocratic measures are bound to have undemocratic and unintended consequences in the new system. We saw how the Egyptian democracy was threatened by the spirit of dictatorship when President Mohammed Morsi allotted dictatorial powers to himself and then was speedily removed by the army, which assumed yet another violent dictatorial posture. Apparently, Morsi noticed it would take a dictator to rule a mob. As expected, this was harshly confronted by the democratically backed mob. We had on one hand a society of mobs with uncensored power to change the government and at another, a government that should primarily make laws and rule by them. However, the powerful mob would insist on dictating to the government, but the government would, and ought not, to condone this. Therefore, either the government does condone the excesses of the mob or it gets toppled — some resultant political chasm for a modern democracy and an unnerving consequence that short-changes the system from within.

The events in Egypt presented an interesting and challenging situation for democracy and the democratic alternative. Those who treat democracy as an end in itself see in the eventual removal of Morsi a coup that should not even be imagined at all in a democratic political circumstance. For these diehard democrats, democracy should be allowed to internally work out its own mechanism of dialectical changes as socio-historical needs demand. However, for some of us who belong to the school that sees democracy as a means to an end, democracy should not destroy the socio-cultural foundations from where it emerges and within which it is circumscribed and thrives. In his essay, “Democracy as Reason (*Geist*) in History: Necessary, Inevitable, Irrevocable?” Joseph Agbo, uses Hegel’s concept of *reason in history* — the active force that brings about change and wonders whether the liberal democratic variant has become the new reason in history,⁴⁷ moving the world to an inevitable end. He however, argues that democracy would be playing Russian roulette if it pursues its course with a sense of historical necessity, inevitability, or irrevocability.⁴⁸ It is to that extent that one could argue that what swept Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood off was the same democratic tide that brought him to power. Recognizing what we said earlier about the need for relative order, we see that order had to be restored. We then see that the army’s intervention in

order to stabilize the polity for democracy to grow was not totally uncalled for.

Another possible consequence of this intervention by the democratic West in the North African revolutions could be the setting of wrong international precedents. When the mob in Tunisia got support from the democratic world and eventually succeeded, the mobs in Egypt, Algeria, and Libya also took to the streets. These democratically supported revolutions eventually became contagious, like a disease, and crossed the Mediterranean. Today, Syria has become a hell and Lebanon has recently been drawn in. Turkey's border with Syria is restive. Security worries in Israel have also increased. Russia, Iran, and many other nations are now part of the war by directly supplying weapons or aid. The United States, NATO, and other parts of the liberal democratic world are under intense pressure to continue doing for the Syrian mob what was done for the Libyan mob. Diplomatically, it can be argued that they resisted this lure initially in order to quell the wrong precedent set in Tunisia and cemented in Libya. But the resistance quickly collapsed. So we see how a little incident in North Africa was escalated and now affects many people in different countries either directly or indirectly by means of excessive democratizing. Architects of excessive democratizing (the democratic world) are now ensnared in the damage control process, which is the least harmful of all possible options left to quell the wrong precedent. The success rate has been appalling. Recently, the contamination has spread to Ukraine, and once again, Russia and the European Union are at daggers drawn. This shows that there has to be a limit to which champions of democracy will go in order to install democracy in an undemocratic setting. Certain measures will definitely go out of hand. At least, there is a need to play by the rules of democracy itself. The unknown, or as Fainsod puts it "unintended,"⁴⁹ consequences of this wrong precedent cannot at the moment be fully understood until the world as we know it becomes visibly divided along the lines of an ideological war as we had in the cold war era. Secessionist events in Spain and Catalonia are at the moment brewing. The precedent in North Africa seems to imply that it is now possible for any people to obtain their political desire by simply claiming some batch of democratic rights and reaching out for a powerful alliance that will supply the guns and the PR. As Jacques Barzun has noted, "there is nothing

we can take from American democracy” because “it is not detachable,”⁵⁰ while will Marshall observes that “America cannot export democracy or remake the world in its image.”⁵¹ Ever since the United States participated in the first World War purportedly to make the world free and democratic, the United States policy of trying to Americanize the world has not abated. The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that provided the entry into Iraq were never found.

With this preceding discussions in view, political philosophers know that it is only a matter of time before our world gets plunged back to another era of grand stand off.

Conclusion

In this essay, we have carried out a kind of analysis of some of the issues thrown up by the revolutionary uprisings in North Africa. We have seen that the outbursts are as necessary as they are dangerous. We have also seen that the North African revolution has both Marxist and non-Marxist attributes. We have argued, a la orthodox Marxism, that it would be difficult to classify these uprisings as “revolutions,” strictly defined. We have also argued that the facts that the proletariats did not take over the mantle of leadership and no new socio-economic formation would emerge from these revolutions makes a strictly Marxist interpretation untenable. We also argued that revolutions do not have to speak the language of Marxism before they are so defined.

The North African situation has shown that there is a limit to despotism and repression. It has also shown that there is a limit to both violent and non-violent installation of democracy. Of course, with the strategic location of the region as source of energy-supply to the West, whatever happens there must evoke reactions from across the globe. In his brilliantly written book *Time for Revolution*, Antonio Negri critically examines the place of revolutionary resistance in a society wholly subsumed and submerged by capitalism. He looks at the fracture lines that force capitalist societies into perpetual crisis and concludes that “we live in the heart of new productive constellations, animated by the articulations of mass intellectuality, shaken in an untimely fashion by the eruption of a new publicity.”⁵² Publicity is the singular, most-crucial element in what is happening in North Africa.

African peoples need to resist the rot and decay that have made the continent look cursed. However, this resistance does not need to be dressed in capitalist or socialist garb. The leaders who manage state affairs must be compelled and constrained by institutional bulwarks to be accountable to the people. Revolutions are only last resorts when dialogues fail in the dialogics of social interaction, as we have recently witnessed in Burkina Faso. The popular uprising, which has just forced Blaise Compaore to abandon his 27-year-old dictatorship, looks typical of proper revolution uninfluenced by ideology. No society plans to destroy what it has built. However, if we compare the number of lives, wasted in the event of a bloody revolution (the main reason revolution strikes fear into the hearts of the protagonists of the status-quo) and the lives wasted as a result of corruption by African leaders and the lethargy by the followers, the people that die systematically, consistently, and gradually as a result of system failures—the hospitals that don't work, the roads untarred, the polluted streams and lands, the noise and carbon monoxide poisoning from generators for lack of energy, etc.,—then, anyone can do the statistics and tell us which is heavier and costlier. As far as we are concerned, revolutions in Africa only help to reduce the long-term collateral damage, but this is only a modest opinion. The seeming failure of the revolutions in North Africa as well as in Syria is a counter to this opinion. Rather than a revolution that yields nothing better, a peaceful change like Ghandi's model is always preferable. But it does not boil down to what anyone prefers. It does seem that since societies are being taken care of by the modern state, revolutionary eruptions will always occur somewhere and somehow in the continuous interplay of the various contending economic, social, cultural, and political forces. Trotsky made a distinction between social and political revolutions.⁵³ And having critically studied the perversion that took place under Stalin in the attempt to build socialism, in the last chapter of *The Revolution Betrayed*, Trotsky wrote about “the Inevitability of a new revolution,”⁵⁴—this time a political, not a social one. And we want to end our reflections with his view that

The revolution which the bureaucracy is preparing against itself will not be social like the October Revolution of 1917. It is not a question, this time, of changing the economic foundations of

society, of replacing certain forms of property with other forms. History has known elsewhere, not only social revolutions which substituted the bourgeois for the feudal regime; but also political revolutions which, without destroying the economic foundations of societies, swept out an old ruling upper crust (1880) and 1848 in France, and February, 1917 in Russia.⁵⁵

But perhaps, economy is not the only reason why people revolt. What a human being thinks about the condition of his/her body appears to be even more important than the condition itself. Fukuyama has been one of the scholars who maintain that the desire for recognition is one of the major internal forces that motivate behavior of humans. According to him, “it is important to resist the temptation to reduce human motivation to an economic desire for resources. Violence in human history has often been perpetrated by people seeking not material wealth but recognition. Conflicts are carried on long beyond the point when they make economic sense.”⁵⁶ As the events in North Africa unfolds, the reader shall discover for himself which will make more sense of the actions of those involved—the economic motivation or that of personal glory.

Notes

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² Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, *The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures* (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.

³ Dombivli Subramanyan, “What is the Jasmine Revolution?” ,” *ibid*.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xxi-xxiii.

⁵ Joseph Agbo, “The ‘End of History’ and the Crisis in Marxism: What Future for Ideology and Revolution?” *Ebonyi Journal of Humanities*1, no. 1 (2001): 90-91.

⁶ Arua Kevin, “Man is Free to Be Free and Not Free Not to Be Free,” *Uche* 13 (2005), 10.

⁷ Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), 46.

⁸ Fainsod Merle. “How Russia is Ruled,” in *Twentieth-Century Europe*, Richard Brown and Christopher Daniels ed., 47 (London: Macmillan, 1982),47.

⁹ Tilly Charles, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992* (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 16.

- ¹⁰ Fang Irving E, *A History of Mass Communication: Six Information Revolutions* (Boston: Focal Press, 1997), Xv.
- ¹¹ Trotsky Leon, *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?* 1937 trans. by Max Eastman. Internet transcription by Zodiac (1993-96)
- ¹² Seymour Martin, *Resistance and Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1968),23.
- ¹³ Godwin Jeff, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001)9.
- ¹⁴ Godwin, *ibid.*, 2001, . 9
- ¹⁵ Engels Frederick, *Anti-Duhring* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976), 248.
- ¹⁶ Engels Fredrick, “The Part played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man”, in Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels: *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, (Engels), (New York: International Publishers, 1987), 452.
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- ¹⁸ Nikitin P.I, *The Fundamentals of Political Economy*. Translated by Jane Sayer. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983),16.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*,18-19.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ²² Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy, On Historical Materialism*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), 138.
- ²³ Marx, Karl, Fredrick Engels and V. I. Lenin, *On Historical Materialism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), 685.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*,686
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 687
- ²⁶ Allen Naomi, and George Breitman, (eds.). *Writings of Leon Trotsky*. (New York: Pathfinder Press Inc., 1973), 56.
- ²⁷ Cornforth Maurice, *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968),217-18.
- ²⁸ Marx Karl, “The German Ideology” in *On Historical Materialism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), 15.
- ²⁹ Marx Karl, “Theses on Feuerbach” in Engels, Fredrick. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886) (Perking: Foreign Language Press, 1976), 65.
- ³⁰ Fiakpa, Lucy Adekunle Adekoya, Hector, Igikiowubo and Babajide Komolafe, “Global Economic Meltdown: Nigeria Panics.” *The Eco 2*, no. 8 (2008): Osunkeye Olusegun, “The Global Economic Crisis and its Implications for Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Convocation and Award Ceremony of the Business Education and Examination Council, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria, November 29, 2008.
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- ³³ The Economists, "Poland's prime minister visits The Economist", Apr 18th 2011, Retrieved March 12, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/node/21256118>
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- ³⁵ Ibid., Web, N.P.
- ³⁶ Huntington Samuel, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). In this great book, Huntington refers to the military coup of April 25 1974 in Portugal as the unwitting beginning of the third wave of democratization in the twentieth century where the aftermath of the coup whipped up world wide sentiment for democracy as against dictatorship.
- ³⁷ Marx Karl, and Fredrick Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, 1976, *ibid.*, 15
- ³⁸ Ali Tariq. 2008. "The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeoisie in the Third World." /www.geocities.com/cmkp-ph/toppsge4.htm? 8-9
- ³⁹ Maurice Cornforth, *ibid.* 191-92
- ⁴⁰ Von Mises Ludwig, *Marxism Unmasked: From Delusion to Destruction*. Irving-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 2006. Retrieved, October 24, 2013, *web. N.p.*
- ⁴¹ Hudis Peter "Marx in the Mirror of Globalization": 15 January, 2006. Retrieved, 16 July, 2013, <http://www.net4dem.org/cyrev/archive/issue7/articles/Hudis/hudis.pdf> web. n.p. Par. 5-6
- ⁴² Ibid., Par.11
- ⁴³ Notes on the Poet Cinna from the Play Julius Caesar, January 1, 2013, Retrieved, July 24, 2013, <http://www.shakespearemag.com/fall98/cinna.asp>
- ⁴⁴ Ozumba Godfrey, "Ancient Period of Philosophy." In *Philosophy and Logic Today*, I. I. Asouzu, ed., 48-82 (Calabar: University of Calabar Press, 2002), 77.
- ⁴⁵ Owens Joseph, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 355-56.
- ⁴⁶ Fukuyama, *ibid.*, 42-43.
- ⁴⁷ Agbo Joseph N, "Democracy as Reason (*Geist*) in History: Necessary, Inevitable, Irrevocable?" *Ebonyi Journal of the Humanities* 2, no. 1 (2004), 61-87. Hegel's concept of *reason in history* could be described as the active force that brings about change.
- ⁴⁸ Agbo, 2004, *ibid.*, 61-87
- ⁴⁹ Fainsod, *ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ Barzun Jacques "The Theorem of Democracy," *Dialogue* 88, 2 (1990): 7
- ⁵¹ Marshall Will, "The Democratic Concept", in, *Dialogue* no.102, (April 1993): 5-9: 8

⁵² Negri Antonio, *Time for Revolution*. Translated by Matteo Mandarini, (New York: Continuum Press, 2003), 134-35. The first part of this book was written in prison.

⁵³ Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed*, Retrieved, June 17, 2013, Chapter 11, “The Inevitability of a New Revolution” Par. 8-10, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch11.htm#ch11-3>

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